3. Multilateral peace missions: challenges of peace-building

RENATA DWAN and SHARON WIHARTA

I. Introduction

A total of 11 new multilateral peace missions were launched in 2004. With the exception of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), all of these missions followed a previous international or regional peace operation and addressed, albeit in different contexts and phases, peacekeeping and peace-building in internal conflict. Seven of the 11 new missions were carried out by regional organizations: two by the African Union (AU)—AMIS and the Military Observer Mission to the Comoros (MIOC); two by the European Union (EU)—the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) and the EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ALTHEA); one by NATO—the NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq (NTIM-I); and two by the Organization of American States (OAS)—the OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti and the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA, Misión para Apoyar el Proceso de Paz en Colombia). The remaining four new missions—the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti) and the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB, Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi)—were UN operations. 1 A total of 35 operations were carried out by regional organizations and UN-sanctioned non-standing coalitions of states, with a total of 225 385 military and civilian personnel deployed. 2

It is against this backdrop that the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change presented its report to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in December 2004. The initial purpose of the panel, convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General in the wake of the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, was not to address UN peace operations but, as its report pointed out, ‘peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in civil wars have become the operational face of the United Nations in international peace and security’. 3

1 ALTHEA took over from NATO’s Stabilization Force, and UNOCI followed the closure of the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d’Ivoire.
2 Of this number, 173 000 personnel were deployed to the Multinational Force in Iraq, which constitutes 77% of the total number of personnel deployed.

SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Table 3.1. Number of peace missions conducted by the United Nations, regional organizations and non-standing coalitions worldwide, 1995–2004

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<td>UN peace missions (DPKO- and DPA-administered)</td>
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DPKO = UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DPA = UN Department of Political Affairs.

Source: SIPRI peacekeeping missions database.

This was reflected in the 64,000 military and civilian police personnel and 4000 civilian personnel deployed in 21 UN missions in 2004. Any discussion of the future role of the UN and of how consensus on it could be built will inevitably, therefore, give substantial attention to multilateral engagement in peace efforts. In this context, the High-level Panel’s report drew particular attention to the challenge of post-conflict peace-building. Peace-building is an increasingly important dimension of multilateral peace missions: for 17 of the UN missions launched since 1999, peace-building tasks are included in their mandates, while a growing number of the operations of regional organizations and non-standing coalitions of states explicitly encompass activities that meet the UN’s definition of peace-building, described below.

This chapter examines the question of peace-building in the context of multilateral peace missions. Section II traces the evolution of the concept of peace-building by the UN in the 1990s, while section III identifies the challenges of magnitude and of legitimacy of the current peace-building agenda. Section IV examines four specific dimensions of this agenda that were prominent in 2004: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); the rule of law; economic reconstruction; and elections. Section V concludes by surveying possible responses to the challenges of peace-building.

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II. The evolution of peace-building in multilateral peace missions

Peace-building is a post-cold war concept and practice. The term first appeared in the 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, in which UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined it broadly as ‘action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict’.5 The introduction of peace-building as a legitimate area for UN attention reflected post-cold war optimism about the potential for international collective action to resolve violent conflict among and within states. An emerging consensus that conflict, particularly the intra-state conflicts dominating the 1990s, was inextricably linked with underdevelopment and inequality facilitated increased UN engagement in the management of peace. Peace-building went beyond physical security and reconstruction: it involved non-military instruments and addressed the political, social and economic development of a post-conflict society.

While An Agenda for Peace noted the importance of including peace-building in peace-making and peacekeeping operations so as to ‘consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people’,6 peace-building was initially seen as a strategy that followed, rather than accompanied, UN peace missions. It was a way of mobilizing international assistance to enable the post-conflict state to make the transition from a short-term focus on security to a longer-term focus on development. This sequential approach was exemplified by the creation of UN peace-building support offices in Liberia (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1999) and the Central African Republic (2000). All of these initiatives followed a multilateral peace operation, involved only civilian personnel and operated under a relatively broad mandate. A large part of their task was to coordinate and harmonize the activities of different UN agencies present in the country.

The increase in complex UN peace operations in the 1990s—involving significant civilian as well as military components and with mandates that included disarmament, human rights, election monitoring, refugee return and support for the rebuilding of state institutions—demonstrated the difficulty of a linear progression from peacemaking, via peacekeeping to peace-building. Many of the conflicts in which the UN and other international actors were engaged throughout the 1990s proved resistant to such an orderly sequence. Relapse into armed conflict, sporadic political violence and public disorder were persistent challenges for peace operations deploying to civil conflicts. These challenges led to increased emphasis on the need for an earlier start to peace-building activities to provide incentives to commit to peace as well as to build confidence in its potential durability among post-conflict populations.


6 UN (note 5), para. 55.
The UN acknowledged the need for peacekeepers to engage in immediate peace-building in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace but stressed that this was a temporary and contingent activity: a multifunctional peace operation should turn over responsibility for ‘the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights activities’ identified as the tasks of peace-building to the appropriate UN agencies and offices as soon as conditions permitted.7 This caution was motivated, in part, by a recognition of the lengthy nature of peace-building and of the unsuitability of short-term peacekeeping operations drawn primarily from military personnel seconded by UN member states to take on responsibility for it. It was also a reflection of the politics surrounding international peace-building: the increased engagement of European regional organizations in the Balkans during the 1990s meant that peace-building was no longer the exclusive preserve of UN missions. Complex peace operations involved a host of different actors—UN, regional organization and state actors as well as non-governmental organizations—operating independently of each other with little coordination and often in fierce competition. The result, as the peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated, made the task of peace-building even more difficult to define and implement.

The most significant test of the international commitment to identify and support structures to consolidate peace came in 1999, when the UN assumed responsibility for the post-conflict administration first of Kosovo and subsequently of East Timor. The military interventions that preceded these operations rested on the contention that the states in question (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Indonesia, respectively) had failed to protect the human rights of the populations of their territories. These operations testified to a view that conflict was a consequence not only of a lack of development but also of the way in which a society was governed. The assertion of the primacy of human rights made sovereignty conditional on the extent to which the state guaranteed and protected those rights.8 Kosovo and East Timor brought the UN into the business of state administration and governance as a temporary replacement for a state that was judged to have ‘failed’ in its obligations. In this context, peace-building addressed the functioning of the state. It was intended to assist the replacement of dysfunctional and illegitimate structures with durable institutions that would protect the rights of the population and sustain peace.

While the UN has so far not sought to take on additional transitional administrations, the remits of all UN peace operations launched since 1999 have explicitly included tasks addressing the reconstruction of the state, and peace-building perspectives have shaped the development of regional organi-

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organizations’ peace operations, particularly those of the EU. The consequences of
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, and the US and European
identification and prioritization of ‘failed states’ as a security threat, have
maintained momentum for the understanding of peace-building as a form of
state-building.9 In the process, this has opened the potential for peace-building
to expand beyond post-conflict contexts to become a ‘pre-emptive’ or pre-
ventive strategy.10 The December 2004 report of the High-level Panel, with its
focus on prevention, articulated the emerging norm: ‘there is a clear
international obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to perform
their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly’.11

III. The challenges of the peace-building agenda

From one perspective, peace-building could be seen as a conservative inter-
national activity, an effort to maintain the sovereign state as the cornerstone of
the international system. Peace-building builds on the assumption that the state
is the best framework to prevent international and domestic anarchy and con-


Commission on Weak States and US National Security, Washington, DC, 8 June 2004, URL
10 Tschirgi, N., Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges, Paper
presented at the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) International/International Peace Academy (IPA)
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/78367.pdf>; and The White House, ‘The
11 UN (note 3), p. 83.
population was illiterate, compared to 36.7 per cent in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. In Afghanistan, 20 per cent of children died before the age of five years in 2004. In the eastern provinces of the DRC, the number of victims of sexual violence was estimated to have increased thirtyfold in 2003. The World Health Organization estimates that 8 million people worldwide died as a result of disease in 1999 in conflict-ridden countries. The extent of human suffering and the substantial humanitarian assistance response it demands distracts from as well as shapes the process of state-building. In addition, the creation of structures and order after conflict does not take place in a vacuum but has to confront informal power structures, economies and social mechanisms that emerge during and after conflict to replace or provide alternatives to formal structures. The presence of warlords and shadow economies in, for example, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone are obvious examples of the structures that need to be dismantled by a peace-building process before state-building can even begin.

The magnitude of the task requires priorities in peace-building. A fair degree of consensus has emerged in the past few years on the tasks to be accomplished, and there is some agreement on the order in which they should be tackled. This order is based on the idea of a hierarchy of political goods provided by the state. The first and prime function of the state is to provide security and, correspondingly, the first priority of post-conflict peace-building is to re-establish it. This includes the maintenance of ceasefires between warring parties and their disarmament, the establishment of secure borders, the ‘renationalization’ of the use of force and the prevention of violence within the society. The second priority area is the establishment of functioning law and order within the society. The current emphasis on the importance of the rule of law for post-conflict peace-building reflects the lessons from peace operations in the past decade that economic reconstruction and social

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rehabilitation cannot proceed without legal and administrative structures and mechanisms in place. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo offer two clear examples of this.\footnote{Crawford, C., ‘Winning the peace? Identifying best practices in mature peace processes’, \textit{Lessons Learned and Best Practices from the Western Balkans}, Conference Proceedings no. 1 (Folke Bernadotte Academy: Stockholm, Oct. 2003).} Law and order tasks also include restorative and retributive justice to set in motion social reconciliation and confidence building.\footnote{Wiharta, S., ‘Post-conflict justice: developments in international courts’, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security} (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 191–206.} The third and fourth priority areas for peace-building are social and economic reconstruction and governance and participation. Here there is less consensus on the order of priorities. It is clear that a basic degree of economic reconstruction is a prerequisite for building confidence among post-conflict societies before potentially divisive political processes are undertaken. Some, however, claim that the establishment of legitimate and effective government is a necessary basis for sustainable economic reconstruction, which may be a lengthy and destabilizing process involving painful market-oriented reforms.\footnote{See, e.g., Paris, R., \textit{At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict} (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004); and Stewart, F. and Fitzgerald V. (eds), \textit{War and Underdevelopment}, vol. 1, \textit{The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict} (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001).}

The domestic focus of peace-building tends to make it an introspective process. Experiences over the past decade, however, have demonstrated the importance of regional dynamics for post-conflict peace-building. The tasks of multilateral peace operations are influenced to a significant degree by the politics and actions of neighbouring states. Afghanistan’s relative stability after the US-led overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, some have argued, is as much a function of a benign regional environment as of the international presence in the country.\footnote{Dobbins, J. \textit{et al.}, \textit{America’s Role in Nation-Building} (Rand: Santa Monica, Calif., 2003), p. 138; and Chesterman, S., ‘Bush, the United Nations and nation-building’, \textit{Survival}, vol. 46, no.1 (spring 2004), pp. 101–16.} The continued instability of eastern DRC, by contrast, is significantly influenced by the policies of neighbouring Rwanda.\footnote{For further details of the conflict in the DRC in 2004 see chapter 2 in this volume.} However, the mandate for a multilateral peace mission, whether UN or non-UN, is usually focused on the state in question and provides the international community with little scope to engage with and in neighbouring states. In the past few years there has been some effort to redress the missing regional dimension in international peace-building efforts: in the Balkans, for instance, donor states and regional organizations have been behind a drive for regional cooperation to address shared problems such as organized crime.\footnote{See, e.g., European Commission, ‘The EU’s actions in support to the Stabilisation & Association Process’, URL <http://europa.eu.int/com/external_relations/see/actions/sap.htm>; the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, at URL <http://www.stabilitypact.org> and in the glossary in this volume; and the Southeast European Countries Initiative, URL <http://www.seeitkr.org.tr/index_eng.html>.} The three UN missions in West Africa, meanwhile, have formally agreed to coordinate in a number of areas, including DDR and joint cross-border patrolling to prevent arms smuggling and the movement of combatants.\footnote{UN Security Council Resolution 1528, 27 Feb. 2004.}
The magnitude of peace-building is complicated by the time frame in which it is undertaken. Peace-building attempts to compress into a few years evolutions that have taken centuries. The limited duration of most international peace operations is a particular problem for effective peace-building. If the process is too short, the risk of a return to conflict is high. Haiti's relapse into conflict in 2004, after six peace missions over the past 10 years, is the most potent illustration of the dangers of the international community departing before post-conflict state structures and processes are sufficiently stable and durable to provide public security, welfare and opportunities for development. The question of time frame is complicated by the lack of any international mechanisms to objectively assess when the structures of a state have reached a level of stability that can make peace-building self-sustaining. In the absence of such mechanisms, the end of an international peace-building operation is determined more by the political interests, priorities and financial resources of the states and organizations involved than by a comprehensive assessment of the needs of the post-conflict state.\footnote{Dobbins \textit{et al.} (note 19); and Chesterman, S., Ignatieff, M. and Thakur, R., \textit{Making States Work: From State Failure to State-Building}, International Peace Academy–United Nations University project report (International Peace Academy: New York, July 2004), URL <http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/MAKING_STATES_WORK.pdf>.
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Greater international awareness of the minimum time commitment required for peace-building was evident in January 2005 when, for the first time, the UN Secretary-General outlined the envisaged period of a peace operation—seven years—in the case of the planned UN peace support operation in Sudan.\footnote{UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, UN Security Council document S/2005/57, 31 Jan. 2005, URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/da/dad.htm>.
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While the demands of peace-building in unstable environments require a large security presence and while many personnel from the less developed countries can relate to the operational and practical challenges of a peace-building environment, traditional military peacekeepers do not have the skills to perform peace-building tasks. Peace-building as state-building requires sizeable civilian resources and experts in civil administration, management, judicial and penal management, and financial auditing. The lack of such capacity is not confined to the UN: regional organizations and individual states are encountering similar problems in identifying, recruiting and deploying experts with careers in their own countries. Even when such individuals are recruited for international service, they face significant challenges in negotiating systems of government of which they have no experience or knowledge.
The scope of the peace-building challenge has an impact on cost. Peace-building is an expensive proposition and the present system for funding falls far short in terms of total amount, coherence and duration. While UN peace operations, in contrast to the ad hoc funding mechanisms of regional organizations’ operations, are funded from the assessed peacekeeping budgets, substantive peace-building programmes such as DDR, elections and rule-of-law reform are entirely reliant on voluntary contributions, usually raised at ad hoc donor conferences on individual countries. Such a mechanism does not promote sustainability, produces pledges that often do not materialize and encourages rival bidding for fashionable projects. Moreover, donor conferences raise funds for a country immediately after conflict at the time when it is least capable of absorbing it. Recent research by the World Bank suggests that the average period of time for which donor assistance is needed for sustainable peace-building is approximately a decade and that the optimal rate of aid ‘absorption’ (the capacity to manage aid) occurs only in the fourth or fifth year.

Coordination in donor assistance is central. Recently improved mechanisms include comprehensive post-conflict needs assessments, carried out jointly by the UN, the World Bank and the state in question to determine funding needs and longer-term reconstruction plans, as well as trust funds to manage the immediate influx of post-conflict aid. A good example of such improved mechanisms was the Afghanistan Interim Administration Fund, an unearmarked fund for start-up and recurrent costs established during the transition phase preceding the convening of the December 2003 Loya Jirga (Grand Council). Efforts to improve pooling of donor assistance around thematic clusters in 2004 included the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the International Reconstruction Trust Fund Facility for Iraq.

Legitimacy challenges

The issue of legitimacy is a serious, although less frequently addressed, challenge for peace-building. Contemporary peace-building as state-building is founded on the assumption that a particular type of state can best guarantee human rights and development, that is, one founded on democratic principles. In today’s globalized world, the democratic state has taken on a particular paradigm—the liberal market economy state. Large parts of the industrialized world hold this paradigm to be the most efficient and sustainable model for democratic statehood and the model for developing countries. Thus, peace-building not only involves external actors in the internal workings of the state but also prescribes the direction of that transformation. This is a highly political endeavour that raises important questions of legitimacy at the international and local levels.

The international legitimacy dimension is most often raised in the debate on the right to intervene, in which the sanction of the UN, as the primary authority in the maintenance of international peace and security, is central. This has been particularly sensitive in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, where multilateral peace missions are a consequence of regime overthrow by US-led interventions. Peace-building pushes the debate on legitimate authority further in raising the issue of what the tasks of international interveners are in a country and what the ‘responsibility to protect’ implies for post-conflict peace-building. What this responsibility entails for the substantive tasks and duties of multilateral peace missions has not yet been spelled out. For some states, the state-building focus of contemporary peace operations is not a part of the international responsibility: rather, it is an infringement of sovereignty and perceived to be more serving of a ‘Western agenda’ than of the human rights of the population in question.

Competing views as to what constitutes the appropriate scope of activity of the international community during and after conflict complicate the already difficult task of coordinating multilateral peace-building. For some, regional organizations or multinational coalitions represent a better framework for peace-building. Apart from the greater probability of reaching consensus on the tasks involved, regional organizations, motivated by self-interest in stability in the immediate neighbourhood, are seen to be more likely to commit the time and resources required for peace-building and, potentially, to share common historical and cultural traditions with the post-conflict country. Such links, however, risk partisanship by regional organizations, while the

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presence of a regional hegemon can further skew the impartiality on which legitimacy depends.\textsuperscript{37}

In reality, only a few European and Euro-Atlantic organizations possess the resource capabilities to undertake peace-building. The EU’s takeover of peace operations from the UN and NATO in the Balkans stands in contrast to the pattern in Africa, where large UN peace operations have replaced shorter and limited operations of ECOWAS and the AU. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the continued increase in the number of peace operations carried out by regional organizations in 2004, regional actors provide an important resource for international peace and security management in terms of quick response, military prowess and targeted regional or specialist attention.\textsuperscript{38} Resources alone, however, cannot replace legitimacy. This was clearly demonstrated in the significant efforts which the USA expended to secure UN sanction for and engagement in the post-war operation in Iraq, both during the US-led coalition’s period as an occupying authority and in the context of its subsequent role in leading the Multinational Force after Iraq regained sovereignty. The High-level Panel reiterated the call for greater engagement of regional and sub-regional groups in peace operations as well as alliance organizations, notably NATO, while underscoring that this can only take place within the framework of the UN Charter and the purposes of the UN. It explicitly recommended that UN Security Council authorization be sought for operations carried out by regional organizations.\textsuperscript{39}

The other, frequently neglected aspect of legitimacy is that derived from the acceptance and support of local populations and their leaders. Local legitimacy extends beyond the initial invitation or acceptance of the host state of an international presence on its territory. Rather, it is a dynamic factor that is crucial for the success of peace-building as state-building and can be gained or lost over the course of an operation. At their worst, international peace operations personnel have perpetrated the same crimes and human rights abuses on civilian populations as those carried out in conflict. The allegations of widespread rape by peacekeepers in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo) in 2004, as well as repeated incidences of the involvement of UN and NATO military and civilian personnel in human trafficking in the Balkans in the 1990s, testify to the way in which legitimacy can be lost as a result of actions on the part of an internationally mandated peace mission.\textsuperscript{40} The lack of accountability of


\textsuperscript{39} UN (note 3), pp. 85–86.

\textsuperscript{40} Lacey, M., ‘In Congo war, even peacekeepers add to horror’, New York Times, 18 Dec. 2004, p. 1; and Amnesty International (AI), ‘So does it mean that we have the rights?’: protecting the human rights
multilateral peacekeepers to the local communities which they profess to serve remains a serious problem and one on which the High-level Panel Report remains silent.

Even in the absence of criminal activity, international peace operations and their personnel have been routinely criticized for failing to engage local populations in the transformation they seek to set in motion and in being non-responsive to local perspectives and concerns. Recent research and UN policy discussions have sought to emphasize the significance of local engagement and ownership in peace-building on grounds of legitimacy as well as on grounds of achieving practical success in peace-building.\textsuperscript{41} What this also suggests is that the scope and pace of peace-building should be determined by the perspectives and priorities of local actors.

Identifying local partners and working closely together is not, however, a straightforward task. It necessitates going beyond wartime leaders, government and economic elites and often discredited or dysfunctional representative structures, such as parliaments, without further undermining the fragile authority of post-conflict governments. It involves consulting and engaging with actors that reflect the society’s ethnic, religious, gender and social composition. It requires distinguishing between the groups and individuals willing and able to play a part in peace-building and those ‘spoilers’ who threaten the effort, while at the same time avoiding becoming bogged down in local feuds and rivalries.\textsuperscript{42} It involves an open position towards approaches and initiatives coming from the local community, some of which may appear to challenge the models and priorities of international actors, while, at the same time, driving through key reforms, such as DDR, that are a prerequisite for peace-building. These are sensitive and time-consuming tasks and highly demanding for multilateral peace operations that may initially have little access to or knowledge of the country in question.

IV. Dimensions of the peace-building agenda

A number of prominent issues in 2004 highlighted how the challenges of magnitude and legitimacy intersect to make the practical tasks of peace-building difficult to address. This section examines four of these issues.


Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration occupied a prominent role on the international policy agenda in 2004, after almost a decade of relative inattention. The primary reason was the recognition of the lack of success of most recent international DDR efforts and the consequences of this failure for the resumption of conflict. DDR is a crucial component of post-conflict peacebuilding as a prerequisite for ending violence and the re-establishment of the state’s legitimate monopoly of coercive force. Iraq in 2004 testified to the perils of not engaging in systematic disarmament and demobilization: the 2003 disbanding of the Iraqi armed forces without the provision of compensation, retraining or employment for former soldiers and without any weapon collection or management programmes resulted in the presence of large numbers of unemployed trained fighters and thousands of weapons on the streets with consequent violent results. Equally significant are the social and economic functions of DDR, which in many post-conflict contexts provide the principal short-term mechanisms to assist large sectors of the population to establish means and capabilities to earn a sustainable peacetime livelihood.

Seventeen current multilateral peace operations—nine UN and eight non-UN operations—have DDR tasks in their mandate. The scope and magnitude of DDR processes, however, make them difficult to strategize, coordinate, fund and implement. They face enormous structural challenges, too: unstable and violent environments, divided and bitter communities and a very real ‘security dilemma’ facing former fighters. In 2004, only one DDR operation was seen to have met its goals with any degree of success, the five-year programme in Sierra Leone. The programme was administered by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and funded by over 10 international donors. It resulted in the disarmament and demobilization of over 72,000 fighters (almost 7000 of whom were child soldiers) at a cost of $36.5 million. Nonetheless, experts warned that Sierra Leone still faced substantive reintegration and reconciliation challenges with high unemployment, particularly among young men.

Four criticisms of DDR programmes have been highlighted: (a) that they are too often politically constrained; (b) that international-led efforts lack adequate planning, coordination and funding; (c) that they fail to include all stakeholders in the society, particularly women and children; and (d) that they focus on the disarmament and demobilization components and neglect reintegration. The first weakness reflects the peace negotiation context in which DDR programmes are usually initiated. Although agreement to demobilize armed forces is crucial in order to persuade all sides to lay down arms, the terms of a ceasefire or peace agreement can present real dilemmas for the inclusion of a

43 For further detail on the conflict in Iraq in 2004 see chapter 2 in this volume.
comprehensive DDR process from the outset. Afghanistan is a clear example of the complexities involved: the political bargains enshrined in the 2001 Bonn Agreement as well as the US-led coalition’s emphasis on militarily defeating the remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the country shored up, rather than undercut, the continued political and military influence of key warlords. The most obvious example of this was the militia forces loyal to the Minister of Defence of the Afghan interim government, Mohammad Qaseem Fahim, only 5 per cent of which entered the DDR programme. The lack of progress in DDR in Afghanistan contributed to the deterioration of the security situation throughout the country in 2004 as fragile power-sharing arrangements between different factions broke down.

The failure to initiate demobilization of armed groups is not always a function of the compromises involved in reaching a peace settlement. In the case of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) made no attempt to disarm and demobilize the main Kurdish militia groups nor the militia forces that sprang up throughout the country in the wake of the defeat of the Iraqi regime, in part because of a desire not to provoke an argument about the future political order of the country. The more violent the insurgency became, the more the occupation forces, and subsequently the interim government of Iraq, came to depend on militia groups for the maintenance of law and order in Iraqi towns and cities. In many cases, DDR involves incorporating former rebel groups into the reformed national armed forces, as in the cases of Afghanistan, Burundi and the DRC. This can make DDR hostage to progress on the government side in charting national security reform and, moreover, may compromise the status of the new security forces in the eyes of significant sectors of the population.

A second weakness of DDR processes is the lack of adequate planning and coordination, linked to which is the perennial lack of funding for DDR operations. Even where agreement to disarm and demobilize formally exists, it is more often than not only partially implemented. Demobilization, in the sense of dismantling former military units, often takes place without any real disarmament, as, for example, in Haiti in both 1994 and 2004. This is in part because most DDR processes rest on voluntary disarmament and thus the international presence has to provide incentives for former combatants to give up their weapons. In most cases, this necessitates the international presence providing a safe environment in which the collection and destruction of weap-
ons can be undertaken. In Afghanistan, for instance, widespread insecurity and the confinement of most of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the capital Kabul until 2003 constrained the Japanese-led DDR effort.\(^49\) Such DDR progress as did take place focused on disarmament, primarily heavy weapon cantonment carried out by ISAF, but was undermined by the lack of a system to store arms and guard cantonment sites.\(^50\)

Another issue is the lack of accurate knowledge about the number of irregular combatant forces and small arms and light weapons circulating in the country. This complicates DDR planning, as the experience in Liberia demonstrated in 2003–2004. The launch of the disarmament and demobilization phase by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in December 2003 was a fiasco when more than 12 000 combatants (out of an estimated 45 000) presented themselves at the opening of a cantonment site outside the capital Monrovia, overwhelming the facilities and turning to violence when they learned that they would not immediately receive benefits.\(^51\) The ensuing serious riots in Monrovia forced the suspension of the DDR programme until adequate preparation had taken place including ‘sensitization’ of combatants, the provision of information regarding numbers of combatants and their weapons to UNMIL and the establishment of cantonment sites around the country.

The disarmament components of most DDR programmes centre on the provision of monetary and other incentives to disarm. This approach can be easily abused, however, where small arms are widely available and where the payment is lucrative. The price offered for such arms in Sadr City in October 2004 by the interim government of Iraq was criticized by many as overgenerous and ultimately ineffective as a replacement weapon could be purchased at a lower price.\(^52\) The DDR programme under way in Côte d’Ivoire offers $900 in subsistence payments spread out over 6 months for the approximately 30 000 fighters scheduled to participate and is seen as a potential good model for future DDR programmes.\(^53\) It does demonstrate, however, the significant funds required to even launch a DDR process. This has remained a substantial problem, for example in Liberia, when at the start of a fresh DDR programme in April 2004 the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Trust Fund for DDR had received pledges of only $11.3 million of


\(^{50}\) UN (note 46).


the estimated cost of $50 million.54 The High-level Panel Report proposed to provide DDR processes with more regular and sustainable funding through including provisions for DDR assistance programmes in the assessed budgets for UN peacekeeping operations.55

A third weakness of DDR programmes that is commonly identified is the focus on ex-fighters. For some groups in the community, the programmes may appear to be rewarding the perpetrators of violence and crime and must therefore be accompanied by initiatives targeted at the wider community. In that context DDR must be seen to be compatible with any truth and reconciliation process under way. In Mozambique, for example, ritual purification ceremonies run by traditional healers and involving the whole community facilitated the reintegration of former combatants.56 Equally significant is the importance of distinguishing the different categories of combatants and, in particular, providing for the specific needs of child soldiers and women combatants. Child and women fighters are a particularly significant issue in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Swift family reunification is a crucial component in assisting child soldiers to make the transition to peace as well as specially focused education programmes. Women combatants, many of whom have been abducted for sexual services, are often neglected in programmes that concentrate on armed groups or are treated only in the context of their male partners. The social and economic reintegration of these women into society is often complex as, in addition to and as a consequence of the legacy of sexual abuse, they may be rejected by their families and communities.57

Ultimately, the area in which DDR has had least success is in providing for the medium-term reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities of origin or new communities. The most significant problem is the failure to provide for or generate alternative sources of employment and revenue for ex-combatants, without which the prospects for long-term peace-building are dim. Economic development programmes are also often conceived of and developed separately from the DDR process, with other priorities such as economic liberalization dominating strategy.58 Delays in the start of economic activities and the end of disarmament and demobilization hamper the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants and encourage their entry into criminal activities. DDR in Mozambique, in the past seen as a success, is being reassessed in the light of the growth of widespread organized crime at

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55 UN (note 3), p. 72.


58 Pouligny (note 56).
the hands of gangs of former combatants. High unemployment among ex-combatants in Haiti resulted in the rise of armed criminal gangs that in turn were used increasingly by the embattled government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to maintain power. These examples testify to the threat to peace-building posed by high levels of criminal violence.

Behind all of these weaknesses lies the problem of coordination of DDR efforts where so many different security and development actors are involved. The High-level Panel Report suggested that the mandate and resources of all future UN peace operations should include DDR tasks. While this might go some way towards ensuring a quicker start to DDR and a degree of coordination in the field, multilateral peace operations alone have neither the capacity nor the reach to undertake extensive DDR programmes. Coordination with development actors, in particular the UNDP, the World Bank and bilateral agencies, will continue to be crucial both for funding and for planning and launching operational projects in DDR. A recent phenomenon is the growing number of private security companies involved in DDR processes, particularly in aspects of security sector reform (training of police and armed forces), an issue that raises prospects as well as challenges for the implementation of comprehensive DDR.

The rule of law

The rule of law was a central theme of the international peace-building agenda in 2004, in part through the release in August of the Secretary-General’s report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. The rule of law implies an effective justice system that is accessible, transparent, impartial, independent, efficient, and that is reinforced by the democratic application and enforcement of the law. Its establishment in a peace-building context is a multifaceted undertaking, involving the administering of justice for war crimes and transforming the justice system (judiciary, prosecution office, law and enforcement agencies, penal institutions and law associations). The Secretary-General’s report underlined the importance of striking a balance between the different rule of law components and the need for careful sequencing of activities. The emerging consensus on the centrality of rule-of-law reform and the notion that it must be tackled in its entirety is drawn from the lessons of previous international engagement, where only one aspect of the rule of law was targeted or the implementation of ill-designed


62 UN (note 41).
assistance programmes undermined progress in other sectors. For instance, the disproportionate emphasis on bringing war criminals to justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina arguably delayed international assistance with institutional legal reforms in areas such as civil law (including commercial and contractual law), which in turn has had a damaging impact on economic growth and efforts to move away from a shadow economy.

Since 2003 the mandates of all the new UN peace operations—UNOCI, MINUSTAH and ONUB—explicitly address the rule of law. In some non-UN operations, the rule of law is the focus of the entire mission. In January 2004 the European Union launched its first rule-of-law mission, EJUJUST THEMIS, with the purpose of assisting the Georgian Government to reform the justice system, particularly the criminal justice sector; the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has a similar remit to assist the government in restoring law and order.

Although rule-of-law reform is now a component of peace operations, neither the UN nor other international actors have so far succeeded in fleshing out the strategies and tools required for it: in this respect the Secretary-General’s August report adds little specific detailing. The absence of a strategic approach has hampered reform efforts in current peace operations. Progress in Afghanistan for example, has been impeded from the outset by the failure of the December 2001 Bonn Conference to give prominence to the issue. As a result, an overall strategy for the rule of law was absent in the Bonn Agreement. The implementation of a comprehensive reform programme on the ground has been further hampered by the division of responsibility for reform between different lead states. In cases where the rule-of-law reform is explicitly provided for in the mission’s mandate, for example, that of UNMIL, progress has been hampered by the sheer scale of the project and the need to set up a temporary skeletal legal system before embarking on a substantive overhaul of the rule of law. The emphasis in Liberia in 2004 was on the immediate functioning of the criminal courts in Monrovia, augmenting the

65 The rule of law is also expected to be included in the mandate of the proposed multidimensional operation in Sudan in 2005. UN Security Council resolutions 1528, 27 Feb. 2004; 1542, 30 Apr. 2004; and 1545, 21 May 2004; and UN (note 24).
national police force and the rehabilitation of penal institutions. At the end of 2004 the focus continued to be on securing funds to support quick impact projects (QIPs) aimed at rebuilding basic infrastructure. A national Law Reform Commission to undertake a comprehensive review of the status of Liberia’s judicial system is not expected to commence work until 2005.

The lack of progress in identifying rule-of-law needs and strategies to address them is hampered by the lack of qualified personnel and resources within the host state. The case of Timor-Leste illustrates the implications this can have for the length of the reform effort where, after six years of significant international engagement, financial support and technical expertise, local capacity in the justice sector remains extremely weak. International advisers are still heavily dependent on to perform basic line functions. Strengthening institutional capacity in judiciary and law enforcement agencies requires not only legal professional training but also the development of a broad range of capacities, including organization management, financial administration and personnel training.

Reform of the rule of law is a profoundly political enterprise: at its core, it is about altering the nature of the social contract between the individual and the state. If the reform process is to be legitimate and sustainable, it must build on existing judicial systems and legal traditions and reflect the culture and values of the country in question, even as it affirms international law, norms and standards. Meaningful consultations with and participation of local stakeholders to establish objectives and priorities and to assess progress are needed if substantial political and popular support is to take root. Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a clear example of the legitimacy of the rule-of-law reform process being brought into question by the way in which it has been implemented by external actors. Some argue that the powers of the Office of the High Representative to introduce substantial legislation, and the way in which these powers have been used to dictate the priorities of reform, undermine the very same democratic principles which the international community claims to promote. Others, however, challenge the view that rule-of-law reform must be built on local ownership, arguing that this approach merely reinforces the established legal order, one which may have

71 United Nations, World Bank and NTGL (note 69).
74 UN (note 41), pp. 6–7.
been a source of grievance in the first place.\textsuperscript{76} This is particularly sensitive in cases where local law runs up against Western legal systems in issues such as the death penalty and humane punishment and gender equality before the law.

**Economic reconstruction**

Economic reconstruction is central for peace-building: in the short term to build confidence in the potential of peace and to ensure that former warring parties buy into a common state-building project. In the medium to longer term, it is crucial to address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty and economic inequity.\textsuperscript{77} In 2004 the particular challenges of peace-building in countries that are rich in natural resources such as oil, diamonds and timber was in focus. Although resource-rich countries possess inherent potential for economic growth, competition within the society over the control and profitable exploitation of these resources can trigger a return to conflict. Peace-building thus requires the rapid assertion of the state’s authority and regulation over those domestic and international actors that formerly profited from the exploitation of natural resources. In recognition of these challenges, the High-level Panel made a somewhat controversial recommendation that the UN provide assistance to weak states, especially those emerging from conflict, in the management of their natural resources.\textsuperscript{78}

In practice, the UN, other relevant international actors and the private sector are already working with governments in, for example, Chad and Sierra Leone to design transparent accounting practices and develop schemes for equitable and socially beneficial sharing of resource revenues.\textsuperscript{79} An expanded notion of this has been proposed for Liberia: an international trusteeship would be established for the collection of revenue from key customs services at major border crossings, including airports and seaports, and from natural resources such as timber, diamonds and gold, which would then be deposited in a central account.\textsuperscript{80} Proposals such as that for Liberia are controversial as they arguably impinge on a state’s sovereign rights to exercise control over revenue collection and raise the question of whether such an international presence would constitute occupation. Moreover, the authority of international management of natural resources was somewhat undermined in 2004 with continued investigations and probes into the CPA’s alleged mismanagement of oil revenues in


\textsuperscript{78} UN (note 3), para. 92.


Iraq.\textsuperscript{81} The investigation into the corruption of UN officials involved in the management of the Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq between 1996 and 2003 cast a further shadow on the notion of international resource management.\textsuperscript{82}

The challenge of economic development is compounded by the need to eradicate shadow economies—criminal activities conducted outside of state-regulated frameworks—which provide important and, in most cases, long-established sources of income.\textsuperscript{83} Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is a clear example of this challenge. While opium production has a long history in the country, since the 2001 fall of the Taliban revenue generated from poppy cultivation and opium trade has risen dramatically and accounts for 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s economy, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates is growing at 20–30 per cent annually.\textsuperscript{84} Ironically, the opium trade achieves many of the development and economic objectives of the licit economy, such as employment, access to land and credit, and links between the centre and the periphery, albeit through illegitimate means.

The challenge of balancing short-term versus long-term development projects is a real one. Economic activities based on emergency relief bear no real sustainable prospects for a country but they may be vital in the initial post-conflict phase. The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, recommended that QIPs be implemented to improve the local quality of life, establish the credibility of a new UN mission and most importantly demonstrate results.\textsuperscript{85} Since then, several missions have implemented QIPs with mixed results. Surveys in Afghanistan show that the population attached greater priority to the restoration of an accountable civil service, customs collection and payments system, and the commencement of large, multi-year infrastructure projects, than to the provision of a myriad of small-scale projects, which can be cost ineffective.\textsuperscript{86} Large, expansive public sector programmes can be another way of bridging the gap between relief and

\textsuperscript{81} The International Advisory and Monitoring Board, set up by the UN to monitor the Development Fund for Iraq, which holds proceeds of oil sales, issued a report in which it criticized the CPA for poor management of the Fund. Iraq Revenue Watch, ‘Disorder, negligence and mismanagement: how the CPA handled Iraq reconstruction funds’, Sep. 2004, URL <http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/>.


development. Labour-intensive infrastructure projects, such as road construction, can yield immediate and long-term benefits: they can generate a high level of employment quickly and at a relatively low cost; result in improvement of the state’s infrastructure, leading to improved access for trade and industry; and facilitate the reintegration of demobilized combatants and returning refugees.87

The problem with large infrastructure projects is, first, that they require a substantial degree of state capacity which the post-conflicts states are unlikely to possess and, second, that they go against liberal economic orthodoxy that has been preached by international financial and development assistance actors. One potential way around this is the proposal that the private sector be brought in from the beginning to provide infrastructure services and help eliminate short-term donor-driven projects that are not sustainable or conducive to long-term economic recovery.88 The international peace-building presence often constitutes one of those non-sustainable economic projects by creating an economic bubble in the capital city of the country. This is a function of the service industries that spring up to cater almost exclusively to the international presence. Afghanistan, again, offers an example of this dilemma, where the international community’s presence has generated employment for approximately 40 000 Afghans. These individuals often have the higher education and specialized skills that are vital to state-building but instead choose the well-paying but less qualified positions that are offered by international organizations.89

Debt was a major issue for peace-building in 2004. Because most post-conflict countries do not have the necessary financial resources to embark on significant reconstruction programmes, the immediate normalization of relationships with the international financial institutions (IFIs) and with the Paris Club is necessary to obtain financial assistance.90 The emergency assistance loans disbursed by the IMF often go towards repaying bridging loans from bilateral donors, which in turn are used to clear arrears to the IMF.91

90 E.g., Burundi’s classification by the IFIs as a ‘post-conflict country’ was a necessary measure to facilitate Burundi’s ability to obtain loans. United Nations, Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi, UN document S/2004/902, 15 Nov. 2004
91 Boyce, J. K., ‘The international financial institutions: postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding capacities’, Paper prepared for the seminar on Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, for the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Copenhagen, 8–9 June 2004.
While this mechanism enables the country in question to elicit more IMF engagement, it does little to rehabilitate the economy. Many policy makers and academics challenge this system and advocate debt relief or debt reduction to facilitate quicker economic reconstruction. In 2004 several post-conflict countries—Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Iraq and Sierra Leone—received partial debt relief. The issue of debt cancellation was particularly controversial in Iraq because a significant portion of its $137 billion debt can, arguably, be considered odious debts—loans ‘obtained against the interests of the population of a state, with the full awareness of the creditor’—thus removing any obligation on the part of the new government to service the debt.

**Elections**

Since 1989, elections have been highlighted as the principal means to legitimate the institutions and leadership of countries emerging from conflict and have been seen as a central task for UN peace operations, for example, in Cambodia and Namibia. The successful holding of national elections is one of the most visible and effective means of enabling popular participation in state-building and one of the clearest signals that legitimate domestic authority has been restored. Elections are, in the words of Terence Lyons, ‘one of the very few mechanisms available to provide internal and external legitimacy as a new government’. For that reason alone, domestic pressures for rapid elections in a post-war context can be intense, as Kosovar Albanian demands after the NATO-led intervention in July 1999 and Shia pressure for elections in Iraq in 2004 demonstrated. In both these cases, formerly disenfranchised sectors of the society have seen post-conflict elections more as the principal means of asserting their majority status than as a step in building a durable peace. The international community, for its part, also has an interest in seeing that elections take place within a short space of time to establish a recognized sovereign authority, uphold the human rights in the name of which it may have intervened, legitimate its own presence in the country and lay the ground for its future departure.

At the same time, there are equally strong factors militating against the holding of national elections too soon after conflict and, indeed, the current
emphasis in the research debate is on the desirability of a long lead-in time.\textsuperscript{96} The electoral process represents, in practical terms, the transfer of a dispute and the means to resolve it from the battlefield to the ballot box, through a contest over political power. A divided and traumatized society emerging from internal conflict may well be unable, in the short term, to manage this transition without endangering the entire peace process. The potential negative impact of national elections on the tentative peace process under way in Burundi prompted the postponement of national elections, originally scheduled to take place in November 2004.\textsuperscript{97} International actors may wish to delay national elections in order to prevent a potentially divisive election process from distracting or undermining the peace-building efforts. This is all the more so where peace-building as state-building involves economic, political and military reforms that challenge the existing status quo. A pertinent example of this was Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the first post-war national elections resulted in a victory for the nationalist factions most opposed to the state-building enterprise. Another reason for international caution is the substantial military, financial and monitoring resources required to hold a nationwide election in an insecure environment, as Iraq demonstrated in 2004. Should violence mar the elections and lead to the results being contested, this could fatally undermine the progress made in peace-building made and shake whatever public confidence previously existed in the reform process.

Even without the threat of large-scale violence, conducting national elections is a complicated, laborious and expensive process, entailing substantial procedural and legal preparations over, ideally, 12–18 months.\textsuperscript{98} In countries with a long legacy of dysfunctional government, such as Afghanistan and Liberia, basic prerequisites such as the holding of a census may lengthen the preparatory process still further. In the case of Afghanistan, the 2001 Bonn Agreement initially set an ambitious target of June 2004 for the formation of a fully representative and elected government. This depended on the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga within six months of the Bonn Agreement to establish the Afghani interim government, followed by the development and approval of a new constitution in 2003, which set the parameters for the type of elections. It also provided for a nationwide census to be undertaken and for the registration in two phases of approximately 11.5 million voters.\textsuperscript{99} The decision in July 2004 to hold presidential elections separately from parliamentary elections rather than simultaneously, as initially announced, and later than originally planned testified to the magnitude of the electoral challenge. Parliamentary elections were rescheduled for April 2005, while the pres-

\textsuperscript{96} Chesterman (note 89); and Paris (note 18).


idential election was reset for October 2004. Nonetheless, the painstaking three-year electoral process, which cost approximately $200 million, paid off on 9 October when a large voter turnout, a peaceful ballot and the declaration by international observers that the vote was free and fair resulted in the election of the incumbent interim president, Hamid Karzai, as president.100

In both Afghanistan and Iraq the grave security situation was the predominant obstacle to successful elections. National elections, in both countries, intensified this violence as the electoral process became a target of rebel groups. In Afghanistan, the extensive voter registration process got off to a slow start, the consequence of threats of violence from re-emerging Taliban forces and forces loyal to influential warlords. The offices of the electoral secretariat and UN electoral workers throughout the country were targeted by bomb attacks, kidnappings and shootings.101 The deployment of some 80 000 Afghan troops and soldiers, 19 000 US forces and 9000 ISAF forces on election day facilitated the provision of security for the vote itself, which passed off peacefully.

In contrast, the short preparatory time for the election in Iraq complicated attempts to contain spiralling violence and undermined the entire electoral process. The decision to hold elections to an Iraqi transitional national assembly on 30 January 2005 was the result of a political compromise in March 2004 between the unofficial leader and moral authority of the Shia community, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and the CPA on the basis of a UN assessment that it would not be possible to hold free and fair elections by the end of the year. The 30 January date had little operational consequence in terms of electoral planning: voter registration and electoral preparations did not begin before December 2004 and in some parts of the country never took place because of the security situation.102 Extraordinary security measures by the Multinational Force and Iraqi security forces enabled an orderly voting process on the election day itself, notwithstanding continued bomb attacks on civilian targets. The relatively good level of turnout among Shia sectors of the population (an estimated 60 per cent of registered voters) was undermined, however, by the lack of participation of the minority Sunni community in the election. This gave rise to fears that the election would only hasten the onset of increased sectarian violence within Iraq. It also cast practical and legitimacy questions over the transitional national assembly, potentially undermining it as it embarks on its primary task of drafting a permanent con-

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101 UN (note 46).

The Iraq experience demonstrated the essential dilemma elections present for peace-building: although a necessary condition of democracy, they are not a sufficient one and, moreover, they may conflict with the state-building enterprise to which the international community is committed.

The security, logistic and political difficulties posed by early elections have led to the more frequent establishment of interim national administrations in post-conflict contexts. This is seen as a way of balancing the demands of legitimacy with the need to maintain a basic degree of stability and, at the same time, continue the process of post-conflict transformation. Interim government processes represent a first step in creating joint consultative and decision-making processes among former combatants and provide for meaningful consultative dialogue between the international community and local stakeholders in shaping the democratization process. They can, potentially, encourage local involvement in state-building and facilitate the maturation of political participation among the population, particularly where it involves elections. The Loya Jirga processes in Afghanistan and the subsequent Transitional Administration were seen to be crucial interim steps towards the October 2004 elections. Similarly, the establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia in 2003 was a necessary measure as it offers a partner for the international community to engage with in developing joint peace-building strategies and projects.

Another approach that can facilitate participatory governance in lieu of national elections is to concentrate on representative and participatory local administrations. In Kosovo, municipal elections were held prior to province-wide elections because they were deemed less political and controversial since the elected officials were only responsible for the administration of local services. Some have pointed to the success of British forces in southern Iraq in facilitating local city and town administrations that served as partners of the occupying forces. Even if national elections are given priority, there is a strong argument to ensure that they are accompanied or soon followed by local or provincial elections because often the trickle-down effect of national elections is too slow to be concretely felt by the population. Sierra Leone’s local elections in May 2004 were seen as a milestone in the extension of state authority and restoration of the system of local government and one of the most tangible demonstrations to the population that the country had turned a corner.

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V. Conclusions: responding to the peace-building challenges

The continued increase in international peace-building in the face of the enormous practical and legitimacy challenges it presents raises the question of its future as a policy and practice. A variety of responses have been offered. The minimalist answer is to narrow the scope of peace-building so as to better carry out a limited range of tasks. In this perspective, international intervention should concentrate on the goal of establishing security over the medium term for local populations while ‘they are sorting out on their own what kind of future for that territory makes the most long-term sense’.  

In this vision security tasks should focus on the provision of security along the territorial borders of the state, on support for the delivery of humanitarian aid and on broad-scale public order—tasks that require the presence of a robust and well-trained international military operation willing to use force ‘to forestall the possibility of anarchy’. Peace-building, as well as state-building in this paradigm, is about enabling a society that is capable of functioning, not a liberal democratic state.

A more refined variation of this minimalist response is the ‘light footprint’ approach, most commonly associated with Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General Brahimi and which guided the UN’s response to post-conflict peace-building in Afghanistan. This approach warns of the dangers of raising the expectations of post-war populations too high by rash promises of what peace-building will bring and emphasizes that local knowledge and expertise is much more attuned to the needs of a society than international actors. Peace-building, in this perspective, should be demand- rather than supply-driven, focused on addressing basic needs rather than a comprehensive vision of statehood and operate, as much as possible, through local ownership and management.

The maximal response, on the other hand, acknowledges the scope and legitimacy challenges of peace-building but points out that local ownership is a false panacea: the presence of a post-conflict peace operation is indicative of the inability of a society to govern itself. From the perspectives of both effectiveness and coherence, a period of ‘benevolent autocracy’ from external actors offers the best chance for successful peace-building. This view, based often on a revisiting of 19th century British colonialism, acknowledges the inconsistency of Western engagement in peace-building around the world but argues that more, rather than fewer, international transitional administrations might better address the problem. Such external administrations would, in the

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short term and for a limited period, subordinate legitimacy concerns to efficiency in tackling the peace-building challenge and setting the state more firmly on course for a stable and durable peace.\(^{111}\) Variants of this approach address how a single state or small group of like-minded states could more efficiently implement a maximal vision of peace-building than the UN.\(^{112}\) While a UN sanction might be required to provide international legitimacy for such groups, local legitimacy would be built on the basis of the success of an efficient peace-building operation.

The December 2004 report of the High-level Panel tried to chart a path for the UN between the minimal and the maximal vision of peace-building and to avoid defining what the end goal of peace-building as state-building should be. It stresses the importance of the UN as the legitimator of any peace-building effort but also acknowledges that regional organizations and alliance organizations such as NATO may be best placed to implement it. It concentrates on the magnitude of peace-building and the challenges this presents for coordination, proposing the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission to work with local governments and the international community in marshalling, assisting and sustaining ‘post-conflict peace-building over whatever period may be necessary’.\(^{113}\)

This is a compromise position and, for all the concrete suggestions of the report of the High-level Panel, will not overcome the challenges presented by contemporary peace-building. The report seems to suggest as much in arguing that more attention should be paid to the prevention of state collapse, so as to avoid having to undertake comprehensive international post-conflict peace-building to the extent possible. Earlier and more comprehensive international prevention would certainly mitigate some of the challenges of magnitude and legitimacy presented by peace-building. In so doing, it may also call into question the dominance of the ‘peace-building as liberal market economy state-building’ paradigm.

In practical terms, much of the current discussion of peace-building is focused on the macro level. What current operational experiences appear to illustrate, however, is that peace-building fails most often at the micro level, in the content and delivery of specific security, rule-of-law, economic, social and political reforms. Although an improved strategic and coordinated approach is a prerequisite for meeting the challenges of peace-building, it is important that this be accompanied by substantive and careful work on the specific details of international peace-building operations. The examples identified in this chapter, like the lessons learned from past operations, testify to the uniqueness of each peace-building case. The conclusion to be drawn is that peace-building will remain a difficult, inevitable challenge for the international community.

\(^{111}\) Paris (note 18).
\(^{112}\) Daalder, I. H. and Lindsay, J. M., ‘Our way or the highway’, *Financial Times*, 5 Nov. 2004, p. 11.
\(^{113}\) UN (note 3), pp. 83–84.
VI. Table of multilateral peace missions

Table 3.2 lists the 56 multilateral peace missions that were ongoing or terminated in 2004. The table lists only those operations conducted under the authority of the UN and operations conducted by regional organizations or by ad hoc coalitions of states that were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, with the stated intention to: (a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conflict prevention and/or peace-building efforts. SIPRI employs the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-ridden countries to create conditions for sustainable peace—this may include monitoring and observing ceasefire agreements; serving as confidence-building measures; protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assisting with the demobilization and reintegration process; strengthening institutional capacities in the areas of judiciary and the rule of law (including penal institutions), policing, and human rights; electoral support; and economic and social development. The table thus covers a broad range of peace missions to reflect the growing complexity of mandates of peace operations and the potential for operations to change over the course of their mandate. The table does not include good offices, fact-finding or electoral assistance missions, nor does it include peace missions comprising non-resident individuals or teams of negotiators or operations not sanctioned by the UN.114

The missions are grouped by organization and listed chronologically within these groups. The first group, covering UN operations, is divided into two sections: 16 operations run by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and 5 operations that are defined as special political missions and peace-building missions. The next nine groups cover operations conducted or led by regional organizations or alliances: 3 by the AU; 1 by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC, Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale), 3 by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including 1 mission carried out by Russia under bilateral arrangements; 1 by ECOWAS; 5 by the EU; 4 by NATO; 2 by the OAS; and 10 by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). A final group lists 6 operations led by ad hoc coalitions of states sanctioned by the UN.

Missions which were initiated in 2004, and new states participating in an existing mission, are listed in bold text; operations and individual state participation which ended in 2004 are shown in italics. Legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation—UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by regional organizations—are cited in the first column. The start dates for the operations refer to actual deployment dates. Lead

114 E.g., Malaysia, in its capacity as a mediator in the conflict in the Philippines, has deployed a team of observers to monitor the ceasefire between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
states (those that either have operational control or contribute the most personnel) are underlined in the table. Local support staff are not included in the figures presented in the table but, where possible, information on the number of local staff is given in the notes below the table. Mission fatalities are recorded from the beginning of the mission until the last reported date for 2004 and as a total for 2004. Where possible, information on cause of deaths is included. Unless otherwise stated all figures are as of 31 December 2004. Budget figures are given in millions of US dollars. For UN operations, unless otherwise stated, budget figures are for the financial year 1 July 2004–30 June 2005. Conversions from budgets set in other currencies are based on 30 December 2004 exchange rates.

Data on multilateral peace missions are obtained from the following categories of open source: (a) official information provided by the secretariat of the organization; (b) information from the mission on the ground, either in official publications or in responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires; and (c) information from national governments contributing to the mission in question. These primary sources are supplemented with secondary sources consisting of specialist journals and newspapers. The sources are given in the notes.
**Table 3.2. Multilateral peace missions, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym/ (Legal instrument)</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2004</th>
<th>Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol/ Civ. staff</th>
<th>Deaths: To date/ In 2004</th>
<th>Cost ($m): 2004/ Unpaid</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations carried out by the United Nations (21 operations): 102 countries participated in 2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UN peace operations (16 operations)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO (SCR 50)</td>
<td>UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Egypt/Israel/ Lebanon/ Syria</td>
<td>June 1948</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, USA</td>
<td>55 909</td>
<td>1 957</td>
<td>3 870.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP (SCR 91)</td>
<td>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>India/Pakistan (Kashmir)</td>
<td>Jan. 1949</td>
<td>Belgium, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Korea (South), Sweden, Uruguay</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFICYP (SCR 186)</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Mar. 1964</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, India, Ireland, Korea (South), Netherlands, Slovakia, UK, Uruguay</td>
<td>1 226</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>52.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDOF (SCR 350)</td>
<td>UN Disengagement Observer Force</td>
<td>Syria (Golan Heights)</td>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>Austria, Canada, Japan, Nepal, Poland, Slovakia</td>
<td>1 018</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. UNTSO = UN Truce Supervision Organization
2. UNMOGIP = UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
3. UNFICYP = UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
4. UNDOF = UN Disengagement Observer Force
5. SCR = Security Council Resolution
6. UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII
7. UN Peace operations (16 operations): 102 countries participated in 2004
8. Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol/ Civ. staff
9. Deaths: To date/ In 2004
10. Cost ($m): 2004/ Unpaid
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym/Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Countries contributing</th>
<th>Troops/Deaths/Cost</th>
<th>Cost ($m):</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNIFIL</strong></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Mar. 1978</td>
<td>Fiji, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Ukraine</td>
<td>1995/250/92.9</td>
<td>71.035</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MINURSO</strong></td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>Sep. 1991</td>
<td>Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, China, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Uruguay</td>
<td>196/10/44.9</td>
<td>4.37</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNOMIG</strong></td>
<td>Georgia (Abkhazia)</td>
<td>Aug. 1993</td>
<td>Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Czech Rep., Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea (South), Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA</td>
<td>119/7/33.6</td>
<td>11.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIK</strong></td>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Rep., Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3509/29/315.5</td>
<td>105.251</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Total Personnel</td>
<td>Hosts</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL (SCR 1270)</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Oct. 1999</td>
<td>4,061</td>
<td>159</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC (SCR 1279)</td>
<td>UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Nov. 1999</td>
<td>11,903</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEE (SCR 1312)</td>
<td>UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Eritrea</td>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>3,705</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym/Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2004</td>
<td>Troops/Mil. obs/CivPol/Civ. staff</td>
<td>Deaths: To date/In 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISET (SCR 1410)</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>429/13/85.2</td>
<td>43/173/69.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL (SCR 1509)</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Oct. 2003</td>
<td>Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Irdand, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Samoa, Senegal, and Montenegro, South Africa, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, USA, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14501/28/864.8</td>
<td>189/23/444.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI (SCR 1528)</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Congo (Rep. of), Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia</td>
<td>5846/297.0</td>
<td>154/0.4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[492x95]172 SECURITY AND CONFLICTS, 2004
### Multilateral Peace Missions

#### UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

- **Country:** Haiti
- **Operation:** MINUSTAH
- **Status:** UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
- **Date:** June 2004
- **Countries Involved:**
  - Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Jordan, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, USA, Zambia
- **Military Personnel:** 6,008
- **Civilian Personnel:** –
- **Cost:** 379.0

#### UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)

- **Country:** Burundi
- **Operation:** ONUB
- **Status:** UN Operation in Burundi
- **Date:** June 2004
- **Countries Involved:**
  - Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia
- **Military Personnel:** 5,190
- **Civilian Personnel:** 5
- **Cost:** 329.7

### UN Special Political and Peace-Building Missions

- **Operation:** UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)
- **Country:** Guatemala
- **Status:** UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
- **Date:** Oct. 1994
- **Countries Involved:**
  - Argentina, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Germany, Honduras, Italy, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA
- **Military Personnel:** –
- **Civilian Personnel:** 4
- **Cost:** 11.6

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*These numbers are approximate and subject to change based on the latest data.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym/Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2004</th>
<th>Troops/Mil. obs/ CivPol/Civ. staff</th>
<th>Deaths: To date/In 2004</th>
<th>Cost ($m): 2004/Unpaid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA (SCR 1401)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Mar. 2002</td>
<td>Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUCI (SCR 1479)</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Gambia, Ghana, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Moldova, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Tunisia, Uruguay</td>
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<td>UNAMI (SCR 1500)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Aug. 2003</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macedonia, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, UK, USA</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIS (SCR 1547)</td>
<td>UN Advance Mission in Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Albania, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Canada, Central African Rep., Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, USA, Zimbabwe</td>
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**Operations carried out by standing regional organizations and alliances (35 operations)**

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<tr>
<th>African Union (AU) operations (3 operations)</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMIB (AU, 3 Feb. 2003)</td>
<td>440</td>
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<td>MIOC (AU, 30 Jan. 2004)</td>
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<td>AMIS (AU, 28 May 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym/ (Legal instrument)</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Start date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC, Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States) operations (1 operation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Libreville Summit, 2 Oct. 2002)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) operations (3 operations)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Ossetia Joint Force</td>
<td>Georgia (South Ossetia)</td>
<td>July 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Bilateral, 24 June 1992)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force</td>
<td>Moldova (Trans-Dniester)</td>
<td>July 1992</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Bilateral, 21 July 1992)</td>
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<td>Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) operations (1 operation)</td>
<td>ECOMICI (SCR 1464)</td>
<td>Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo</td>
<td>1,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union (EU) operations (5 operations)</td>
<td>EUMM (Brioni Agreement)</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK</td>
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<td>EUPM (Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP)</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine</td>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Start date</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU POL PROXIMA (Joint Action 2003/681/ CFSP)</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Dec. 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>EJUST THEMIS (Joint Action 2004/523/ CFSP)</td>
<td>EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA (Joint Action 2004/570/ CFSP)</td>
<td>EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Dec. 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Multi-Lateral Peace Missions (4 operations)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SFOR (SCR 1088)</strong></td>
<td><strong>NATO Stabilization Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dec. 1996</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KFOR (SCR 1244)</strong></td>
<td><strong>NATO Kosovo Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)</strong></td>
<td><strong>June 1999</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ISAF (SCR 1386)</strong></td>
<td><strong>International Security Assistance Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dec. 2001</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NTIM-I (SCR 1546)</strong></td>
<td><strong>NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aug. 2004</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym/Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization of American States (OAS) operations (2 operations)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Canada, Colombia, Dominica, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Mexico, Uruguay, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPP/OEA Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Feb. 2004</td>
<td>Argentina, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Sweden</td>
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<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) operations (10 operations)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>Sep. 1992</td>
<td>Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>OSCE Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>6 Nov. 1992</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belguim, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA</td>
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<td>4 Feb. 1993</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Belarus, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, UK, USA</td>
<td>12244</td>
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<td>1 Dec. 1993</td>
<td>Dushanbe</td>
<td>Belarus, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, USA</td>
<td>2244</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Dec. 1995</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA</td>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym/</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2004</th>
<th>Troops/</th>
<th>Deaths:</th>
<th>Cost ($m):</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Croatia</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>July 1996</td>
<td>Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Ukraine, USA</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13.6264</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE Presence in Albania</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Apr. 1997</td>
<td>Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Moldova, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>5.1269</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMiK</td>
<td>OSCE Mission in Kosovo (Kosovo)</td>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>July 1999</td>
<td>Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52.9274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMiSaM</td>
<td>OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>Mar. 2001</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13.3270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- OMiK (PC/DEC 305, 1 July 1999)
- OMiSaM (PC/DEC 401, 11 Jan. 2001)
### Other operations (6 operations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Lasted</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NNSC</td>
<td>Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission</td>
<td>North Korea/South Korea</td>
<td>July 1953</td>
<td>Poland, Sweden, Switzerland</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
<td>Egypt (Sinai)</td>
<td>Apr. 1982</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay, USA</td>
<td>1 686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPH 2</td>
<td>Temporary International Presence in Hebron</td>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>Jan. 1997</td>
<td>Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Licorne</td>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Feb. 2003</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source

281 Other operations (6 operations)

282 NNSC (Armistice Agreement)

283 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

284 North Korea/South Korea

285 Poland, Sweden, Switzerland

286 Other countries

287 MFO (Protocol to Treaty of Peace)

288 Multinational Force and Observers

289 Egypt (Sinai)

290 Apr. 1982

291 Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay, USA

292 MFO (Protocol to Treaty of Peace)

293 Multinational Force and Observers

294 Egypt (Sinai)

295 Apr. 1982

296 Other countries

297 Multinational Force and Observers

298 Egypt (Sinai)

299 Apr. 1982

300 Other countries

301 Multinational Force and Observers

302 Egypt (Sinai)

303 Apr. 1982

304 Other countries

305 Multinational Force and Observers

306 Egypt (Sinai)

307 Apr. 1982

308 Other countries

309 Multinational Force and Observers

310 Egypt (Sinai)

311 Apr. 1982

312 Other countries

313 Multinational Force and Observers

314 Egypt (Sinai)

315 Apr. 1982

316 Other countries

317 Multinational Force and Observers

318 Egypt (Sinai)

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321 Multinational Force and Observers

322 Egypt (Sinai)

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450 Egypt (Sinai)

451 Apr. 1982

452 Other countries

453 Multinational Force and Observers

454 Egypt (Sinai)

455 Apr. 1982

456 Other countries

457 Multinational Force and Observers

458 Egypt (Sinai)

459 Apr. 1982

460 Other countries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym (Legal instrument)</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2004</th>
<th>Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol/ Civ. staff</th>
<th>Deaths: To date/ In 2004</th>
<th>Cost ($m): 2004/ Unpaid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I (SCR 1511)³⁰⁷</td>
<td>Multinational Force in Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Oct. 2003</td>
<td>Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech. Rep., Denmark, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea (South), Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Thailand, UK, Ukraine, USA³⁰⁸</td>
<td>173 000³⁰⁹, 1 441 902³¹¹, 318³¹⁰</td>
<td>–, –, –</td>
<td>53 869.1³¹², –, –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Acronyms in the table and notes: A/RES = UN General Assembly Resolution; CPA = Coalition Provisional Authority; CSO = OSCE Committee of Senior Officials (now the Senior Council); DDR = disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; DMZ = Demilitarized Zone; DPKO = UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; FY = financial year; GA = UN General Assembly; MC = Ministerial Council; MOU = Memorandum of Understanding; NAC = North Atlantic Council; PC = OSCE Permanent Council; PC.DEC = OSCE Permanent Council Decision; SC = UN Security Council; SCR = UN Security Council Resolution.

¹ These operations are administered and directed by the DPKO.
³ Figure as of 31 Dec. 2004, including military, observer, police and international civilian staff. Note that this figure represents the total mission fatalities for all UN missions since 1948, not only those listed below. DPKO Situation Centre, ‘Fatalities by mission and incident type—as of December 31 2004’, 7 Jan. 2005. UN Internet site, URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/fatal1.htm>.
⁴ Total for the costs of the 16 operations listed in the table. This total does not include the member states’ pro-rated share of the support account for peacekeeping operations nor the costs of the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi (Italy).
⁶ UNTSO was established in May 1948 to assist the Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The mandate was maintained during 2004.
⁷ For UN operations, the underlined country represents the country with the largest number of personnel deployed to the field. United Nations (note 2).
⁸ United Nations (note 2).
⁹ Death owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).

UNMOGIP was established in Mar. 1951 to replace the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (SCR 91, 30 Mar. 1951). Its task is to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir under the July 1949 Karachi Agreement. A positive decision by the Security Council is required to terminate the mission. UNMOGIP Internet site, URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmogip.htm>.


UNFICYP was established by SCR 186 (4 Mar. 1964) to prevent fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order. Since 1974 UNFICYP’s mandate has included monitoring the ceasefire and maintaining a buffer zone between the 2 sides.

UNDOF was established after the 1973 Middle East War under the Agreement on Disengagement and SCR 350 (31 May 1974), to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria and to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces. The mandate was extended until 30 June 2005 by SCR 1578 (15 Dec. 2004).

UNFIL was established by SCR 425 (19 Mar. 1978), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The mandate was renewed until 31 July 2005 by SCR 1583 (28 Jan. 2005).

MINURSO was established by SCR 690 (29 Apr. 1991) to monitor the ceasefire between the Frente Polisario and the Moroccan Government, verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara, and organize a free and fair referendum. The mandate was renewed until 30 Apr. 2005 by SCR 1570 (28 Oct. 2004).
UNOMIG was established by SCR 849 (9 July 1993) and SCR 858 (24 Aug. 1993). The mission’s original mandate of verifying the ceasefire between the Georgian Government and the Abkhaz authorities was invalidated by resumed fighting in Abkhazia in Sep. 1993, and UNOMIG was given an interim mandate to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and to monitor and report on the situation. Following the signing of the 1994 Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, UNOMIG’s mandate was expanded to include monitoring and verification of the implementation of the agreement by SCR 937 (27 July 1994). The present mandate was renewed until 31 July 2005 by SCR 1582 (28 Jan. 2005).

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In July 2003, SCR 1494 (30 July 2003) authorized the addition of a civilian police component of 20 officers with a view to help build local capacity to improve law and order in the Gali sector such that conditions are improved for the return of refugees and IDPs. United Nations (note 2).

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59 United Nations (note 2).
60 United Nations (note 2).
61 9 fatalities owing to accident, 5 owing to hostile acts, 4 to illness and 3 owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).
64 UNMEE was established by SCR 1312 (31 July 2000). The mission was mandated to prepare a mechanism for verifying the cessation of hostilities, the establishment of the Military Co-ordination Commission provided for in the ceasefire agreement, and a peacekeeping deployment. The mission was later expanded with the allocation of 4200 troops and 220 military observers and tasked to monitor the ceasefire, repatriate Ethiopian troops and monitor the positions of Ethiopian and Eritrean troops outside a 25-km temporary security zone, to chair the Military Co-ordination Commission of the UN and the AU, and to assist in mine clearance. SCR 1320 (15 Sep. 2000). Delays in the demarcation process continue to necessitate the prolongation of the mandate.
65 United Nations (note 2).
66 United Nations (note 2).
67 1 fatality owing to accident and 2 to illness. United Nations (note 3).
70 UNMIST was established by SCR 1410 (17 May 2002) as a follow-on mission to UNTAET. The tasks of the mission are to provide assistance to the administrative structures of the Timorese Government, to provide interim law enforcement while assisting in the development of a new law enforcement agency, and to contribute to the overall security of Timor-Leste.
71 In 2004, owing to significant progress made in the handover of operational responsibilities to the Timor-Leste authorities, the mission began its drawdown procedures. United Nations (note 2).
72 In addition, as part of a UNDP-managed assistance programme, 50 civilian advisers were attached to the mission. United Nations, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UN document S/2004/888, 9 Nov. 2004, para. 64; and United Nations (note 2).
73 Death caused by illness. United Nations (note 3).
76 UNMIL was established by SCR 1509 (19 Sep. 2003) with UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mission was mandated to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; assist the government’s efforts in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military; support humanitarian and human rights activities; and protect UN staff, facilities and civilians.
77 United Nations (note 2).
78 United Nations (note 2).
79 4 fatalities owing to accident, 16 to illness and 3 owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).
81 United Nations (note 80), para. 56.
82 UNOCI was established by SCR 1528 (27 Feb. 2004) with UN Charter Chapter VII powers, as a follow-on mission to MINUCI. The mission was mandated to monitor the ceasefire agreement and to prevent the movement of combatants and arms across shared borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone; to assist the interim Government of National
Reconciliation in the following activities: implementing DDR programmes, restoring state authority and the holding of elections in Oct. 2005; and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. In carrying out its mandate, the mission cooperates with UNAMSIL, UNMIL and Licorne forces in Côte d’Ivoire.

United Nations (note 2).

As provided for in SCR 1528, the c. 4000 Licorne forces were deployed alongside UNOCI. United Nations (note 2).


MINUSTAH was established by SCR 1542 (30 Apr. 2004) with UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mission was tasked to ensure a secure and stable environment to ensure the peace process is carried forward; assist the government’s efforts in national security reform, including a comprehensive DDR programme, national police training and assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law; support humanitarian and human rights activities; and protect UN staff, facilities and civilians.

United Nations (note 2).

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United Nations (note 2).

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United Nations (note 2).
106 UNAMA was established by SCR 1401 (28 Mar. 2002). The mission is mandated to promote national reconciliation; to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the UN in the 2001 Bonn Agreement, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues; and to manage all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan in coordination with the Afghan Transitional Authority. In carrying out its mandate, UNAMA cooperates with ISAF.

107 The countries listed represent the nationalities of the international civilian staff who are recruited in their personal capacity. They are not seconded by their governments. Ariane Quentier, Senior Public Information Officer, UNAMA, email to author, 1 Feb. 2005.


109 However, 1 international UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) personnel and 2 national UNOPS personnel died owing to a traffic accident and hostile action, respectively. Quentier (note 107).

110 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, UN document A/59/534/Add.1, 23 Nov. 2004, p. 57.

111 MINUCI was established by SCR 1479 (13 May 2003) to facilitate the implementation of the Linaæ-Marcoussis Agreement. The mission was integrated into UNOCI on 4 Apr. and subsequently closed.


113 As of 29 Feb. 2004. The mission was supported by 55 local staff. MINUCI (note 112).

114 United Nations (note 3).

115 Budget for the period 1 Jan.–4 Apr 2004 and represents a portion of the mission’s total budget of $29.9 million. United Nations (note 108), p. 17.

116 UNAMI was established by SCR 1500 (July 2003) to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to fulfil his mandate to coordinate the UN’s humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, promote the safe return of refugees and IDPs, and facilitate international efforts to help rebuild the local institutional capacities, as provided for by SCR 1483 (22 May 2003). In carrying out its mandate, UNAMI cooperates with MNF-I.

117 The countries listed represent the nationalities of the international civilian staff who are recruited in their personal capacity. They are not seconded by their governments. Shiyun Sang, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information, United Nations, email to author, 17 Jan. 2005.

118 These are military advisers. Sang (note 117).

119 The mission is supported by 190 locally employed staff. Sang (note 117).

120 United Nations (note 3).


122 UNAMIS was established by SCR 1547 (11 June 2004) to monitor the ceasefire agreement of 25 Sep. 2003 in cooperation with AMIS, and to plan and prepare for the establishment of a full-fledged peace operation.


125 United Nations (note 3).


127 AMIB was established on 3 Feb. 2003 by decision of the 7th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Heads of State and Government level. The mission’s mandate was to monitor and verify the implementation of the 2002 and 2003 Ceasefire Agreements, to liaise
between the conflicting parties, to assist the JCC, to facilitate the DDR process and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. AMIB was integrated in ONUB on 1 June 2004.


South Africa contributed 1600 soldiers, Ethiopia 858 and Mozambique 228, while the 43 observers were drawn from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. South Africa also provided logistical control of the mission. Agoagye (note 128).

Salinda Biyana, First Secretary, South Africa Embassy in Stockholm, fax to author, 28 Jan. 2005.

For the period 1 Jan.–31 May 2004. This figure is derived by subtracting the budget ($90,700,000) for the mission’s 1st year from the total budget for the mission’s entire mandated period ($134,000,000). Known individual contributions include Denmark’s $1,000,000; the EU’s €25,000,000; Germany’s $464,920; Italy’s $545,372.08; Senegal’s $1132; South Africa’s R 8,620,000; the UK’s £2,000,000; and $300,000 from the AU’s Peace Fund. Agoagye (note 128); ‘Resolving conflicts’, Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 2 (Oct. 2003–Mar. 2004); Dwan, R. and Wiharta, S., ‘Multilateral peace missions’, SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 175–90; and Biyana (note 130).

MIOC was established on 30 Jan. 2004 by decision of the 97th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/COMM.(XCVII). The mission closed on 30 May 2004.


AMIS was initially established by the Agreement with the Sudanese parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur on 28 May 2004 as an observer mission and was endorsed by SCR 1556 (30 July 2004) with UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mandate was expanded pursuant to a decision adopted at the 17th Meeting of the Africa Union’s Peace and Security Council. The mission is currently mandated to monitor the N’Djamena ceasefire agreement, assist in confidence building between the parties and contribute to a secure environment in Darfur. African Union, Communiqué of the 17th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, AU document PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII), 20 Oct. 2004.

As of 9 Jan. 2005. In addition, there are 10 EU and 36 Sudanese military observers, and the mission is supported by the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF). The authorized strength is 3,320 personnel, including 1,931 troops, 450 military observers, 880 civilian police and the necessary number of civilian personnel. AU (note 137).

Brigadier General Auguste Bihaye Itandas, Commander, CEMAC Multinational Force, fax to author, 20 Nov. 2004. Of this figure, 121 are from Chad, 139 from Gabon and 120 from the Republic of Congo. Bihaye Itandas (note 142).
Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in South Ossetia, signed in Dagomys, on 24 June 1992, by Georgia and Russia. A joint Monitoring Commission with representatives of Russia, Georgia, and North and South Ossetia was established to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

The participation of parties to a conflict in peace operations is typically not included in the table; however, the substantial involvement of the parties to the conflict in this operation is a distinctive feature of CIS operations and of the peace agreement which is the basis for the establishment of the operation. The official name of the Ossetian battalion is the Battalion of North Ossetian/Alania. Vladimir Barbin, Minister-Counsellor of the Embassy of Russia in Stockholm, email to author, 18 Jan. 2005.

Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Trans-Dniester region, signed in Moscow on 21 July 1992 by the presidents of Moldova and Russia. A Monitoring Commission with representatives of Russia, Moldova and Trans-Dniester was established to coordinate the activities of the joint peacekeeping contingent.

The participation of parties to a conflict in peace operations is typically not included in the table; however, the substantial involvement of the parties to the conflict in this operation is a distinctive feature of CIS operations and of the peace agreement which is the basis for the establishment of the operation. Email from Wenker (note 129).

Russia, Moldova and Trans-Dniester contributed 334, 360 and 578 military personnel, respectively. The figures for the number of personnel from Moldova and Trans-Dniester for 2004 are not available. Barbin (note 147).


This figure is tallied from 2001. Prior to 2001, data could not be ascertained.

Barbin (note 147).

There is no designated budget for the mission. Each side bears the cost of sending its respective personnel.


Barbin (note 147).


Barbin (note 147).

The SC authorized under UN Chapter VIII the establishment of ECOMICÌ alongside French troops to contribute to a secure environment and allow for the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. SCR 1464 (4 Feb. 2003). The mission’s tasks included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, facilitating the free movement of persons and goods, providing security for members of the national government of reconciliation as well as humanitarian workers, and to contribute to the implementation of DDR programmes. ECOMICÌ was integrated into UNOCI on 4 Apr. 2004.
The mission was established by the Brioni Agreement, signed on 7 July 1991 at Brioni, Croatia, by representatives of the European Community (EC) and the 6 republics of the former Yugoslavia. MOUs were signed with the governments of Albania in 1997 and Croatia in 1998. The ECMM became the EUMM upon becoming an instrument of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and was mandated to monitor political and security developments, borders, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns; to contribute to the early warning mechanism of the European Council; and to contribute to confidence building and stabilization in the region. Council Joint Action of 22 Dec. 2000 on the European Union Monitoring Mission, EU document 2000/811/CFSP, 23 Dec. 2000, Introduction, para. 6 and Article 1, para. 2.

The EUMM operates in Albania and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Presevo.


Germany contributed the largest number (c. 80–86) of police officers. Kilian Wahl, Public Information Officer, EUPM, email to author, 20 Dec. 2004.

Of this figure, EU member states provided 432 officers while non-EU states provided 47. The mission is supported by 329 local staff. Wahl (note 176).

1 fatality owing to illness and the other caused by traffic accident. Wahl (note 176).

€17.5 million. The figure includes salaries for the international civilian staff and local staff as well as infrastructure but does not include salaries of the international police personnel which are borne by the contributing countries. Nicolas Kerleroux, EU Council Secretariat, Directorate-General F (DG F), Press, Communication, Protocol, email to author, 27 Jan. 2005.

EUPOL PROXIMA was established by Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 Sep. 2003 to support the development of a professional police service in FYROM in accordance with European policing standards. In carrying out its activities, the mission cooperates with the OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje.


EUFJUST THEMIS was established by Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004 to assist the Georgian Government in developing a coordinated strategy for reform of the criminal justice sector.

The mission began its operational phase on 15 July 2004. This was preceded by the planning phase, which began on 1 July 2004.


The mission is supported by 16 local staff. Paesen and Bruynel (note 187).
Multilateral Peace Missions

193 Paesen and Bruynel (note 187).


191 EUFOR ALTHEA was established by Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004, was endorsed and given Chapter VII Powers by UN Security Council Resolution 1551 (9 July 2004). The mission is a follow-on mission to NATO’s SFOR and has a mandate to maintain a secure environment for the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Agreement, to assist in the strengthening of local capacity and to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards EU integration.

192 The contingents are grouped into 3 task forces—MNTF North (Tuzla), MNTF Southeast (Mostar) and MNTF Northwest (Banja Luka)—for which Finland, France and the UK are the framework nations. Lt-Cdr Chris Percival, EUFOR Spokesperson, email to author, 21 Dec. 2004 and telephone conversation with author, 4 Mar. 2005.

193 This figure includes the c. 500 personnel in the Integrated Police Unit. Percival (note 192); and Internet site of ALTHEA, URL <http://www.euforbih.org/sheets/fs050225a.htm>.

194 Percival (note 192).

195 €71 700 000. This figure refers to the common costs of the operation and does not include the salaries of the personnel, which are borne by the contributing countries. Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004.

196 SFOR was established in Dec. 1996 to replace the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), created to implement the military aspects of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. SCR 1088 (12 Dec. 1996). In 2004 NATO decided to close the mission. Although SFOR was succeeded by EUFOR ALTHEA, a small NATO military presence continues to operate in Sarajevo.

197 SFOR contingents were grouped in 3 task forces—MNTF North (Tuzla), MNTF Southeast (Mostar) and MNTF Northwest (Banja Luka)—for which Finland, France and the UK were the framework nations. Percival (note 192).


199 Percival (note 192).

200 €16 141 601. This figure covers only the common costs, mainly the functioning costs of NATO headquarters (civilian personnel and operations and maintenance costs) and investments in infrastructure necessary to support the operation. Contributing countries provide separate finances for their contingents. John Day, Military Budget Committee Section, NATO, email to author, 8 Mar. 2005.

201 KFOR received its mandate from the SC on 10 June 1999. Its tasks include deterring renewed hostilities, establishing a secure environment, supporting UNMIK and monitoring borders. SCR 1244 (10 June 1999).

202 KFOR contingents are grouped in 4 multinational brigades—MNB Centre (Lipljan), MNB Northeast (Novo Selo), MNB Southwest (Prizren), MNB East (Urosevac)—for which Finland, France, Germany and USA, respectively, are the lead nations. Colonel Yves Kermorvant, Chief Public Information Officer, KFOR, email to author, 5 Jan. 2005; and Internet site of KFOR, URL <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm>.

203 NATO member states contributed a total of 15 000 personnel and NATO partner countries contributed 3000. Kermorvant (note 202).

204 Kermorvant (note 202).

205 €23 795 794. This figure covers only the common costs: mainly the functioning costs of NATO headquarters (civilian personnel and operations and maintenance costs) and investments in infrastructure necessary to support the operation. Contributing countries provide separate finances for their contingents. Kermorvant (note 202).

As of 17 Jan. 2005, Canada assumed command and leadership for ISAF until Eurocorps took over in Aug. 2004. Within Eurocorps, France and Germany are the lead nations for the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB), providing c. 3000 soldiers each. Internet site of ISAF, URL <http://www.isaf6.eurocorps.org/structure.php#nations>.

Capt. Mike Nicholson, Public Information Officer, ISAF6, email to author, 9 Jan. 2005.

Nicholson (note 208).

£54 610 570. This figure covers only the common costs, mainly the functioning costs for NATO headquarters (civilian personnel and operations and maintenance costs) and investments in infrastructure necessary to support the operation. Contributing countries provide separate finances for their contingents. Day (note 200).

The mission was established under the authority of SCR 1546 (8 June 2004), which requests member states and other international organizations to assist the Iraqi Government’s efforts in building the capacity of Iraq’s security forces. The NAC agreed on 30 July 2004 to the establishment of NTIM-I.


Cvanova (note 212).

€2 696 100. This figure covers only the common costs, mainly the functioning costs of NATO headquarters (civilian personnel and operations and maintenance costs) and investments in infrastructure necessary to support the operation. Contributing countries provide separate finances for their personnel. Day (note 200).

The mission was established by OAS Permanent Council decision CP/RES.806 (1303/02) on 16 Jan. 2002 to contribute to the resolution of the political crisis by *inter alia* assisting the Government of Haiti to strengthen its democratic processes and institutions. In June 2004, the OAS General Assembly, through A/RES 2058 (XXXIV-O/04) amended the mandate to include the following: assist in the holding of election, promoting and protecting human rights and assist in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police. In carrying out its mandate, the mission cooperates with MINUSTAH and CARICOM.

Louise Brunet, OAS Special Mission to Haiti, email to author, 8 Mar. 2005


Brunet (note 217).

$5 010 965. Brunet (note 217).

**Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz (MAPP/OEA)** was established by OAS Permanent Council decision CP/RES.859 (1397/04) on 6 Feb. 2004 in support of the efforts of the Colombian Government to engage in a political dialogue with the ELN. The mission is tasked to facilitate the DDR process.


The mission is supported by 10 civilian observers and 10 administrative staff. Palacios (note 222).

Palacios (note 222).

Budget for the mission is financed from contributions from: Bahamas, Colombia, the Netherlands, Sweden and the USA. Palacios (note 222).

Includes OSCE long-term missions and other field activities with a peace-making or peace-building mandate but not human rights offices, election monitoring groups or liaison offices.

Decision to establish the mission taken at 16th Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting, *Journal* no. 3 (18 Sep. 1992), Annex 1. The mission was authorized by the FYROM Government through Articles of Understanding agreed by an exchange of letters on 7 Nov. 1992. The mission’s tasks include assessing the level of stability and the possibility of conflict and unrest.

Maxime Filandrov, Public Information Officer, OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, email to author 8 Mar. 2005.

20 are officers who work in the field (community policing) and the remaining 20 personnel are trainers or administrators within the Police Development Unit.

Supported by 259 locally employed staff. Filandrov (note 228).

Filandrov (note 228).
Decision to establish the mission taken at the 17th CSO meeting, Journal no. 2 (6 Nov. 1992), Annex 2. The mission was authorized by the Government of Georgia through an MOU of 23 Jan. 1993 and by South Ossetia’s leaders through an exchange of letters on 1 Mar. 1993. Initially, the objective of the mission was to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties. The mandate was expanded on 29 Mar. 1994 to include monitoring of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia. In Dec. 1999 this was expanded to include the monitoring of Georgia’s border with Chechnya. PC.DEC/344, 15 Dec. 1999. In Dec. 2001 the mission’s tasks were further expanded to include the monitoring of Georgia’s border with Ingushetia. PC.DEC/450, 13 Dec. 2001. In Nov. 2002 the mandate was again expanded to observe and report on cross-border movement between Georgia and the Dagestan Republic of the Russian Federation. PC.DEC/522, 19 Dec. 2002.

Of the 169 international staff, 144 serve as border monitors. The mission is supported by 104 local staff. Freeman (note 234).

Decision to establish the mission taken at the 19th CSO meeting, Journal no. 3 (4 Feb. 1993), Annex 3. Authorized by the Government of Moldova through MOU, 7 May 1993. The mission’s tasks include assisting the parties in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement to the conflict as well as gathering and providing information on the situation.

In addition, there are 2 short-term verification staff and 1 contracted ammunition expert who are employed under the Voluntary Fund, which provides financial and technical assistance to Russia for the removal of troops, arms and military equipment from the region. Kalland (note 240).

The tasks of the mission include facilitating dialogue, promoting human rights and informing the OSCE about further developments. This was expanded in 2002 to include an economic and environmental dimension.

Formerly the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan. In Oct. 2002 a decision was taken to change the name of the mission to reflect the change of focus of the mission’s activities.

The mission is supported by 65 local staff. Rouault (note 246).


The Personal Representative is assisted by 5 field assistants. Keay (note 251).

Decision to establish the mission taken at 5th meeting, Ministerial Council, Budapest, 8 Dec. 1995 (MC(5).DEC/1) in accordance with Annex 6 of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. The tasks of the mission include assisting the parties in regional stabilization measures and democracy building.

The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC.DEC/206). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC.DEC/206).

The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC.DEC/160). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC.DEC/160).

The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160).

The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160).

Data for this mission were provided by the OSCE itself. The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160).

Data for this mission were provided by the OSCE itself. The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160).

Data for this mission were provided by the OSCE itself. The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC/DEC/1/160).
These are operations carried out by non-standing coalitions of multinational states sanctioned by the UN. Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953 by the Commander-in-Chief, UN Command; the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army; and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Entered into force on 27 July 1953.


Delorme (note 283).

Delorme (note 283).

Delorme (note 283).


Forselv (note 288).


The mission receives its authority from the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, 15 Jan. 1997, and the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron, 21 Jan. 1997. The mandate of the mission is to provide by its presence a secure and stable environment. The mandate is renewed every 3 months pending approval from both the Palestinian and Israeli parties.

Gunhild L. Forselv, Senior Press and Information Officer, TIPH, email to author, 8 Jan. 2005.

Forselv (note 293).

Forselv (note 293).

Forselv (note 293).

Budget for the period 1 Feb. 2004–31 Jan. 2005. Approximate amount of the core budget; it does not include salaries, which are paid by the contributing countries.

Forselv (note 293).

The SC authorized under Chapter VII and in accordance with Chapter VIII the deployment of French troops alongside ECOMIC to contribute to a secure environment and allow for the implementation of the of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. SCR 1464 (4 Feb. 2003).

Following the attack against the Licorne forces by FANCI forces and the subsequent riots in Nov. 2004, the strength of the mission was increased by 1000 soldiers.


Lyet (note 298).

Lyet (note 298).

Lyet (note 298).

The Regional Assistance Mission was established under the framework of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration in which members of the Pacific Islands Forum agree to a collective response to crises usually on the request of the host government. 31st Pacific Islands Forum Comuniqué 2000, Tarawa, Kiribati, 23–30 Oct. 2000. The mission is mandated to assist the Solomon Islands Government in restoring law and order and in building up the capacity of the police force.


As of 1 Dec. 2004. This figure includes 21 lawyers and legal advisers, 30 advisers for prisons, 100 advisers for the nation-building and development components of the operation, and 19 advisers and in-line personnel for MOF. ‘RAMSI—Fact Sheet’ (note 303).
The Multinational Force in Iraq was authorized by SCR 1511 (16 Oct. 2003) to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of UNAMI’s mandated tasks. The mandate of the MNF was reaffirmed by SCR 1546 (8 June 2004) following the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the subsequent transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Government of Iraq.


The USA contributed 148 000 soldiers and the remaining 25 000 were contributed by the rest of the coalition. The force is supported by c. 118 000 members of the Iraqi security forces (police, National Guard, armed forces and border patrol). O’Hanlon, M. E. and Lins de Albuquerque, A., Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, ‘Iraq Index: Tracking reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq’, URL <http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex>, 5 Jan. 2005.

This figure includes the 98 training officers operating out of the Jordanian facility. Ian Bald, Assistant Public Affairs Officer, US Embassy in Stockholm, email to author, 8 Feb. 2005.

Of the 902 fatalities, 844 were US soldiers (721 owing to hostile action and 123 to other causes), 23 were British soldiers and the remaining 35 were from other countries. O’Hanlon and Lins de Albuquerque (note 309).