2. Major armed conflicts

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I. Introduction

The discussion of major armed conflicts in the SIPRI Yearbook 2004 focused on the dominance of intra-state armed conflict in the contemporary international system.1 This trend was even more apparent in 2004, when every one of the 19 major armed conflicts that were active during the year was classified as intra-state. Only three of these—the conflict against al-Qaeda, the conflict in Iraq and the conflict in Darfur, Sudan—are less than 10 years old. These figures may appear at odds with a contemporary international security climate that is preoccupied with perceived ‘new’ security threats such as international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. However, in a globalized world, intra-state conflicts are increasingly becoming international in nature and in effects. The complexity and diversity of these conflicts make the distinction between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ particularly complicated and call into question the basis on which conflicts are classified and addressed.

This chapter therefore concentrates for the second year running on intra-state conflict. Section II looks at the internationalization of these conflicts and how this affects the perceptions as well as the handling of conflict. Section III addresses a number of contemporary features of intra-state conflict that complicate traditional approaches to their analysis and management: the diversity of warring parties and multiple grievances; the evolving tactics in conflict and their consequences for civilians; and the shifting location and containment of intra-state conflict. These themes are illustrated by synopses of a number of the major armed conflicts that were active in 2004. The international dominance of the war in Iraq, and the special circumstances regarding its origin and prosecution, merit a separate discussion in section IV, and section V presents the conclusions.

II. Internationalized intra-state conflicts

The data on major armed conflicts for 2004 presented by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) in appendix 2A show that this is the first year of the entire data series for which no interstate conflict was reported.2 Two interstate

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2 The UCDP has contributed data on major armed conflicts for publication in the SIPRI Yearbook annually since the late 1980s; for the first published data in the series see Wilson, G. K. and
conflicts that were registered for 2003 do not appear in the table for 2004. The conflict between the United States and its allies and the Government of Iraq, which began in March 2003, ended formally on 1 May 2003 when US President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations. The conflict in Iraq in 2004 was an internal, intra-state war (see section IV). In the second, long-standing, interstate conflict registered for 2003—between India and Pakistan—the 23 November 2003 negotiated ceasefire on the disputed Line of Control (LOC) that divides Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir held throughout 2004. Although fighting between India and Kashmiri separatists continued, and although the Indian Government claimed that terrorists were continuing to cross the LOC from Pakistan, the improved security situation led India to withdraw several thousand troops from Kashmir in November 2004. Formal peace talks between India and Pakistan, which began in February, made little progress on the Kashmir dispute but facilitated perceptible improvement in the relations between these two nuclear weapon powers.

The prevalence of intra-state conflict has been widely noted as one of the most distinguishing features of the late 20th century. The distinction between ‘intra-state’ and ‘interstate’ as a way of categorizing and studying contemporary armed conflicts becomes irrelevant if all extant major armed conflicts are classified as intra-state. This classification arguably also stretches the term ‘intra-state’ to an extent that it is no longer a helpful analytical concept. The only apparent common feature of the 19 intra-state conflicts listed in appendix 2A is that they are being fought by one or more states against one or more non-state groups. Beyond that, it is the diversity of intra-state conflicts that is most striking. Both conflicts involving the USA—the conflict in Afghanistan fought against al-Qaeda and the conflict in Iraq against various Iraqi insurgent groups—began as interstate conflicts with US-led attacks on the state in question, and both were rooted in the United States’ post-11 September 2001 ‘global war on terrorism’. These conflicts involve other states fighting alongside the USA in multinational (non-standing) coalitions against disparate non-state groups. In both cases fighting has continued after the military victory of the USA and its allies and the collapse of the government in question: the subsequent interim governments of Afghanistan and Iraq are now warring parties on the side of the USA. These complex international conflicts resist neat intra-/interstate labelling. Moreover, despite their shared origins and Wallensteen, P., ‘Major armed conflicts in 1987’, SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1988), pp. 285–98. The data for 2004 are presented in appendix 2A in this volume.


4 The conflict between the Government of Afghanistan and Taliban rebels, classified as intra-state with foreign involvement, has not reached 1000 battle-related deaths and is therefore not included in the data in appendix 2A.

5 Some analysts have defined conflicts between states and non-state groups outside the territory of the state as ‘extra-systemic armed conflict’. Strand, H.; Wihelmsen, L. and Gleditsch, N. P. (International
protagonists, their comparability is limited. The conflict against al-Qaeda appears to be more a contest over the structure and governance of the international system, in which states are defending the system of states against challenges posed by transnational, non-state, political protest movements (al-Qaeda) and the parties that support them (the Taliban in Afghanistan). In contrast, some analysts saw the interstate war in Iraq in 2003 as a rejection of the international multilateral order by the USA and its allies.6 The current conflict in Iraq is seen by many as an imperial or anti-colonial war, closer to the wars of national liberation that were fought in the late 19th century and much of the 20th century in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.7

The intra-/interstate distinction is also challenged by the international dimensions of conflicts fought by a government party on its own state territory. Some analysts have sought to define internationalized internal conflicts as those in which third-party state military intervention takes place.8 However, this categorization fails to take into account non-military forms of intervention and the very different ways in which an internal conflict can affect and be affected by external factors. In an increasingly globalized world, it is questionable whether any internal conflict can be devoid of international dimensions.9 All conflicts, in this context, are ‘international’, even if they are not interstate wars.

A particularly stark example of the complexity of internationalized internal armed conflict is the long-standing conflict between the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and various militant Islamic groups, which intensified in August 2000 after the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and the launch of the second Intifada. The conflict continued to have a significant regional dimension as regards its conduct—Israel launched air strikes on Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on a number of occasions during 2004—and as regards relations between countries in the region. Israel rejected Syrian overtures to renew the Middle East peace negotiations that were broken off in 2000, despite efforts by the United Nations to revive talks on the return to Syria of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel argued that Syria’s move was an effort to improve its relations with the USA rather than with Israel and


8 Strand, Wihelmsen and Gleditsch et al. (note 5), p. 11.

that no progress was possible until Syria had made conciliatory gestures such as expelling Palestinian militants and stopping all assistance to Hezbollah, which Israel describes as ‘Iran’s forward military arm’. Continued international efforts to resume Israeli–Palestinian peace talks through the individual engagement of members of ‘the Quartet’—the USA, the UN, the European Union and Russia—failed to bring any breakthrough in 2004.

The actions of the government of Ariel Sharon were particularly influenced by the policies of the USA towards the wider Middle East and the ‘global war on terrorism’. Israel, supported by the USA, maintained its refusal to negotiate with the President of the PA, Yasser Arafat, on the grounds that he was not able to halt Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli targets. Israel’s policy was part of a comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy focused on the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which included Israeli Army raids on Palestinian towns in search of Palestinian militants, targeted assassinations of alleged militant leaders and the construction of a 365-km barrier intended to prevent Palestinian incursions into Israel. The USA supported the construction of the barrier as a ‘temporary’ measure to protect Israel against terrorism. Although the policy led to a significant drop in suicide bombings in Israel, the number of suicide bomber recruits appeared to rise. Moreover, many argued that Israel’s policies were creating divisions within Palestinian society and increasing popular support for extremist militant groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.


12 In the years preceding his death Arafat was a virtual captive in the PA Headquarters in the West Bank town of Ramallah, blockaded by Israeli tanks since mid-2002. On developments in the greater Middle East region see chapter 5 in this volume.


14 In July 2004 the International Court of Justice handed down its advisory opinion on the legality of the security fence, declaring that a major portion of the fence was on Palestinian land in the West Bank and therefore illegal. ‘Israel and Palestine: talking again (but not to each other)’, The Economist, 3 July 2004, p. 35; and Crouch, G. and Myre, G., ‘Major portion of Israeli fence is ruled illegal’, New York Times, 10 July 2004, p. 1.

Sharon’s plan to pull back Israeli forces and an estimated 7500 Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip, while keeping some West Bank settlements as part of any future peace accord with the Palestinians, was seen as particularly controversial both within and outside Israel. For many Palestinians and Arab leaders, it constituted a fundamental departure from internationally agreed positions on a future Palestinian state as outlined in the ‘road map’ backed by the Quartet. In May 2004, the Quartet gave its qualified endorsement to the Gaza withdrawal plan.

The death of Arafat on 11 November 2004, after 35 years as head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the election in January 2005 of the moderate Mahmoud Abbas as President of the PA appeared to offer a unique opportunity for a revival of the peace process. The incoming US Administration declared that the peace process would be a priority of the second term of President Bush, while the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, announced that a conference on Palestinian reform would be held in London in early 2005 and Egypt committed itself to cooperation with Israel on the withdrawal from Gaza. Whether renewed efforts can revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process depends, in no small part, on the extent to which a coordinated international approach to the conflict can be reforged. Disengaging the ‘international’ from the ‘domestic’ in such intra-state conflicts is impossible.

Many analysts are now trying to analyse the term ‘internal conflict’ in ways other than according to the international or domestic dimensions of conflicts. They have examined *inter alia* the distinctions between civil war and insurgency, between armed conflict and criminalized violence, and between internal armed conflict and terrorism. Such approaches demonstrate that conflict does not easily lend itself to categorization and comparison. Understanding intra-state conflict may require closer attention to the features and details of individual conflicts and greater caution towards using comparative labels and deriving generic recommendations.

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16 Sharon faced significant domestic opposition to the Gaza disengagement plan from within his own Likud Party as well as from the Israeli settler lobby, both of which demanded a national referendum on the issue.


III. Features of contemporary intra-state conflicts

In explaining how contemporary armed conflicts resist neat internal/external, intra-/interstate classification, many have sought to draw attention to the way in which today’s intra-state conflicts are different from the wars of national liberation or classic interstate wars of the past. A number of features of contemporary intra-state conflict are highlighted: the diversity of the warring parties and their grievances; the interplay between conflict tactics and the role of civilians in conflict; and the shifting location of conflicts. While it is debatable how ‘new’ each of these features really is, collectively they complicate both the understanding and the management of contemporary intra-state conflict. It is important to bear in mind that the features highlighted in many cases reinforce and feed into one another or are particularly salient at different stages of a long-standing conflict. Most conflicts exhibit more than one of the features in question.

**Diversity of warring parties and multiple grievances**

The diversity of warring parties and the grievances that they may reflect is one of the most complicating features of intra-state conflict. Most of the current interstate conflicts include more than one rebel group, and in cases such as India and Iraq it is difficult even to identify and describe all the insurgent groups. Moreover, it should be noted that the conflicts listed in table 2A.3 are only those defined as ‘major’ (see appendix 2B): Indonesia, for example, is negotiating at least two ongoing ‘minor’ conflicts in addition to the conflict in Aceh. In some cases, multiple rebel groups may reflect the ethnic divisions of a country. Such groups may share the same general grievance or incompatibility—opposition to the government—but differ in the specific nature of that opposition and how they express it in armed conflict. In cases such as the conflicts in Burundi, Colombia and Darfur, Sudan, diverse rebels groups fight independently against the government party and only rarely coordinate their armed opposition. Where rebel parties coordinate their political and military strategies they may prove a more potent threat to the government. The setting up of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in Sudan in 1989, an umbrella organization for several opposition parties in the south, is an example of this.

Prolonged conflict may also lead to the proliferation of warring parties as rebel groups splinter into different factions, external parties intervene and new grievances develop out of the conflict. In Colombia, for example, the rise of

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21 The protracted nature of many intra-state conflicts, and its consequences for conflict management, are discussed in detail in Dwan and Gustavsson (note 1), pp. 95–121.

22 E.g., in Liberia, the fighting reported in 2004 was between the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy rebel groups rather than between the government and rebel opposition.
the right-wing paramilitary organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, or the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) was a consequence of the long-standing conflict between the government and the rebel groups Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, or the National Liberation Army). However, multiple parties are not only associated with non-state opposition. Government forces can be boosted by the engagement of foreign state and non-state actors, including private security companies.\textsuperscript{23} Government parties may also make use of local militia groups either indirectly, as in the case of the Janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan, or directly, as in the case of Nepal, where the government is creating local militia groups to counter attacks by Maoist rebel groups.\textsuperscript{24}

Multiple warring parties make for, and are made by, multiple grievances. Table 2A.3, in appendix 2A, lists two general types of incompatibility: over government and over territory. However, these say little about why groups seek control over one or the other (or both) and why they are willing to risk their lives to do so. Self-determination continues to be an important motivation for some groups to seek control over government (regional autonomy) or territory (secession). For much of the past decade, research has played down the extent to which ethnic or religious differences per se are the motivating drivers for groups to seek control over government or territory. Instead, analysts have highlighted the access to and distribution of wealth, land and natural resource in societies, which may or may not be determined along dominant and minority ethnic or religious group lines, as the driving forces in internal wars.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, the longer a conflict continues, the greater the likelihood of new grievances emerging as consequences of death and suffering.

Another distinction to be drawn is that between stated grievances and ‘real’ agendas. Much of the work explaining prolonged conflict has focused on the profit motivations of rebel groups, particularly in resource-rich countries. As Paul Collier, the leading proponent of this research, has noted, ‘to get started, rebellion needs grievance, whereas to be sustained, it needs greed’.\textsuperscript{26} In some cases, particularly where multiple warring parties are present, even the stated incompatibility is unclear: in the case of Iraq, for instance, it is difficult to identify, much less distinguish between, the motivations for many of the multiple insurgent attacks—the creation of an Islamic state or the removal of US


forces, or criminal gain, or local rivalries and vendettas. In cases of weak or collapsed states, such as Somalia, the presence of multiple warring parties is less representative of competing political agendas than a symptom of the absence of any political arena in which competition over power, resources and territory can be regulated. The reality of most conflicts is more complex and more mundane than the categorization by political incompatibilities may initially suggest. Rebel groups, and their individual members, may be motivated by a range of factors operating at the same time: local as well as national, personal as well as political, ideological as well as profit-based. This sometimes leads to the fragmentation of rebel groups and inter-rebel hostility.

The presence of multiple parties and multiple grievances may have a significant impact on the shape and course of a conflict. It tends to protract conflict by weakening the ability of any one party to attain outright military victory, creating multiple centres of violence within a country and provoking competition between groups, usually reflected in an increased intensity of violence. The multiplicity of actors and grievances poses particular challenges for conflict resolution efforts—whether in grappling with several essentially separate conflicts at once, as in the cases of Colombia and Sudan, or in attempting to negotiate an overall framework for peaceful resolution of conflict, as in the case of Burundi.

Burundi

The conflict in Burundi began in 1991 and has claimed approximately 200,000 lives and involved several different rebel groups. The 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi stipulated 2004 as the final year of the transition, and prospects for peace initially appeared to be good. The 16 November 2003 power-sharing agreement between the transitional government and its most significant rebel opponent, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie–Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD–FDD, or the National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy) halted fighting in 16 of Burundi’s 17 provinces. The agreement stipulated the integration of CNDD–FDD fighters into the transitional government forces (Forces Armeés Burundaises, FAB, or the Burundian Armed Forces), leaving only one rebel group, the Palipehutu–FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu–Forces nationales de libération, or the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People–Forces for National Liberation) outside the peace process.27

Optimism about implementation of the November 2003 agreement proved hasty, however. Failure to discipline cooperation between the government and the CNDD–FDD and to proceed with disarmament during the year hampered

the consolidation of peace in the country. After military successes awarded the CNDD–FDD with a boost in political support, it withdrew from the government in May, stating that it was not adequately represented, and factionalism within the CNDD–FDD further complicated the implementation and consolidation of the peace agreement. Meanwhile, the conflict between the transitional government and the Palipehutu–FNL showed few signs of de-escalation. Under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa, a faction of the Palipehutu–FNL condemned the November 2003 agreement and has continued armed attacks against the government and maintained its refusal to negotiate with the transitional government. Fighting between the government and the FNL in the first half of 2004 displaced approximately 30 000 people.

Confusion over rebel identities and affiliations in the conflict was further illustrated in the massacre of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at a UN-run camp in Gatumba, Burundi, on 13 August 2004. The FNL claimed responsibility for the massacre on the following day, but both eyewitnesses and officials from the Burundian and Rwandan governments claimed that Rwandan Hutu Interahamwe rebels based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were involved. Human Rights Watch, an internationally respected non-governmental organization (NGO), has disputed the involvement of Congolese and Rwandan groups. There was no conclusive word on the identity of the perpetrators, and a UN report recommended the continuation of investigations by the Burundian Government and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Negotiations on power sharing held in August between the government and various Burundian groups illustrated the intricate balance that needs to be struck between different actors in order for the peace process to continue. The holding of a referendum on Burundi’s new constitution, a precondition for general elections, was delayed for the third time in December, and no new date was specified, thus breaking the timetable set in the Arusha Agreement.

The need to find the correct modus operandi for engaging the FNL (punishment for the crimes committed in Gatumba versus continued attempts to hold

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32 In line with the Arusha Agreement, the ‘Pretoria compromise’ was predicated on ethnically defined power sharing and set to guarantee minimum representation to the Tutsi minority. ‘Burundi: the timetable slips’, Africa Confidential, vol. 45, no. 20 (8 Oct. 2004), p. 5.

peace negotiations with the group) and its supporters in the peace process will be an important factor in the consolidation of peace in Burundi.34

**Colombia**

In the conflict between the Colombian Government and the FARC and ELN rebel groups, more than 70 000 people have been killed since the early 1960s. While neither of the rebel groups has relinquished its Marxist ideologically based political opposition, analysts generally agree that the political content of the conflict has been increasingly de-emphasized in favour of the warring parties’ pursuit of economic agendas, mainly through drug trafficking and kidnappings.35

The Colombian conflict is complicated by the role played by the AUC, dominant among the several paramilitary forces that have emerged in opposition to both the government and the rebel groups, and big players in the drugs trade.36 Negotiations between the government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez and the AUC led to a ceasefire in July 2003. On 13 May 2004, the Ralito II Agreement was signed, establishing a neutral ‘zone of location’ for the paramilitaries.37 Disarmament of the AUC started in earnest in November 2004 and was intended to reach 3000 (of an estimated total of 20 000) combatants before the end of the year, but progress was slow.38 Although curbing the AUC is an important step forward, international endorsement has been tempered by allegations of government–AUC collusion and side-by-side fighting against the rebels.39

President Uribe’s hard-line ‘democratic security policy’ aimed to uproot the insurgents militarily, deny them illegal sources of income, and boost the police


35 Some analysts interpret the fact that armed groups seek not only to seize control of territory but also to establish basic forms of government as an indication that political grievances are returning to the forefront. ‘Study finds Colombian armed groups have different motives, modes of operation’, El Espectador (Bogota), 4 Apr. 2004, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report–Latin America (FBIS-LAT), ‘Geography of the conflict’, FBIS-LAT-2004-0818, 19 Aug. 2004.

36 The AUC was officially formed in 1997 but has roots dating back almost 30 years. One estimate claims that 40% of Colombian territory is under FARC or AUC domination and the 2 groups together account for 70% of the drugs leaving the country. McDermott, J., ‘FARC and the paramilitaries take over Colombia’s drugs trade’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 16, no. 7 (July 2004), p. 28.


and military. Under ‘Plan Patriota’, announced in May 2004 and involving the mobilization of 14 000–17 000 government troops, major military offensives were launched against FARC.\(^{40}\) Government operations, targeting especially the southern and central regions, where FARC has maintained a stronghold for decades, yielded some success.\(^{41}\) According to an army commander, 1500 ‘members of illegal organisations’ were killed and close to 6000 captured in the first eight months of 2004.\(^{42}\) The government’s success in occupying several of FARC’s ‘strategic corridors’ also curbed the mobility of the rebels.\(^{43}\) Rebel leaders were specifically targeted during the year, resulting in the arrest of the most senior FARC leader ever to be captured, Simón Trinidad, in January; the surrender of Herando Buitrago, another prominent FARC leader, in November; and the capture of José Ramirez, a senior ELN commander notoriously involved in the kidnapping business, in December.\(^{44}\)

FARC kept up its retaliation, however, including cross-border raids into Ecuador and Venezuela.\(^{45}\) Major fighting between FARC and the AUC, killing 200, took place in the Choco region, bordering Panama, in August.\(^{46}\) Although informal talks were held between the government and FARC, they faltered on the rebel group’s insistence on ‘humanitarian exchange’ (i.e., the release of imprisoned rebels in exchange for military and political hostages held by FARC) and the demand for a demilitarized zone.\(^{47}\) Although the government appeared to take a more conciliatory position towards the ELN, there was no real move towards negotiations.\(^{48}\)


The forceful approach on the part of the Colombian Government remained controversial, and government troops, paramilitaries and rebel parties alike were accused of violence directed against civilians, particularly the indigenous population. The grave humanitarian situation caused by the conflict is reflected in the fact that Colombia is third only to Sudan and the DRC in terms of the number of displaced persons, and drug-related crime continues to be the most common cause of death after cancer. Nevertheless, Uribe’s domestic approval ratings remained solid, and neighbouring leaders have expressed their approval of the drugs trade clamp-down. US President Bush showed his approval by promising to continue aid after the formal end of ‘Plan Colombia’ in September 2005.

Sudan

Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) Government and the main rebel group in the south, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), at war for over 21 years, made painstaking progress towards peace in 2004. Sudan’s second conflict, waged in the country’s western region of Darfur between the government and two rebel groups—the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—began in February 2003 and reached alarming levels by the end of 2004, with over 70 000 people killed and up to 2 million forcibly displaced. Although the UN humanitarian coordinator for Sudan in March 2004 labelled Darfur the ‘world’s greatest humanitarian catastrophe’, the divisions of the international community over potential military intervention in the region were reflected in an inconclusive debate over whether the events in Darfur could be classified as genocide.


52 US Department of State, ‘FY 2006 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request: foreign operations, export financing, and related programs (foreign operations)’ (Department of State, Washington, DC, 2005), URL <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2006/html/41795.htm>. See also chapter 8 in this volume.


Testifying to the importance of sustained and comprehensive peace processes, negotiations between the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A—mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—finally resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005.\textsuperscript{55} Most importantly, the agreement stipulated the equal sharing of oil revenues (largely derived from the south), proportionate sharing of civil service posts and the right of the south to vote on secession after an interim period of autonomy of six years. Negotiations between the NIF Government and the rebel groups in Darfur were less successful. Talks restarted in March 2004, mediated by a representative of the Government of Chad. An agreement was signed in N'Djamena, Chad, by a representative of the Sudanese Government and leaders of both the SLM/A and the JEM on 8 April, but its effectiveness was limited.\textsuperscript{56}

The negotiations on Darfur were complicated by the diversity of actors in the region (and periodic hostility between them) as well as a questionable commitment on the part of the Sudanese Government to bringing the violence to an end. The government-affiliated Janjaweed militias were pivotal players in the conflict but were not represented in any formal peace negotiations. Sudan’s policy of publicly distancing itself from the Janjaweed yet using them in effect as a powerful proxy aggravated the situation,\textsuperscript{57} in particular as air raids by the government paved the way for direct attacks on civilians by the Janjaweed.\textsuperscript{58} Some of the most egregious violence, involving raids on villages, looting, raping and pillaging, took place at the hands of the Janjaweed and was primarily targeted at civilians rather than SLM/A or JEM forces.\textsuperscript{59} The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), deployed to Darfur in July, faced difficulties owing to the continued fighting in the region.\textsuperscript{60}

humanity committed in Darfur was launched by the UN Secretary-General in Oct. in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 Sep. 2004, and was expected to report its findings in early 2005. Action against genocide—defined as a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic or religious group—is required under the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the convention is reproduced at URL <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm>.

\textsuperscript{55} Landmark agreements had been reached in 2004, including the Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-Interim and Interim Period of 7 Jan. and 3 protocols of 26 May between the government and the SPLM: on power sharing (outlining a system for a separate southern administration); on the resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States; and on the resolution of the conflict in Abyei Area. See the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan, State House, Nairobi, 5 June 2004, at URL <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/pa_sudan.html>. For a description of earlier stages of the peace process see Dwan and Gustavsson (note 1), pp. 119–21.


\textsuperscript{57} The Sudanese Government was required to disarm the Janjaweed militias by UN Security Council Resolution 1556, 30 July 2004. ‘Fleeing the horsemen that kill for Khartoum’, The Economist, 15 May 2004, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{60} For further details on AMIS see appendix 3A in this volume.
Talks continued, under the mediation of the African Union (AU), in Abuja, Nigeria, in the autumn and reached some agreement, but they broke down again in December after a government offensive directed at civilians and SLM/A targets in southern Darfur. Although the SLM/A and the JEM initially cooperated as a single delegation in negotiations with the government, sporadic clashes between members of the two rebel groups complicated efforts to put up a united front against the government. In addition, already at the outset of the 2004 round of talks on Darfur, individuals who did not consider themselves represented by either the SLM/A or the JEM expressed their dissatisfaction at being excluded. In October it was reported that two active groups had broken away from the JEM. One group, the National Movement for Reformation and Development (NMRD), estimated to command 1000–3000 fighters, was involved in clashes with both government troops and the JEM during the autumn. In December the government decided to pursue separate talks with the NMRD.

While grievances over economic governance and marginalization by the central government were expressed both in the south of Sudan and in Darfur, there was no effort to explicitly link the peace processes, either by the Sudanese Government or by external mediators. Concerns were raised during the autumn that the NIF Government was unscrupulously exploiting international goodwill over prospects for a final settlement with the SPLM/A and deliberately prolonging talks so as to have a free hand in Darfur. In more positive manifestations of linkage, however, analysts have argued that the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPLM/A and the government could set a precedent for conflict resolution in Darfur.

Conflict tactics and their consequences for civilians

In conflict analysis, a distinction is often made between conventional warfare between states and internal conflicts in which at least one party is a non-state
actor. In the former, conflict is seen to involve large, organized and well-disciplined national forces, backed up by advanced technology, and parties which observe the international laws of war and international humanitarian law. Internal conflict, on the other hand, is seen to be characterized by small, diverse and often ill-disciplined groups relying on small arms and light weapons to fight a mobile war against one or more enemies. A contrast is also drawn in the relationship between the warring parties and the civilian population in these different types of conflict, with the non-state rebel groups being seen to interact far more closely with the civilian population than with regular government forces. Rebel groups are seen to implicate civilians in conflict through their reliance on civilian support, shelter and resources, even if they are secured through brutal and coercive means. At the same time, rebels are seen as deliberately attacking civilians as part of a tactic of aiming at weaker and less-protected targets. Tactics such as suicide bombings, hostage takings and seizure of public buildings also ensure rebel groups significant media attention and can highlight their cause at home and abroad, as Chechen tactics demonstrated throughout 2004. In this context, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between asymmetric tactics and acts of terrorism.

However, despite disparities in training, level of professionalism and strength both between different governments and between regular and non-government forces, the conflict tactics employed by both are seen as becoming increasingly similar, particularly in their effect on civilians. The ‘Western way of warfare’, which developed in the 1990s as a result of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs and made states rely increasingly on technological advantage to pursue military advantage, has been challenged in the context of recent conflicts. ‘Low-risk’ warfare, exercised primarily by the USA, in which fighters far removed from the battlefield rely on precision bombing and targeted attacks involving little risk to either themselves or civilian populations, has been largely discounted for two reasons. First, it has proven ineffective in purely military terms to ensure the defeat of smaller and less well-armed forces employing ‘lightning’ attacks, ambushes and bombs, before disappearing into familiar rural terrain or, increasingly, blending into urban civilian populations. The experience of the USA and its allies in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Iraq testifies to the impotency of overwhelming technological warfare superiority. Second, risk-free warfare has proven a chimera in contexts where a large part of the conflict is about ‘winning the peace’ and securing public support. In this context, the government party cannot prosecute the conflict from afar but must engage with the public. This has forced intervening states, particularly Western states, to make operational and

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67 See, e.g., Kaldor (note 20).
doctrinal changes, placing greater emphasis on infiltration and the use of special forces so as to better combat rebel groups and deprive them of cover and support among the civilian population.\textsuperscript{70} This development turns the concept of asymmetry on its head, as tactics used by the USA and the UK in Afghanistan and Iraq resemble those normally associated with weaker parties in conflict.\textsuperscript{71} 

While the government party is perceived to have an interest, as well as a duty, to ensure the support and protection of the population in an intra-state conflict, counter-insurgency tactics can result in higher casualties, both military and civilian, at the hands of government parties. Government parties may deliberately target civilians in conflict in much the same way as rebel groups do. The reasons for this include the inability to strike targets directly, the association of the population or a sector of it with ‘the enemy’, the calculated shock value of civilian deaths, material incentives, as well as the fragmentation of warring parties and lack of discipline.\textsuperscript{72} This may reflect the tactical or military weakness of the government party itself, as is evident in the Sudanese Government’s aiding and abetting of the Janjaweed militias in Darfur. However, material incentives and lack of discipline of government or irregular forces also play a role, particularly in those conflicts where natural resources and ‘predation’ play an important role.\textsuperscript{73} 

The movement of fighting into cities further exposes civilians to conflict.\textsuperscript{74} Urban warfare is in part a function of changing demographic patterns but may also signal the growing strength of a rebel group, as the incursions of the Nepalese Maoist parties into the capital, Kathmandu, in 2004 indicated. Moreover, attacks on urban areas and targets guarantee rebel groups increased international and domestic media attention.

The killing, wounding, raping and pillaging of civilians are permanent features of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{75} Even where the civilian population is not deliberately targeted, the effects of prolonged intra-state conflict on the health, welfare and development of individuals are catastrophic. Although the consequences of


\textsuperscript{74} For a detailed discussion of urban and rural insurgencies see Marks, T. A., ‘Urban insurgency’, \textit{Small Wars and Insurgencies}, vol. 14, no. 3 (autumn 2003), pp. 100-157.

\textsuperscript{75} Efforts at tracking the incidence of rape in conflict contexts and its use as a deliberate tactic have recently been initiated. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Women and War Project, ‘Rape as a weapon of war’, URL <http://web.amnesty.org/actforwomen/conflict-1-eng>. 
intra-state conflict for civilians are increasingly highlighted in the media, international policy discussions and academic research, analysis and directed action are impeded by the difficulty of tabulating direct and indirect non-combatant fatalities in conflict.\(^{76}\) This is an important area for future research.

**Nepal**

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)—CPN(M)—has fought against the government and the king since 1996, with the stated aim of establishing a communist state in Nepal and abolishing the monarchy. Since the CPN(M) walk-out from negotiations with the government in August 2003, breaking an eight-month ceasefire, heavy fighting has continued virtually unabated. In November 2004 it was estimated that close to 11 000 people had died as a result of the conflict, 2700 of whom since August 2003.\(^{77}\) Nepal is one of the world’s 10 poorest countries, and land issues are central to popular grievances and support for the rebels.\(^{78}\)

The increasing ferocity of the conflict reflected a shift in tactics on both sides. The guerrilla tactics of the rebels included bombings and intimidations as a means of increasing support for the CPN(M) as well as the forcible recruitment of fighters. In January 2004, 192 students and teachers from villages in western Nepal were abducted by rebels and reportedly sent to military training camps; a further 300 students were kidnapped in the mid-western Rolpa district in February.\(^{79}\) In the single largest seizure, rebels abducted over 1000 people from villages in Nepal’s western Bajura district on 30 March.\(^{80}\) Abductions continued during the year and, whereas independent analysts estimate the rebels’ total mobilization capacity at 15 000 fighters, CPN(M) leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, also known as Prachanda, stated that 100 000 people were undergoing guerrilla warfare training.\(^{81}\) The government’s response of arming local civilians in militia groups known as Rural

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\(^{77}\) Agence France-Presse, ‘Nepal army has secured 2,000 villages, out of 4,000’, 19 Nov. 2004, URL <http://www.reliefweb.int>.


\(^{80}\) Deutsche Presse Agentur, ‘Maoists abducted over 1,000 villagers in west Nepal’, 1 Apr. 2004, URL <http://www.reliefweb.int>.

Volunteer Security Groups and Peace Committees fragmented the counter-insurgency.\textsuperscript{82}

In testimony to the rebels’ capacity to mount credible threats through intimidation rather than sheer strike capacity, the CPN(M) for the first time blockaded routes into Kathmandu between 17 and 24 August and launched attacks in the city centre.\textsuperscript{83} Clashes between the army and rebels in the western parts of the country in December, killing 23 rebels and 20 police and soldiers, indicated that the armed insurgency did not wane in 2004.\textsuperscript{84}

The conflict in Nepal is complicated by the power struggle between the rebels, the political parties in parliament and King Gyanendra, who has exercised executive powers, including control over the military, since October 2003.\textsuperscript{85} The resignation of the royalist prime minister, Surya Bahadur Thapa, in May 2004 and the appointment of the new prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, by the king led to further marginalization of the government in the conflict. The CPN(M) rejected offers of talks with Deuba and demanded direct talks with the king. The rebels also made international mediation and the removal of their labelling as terrorists by the Nepalese authorities a condition for any peace talks.\textsuperscript{86} The political situation in Nepal came to a crisis in February 2005 when King Gyanendra assumed direct power by declaring a state of civil emergency and dismissing the government.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{Uganda}

The conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group and the Ugandan Government under President Yoweri Museveni continued to pose a grave threat to the Ugandan population in 2004, largely outside the international media spotlight.\textsuperscript{88} The conflict, carried out in the north of Uganda since 1988, has seen alarming levels of child soldier recruitment: one source estimated that close to 90 per cent of the LRA fighters are minors.\textsuperscript{89} Children also answer for a particularly large proportion of Uganda’s 1.5 million


\textsuperscript{88} Jan Egeland, UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, has repeatedly criticized the lack of attention given to the Ugandan conflict. See Wallis, W., ‘Uganda vows to avenge massacre by rebels’, \textit{Financial Times}, 24 Feb. 2004, p. 4.

Despite the LRA’s stated aim of fighting for the establishment of a Christian regime in Uganda, analysts generally agree that the lack of clarity of the rebel group’s agenda makes a politically negotiated settlement of the conflict difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, deep divisions in Ugandan society and the marginalization of the population of Acholiland (simultaneously the base for LRA recruitment and the target of LRA attacks) in the north of the country point to the grievances in the conflict.

The government’s sustained campaign against the LRA resulted in the reported killing of over 200 rebels between January and March 2004. The offensive of the Ugandan national army—the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF)—picked up pace again in September, and the LRA was thought to be considerably weakened as a result. The government, confident that a military ‘solution’ to the conflict was near, rejected a ceasefire offer by the LRA in September. However, a ceasefire in Acholiland was agreed on 15 November and later extended to cover southern Sudan. Talks were held on two occasions near the end of the year between LRA representatives and government negotiators, raising the potential for a negotiated end to the conflict.

Substantial setbacks for the LRA at the hands of UPDF forces throughout the year provided little respite for the civilian population, however. Attacks on refugee camps in Uganda’s northern region followed the usual LRA hit-and-run pattern, with the gruesome massacre of over 300 internally displaced persons in the Barlonyo camp, Lira district, on 21 February. Similar attacks in May left several dozen civilians dead and sent thousands fleeing. On 29 July the ICC began investigations into abuses of civilians by both the LRA and

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91 ICG (note 90), pp. 5–6.
Ugandan government forces. Reports of at least 40 000 ‘night commuters’—women and children leaving their homes in rural areas of northern Uganda to seek refuge for the night in the bigger towns of Gulu and Kitgum for fear of LRA abductions—indicate the continued victimization of children in the Ugandan conflict.

Having rejected the AU’s offer of help in March, in September the Ugandan Government appealed for UN assistance for reconstruction. Reconstruction and development of northern Uganda are especially important for protection of the population from LRA attacks. In the interim, the problems of dealing with an armed group which appears to have ‘no policies, no specific demands and no mercy’ and which relies on children to do its work continue to make the conflict in Uganda particularly difficult to address.

The shifting location and containment of intra-state conflicts

One of the obvious classic features of intra-state conflict is that it takes place within the borders of a state. The fact that the members of all the contending groups typically have to continue to coexist within the same borders after the conclusion of civil war is often cited as an explanation for why many intra-state conflicts are protracted and intense.

Within the context of an intra-state conflict, however, the location of the fighting may vary considerably, with different consequences for prosecution and resolution of the conflict. A number of intra-state conflicts, often intense, are highly local. They are usually pursued in remote areas within a country, where they raise very little international attention or even awareness. Fighting in Darfur in western Sudan, for example, raged throughout 2003 but came to the attention of the international media only in early 2004. The containment of some intra-state conflicts may be a function of a range of factors, such as the nature of the grievance of the rebel group, its size and capacity, the level of economic and technical development of the country, as well as the geographical location and terrain of the conflict. Where the source of the conflict

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104 Dwan and Gustavsson (note 1), p. 121.

105 Recent analyses have examined the nature of terrain (e.g., forest or mountain) as a factor explaining the duration of civil wars. See, e.g., DeRouen, K, and Sobek, D, ‘The dynamics of civil war duration and outcome’, Journal of Peace Research, Special Issue on Duration and Termination of Civil War, vol. 41, no. 3 (May 2004), pp. 303–20.
grievance is local or the rebel group is weak, an intra-state conflict may be isolated domestically as well as internationally. One example of this is the long-standing conflict between the Karen ethnic group and Myanmar’s military junta in the region near the border with Thailand. The internal containment of an intra-state conflict is also a function of the political and military capacity of the government. The Indonesian Government’s effective closure of the province of Aceh in 2003 was a clear example of this, broken only by the forces of nature in the form of the 26 December 2004 tsunami.

In some cases, even where fighting is contained in one geographical location, the effects of the intra-state conflict can be felt nationwide. This is particularly the case where the conflict has been previously prosecuted on a wider scale. Ongoing fighting in the eastern provinces of the DRC in 2004, for example, complicated post-conflict reconstruction and conflict resolution elsewhere in the country. A third variant of the location dimension of intra-state conflict is its potential to shift across a state without necessarily increasing in terms of escalation or intensity. This may occur when a rebel group is driven out of the local area or when one or more of the warring parties seek new sources of civilian support or finance or, more often, when a warring party seeks to draw national and international attention to its cause.

In the post-cold war environment, attention arguably focused more on the regional, international and transnational dimensions of internal conflict than on shifting national dimensions. The spread of internal conflicts beyond national borders was seen as an increasing feature of international politics, in part because of the growing interdependence and integration of states and in part because of the broadening of the concept of security to include economic, environmental and societal factors, none of which can be easily confined within the borders of a nation state.\footnote{Brown, M. (ed.), \textit{The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict} (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and Buzan, B., ‘The logic of regional security in the post-cold war world’ in Hettne, B. \textit{et al.} (eds), \textit{The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development} (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2000).} The early debate on conflict spillover focused on the spread of conflict to immediate neighbouring states, most graphically illustrated by the long-standing conflict between ethnic Tutsi and Hutu groups in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa and the prevalence of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

As seen in 2004, however, it is the relative lack of regional spillover of intra-state conflicts that is most striking. Long-standing intra-state conflicts in, for example, Algeria, Colombia, Myanmar, Sudan, Turkey and, more recently, Iraq have not (as yet) led to a cross-border war. The location of these intra-state conflicts varies substantially, with some isolated in a particular region (e.g., the conflict in Turkey) and others under way throughout the country (Colombia and Iraq). The absence of the spread of intra-state conflict beyond national borders does not mean that neighbouring regions have been unaffected by intra-state conflict: cross-border movements of refugees, smuggling of arms and natural resources, rebel organizations’ use of bases in neighbouring countries for cross-border infiltrations, and attacks and incur-
sions by government forces into neighbouring countries in pursuit of rebels (either with or without the agreement of the neighbouring governments) create severe pressure on contiguous states. West Africa is a particularly potent example of the destabilizing effects of the spillover of refugees, rebels, arms and government forces to neighbouring countries (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire) from the intra-state conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The phenomenon of intra-state conflicts that are and remain contained in various ways, and with various effects, however, raises interesting research questions regarding the factors that influence the geographical scope of intra-state conflict.

More recently, attention has focused on international, as opposed to solely regional, spillover of intra-state conflict. In the past few years this debate has been fuelled by the perceived rise of global transnational terrorist threats. Internationalization is seen by many as an inevitable consequence of globalization and its effect on markets and communications, which have provided rebel groups with the means to pursue armed conflict and a global platform to make their case. The rise of political Islam is perceived to bring an additional element to this internationalization—a shared grievance and a common goal between diverse rebel groups. The US-led war against al-Qaeda is premised on this perception of a conflict without a single territorial location in terms of grievance, the parties involved or the potential of its impact.

Ironically, the perspective of the global war on terrorism and its logic of internationalized motivation have led to increased emphasis on the isolation of intra-state conflicts. Outside actors as well as domestic governments are increasingly pursuing or supporting strategies to contain and isolate intra-state conflicts perceived to have ‘global’ motivations or grievances. Such an approach almost inevitably aligns international support with the perspective of the government party to the intra-state conflict. In so doing it has, arguably, reduced international pressure and engagement for a negotiated end to a number of conflicts. Two of the most obvious examples of the effect of the global war on terrorism on the pursuit of a policy of international isolation of intra-state conflict in 2004 were the conflicts in Chechnya and in Aceh. The interplay between the location of a conflict and its national, regional and international dimensions is another example of the diversity and complexity of intra-state conflict and demonstrates, yet again, the difficulty of classification and generalization.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The conflict in the DRC ended formally on 16 December 2002 with the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. This agreement was enabled by prior agreements in 2002 between the DRC Government and neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda, which had provided support to rebel groups during the war. Despite the establishment of a transitional power-sharing government in July 2003 under President Joseph Kabila, and the initiated disarmament and integration of former rebel groups into the new transitional government forces—Forces armées du peuple congolais (FAPC, or the Armed Forces of the Congolese People)—post-conflict efforts in 2004 were largely lost on the country's eastern provinces. The Ituri and North and South Kivu provinces' legacy of volatility is attributable both to their porous borders with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and to local factors, such as land scarcity and persistent inter-ethnic tension over the control of gold and diamond mines in the area.

Efforts at regional pacification were thwarted by tensions in Ituri province between the militias of the minority Hema and majority Lendu ethnic groups, combined with resistance to the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and FAPC forces. Sporadic attacks against MONUC were launched throughout 2004 by both the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC, or the Union of Congolese Patriots), predominantly Hema, and the Front nationaliste intégrationniste (FNI, or the Front for National Integration), a Lendu armed faction. In South Kivu, anti-FAPC sentiments culminated in the mutiny of dissident former officers of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Goma (RCD, or Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma) against the FAPC regional commander and the seizure of Bukavu, the province capital, between 2 and 9 June, sending close

108 The agreement was signed in Pretoria, South Africa, by the parties of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue—the DRC Government, the Congolese Rally for Democracy, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, the political opposition, civil society, the Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy/National, and the Mai-Mai. The agreement is available at URL <http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/DRCongo/cdreader/bin/6global.pdf>.


110 In Dec. 2004 the International Rescue Committee put the total number of war-related deaths in the DRC since 1998 at 3.8 million, making this conflict the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II. “Over 31,000 a month “are dying in Congo war””, Financial Times, 9 Dec 2004, p. 5. In late Mar. there was also fighting in the capital Kinshasa for the first time since the peace agreement of 2002. “‘Coup attempt’ in DRC capital”, BBC News Online, 28 Mar. 2004, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3576139.stm>.


to 30,000 people fleeing. Further fighting between dissident RCD–Goma forces and government forces continued in North Kivu in December.\textsuperscript{113}

The presence of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, or the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) in the DRC since the 1994 Rwandan genocide demonstrates the conflation of local and regional tensions in eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{114} It is estimated that 8000–10,000 Rwandan Hutu rebels remain in the DRC, continuing their strategy of launching periodic attacks into Rwanda.\textsuperscript{115} In April 2004, MONUC officials reported the presence in the DRC of Rwandan national troops—Forces de défense Rwandaises (FDR)—although Rwandan authorities denied this.\textsuperscript{116} Despite warnings from the UN that military incursions by Rwanda into DRC territory would undermine regional efforts at stabilization, FDR troops entered the DRC on 1 December, in an alarming repetition of events in 1996 and 1998, when Rwandan troops’ pursuit of Hutu rebels in eastern DRC was instrumental in fuelling the subsequent wars. By mid-December 2004 it was reported that 1000 people a day were dying in the DRC as a result of the conflict and that only 880 of an estimated 15,000 fighters in Ituri had voluntarily disarmed.\textsuperscript{117}

Russia (Chechnya)

The second war between the Russian Government and the breakaway Chechen Republic began in 1999. It has claimed an estimated 70,000–80,000 lives and resulted in hundreds of thousands of Chechen refugees.\textsuperscript{118} The Chechen conflict has been characterized by Russian authorities as an internal anti-terrorist


\textsuperscript{114} The conflict between the DRC Government and RCD–Goma is not listed in table 2A.3, although it previously reached the threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths. This is because the parties now fighting in the conflict are RCD dissidents, a new group which has not, on its own, reached 1000 battle-related deaths. The conflict between the Rwandan Government and the FDLR does appear in the table, however, as it is a conflict between 2 warring parties that previously resulted in 1000 battle-related deaths. For further discussion see appendix 2B. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: complex emergency’, Situation Report no. 3, 3 May 2004, URL <http://www.usaid.gov>.


\textsuperscript{116} ‘Killers next door?’, \textit{The Economist}, 1 May 2004, p. 44. A Joint Verification Mechanism to address border security was established by the Rwandan and DRC governments in Sep., but with little effect. Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN-CEA), ‘DRC–Rwanda: Kigali, Kinshasa agree to border verification mechanism’, IRIN-CEA Weekly Round-up 245, 18–25 Sep. 2004.


\textsuperscript{118} Shah, A., ‘Crisis in Chechnya’, Global Issues, Sep. 2004, URL <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp>. According to another estimate, at least 10% of the Chechen population have been killed and around 50% have been forced to flee their homes at some point. Cornell, S. E., ‘Chechnya: terrorists take centre stage’, \textit{RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor}, vol. 3, no. 8 (Oct. 2004).
Russian President Vladimir Putin came to power on the back of a promise to defeat the Chechen rebels, and the war, as well as the prestige invested in that effort, continues to shape his presidency. The complex links between the Chechen conflict, the Northern Caucasus region and the wider international stage were alarmingly demonstrated in 2004.

The most significant event of 2004 in the Chechen Republic itself was the 9 May bomb attack in the capital, Grozny, killing up to 30 people, among them Moscow-backed Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov. The attack, for which the Chechen rebel leader Shamal Basayev later claimed responsibility, was a blow to Russia’s strategy of ‘normalization’ in Chechnya. A new pro-Moscow president, Alu Alkhanov, was elected on 29 August by a huge majority. International observers were not permitted to observe the election, and the conduct and outcome were widely contested.

The spread of the Chechen conflict to locations external to the republic, which began in 1999 with a series of bombings in Moscow, allegedly carried out by Chechen rebels, continued in 2004. Chechen rebels were widely thought to be the instigators of the 6 February bombing of a Moscow underground train, which killed 39 people, as well as a wave of attacks around the time of the Chechen elections in August. Chechen rebels were also blamed for the explosion of two civilian aircraft on 24 August shortly after they had taken off from Moscow airport, killing close to 100 people. Rebel leader and former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov consistently denied any involvement in the attacks, which some analysts see as indicative of his lack of effective control over the Chechen rebel forces. The most devastating attack took place in the North Caucasus region, however, when 1200 school-

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119 The conflict in Chechnya in 1994–96 formally ended with the signing of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement, the Khasavyurt Accords, on 26 Aug. 1996, and was followed by a peace agreement in 1997. Although the Khasavyurt agreement formalized the withdrawal of Russian troops, it did not address the core issue of the future legal status of Chechnya. For more detail, see Evangelista, M., The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2002).


children, teachers and other adults were taken hostage in a school in Beslan, in the Republic of North Ossetia, on 1 September. When Russian troops stormed the school to end the siege on 3 September, over 330 people were killed.\footnote{Liss, A., ‘Pains lingers on in Beslan’, BBC News Online, 2 Oct. 2004, URL \textlangle}http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3710294.stm\textrangle. The exact nature of the links between the Beslan school siege and the Chechen conflict was disputed: Russia blamed international terrorists with links to Maskhadov, but Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev eventually claimed responsibility for the siege. It later emerged that several of the perpetrators were Ingush rather than Chechen.\footnote{‘Excerpts: Basayev claims Beslan’, BBC News Online, 17 Sep. 2004, URL \textlangle}http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3665136.stm\textrangle; \textand Mulvey, S., ‘Analysis: the hostage takers’, BBC News Online, 6 Sep. 2004, URL \textlangle}http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3627586.stm\textrangle.}

Some analysts inferred that the violence outside Chechnya was less exemplary of Chechen rebels’ strike capacity than of the failure of the Russian Government’s uncompromising policy towards the North Caucasus region as a whole and the ‘irrevocable spread’ of the Chechen conflict in the region.\footnote{Cornell, S. E., ‘Chechnya: terrorists take centre stage’, RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor, vol. 3, no. 8 (Oct. 2004); and Blank, S., ‘Lessons of an endless war’, RUSI/Jane’s Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor, vol. 3, no. 9 (Nov. 2004).} Chechens have frequently crossed into the adjacent republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia, occasionally colluding with local rebel forces.\footnote{Riskin, A., ‘“Erasure of borders” between Chechnya and Ingushetia’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), 19 Apr. 2004, in ‘Russia: Conflict seen spreading from Chechnya to Ingushetia’, FBIS-SOV-2004-0419, 20 Apr. 2004.} The 21 June 2004 raids against official buildings in Ingushetia, including the region’s ministry of interior, killing at least 44 and wounding 60, were the biggest armed operations in the province since the second Chechen war erupted in 1999.\footnote{Reuters (Moscow), ‘Putin calls for rebels to be hunted down’, Financial Times (Online edn), 22 June 2004; \textand Jack, A., ‘Fifty die as Chechen rebels mount raids in Ingushetia’, Financial Times, 23 June 2004, p. 2. For further discussion see ‘Is Russia planning a war in Ingushetia?’, RFE/RL Caucasus Report, vol. 7, no. 16 (22 Apr. 2004).} Repeated attacks and mine explosions in November 2004 killed over 40 Russian troops.\footnote{‘Over 40 Russians killed in clashes on 24–29 November—Chechen rebel web site’, BBC Monitoring Service, 30 Nov. 2004.} Concerns about the stability of the North Caucasus region extended also to Georgia, which Russia accuses of failing to take a sufficiently active stance against the Chechen rebels and whose own separatist conflict in South Ossetia also flared up in 2004.\footnote{Buechsenschutz, U., ‘A stability pact for the Caucasus?’, RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 8, no. 179, Part 2 (20 Sep. 2004); \textand Barateli, O., ‘Chechen rebels’ arms cache found in Pankisi gorge’, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 19 Apr. 2004, in FBIS-SOV-96-240, 20 Apr. 2004.}

Despite earlier promises of withdrawal, the number of Russian troops on Chechen territory remains at over 80 000.\footnote{‘Russia to boost Chechnya forces’, BBC News Online, 11 May 2004, URL \textlangle}http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3703755.stm\textrangle. Ten years of violence and grave human rights abuses against civilians at the hands of Chechen rebel groups, the Russian Federal Security Service and, more recently, the Kadyrovtsy militia have left the Chechen population physically, economically and socially
devastated. The continued difficulty for international aid agencies to gain access and Putin’s reluctance to engage the international community in conflict resolution efforts testify to the detrimental effects of localizing or containing conflicts. At the same time, Putin continues to present the Chechen conflict as part of the global war on terrorism, contributing to the conflict’s international resonance.

Indonesia (Aceh)

The conflict between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or the Free Aceh Movement) and the Indonesian Government dates back to 1976 and has claimed more than 15,000 lives. GAM continues to demand independent statehood for the Aceh province in north-western Sumatra and its approximately 4 million inhabitants.

Although it is resource-rich, the Aceh province has suffered from poor economic governance and endemic corruption which, in combination with continuing insecurity, have spurred GAM grievances and channelled young people into the rebel movement. The conflict is localized in grievance and geography: its remoteness allowed the Aceh province to be almost completely sealed off from the outside world by the Indonesian Government. Although the containment of the Aceh conflict has played a role in preventing spillover tendencies common to many intra-state conflicts, it has also limited efforts at resolution and international engagement.

The declaration of a military emergency in Aceh and the imposition of martial law in the region in May 2003 marked the start of a new military offensive by 40,000 Indonesian troops in the province. According to Indonesian military officials, 2,100 presumed rebels have been captured and around 2,000 killed since the start of the offensive. Reports of gross human rights abuses by

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both sides of the conflict emerged in 2004.\textsuperscript{141} Martial law was lifted on 19 May 2004 and replaced by a state of civil emergency, but Indonesian security forces maintained a significant presence in the area. The change in status was generally interpreted as a largely tactical move to shore up sympathies for the government rather than any significant shift in policy towards the GAM insurgents.\textsuperscript{142} The September elections for the Indonesian presidency resulted in the victory of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono over the incumbent president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, but did not result in an alternative agenda for Aceh, and the poor accountability of security forces continued to affect developments in the region.\textsuperscript{143}

When the tsunami struck on 26 December 2004, the Aceh province was the worst affected in the region, and the provincial capital, Banda Aceh, was virtually wiped out. The unfathomable human costs brought the remote Aceh province, and consequently the conflict, onto the international front stage and opened up the province to international assistance, including military relief and aid agencies, and to journalists. The declaration of a ceasefire by GAM in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami offered optimistic prospects, but continued violence on both sides in the midst of the relief effort strained the situation.\textsuperscript{144} However, accessibility for international actors to the region was soon curbed as the Indonesian Government, after pressure by the military, imposed travel restrictions on aid workers, insisted on military escorts for relief workers and set a deadline of 26 March 2005 for foreign troops participating in the relief effort to leave Aceh.\textsuperscript{145} The tension between the civilian government and the powerful military establishment in Indonesia continued to have an impact on the handling of the Aceh conflict.

IV. Iraq

The war in Iraq, unlike almost all the major armed conflicts that were active in 2004, did not originate as an intra-state conflict. It began on 20 March 2003 when forces from the USA, the UK and Australia attacked and invaded Iraq.


Operation Iraqi Freedom, as the USA called the invasion, formally ended on 1 May 2003, when President Bush declared the end of major combat operations and the victory of the USA and its allies.\textsuperscript{146} The recognition by the UN Security Council of the USA and the UK as occupying powers under unified command on 22 May 2003 established these states temporarily as ‘the Authority’ in Iraq, responsible for the administration of the territory of Iraq and the promotion of the welfare of the Iraqi population.\textsuperscript{147} This meant that the USA and its allies became, effectively, the state party in the internal conflict that ensued with a wide range of often unidentified non-state groups. The transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under the leadership of L. Paul Bremer III, to an Iraqi interim government led by Ayad Allawi on 28 June 2004 formally ended the occupation. In so doing, it established the interim government as the state party in the continuing intra-state conflict, assisted by the USA and its allies, now designated as the Multi-national Force (MNF) ‘with the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq’.\textsuperscript{148}

Notwithstanding developments at the political level, violence continued unabated in Iraq in 2004. In terms of fatalities, the costs were significant. Between 20 March and 1 May 2003, 138 US troops were killed. From May 2003 to the end of December 2004, 1191 US soldiers were killed.\textsuperscript{149} Figures for civilian deaths in Iraq cannot be verified, but estimates range from 15 038–17 240 (7350 of which occurred during the 20 March–1 May 2003 phase of the conflict) to 98 000, of which 60 000 are the result of violence.\textsuperscript{150} Attacks on Iraqi targets, particularly government officials, political figures and security forces, escalated in the run-up to the national election on 30 January 2005. By the end of 2004 Iraq, in a reversal of the classic spillover of conflict from intra- to interstate, raised the prospect of an international conflict creating a civil war.

Despite its different origin and trajectory and the difficulty it presents for classification, the conflict in Iraq displayed many of the features common to armed conflicts elsewhere in the world. The diversity of combatant parties, the use of guerrilla warfare tactics and acts of terrorism that deliberately targeted and killed civilians, and the local focus of conflict zones characterized the conflict in 2004. These features compounded existing difficulties facing the USA and its allies, and subsequently the interim government of Iraq, as to how

\textsuperscript{146} For the origins, conduct and immediate aftermath of the Iraq war see Cottey, A., ‘The Iraq war: the enduring controversies and challenges’, SIPRI Yearbook 2004 (note 1), pp. 67–93.
\textsuperscript{147} UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003.
\textsuperscript{148} UN Security Council Resolution 1546, 8 June 2004.
to define and pursue the conflict. One of the most serious challenges was defining the rebel parties. For most of 2003 and early 2004, the USA characterized attacks on the occupying forces as the work of remaining elements of the former Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein. This was fuelled, in part, by the fact that much of the violence was concentrated in the so-called Sunni Triangle, the area in central Iraq dominated by Sunni Arabs, who account for around 20 per cent of the Iraqi population and formed the bedrock of support for Saddam Hussein. The capital of this resistance is the city of Falluja, 48 km west of Baghdad. With the capture of Saddam Hussein by US forces on 13 December 2003 and of 46 of the USA’s list of 55 most wanted Iraqis by March 2004, the perception that former elements of the Baath regime were responsible for mounting violence became harder to sustain.151

Double suicide bomb attacks on the two main political parties in the northern Kurdish region on 1 February 2004, then the most stable region in Iraq, appeared to signal a new element in the geographical scope as well as the tactics of the conflict. US officials claimed that the suicide attacks were the work of foreign Islamic militants and identified Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant with alleged links to al-Qaeda and to a Kurdish militant group, Ansar al-Islam, as responsible for the attacks. The US Department of Defense had already declared the group the principal ‘terrorist adversary’ of the US forces in Iraq in October 2003.152 The USA claimed that Zarqawi was the main organizer of the group and that he was behind the August 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad.153 On 8 February 2004 US officials published the text of a letter purportedly written by Zarqawi to the al-Qaeda leadership requesting help to launch a civil war in Iraq, and they offered a bounty of $10 million for his capture (subsequently increased to $25 million in July).154 The Bush Administration, against the domestic backdrop of a presidential election campaign, continued to emphasize foreign Islamic militants, in cooperation with former Baathists, as the source of the violence in the central and northern areas of Iraq.155 The USA was particularly critical of Syria, alleging that it failed to adequately protect the 640-km Iraq–Syria border against insurgent crossings and suggesting that the Syrian Government was providing shelter and support to former supporters of Saddam Hussein.
engaged in fighting the USA in Iraq.\textsuperscript{156} Although the conflict in Iraq evidently attracted Islamic extremists, the small number of foreigners among those detained by the US forces in Iraq challenged the assumption that foreign Islamic extremists were the principal source of violent opposition to the occupation.\textsuperscript{157}

In early April 2004, violence extended beyond the Sunni Triangle to urban centres dominated by Shia Arabs, who constitute 60–65 per cent of the Iraqi population.\textsuperscript{158} The main Shia opposition was led by a young militant cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who drew on a strong following among poor Shia townships in Baghdad as well as in southern cities and towns to recruit a private militia force, the Al-Mahdi Army of around 3000 men. Al-Sadr draws much of his support as a son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr who, until his assassination by agents of Saddam Hussein in February 1999, was Iraq’s most senior and venerated cleric.\textsuperscript{159} Al-Sadr’s supporters began an uprising in the Shia slums of Baghdad, which quickly spread to the Shia holy city of Najaf and the southern city of Basra, after occupation authorities shut down a newspaper published by al-Sadr and announced their intention to arrest the firebrand cleric in connection with the killing of a rival cleric in 2003.\textsuperscript{160} In a pattern that was repeated in 2004, insurgents overran public buildings and police stations in an effort to seize control of towns. The USA responded on 4 April by launching its biggest assault since the formal end of the war in May 2003 on Sadr City, with more than 1000 US troops involved in retaking control of government buildings and police stations. In Basra, where Al-Mahdi militia occupied the main government building on 5 April, British military forces managed to defuse the crisis by negotiating with the militia to return control of the building to the CPA. Suicide attacks targeting Iraqi police buildings and killing around 70 in Basra two weeks later, however, put an end to hopes that the southern city would return to the relative stability it had hitherto enjoyed.\textsuperscript{161}

The April 2004 Shia uprising was significant for a number of reasons. First, it put to rest any residual hope that opposition to the occupying forces came from only one sector of the Iraqi population and forced recognition that the insurgency was as much a nationalist movement of protest against foreign occupation as a Sunni rebellion. This was reflected increasingly in the tactics used by insurgents in 2004. Attacks against the forces of the USA and its allies


\textsuperscript{158} On the background of Shiite political movements see Samii, A. W., ‘Shia political alternatives in postwar Iraq’, \textit{Middle East Policy}, vol. 5, no. 2 (summer 2003), pp. 93–101.

\textsuperscript{159} See, e.g., Terrill, W. A., \textit{The United States and Iraq’s Shi’ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries?} (Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College: Carlisle, Pa., Feb. 2004), URL \texttt{<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/>}.


extended to foreign private contractors and aid workers as well as to Iraqi nationals seen to be cooperating with the occupation. From April, the kidnapping of foreigners became an increasing feature of the conflict.\textsuperscript{162} Around 145 foreign nationals were kidnapped during 2004, of whom at least 30 were killed, in many cases through a beheading filmed for subsequent broadcast via television or the Internet.\textsuperscript{163} Such terror tactics succeeded in dissuading a number of coalition partners from continued military participation in the occupation, out of security and cost concerns as well as domestic public opposition to the war.\textsuperscript{164} The violence was particularly damaging for the work of Western NGOs and aid agencies: by the end of 2004, only a handful of foreign non-governmental actors were active on the ground in Iraq.

A second significance of the Shia uprising was that it demonstrated the failure of the occupation to deliver quick benefits to those Iraqis who had hoped to gain most from the US-led invasion. Although the USA had appropriated $24 billion for post-war reconstruction in Iraq by April 2004, as of November only $5.2 billion of this had been disbursed.\textsuperscript{165} This delay was a reflection of the failure of the USA and its allies to adequately plan for the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction.\textsuperscript{166} Some argued that reconstruction was also hampered by the CPA’s reluctance to put in place autonomous local Iraqi government structures to address local needs and its reliance on subcontracting to the private sector.\textsuperscript{167} Over the course of 2004, however, reconstruction progress became hostage to increased insecurity in Iraq. Violence impeded the delivery of relief aid, while the targeting of Iraq’s oil infrastructure threatened the Iraqi administration’s dominant source of revenue. The fact that many Iraqi contractors were threatened or intimidated into not seeking contracts or employment offered by US forces and occupation authorities compounded the lack of economic regeneration: in December 2004 Iraq had an estimated unemployment rate of over 50 per cent.\textsuperscript{168}

Economic difficulties were exacerbated by the high rate of crime and local violence. A significant part of the violence in Iraq in 2004 was criminal in intent and often local in origin. Many middle-class Iraqis were kidnapped, usually for ransom payments. Local rivalries, sustained in part by Iraq’s complex system of tribal identities and affiliations, were dangerously facilitated by the widespread availability of arms throughout the country. Iraqi frustration at the perceived failure of the occupation forces to provide security against criminal violence as well as regeneration helped fuel allegations of US ‘evil

\textsuperscript{163} O’Hanlon and Albuquerque (note 149), p. 11.
\textsuperscript{164} The countries which withdrew troops from the coalition during 2004 include the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines and Spain; Hungary, New Zealand and the Netherlands announced that they would withdraw troops in early 2005.
\textsuperscript{165} O’Hanlon and Albuquerque (note 149); and chapter 8 in this volume.
\textsuperscript{167} On the role of private security companies in Iraq see Holmqvist (note 23); and on peace-building see chapter 3 in this volume. See also Diamond, L., ‘What went wrong in Iraq?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 5 (Sep./Oct. 2004), pp. 34–57.
intentions’ regarding Iraq. The scandal concerning the abuses committed by US military police and intelligence officers in Abu Ghraib prison, which came to international attention in April 2004 with the presentation on US television of photographs of US personnel abusing Iraqi detainees, only served to confirm the opinion of a growing number of Iraqis of the humiliation and threat which the US occupation represented.169

Third, the April 2004 Shia uprising illustrated that a strategy of defeating insurgency through the massive use of force in urban environments risked turning more Iraqis against the occupation and threatened to become a rallying point around which Iraqis—Kurd, Sunni or Shia—might unite in common cause. A US assault and the two-week siege on Sunni-dominated Falluja grimly illustrated the damage of such operations on efforts to win public support: the assault killed hundreds, injured civilians were blocked inside the city, and displaced families were prevented from returning to their homes. The alternative was to pull the occupation forces back from the city and leave the provision of security in Falluja in the hands of a new local force of former Iraqi soldiers.170 This policy was tacitly applied in other parts of the country: by May, Sunni and Shia militia forces were in effective control of cities in the central and southern parts of the country, such as Falluja, Samarra, Karbala, Nasiriya, Kufa and Najaf. Most large political movements in Iraq dispose of sizeable militia groups, including the two main political parties in the Kurdish north (Peshmarga), the secular Iraqi National Congress led by former exile Ahmed Chalabi and the Shia organization, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Badr Brigade).171

Fourth, the CPA’s strategy to provide security in Iraq through the raising of Iraqi military and police forces was challenged by the speed with which Iraqi police and security forces crumbled in the face of the uprising. Recruits to the new Iraqi armed forces and police services were targeted throughout 2004 in multiple violent bomb attacks and shootings. Close to 3000 Iraqi police and security forces were estimated in February 2004 to have died since May 2003, and attacks continued throughout 2004.172 Inevitable fear, combined with the


171 For a list of the political, religious and ethnic groups after the fall of Saddam Hussein and prior to the election campaign of 2004 see Cottee (note 146), p. 88.

limited training received by recruits and, in some cases, sympathy with the insurgents, led to poor performance by and a lack of authority of the new Iraqi security forces. This came to a head in April 2004, when Iraqi army units refused to participate in the US offensive against insurgents in Falluja. At the end of April, Bremer reversed the former policy of ‘debaathification’ and moved to recruit former Iraqi soldiers and police as part of an expanded US recruitment and training drive. The drive for more Iraqi personnel, however, had to be balanced against the risk it presented for insurgents’ infiltration into Iraqi security forces—a factor seen as responsible for a number of the most violent attacks on US and Iraqi forces in the second half of 2004. Disappointing performance, widespread desertion and the lack of leadership by the new Iraqi Army, police forces and National Guard, and the related escalating attacks they faced, continued to be a concern for the US military and a central theme in discussions of a US exit strategy.

Increased violence against the occupation forces underscored the political imperative of restoring Iraqi sovereignty quickly while, at the same time, complicating the design and implementation of the transfer of power. This process centred on the drafting of an interim constitution—the Transitional Administrative Law—by the CPA and on the setting out of the scope and structure of a transitional administration by the CPA-appointed 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Regional autonomy was a particularly sensitive issue, with Kurdish representatives seeking to maintain the autonomous status they had gained as a result of the 1991 Gulf War, while many Shias opposed any provision for minorities to exercise a veto on majority opinion. This issue demonstrated the fragility of Iraq as a unified state and will be a central issue when Iraqis come to draft a permanent constitution.

The timing and means of election of an interim government proved the most serious obstacle to designing the handover. The US proposal for a system of regional caucuses was vehemently opposed by Iraq’s most senior and influential Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Sistani insisted that a permanent constitution could not be drawn up by unelected actors and demanded that direct elections be held before the transfer of sovereignty in June. The only compromise Sistani was willing to accept was the opinion of UN election specialists on the timing of elections. A UN fact-finding team, led by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, travelled to Iraq at the
request of the USA to examine the issue. They reported that it was impossible to hold free and fair elections before the end of 2004. Agreement was finally reached that direct elections would take place before 31 January 2005, allowing the interim constitution to be signed on 8 March 2004.

Further UN assistance was required to help form an interim government that was acceptable to Iraq’s main political groups, based on the May 2004 proposals of Brahimi for an expanded IGC with a president, two vice-presidents, a prime minister and deputy prime minister, and 30 ministers broadly reflecting Iraq’s ethnic composition. From an international perspective, the most controversial aspect of the transfer of sovereignty concerned the post-handover relationship between the Iraqi interim government and the MNF. The USA insisted that an Iraqi government could not have a veto over the deployment of the MNF. Compromise at the UN Security Council was reached only on 8 June, when Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Allawi and US Secretary of State Colin Powell provided separate written assurances that the MNF would consult with the Iraqi Government on security matters, including consultation on offensive operations.

The handover of sovereignty had little effect on the violence. Although the new Iraqi Administration attempted to assert its authority and launch popular policies—such as the reinstatement of the death penalty, a general amnesty for violent crimes against the pre-June 2004 administration and the incorporation of former Baathists into the administration—its political, financial and security dependence on the MNF meant that it had little legitimacy in the eyes of many Iraqis. In August the new government faced its first big test, when intense fighting broke out in Najaf between forces of al-Sadr and US and Iraqi troops. The fighting was quelled by an uneasy ceasefire after widespread Shia public protests. Attacks on US forces in the second half of 2004 rose to their highest level since the start of the war, with an average of 87 per day: in Sep-


181 Text of letters from the prime minister of the interim government of Iraq Dr. Ayad Allawi and the United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the President of the Council, 5 June 2004, Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1546, 8 June 2004.


tember not a single one of Iraq’s 18 provinces went without an attack. US military officials reported that insurgents were showing increasing sophistication and reach in their attacks. US and Iraqi estimates of the number of insurgents differed significantly, with the USA claiming around 25,000 fighters and Iraqi intelligence services putting the number at 200,000, of whom 40,000 were claimed to be core activists. The lack of unity and coordinated direction of Iraqi insurgents was the single most important factor enabling the US and Iraqi forces to retain some remaining degree of control in the country, even as the disparity of insurgents complicated efforts to counter them.

The political imperative to hold national elections on schedule on 30 January 2005 led the MNF and the Iraqi Administration to pursue a variety of sometimes competing strategies to stem the violence and enable the election preparations to proceed. In October 2004 the Iraqi Government launched a weapons buy-out programme, initially aimed at Sadrist militias in Baghdad but subsequently extended. By 7 November, five days after the re-election of US President Bush, the strategy changed with the declaration of a 60-day state of emergency and the launch of a massive assault on Falluja by US troops, supported by Iraqi troops. Air bombardment, door-to-door searches and closing the city to humanitarian agencies were intended to flush out insurgents and prevent their escape. However, these measures ran the risk of high civilian casualties and political fallout when the main Sunni Arab group represented in the Iraqi interim government withdrew its support. Fears of a Sunni boycott of the election led Allawi to seek a compromise with Sunni leaders and to describe the Falluja siege as an attempt to separate foreign terrorists from insurgents. Of over 2000 men detained during the Falluja fighting, however, fewer than 30 were non-Iraqi.

Moderate Sunni groups warned of the growing alienation of the Sunni minority and urged the postponement of elections until security improved.

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This was rejected by the interim government as well as by Shia political leaders, notwithstanding the onslaught of suicide and car bombs as well as targeted attacks on electoral workers, police and security forces and prominent Shia figures that followed the start of the election campaign on 15 December 2004. The MNF also urged for the elections to proceed as planned: the USA increased its force presence in Iraq to 150 000, surpassing the wartime height of 148 000 troops, in an effort to facilitate election security. The violence put severe constraints on the election process. No public election rallies were held and many on the lists of candidates put forward were identified only by their number on the election ballot. Voter registration rules were relaxed in the most violent areas of the country to permit Iraqis to register to vote on the same day as the election, and Allawi acknowledged that some pockets of Iraq would be too dangerous for voting. Extraordinary security measures were taken to guard polling stations, with most cities closed to traffic and the location of polling stations made known only at the very last moment.

In January 2005, the higher than expected turnout of mainly Shia and Kurdish voters in the first pluralist election in Iraq in 50 years was seen as an important vindication of the strategy of the USA and its allies. Iraq’s Electoral Commission estimated that around 60 per cent of registered voters—around 8 million of Iraq’s population of 28 million—had taken part in the election for the 274-seat transitional National Assembly. However, this inevitably produced results that were heavily skewed towards Shiite and Kurdish lists, with the Shiite religious list, the United Iraqi Alliance, winning a little over 48 per cent of the vote. It further alienated the Sunni population from the political process under way in Iraq. This raised real challenges for the drafting of a permanent constitution for Iraq, the primary task of the National Assembly. Meanwhile, continued high levels of violence throughout Iraq in early 2005 suggested that the election would have little effect on ending the insurgency. The severe stretch which the continuation of violence presented for both the MNF and the Iraqi armed forces made the implementation of a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy even more difficult. The US commander of the MNF in Iraq, General George Casey, admitted as such, noting, ‘Our broad intent is to keep pressure on the insurgents . . . This is not about winning


hearts and minds; we’re not going to do that here in Iraq’. The continued post-election violence also raised large question marks over the timing of the withdrawal of MNF troops from Iraq. In January 2005 the US Department of Defense ordered a comprehensive review of the US strategy on Iraq.

V. Conclusions

The major armed conflicts that were active in 2004 demonstrated that, despite the absence of conflict between states, many parts of the world remain neither peaceful nor secure. If intra-state conflict now represents a greater threat to international peace and security, the conflicts in 2004 testified to the complex and diverse forms that intra-state conflict takes. A substantial number of these conflicts had international dimensions in terms of motivations, warring parties, location, funding and resolution efforts, but many were noteworthy for their ‘localized’ nature—‘small’ wars with very big costs. This suggests the need for greater nuancing and sub-division of the broad category of ‘intra-state’ conflict. Moreover, while greater attention to the interconnection of the international community and the conflicts within it is welcome, it is also important not to overstate the ‘global’ dimension of intra-state conflict. Continued policy and research attention must be devoted to the local and ‘micro’ factors at work and to how local factors interact with international and global forces and actors.

A second conclusion relates to the specific conflicts that were active in 2004. Many of the conflicts that continue to produce the greatest number of deaths, casualties and suffering are wars of long duration. Far from soliciting more attention, their long-standing recurrence and perennial nature tend to make them disappear from the international stage. Although the current international emphasis on the prevention of violent conflict is a positive development, it is worth considering whether the real emphasis of policy and research should be directed at addressing, in a sustained way, resolution of the world’s longest-standing major armed conflicts.

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200 See also chapter 7 in this volume.