

6. Latin America and the Caribbean: security and defence in the post-cold war era

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I. Introduction

In the past 20 years the 35 countries of Latin American and the Caribbean have experienced dramatic transformations.¹ Throughout the 1980s, known as the ‘lost decade’, the economies of most of these countries suffered a severe recession. These countries had inherited a policy of import substitution from the Great Depression of the 1930s. The crisis of the 1980s was one of the main reasons why that policy was modified and an open-economy model of deregulation and privatization was adopted—the so-called Washington Consensus.² At the same time, several regional economic cooperation and integration initiatives developed,³ which increased trust and opened the way for greater, although varying, degrees of interdependence among the countries of the region. In the political arena, most of the authoritarian regimes in the region fell and were replaced by democratically elected civilian governments.

Important changes have also taken place in the security domain. In the 1980s the region experienced armed conflicts in Central America: El Salvador, 1979–92;⁴ Guatemala, 1982–95; and Nicaragua, 1979–90. Other conflicts involved Argentina and the United Kingdom (the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas

¹ For the purposes of this chapter, the region Latin America and the Caribbean comprises 35 states, in the following sub-regions: *Latin America*, including *Central America*—Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico (note that in other contexts Mexico is often included in North or South America), Nicaragua and Panama—and *South America*—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela; and *the Caribbean*—Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. For the sake of brevity, ‘Latin American’ is used to denote the larger region. ‘The Americas’ refers to the states of the Latin America and Caribbean region plus the United States and Canada.

² The Washington Consensus refers to economic reforms implemented by Latin American countries and, e.g., the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United States Federal Reserve, the US Congress, etc. Williamson, J., ‘What Washington means by policy reform’, ed. J. Williamson, *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Institute of International Economics: Washington, DC, Apr. 1990), URL <<http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson1102-2.htm>>; and Kuczynski, P.-P. and Williamson, J. (eds), *After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America* (Institute for International Economics: Washington, DC, 2003), pp. 1–19.

³ E.g., the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, Mercado Común del Sur) was formed in 1991. For the member states of MERCOSUR see the glossary in this volume. In 1994 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which includes Mexico, Canada and the United States was established. The Association of Caribbean States (ACS) was also established in 1994.

⁴ In the civil war 75 000 people were killed, 8000 were reported missing and almost 1 million were displaced. Instituto del Tercer Mundo, *Guía del mundo 2003–2004* [Guide to the world 2003–2004] (Instituto del Tercer Mundo: Montevideo, 2004), URL <<http://www.guiadelmundo.org.uy/cd/index.html>>.

War);⁵ Ecuador and Peru (1981);⁶ Grenada (the 1983 invasion by the United States);⁷ and Panama (the 1989 US invasion).⁸ These conflicts were followed by peace processes which promoted national reconciliation and diminished tensions between neighbouring states in Central and South America. Even Argentina and Chile solved most of their border disputes in the 1990s.⁹ In addition, the armed forces of Latin American countries were gradually placed under civilian authority and given new responsibilities in areas such as peace-keeping operations (PKOs).

Nonetheless, the region continues to face important security challenges. For example, its income distribution is the most inequitable in the world.¹⁰ In the past 12 years, 14 political crises occurred and at least 11 heads of state stepped down before completing their terms of office.¹¹ Reform of the armed forces is

⁵ Goldblat, J. and Millán, V., 'The Falklands/Malvinas conflict—a spur to arms build-ups', *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1983* (Taylor & Francis: London, 1983), pp. 467–527.

⁶ Goldblat, J. and Millán, V., 'Militarization and arms control in Latin America', *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1982* (Taylor & Francis: London, 1982), pp. 411–14.

⁷ On 25 Oct. 1983 the US Army invaded Grenada, after a political and military crisis in which Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was killed. Supported by troops of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the USA carried out the invasion, arguing that it was done for 'humanitarian reasons'.

⁸ Lindgren, K. *et al.*, 'Major armed conflicts in 1989', *SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1990), pp. 415–16.

⁹ In 1991 Argentinian President Carlos Menem and Chilean President Patricio Aylwin signed a Presidential Declaration on Borders—ending 24 border disputes, 22 of which were resolved by establishing border limits. The Laguna del Desierto border dispute was resolved by international arbitration in 1994, and the Hielos Continentales dispute was resolved in 1998. Fabián Saín, M., 'Argentina frente a la seguridad hemisférica' [Argentina in face of hemispheric security], ed. M. C. Rosas, *Seguridad hemisférica e inseguridad global: entre la cooperación interamericana y la guerra preventiva* [Hemispheric security and global insecurity: between inter-American cooperation and preventive war] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Embajada de Canadá: Mexico City, 2004), pp. 273–74.

¹⁰ The lost decade contributed to deterioration of the standard of living. The region suffered a dramatic economic setback and poverty increased. By 1990 poverty levels were higher than in 1970. In 1980, 35% of households lived in poverty; by 1990, the figure had increased to 41%. Even in 1994, when the economic situation was improving in the region, 39% of households remained in poverty. International organizations referred to the economic situation in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1998–2002 as a 'lost half decade'. E.g., in 2002 output in the region contracted by 0.5%, and real income per capita decreased by 1.9%; 7 million more people sank into poverty. UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *The Equity Gap: Latin America, the Caribbean and the Social Summit* (United Nations Publications: Santiago, 1997); and 'Social panorama of Latin America 2001–2002', *ECLAC Notes*, no. 25 (Nov. 2002), pp. 1–3, URL <<http://www.eclac.cl/prensa/noticias/notas/6/11256/NOTAS25INGLES.pdf>>.

¹¹ This was the case *inter alia* in Paraguay (Juan Carlos Wasmosy, president 1993–98), Peru (Alberto Fujimori, president 1990–2001), Venezuela (Hugo Chavez, president 1999–2002), Argentina (Fernando de la Rúa, president 10 Dec. 1999–21 December 2001; Federico Ramón Puerta, president, 21–23 Dec. 2001; Alfonso Rodríguez Saa, president, 23 Dec. 2001–1 Jan. 2002; Eduardo Oscar Camaño, president 1–2 Jan. 2002; and Eduardo Alberto Duhalde, president, 2 Jan. 2002–25 May 2003), Haiti (Jean-Bertrand Aristide, president for 8 months in 1991, and in 1994–96 and 2000–2004), Bolivia (Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, president in 1993–97 and in 2002–2003), Paraguay (Raúl Cubas Grau, president from 1998 to 1999), and Ecuador (Abdalá Bucaram Ortíz, president 1996–1997; Jamil Mahuad Witt, president 1998–2000; and Lucio Gutiérrez, president 2002–Apr. 2005). For biographies see Centre for Research, Teaching, Documentation and Dissemination of International Relations and Development (CIDOB, Centro de investigación, docencia, documentación y divulgación de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo), URL <<http://www.cidob.org/bios>>.

incomplete, although some goals have been met.¹² As recently as 1995, Ecuador and Peru used armed force in a border dispute.¹³ Political and social crises are also a source of conflict.¹⁴

Section II of this chapter addresses the regional and sub-regional environment, and section III covers developments in regionalism and cooperation. Section IV analyses the prospects for cooperation or conflict. Section V discusses the participation of Latin American armies in PKOs, while section VI discusses Latin American–US relations before and after 11 September 2001. The conclusions are presented in section VII.

II. The regional and sub-regional environment

Latin America extends from the Mexican–US border south to Patagonia and includes all the islands of the Caribbean. It includes countries that were formerly colonies of Portugal and Spain and some that are neither Portuguese- nor Spanish-speaking, such as the former and remaining British, Dutch, French and US dependencies.¹⁵ From 1915–20 until today, two political and geographical factors have principally shaped the region: the growing dominance of the USA, especially but not exclusively in the Caribbean, Central America, Colombia and Mexico; and the consolidation of national borders, achieved through either diplomatic negotiations or the use of force. Prior to World War I, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and all the nations in Central America and South America existed as independent states. The first country to gain independence was Haiti, in 1804, and this first

¹² An important step in reform of the armed forces is the publication of White Papers. They have been published by Argentina (on national defence) in 1999 with a revised edition in 2001; Brazil (on national defence policy) in 1996; Chile in 1997 and 2002; Colombia (on defence policy and democratic security) in 2003; Ecuador in 2002; El Salvador (on defence, security and development) in 1998; Guatemala in 2003; Peru (a proposal) in 2004; and Uruguay (rules defined for a White Paper) in 1999. In 2003 the Dominican Republic presented a defence and security White Paper for presidential approval. Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela have not produced White Papers. Nicaragua is working on a White Paper, and in Mexico the need for a White Paper has been noted. Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), *Atlas comparativo de la seguridad y la defensa en América Latina* [Comparative atlas of security and defence in Latin America], URL <<http://www.resdal.org/atlas/atlas-definiciones.html>>; and Center of Research for Development (CIDAC, Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo), *Threats and Challenges for Mexican Security* (Center of Research for Development: Mexico City, June 2004), p. 11.

¹³ Aldana, S. *Las vicisitudes de un protocolo: Reflexiones sobre la historia del problema de límites entre Perú y Ecuador* [The rocky ground of a protocol: reflections on the history of the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador], URL <http://www.cipca.org.pe/cipca/frontera/Vicisitudes_protocolo.htm>.

¹⁴ E.g., Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in the region, possesses vast natural gas reserves that currently have to be exported through Chile. In 2003 Bolivia restated an historic claim to the Atacama corridor (ceded to Chile in 1884) in order to secure access to a port for export of its natural gas. This led to increased tension between the 2 countries.

¹⁵ Peña, O., *Estados y territorios en América Latina y el Caribe* [States and territories in Latin America and the Caribbean] (Era: Mexico City, 1989), p. 13.

'independence cycle' in the region finished a century later, in 1903, when Panama proclaimed its independence from Colombia.¹⁶

The second or late 'independence cycle' affected the Caribbean states and territories of various European nations in the Americas. The major Anglophone territories were emancipated one after another starting in 1962, when Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago obtained their independence. Suriname, a Dutch colony, gained its independence in 1975. Several territories, however, are still dependencies of European powers: the UK has five island possessions;¹⁷ the Netherlands possesses the Dutch Antilles and Aruba; and France has three overseas territories, one of them located in South America.¹⁸ The political status of some territories also remains disputed. These include Puerto Rico, which is associated with the USA;¹⁹ Guantánamo Bay, which is leased by the USA but claimed by Cuba;²⁰ and Navassa Island, which is occupied by the USA but claimed by Haiti.

Two additional territorial disputes in the region relate to, first, parts of the Antarctic, which are claimed by several Latin American countries, and, second, the negotiations on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).²¹ In the course of implementing UNCLOS, disputes have occurred between the Latin American and Caribbean nations and with neighbouring and other states.

Table 6.1 lists current interstate disputes as 'major', 'minor but active' or 'latent' disputes. The issue in contention is listed for territorial or border disputes. Given the economic and political transformations experienced by Latin American countries, it is possible that even disputes which have been regarded as 'major' can now be resolved peacefully. For example, on 10 September 2002, El Salvador submitted a request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to review the ICJ's decision of 11 September 1992 on the maritime, territorial and insular dispute between El Salvador and Honduras. The review

¹⁶ Peña (note 15), p. 51. The term 'independence cycle' refers to specific periods in which a group of countries became independent.

¹⁷ The British islands in the Caribbean are Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos. In the South Atlantic area, the UK possesses the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

¹⁸ The territories are French Guiana, Guadalupe and Martinique.

¹⁹ Puerto Rico is not an independent country or a part of the USA. However, the US President is its head of state and it elects 1 representative to the US House of Representatives. Elections are held on the island to elect its governor. Indigenous inhabitants are US citizens but cannot vote in US presidential elections.

²⁰ After the victory over Spain in the 1898 Spanish–American War, the USA leased in 1903 the land and water of Guantánamo Bay for use as a coaling station. When the USA ended diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961, many Cubans sought refuge on the base; US Marines and Cuban soldiers began patrolling the fence and continue to do so. 'US Naval Station, Guanánamo Bay, Cuba', URL <<http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/>>.

²¹ The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 Dec. 1982 and entered into force on 16 Nov. 1994; it is reproduced in *The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (United Nations: New York, 1983) and is available on the Internet at URL <<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>>. See also chapter 18 in this volume. On related disputes in the region see Peña (note 15), pp. 129, 144–45.

was conducted, and on 18 December 2003 the ICJ found the Salvadorean claim to be groundless.²²

Apart from 'traditional' interstate conflicts, tensions exist because of rivalries between Latin American and Caribbean countries. For example, Mexico's interaction with the USA is complex and includes such issues as undocumented migration, drug trafficking, organized crime, border security and, since September 2001, the global war on terrorism. South of the Usumacinta River (the Guatemala–Mexico border), the Central American countries face similar problems (e.g., undocumented migration, poverty, natural disasters, and organized crime, including the so-called 'maras').²³ Rivalries between these countries, however, limit the possibilities of addressing these problems collectively for the benefit of the region. In the Caribbean, the colonial heritage survives and to some degree the sub-region may still be seen as an 'imperial frontier'.²⁴ Cuba, the largest Caribbean state, is the only Communist country in the region, and it remains in conflict with the USA, which in turn maintains an embargo against Cuba.²⁵

In South America, the Andean sub-region²⁶ faces challenges similar to those of Central America: drug-trafficking, guerrilla activities, terrorism, fragile democracies and poverty. The ongoing civil war in Colombia represents a special challenge as the longest running armed conflict in Latin America, and its complexity has grown over time.²⁷ Colombian–Venezuelan rivalry extends beyond the border demarcation issue, since both countries aspire to leadership

²² ICJ, 'Aplicación de la revisión del fallo del 11 de septiembre de 1992 en el caso relativo a la disputa fronteriza, marítima e insular entre El Salvador y Honduras. La Corte rechaza la solicitud de revisión efectuada por El Salvador' [Application for review of the case of 11 September 1992 as regards the dispute over the sea and coastal area between El Salvador and Honduras. The Court rejects the request made by El Salvador], *La Haya*, 18 Dec. 2003, URL <<http://www.icj-cij.org>>.

²³ 'Maras' refers to Marabuntas (swarming ants) that are common to the Amazon jungle, where they can become plagues. In Central America, Mexico and the USA the term 'maras' is applied to gangs whose members are very young and who are identified by their tattoos, loose clothing, and the violence they employ. They use particular gestures and terms that are a mixture of English and Spanish. The maras became established in Los Angeles, Calif., and began criminal activities in El Salvador, later expanding to Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Mexico. Their numbers are growing rapidly and their current membership is c. 200 000. They are considered threats to the national security of the countries where they operate. García Méndez, E., 'Las maras como sombras del pasado: los niños de la calle veinte años después' [The maras as shadows of the past: street children twenty years after], 25 Apr. 2005, URL <http://www.elfaro.net/secciones/opinion/20040321/opinion4_20040321.asp>.

²⁴ The 'imperial frontier' concept refers to the historical presence of the USA and major European, and even Asian (e.g., China and Japan) powers in the Caribbean. Bosch, J., *De Cristóbal Colón a Fidel Castro: El Caribe, frontera imperial* [From Christopher Columbus to Fidel Castro: the Caribbean, an imperial frontier] (Alfaguara: Barcelona, 1970). An excerpt from the book is available at URL <http://www.cielonaranja.com/bosch_caribe.htm>.

²⁵ Peters, P., *U.S.–Cuba Bilateral Relations: Cooperation at Arm's Length* (Lexington Institute: Arlington, Va., Jan. 2001), URL <<http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/pdf/CubaRelations.pdf>>.

²⁶ The countries of the Andean sub-region are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

²⁷ On Colombia see chapters 2 and 8 in this volume.

Table 6.1. Interstate disputes involving Latin America and Caribbean countries, 2004

Countries or regions	Causes of dispute
<i>Major disputes</i>	
Belize–Guatemala	Border demarcation
Bolivia–Chile	Territorial dispute over access to the Pacific Ocean; exportation of Bolivian hydrocarbons
Colombia–Nicaragua	Border dispute over San Andrés and Providence Islands
Colombia–Venezuela	34 border demarcation disputes; migration; guerrillas; smuggling; drug trafficking
Costa Rica–Nicaragua	Border demarcation; migration
Dominican Republic–Haiti	Migration; border demarcation
El Salvador–Honduras	Migration; International Court of Justice decision on border demarcation
El Salvador–Honduras–Nicaragua	Maritime border demarcation in the Gulf of Fonseca; exploitation of fishing resources
Honduras–Nicaragua	Maritime border demarcation in the Atlantic Ocean; migration
Trinidad and Tobago–Venezuela	Maritime borders; natural resources
<i>Minor but active disputes</i>	
Chile–Peru	Implementation of the 1929 Lima Treaty
Guyana–Suriname	Dispute over the axis of the territorial sea boundary; Suriname claims a triangle of land between the New and Kutari/Koetari rivers in a dispute over the headwaters of the Courantyne River
<i>Latent disputes</i>	
Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, UK	Sovereignty claims over areas of Antarctica
Argentina–UK	Falklands/Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich islands
Cuba–USA	Guantánamo Bay
Guyana–Venezuela	Venezuela claims 40% of Guyana's territory
French Guiana–Suriname	Suriname claims the area located between the Litani and Marouini rivers, both headwaters of the Lawa River
Haiti–USA	Navassa Island

Sources: Mares, D. R., 'Securing peace in the Americas in the next decade', ed. J. I. Domínguez, *The Future of Inter-American Relations* (Routledge: New York, 2000), p. 36, adapted from Rojas Aravena, F., 'Latin America: alternatives and mechanisms of prevention in situations related to territorial sovereignty', *Peace and Security in the Americas*, no. 13 (Oct. 1997), pp. 2–7; and Cheyre Espinosa, J. E., *Medidas de confianza mutua: Casos de América Latina y el Mediterráneo* [Confidence-building measures: the cases of Latin America and the Mediterranean] (Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares: Santiago, 2000), pp. 31–55. On Antarctica see Goldblat, J., Peace Research Institute Oslo/SIPRI, *Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements* (SAGE Publications: London, 2002), pp. 190–95. See also table 2A.3 in appendix 2A in this volume.

in the Andean sub-region. Chile, a former member of the Andean Pact,²⁸ is a cause of concern for both Bolivia and Peru. In addition, the remaining South American countries tend to be influenced by Brazil—the largest country in South America, which shares borders with all the South American nations except Chile and Ecuador. Together with Argentina, Brazil initiated in the middle of the 1980s an integration process that led to the establishment, in 1991, of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, Mercado Común del Sur), with the participation of Paraguay and Uruguay as full members and Chile, Bolivia, Mexico and Peru as associated members.

Although Latin American countries share similar problems, they have difficulty in tackling them collectively. An example is the foreign debt burden. In the 1980s, several attempts were made to bring together major debtors like Brazil and Mexico. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) sponsored meetings aimed at the establishment of a ‘debtors club’, capable of negotiating better conditions with the ‘creditors club’. However, these efforts failed, and Brazil and Mexico signed separate agreements with their creditors. The Latin American and Caribbean countries appear to lack the political will to work together on issues of mutual concern. Moreover, large and influential countries, like Brazil and Mexico, maintain a rivalry that adds to sub-regional tension.²⁹ The many faces of this rivalry touch different areas of interest from trade to political and security matters. For example, economic disputes between Brazil and Mexico prevent Mexico from becoming a full member of MERCOSUR.³⁰

In August–September 2000, Brazil sponsored the first South American Summit, on South American identity, which was held in Brasilia.³¹ The

²⁸ The Andean Pact (the forerunner of the Andean Community) was created on 26 May 1969, when Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru signed the Agreement on Subregional Integration (Cartagena Agreement). Venezuela joined in 1973, and Chile withdrew in 1976.

²⁹ The rivalry between Brazil and Mexico can be traced to colonial times. Palacios, G., *Intimidaciones, reconciliaciones y conflictos: México y Brasil, 1822–1993* [Intimidations, reconciliations and conflicts: Mexico and Brazil, 1822–1993] (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores: Mexico City, 2001); and Rosas, M. C., ‘México y Brasil: ¿buenos enemigos o amigos mortales?’ [Mexico and Brazil: good enemies or mortal friends?], *Estudios Humanidades*, vol. 31, no. 5 (May 2004), pp. 783–814.

³⁰ A critical element of Brazilian–Mexican relations relates to reform of the UN Security Council, on which Brazil has long sought a permanent seat (it has participated as a non-permanent member 9 times; Mexico has done so 3 times). Mexico has focused on disarmament, drug-trafficking and international cooperation. Brazil has emphasized issues related to environment, gender, development, hunger and technology transfers. On 22 Sep. 2004, together with India, Japan and Germany, Brazil formally applied for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Mexico has argued that enlargement of the Security Council would not effect true reform. With Egypt and Pakistan, Mexico has proposed creating a new category of semi-permanent members. Rosas (note 29); ‘Le Japon, le Brésil, l’Inde et l’Allemagne veulent siéger au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU’ [Japan, Brazil, India and Germany want seats in the UN Security Council], *Le Monde*, 23 Sep. 2004, URL <<http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3220,36-380233,0.html>>; and ‘Debaten reforma del Consejo de Seguridad’ [The debate on the reform of the Security Council], *El Universal*, 23 Sep. 2004, pp. 1, 15.

³¹ The summit meeting participants were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Mexico was not invited to attend, but president-elect Vicente Fox sent Jorge G. Castañeda (later Minister for Foreign Affairs) as an observer. Rosas, M. C., *La economía internacional en el siglo XXI: OMC Estados Unidos y America Latina* [The

summit meeting was designed to bring together MERCOSUR, the Andean Community³² as well as Chile, Guyana and Suriname. The second South American Summit took place on 8 December 2004, when the establishment of the South American Community was proclaimed in the Cuzco Declaration.³³ Mexico is not part of the 'new' South American Community.

III. Regionalism and cooperation

Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean has evolved dramatically, from preferential trade arrangements during the cold war to ambitious cooperation and integration initiatives in the post-cold war era.³⁴ Björn Hettne and András Inotai have developed the concept of 'new regionalism' to distinguish this transition. Several regionalization initiatives took place during the cold war. Some of these were promoted by the superpowers and subordinated the interests and room for manoeuvre of the countries involved to the needs of either the Soviet Union or the USA. New regionalism differs from previous initiatives: (a) it takes place in the post-cold war era; and (b) unlike the 'vertical' cold war initiatives that often came from 'outside' and 'above' (*inter alia* from the superpowers), it goes beyond economic goals to embrace democracy, human rights, environmental and labour concerns, and the like. New regionalism seeks to contribute to conflict resolution by increasing cooperation, trust and confidence; it is 'horizontal' and the states within the region play the leading role.³⁵

In terms of regional security, however, it should be noted that one of the reasons for the greater 'autonomy' experienced by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-cold war era is the increased indifference of the global powers to them.³⁶ The countries of the region clearly do not receive the attention that the USA now gives, for example, to the Middle East.

international economy in the 21st century: WTO, the USA and Latin America] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México: Mexico City, 2001), pp. 334–35.

³² Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are members of the Andean Community. See the Andean Community Internet site at URL <<http://www.comunidadandina.org/endex.htm>>.

³³ The 12 countries (see note 31) were not represented at the highest levels. The presidents of Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay did not attend the meeting. This was unfortunate for the Brazilian Government because all the MERCOSUR presidents, with the exception of Lula Da Silva, were absent. 'L'Amérique du Sud en quête d'unité' [South America in search of unity], *Le Monde*, 9 Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1@2-3222,36-390157,0.html>>.

³⁴ Regionalization and regionalism are specific concepts, usually used synonymously. Thus, in an economic sense, regionalization refers to a process where 2 or more countries in a specific geographical area grant each other preferential treatment that is not extended to third parties. Regionalism, on the other hand, refers to the way in which inter-governmental political cooperation develops to achieve economic goals. Ravenhill, J., 'Competing logics of regionalism in Asia-Pacific', *Revue d'intégration européenne/Journal of European Integration*, vol. 18, nos 2–3 (1995), p. 179; and Ravenhill, J. and Bernard, M., 'Beyond procut cycles and flying geese: regionalization, hierarchy, and the industrialization of East Asia', *World Politics*, vol. 45, no. 2 (Jan. 1995), pp. 179–210.

³⁵ Hettne, B. and Inotai, A., *The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security* (UN University Institute for Development Economics Research: Helsinki, 1994), pp. 1–3.

³⁶ Buzan, B. and Waever, O., *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003), pp. 17–18.

Regionalism is a global phenomenon, and virtually every country in the world participates in at least one such initiative. The Latin American and Caribbean states were not exceptions in the cold war period, and this remains the case today.³⁷ The most important cold war regional initiatives were the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), set up in 1960,³⁸ which became the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA, in Spanish Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración or ALADI) in 1981;³⁹ the Central American Common Market (CACM), established in 1960;⁴⁰ the Andean Group, created in 1969;⁴¹ and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), founded in 1967 and transformed into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1973.⁴² Most of these initiatives were inspired by the integration process of the European Communities. However, the import substitution policies of the countries in the region kept foreign goods from reaching domestic markets. The primarily economic focus of regionalism in the cold war was related to the prevalence of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in the region and to mistrust and rivalries, which prevented states from cooperating and increasing their economic and political links.

As noted above, the lost decade of the 1980s was accompanied by a process of democratization that paved the way for a dialogue between the new civilian governments of the Latin American countries, particularly in Central and South America. This produced several 'new regionalism' initiatives in the 1990s and the new century: MERCOSUR; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the Central American Integration System (SICA, Sistema de Integración Centroamericana), created in 1991;⁴³ the Central American Group of Four (G4), established in 1992;⁴⁴ the Association of Carib-

³⁷ Rodríguez y Rodríguez, S. and Guerra-Borges, A. (eds), *El desarrollo en América Latina y los procesos de integración subregional* [Development in Latin America and the processes of subregional integration] (Siglo XXI/Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas: Mexico City, 1999), pp. 76–95.

³⁸ LAFTA's members were Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

³⁹ LAIA's members are the same as those of LAFTA. In 1997 Cuba became a full member. LAFTA failed, in part, because it tended to ignore asymmetries between its members. When it was created much attention was paid to preferential trade agreements and recognition of the different levels of development of its member countries. On the history of LAFTA/LAIA see the LAIA/ALADI Internet site at URL <<http://www.aladi.org>>.

⁴⁰ CACM's members are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

⁴¹ See note 28. The group's creation was directly linked to LAFTA's failure to deal with the asymmetries between the most and least advanced countries in the region. See Rosas (note 31), pp. 170–73.

⁴² CARIFTA/CARICOM initially included only Anglophone countries or territories: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. However, Suriname and Haiti subsequently became full members. See the CARICOM Internet site at URL <<http://www.caricom.org>>. In addition to CARIFTA/CARICOM, the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM), created in 1968 and transformed into the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 1981, includes 7 Caribbean members: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

⁴³ SICA's members are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. See General Secretariat of the Central American Integration System, URL <<http://www.sgsica.org/>>.

⁴⁴ The G4 is also known as the Northern Trade Triangle, and initially included Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. Nicaragua joined the group a year after its creation, in 1993.

bean States (ACS), created in 1994;⁴⁵ the Group of Three (G3), created in 1991;⁴⁶ the Andean Community,⁴⁷ the successor to the Andean Pact, which was reactivated in 1991; and the Plan Puebla-Panamá (PPP), set up in 2000 to promote development initiatives in southern Mexico and Central America in sustainable development, tourism, natural disasters, infrastructure, and so on.⁴⁸ All of these were local initiatives that aimed to go beyond tariff dismantling and limited commercial objectives. They met varying degrees of success. For example, when Paraguayan President Juan Carlos Wasmosy faced a *coup d'état* in 1996, the other MERCOSUR countries pressured and eventually convinced General Lino Oviedo not to destroy the fragile Paraguayan democracy—but this experience seems more the exception than the rule.⁴⁹

In addition to these new regionalism initiatives, the Latin American and Caribbean countries have endorsed the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTA) bilaterally, both in and outside the region. Mexico, for instance, has signed FTAs in the region with Nicaragua, the Northern Trade Triangle, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay; and outside the region with Israel, the European Union (EU) and recently Japan. All these FTAs are considered to be 'new generation' agreements because they go beyond tariff dismantling to include trade in services, intellectual property measures, investment rules and even environmental, labour, democracy and human rights provisions.

Most of these FTAs are modelled on NAFTA, which covers areas and issues that were previously untouched by trade negotiations, and in this respect the Latin American countries could be said to be following Mexico's example with the USA. However, it remains to be seen how far the new regionalism and 'new generation' FTAs will contribute to political reconciliation and cooperation between the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Trade issues—both traditional, such as tariff dismantling and non-traditional, such as intellectual property rights—tend to be treated separately from security, political, social and cultural issues. The agreements do not give adequate attention to the link between security and development and instead are limited to commercial considerations. Even the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),⁵⁰ endorsed by the USA at the first Summit of the Amer-

⁴⁵ ACS is the most comprehensive initiative so far in the Caribbean, including not only the Caribbean islands but also continental countries with access to the Caribbean, as well as Dutch, French and British dependent territories (as associate members). Its 25 full members are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

⁴⁶ The members of the G3 are Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.

⁴⁷ In 1991, under the Guayaquil Commitment, the Andean sub-region countries agreed on a common external tariff and the consolidation of the Andean Customs Union. See Rosas (note 31), p. 172.

⁴⁸ Inter-American Development Bank, Plan Puebla-Panamá, URL <<http://www.iadb.org/ppp/ppp.asp>>.

⁴⁹ At the time, it was commented that, in a hypothetical scenario where either Argentine or Brazil was at risk, neither country would have accepted the mediation efforts made by Paraguay and Uruguay. This scenario is discussed in Rosas (note 31), pp. 332–38.

⁵⁰ Then US President Bill Clinton invited all the countries in the region, except Cuba, to participate in the Summit of the Americas. The proposed FTAA includes 34 countries from the Americas; its agenda is

icas, held in Miami in December 1994, which aimed to create a continental free trade area by 2005,⁵¹ distances itself from security, political, social and cultural considerations.⁵²

IV. Cooperation or conflict

The states of the Latin America and the Caribbean region have some of the smallest defence budgets in the world and the smallest budgets relative to gross domestic product (GDP).⁵³ This has been the trend with a few exceptions since the first years of the post-cold war era. The accuracy of military expenditure data is, however, frequently challenged by scholars and even international institutions and governments. For instance, in November 2001 ECLAC published a study suggesting a methodology to improve the way in which military expenditure is measured in the region, in an effort to promote more stable security cooperation among Latin American countries. The cases of Argentina and Chile were considered.⁵⁴ Although ECLAC's methodology has been criticized and its findings are weakened by problems of access to data, the study highlighted some of the difficulties faced by decision makers, the armed forces, academics and other interest groups in dealing with military expenditure.⁵⁵ The most frequently encountered problems include: unclear criteria for the areas covered or excluded in military expenditure figures;⁵⁶

based on that of NAFTA. The Internet site of the FTAA is at URL <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca_e.asp>.

⁵¹ Due to divergent views mainly by Brazil and the USA on the areas that the FTAA is expected to cover, the negotiation process is currently stagnant.

⁵² Curzio, L., "La seguridad hemisférica: balance y perspectivas" [Hemispheric security: balance and perspectives], ed. M. C. Rosas, *Cooperación y conflicto en las Américas: Seguridad hemisférica: un largo y sinuoso camino* [Cooperation and conflict in the Americas: hemispheric security, a long and winding road] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies: Mexico City, 2003), p. 87; and Rosas, M. C. and Reyes, G. E., *ALCA y OMC: América Latina frente al proteccionismo: El libre comercio en los tiempos del ántrax* [FTAA and WTO: Latin American in face of protectionism: free trade in the times of anthrax] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Sistema Económico Latinoamericano: Mexico City, 2003), pp. 29–43.

⁵³ Nueva Mayoría, 'América Latina y el Caribe es la región del mundo que menos gasta en defensa' [Latin America and the Caribbean is the region of the world which spends the least on defence], 16 Nov. 2004, URL <<http://www.nuevamayoria.com/ES/BIBLIOTECA/resenas/041116.html>>.

⁵⁴ La Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL), *Metodología estandarizada común para la medición de los gastos de defensa* [Standard methodology for measurement of defence costs] (Oficina Ejecutiva de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe: Santiago de Chile, Nov. 2001).

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Scheetz, T., 'Una evaluación del documento cepalino: metodología estandarizada común para la medición de los gastos de defensa' [An evaluation of the ECLAC document: standard methodology for measurement of defence expenditure], *Fuerzas armadas y sociedad*, vol. 18, no. 1–2 (2004), p. 108.

⁵⁶ One of the problems of analysing Chile's military expenditure is that the budget for public security is included, which makes Chile's military expenditure appear higher than that of its neighbours. Cheyre Espinosa, J. E., *Medidas de confianza mutua: Casos de América Latina y el Mediterráneo* [Confidence-building measures: the cases of Latin American and the Mediterranean] (Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares: Santiago, 2000), p. 65. There have also been political obstacles to obtaining information from the Argentinean and Chilean defence ministries.

Table 6.2. Armed forces in Latin America and the Caribbean, as of July 2004

Country ^a	Population	Army	Navy	Air force	Total armed forces
Argentina	38 428 000	41 400	17 500	12 500	71 400
Bolivia	8 808 000	25 000	3 500	3 000	31 500
Brazil	178 470 000	189 000	48 600	65 310	302 910
Chile	15 806 000	47 700	19 000	11 000	77 700
Colombia	44 222 000	178 000	22 000	7 000	207 000
Cuba	11 300 000	38 000	3 000	8 000	49 000
Dominican Republic	8 745 000	15 000	4 000	5 500	24 500
Ecuador	13 003 000	37 000	5 500	4 000	46 500
El Salvador	6 515 000	13 850	700	950	15 500
Guatemala ^b	12 347 000	27 000	1 500	700	29 200
Honduras	6 941 000	8 300	1 400	2 300	12 000
Mexico	103 457 000	144 000	37 000	11 770	192 770
Nicaragua	5 466 000	12 000	800	1 200	14 000
Paraguay	5 878 000	7 600	1 400	1 100	10 100
Peru	27 167 000	40 000	25 000	15 000	80 000
Uruguay	3 415 000	15 200	5 700	3 100	24 000
Venezuela	25 699 000	34 000	18 300	7 000	59 300

^a Costa Rica and Panama do not have armed forces.

^b Guatemala is reducing its army to 15 500.

Sources: World Health Organization (WHO), *World Health Report 2005: Make Every Mother and Child Count* (WHO: Geneva, 2004), URL <<http://www.who.int/whr/2005/en/>>; and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2004/2005* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004).

different concepts of security and defence from country to country;⁵⁷ information access; unclear judicial frameworks; the exclusion of legislators from the debate on defence and security; confusion over the design and purpose of security and defence policies; ‘securitization’ of the agenda so that the armed forces are in charge of tasks not necessarily related to defence; and the inadequacy of civilian oversight.⁵⁸ The contribution of transparency and accountability to confidence building and cooperation in the field of security and defence and related areas in Latin America and the Caribbean needs to be underlined and military expenditure data are a key starting point.

Throughout the 1980s, when several armed conflicts developed especially in Central America, the defence budget as a percentage of GDP was as high as 44.1 per cent in Nicaragua (in 1986), 6.4 per cent in Honduras (1985), 4.9 per

⁵⁷ RESDAL, *Las definiciones políticas* [Political definitions], URL <<http://www.resdal.org/atlas/atlas-definiciones.html>>. The site compares different concepts of defence and security in some Latin American and Caribbean countries. E.g., the Dominican Republic lacks a ‘security concept’.

⁵⁸ The national defence budgets of several countries in the region are listed at RESDAL, *Presupuestos nacionales y otras cifras* [National budgets and other figures], URL <<http://www.resdal.org/main-transparencia.html>>. See also Robles Montoya, J., *Metodología de análisis para la asignación de recursos de la defensa: presupuestos y adquisiciones* [Analytical methodology for allocation of defence resources: budgets and acquisitions], URL <<http://www.resdal.org/idele-montoya.html>>. See also chapter 8 in this volume.

cent in El Salvador (1986) and 3.6 per cent in Guatemala (1985).⁵⁹ In South America, Argentina spent 7.1 per cent of its GDP on defence (1981), Chile 9.6 per cent (1984), Guyana 12.4 per cent (1986), Peru 10.4 per cent (1982) and Uruguay 4 per cent (1982).⁶⁰ In sharp contrast to these figures, by the early 21st century, the country with the highest military expenditure in South America was Colombia with 4.4 per cent of GDP (in 2003), followed by Chile with 3.5 per cent (in 2003). None of the remaining Latin American countries, with the exception of Ecuador (2.4 per cent) and Cuba,⁶¹ came close to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence.⁶²

Table 6.2 shows the number of personnel in the armies, navies and air forces of 17 Latin American and Caribbean countries. According to these figures, the aggregate armed forces of the 10 South American countries in the table, with 910 410 troops, correspond to 64 per cent of the USA's armed forces, including the Marine Corps. The largest contingent is that of Brazil (33 per cent of the region's armed force manpower), followed by Colombia (23 per cent) and Peru and Chile (9 per cent each). MERCOSUR countries, with a population almost double that of the Andean Community countries, have an average of 1.7 military personnel to every 1000 inhabitants. In the Andean Community, there are 3.5 military personnel for every 1000 inhabitants.⁶³ Colombia, with a population less than half that of Mexico, possesses a larger army, but the Colombian conflict demands a degree of defence expenditure and armed forces which Mexico does not need. However, the Colombian Army is still second in size to that of Brazil.

In the 1990s two contradictory trends were demonstrated in Latin America: an ostensible decrease in tension in the region as a result of disarmament and confidence-building measures (CBMs); and efforts by several governments to acquire new defence technologies. In general, Latin American arms acquisitions appear related more to modernization requirements than to threats to the security of the countries involved. Most of the military equipment possessed by the Latin American countries was designed, produced or purchased in the 1960s and 1970s, which, although seemingly outdated, is in line with

⁵⁹ These figures represent the highest military expenditure for each country in the 1980s. Hagemeyer-Gaverus, G. *et al.*, 'Tables of world military expenditure, 1979–88', *SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), pp. 191–92.

⁶⁰ Hagemeyer-Gaverus *et al.* (note 59), pp. 191–92.

⁶¹ According to SIPRI, in the cold war years of 1979–85 Cuba had a highly militarized society and devoted large human and material resources to defence (9.6–10.5% of GDP). There are no reliable figures on current Cuban military expenditure, but according to Pérez-López the average level of spending dropped to 5% of GDP in the 1990s. Even so, Cuba's index of armed forces per 1000 inhabitants in 1993 was still more than 5 times higher than in other Latin American countries. Hagemeyer-Gaverus *et al.* (note 59), p. 191; and Pérez López, J. F., *Cuban Military Expenditures: Concepts, Data and Burden Issues*, Paper presented at Fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, University of Miami, Fla., 8–10 Aug. 1996, pp. 124, 140–41.

⁶² See appendix 8A in this volume.

⁶³ Nueva Mayoría, *Balance estratégico militar de América del Sur* [Strategic military balance in South America] (Nueva Mayoría: Buenos Aires, 2004), pp. 4–5.

Table 6.3. Significant political cooperation and disarmament initiatives contributing to confidence building in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1942–2002

Name of initiative/agreement	Established	Aim/comment
Inter-American Defence Board (IADB, Junta Inter-americana de Defensa)	1942	To coordinate defence of the Americas
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) (TIAR, Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca)	1947	To ensure inter-American peace and reciprocal assistance to meet armed attack against any American state
Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS)	1948	To promote peaceful settlement of disputes and arms control; special meetings of foreign ministers of member countries may be called if a conflict or threat to peace develops in the area
American Treaty on Pacific Settlements (Bogotá Pact)	1948	To ensure settlement of disputes by pacific means
South Atlantic maritime area Treaty of Tlatelolco	1967	To proclaim a peace and cooperation zone ^a
	1968	To establish a Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ); ^b all Latin American and Caribbean nations, including Cuba, are parties; ^c to guarantee compliance with treaty provisions, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established to guarantee that the region remains an NWFZ, to prohibit nuclear tests and storage of nuclear weapons in the area, and to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and support the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes ^d
Declaration of Ayacucho	1974	To control arms proliferation and ratify the non-nuclear status of the region; parties are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela
Mendoza Commitment	1991	To eradicate chemical weapons in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay
Cartagena Declaration	1991	To renunciate weapons of mass destruction; signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador Peru and Venezuela
Summit of the Americas	1994	To promote cooperation in the Americas in the fields of de-mining, transparency on defence expenditure, the peaceful settlement of disputes, etc.; ^e mechanism is not primarily focused on security matters but has generated important initiatives in this area, e.g., 1998 Declaration of Santiago

Name of initiative/agreement	Established	Aim/comment
Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America	1995	To contribute to the regional security debate by introducing the 'democratic security' concept; ^f important because of the 'cooperative security' approach ^g and endorsement of disarmament and arms control in the region through 'a reasonable balance of forces'; ^h agreed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 2 Central American countries that do not possess armies: Costa Rica and Panama
Treaty Establishing the Regional Security System in the Caribbean	1996	To foster cooperation on immigration environmental, smuggling, natural disaster and fishing issues; ⁱ established by Caribbean Anglophone countries
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials	1997	To regulate firearms and related materials by requiring licensing and marking of them; criminalizes illicit manufacture and trafficking; provides for information sharing and cooperation
Treaty on Maritime Boundaries between Mexico and the USA	1997	To conclude a border dispute related to the North Archipelago (Channel Islands); ^j not included in the 1848 Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty, but which are occupied by the USA; ^k important because of the vast hydrocarbon reserves in the Gulf of Mexico area, particularly in the 'hoyos de dona', ^l which contains c. 43–59 billion barrels of oil
Ushuaia Declaration	1999	To establish a peace zone between MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile
Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM, or Ottawa, Convention) ⁿ	1999	All but 2 countries in the Americas, Cuba and the USA, ^m have signed the convention
Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions	1999	To establish a framework for timely notification of arms acquisitions and annual reporting on imports and exports
Lima Commitment (Andean Charter for Peace and Security and the Limitation and Control of the Expenditure on Foreign Defense)	2002	To set out principles for an Andean Community security policy and commitments to establish a peace zone and take measures to combat terrorism, limit defence spending, promote arms control and eradicate illicit arms trafficking
Amazonian Watching System (SIVAM)	2002	To safeguard Brazilian sovereignty in the light of Colombia's internal security situation, as well as the implications of Plan Colombia ^o

^a The South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination (CAMAS, Control del Area Marítima Atlántico Sur) was initiated in 1967 and became crucial after the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. Delamer, P. G. R., 'Prospects for multinational cooperation at sea in the South Atlantic', URL <<http://www.centrotocqueville.com.ar/htm/htm/gdyy090101in.htm>>.

^b Cheyre Espinosa, J. E., *Medidas de confianza mutua: Casos de América Latina y el Mediterráneo* [Confidence-building measures: the cases of Latin American and the Mediterranean] (Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares: Santiago, 2000), p. 84. During the cold war Argentina and Brazil decided to conduct nuclear weapon programmes. On Brazil see Rosas, M. C., *La economía política de la seguridad internacional. Sanciones, zanahorias y garrotes* [Political economy of international security: sanctions, carrots and sticks] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Sistema Económico Latinoamericano: Mexico City, 2003), p. 188. On Brazil's nuclear policies and the reasons for dismantlement see Sum, G. H., *The Brazilian Dream: A Middle Power Seeks Greatness* (Xlibris: Miami, Fla., 2000).

^c Cuba signed the treaty on 23 Oct. 2002. Argentina, Brazil and Chile became parties in 1994. For the full list of parties to the treaty see annex A in this volume.

^d The Treaty of Tlatelolco has inspired other non-proliferation initiatives elsewhere in the world. See the analysis by the Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL, Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe) in Vargas Carreño, E., 'El Tratado de Tlatelolco, el desarme y la no-proliferación nuclear en América Latina y el Caribe' [The Treaty of Tlatelolco: disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in Latin America and the Caribbean], ed. M. C. Rosas, *Seguridad hemisférica e inseguridad global: entre la cooperación interamericana y la guerra preventiva* [Hemispheric security and global insecurity: between inter-American cooperation and preventive war] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Embajada de Canadá: Mexico City, 2004), pp. 309–22.

^e 'Second Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Santiago', 18–19 Apr. 1998, URL <<http://www.summit-americas.org/chiledec.htm>>.

^f Legler, T., '¿Víctima del terrorismo? La seguridad humana después del 11 de septiembre' [Victim of terrorism? Human security since 11 September], ed. M. C. Rosas, *Cooperación y conflicto en las Américas. Seguridad hemisférica: un largo y sinuoso camino* [Cooperation and conflict in the Americas: hemispheric security, a long and winding road] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies: Mexico City, 2003), p. 299.

^g Article 26g of the treaty emphasizes that 'The democratic security of each of the countries signing this Treaty is closely connected with the security of the region. Accordingly, no country shall strengthen its own security at the expense of the security of other countries'. 'Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America', URL <<http://www.summit-americas.org/Hemispheric%20Security/Franework3893-96.htm>>.

^h 'Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America' (note g); and Jácome, F. (ed.), *Seguridad democrática en Centroamérica: Logros y limitaciones en Costa Rica, Panamá, Guatemala y El Salvador* [Democratic security in Central America: achievements and limitations in Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador] (Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales: Caracas, 2004).

ⁱ The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Committee on Hemispheric Security, URL <<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/csh/english>>, 5 Mar. 1996; and US Department of State, 'Treaty Establishing the Regional Security System', 5 Mar. 1996, URL <<http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/4367.htm>>.

^j The archipelago comprises the islands of Anacapa, the Farallones, San Clemente, San Miguel, San Nicolas, Santa Barbara, Santa Catalina, Santa Cruz and Santa Rosa. It is located off the coast of southern California.

^k The controversy over the archipelago is addressed in Moguel Flores, E. H., 'El Archipiélago del Norte y los Farallones: Asignaturas pendientes del Tratado de Guadalupe en la agenda de asuntos fronterizos entre México y los Estados Unidos de América' [The North

Archipelago and the Farallones: pending aspects of the Treaty of Guadalupe related to border issues between Mexico and the United States of America], *Revista Asociación de Diplomáticos Escritores*, no. 4 (June–Aug. 2002), URL <http://diplomaticosescritores.org/NumeroActual.asp?link=4_2.htm&num=4>; and ‘Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo’, 2 Feb. 1848, URL <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/mexico/guadhida.htm>>.

^l An ‘hoyo de dona’ is a ‘discontinuous line’ with eastern and western orientations. These ‘hoyos’ extend beyond the c. 320 km limit for both Mexico and the USA. The borders of this area were not addressed by the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries.

^m See Rosas, M. C., ‘México y Brasil: ¿buenos enemigos o amigos mortales?’ [Mexico and Brazil: good enemies or mortal friends?], *Estudios Humanidades*, vol. 31, no. 5 (May 2004), pp. 783–814. Former US President Bill Clinton had promised that the USA would sign the Ottawa Convention in 2006. His successor, George W. Bush, suggested a delay that could extend to 2010. See Kucera, J., ‘US changes landmine policy’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, vol. 41, no. 10 (10 Mar. 2004), p. 11.

ⁿ Matthew, R. A., ‘Human security and the mine ban movement: introduction’, ed. R. A. Matthew *et al.*, *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War’s Hidden History* (State University of New York: Albany, N.Y., 2004), pp. 3–17.

^o Concerns about Plan Colombia relate not only to the physical presence of US soldiers in Colombia, but also to possible incursions into neighbouring countries by Colombian drug traffickers and guerrillas seeking a better environment in which to operate.

the region’s needs. Part of the military equipment is second-hand stock from European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the former Warsaw Pact, and countries such as Israel and South Africa.⁶⁴

Despite the existence of a series of CBMs and arms control agreements on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and anti-personnel mines (APMs), Latin America lacks an equivalent to the European arms control and confidence- and security-building measures regimes (see table 6.3). This may explain why the governments of the region accede too readily to modernization requests made by the armed forces.⁶⁵ In Chile, for example, the arms procurement decision-making process occurs essentially only within the armed forces, a situation that is not expected to change in the near future.⁶⁶

Even so, in terms of conventional weapon purchases, Latin America is a minor market compared with the Middle East and South-East Asia. Between 1998 and 2002, the Latin American country leading the list of recipients of conventional weapons was Brazil, which ranked 20th in the world, followed by Argentina at 29th, Colombia at 37th, Chile at 40th, Mexico at 47th and Peru at 57th.⁶⁷ The same applies to spending on the procurement of conven-

⁶⁴ Nueva Mayoría (note 63), pp. 37–49.

⁶⁵ Hagelin, B. *et al.*, ‘International arms transfers’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 452–53. See also chapter 15 in this volume.

⁶⁶ Rojas Aravena, F., ‘Chile’, ed. R. P. Singh, *SIPRI, Arms Procurement Decision Making*, vol. 2, *Chile, Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), p. 17. The author explains that, although the Chilean president has the right to veto these decisions, he has so far chosen not to do so in most cases.

⁶⁷ Curzio (note 52), pp. 84–85.

tional arms, where the Latin American country with the highest position is also Brazil, which ranks 36th in the world.⁶⁸

Military expenditure, the size of the armed forces and arms procurement are important considerations because civil–military relations are experiencing transformation, which may lead to crises such as the 1995 Ecuador–Peru crisis in the disputed Condor Cordillera border region.⁶⁹ Democratic control of the armed forces has not been fully achieved, and traditional border disputes and ‘new’ threats—like drug trafficking, organized crime and undocumented migration—have the potential to spark armed conflict. However, as suggested above, the use of force in the region has generally decreased, and the various regional CBMs appear to be taken seriously by the parties and their neighbours. The origins and rationale of such measures were as follows.

1. The disputes between the countries in Latin American and the Caribbean no longer relate to either ideological issues or conflicts between blocs.⁷⁰ Increasingly, the main security challenges for societies in the region are linked to economic crises, the prevailing unequal income distribution, poverty, environmental degradation, organized crime, corruption and the failure of existing political institutions to meet these challenges.

2. The prevailing strategic concept in military establishments is ‘realist’:⁷¹ there is a state-centric perception of threats and risk with little willingness to address the ‘broad concept’ of security,⁷² which includes notions such as human security.⁷³ Nonetheless, civil–military relations are moving towards the implementation of a preponderantly civilian decision-making authority on security matters.

3. Despite the asymmetries shown in table 6.2, the region’s armed forces are relatively small, with limited and slow deployment capabilities.⁷⁴ Intelligence gathering about a potential ‘adversary’ is particularly limited.⁷⁵ The armed

⁶⁸ Hagelin *et al.* (note 65).

⁶⁹ Ortiz, R. D., ‘Ampliación del horizonte estratégico y reforma militar en América Latina’ [The widening of the strategic horizon in military reform in Latin America], *Fuerzas armadas y sociedad*, vol. 15, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2000), p. 3.

⁷⁰ Cheyre Espinosa (note 56), p. 54.

⁷¹ Cheyre Espinosa (note 56).

⁷² The proponents of the ‘realist’ concept of security reject the ‘broad’ notion of security, arguing that it lacks clear goals and is thus difficult to translate into concrete measures. For a comparison of ‘broad’ and ‘restricted’ security see Bárcena Coqui, M., ‘La reconceptualización de la seguridad: el debate contemporáneo’ [Reconceptualizing of security: the contemporary debate], *Política Exterior*, no. 59 (Feb. 2000), pp. 9–31; and Garduño Valero, G. J. R., ‘Epistemología y semántica de la seguridad nacional’ [Epistemology and semantics of national security], ed. Rosas (note 9), pp. 65–91.

⁷³ The human security concept is controversial, and its translation into concrete policies has been difficult. Legler, T., ‘¿Víctima del terrorismo? La seguridad humana después del 11 de septiembre’ [Victim of terrorism? Human security after 11 September], ed. Rosas (note 52), pp. 283–99. See also chapter 7 in this volume.

⁷⁴ Cheyre Espinosa (note 56).

⁷⁵ On the failures and limitations of the intelligence services in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay see Swenson, R. and Lemozy, S. C. (eds), *Profesionalismo de inteligencia en las Américas* [Professional intelligence in the Americas] (Center for Strategic Intelligence Research/Joint Military Intelligence College: Washington, DC, Aug. 2003).

forces do not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and, indeed, Latin America pioneered the first nuclear weapon-free zone.⁷⁶

4. Armed forces are typically not deployed in direct confrontation with each other, either in the region or abroad.⁷⁷

5. Cooperative security initiatives tend to prevail and are based on the assumption that the security of one country can be guaranteed only when its neighbours are also in a 'secure environment' (win-win approach). It is considered ineffective for countries to seek to increase their security at the expense of others (zero-sum game).⁷⁸ This is the case, notably, between Colombia and Venezuela in the Andean sub-region, where it is believed that most of the challenges faced by the two countries in their relations could be solved by a cooperative approach based on continuing interdependence.⁷⁹

6. As regards arms transfers, the most important problem is the trade in SALW.⁸⁰ The proliferation of WMD and major conventional weapons is a relatively less important issue than in other regions of the world. In fact, if not for Cuba and the USA, the Americas would be entirely committed to the prohibition and dismantling of APMs, a specific category of SALW.⁸¹

7. The countries of the region have an extensive set of rules, political agreements, and diplomatic mechanisms for conflict resolution. The existing CBMs are particularly important in times of crisis.

⁷⁶ See table 6.3.

⁷⁷ Cheyre Espinosa (note 56).

⁷⁸ The way in which Latin American countries deal with democratic and cooperative security initiatives is analysed in Gomariz, E., 'La doctrina de la seguridad democrática y el impacto paradigmático de la crisis global' [The doctrine of democratic security and its impact on the paradigm of the global crisis], ed. Rosas (note 9), pp. 203–12.

⁷⁹ Jiménez y Meleán, R. S., *Integración económica y fortalecimiento institucional en el nuevo perfil de las relaciones colombo-venezolanas* [Economic integration and institutional fortification in the new profile of Colombian–Venezuelan relations] (Impresora Micabú: Caracas, 1999), p. 15. A more pessimistic view is presented in Bonilla, A., 'Una agenda de seguridad andina' [An agenda for Andean security], ed. Rosas (note 52), p. 239.

⁸⁰ An important step was the opening for signature, under the Organization of American States framework, of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, on 14 Nov. 1997. The importance of SALW in Latin America is related to the military's historical emphasis on 'internal enemies'; endemic economic crises which prevented acquisition of expensive, sophisticated weapons; US military programmes designed to strengthen internal security in the region by sponsoring production for 'domestic use'; the presence of insurgent forces, private militias and criminal organizations equipped with SALW; and the trend of privatization of security in the region. Rosas, M. C., '¿Privatización o privación de la seguridad?' [Privatization or deprivation of security?], *Metapolítica*, no. 35, vol. 8 (May/June 2004), pp. 88–97; Rosas, M. C., 'Minas terrestre anti-personal: infierno al ras del suelo' [Anti-personnel landmines: inferno on the ground], *Etcétera*, no. 233 (17 July 1997), pp. 22–25, URL <<http://www.etcetera.com.mx>>; and Klare, M. and Andersen, D., *A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America* (Federation of American Scientists: Washington, DC, 1996), p. 90, URL <<http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/publications/scourgefl.htm>>. The RAND Report *Arms Trafficking and Colombia*, URL <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1468/>>, analyses the black and 'grey' market sources of SALW and how illegal providers transfer, sell, acquire and ship them.

⁸¹ The parties and signatories to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction are listed in annex A in this volume; see also chapter 15.

Table 6.3 shows the growing importance of treaties, declarations and commitments in the post-cold war era for ensuring non-violent outcomes in the region. The countries of the region recognize that some of these initiatives are more successful than others and that some of the institutions involved may have outlived their usefulness.⁸² The Inter-American Defence Board (IADB), a mechanism created in 1942 in the context of World War II to coordinate the defence of the Americas vis-à-vis the Berlin–Rome–Tokyo axis, is such an example. After World War II the IADB became a consultant to the Organization of American States (OAS), which reciprocates by funding the IADB, but the nature of their relationship remains unclear.⁸³

V. The participation of Latin American armies in peacekeeping operations

In addition to their primary aim, international peacekeeping operations may contribute positively to the democratization of the participating armed forces and their subordination to civilian rule—a trend of particular importance for Latin America, where the establishment of democracy is still an ongoing process. The military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s in the region emphasized the war against ‘internal enemies’ in the framework of national security doctrines,⁸⁴ and many political and human rights abuses were committed in the name of this strategy.

Today those military regimes are gone, but it is premature to speak of complete subordination of the armed forces to civilian authorities because in several domains the armed forces remain in control. There are other dimensions, however, which give cause for optimism, among them PKOs. The transformation of the armed forces from ‘repressive tools’ into ‘peace soldiers’ seems to be an increasingly popular trend in the region, as elsewhere.⁸⁵

There has been increased Latin American participation in PKOs since 1989. Although such participation was not unknown in the cold war period,⁸⁶ at that

⁸² For a comprehensive list of the security and regional cooperation arrangements in the Americas see ed. Rosas (note 52), pp. 55–61.

⁸³ The IADB is made up of armed forces representatives, is based in the USA and is chaired by a US officer (who reports to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff). Among its activities are de-mining and the promotion of regional CBMs at the request of the OAS General Assembly. Most CARICOM countries do not participate. Rosas, M. C., ‘¿Existe la seguridad hemisférica?’ [Does hemispheric security exist?], ed. Rosas (note 52), p. 56. For a list of OAS members see the glossary in this volume.

⁸⁴ Cepik, M. and Antunes, P., ‘Brazil’s new intelligence system: an institutional assessment’, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, vol. 16, no. 3 (fall 2003), p. 351.

⁸⁵ Sotomayor, A. C., ‘Reforming Praetorian militaries to become responsible peacekeepers’, *Informational Memorandum*, no. 59 (spring 2004), pp. 7–8.

⁸⁶ E.g., in 1948, 4 Latin American soldiers were observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Lebanon. Latin American forces took part in the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in 1949; in the Suez UN Emergency Force in 1956; in the UN Operation in the Congo in 1960; and in the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights in 1974. Childe, J., ‘Peacekeeping and the inter-American system’, *Military Review*, Oct. 1980, pp. 40–51; and Pala, A. L., ‘The increased role of Latin American armed forces in UN peacekeeping: opportunities and challenges’, *Airpower Journal*, special edn 1995, URL <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/pala.html>>.

time PKOs were not a part of the defence doctrines of the countries of the region.⁸⁷ This situation has changed dramatically since the end of the cold war. As of 31 December 2004, 12 countries in the region were contributing to 15 UN PKOs with a total of 6163 personnel, 9.5 per cent of all the personnel employed in UN PKOs worldwide.⁸⁸ Among the 20 major current national contributors of military and civilian police to UN PKOs, Uruguay ranks 9th, Brazil 14th, Argentina 16th and Chile 22nd.⁸⁹ If participation in PKOs is measured as a share of the population of each country, Uruguay is the world's largest provider of personnel to PKOs.⁹⁰ As table 6.4 illustrates, it participates in PKOs where no other Latin American country is present (e.g., in Afghanistan and Georgia).

Involvement in PKOs is not limited to UN PKOs. Following a general post-cold war trend, PKOs have been conducted under the framework of regional security organizations also in Latin America.⁹¹ For instance, after the 1991 *coup d'état* which overthrew Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the OAS and the UN worked together to manage the crisis, creating the OAS–UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH).⁹² Two years later, the Military Observer Mission Ecuador–Peru (MOMEP) was created with an equal number of observers from the four guarantor countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the USA) of the 1942 Rio Protocol to help tackle the Ecuador–Peru

⁸⁷ Rosas, M. C., 'La seguridad internacional y el debate sobre la participación de México en las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas' [International security and the debate on the participation of Mexico in UN peacekeeping operations], ed. Rosas (note 9), p. 119; and Rosas, M. C. (ed.), *Las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas: lecciones para México* [United Nations peacekeeping operations: lessons for Mexico], (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Folke Bernadotte Academy: Stockholm, Sweden, 2005).

⁸⁸ As of 31 Dec. 2004, 102 nations, mostly developing countries, participated in UN PKOs. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Ranking of military and civilian police contributions to UN operations', 31 Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>>. See also table 3.2 in this volume.

⁸⁹ The countries ranking higher than Uruguay were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Ethiopia, Ghana, Jordan and Nigeria. The countries ranking higher than Brazil were those countries plus South Africa, Kenya, Morocco and Senegal. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (note 88).

⁹⁰ Pakistan, the largest contributor to UN PKOs, has a population of 145 million and contributes 8140 civilian police and troops. Uruguay, with a population of 3 415 000 (2.4% of Pakistan's population) provides 2490 civilian police and troops to PKOs (31% of Pakistan's contribution). These data refer to the total contribution to UN PKOs. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (note 88).

⁹¹ Heldt, B. and Wallenstein, P., *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2000* (Folke Bernadotte Academy: Stockholm, Sweden, 2004), p. 1. See also chapters 2 and 3 in this volume.

⁹² MICIVIH (1993–2000) was a peace-building mission with no peacekeeping tasks under which the UN provided operational support. In 1995 the OAS monitored elections and the UN contributed technical assistance. Heldt and Wallenstein (note 91), p. 46; and UN Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 'Regional security organisations and the challenge of peacekeeping', URL <<http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/regionalsecurity.html>>.

Table 6.4. Participation of 12 Latin American and Caribbean states in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as of 31 December 2004

Country	Mission	Civilian police	Military observers	Troops	Total personnel
Argentina	MINURSO	135	5	963	1 103
	MINUSTAH				
	MONUC				
	UNFICYP				
	UNMIK				
	UNMIL				
	UNOCI				
	UNTSO				
Bolivia	MINUSTAH	–	19	212	231
	MONUC				
	ONUB				
	UNAMSIL				
	UNMIK				
	UNMIL				
	UNMISSET				
	UNOCI				
Brazil	MINUSTAH	10	8	1 349	1 367
	UNMIK				
	UNMIL				
	UNMISSET				
	UNOCI				
Chile	MINUSTAH	38	6	540	584
	UNMIK				
	UNMOGIP				
	UNTSO				
Dominican Republic	UNOCI	–	4	–	4
Ecuador	MINUSTAH	–	5	67	72
	UNMIL				
	UNOCI				
El Salvador	MINURSO	5	11	–	16
	MINUSTAH				
	UNMIL				
	UNOCI				
Honduras	MINURSO	–	12	–	12
Jamaica	UNMIL	10	–	–	10
Paraguay	MINUSTAH	–	37	9	46
	MONUC				
	ONUB				
	UNMEE				
	UNMIL				
	UNOCI				
	UNTSO				
Peru	MINUSTAH	–	17	209	226
	MONUC				
	ONUB				

Country	Mission	Civilian police	Military observers	Troops	Total personnel
Uruguay	UNMEE				
	UNMIL				
	UNOCI				
	MINURSO	22	56	2 414	2 492
	MINUSTAH				
	MONUC				
	ONUB				
	UNAMA				
	UNAMSIL				
	UNFICYP				
	UNMEE				
	UNMIL				
	UNMOGIP				
	UNOCI				
UNOMIG					
Region total	15	220	180	5 763	6 163
Global total	17	6 765	2 046	55 909	64 720

MINURSO = UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MINUSTAH = UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti; MONUC = UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; ONUB = UN Operation in Burundi; UNAMA = UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMSIL = UN Mission in Sierra Leone; UNFICYP = UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMEE = UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea; UNMIK = UN Interim Administration in Kosovo; UNMIL = UN Mission in Liberia; UNMISSET = UN Mission of Support in East Timor; UNMOGIP = UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNOCI = UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire; UNOMIG = UN Observer Mission to Georgia; UNTSO = UN Truce Supervision Organization.

Sources: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'UN missions summary detailed by country', 31 Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>>; and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Monthly summary of military and civilian police contribution to United Nations operations', Dec. 2004, URL <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>>.

border conflict.⁹³ Other non-UN peacekeeping efforts have included Brazil's actions under the OAS in Suriname in 1992; OAS de-mining efforts in Nicaragua, with the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay; and several 'fuerzas aliadas' (allied forces) and

⁹³ For the Rio Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries see URL <http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks27/appndx1_27.html>. MOMEPEP comprised 50 personnel and was funded by Ecuador and Peru. The USA provided aerial support for reconnaissance of the demilitarized zone. Weidner, G. R., 'MOMEPEP's legacy: a new peace, a brighter future', US Army School of the Americas, URL <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/usarsa/ACADEMIC/MOMEPEP%27s%20Legacy.htm>>; and Weidner, G. R., 'Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley', US Army School of the Americas, URL <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/usarsa/ACADEMIC/MOMEPEPNDU.HTM>>.

'fuerzas unidas' (united forces) peacekeeping exercises conducted under the auspices of the USA.⁹⁴

Currently, the most important UN peacekeeping mission in which Latin American countries participate is the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1542.⁹⁵ After the controversial ouster, on 29 February 2004, of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been re-elected in November 2000, the UN decided to support the efforts to stabilize Haiti.⁹⁶ As of December 2004, MINUSTAH comprised 7406 personnel, including 6008 troops and 1398 civilian police.⁹⁷ Nine Latin American countries contributed military personnel to MINUSTAH,⁹⁸ and five countries provided civilian police personnel.⁹⁹ MINUSTAH is primarily made up of Latin American military and civilian personnel, especially from Argentina and Brazil. Brazil leads the mission and provides the largest contingent: 1212 troops and 3 civilian police; Argentina contributes 555 troops and 5 civilian police (as of December 2004).¹⁰⁰

Latin America's involvement in PKOs has been welcomed in the light of the demand for new operations and also because traditional peacekeepers such as Canada are reducing their participation.¹⁰¹ The participation of the Latin American countries provides 'new blood' and their 'neutrality' may be welcomed: they have no 'imperial' ambitions in the regions in which PKOs are conducted but do have some 'cultural affinity' with the African and Latin American societies where troops are deployed. However, the relative lack of field experience and of proper equipment makes Latin American peacekeepers less capable of handling situations in which violence has not completely abated and may also increase the risk of violence during PKOs, limiting the potential contribution of these peacekeepers to peace, conflict management and national reconciliation.

Apart from the political motives for Latin America's participation in PKOs, there are economic advantages. The UN pays each participant a monthly bonus of approximately \$980, and personnel in combat missions receive an

⁹⁴ These exercises are expected to develop skills relevant to PKOs. When conducted in Central America, they are called 'fuerzas aliadas'; when held in South America they are termed 'fuerzas unidas'. Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA), 'Exercise "Fuerzas aliadas"/"Fuerzas unidas" peacekeeping', Washington, DC, 14 Oct. 2003, URL <<http://www.ciponline.org/facts/fapko.htm>>.

⁹⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1542, 30 Apr. 2004.

⁹⁶ Now in exile, Aristide claims that in Feb. 2004 he was kidnapped by US troops with the consent of France and taken from Haiti. González, G., Inter-Press Service, 'Haiti: Latin American-led peacekeeping operation, a "mission impossible"?' , URL <www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=26166>.

⁹⁷ See table 3.2 in this volume.

⁹⁸ The 9 countries were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

⁹⁹ The 5 countries were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Uruguay.

¹⁰⁰ For contributions by country to UN missions see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (note 88).

¹⁰¹ As of 31 Dec. 2004 Canada was participating in 8 UN PKOs (see note 100) and in other PKOs in collaboration with its allies. See table 3.2 in this volume; and Hobson, S., 'Country briefing: Canada: readiness at a price', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 17 Sep. 2003, pp. 22–28.

additional 25 per cent of this sum.¹⁰² Observers receive a monthly per diem of \$85–120.¹⁰³ Latin American nations have experienced severe economic crises (e.g., in Argentina and Uruguay in 2001–2002), and participation in PKOs may help ease social, political and economic tensions, especially as regards civil–military relations, and keep the military establishment satisfied.¹⁰⁴ According to ECLAC, Uruguay’s critical economic situation in 2001 and 2002 may, for example, have played a role in stimulating the participation of Uruguayan troops in PKOs.¹⁰⁵ The UN encourages the participation of other Latin American countries, such as Mexico, in military PKOs.¹⁰⁶

VI. Latin American–US relations before and after 11 September 2001

Historically, the USA has been the major supplier of military equipment to Latin America. The USA has justified arms sales by arguing that they contribute to the security of its allies. In 1993–96 the USA supplied 25 per cent of all arms purchased by Latin America, three times more than any other supplier.¹⁰⁷ During the cold war, the USA argued that arms sales were warranted as a means of supporting security doctrines in the region that aimed to prevent ‘domestic subversion’ by Communist-backed elements. After the 1953–59 Cuban Revolution, the US Government implemented the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which, in part, provided economic assistance to Latin American military forces providing that human rights and democratic standards were

¹⁰² Pala (note 86).

¹⁰³ Pala (note 86).

¹⁰⁴ Rosas (note 87).

¹⁰⁵ La Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL), *Panorama económico de América Latina y el Caribe* [Economic panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean], Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe-Naciones Unidas: Santiago, 2003).

¹⁰⁶ Mexico has provided electoral assistance (e.g., in East Timor in 2000) and trained electoral personnel (e.g., from Iraq in 2004) in cooperation with the UN. Rosas, M. C., *Irak: el año que vivimos en peligro* [Iraq: the year of living dangerously] (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/Editorial Quimera: Mexico City, 2004), pp. 224–25. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged Mexico to contribute military personnel to PKOs. ‘L’ONU débordée par les opérations de maintien de la paix’ [The UN is overstretched in peacekeeping operations], *Le Monde*, 8 Sep. 2004, URL <<http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3220,36-378226,0.html>>. Participation in PKOs requires congressional approval although recently the Mexican Congress has debated reforms to Article 76 of the Constitution, which requires such approval before the president can deploy troops abroad. The proposed reform may grant the president that authority without the need for congressional approval. In 1998 the Mexican Army provided disaster assistance in Honduras without such consent, but the May 2004 proposal that Mexico should participate in military PKOs in areas of conflict was controversial. ‘Descarta Fox enviar tropas en misiones de paz’ [Fox rejects the idea of sending troops on peace missions], *El Universal*, 13 May 2004, URL <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia_busqueda.html?id_nota=16426&tabla=primera_h>; and ‘Abre Derbez debate sobre envío de tropas’ [Debate opens on troop deployments], *El Universal*, 12 May 2004, URL <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impresonoticia_busqueda.html?id_nota=110775&tabla=nacion_h>; and Rosas (note 87), pp. 109–10, 123–26.

¹⁰⁷ Between 1984 and 1995, the USA was the major provider of arms and military assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cardamore, T., ‘Arms sales to Latin America’, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, vol. 2, no. 53 (Dec. 1997), p. 1, URL <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol2/v2n53arm_body.html>.

met.¹⁰⁸ This aid package was administered essentially by the US Department of State, and assistance continued despite the fact that neither democratic nor human rights were respected in several countries in the region. Following the end of the cold war, however, and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, US military assistance and arms sales to the region have experienced important changes.

The end of the cold war brought a reduction of the defence budgets of the USA and of most Latin American countries, leading in turn to a reduction in arms purchases. Prior to September 2001, there was no threat to international security on the scale of that experienced in the cold war. It therefore became difficult to justify the acquisition of new and sophisticated arms.

The critical domestic situation in Colombia has made it the beneficiary of the most important US military cooperation programmes in Latin America. Colombia currently receives more US military training than any other country. The Colombian Government faces internal conflicts involving guerrillas, drug lords, armed paramilitary forces, the police, and so on. The armed forces and the police battle two leftist rebel groups—the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, or National Liberation Army) and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)—as well as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, or United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), a right-wing umbrella organization of drug traffickers and landowners, who oppose FARC and the ELN.¹⁰⁹

Former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana tried to increase the involvement of the EU and the USA in Colombia's peace and reconciliation process through Plan Colombia.¹¹⁰ The USA approved \$1.3 billion in defence aid for the first three years of the plan's implementation: 82 per cent was to be used in support of the armed forces and the police; aid for vulnerable groups and internal displaced persons totalled 4 per cent; support for law enforcement received 2 per cent; human rights and judicial reform were given 4 per cent; promotion of alternative (i.e., non-drug-based) rural development was allocated 7 per cent; and other social programmes received 1 per cent.¹¹¹ These

¹⁰⁸ A description of the aid programme established by the act is available in USAID, 'About USAID: USAID history', URL <http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html>.

¹⁰⁹ Krujtit, D., 'Uso de política y fuerzas armadas en América Latina y el Caribe en la post guerra fría: ¿nuevos escenarios y tendencias?' [Use of policy and armed forces in Latin America and the Caribbean after the cold war: new scenarios and trends], *Fuerzas armadas y sociedad*, vol. 17, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 2002), p. 54; Dwan, R. and Gustavsson, M., 'Major armed conflicts', *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 101–103; and Borda Medina, E. *et al*, *Conflicto y seguridad democrática en Colombia: Temas críticos y propuestas* [Conflict and democratic security in Colombia: themes, criticism and proposals] (Fundación Social Friedrich Ebert in Colombia/Embajada de la República Federal de Alemania en Colombia: Bogotá, 2004).

¹¹⁰ US Department of State, 'Support for Plan Colombia', 14 Mar. 2001, URL <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/plncol/>>; and Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA), Amnesty International, US Office on Colombia, the Latin America Working Group and the Center for International Policy, 'Plan Colombia: 3 Year Anniversary Report Card, 2003', at URL <http://www.wola.org/Colombia/plan_col_report_card03.pdf>. See also chapters 2 and 8 in this volume.

¹¹¹ The budget approved for 2004 suggests that the total amount will increase to \$3.67 billion. WOLA, Amnesty International, US Office on Colombia, the Latin America Working Group and the

figures confirm the militarization of the US agenda for Colombia, a trend that was reinforced after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Indeed, in 2002 and 2003 the USA expanded the spectrum of its military assistance to Colombia beyond countering drug-trafficking.¹¹² In 2003 the USA helped the Colombian Army to protect an oil pipeline and to re-establish control in Arauca, near the border with Venezuela. In 2003 the USA launched a new programme, Plan Patriota, to recover territories held by FARC.¹¹³ All these initiatives require the physical and official presence, for the first time since World War II, of US troops on South American soil.¹¹⁴

The approach taken in Colombia is being reproduced in other US-sponsored cooperation programmes in the region. As figure 6.1 shows, the USA increasingly favours military and police programmes, which have been growing relative to economic and social programmes since the end of the 1990s. Between 2002 and 2003, the number of Latin American troops trained by the USA increased by 52 per cent, making the region the major recipient worldwide of military training funded by the USA—a surprising result given the lack of any major threat to US security or US interests there.¹¹⁵ Latin America and the Caribbean are of little interest for the USA in terms of a terrorist attack: the countries in the region favour cooperation with the USA, and an alliance between them and the current ‘enemies’ of the USA seems improbable.

The Latin American experience reflects the tendency after the 2001 terrorist attacks for the US Department of Defense to gain influence on foreign policy making at the expense of the Department of State and of a consequent greater emphasis on military solutions. The US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) plays a prominent role in the US foreign policy agenda for the Americas, while issues such as human rights, poverty, indebtedness and environmental pollution have lost salience.¹¹⁶

Center for International Policy (note 110). This proportional allocation of aid is criticized by the EU, which believes that Colombia needs an economic and social solution not a military programme.

¹¹² McDermott, J., ‘Washington increases assistance to Colombia’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 4 Feb. 2004, p. 10; and Bender, B., ‘Visible cracks: Colombian military units are using US training and equipment to take the country’s 40 year civil war to the rebels’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 9 July 2003, pp. 24–27.

¹¹³ Isacson, A., Olson J. and Haugaard, L., *Diluyendo las divisiones: Tendencias de los programas militares de EEUU para América Latina* [Decreasing the divisions: tendencies of the military programmes of the US for Latin America] (Washington Office for Latin America: Washington, DC, Sep. 2004), p. 6; and Burger, K., ‘USA turns up the heat on Colombian insurgents’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 8 Jan. 2003, p. 6.

¹¹⁴ Officially the presence of 800 US military advisers in Colombia has been recognized, although unofficially there seem to be at least 1400. Sennes, R. U., Onuki, J. and de Oliveira, A. J., ‘La política exterior brasileña y la seguridad hemisférica’ [Brazilian foreign politics and hemispheric security], ed. Rosas (note 52), p. 198.

¹¹⁵ Isacson, Olson and Haugaard (note 113), p. 3. See also chapter 8 in this volume.

¹¹⁶ See ‘United States Southern Command’, URL <<http://www.southcom.mil/home/>>. SOUTHCOM’s counterpart, the Northern Command (NORTHCOM), was set up after Sep. 2001. It covers Canada and the USA, Cuba, Mexico and parts of the Caribbean and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Its focus is on US air, territorial and maritime security and natural disasters. Rosas (note 83), p. 63; and ‘U.S. Northern Command’, URL <<http://www.northcom.mil/>>.




Figure 6.1. US assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1997–2005

Figures are in 1997 constant dollars; figures for 2004 are estimated; and figures for 2005 are proposed.

Source: Isacson, A., Olson J. and Haugaard, L., *Diluyendo las divisiones: Tendencias de los programas militares de EEUU para América Latina* [Decreasing the divisions: tendencies of the military programmes of the US for Latin America] (Washington Office for Latin America: Washington, DC, Sep. 2004), p. 10.

The USA pursues the global ‘war on terrorism’ in inter-American relations with other means that do not necessarily receive major funding. Older US programmes for this purpose had limited material and human resources, and there are only two new initiatives in this area: the Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) programme and a Counterterrorism Fellowship administered by the US Department of Defense. Most of ATA’s funding has been used to finance anti-kidnapping programmes in Colombia. Paradoxically, the USA has reduced funding to Latin America for airport and port security and for the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing.¹¹⁷

These actions contrast with the political solidarity shown by the region after the 2001 attacks. Every country in the region condemned the attacks—even Cuba, which the US Department of State designates as a ‘terrorist sponsor’.¹¹⁸ Brazil even invoked the collective security provisions of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, in Spanish *Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca*).¹¹⁹ As elsewhere in the world, this initial

¹¹⁷ Isacson, Olson and Haugaard (note 113), p. 6.

¹¹⁸ Cuban President Fidel Castro deplored the situation and condemned what he considered to be ‘cowardly attacks’ on the USA. International Action Center, ‘Speech by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba’, 22 Sep. 2001, URL <http://www.iacenter.org/fidel_on911.htm>.

¹¹⁹ US Department of State, ‘Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)’, URL <<http://www.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/4369.htm>>. Sennes, Onuki and de Oliveira express the view that the Brazilian Government made this decision in the light of strong US pressure for a formal commitment that was not acceptable to Brazil. Thus, Brazil, knowing that the TIAR was obsolete, invoked its collect-

sympathy for the USA dissipated once the USA developed its 'war on terrorism' strategy, because of the military emphasis of the strategy and the way in which it has conflicted with other important agendas. Part of the problem is rooted in the US Administration's concept of terrorism as a threat that operates everywhere and may attack anywhere at any time, making use of networks involving individuals, groups and states located anywhere.¹²⁰ This definition is wide enough, in the US view, to include Latin America and the Caribbean as an arena for the global war on terrorism.¹²¹

Apart from Colombia, the USA has identified several 'risk zones' where presumed terrorists operate, such as the so-called Tri-Border Region—the area where the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet¹²²—and parts of the Caribbean. The USA considers these 'risk zones' to be 'ungoverned spaces'.¹²³ These assumptions are of concern to the region because of the new slant they have brought to several issues that were important in inter-American relations prior to September 2001: (a) in fighting drug trafficking, the 'narco-terrorist' notion is now applied not only to guerrillas but also to peasants; (b) illegal migrants are considered to be potential 'terrorists' and even possible sources of WMD attack; (c) profit from the violation of intellectual property rules is perceived as a possible source of income to finance terrorist activities; (d) money laundering is viewed in a similar light; and (e) arms trafficking is recognized as a source of aid to terrorists.¹²⁴

Despite criticism in the region of this 'terrorization' of the agenda for inter-American relations, the states of the region have supported the USA in its pursuit of al-Qaeda. For example, they have increased border controls and passed laws to fight the financing of terrorism, making such actions a felony under their legislation. The OAS condemned the 2001 attacks. After UN Security Council Resolution 1373 was passed, representatives of the majority of Latin

ive security provisions as a 'politically friendly' gesture. Sennes, Onuki and de Oliveira (note 114), p. 200., Mexican President Vicente Fox addressed the OAS in Washington, DC, 1 week before the terrorist attacks, explaining that Mexico would withdraw from TIAR. Obviously, the call made by Brazil after the attacks forced Mexico to delay its withdrawal, which finally took place in late 2002.

¹²⁰ On such networks, 'netwars' and the challenges they pose to US and international security see Arquilla, J. and Ronsfeldt, D. (eds), *Netwars and Networks: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* (RAND: Santa Monica, Calif., 2001), URL <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/>>.

¹²¹ Haugaard, L. *et al.*, *September's Shadow: Post-9/11 U.S.–Latin American Relations* (Washington Office for Latin America: Washington, DC, Sep. 2004), p. 2.

¹²² Terrorism did not begin on 11 Sep. 2001. Argentina suffered 2 deadly attacks in 1992 and 1994. Intelligence and information gathering and exchange with neighbouring countries were thus conducted in the 1990s and remain a matter of great concern to the Tri-Border Region countries because terrorist threats have been made against them since Sep. 2001. De Lima e Silva, M. M., *9/11, Terrorism and Brazil: Facts about the Tri-Border Region* (Hispanic American Center for Economic Research: Miami, Fla., 2003), p. 2.

¹²³ The Tri-Border Region has long been considered a sanctuary for terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which can obtain funding there. Trafficking in weapons and drugs, smuggling, money laundering and document forgery take place in the region. Nonetheless, the '3 + 1 Mechanism', an initiative endorsed by Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay plus the USA, in 2003 denied that the terrorist organizations operate in the area. Haugaard *et al.* (note 121), p. 3.

¹²⁴ Olson, J., 'Terrorism: stop inflating the concept', *Cross Currents* (Washington Office for Latin America: Washington, DC, June 2004), pp. 1, 3.

American countries appeared before the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee to explain the measures they had developed to fight terrorism and the legislation they had passed or were in the process of ratifying.¹²⁵

The 2003 war against Iraq caused much criticism of the USA in the region. Chile and Mexico found themselves in a particularly difficult position as non-permanent members of the Security Council, where they consequently were exposed to strong pressure to support the USA's interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1441 as allowing the use of force in Iraq.¹²⁶ Neither state succumbed to this pressure. However, a group of Central American countries plus Colombia and the Dominican Republic joined the 'coalition of the willing' in March–April 2003, thereby providing support to the USA and helping it to legitimize the war against Iraq.

Later, in March 2004, a smaller group of Latin American countries including the Dominican Republic,¹²⁷ El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua¹²⁸ sent troops to Iraq, which were deployed in the area administered by Spain. The withdrawal of Spanish troops announced by Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in April 2004 occurred when he took office. Honduras also announced that, once its contingent had completed its tour of duty in June 2004, the Honduran commitment would not be renewed.¹²⁹ Nicaragua withdrew its troops in February 2004, citing budget constraints, and the Dominican Republic, in the light of its forthcoming presidential elections, also withdrew its troops. The only Latin American country with troops still in Iraq is El Salvador, in spite of the death of one of its soldiers there, and the growing criticism from Salvadoreans.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ For UN Security Council Resolution 1373, 28 Sep. 2001, see URL <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm>>. On the Committee see URL <<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/>>; and Biersteker, T. J., 'Counter-terrorism measures undertaken under UN Security Council auspices', eds A. J. K. Bailes and I. Frommelt, SIPRI, *Business and Security: Public–Private Sector Relationships in a New Security Environment* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 60–63, 64–66, 73.

¹²⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 Nov. 2002.

¹²⁷ The contribution made by each country was symbolic: they sent 115–380 troops. 'Latino-americanos celebran la navidad en Irak' [Latin Americans celebrate Christmas in Iraq], *El Nuevo Herald*, 25 Dec. 2003, URL <<http://www.miami.com/mld/elnuevo/news/world/americas/7566627.htm>>; and 'Trillo visita a las tropas españolas desplegadas en Irak' [Trillo visits the Spanish troops deployed in Iraq], *IbInews*, 27 Sep. 2003, URL <<http://www.iblnews.com/news/print.php3?id=87880>>.

¹²⁸ To explain the participation of Central American countries in Iraq, it seems that this decision was made due to the ongoing negotiations with the USA to negotiate the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and, especially in the cases of El Salvador and Honduras, because of the migration agreements that make it possible for Hondurans and Salvadoreans to work in the USA and send their remittances to their homelands. These remittances are the most important source of capital flows for Central America, and for Latin America in general.

¹²⁹ Honduras had been strongly criticized at home and abroad in Mar.–Apr. 2004 for its proposal that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva send a rapporteur to Cuba at the same time that it condemned the human rights situation in Cuba. Honduras was seemingly unwilling to make another political concession to the USA, especially given that Cuba sponsors several social programmes in Honduras. Honduran President Ricardo Maduro also needed popular support to conclude free trade negotiations with the USA. Associated Press, 'Honduras rejects 25 medical scholarships from Cuba', 18 Apr. 2005, URL <<http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/redir.php?jid=8ec275c116227aa1&cat=d3ec65f36ba00308>>.

¹³⁰ Rosas, M. C., '¡Ay! esos hermanos latinoamericanos en Irak: ¡sálvese el que pueda!' [Oh! those Latin American brothers in Iraq: Save the ones you can], *Siempre!*, 23 May 2004, p. 55.

The benefits gained by the Central American states and the Dominican Republic from these contributions are unclear. The USA did not increase military assistance to these countries, and economic assistance to El Salvador, which showed more solidarity with the USA than other countries in the region, actually dropped. The USA gave El Salvador \$40.4 million in aid in 2003, and was expected to provide only \$28.89 million in 2005.¹³¹

VII. Conclusions

The influence of the US agenda on inter-American relations is undeniable, despite the marginal importance the USA now grants to Latin America and the Caribbean in its foreign policy. Some initiatives promoted autonomously by countries in the region have, however, introduced alternative emphases into the security debate. One of these was the OAS Special Conference on Security, held on 27–28 October 2003 in Mexico City, after years of preparation and effort in the OAS framework. This conference not only recognized the contributions to the reconceptualization of security made by states such as those in Central America (democratic security), but also accepted the concept of security as multidimensional, a term embracing all the concerns that OAS member states may have about their security without exclusion or hierarchy. The 2003 OAS Declaration on Security in the Americas¹³² underlined that, although the USA considers terrorism the most important threat to its security, other OAS member states have other worries: in Central America and the Caribbean natural disasters usually become threats to security; in Colombia the war on drugs is an obvious priority; organized crime and violent gangs ('maras') have expanded and affect Central America, Mexico and the USA, and so on. The states of the region have thus refused to make terrorism the only, or dominant, item on their security agenda. This approach has attracted the attention of the United Nations, which is simultaneously celebrating its 60th anniversary and facing a reform process. The war on terrorism has favoured the debate on security over the debate on development; the multi-dimensional profile of security suggested by the OAS can reconcile both.

Latin America and the Caribbean have not profited as much as might be expected from their generally low military expenditure, relatively peaceful environment, the existence of democratic governments and reform of the military. In many respects, the very fact that the region has become a more or less stable zone allows the major powers to shift their focus to more problematic and 'critical' areas. Nevertheless, it is very much in the interest of the USA and the international community that the region remains stable and prosperous. If the USA does not pay the necessary attention, it is a permanent task that the countries of the region must take upon themselves, but the worst-case

¹³¹ Haugaard *et al.* (note 121), p. 5.

¹³² US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 'Results of the OAS Special Conference on Security', 29 Oct. 2003, URL <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/26001.htm>>.

scenario would be one where the situation deteriorates especially owing to economic and social constraints. ECLAC, for instance, considers that few countries in the region are capable of accomplishing their millennium development goals. ECLAC analysed 18 countries of which only 7 could reduce poverty by 2015 if the economic indicators of these countries continue the trends shown in the 1990s.¹³³

More worrisome is the dependence of Latin America and the Caribbean on external developments. According to ECLAC, the region witnessed a growth rate of 5.5 per cent in 2004, mostly because of the dynamism shown by the US economy and, above all, the Chinese economy.¹³⁴ Should the Chinese or US economy experience a slowdown, this would have an adverse effect on Latin America and the Caribbean.

Another challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean is domestic violence and social unrest, which are linked, in part, to the inequitable distribution of wealth and the fragility of the region's political institutions.

In this respect, the security agenda should not be divorced from the development agenda. Security and development are two sides of the same coin. As shown above, Latin America and the Caribbean countries face practically every known variety of threat in the societal–security and national–transnational areas. Yet the governments of the region have treated the trade, health, education, anti-corruption, security, judicial and political agendas independently, almost ignoring the interdependence and complementarities between them.

In reality, none of these threats and risks can be addressed in isolation, or in a single community. They demand a collective effort, which in turn means overcoming past and recent rivalries. Brazil and Mexico are key players in this equation: if they do not come to an understanding on fundamental matters, they will contribute to a kind of 'Balkanization' of the region. Political reconciliation is thus the starting point for addressing national, regional and international security agendas. In its absence, all the countries of the region will remain vulnerable to the intrusions and demands of the USA, as shown in the evolution of inter-American relations before and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

¹³³ UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Hacia el objetivo del milenio de reducir la pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe* [Toward the millennium objective of reducing poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean], (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: Santiago, 2003), URL <<http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/4/12544/P12544.xml&xsl=/deype/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl>>.

¹³⁴ ECLAC, *Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe* [Preliminary balance of Latin American and Caribbean economies] (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: Santiago, 2004), URL <<http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/9/20479/P20479.xml&xsl=/de/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl>>.