REFLECTIONS

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This year, the theme for the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development was ‘From crisis response to peacebuilding: Achieving synergies’. The co-hosts, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), aimed to better understand how peacebuilders navigate the complexities of moving from the short-term challenges of ‘stabilization’ to a longer-lasting sustainable peace. In total, 21 partner organizations contributed to delivering 53 discussions and roundtables over the three-day event, including ten parallel sessions on the Open Day (May 14) and 43 roundtables, workshops and group discussions on the Focus Days (May 15–16). Over 750 people attended the Open Day, while approximately 400 participants joined by invitation over the two Focus Days. These senior practitioners and policymakers met to workshop some of the most pressing problems facing peacebuilders today and—of equal importance—reinforce the networks these peacebuilders will need to solve the problems they will face tomorrow.

Partners and participants to the Stockholm Forum grappled with the theme, engaging with how humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, stabilization and security interventions as well as peacebuilders can find lasting, sustainable peaceful solutions to complex problems. While it is impossible to summarize all 53 sessions and their session reports, the sessions have been arranged below under three framing questions posed on the first day of the Forum. Links to each session report are included where relevant.

HOW CAN EXISTING SUPPORT BECOME MORE SPECIFIC AND DIRECTED TOWARDS BUILDING A TRULY INCLUSIVE PEACE? IS IT A MATTER OF VOLUME OR WAYS OF WORKING OR BOTH?

Many of the sessions focused on how peace is delivered peace, rather than what peace was delivered. For example, while security is often treated independently as a sector, peace, as conceived and discussed by Forum participants, is rarely conceived as a sector or a programmatic area, rather it was often discussed as a way of doing things (see report 28). Stabilization may be assessed by how it is done, rather than what is done (see report 37). A number of sessions discussed the importance of connecting peacebuilders to security actors (see report 21) so that both could deliver on common objectives, including protection of civilians (see report 50) and reform of the security sector (see report 47). One of the many sessions on the Sahel was focused on unpacking exactly how peace is conceptualized and who defines it (see report 43). Likewise, stability and peace will be necessary if other goals in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (also known as Agenda 2030) are to be reached, like eliminating hunger (see report 3) or promoting nutrition and sustainable agriculture (see report 25).

When we defer accountability, it has consequences.

Of course, peace is not always instrumental, it is often an objective in its own right—other sessions focused on linking governance to peacebuilding, as an objective of a lasting peace can serve as a foundation and common entry point for engaging in governance reform (see report 20 and report 39). Likewise, a commitment to human rights and other global obligations can serve as a foundational entry point for engaging in delivering Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (see report 18). Also, even where peace is the objective, human rights are fundamental—accountability cannot be deferred without consequences (see report 14) and there needs to be an awareness of false narratives that suggest that there is a trade-off between legal rights and obligations against reconstruction and stability—they are not mutually exclusive (see report 15).
The idea that peace is a process rather than a condition was framed by a plenary session on the first day, in which a panellist noted that we need to stop thinking about peace as a state, but rather to ‘...re-frame peace as a 20-year process’ (see report 9). Indeed, many participants pushed the discussion forward by considering that ‘corruption is a system’ (see report 11) and how governance reform can be undertaken even in the presence of conflict and violence (see report 20). One session underlined the role of ombudsmen in promoting reform and delivery of the Agenda 2030 (see report 30). The nature of an ever evolving policy and demographic terrain requires adaptation. This terrain was explored in sessions on the mega-trends in Africa over the next 30 years (see report 23) and recent developments in the Horn of Africa (see report 13).

Because peace is a process, not a condition, it is fluid and evolving. Indeed, in many countries, there is no ‘normal’ to return, to—one participant noted that the concept of stabilization was unhelpful unless it was understood as a ‘redistribution of power’ reflecting a new equilibrium (see report 32). The dynamic nature of peace means that it can be difficult to understand. Bridging this gap is vital to peacebuilders since they must be inside the system in order to change it (see report 28). As a result, the full breadth of the challenges associated with peacebuilding can be daunting as demonstrated by a plenary on demographic trends in Africa (see report 2). Likewise, the challenges in adapting to (see report 48) and mitigating the effects of climate change will be particularly difficult because so many of these changes have already been set in motion (see report 6), for example in the Lake Chad Basin (see report 12).

**FOR MANY DECADES, WE HAVE HAD THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS DESIGNATING THE RULES OF WAR. DO WE NEED TO DEVELOP AND ADOPT PRINCIPLES FOR BUILDING PEACE?**

Participants engaged with this theme by both endorsing new principles to reinforcing already existing principles. There was agreement surrounding the notion that more needs to be done delivering on these principles and that building peace only works when those who build it value it (see report 46). Many participants stressed that ownership is not just by national governments, but by civil society (see report 36); by the private sector; by local leaders (see report 17); and by international and by regional actors committed to a lasting peace (see report 45). Where peace fails, it can be because external actors intervene contrary to local peace objectives (see report 31) and/or because of a lack of buy-in by local leaders as in South Sudan (see report 33) or Cameroon (see report 27). Discussions also focused on how regional actors, like China (see report 44), can become more involved in the dialogue on principles for peacebuilding and development. Speakers in other panels cautioned that conflict in cyberspace has the potential to undermine progress made on norms, and highlighted the need to broaden the discussion to include the private sector and tech industry (see report 10 and report 52).

The definition of security shifts depending on how it is interpreted (see report 43). In the same way, the quality and sustainability of peace depend on who defines and negotiates it (see report 7). A number of sessions focused on inclusivity by asking how we know it when we see it and its value in addressing grievances (see report 27); and promoting dialogue (see report 42) for a lasting peace (see report 24). Participants were reminded that ‘who should be at the table’ should be considered an opportunity, rather than a constraint, as peacebuilders can convene actors without a voice for difficult discussions (see report 8) and can use that convening power to keep human rights at the
fore (see report 15). Some also questioned the continued centrality of ‘the table’ and its mechanisms for inclusion.

Inclusivity was further unpacked through sessions on the gendered dimensions of conflict. These sessions stressed the value of support to women’s organizations (see report 19) and how identity and marginalization, including gender, ethnicity and language, are mobilized for both peace and conflict (see report 29). Women’s participation and leadership in peace efforts are of particular importance. A key finding in many of these sessions was that inclusion is not only about including certain groups but it also must be a way of thinking and acting that is owned by all. Indeed, one session used behavioural sciences to explore how peoples’ experience of conflict affects their recollection and understanding of it (see report 38).

ARE THERE SUFFICIENT MECHANISMS IN PLACE FOR BRINGING ACTORS IN CRISIS RESPONSE TOGETHER WITH PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT ACTORS? IF NOT—WHAT IS NEEDED?

The 2019 Stockholm Forum saw an increase in the number of actors beyond the development and peacebuilding space, precisely because so many actors are grappling with ways to find lasting solutions to complex problems, including in the humanitarian field. The so-called ‘triple-nexus’ of humanitarian, security/peace and development action was explored in a plenary session (see report 5). It was explored further during focus day round-table sessions on how local delivery provides examples of working with a nexus approach in Somalia (see report 22); the importance of joint funding and modalities, including peace platforms, as entry points to bridge operational silos (see report 40); and by considering how academic disciplines in security and development can bridge gaps in research (see report 16).

The importance of strategic patience was highlighted, and the necessity of longer-term funding to give activities with a peacebuilding objective a chance to contribute to transformation.

One advantage of the round-table format for the Stockholm Forum is the tremendous expertise gathered around the table to discuss a given topic. While a few catalytic interventions may start the conversations, the Stockholm Forum is built around dialogue which promotes exchange and allows practitioners to share their expertise with peers. This allowed for frank and open discussion about successes and failures and the type of learning necessary for adaptation.

One critical area (central to the theme of the Stockholm Forum this year), was that of evolving mandates, mission draw-downs and changing relationships in a peacebuilding context. One session compared the situations in Mali and Somalia (see report 32) to discuss the implications of mission draw-downs and redefining mandates. Others explored the conditions that contribute to successful peacekeeping and recurrent challenges, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali (see report 1) and through comparison of the role of police in peace operations in multiple contexts (see report 51).

A recurrent theme was the importance of designing solutions that are context-specific and contribute to the final objective. If the objective is a lasting peace, then rushed elections that can lead to grievances and, possibly, violence, may be counterproductive (see report 41). If parliament

People who are not visible in your horizon would not be visible in your answers.

There's a disconnect between local efforts and international dialogue on the frameworks... the real shift needs to be from local to global, not the other way around.
is no longer serving the purpose of legislation and oversight, then solutions will need to start from that context (see report 11).

Another challenge raised repeatedly was that of connecting global frameworks to local peacebuilding (see report 26). While commitment to initiatives like the SDGs (see report 4); commitments to disarmament (see report 35); and other global commitments related to health (see report 34); or climate change (see report 6) may drive attention and financing from donors, these global principles may face challenges in gaining traction locally in the Horn of Africa (see report 13); the Maghreb (see report 39); the Sahel (see report 49); or more specifically South Sudan (see report 33); Syria (see report 15); or Myanmar (see report 4) where exigencies challenge commitments to global principles.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Saving lives today and building peace for tomorrow—is that possible?

This was the overall question of the Stockholm Forum this year. Humanitarian assistance, security responses, development cooperation and peacebuilding are different communities and use different terminology and approaches. However, many times they are working in the same settings, where we need to seize opportunities for synergies, while respecting different mandates in addressing immediate crises and at the same time building sustainable peace and development.

The Stockholm Forum is a reminder that humanitarian actors are not peacebuilders but humanitarian action helps to make peace possible, not least if it is shaped in a way that contributes to the creation of peace in the long run. Stabilization and security interventions are key to address immediate security threats and constitute key building blocks for sustainable peace and development, if they are part of a broad and inclusive framework.

Peace is a messy business. It is highly experimental and requires partnerships and building trust to truly explore problems and find solutions that can last. The 2019 Stockholm Forum: (a) reminded participants that peace is a process, not a state; (b) that inclusivity is key since peace is defined and owned by the ones who are involved in the process and; (c) that it is necessary to design solutions benefiting function and to create space for honest exchange and learning from those who do.

SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions highlights that the sustainable development goals in Agenda 2030 will not be achieved unless violence and fragility are addressed. Given the global nature of the challenge, there is a need for a comprehensive strategic vision that goes beyond national or sectoral approaches. All SDGs are integrated and interdependent.

So how can existing support become more specific and directed towards building a truly inclusive peace? Is it a matter of volume or ways of working or both?

It was clear in the discussions of the Forum that additional resources are needed, coupled with new ways of working. Development cooperation directed specifically towards peacebuilding is still too limited and the synergies with political dialogue processes often under-utilized. At the same time, there are opportunities to work differently with joint analysis and planning. Increasing the

We need to not only look at ‘invited spaces’ but also to invent our own spaces to make our voices heard
— Fatima Shehu Imam

A peace where the voices of communities, of victims, of women have been heard – in preparations, in negotiations, and in implementation – will be more deeply rooted and has a greater chance of lasting longer.
— Margot Wallström
focus on the prevention of violent conflict requires more integrated and inclusive approaches, not least by security, development and political actions. Do we need to develop and adopt principles for building inclusive and sustainable peace?

The Forum indicated that more work will be needed. While there is broad agreement on the rhetoric around inclusivity, in practice there is still a long way to go. A process to address this gap, and to highlight meaningful examples of inclusive peace processes could be an important contribution to the continued international efforts to promote long-term inclusive peace.

Are there sufficient mechanisms in place for bringing actors in crisis response together with peacebuilding and development actors? If not—what is needed?

It was apparent during the Forum that mechanisms for joint approaches exist however not always applied. It might therefore be necessary to find incentives for more combined efforts. It is important however to not push any actor outside their mandate—then there is a risk of doing harm rather than good. It was also evident that meeting places where for example a member of a peacekeeping team would exchange informally with humanitarian actors or civil society representatives are still not frequent enough. It is particularly important at the country level, that such mechanisms and meeting places are established. It was widely agreed that the Forum itself can serve a purpose in this regard in future sessions.

As Peter Eriksson, Sweden's Minister for International Development Cooperation underlined, and the discussions of the Forum confirmed, coming together is the only way of working if we are supposed to take on the challenges of today and achieve Agenda 2030 for all.

Saving lives today and building peace for tomorrow is possible—if we do it together.
DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK? KEY FINDINGS FROM RECENT RESEARCH IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND MALI

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
EPON Network and Challenges Forum

MODERATOR
Sharon Wiharta
Head, Policy and Best Practices
Challenges Forum
Folke Bernadotte Academy

THEMATIC FOCUS
Most of the increase in violent conflict since 2010 and 80 per cent of all humanitarian needs are associated with approximately 12 fragile and conflict-affected states. By 2030, the share of global poor living in these states is projected to reach nearly 50 per cent. If the violent conflicts affecting these states cannot be resolved, or at least significantly reduced, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will not be achieved. A number of instruments are employed by the international community to prevent and manage conflicts, to reduce fragility and to sustain peace. Among these, a peace operation is one of the instruments that has the greatest potential to enhance the implementation of the SDGs in fragile and conflict-affected states. But do peace operations work? There is a significant discrepancy between the findings of most quantitative studies that state that peace operations do work, and the inability of specific peace operations to end violent conflict, despite being deployed in several of these states—in some cases for decades. The objective of the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) is to improve research-based knowledge on the effectiveness of specific peace operations and the impacts they are having on the conflict systems they are trying to influence. The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (Challenges Forum) is a global partnership of 49 organizations and departments in 22 countries aiming at improving the effectiveness of international peace operations.

SUMMARY
A main priority within the United Nations’ work on sustaining peace should be to focus more on prevention and drivers of conflict instead of just being a crisis management apparatus. Crisis and conflict management shrinks the room for sustainable development. The situations in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are multidimensional and there is a need to integrate peacekeeping in many policy areas. New thinking is developing within the UN and it needs academic research to assist in this process. Long-term perspectives, exit strategies and ensuring the primacy of politics are crucial to create space for sustainable development. It was emphasized that closer cooperation with regional organizations and inclusion of women, youths and marginalized groups are important parts of successful peacekeeping.

A major challenge to peacekeeping is that the mandates from the UN constitute linkages to the government of the country without involving them in the formulation and negotiation of the mandates. A related key factor is national ownership and leadership. A major challenge is when governments do not provide basic services for the population. This space is often filled by other actors, including armed and extremist groups. Thus, there is a need for approaches to build state capacity. There is also need for greater coordination among different actors. Financing is another
challenge for peacekeeping. The focus should be on targeting root-causes, not just solving short-term problems. Moreover, peacekeeping operations need to be more people centred.

Earlier studies have shown that peacekeeping does have a significant effect in reducing violence and preventing spillover effects. However, some peace operations contradict these results. Hence, EPON wanted to study these operations separately and more closely. Even if it is too early to state any significant results in general, some patterns can be identified. One refers to methodology—the research has shown that it is more efficient to study a specific episode of a peace operation instead of studying the whole time-period of a mission (factors changing rapidly). Studies have also pointed out some key indicators: ownership, coherence, and women, peace and security. When these indicators are included in peacekeeping, the mission is more likely to succeed. Missions usually have a limited mandate as part of a complex process. Thus, their efficiency needs to be evaluated with regards to other processes in the same context. The EPON research tries to capture the whole situation, which has lacked in previous studies. In the future there is a need for a mega-analysis including all the indicators and processes.

The international community wants quick results in the DRC. However, it is impossible for the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to deliver. When focusing on long-term results in the DRC, the mission has been able to change dynamics. MONUSCO has prevented a major violent conflict from developing. The violence in eastern DRC poses a threat to the population but is today considered as less of a threat to regional and international stability. The mission has contributed to the enhancement of a dynamic civic space and greater democracy. It has also played a role in information collection, which have been used by, for example, the International Criminal Court.

In DRC, a major challenge is the resistance of the government to collaborate. Another operational constraint is the multiple interpretations of what peacekeeping is and should be. The lack of political framework prevents the mission from having a real impact on the primacy of politics.

The situation in Mali has a lot in common with the DRC. Until 2016, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was quite successful in decreasing killings, and it contributed to the peace agreement and the elections in 2014. But since then, the situation has worsened. MINUSMA's mandate is to support the peace process, but it is hampered by the government's lack of capacity and political will. A significant problem is central Mali, where the absence of the central governments has created room for other groups to operate and for violence to escalate. MINUSMA is also operating within a broader counterterrorism context, where some parties are trying to enforce military solutions to local problems that might need different solutions.

It was highlighted that the core of the problem in Mali is the lack of a social contract between the population and the government. Without dedication from the government, peacekeeping is difficult. MINUSMA needs more resources to be able to reverse the development in the centre of the country.

**KEY TAKEAWAYS**

A number of key challenges need to be addressed to improve the efficiency of UN peacekeeping, including ensuring relevant and achievable mandates, adequate funding and long-term strategies, including exit strategies. The UN Security Council bears a great responsibility in this regard and the permanent members particularly so.

The tool box should be expanded. Peacekeeping is only one of the tools in the toolbox, and it may not always be the right one. Regional organizations, host governments and the affected population must be better integrated in the development of UN mandates and there must be strategies for exit and continuation in forms other than peacekeeping.
To achieve this, peacekeeping mission needs to take a people-centred approach. There is a need for the missions to connect with the people and allow time for the missions to engage with them. Instead of international experts implementing their solutions, the solutions should be developed from the local community and receive international support.
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF MEGATRENDS IN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Africa Center for Strategic Studies

MODERATOR
Katherine Almquist Knopf
Director, Africa Center for Strategic Studies

THEMATIC FOCUS
This panel analysed the security implications of megatrends that characterize Africa's peace and security landscape, including migration, demographic transition, urbanization and climate variability. Data and research on megatrends provide some indication of what Africa's security landscape will look like in the coming years. As global fertility levels contract, Africa's population is forecast to double before 2050. The continent's demographic profile will maintain a persistently youthful age structure, and job creation is not expected to keep pace. Urban centres will bear the brunt of this growth. Africa is also particularly vulnerable to climate variability: drought conditions, floods and extreme weather events threaten to disrupt agricultural production, deplete water tables and expand the reach of vector-borne disease. Demographic and environmental pressures will drive both in- and out-migration. These megatrends will challenge the future and adaptability of security institutions in 2030.

SUMMARY
The African continent underwent a dramatic transformation between 1994 and 2008: economic growth averaged 4.6 per cent per year, the number of electoral democracies increased from 25 to 36, and the size of the African economy has almost doubled. While the trendline is generally positive, there are challenges. Dr Jakkie Cilliers elaborated on some of these megatrends, including demographic growth, urbanization, migration and climate variability, as well as economic trends. First, the demographic dividend—the economic growth potential that can result from shifts in a population's age structure—will only begin to pay off by 2054, when the dependent-to-worker ratio reaches 1.7. Second, poverty is urbanizing, as the poor are moving to cities more rapidly than the population as a whole. Third, the population of urban poor is set to triple by 2050. This trajectory suggests that, in absolute terms, the number of people living in poverty in Africa will increase by approximately 100 million by 2030. In order to close the poverty gap, Africa must triple its growth rate.

Dr Luka Kuol highlighted the connection between these megatrends and the security challenges stemming from corruption, peacekeeping and organized crime. This led a discussion of the need for national security strategies, which many African states do not have. To solve these challenges, Africa must see a paradigm shift in governance norms, which have yet to take root in much of the continent. States must transition from procedural to substantively competitive elections.

Africa must also leverage mechanisms for regional security cooperation, since many conflicts on the African continent are of a regional character. Ms Michelle Ndiaye emphasized that regional organizations must be at the forefront of framing institutional responses. They must also reconcile short- and long-term objectives, which are often at odds. Countries and regional organizations must take a strategic, long-term, evidence-based approach to insecurity. These responses must be formulated in parallel.

Dr Raymond Gilpin spoke on the interconnectedness of these megatrends. What are appropriate entry points when variables are interdependent? Indeed, there are multiple nexuses within the
security–development–governance sphere, and each is deeply entwined with the other. Thus, there arises the need to revisit the framework in order to address these complex issues: the problem must drive the solution. The main point was that these megatrends establish a challenge to revisit and reconceptualize how problems are thought of and solves.

According to the speakers, it is also important to look at the European and African relation in a new light. African states must move towards a more regionally, continent-wide and globally integrated future. The speakers highlighted the Agenda 2063 and continental free-trade agreements as mechanisms to address these issues. The speakers concluded by restating the need to pivot from a state-centric to citizen-centric security framework.
FOOD ASSISTANCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
World Food Programme

MODERATOR
Per Enarsson
Head of Department, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

THEMATIC FOCUS
Today, an estimated 2 billion people live in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world, where they are extremely vulnerable to the impact of conflicts and disasters. There are more crises, affecting more people, and lasting longer today than a decade ago. Most humanitarian crises are not the product of any single factor or event, but of the interaction between climate change, natural hazards, armed conflict and human vulnerability.

For the World Food Programme (WFP), this is an operational reality. Over 80 per cent of its annual expenditure goes directly to conflict contexts where food insecurity is massive and humanitarian access to many areas highly challenging. It is evident that without an end to manmade conflict, it will not be possible to reach Sustainable Development Goal 2 on zero hunger by 2030.

In this context, WFP and SIPRI established a new knowledge partnership, which kicked off in September 2018 and initially examined four country case studies: Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Iraq and El Salvador. Initial lines of enquiry included the following: Are WFP’s humanitarian and development interventions contributing to improving the prospects for peace? What could WFP do more, better or different to maximize such contributions and to measure them? Which partnerships should it invest in? Is WFP ensuring that its programmes are conflict-sensitive and do not exacerbate tensions?

The session presented some of the preliminary findings of the partnership and discussed overall linkages between food assistance interventions and possible contributions to peace.

SUMMARY
The discussion emphasized the importance of food security in conflict contexts, how it might affect countries in conflict, on the merge from conflict to post-conflict. The example of Liberia was used to elaborate on how food assistance can affect local communities positively. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2417 on conflict and hunger was highlighted as an important step to acknowledge the link between famine and conflict. Food security was further discussed in relation to its possible impacts as stabilizing or as a driver for riots—therefore, food distribution and targeting should be done with conflict sensitivity.

It was shared that food security is of foundational importance when discussing prospects for peace: although food security does not directly build peace, it can contribute to its prospects. It was agreed that building peace is complex and one agent cannot build it alone. WFP does not have the aspiration to be a peacebuilding organization, but due to its operational presence in complex contexts, it strives to integrate conflict sensitivity. Several speakers highlighted the importance of working collectively towards a common vision at national level to build joint conflict sensitivity.
One perspective from the discussion was how the humanitarian principles and assistance can shift into stabilization and further into development. Humanitarian work was described as practical, such as WFP's food assistance; however, there could be improvement in how it is done. Collective action was emphasized as a key aspect of how to improve food assistance prospect to contribute to peace, two issues otherwise targeted by two different silos. There is further work to be done to move from abstract silos and create capacity to launch emergency response and to deliver at large scale. The humanitarian sector faces challenges in delivering conflict-sensitive humanitarian assistance and several panellists emphasized that a joint analysis approach could help create synergies to manage this task.

**KEY TAKEAWAYS**

The international humanitarian system is recommended to work towards inclusive national ownership, and to further support and engage governments and civil society.

To prevent siloed responses, the panellists highlight the need for joint analysis that enables context-specific interventions with a common agenda.

Humanitarian actors are not actors of peace; however, they do have an impact in the contexts where they are present and can play a role to improve the prospects for peace.
NEGLECTED, IMMEASURABLE AND HYPER COMPLICATED: IS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 ON PEACEFUL AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES DOOMED TO FAIL?

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Center on International Cooperation

MODERATOR
David Steven
Senior Fellow and Associate Director, Center on International Cooperation

THEMATIC FOCUS
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 is a cornerstone of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: ultimately it is peace and the quality, inclusiveness and effectiveness of public and social institutions that will determine the ability of states to achieve the SDGs and promote human dignity, welfare and development. Armed conflict, violence, corruption and organized crime are major threats to sustainable development. At the same time SDG 16 is very broad, is difficult to implement and measure, and there is resistance from some regarding SDG 16 as challenging the sovereignty of states. Is SDG 16 doomed to fail or are there opportunities for success?

SUMMARY
The 2030 Agenda is highly relevant and a useful framework for building peace, development and good governance. SDG 16 is a cornerstone of the 2030 Agenda and important for other goals to be reached.

There are improvements and plenty of successful stories; however, many people are left behind without their basic needs being met. There are many challenges in implementing the SDG16 and several protracted violent conflicts have increased violence and reversed steps regarding several of the SDGs.

The international community is weakened and focusing more on hard security than on human security in peace processes. Moreover, there are too many conferences with grand visions without real action plans. It is necessary to reflect more on the transition from words to actions.

Inclusive approaches to peacebuilding are crucial, and inclusive societies are at the heart of SDG 16. It is important for social, economic as well as political inclusion. However, the concept of inclusion is often generalized and carries different meanings for different actors. It is therefore important to be clearer about what is meant by inclusion, since otherwise there is the risk of the concept being confused and blurred. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) was mentioned as one of many methods for a more inclusive and sustainable society.

There is a need for political solutions but also realistic and creative solutions to step up the implementation of SDG 16. Resistance and challenges to SDG 16 have been ignored, which is reinforcing rather than solving problems. There should therefore be a more reality-based focus that faces the challenges to reach improvements. It is possible to reach SDG 16 on inclusive and peaceful societies. It needs to be accepted that development is not linear: it has backlashes and ups and downs. What is important is that countries are striving to be on the right path and persistent in improving the implementation. Also, the goals and improvements must be seen in its context. The importance of learning from local solutions and that progress is found in creativity and local solutions was emphasized.
Moreover, the goal of inclusion was discussed: is it a means or an end? The long-term focus was emphasized. Ad hoc solutions are not enough. The focus must be on creativity and durability of how to reach inclusive societies. There is a need for a more coherent agenda with multidimensional focus and multilateral actions. For instance, humanitarian aid is not sufficient for good governance and cannot replace the government, which is a key element of a sustainable peace. The different SDGs must be more integrated and local, and international actors must work together.

Post-conflict societies suffer from both horizontal and vertical distrust. There is deficit of confidence for the government because of bad governance and civil war. It is essential to promote good and creative leaders as well as to facilitate cooperation between the international community and local organizations and civil society actors. It is also essential to interconnect peace and development to reach a sustainable development. Good governance with rule of law and transparent and accountable institutions is the key for a sustainable peace. Trust between communities as well as between citizens and the government is important and must be built in the early stage of the peace process. National and local ownership were emphasized as crucial for sustained development. Leadership was emphasized, on the global, national and local levels. Actions must base on local ownership and context analysis and lessons brought into practice.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Transparent and accountable institutions are key for peaceful and inclusive societies. There is optimism about the development of SDG 16, but there is a need to step up actions, become more practical and invest in long-term commitment. Achievements need to be taken step by step by committed individuals. It is necessary to step up the financing of the implementation of SDG 16 and consider new security risks such as climate change. A sustainable peace and good institutions are created by individuals who have their societies’ best in front of their eyes.
HOW TO REALIZE THE SECURITY–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS?

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
The Brookings Institute

MODERATOR
Johannes Oljelund
Director-General, International Development Cooperation
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

THEMATIC FOCUS
Corruption is the abuse of power, position or trust for private gain. It is present in all countries but scholars and practitioners have acknowledged a security–development nexus for over 25 years, and yet there are few examples of operations that successfully navigated the challenges posed by this nexus. Security and development actors have made some advances in recent years, but developing for security and securing development remains elusive. Overcoming this requires a fundamental rethinking of how national and international actors promote security and development.

SUMMARY
All speakers highlighted the importance of the security–development nexus and the fact that it now seems to be a consensus on its importance. However, they all emphasized the struggle of how to implement it in practice. It was raised that more discussion is needed on how to bridge the gap between security and development actors and overcome the tensions faced in today’s world. It is not enough to create security institutions that work perfectly. Without bringing in development, in a successful way, a good result will not be reached. Likewise, by not addressing security challenges, progress could be, and is being, undone. In complement to this, aligning all actors was emphasized as a key component.

Several challenges were presented in a variety of areas. The struggle of getting donors to work collectively instead of going into different silos was presented as a big challenge. In the case of Iraq, it was highlighted that reconciliation between factions presents a challenge and that it becomes of utter importance that the state system represents everyone in order to deal with such questions as that of the security–development nexus. Even in the cases where all the elements of the nexus are present, it is a challenge to reach consensus. Another challenge presented was the architecture and the fact that it is not designed to support collective work within the security–development nexus. There is a challenge in how to overcome the bureaucracy and support collective action in these questions in daily work. Lastly, the role of humanitarian actors, and how to bring together humanitarian assistance and development assistance, was underlined as a challenge.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
There is consensus that the main challenge is how to implement the security–development nexus in practice. It was highlighted that to do requires overcoming bureaucracy. One way of doing this that was mentioned was through a reform of the United Nations. However, it should not be limited to just the UN. It was mentioned that, rather than UN reform, the focus could be on leadership and that good leadership can help overcome the bureaucracy.

Another recommendation mentioned was getting agreement among actors. In most cases the actors have the same goal but tend to work separately. To reach the ultimate result, collective work is needed. This is done by continued discussions and overcoming the differences in perspectives.
and timelines. By working together in coming up with a shared timeline, that is agreed upon with donor states, the ultimate result will be reached.

There is a need for innovation in the approaches and how collective work is designed. Collective work needs to be present at all stages of the process and it is especially important to find innovative ways of working together from the beginning.

Lastly, it was emphasized that honest dialogue and conversation is key to create the collective work needed in order to implement the security–development nexus in practice.
INTEGRATING CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: ENHANCING THE MOMENTUM IN THE UNITED NATIONS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Dan Smith
Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

THEMATIC FOCUS
In recent years, the discussion of the United Nations’ role and the UN Security Council’s ability in addressing and responding to climate-related security risks has intensified. Member states have specifically called for adequate risk assessment and risk-management strategies, which is reflected in several UN Security Council resolutions.

The high-level panel takes forward the work that has been made on climate risk assessment and the institutional responses, the ‘Climate Security Mechanism’ and climate-related security risks, against the backdrop of a broader UN-reform agenda, the sustaining peace approach and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Integrating climate risks in the UN’s work on peace, security, development and stability is an absolute necessity, both as a basis for real conflict prevention but also to achieve the 2030 Agenda. The panel discussed key steps to ensure increased momentum in 2019 and beyond, such as through the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) in New York in July 2019, the upcoming Climate Summit in September, and dynamics in the UN General Assembly.

SUMMARY
The panel agreed on the complexity of connecting climate-related security risks to different aspects of their work. Although there has been an increased space for climate-related issues in the UN, with the Paris Agreement and the integration of climate within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it remains a challenging issue to raise in some forums. The term climate change and climate-related security risks were discussed from several perspectives, specifically that the latter term should be understood in a broad manner. However, there was no general agreement on whether this would increase or decrease the possibilities to raise the issue in international forums.

Some speakers argued for climate-related security risks to be a growing part of the agenda of the UN Security Council and to further strengthen the UN Climate Security Mechanism to enhance the momentum in the UN and adequately engage the international community. Other speakers emphasized the need to engage the local community with a bottom-up approach, and the importance of including women and youth.

Several panellists described the perspective of climate risks and security risks as being mutually linked. As a consequence, climate interventions should strive to be conflict sensitive and conflict-related interventions should strive to be climate sensitive. Climate awareness was highlighted as a key component in security discussions. The need to confront climate effects that were causing people to lose their livelihoods was also underlined, and the risk of neglecting the demographic factor was raised. The plans on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement were highlighted as an important tool for discussions with national governments, as well as using the 2030 Agenda as a risk-awareness framework.

Whether environmental risks, environmental peacebuilding, crisis mitigation, climate adaption, disaster risk reduction or climate change is discussed, the panel agreed on the importance of
the international community working together to address climate-related security risks and support the momentum in 2019.

**KEY TAKEAWYS**

Several speakers highlighted the importance of increased understanding of climate-related security risks. Awareness of the climate-related security risks is on the rise; however, there is a need for a more systematic approach to manage the issue and to build further awareness of climate-related security risks. This is of key importance to create knowledge of the challenges, to support national plans and to work towards the SDGs.

Climate-related security risk assessments should be integrated in existing analyses, tools and institutions to enhance the possibilities of the issue being properly addressed. The UN, regional organizations, national governments, development actors and non-governmental organizations all have an important role to play in this.

The international community should work to ensure that knowledge and resources trickle down to community level. Grassroot involvement is necessary to build sustainable change and proactive management, instead of reactive management.
INCLUSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
UNDP Oslo Governance Centre

MODERATOR
Dr Thania Paffenholz
Director, Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative

THEMATIC FOCUS
The failure to implement negotiated peace agreements and the frequent collapse of elite deals have drawn the attention of policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to conditions for the successful implementation of peace agreements and political transitions, and to greater societal inclusion in negotiations. The Inclusive Peace Agreement Implementation research project of the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI), supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Oslo Governance Centre, shows that the classical linear understanding of peace negotiations followed by implementation is misleading as reality is less straightforward: implementation often entails an ongoing renegotiation of agreements through a mixture of formal and very often informal negotiation spaces. Inclusion of a broad range of societal actors is hugely important for implementation, as it can help to build momentum to sustain implementation processes, and at the same time achieve inclusive outcomes. The panel will critically reflect on the opportunities and obstacles presented by peace agreement implementation processes, and under which conditions inclusive arrangements can help to support the establishment of pathways to peaceful, just and inclusive societies.

SUMMARY
Inclusive peace agreement implementation is agreed to be a highly complex issue. There is no linearity in peace agreements and there has yet to be a peace agreement where all provisions were implemented. What can be agreed upon is that a focus on implementation is necessary to avoid failure and that an inclusive process creates more momentum. Inclusivity is a key component in reaching sustainable peace and exclusion creates spoilers. However, there is no consensus on what an inclusive peace agreement is in practice, and how to define inclusivity in those terms. It was highlighted that inclusivity is not about one stage only; it needs to be present throughout all stages, and that inclusiveness is needed at all levels. Moreover, it was emphasized that representation is key, but it might not be influential, and if that is the case can it be called inclusive? The question of whether a large number equals inclusivity was raised. It was emphasized that it is not about the number—the focus needs to be on the right people being included. Women were mentioned as especially important in order to ensure inclusivity. However, rather than ensure their inclusion through quotas and as a group of their own, they should be represented in all groups.

However, not everyone finds inclusivity to be a positive aspect. It was highlighted that the people who do not believe in inclusivity should not be forgotten. Preaching tends to create problems rather than solving the problems of exclusive peace agreements. Inclusivity is not something that can be imposed on day 1. Inclusivity is a process and it needs to be remembered to adjust to the context and environment where the work is taking place.

Another aspect that was emphasized was that implementation is the most difficult part and it needs to be in focus in order to create sustainable peace. The implementation is likewise in need of inclusivity. Moreover, the question of formal or informal negotiations as the best alternative was raised. It was mentioned that informal negotiations tend to be more open and more inclusive. It
was also highlighted that where formal negotiations often take a long time, informal negotiations have in more cases led to a quicker and more sustainable result.

**KEY TAKEAWAYS**
The takeaways from the session were many but it was highlighted that it is of importance to create space to talk to everyone, using different tools and creating trust. Furthermore, it was mentioned that the one factor that goes through all the conflict, as the most important driver or cause, is bad governance. Good governance was presented as the key in sustaining peace. It was emphasized that the changing nature of what inclusiveness means needs to be taken into account. The new tools that are being presented will have an impact on the meaning of inclusiveness. Lastly, it was highlighted that coherence and response, as well as how the toolbox is used in the right way, are of importance in order to achieve inclusive peace agreement implementation.
DIALOGUE IN ACTION: A CANDID CONVERSATION ON DELIVERING TOGETHER

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

MODERATOR
Michael Callan
Director, Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Peacebuilding Division
Global Affairs Canada

THEMATIC FOCUS
The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Security (IDPS) brings together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners and civil society to build sustainable peace and development. The World Bank Group is increasingly focusing on fragile situations and supporting sustainable peace and development, and is this year developing a new Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV). United Nations reform is geared for delivering together and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is reorganized for improved crisis response, peacebuilding and development. This session reflected on the experiences of the IDPS and its relevance for the World Bank, UN and bilateral cooperation, and identified opportunities for delivering together in crisis response and long-term peacebuilding.

SUMMARY
The IDPS was created in 2008 as a platform to bring donors and recipients together in a forum where they all had an equal voice to discuss state-building and peacebuilding. The New Deal represents the core of the IDPS’s work and is made up of five peacebuilding and state building goals. The work of the IDPS has been marked by several meaningful achievements. One example is the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. This goal was one of the hardest to negotiate when the SDGs were written. There is also a need to talk about the entire 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, not just individual goals.

Purely humanitarian action has limits. It is usually aimed at reducing immediate suffering and achieving short-term goals. There is a need for strategic patience in the work of the IDPS. There have been several successful projects that have contributed to long-term results. A question that should be asked during humanitarian actions is: Who is the most vulnerable and in need of protection and aid? A programme should go beyond ‘where’ and ‘how’ and be concrete regarding activities carried out.

During humanitarian action it is important to talk to people on all levels of a conflict situation, not just prominent leaders. Some actors are likely to be interested in maintaining the conflict. It should be remembered that donors are working with established partners and banks at a higher degree now than before. Because of this, donors need to look at how they interact with different partners. They need to make sure that they establish contacts that enable them to speak up for those that do not have a voice.

Individuals working as a humanitarian coordinator in a recipient state need to be modest, competent and adept in risk management. There is a need to develop a process of learning and implementing lessons. For example, a humanitarian project or peace process that worked in a coastal state cannot always be transferred to a landlocked state. Donors have also tended to underestimate the need for consensus regarding what constitutes the issues during a humanitarian effort. Part of the dialogue...
must be about establishing consensus among all actors involved in a crisis or conflict regarding what problems they face.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Today the space for civil society is shrinking at the same time as nationalism and unilateralism is challenging the multilateral approaches preferred by the IDPS. In this context the IDPS is putting the New Deal’s principles into action and working to involve more states and partners in the dialogue.

Instead of talking about stabilization of weak states, donors should talk about expanding state authority. When donors refer to stability, they are working to bring accountable services to people on all levels of society in a recipient state. The inability of a state to do this is a trigger for conflicts and crises, as non-state actors take over the role of a state in areas it lacks the capacity to control.

A point raised during the session was that the international political context has changed since the creation of the IDPS in 2008. The IDPS function as a dialogue forum for donors and recipients rested on the implicit assumption that states that were not fragile were stable and resilient. New security challenges such as the disininformation, cybercrime and extremism has challenged this assumption.

A theme from the high-level session in the morning resurfaced. The question of institutional ownership over issues is important also in the context of the IDPS. Donor countries and donor organizations can work to strengthen the resilience of a fragile state. But it is important that the recipient state maintains ownership over the issues in question.
TOWARDS A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INCLUSIVE AND EFFECTIVE PEACE PROCESSES

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Interpeace

MODERATOR
Scott Weber
President, Interpeace

THEMATIC FOCUS
To design and implement peace processes that can successfully address the underlying root causes of violence and make peace more sustainable, the way the international system approaches peace processes needs to fundamentally change. This includes overcoming silos of different peace and security interventions and casting them more coherently in the context of the longer-term framework that sustainable peace requires. The panel discussed the need for new mechanisms, practices and norms in peacebuilding and peace processes and showcased examples of how this can work in practice.

SUMMARY
The panel highlighted the importance of inclusion as an underlying principle of effective peace processes, but it nuanced what must be understood by ‘inclusion’. Inclusion must have as its guiding principles being truly representative of society, seeking broad-based legitimacy, and ultimately achieving collective ownership of policies and decisions.

The panel also underscored that, while there are numerous policies and resolutions that address parts of the challenge of pursuing peace, few if any provide clarity on how various siloed efforts must articulate with each other as part of a whole, on who is best placed to lead on each area of work and at each level of society, on when such efforts are appropriate, premature or too late, and, most importantly, on how it all adds up. Moreover, even fewer provide a reference point against which to assess progress, over time, towards the greater capacity of a society to manage its own conflicts non-violently and the growth (or deterioration) of social and political trust.

Peace processes as currently designed remain overly focused on the negotiation table, which keeps attention on a narrow and elite-driven track 1 process primarily composed of the actors of violence. This, in turn, can reinforce the notion of rewarding violence (‘prime à la violence’) as a pathway to securing a seat at the table. There are many other moments and levels of engagement that are equally important and that demand as much, if not more, attention in order to move the overall society closer to peace.

Making meaningful change in how peace processes are conceived and run must start by reframing peace processes as longer-term (20+ years, as this is the length of time that instilling durable peace generally requires), multilayered (working at several layers of society) and multi-stakeholder in nature. In the pursuit of these objectives, the panel recognized that peace is not the exception. Rather, conflict is. Hence the need to recognize and enhance the factors of positive peace in society, rather than focusing primarily on the factors of violence. In this way, peace processes can overcome their current tendency to give greater attention to conflict resolution rather than peace enhancement.

The panel also noted that the actors focused on short-term objectives (elections, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and ceasefire negotiations, etc.) will need to be far more closely
coordinated with, and even guided by, those that keep their attention on the longer-term goals. The present short-term funding cycles, staff rotation, political election calendars and media attention fatigue currently result in an inconsistent attention to the overall peace process agenda in the concerned country. This leads to poor follow-through and implementation of peace processes.

The panel recognized the need for new standards and mechanisms to bring the needed coherence to the design, monitoring, re-adjustment and assessment of peace processes, understood as re-cast in their longer-term framework. Several critical elements were cited in terms of criteria for assessing progress in a peace process, namely the degree to which they move the needle positively in terms of the empowerment of local actors, the improvement of a social contract between the people and between the state and its population, the perception of a fair security and justice system, and equality of rights and development opportunities for all.
CAN MEDIATION DE-ESCALATE CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE?

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

MODERATOR
David Harland
Executive Director, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

THEMATIC FOCUS
Conflicts in cyberspace—from intrusions into critical infrastructure to the manipulation of social media to interfere in elections—have so far not proved amenable to the traditional tools of conflict resolution. There continues to be vigorous debate about what constitutes acceptable behaviour in cyberspace, particularly across geopolitical divides. In the meantime, states are rapidly developing their offensive capabilities, which at worst could spill over into conflict in the kinetic realm. This session examined existing diplomatic efforts to promote the stability of cyberspace and considered in what circumstances mediation may help.

SUMMARY
The discussion centred around cyberspace—said to be the next frontier in warfare and conflicts. Cyberattacks, by their nature, are attractive to use because they can be deployed quickly, ignoring geographical boundaries and having a low cost and risk. More importantly, they can be used with plausible deniability and attributing attacks is next to impossible—unlike conventional weapons.

Conflicts and attacks in cyberspace have the potential to be a destabilizing force in international affairs. For the first time, there was a kinetic response to a cyberattack when the Israeli Defence Forces conducted airstrikes in response to an alleged hacking attempt by Hamas in May 2019. Disinformation and hacking campaigns were used by Russia against Ukraine and Georgia and against the United States in the 2016 elections. Civil society is particularly vulnerable to these types of attacks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights activists and journalists are regularly targeted around the world. There is also a discrepancy in capabilities between larger and smaller states.

The issue of security versus freedom and democracy was also discussed. In trying to counteract content manipulation (i.e. fake news), governments often propose to monitor networks. However, in doing so they build the infrastructure for an authoritarian surveillance regime capable of censoring the internet. Careful attention should be paid to ensure transparency in the process and the possibility for citizens to appeal against content removal.

While the current debate on the topic is largely focused on the technical and technological aspect of cyberspace, it was said that it is important not to forget the human behind the computer screen. Shared learning and research on human behaviour in this context is important for a deeper understanding of this new phenomenon.

The panel unanimously agreed on the importance of this emerging phenomenon and that traditional approaches need to be overhauled. The inclusion of civil society, businesses and academia were seen as key to advancing thought in this area because of the high level of complexity and the decentralized nature of cyberspace. Policy has simply not caught up to the rapid development of new information technologies and this could no longer be considered a marginal problem in international affairs. A bridge between the cyber community and the traditional peacebuilding community was welcomed by the panel to advance thought in the area.
KEY TAKEAWAYS

The potential benefits from technology are considerable—but so are the risks. While there is eagerness to reap the benefits of technological innovation and information technology, there is an increasingly vulnerability to cyberattacks and this is no longer a marginal problem.

Civil society is particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because it lacks resources and tools to defend itself. Cyberattacks are actively being used against NGOs, human rights activists and journalist around the world.

The international laws and norms that do exist regarding cyberspace are not applied in practice. Because of the decentralized infrastructure of cyberspace, it is key to involve civil society, businesses and academia in this matter.

It is important not to forget the human behind the computer screen. The current debate about cyberconflicts and cyberattacks is largely focused on technological and technical aspects, while the actors—human beings—are absent from the conversation. Further study is needed to understand the human behaviour in this new context.

There is an opportunity and a need to connect the peacebuilding community to the digital community to effectively deal with this paradigm shift and evolve traditional ways of thinking and dealing with conflict mediation in this new space.
CORRUPTION AND PEACEBUILDING

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Marina Caparini
Programme Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
Corruption is the abuse of power, position or trust for private gain. It is present in all countries but is especially prevalent in conflict-affected and fragile states. According to a United Nations–World Bank report, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, corruption is an underlying cause of conflict and violence. In addition, it is often the most disempowered and vulnerable members of society who are most affected by corruption. Women, for instance, tend to rely more on public services such as health and education due to their childbearing and caregiving roles. Despite the corrosive impact of corruption on the state and the social compact, it is often neglected, deferred to some future stage of recovery and development, or forced down the agenda as other objectives such as counterterrorism take priority. The session discussed experiences and challenges of mitigating corruption risks in stabilization and peacebuilding environments and lessons learned.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session aimed to examine how corruption interacts with and can undermine efforts to build peace and resilient states in countries affected by conflict and in transition towards democracy. It identified key lessons learned in mitigating corruption risks in stabilization and peacebuilding environments

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Research suggests that some level of corruption may be built into peace agreements in order to buy off potential spoilers. Criminal or violent actors are given impunity and a chance to make some money through lucrative positions in ministries. A peace deal thus enshrines some level of corruption in the post-conflict state. As it becomes entrenched, it fosters anger and instability, leading to further conflict.

One challenge for practitioners is where to draw the line in terms of an acceptable level of corruption and what support can be given to local actors. However, politically, this is a very difficult stance for donors or international organizations to adopt publicly.

With the fall of Mosul and the crumbling of the corrupt Iraqi Army, people lost trust, and an international coalition funded militia groups. These groups are still there. The United States’ stabilization programme in Iraq is not achieving the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) because militias are not allowing anyone to go back unless they pay bribes. These groups force parliamentarians to support them through the award of government contracts and ministry positions. They are the real rulers of Iraq in many provinces. They are protected from being held accountable. There is a need to dissolve the militias, but to do that would also require the dissolution of the parliament and government.

Corruption is not a culture but a system that has become entrenched in society. In Iraq, corruption has worsened to the extent that a recurrence of civil war would not be surprising.
Defence and security professionals tend to see corruption as a soft governance issue that is not their business. They feel that the problem is pervasive, is too big to deal with or is just part of the local culture. This implies that moral standards are lower than in Western countries. Western intelligence agencies do not look at financial arrangements, but at the enemy. The extent to which internationals exacerbate the problem is underestimated.

Tunisia made important major institutional steps after the fall of President Ben Ali in 2011, but it is widely perceived that corruption has increased since then. On the ground the results of anti-corruption measures and structural reforms have still not been seen. The fight against corruption is a national objective and has resulted in whistle-blower protection and a law against conflict of interests in the public sector. A minority of political parties and members of parliament have declared assets and potential conflict of interests, so even those who passed the anti-corruption law have actually complied with the law.

An international military presence complicates an already complex situation in societies emerging from conflict. Corruption tends to be seen by Western militaries as a long-term local self-governance and civilian issue that does not fit into military time frames or tools. Corruption is also seen as political, and that engaging with the problem will mean taking a side where this is not supposed to happen (international intervention is often self-perceived by international militaries as ‘neutral’, even though they are clearly intervening to assist one party, usually the host state). Military forces are also not trained or prepared to recognize corruption or its consequences.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The ‘dirty deals’ in peace agreements which build in some degree of corruption must then somehow not allow corruption to become entrenched in the society.
- Deal with corruption from the onset of contingency and peace operations.
- Recognize international military forces as a huge ally in the fight against corruption. They have the opportunity and legitimacy to talk to other military forces in a way that might be difficult for civilian actors. As an entry point, address corruption as an issue undermining operational efficiency.
- Ensure that civil society and the media have the capacity and skills to investigate corruption and perform a watchdog function.
- Ensure that laws promoted by international actors are not too sophisticated and can work without the necessary resources; tailor them to the context, its legal infrastructure and the resource base.
- Make sure that highly technical anti-corruption measures (e.g. payment chains or biometric systems) can work by ensuring, when they are introduced, the political awareness of who is gaining opportunities from the resources brought into the context by the international military presence.
- While transitional justice has focused on human rights abuses, explore economic transitional justice for the forms of corruption that amount to an international crime.
SESSION QUOTES

‘Parliament is not a parliament anymore, it’s an auction.’

‘Corruption has grown within the cracks that have been created under the pressure of the structural progress.’

‘The same phenomena that get us into war, get us out of war.’

‘Achieving peace is important, but more important perhaps is how afterward to unravel that “dirty deal” that bought off potential spoilers, whether through impunity or access to state resources.’

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS

SHORING UP STABILITY IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION:
ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND FRAGILITY RISKS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Adelphi

MODERATOR
Janani Vivekananda
Senior Adviser and Project Lead, Adelphi

OVERVIEW
The Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) is caught up in deadly and seemingly intractable conflict that has killed thousands of people, displaced over 2.5 million and left over 10.7 million in urgent humanitarian need. Solely military responses are not working. The first step towards addressing the crisis is to understand how and why it came about. This session unpacked the findings of an assessment of the climate and fragility risks affecting the region—the independent Adelphi report *Shoring up Stability: Addressing Climate and Fragility Risks in the Lake Chad Region*—in order to identify responses which can address the linked causes and drivers of the crisis. The research finds that Lake Chad is not shrinking. Nonetheless, climate change poses a profound and far-reaching challenge to stability. In this in-depth problem-solving session, experts from the region and development policymakers drew on the newly available evidence to debate the different and connected dimensions of risk and to assess the merits of a number of specific responses.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
Based on the findings of the assessment, this session aimed to shine a light on the specific climate change and fragility risks affecting the Lake Chad region and the need for responses in the region to take account of these risks. Failure to do so has been proven to increase these risks further. However, addressing these risks provides an opportunity to ensure responses are sustainable, that future risks can be prevented and that the conflict trap can ultimately be broken.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
An understanding of the interconnectedness of climate and security is needed in order to make sure that the responses implemented are effective and sustainable.

In her opening remarks to Forum 2019, Ulrika Modéer, Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy at UNDP, underscored the importance for actors working in conflict contexts to conduct climate-fragility risk analysis. Secondly, she stressed the need for getting the analysis right in order to avoid maladaptation to climate change which worsens the conflict, security responses which worsen climate impacts, and to enable management of joint risks.

Lake Chad is a good indicator of climate change. According to research on this 7-million-year-old lake, its size is highly variable. Satellite data has been used to show how the size of the lake has varied over the past 20 years and the findings show that its size has proven relatively stable over the past two decades. Indeed, the total water storage has actually increased, if one includes groundwater as well as surface water. The lake's size has expanded to currently roughly 14 000 square kilometres.

Any responses to the situation around Lake Chad therefore need to take into account the latest research findings.
During the session the discussants further pointed out the interlinked climate and fragility risks in the Lake Chad region. The discussion focused on the following four risks:

1. The ongoing conflict undermines people’s ability to deal with the changes that an increasingly variable climate is bringing.

2. Climate change, conflict and displacement is adding to intercommunal tensions over natural resources such as arable land, grazing pastures and fishing areas.

3. By compounding poverty climate change is adding to the conditions in which armed groups can recruit new fighters.

4. Heavy-handed military responses to the violence can themselves undermine communities’ resilience and their ability to adapt to climate change. The focus on military measures to respond to the crisis by the region’s governments has not addressed the root causes of the crisis.

At the moment, for example an increasing number of attacks in the region is reported as well as that due to the security restrictions in place people are pushed further and further towards armed opposition groups and even moving significant distances to join them.

It is important to share new information and analysis between the actors that work in the region, in order to prevent escalation of the existing conflicts and crises. For example, military interventions to fight armed opposition groups such as Boko Haram partly undermine the population’s livelihood as they do not take into account the climate variability in the region. To avoid this, it is important to spread information among the actors and for the government responses to take into account the links between climate and fragility risks.

Coordination between governments, academia, regional actors and civil society is currently still a problem. Two questions must be addressed: ‘Who is doing what and where?’ and ‘Who should coordinate all the actors in the Lake Chad region?’ There is a fear that opportunities for synergy between the responses are being missed in the absence of coordination.

To summarize, it is necessary to rethink the responses made in the Lake Chad region and to start to integrate climate change, security planning and humanitarian action perspectives in all responses that are implemented.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ensure that efforts to address the violent conflict and humanitarian crisis and build longer term development take account of climate change and fragility risks.

- Independent science/research is crucial to avoid politicization of findings; Have to engage national governments in the region in the analysis and bring findings down on the ground.

- Sharing of information and coordination between partners is still a gap; synergies and leadership in the region are crucial.

- The situation around Lake Chad is a transboundary issue, Lake Chad Basin Commission has a strong role in it.

- Rethink mindsets of responses, often climate change comes later after stabilisation but people in crises are at the same time affected by climate change; hence a “climate lens” needs to be part of stabilisation/humanitarian actions at any time; To address climate and conflict in an integrated approach is not only relevant for the Lake Chad region but for climate and conflict affected regions in general.

- Stress the importance of the Regional Stabilization Strategy, accepted by Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations, since it aims to facilitating a transition from active military engagement to addressing the root causes of the crisis and rationalizing various initiatives to stabilize areas affected by Boko Haram.

- Also stress the need for local government investment in the Lake Chad region as a complement to the Regional Stabilization Strategy.
This session report was produced onsite at the 2019 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development hosted by SIPRI and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The report aims to reflect the session discussion. The views, information or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of SIPRI, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs or other institutes associated with the session.

LINKS AND DOCUMENTS

MANAGING SECURITY AND PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND RED SEA

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Crisis Management Initiative and
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Yasar Al Qatarneh
Senior Advisor, MENA Program,
Crisis Management Initiative

OVERVIEW
The Horn of Africa and Red Sea has emerged as a multidimensional space that brings together overlapping security engagements by local, regional and international actors in complex and dynamic configurations. Managing insecurity and promoting the emergence of sustainable peace across the region has emerged as a regional and international priority against a backdrop of civil war in Yemen and violent instability in Somalia; transformation in relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea; political transition in Sudan; significant external militarization of the Red Sea and Horn littorals; and unresolved resource disputes—notably over the Nile basin—together with rising geo-economic and geopolitical competition. This session sought to identify the key security threats that intersect in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea; to explore the emerging role of local, regional and international security actors in the region; and to consider how existing regional institutions can be adapted and new arrangements developed to better manage the region’s security challenges.

OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the session were to explore the contemporary security challenges in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea; to identify what is driving these challenges and how they are likely to evolve; and to consider what steps might be taken to promote demilitarization of the region.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
In the multilayered security context in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, the current dynamics of country-specific conflicts, migration, trade and transportation are complex. The relationship between the regional actors is asymmetric. Moreover, the securitization of the region goes beyond the regional actors, involving the international dynamics of United States, European Union (EU), Middle Eastern and Asian military presence. The interactions are both competitive and spillovers from other international power struggles. SIPRI has reported on the issue of the new external militarization of the Horn of Africa to highlight the diversity of actors; how mandates are widening from security to protect national interests; and an increased external presence.

The Horn of Africa and Red Sea region is part of a transforming security space in which external security actors contribute to an increased militarization. One of the contemporary challenges is the perspective of actors from different layers, as the region is a space were both state and non-state actors and, further, actors from both within and outside the region are present. Addressing the different drivers of these actors is a further challenge. Further inclusive initiatives for dialogue...
are a possible solution to the current situation. The discussion therefore focused on how to encourage different forums of dialogue, both multilateral and bilateral, to enhance the prospects for stabilization.

Overall, the discussion was optimistic regarding the future prospects for the region as dialogue initiatives develop. However, the question of whether these proposed initiatives will change the intent of the all parties was raised. A further question concerned how parties could create a forum for subsequent dialogue around the security situation. These are challenging questions to keep in mind for future discussions.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Take steps towards stabilization in the region with a multilayered approach that reflects the situation's complexity. Include bilateral agreements between the countries of the region as one of the layers.
- Since the regional security situation has many layers, encourage different forums of dialogue such as bilateral and multilateral. Include among them inclusive forums for dialogue to engage in the region's complex, multilayered context.
- Recognize the future challenge of addressing how to increase security in the region and at the same time demilitarize.

**RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS**


WHAT NEXT ON THE PATH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ABUSES INCLUDING SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN RAKHINE STATE?

OVERVIEW
The pursuit of accountability following the military operations in Rakhine state, Myanmar, in 2017 has triggered both international and locally grown truth- and justice-seeking mechanisms. These are attempting to hold perpetrators to account and to bridge national and international narratives of events. Women have disproportionately suffered the impacts of the conflict. It is also important to consider what justice means for victims, including victims of sexual and gender-based violence. At the same time, the context in Rakhine state has become more complex. In addition to the poor prospects for return in the near future, there has been a recent surge in confrontation between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military. The session explored what these new dynamics mean for accountability and efforts towards eventual reconciliation in Rakhine state.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
• To move forward on the path towards accountability, certain points need to be considered.
• Rohingya voices are important: both those who remain in Rakhine and those that are in camps. These voices can be heard through representation in international forums, for example.
• Interim measures can be taken while accountability is being pursued: education and freedom of movement are part of protecting people.
• The discussion around reparations is starting, but it needs to be expanded.
• As parallel investigations are being pursued, methodological issues arise. Investigations must be undertaken from a ‘do no harm’ perspective. They also require translation, creation of a common understanding and collective memory.
• A bottom-up civil society approach should be adopted. The situation should be looked at from long-term perspective.
• The regional perspective is already being thought of, but it needs to be expanded on. This requires being pragmatic about who has leverage on military.

SESSION QUOTES
‘When we defer accountability, it has consequences’

‘We want the women to be the holders of their story’

This session report was produced onsite at the 2019 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development hosted by SIPRI and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The views, information or opinions expressed are solely those of the lead institution and do not necessarily represent those of SIPRI or the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
PREVENTING AN UNJUST PEACE: HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SYRIA AND THE RISK OF PREMATURE PEACEBUILDING

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
International Legal Assistance Consortium

MODERATOR
Shane Quinn
Director of Programmes, International Legal Assistance Consortium

OVERVIEW
Syria is at a crossroads, and with that comes a heightened risk of premature peacebuilding. It is time for a more informed dialogue on guaranteeing the security and well-being of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees who want to return to their homes and reclaim their property in any potential reconstruction process. The conflict in Syria has effectively reached its endgame but the post-conflict setting is characterized by a lack of strategy and momentum, and governments and multilateral actors remain divided on how to chart a viable way forward that is acceptable to all sides.

Syria can no longer be seen solely through a crisis response lens but the terms for sustainable peacebuilding—or even an inclusive peace process—remain elusive. A combination of factors, such as transformation of the Syrian conflict into a proxy war between regional powers and the overwhelming military advantage enjoyed by the Syrian Government and its allies, means that the playbook developed in the 1990s for ‘early recovery’ efforts to bridge the gap between humanitarian response and development-oriented peacebuilding has become virtually irrelevant. This dynamic is nowhere more visible than in the debate over housing, land and property (HLP) rights. Over half the population—13 million Syrians—have been displaced from their homes. Ongoing government efforts to confiscate the homes of accused ‘terrorists’ and engage in wholesale urban redevelopment of war-damaged urban neighbourhoods raise the spectre of millions of refugees never being able to return to the country and millions more IDPs being permanently marginalized.

United Nations-led and regional responses to HLP violations were painstakingly developed in the 1990s, but these tend to presuppose that the conflict parties can be pressured into painful but necessary compromises to allow former opponents to return and reclaim their homes. Such approaches offer few prospects of immediate success in the ongoing wrangling surrounding the constitutional process.

Through increased advocacy and actively seeking synergies on HLP—while putting the emphasis on Syrian ownership throughout—there is the potential to guarantee the security and well-being of IDPs and refugees who want to return to their homes and reclaim their property. The need could not be more urgent. Failure may not only doom Syria to being left behind in terms of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development—it may also jeopardize peaceful development in the entire region.

FOCUS
Syria is at the crossroads, and with that comes a heightened risk for premature peacebuilding. This session promoted a more informed dialogue on guaranteeing the security and well-being of IDPs and refugees who want to return to their homes and reclaim their property in any potential reconstruction process.
OBJECTIVES

The session had two objectives. The first was to preserve the normative gains made during the 1990s related to the rights of conflict-affected civilian populations. This is related to the questions ‘What will be the fallout if HLP rights are not recognized in the Syria process?’ and ‘What type of precedent does that set for future peace negotiations?’ The second objective was to identify steps that can be taken to preserve the rights of Syrians in a context where the government is unwilling to make concessions and is proceeding unilaterally on HLP rights and other issues in a way that will irrevocably prejudice any possibility of return or reintegration for people displaced by the conflict.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The current situation in Syria creates a difficult backdrop to the issue of housing, land and property rights, with large numbers of refugees and IDPs, the destruction so far, and the need for reconstruction. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad is still in place with the support of its allies—regional actors with their own interests.

HLP law was an issue already before 2011, with many properties not registered (i.e. informal housing). As a result, many Syrians have no formal documentation to prove their property rights, as houses were often built without building permits.

Before and during the war, laws have been put in place to make sure that people cannot return, with effective measures taken to remove their property claims and to redistribute property. The priorities of the regime are clearly developed not according to the housing needs of the population but according to the regime’s political strategies, to expropriate as much land for its own purposes as possible.

Reconstruction is a central aspect of HLP rights: in the current situation, contributing to reconstruction means being complicit in war crimes. Reconstruction means consolidation of forced displacement and the legal changes made by the Syrian Government since the beginning of the conflict, as well as empowerment of the allies of the Syrian regime. In this regard the term ‘war crime economy’ is used to refer to the economic structures in place and being developed in Syria.

There is an interplay between civilian suffering, sanctions and HLP rights. Sanctions are a means to create leverage over the regime and its supporters to make the regime enforce HLP rights, but they have important implications for the local population.

The Syrian Government and its allies seem to care about the law and the UN, which creates an opportunity: international law has supremacy over certain Syrian internal laws. How can best use be made of this to guarantee the security and well-being of IDPs and refugees who want to return to their homes and reclaim their property in any potential reconstruction process?

Regarding the role of human rights: they have supremacy over certain Syrian laws; they can be an analytical tool in order not to be drowned in the details created by the many laws implemented by the Syrian Government; and they can demarcate the principled stance that must be taken by Europe. Europe seems to be in a state of fatigue. There are expectations that it should continue to try to resolve the conflict, but it is pulling out and reducing its involvement.

Regarding women and HLP rights, in Syria it is usually the men who are listed on property documents, not the women. Women have no proof of property that they would be entitled to. There is awareness that this is an issue, but nothing has yet been done, and no recommendations have been formulated so far.

Related to the right of return is the question ‘Why did people flee in the first place?’ This was not due to economic needs or for better education, but rather due to torture and prosecution. Surveys conducted for potential returnees should more clearly analyse reasons why people do not return, rather than speaking generally about ‘security risks’. If the aim is to have people want to return, it is necessary to make sure that they have access to their rights and property before embarking on this course.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Europe is not as weak as it thinks it is. It needs to use reconstruction not only as a carrot but also as a stick. Advocacy can lead to change, especially when backed up by diplomatic and financial pressure. Europe should reframe the debate on HLP rights in terms of respect for human rights and Syria’s obligations under international law.

• International powers and donors should use their influence to reverse the laws that were put in place. Reconstruction is happening under the guise of stabilization—it must be ensured that the rightful owners of property are protected.

• European governments need to take a principled stance, formulated together with academia and civil society.

• Create a narrative that Europe is not going to invest in a ‘war crime economy’.

• Work not only towards HLP rights but also make sure that reconstruction is not used as a tool to perpetuate these illegal structures.

• Translate issues of HLP rights from highly legal terms into a language that can be understood by everybody and that highlights their importance.

• Take a much longer time perspective to work for solutions, rather than trying to secure quick wins. Use less public diplomacy and more confidence building, which is a prerequisite for peace.

• Since HLP not only a human rights issue, tie it to political and economic issues.

• Establish HLP rights in a greater welfare programme. This must be achieved in the political process.

• Since forced returns are not acceptable, uphold the principle of voluntary return. Returns can only happen when Syrians have their rights protected in Syria.

• Put in place international mechanism for HLP rights that build on the work of civil society actors that have started to compile property documentation; this mechanism should also take into account the issue of informal housing.

SESSION QUOTES

‘HLP is a means of warfare, used as weapon.’

‘We are not talking about something long ago in the past. It is currently happening, and something can therefore be done about it.’

‘Reconstruction will consolidate displacement and dispossession and empower regime cronies and financial backers of crimes who have set up the companies that would benefit.’

‘Application of basic human rights standards—and some of the best practices that emerged from them—is the only feasible way of providing an effective response to both the immediate and long-term issues raised by dispossession and displacement in Syria.’

‘There is no will on the part of the winners to cooperate.’

‘Sanctions should be a tool, not the policy.’
EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACHES TO THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
The Brookings Institute

MODERATOR
Michael Miklaucic
Senior Fellow and
Editor-in-chief of PRISM,
National Defense University

OVERVIEW
Scholars and practitioners have acknowledged a security–development nexus for over 25 years, but there is a divide between each community. Even within academia and the implementer community, the security, development and humanitarian subfields are in their own silos. This session focused on creating a better understanding of each of these divides and brainstorming how they can be bridged to create better, evidence-based approaches in the security–development nexus.

OBJECTIVES
The session had four objectives. First was to identify the significant gaps of understanding that practitioners face when developing strategies and programming in the security–development nexus, and to understand better the gaps between the security, development and humanitarian practitioner fields. Second was to identify major research agendas regarding the security–development nexus, incorporating the subfields of development, humanitarian efforts, security and peace science, and to understand better how these subfields interact. Third was to develop an understanding of the institutional incentives across and within the academic, security, development and humanitarian communities that challenge coordination and evidence-based approaches. The fourth objective was to propose ways to overcome structural barriers in order to bridge the security–development nexus with the academic community.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Having the two communities—security and development—working in the same space creates a need to work together more effectively. However, there are several challenges to making this happen. There is an intellectual cultural gap between the academic and practitioner communities, with disincentives to collaboration in the face of the need to understand each other better. Moreover, the security, development and academic communities work according to different timeframes: while the security community is forced to work rapidly, with shorter time frames, the development and academic communities both have a time frame with a long-term focus. There is also an information asymmetry between the security and development communities, which poses a challenge. Likewise, the two communities have different agendas that need to be bridged.

Host country ownership was identified as a key component to ensure successful programmes. The need to approach local researchers and bring in their expertise and perspective was highlighted. Moreover, it was emphasized that policymakers have a tendency to push for research that supports
policy agendas rather than drives change. It was concluded that these challenges are inherently political and not necessarily subject to rational solutions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Create common institutional platforms in the field in order to tackle the challenge of the security and development communities having different agendas.
- Eliminate disincentives in order to overcome and bridge the existing intellectual cultural gap between the academic and practitioner communities. Similarly, incentivize familiarity of the two communities and through that further bridge the existing gap.
- Engage with the local community as a key component of success and sustainability.
- Continue development support beyond the peacekeeping phase in order to achieve sustainability and build trust among the local community.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


BROOKINGS

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IS PEACEMAKING TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT IN THE HANDS OF PEACEMAKERS?

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
European Institute of Peace

MODERATOR
Michael Keating
Executive Director,
European Institute of Peace

OVERVIEW
Peace and security are traditionally the purview of states and international organizations, but in recent years the results are discouraging. Meanwhile, the private sector is often sidelined, despite the important role it plays in creating alternative livelihoods for potential fighters, providing basic services and in the implementation of peace agreements. At the same time, the private sector can also act as spoilers if they benefit more from continued instability than from peace. In Europe, solving and preventing conflict is a core ideal of the European Union (EU) as a political project. Some of the most notable strengths of the EU—the four freedoms, the world's largest market—were created in an effort to ensure peace and prosperity for a battle-weary part of the world. The benefits to Europe have been immense and, accordingly, it is high time to look at how these strengths can be built on to support peacemaking worldwide. This session explored how peacemakers can constructively work with both local and international private sector actors to support their work and contribute to reaching sustainable peace.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session addressed three questions: How does the private sector see its role in the area of conflict resolution and conflict prevention? Are there ways in which the public sector can work with the private sector and create synergies and contribute to sustainability? What practical ideas can be suggested?

KEY TAKEAWAYS
The private sector represents much more than just financial support. Large companies play an important role, but using big financial mechanisms is not the only option: it is important to find ways to support local and regional small and medium-sized businesses. Peacemakers must recognize the fundamental role the private sector plays, both economically and societally. Private investments lead to concrete peace dividends and are a key part of reaching a sustainable peace but such investments are inherently risky. These investments can be supported through, for example investment guarantees, security, and showing the value to the private sector of a functioning state. Somaliland was brought up as an example where the private sector came together to invest in a state apparatus – this did not happen in Mogadishu and is part of the answer to why Somaliland has remained relatively stable compared to the rest of the country.

In the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it is fundamental to make a conscious effort from the start to bring in and strengthen local entrepreneurs, because of their crucial role in society. Especially by the time foreign interference leaves, the private and public sector must be able to sustain peace by themselves. This makes it even more important to have a long-term perspective and understand that long-term peace and stability cannot be sacrificed for short-term change by engaging with illicit economic actors.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Increase the involvement of the private sector in conflict analysis.
• Paying taxes is fundamental, but it requires a functioning state.
• Keep the sustainability perspective in mind when working with peace agreements.
• Train regional companies in sustaining peace.
• Involve women in the peace process.
HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACEBUILDING AND SDG16.1: BREAKING SILOS AND BUILDING BRIDGES

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies Program at the Center on International Cooperation, New York University

MODERATOR
Rachel Locke
Head of Research for violence prevention with the Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies Program at the Center on International Cooperation, New York University

OVERVIEW
This session explored the essential connections between peacebuilding, violence prevention and human rights, elaborating on how the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide an essential framework for action. The session revealed both key areas of convergence and existing gaps between communities. It reinforced emerging efforts to engage different sets of tools in the interest of significantly reducing all forms of violence (SDG 16, target 16.1). The panel began by exploring the efforts of one community to pursue a human rights-based approach to violence prevention.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session aimed to specify tools that can be more proactively used to address violence both through policy and in practice. By framing in the context of the SDGs, it reinforced the immediate and long-term priorities for action. It also aimed to engage those Forum participants with a human rights background or with an interest in engaging human rights tools in an ongoing, deliberate discussion on working more purposefully together.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Human rights and peacebuilding have strong connections and deal with similar issues. However, they often use very different language, which can expand gaps between the fields and result in weak communication. There are untapped opportunities to identify points of convergence, at which it is recognized that advancing human rights helps to reinforce peace and reduce violence. This can also aid in bringing discussions from the ground to high-level policy forums. As one panellist commented, ‘We should pepper our commentary and arguments with language from across human rights, peacebuilding and development’, thereby better translating challenges and tensions in the different spheres. Human rights and peacebuilding work in different ways to try to find solution for existing challenges. Sustainable Development Goal 16 provides an essential framework that brings together human rights defenders, peacebuilders, governments and local communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Identify points of entry and convergence and make strategic use of this knowledge when mobilizing actors and resources.
- Increase strategic thinking about how to use frameworks such as the Universal Periodic Review and human rights conventions to advance working practice in the fields of prevention and peacebuilding.
- Conceive the relationship between governments and human rights defender organizations as an enabling partnership—not opposing actors—to advance peace and rights consolidation.
• Recognizing that violence tends to concentrate among people and in places that have typically been disenfranchised or lack power, use tools such as the 1969 Convention on Racial Discrimination to promote inclusion, reinforce the ambitions of the SDGs and advance peacebuilding.

HIGHLIGHTS
• Human rights and articulation of the SDGs are universal. How do we use each to promote a transformation to greater equality for all?
• On the ground, human rights actors and peacebuilding practitioners are concerned with the same things, but a separation has been created by the international community. How do we use our respective fields to advance our common goals without getting stuck in silos?
• Human rights language can be better used to reinforce a positivist approach to peace.

LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


GENDERED DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AND GENDERED RESPONSES

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Dylan O’Driscoll
Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
This session examined the role of gender norms and gender inequalities in driving conflict and violence, as well as the gendered impact of conflict. Using a number of case studies (Ukraine, Nigeria, Liberia, Yemen and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), it explored how peacebuilding and development at the local and national levels can, and should, address gender norms, tackle gender inequalities and be inclusive.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session examined the links between gender, violence and conflict, as well as how gender matters in responses to these, and made recommendations on best practice.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Gender matters from the onset of conflict and into the peacebuilding phase. For example, conflict is more likely to breakout in countries with high levels of gender inequality. Masculinities, and particularly militarized masculinities, are important as they increase violent attitudes. In contrast, gender equality is associated with less conflict and less reliance on violence for conflict resolution.

Case studies have shown that expectations of men are important for the violence playing out in conflict contexts (e.g. toxic masculinities). It is important to question gender roles in particular contexts and not assume stereotyped gender roles. In addition, gender should not be understood only in the binary of male and female; issues relating to the intersectionality of discrimination and a more diverse gender definition need to be better researched and addressed.

The roles of women in conflict are complex. It is important to see women not only as victims but also as actors in various roles. These roles will differ in different contexts, as the different case studies discussed show with ample examples.

During conflicts, women often have to take on economic responsibilities as breadwinners in their family. However, whether this leads to the empowerment of women or increased violence against them depends on the socio-economic context and family background.

Intimate partner violence is often overlooked by those working on violence in conflicts, despite evidence that it affects women more than conflict-related sexual violence.

It is surprising that the participation of women in peacebuilding is still very low, despite the action taken by many actors to work towards change. Conflict often leads to women being pushed further away from political structures, as these structures became the focus of violent struggles. Yet international players also restrict the impact that women have in political processes as the issue of women’s rights is deprioritized or is deferred as the responsibility of the conflict actors (e.g. in Yemen).
General violence is higher in post-conflict societies than in pre-conflict societies. No systematic evidence is available, but people working on the ground regularly report this.

Reintegration of (male and female) combatants is gendered. Gender and gender roles are not taken into consideration when setting up reintegration programmes, even though gender norms influence the experience of being a veteran or an injured ex-combatant as well as the mental health of ex-combatants.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Support gender analysis as key to adapting and designing interventions for particular contexts. Avoid integrating gender perspective into policies in a stereotyped way that is not based on local context as this leads to the perpetuation of gender norms and to maladapted interventions. Do not overlook changes in gender roles and gaps between former norms and current realities, since this leads to the perpetuation of old power structures in society, hindering change.

• Develop a bottom-up approach to achieving gender equality. Increase support for women-led organizations, which work at the grassroots of society and are well placed to work bottom-up on issues of women’s rights.

• Recognize that norms of masculinity and women’s empowerment need to go hand in hand; that men play an important role in changing gender norms and roles in local contexts, and post-conflict situations often lead to fragile situations in which men cannot live up to the masculinity norms of society; and that, therefore, when women are empowered there is often a backlash from men in the society. Look at the repertoire of examples of working with men to find positive masculinities when designing future interventions.

• Train and fund staff, since well-trained staff are key for gender-sensitive interventions.
HOW CAN WE IMPROVE GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE MIDST OF WAR?

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Mercy Corps

MODERATOR
Ryan Sheely
Senior Researcher in Governance, Mercy Corps

OVERVIEW
Positive governance outcomes such as fair power structures, effective and legitimate institutions, low levels of corruption, inclusive political settlements, the equitable provision of public services, and equitable laws and policies are critical to creating an enabling environment for peace. This session explored how to build positive governance capacity in complex contexts where institutions may have collapsed or were a party to the war, as well as how to strengthen actors and systems in insecure environments.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The objective of this session was to discuss how to reach a sustainable peace by addressing the governance-related drivers of conflict, with an emphasis on the particular challenges associated with working on governance during wars and complex crises. Three groups of key questions were discussed: (a) What is known and what is not known about the linkages between governance and peace/conflict? What is the relative importance of each of these factors across contexts and types of conflict? (b) What are the particular challenges and opportunities related to addressing these governance factors during war and crisis in immediate post-conflict settings? (c) Where are the points of agreement between actors from the worlds of policy, practice and research? Where are there areas of consensus versus disagreement? Where are the areas for more research?

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Three broad types of programming approach address the governance-related drivers of conflict: (a) legitimate, effective, and accountable institutions; (b) promoting inclusive and fair power structures; and (c) civic engagement.

Communication, perceptions and expectations around the delivery of service is the key for legitimate state institutions, rather than a narrow transactional relationship between services and legitimacy. Legitimate governance is in turn a precondition for peace and a fair and sustainable development where people's needs are met. The way resources are shared affects the legitimacy of the state and development of the country.

In promoting inclusive and fair power structures, it is important that all the different identity groups feel heard and are represented in the formal government for a lasting peace. However, identity should not be overemphasized since this carries with it the risk of identity-based politics, which can fertilize future conflicts. Furthermore, building a national identity can be a means for improving cohesion and coexistence. Inclusiveness in peace- and development processes is important. The government must be representative to its citizens. Related to this is the question of what inclusiveness means: it is important to reflect on who something is inclusive, legitimate and fair to. This question is tricky due to people having different perceptions on what, for example, inclusiveness is. Moreover, inclusive and fair structures are important to create social cohesion and
the social contract between the state and its people. However, too often political solutions are only inclusive for the influential elite and leave the broader public out of decision-making.

The interaction between the government and civil society—civic engagement—is crucial. It is difficult to foster civic engagement due to the lack of good platforms for discussion. Safe spaces where the broader public can engage in politics are critical. The responsibility for setting up these platforms/safe spaces should go beyond the usual actors such as civil society organization (e.g. consider the role that the private sector can play to facilitate the process). The elite dealing in peace processes must be challenged by inclusion of the broader public, since an elite based deal is doomed to fail and can even become a conflict driver since it lacks representation and legitimacy. In other words, it is a narrow and short-term peace that is unable to foster a positive change. A question that arises is how to effectively mobilize communities to collaborate. Peace and development are a collective responsibility in which everyone needs to be engaged and do what they are best at.

Among the operational and strategic issues to address governance during war are (a) broadening types of local partnership during conflict; (b) timing; (c) balancing peace and justice with law and order; and (d) making research useful for policy and practice.

Local ownership of governance interventions is key for sustainable development. However, supportive national and international structures for enabling capacity building of local actors is crucial. For a lasting peace it is important for formal structures to cooperate with the informal traditional peacebuilding, justice and governance structures since they most often carry more trust than the formal ones.

Regarding timing, the balance between long-term and short-term work is tricky and must be discussed further. However, both must be done simultaneously. Short-term projects are important for winning the trust of the people and building a national identity and a common narrative that can facilitate the long-term goal. However, long-time development is important to reach a sustainable peace and development anchored in the local context. Quick wins are a related concept. A new government only has a short time to win legitimacy in the eyes of the citizen in a post-conflict country that suffered from bad governance. However, with this comes the challenges with locally anchored solutions. It is not possible for external actors to intervene and expect quick and durable solutions if the solutions are not locally anchored.

A balance between peace and justice and law and order are important as a support for each other when one of these pillars for peace is lacking. For instance, the law might be unjust and therefore may not be able to be relied on in peace processes. Moreover, short-term humanitarian and long-term governance change can and should be combined by paying attention to modelling good governance principles in the implementation of humanitarian programs.

The concept of good governance tends to be defined narrowly and produces a type of tunnel vision. Instead, the broad field of vision of the goat is an alternative way of seeing governance, since goats have a wider vision than the human eye. The spirit of this idea of ’goat governance’ is that more research should be done to understand the complexity of good governance in order to broaden the perspective and challenge assumptions. Related to this is the importance of combining reflective action by practitioners and action-oriented research by academics.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Reflect more on the psychological aspects of governance-focused peacebuilding interventions since each person understands fairness, legitimacy, inclusiveness and good governance differently. This also indicates that people’s perceptions could be changed to support real inclusiveness and justice.
• Promote civil society capacity programmes that create safe platforms for interaction as essential to foster participation and representation.
• Recognize the importance for building trust and legitimacy of well-functioning communication channels that allow for mutual understanding about local needs.
• Reflect further on now to improve and broaden the definition of inclusiveness.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS

TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN? ACHIEVING PEACE AND STABILITY THROUGH BETTER COLLABORATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND SECURITY ACTORS AND PEACEBUILDERS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Interpeace

MODERATOR
Renée Laviriè re
Senior Director of Programme Management, Interpeace

OVERVIEW
The world is at its most violent level in 30 years. Political upheaval, the emergence of new powers and the instability from increased violence have provided incentives for serious reflection and a search for new ways of working, especially in terms of how to prevent conflicts from erupting or reoccurring. One of the main challenges is the deep division at the operational level within and between the security, military and peacebuilding fields. This is in spite of the fact that the disparate sectors share similar goals and often work in close proximity to each other. The recently released report of the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is a vivid demonstration of the need to better exchange learning experiences between stabilization efforts and peacebuilding practices. Starting with the case study of Afghanistan, the session explored how similar mistakes can be avoided in the Sahel region, a space crowded by military, security and peacebuilding actors.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
This session kick-started a unique dialogue between military, security and peacebuilding actors. It aimed to identify entry points for collaboration and opportunities for joint learning and to identify limitations of current approaches aimed at violence reduction, conflict prevention and sustainable peace.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Synergy between armed forces, security forces and local populations is key. Peace cannot be restored if there is no cooperation between civil society and security forces.

Experiences from Mali show that it is necessary to get closer to peacebuilders on the ground. In the case of Mali there is a problem of mistrust from civil society toward the security forces. Because of recurring attacks, civil society has started to distrust all kinds of armed forces. The people of Mali have understood that they play an important role in conflict resolution. But because of the weak presence of the security forces, they do not have the guarantee of being protected—they therefore remain silent. One reason for this is that they believe that, when the security forces leave, there will be retaliation.
It is important to deeply understand the needs and desires of the population in Afghanistan and the context before committing significant resources. Without doing so, the likelihood of development and stabilization initiatives causing harm and deepening local grievances will be increased. Top-down approaches do not work, hence the need for bottom-up and tailored approaches developed with local populations.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- In Mali, continue support from the international community and accompany it with action to reinforce capacities and harmonize actions, in order to get closer to the civil population.
- In Afghanistan, take a long-term approach: time frames should be 10 years, not 1–3 years.
- Work with women’s engagement in peacebuilding: better collaboration is needed.
- Take a bottom-up approach for sustainable peace.
- Make sure that the security-, humanitarian- and diplomatic tracks are on the same side.

**RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS**


IMPLEMENTING THE HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT–PEACEBUILDING NEXUS: FROM GOOD INTENTIONS TO ACTIONS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
European Centre for Development Policy Management

MODERATOR
Lidet Tadesse
Policy Officer, European Centre for Development Policy Management

OVERVIEW
Calls for greater collaboration between the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors are getting louder. This session discussed the reasons why some aspects of this ‘nexus approach’ work while others face resistance. It took as its point of departure insights from new research conducted by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) on the nexus approach to humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and development cooperation in Somalia.

OBJECTIVES
The objective of the session was to encourage an honest exchange on what works, what does not and in what context when implementing the humanitarian—development—peacebuilding nexus in general, paying particular attention to realities in Somalia. The idea was to go beyond the conceptual appeal of the ‘nexus approach’ and why it is needed, to discuss the incentives and disincentives for collaboration and coordination across these sectors.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
There is almost a consensus on the need for clarification of the term ‘nexus’. It means different things to different people, depending, among other things, on their institutional mandates, approaches or positions (or location) within organizations. This nexus approach is still new to some actors and the difference between nexus and resilience or durable solutions is not well understood or established. From a humanitarian field worker’s point of view (in Somalia), it is something that is already done everyday by responding to various needs of the population.

The relevance of the nexus approach is contested. Some question the usefulness of the term: should it be operationalized by each actor on the ground or is it useful just as an analytical tool? A critique of the approach is that it is a supply-driven approach—it is the viewpoint of international actors, not national or local actors. It is frustrating to use the nexus as a concept, as it is difficult to categorize the phase in which Somalia is now today: is it humanitarian crisis response, peacebuilding, state-building, stabilization or countering terrorism? Additionally, each of these terms is ambiguously defined. No impact has been observed in practical terms in Somalia.

There are many challenges to implementing the nexus, some specific to Somalia. There is fragmentation across and within organizations: this concerns how donors and the United Nations are organized. Not only are actors in each sector fragmented, they are fragmented internally: by sector or location (e.g. in headquarters, the capital or the field or as policymakers versus practitioners). This adds burden on the government. There is a lack of incentives: there are not enough incentives to work together and the current funding mechanisms do not allow it. Regarding security and access, the Somali Government is confined in Mogadishu and has been unable to reach many parts of the country. It is impossible to apply the nexus approach in such areas. In Somalia in particular, security has been given such a priority that it displaces people-oriented peacebuilding. In such a context, humanitarian and development organizations are reluctant to collaborate with the peacebuilding sector. Moreover, it is challenging to fully apply the humanitarian principles in such contexts. It is also challenging in the sense that the peace process in Somalia is not following the traditional path, from peace agreement to its implementation (i.e. there is no agreement
with al-Shabaab). National ownership is necessary: there is a need to integrate the views of the government.

Some achievements can be recognized. There are increased funding mechanisms for the nexus approach and diversification of funding modalities, such as community-driven development projects for the World Bank. The need to work together has now been recognized, whereas previously humanitarians, development workers and peacebuilders criticized and even neglected each other.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Consider how the widely recognized need for localization is implemented. Consider how to strengthen the role of government in such contexts, since civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector have been more capable and more noticeable through their implementation of services and their longer existence.
- Determine what national governments and local actors can bring to the table and how each can help the other.
- Bring innovation to funding: the way that the donors are structured and the way that the UN is organized are preventing implementation of the nexus approach. For example, while the recipient of World Bank funding is generally a state, in Somalia the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has received funding for the first time due to the government’s lack of capacity to borrow and execute. Replicate such innovation in other areas.
- Consider how to create a real platform for collaboration that does not depend on the willingness of individuals.
- Think beyond the nexus and re-evaluate the fundamental approach of the nexus.
- Look at the nexus as a continuum and embrace its complexity, rather than seeking its simplification.
- Build bridges between policymakers and practitioners.

**HIGHLIGHTS**

It is more important to reflect on how we help people make progress than how we want to deliver together.

It is also important to reflect on the context in which this nexus approach has emerged (out of increasing humanitarian needs) and put it into a wider context.

**RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS**


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SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF MEGATRENDS IN AFRICA

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Africa Center for Strategic Studies

MODERATOR
Raymond Gilpin
Dean of Academic Affairs, Africa Center for Strategic Studies

OVERVIEW

Insecurity in Africa is not an exclusively military or defence phenomenon. Understanding and responding to insecurity in Africa requires a keen understanding of a broad range of drivers, such as demography, climate change, urbanization and migration. This session examined how these megatrends will interact with evolving security conditions in the coming decades, and how to identify appropriate policy and institutional responses.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of the session was to review both external and endogenous forces shaping African security futures and to consider a range of alternative potential scenarios. The session also aimed to identify key security sector institutions and actors charged with confronting these challenges in the coming decades. Finally, the session was to consider approaches by African stakeholders and external partners for developing and strengthening these institutions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

The megatrends of urbanization, migration, climate change and the global economy are present in Africa and have consequences for other issues in the region.

There is a rapid economic growth in Africa, and it has been resilient to negative trends in the global economy. Non-resource sectors (e.g. services, manufacturing, agriculture) have produced the most growth. However, a major challenge is that the growth is disproportionately distributed among the population. Women and youths are marginalized, and poverty and unemployment rates are not decreasing. The drivers of economic growth are the transformation of quality institutions, macroeconomic policies, infrastructure and the informal sector, which employs a lot of people.

In the long-term, the African economy is predicted to continue growing. A clear challenge is the dependence on diminishing resources, for example oil. The implications of economic growth for security and governance might result in a fast-growing middle class. When the middle class increases, it is going to expect accountable and legitimate governance. Other implications might be a decreased fertility rate, increased demand for transparency in the security sector and improvement of professionalism within the security sector.

One framework within which urbanization could be viewed is: (a) homogenizing of the population (e.g. tribe and ethnic identity will change); (b) spread of technology (especially for urban youth); (c) change of norms (e.g. on gender, and clashes between traditional and modern beliefs); and (d) climate change. Africa is vulnerably to climate change and there have already been consequences such as drought, cyclones and water shortages. The water shortage in Cape Town, South Africa, made the vulnerability of African cities visible. Huge slums might be created in the big cities, increasing urban-based violence. In summary, urbanization is taking big leaps and the effects are difficult to predict.

Even though migration is a global threat, Africa is going to be affected more by increased migration as it hosts more than half of the world's internally displaced persons (IDPs). Migration today is
mainly regional, but migrants are to a greater degree eventually moving overseas. There will be consequences for other countries as well.

The megatrends affect each other. Globalization leads to economic growth, which leads to a rising middle class, which in turn leads to greater migration in a positive sense (more people have the opportunity and means to go abroad). The scenario could also be negative: urbanization leading to increased insecurity, which triggers negative migration, increased conflict over natural resources because of climate change, internal displacement and regional conflict. The Horn of Africa in particular is going to be affected by climate change, which will increase migration to the Middle East. This development will bring more barriers to free movement between states, which is something that the African Union (AU) has worked a lot to achieve. Regional integration is an important part of the AU’s Agenda 2063. The development, positive or negative, depends on how climate change is handled. It is necessary to implement the AU agenda in national policy frameworks. With a policy of free movement in the region, the organized crimes of smugglers will decrease.

Megatrends have an impact on the nature of the state: the democratization process is an important driver of positive change. The capability and behaviour of African states are crucial when it comes to the threat of climate change. If states have the capacity to deliver on energy, water and food security, conflict can be avoided and democratization will proceed. States’ provision of education for the people is also important. The capacity of states is thus significant in terms of the current population boom. Currently, many states neglect the agricultural sector, which provides a lot of employment and is crucial for food security. In Ethiopia, for example, there is a major gap between the jobs created by the state each year and the people who need employment. When a state is unable to provide stability to the people, it has an impact on the peace and security landscape. Subnational actors could play a role in delivering stability. However, there is currently a tension between decentralization and central governments. Global and regional actors have the ability to have an impact on stability in Africa through trade and policies. The question is how this could be regulated.

Regarding transitional justice, there is a move towards new treaties and agendas developed by, for example, the AU, targeting subnational entities. This will make transitional justice easier to achieve. Foreign military intervention can be seen as a post-colonial force and a creator of insecurity. There is a need to rethink the traditional distinction between external and internal security.

Practical steps are needed for African countries as well as external partners to adapt to the megatrends. States should invest more in regional institutions to provide state security. Security institutions must understand the implications of the megatrends. The focus in the regional agendas needs to shift from conflict management to development. The AU’s Agenda 2063 identified some drivers of change: development of the state, decentralization to serve the people’s needs, development of the public sector (not all AU member states have ratified this part), industrialization, management of natural resources, infrastructure development, regional integration and trade agreements. Public safety should be prioritized through allocating more resources to the police and informing them how to deal with security issues such as counterterrorism. In addition, stakeholders should get closer to the people and build trust; reinforce African resilience; integrate civilians and invest resources back in the people; recognize that gender equality make societies better; encourage dialogue with Africa and donors on how to create good legislation targeting these issues. Funding is a major challenge in handling these issues.

One view is that African militaries are barely able to take care of themselves. Most of their budgets goes to salaries instead of training or new equipment. States need to take ownership of these issues. Donors are focusing too much on development and forget the security implications. Until African actors take leadership and ownership of these questions, nothing will change.

There are also criticisms of the AU. Donors focus a lot on supporting regional instruments, but the AU lacks political will and no one is holding it accountable. Focus need to shift outside the AU framework because it is mainly handling urgent issues without having conversations like this.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Grasp the urgency of the megatrends and their implications.
- Recognize that climate change and how it is dealt with affects Africa, and vice versa.
- Observe megatrends in other regions as there is a risk of spillover into Africa.
- Train indigenous military forces to fight the terrorist groups in Africa in place of foreign military presences. Many young people are willing to defend their country, but this is not recognized in the international community. Investment companies could allocate money to build a security force in the country (with no demands, debts etc.).
- Focus financing more on the transition to renewables and make Africa more self-sufficient. Africa need to develop its own financing models, not only from donors.
- Donors should emphasize education (especially for girls), focus more on investment in justice instead of the military, and invest in infrastructure to increase trade.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


INCLUSIVITY: THE LONG AND SHORT OF IT

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

MODERATOR
Matilda Hald
Programme Manager,
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

OVERVIEW
The session explored how interventions that seek to achieve immediate stabilization can promote inclusivity and contribute to long-term efforts to build inclusive and sustainable peace and development. The session discussed how the United Nations and other international actors can support the implementation of inclusivity-related frameworks at the country level, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the resolutions on sustaining peace, and the agendas for women, peace and security and for youth, peace and security. The discussions were contextualized with examples from Jordan, Colombia and Sri Lanka.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session addressed three questions: How can inclusive approaches be adopted early on in prevention and crisis response? What mechanisms are needed to ensure that short-term interventions contribute to broader inclusivity efforts? What are the positive and negative experiences of international actors supporting inclusivity at various stages of humanitarian, peace and development efforts?

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Although there is strong recognition of the importance of inclusivity in international normative frameworks, there is still an enormous gap between policies and reality. There is a need to continue the conversation on how to implement inclusivity-related frameworks in practice. It is necessary for international actors to work with local civil society and support local initiatives from the bottom-up rather than using a top-down approach to implementing the frameworks. Capacity building, funding and providing spaces are needed to strengthen existing networks that already work to promote inclusion, linking local and international efforts.

Experiences from Sri Lanka suggest that the UN system consciously considers ways to strengthen inclusivity through the localization of the above-mentioned frameworks. Working at the invitation of the government comes with challenges related to a lack of political will and changes in government. The UN could further enhance its efforts to promote inclusivity by investing in key individuals while ensuring institutional memory, working creatively across the frameworks, and increasing and restructuring funding for local actors.

In Colombia, inclusivity was a key consideration in the peace process. While the negotiations were initially rather exclusive, civil society—at times in alliance with international actors based in Colombia—exerted pressure to be included, convincing the parties to adopt a more inclusive approach. Civil society has an important role to play at all stages of a peace process and inclusion should be applied already when designing it. Sweden prioritized civil society inclusion throughout its support to the Colombian peace process, and the political support was often more important than the financial.

In Jordan and the Middle East and North Africa, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has started to create inclusive partnerships in refugee crisis response. Conversations with new stakeholders such as the private sector and civil society are incorporated earlier in the process and a network of civil society organizations for displacement has recently been created in...
the region. There are also joint initiatives between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UNHCR that bridge short-term relief with longer-term development efforts. With a very young population, the inclusion of children and youths is another key inclusivity-related consideration in Jordan. Young people need to be invited to join conversations that concern them and be provided with more spaces and opportunities. opened up with new stakeholders, incorporated earlier in the process. There is more flexibility in partnerships, while mandates and principles are maintained.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTORS WHEN PROMOTING INCLUSION OF MARGINALIZED GROUPS

- Use the local context as the starting point, rather than the international frameworks.
- Apply an intersectional approach by recognizing the multiple reasons for marginalization and exclusion.
- Invite those that are excluded to represent themselves rather than analysing their situation for them.
- Use language and terminology that are accessible to those concerned.
- Understand and try to overcome practical barriers to inclusion that may prevent groups or individuals from participating in processes despite being invited to partake.
FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES: CRISIS RESPONSE, BUILDING RESILIENCE AND IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Florian Krampe
Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
Conflict and climate change are the two main drivers of hunger. Achieving food security in climate-sensitive, fragile and conflict-affected states is challenging and requires compromises and coordination by actors across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. What sort of planning and vision is required to ensure both sustainable peace and sustainable food systems?

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
This panel brought the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) together with peacebuilding and civil society actors to discuss challenges, share successes and failures, and identify lessons that bridge short-term emergency support and longer-term resilience and development interventions while supporting local peace and stability. This discussion will feed into a review of Sustainable Development Goal 16 at the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in New York in July 2019.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Food security and conflict are strongly correlated. In 2018, 113 million people across 53 countries experienced acute hunger requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihoods assistance. Of these, 72 million lived in just eight countries, seven of which were affected by conflict. Among the conflict drivers on the community level is competition over natural resources. At the macro level, by some estimates 40 per cent of intrastate conflicts in the past had been linked to disputes over natural resources (e.g. land or water). Demographic challenges are a further complication.

Countries that are highly reliant on food imports and that have subsidies for staple products have an increased exposure to food price volatility. This can be a factor in social instability. Increased diversity of a countries’ food basket can mitigate this risk and increase resilience across a number of exogenous shocks, including climate-related events as well as conflict.

A main challenge is the need for contextual understanding of conflict and the foundational nature of conflict sensitivity to inform programming.

Support for longer-term planning is often constrained as a result of political interests and election cycles, and it is further complicated by the recent rise in populist rhetoric. Attention and care should be given to working with relevant stakeholders at all levels to ensure more integrated and sustainable approaches over the longer term.

Preliminary research suggests that the more resilient a community is, the less inclined it is to engage in political violence. However, more evidence is urgently required on these potential linkages in order to improve policies and actions.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Inform the design of all programming and interventions with conflict-sensitive approaches. Conflict sensitivity is not necessarily incompatible with humanitarian principles. Make longer-term investments, beyond one-year time frames, in order to enable transformative engagement with communities.

- Recognize that partnerships across different actors are fundamental at the global, regional and local levels; and that partnership across different UN agencies is vital in implementation. Incorporate national ownership into the partnerships.

- Share knowledge across partners engaging in humanitarian-, development- and peace-related action. Moreover, make knowledge- and research-based efforts on the linkage between food security and resilience and how these may contribute to improving the conditions for local peace.
FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL: HOW CAN WE PRACTICALLY APPLY GLOBAL PEACEBUILDING FRAMEWORKS?

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Alliance for Peacebuilding

MODERATOR
Uzra Zeya
President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding

OVERVIEW
The United Nations Secretary-General’s sustaining peace initiative, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the World Bank–UN Pathways for Peace report represent global policy frameworks that boldly push for fundamental change in the way that violent conflict and violence are addressed. While there have been concrete efforts to bring attention to these frameworks, such as the 2018 General Assembly high-level meeting, the international community must do more to transition from dialogue to action. While the peacebuilding field collectively advocated for these frameworks, there remains a lack of action on practical implementation at the national and community levels. This absence of practical action is driven by a lack of understanding about these frameworks and a frustration stemming from the proliferation of numerous priorities and furthering the view of ‘having frameworks for the sake of frameworks’. This session explored how to translate these frameworks into national ownership to help achieve change by integrating the frameworks’ goals into decision-making processes, such as national development plans. Participants outlined current efforts and challenges to connect these frameworks towards a larger goal of reducing violence, advancing local ownership, and building peaceful and just societies. Furthermore, the session explored the political constraints that surround UN and UN member state-directed action, as well as the barriers that often keep local actors and knowledge from being heard.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session outlined how civil society, non-governmental organizations and government actors can help advance discussion and action on these frameworks between key stakeholders and policymakers.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Global frameworks are helpful in enhancing a common understanding of relevant concepts—they can be tools for more effective coordination and coherent responses. However, there are still significant challenges when it comes to making them operational at the local level. They provide the ‘what’ but not the ‘how’, so understanding them as guides or systems may enhance their overall effectiveness.

There is a need for hybrid knowledge, rather than top-down knowledge on peacebuilding, as well as creative and entrepreneurial approaches to creating positive sustainable peace. Seen in this view, the frameworks should be considered as entry points towards approaches being adapted and fleshed out according to the local environment.

While progress has been made in strengthening the role of civil society within these frameworks, there is still a lack of clarity on how best to involve civil society organizations (CSOs) and encourage them to apply and promote the frameworks. Government is the boss, and CSOs have a role that is not well defined.

The focus of all actors is increasingly on prevention, rather than just on resolution, but the big picture ‘how’ is not evident. There is a perception that the peacebuilding sector ‘projectizes’ peace rather than looking at the sum total of action.
Consultation between all stakeholders in the process of implementing frameworks is vital. Global frameworks can act as a vehicle to ask governments and people at the local level what they want and need. However, this is not really being done.

One of the key challenges lies in the fact that global bodies, such as the UN and the World Bank, are subject to the political will of their member states. It is important to recognize that in many cases the UN may not be the most impartial or effective organ for conflict prevention. Can impartial peacebuilders fill this gap in part?

Local contexts will change the elements of the framework that are more applicable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Think of global frameworks as a system within which local actors can seek guidance. Local agency and ownership need to be at the core of this system.
- Use voluntary national reviews as an opportunity for consultation, collaboration and listening, not merely an exam score.
- Make a collective effort to map the ‘how’ to the ‘what’ that global frameworks provide.
- Apply global frameworks more effectively to supporting already existing action.
- Create more effective feedback loops on what works—more research is needed on what conditions are conducive to creating sustainable, positive peace, but better methods of communicating such findings are also needed. At the same time, peacebuilders need clarification on what kind of evidence of impact at the local level is needed to shape donor policy and programmes, and they need to learn how to get donors and policymakers to listen.

SESSION QUOTES

‘Everything that is happening globally has an impact locally.’

‘We need to substitute the word “systems” for frameworks and understand the system and geopolitical changes these entail.’

‘There’s a disconnection between local efforts and international dialogue on these frameworks among people who don’t do local work . . . the real shift needs to be from local to global, not the other way around.’

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


SUSTAINING PEACE IN PRACTICE: REFLECTIONS FROM IMPLEMENTATION AT COUNTRY LEVEL

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation; Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict; International Peace Institute

MODERATOR
Henrik Hammargren
Executive Director,
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

OVERVIEW
In this session, speakers shared the findings of country-level research on how the United Nations Security Council resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace are being operationalized. They explored the innovations taking place and the remaining challenges, and stimulated participants to examine these findings and experiences more broadly. The session sought to enhance understanding of ongoing efforts to strengthen the UN's work on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in practical terms and to look more closely at what is required to deepen operational coherence, partnerships and inclusivity. In addition, the discussion linked the processes related to implementation of the resolutions on sustaining peace to other UN reform efforts, such as the new Resident Coordinator system, and follow-up of the UN–World Bank report, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, while also identifying methods to better encourage and support realization of the changes called for in the peacebuilding and sustaining peace resolutions.

OBJECTIVES
The objective of the session was to assess the changes at country and regional level as a result of the sustaining peace resolutions and what can be expected with regard to the implementation process over the coming months

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace are open concepts to be adapted and defined at country level and in dialogue with national actors. The sustaining peace framework aims to bring coherence and tools in an increasingly complex world, where peace agendas are no longer isolated processes.

There has been progress in implementation, particularly regarding the promotion of coherence and national ownership. In contrast, follow-up on recommendations for securing adequate and predictable financing is lagging behind.

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) is recognized as having become a stronger organization after being delinked from the Resident Coordinators. Similarly, the UN and the World Bank have increasingly conducted joint analyses and have an ongoing dialogue on the specific needs and goals for addressing underlying drivers of conflict.

Responses to displacement have been adapted to consider sustainability and inclusivity.

The operationalization of sustaining peace can be considered in terms of willingness and capacity. For instance, in Cameroon there is capacity but not willingness—the government is reluctant to recognize the problems. It is necessary to ask whether the governments are part of the dialogue about the nexus of development and peace; whether they are recognizing the problems.

In the case of Liberia, there are good dynamics in terms of the resident coordinator working closely with the national government. There is also more coherence at country level, including coherent joint analyses, and there have been efforts to strengthen partnerships. Liberia has developed a
peacebuilding plan supported by the UN and incorporated into the national development plan, although it remains largely unfunded.

The importance of partnerships with regional actors is recognized as being critical, with West Africa being cited as a positive example. There is ownership at both the local and regional levels—a problem for one country is understood to affect the whole region, the whole system. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) play an important role: as soon as there is a problem, there is consensus on the importance of responding.

While civil society actors are recognized as having an important role, they are often not included in developing strategies for prevention. The aim should be to build the capacity of local civil society.

The question was raised about whether the operationalization of sustaining peace and Pathway for Peace may be a supply-driven agenda, which might be missing opportunities to listen for context-specific demands. It is important to remember that the sustaining peace resolutions were adopted unanimously by all Member States with commitment to their implementation reaffirmed in two new parallel resolutions in 2018.

There is a problem of conversations taking place at different levels, with the resident coordinators, for example, largely absent in some of the discussions. Operationalization requires ongoing dialogue; it is about recognizing the complementarity of all roles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Better articulate the intersection of security and development. There is a need for a broader discussion on how security actors interface with development interventions, for instance in West Africa.

• Engage academia, for instance regarding the spread of information about displacement in local languages, including Arabic (e.g. on refugee and human rights).

• Look at livelihoods as a way to sustain peace: stakeholders from the private sector can play an important role and provide solutions, for instance by advocating for policies that open up employment for refugees and creating platforms for entrepreneurship in the Middle East and North Africa.

• Work with stakeholders to address displacement more comprehensively and have refugee responses as part of national peacebuilding and development plans.

• To improve the quality of funding and partnerships, establish dialogue with all actors. Instead of expanding the number of non-governmental organization partners, deepen relationships and build local capacity.

• Create a reporting mechanism for country-specific progress that is taking place, similar to that of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which has galvanized energy, although it would be even better if it is not only voluntary.

• In the case of Cameroon, there is opportunity for funding civil society. This would provide an opportunity for actors to engage who would otherwise not have the chance.

• Make the 2020 review of UN peacebuilding as coherent as possible, bringing together perspectives from the UN, national governments and other partners.

• UN Headquarters staff are expected to be on the same page regarding the SDGs and provide coherent support.

SESSION QUOTES

‘There is always something that can be done [to build peace], if not for now, then probably for later, plenty that can be done even in the midst of crisis—this is the core of prevention.’

‘Collaboration in the field has never been as close as today.’
‘A lot of the changes we see come from civil society. So my question is: what would civil society want to see from the UN?’

‘This is not about connecting bureaucracies but breaking them down and recognizing who should do what, as well as linking steps together towards sustaining peace.’

‘Adopting the resolution doesn’t mean that they bring it back home.’

‘It’s not a question of money but how we use the different tools and resources available, in order to advance a transformative agenda like sustaining peace.’

HIGHLIGHTS
Among the main challenges ahead, five ‘P’s were recognized: (a) How to make Pathways for Peace implementable? (b) Peace as part of SDG 16; (c) Peace in the humanitarian–development–peace nexus (d) Partnerships; and (e) People—numbers are increasing.

Civil society is an important source of resilience and change.

The more that countries develop a peacebuilding plan, the larger the body of knowledge will be.

There should be effort to leverage dialogues taking place and to turn them into action through a more coherent approach.

It is extremely important to recognize what does work—what is needed is more, longer-term support to those who are already demonstrating a great effort with good results.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


LEVERAGING CRISIS POINTS TO CATALYSE LONG-TERM SOCIAL CHANGE

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Institute for Integrated Transitions; World Bank

OVERVIEW
Acute crises create the disequilibrium required for a questioning of the values, beliefs and behaviours that stand in the way of sustainable change. Using concepts from the adaptive leadership framework, the session participants engaged in a learning environment that invited them to question the barriers to change facing the societies in which they work. By exploring why individuals and groups resist change, and how to leverage moments of crisis to launch and sustain a system-level change process, this session empowered participants to be more effective agents of sustainable change in their respective environments.

FOCUS
The session focused on the concept of adaptive leadership and how crises create the disequilibrium necessary for questioning the values, beliefs and behaviours that stand in the way of sustainable change.

OBJECTIVE
Using concepts from the adaptive leadership framework, the session aimed to empower participants to be more effective agents of sustainable change.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
There are differences between technical and adaptive challenges and between leadership and authority. People do not resist to change but to changes causing losses. Yet, adaptive leadership implies some losses and the ability to recognize the losses which are needed to engage for a successful adaptive work.

It is necessary to maintain a disequilibrium level that makes the cost of not dealing with the problem higher than the discomfort of dealing with it. The adaptive leadership framework can be applied to country cases, with a focus on how to build trust and how to change core values and beliefs in a society. The framework is still in development and there are no indicators to evaluate the results. Future work is needed to discover how to pressurize and find resources for people in a position of authority.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Identify the stress in the system that need to be dealt with.
• Undertake technical (not adaptive) work in order to reduce disequilibrium under the limit of tolerance.

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NO ROOM FOR MARGINALIZATION: AN INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH TO GENDER-SENSITIVE PEACE PROCESSES

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Chitra Nagarajan
Independent Conflict Analyst, Nigeria

OVERVIEW
Despite the emphasis of the United Nations Agenda on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) on applying a gender perspective, the agenda tends to emphasize ‘women’ rather than ‘gender’ in existing security practices in the fields of peace and security. As a result of their binary gender norms and lack of intersectional perspective, current policy debates and practices often perceive women as a homogeneous group and treat women's participation in peace processes as synonymous with a gender perspective. This risks excluding women and men in marginalized groups as well as other gender identity groups from post-conflict and new political settlements.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
With the aim of advancing a more inclusive WPS agenda, this session sought to increase understanding of intersectional approaches to gender-sensitive peace processes, focused primarily on women and men from marginalized groups as well as other gender identity groups, and to devise strategies for their inclusion in WPS discussions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Exclusion and marginalization of groups in peace processes and peacebuilding occurs as a result of power dynamics and heteronormative frameworks with built-in gender binary assumptions. There are limitations in the language surrounding women and gender in the WPS agenda that promote gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding and peace processes. For example, this results in the exclusion of gender and sexual minority from discussions of gender in peace processes. Young men's experiences are also often ignored, their experiences are compartmentalized as one and there is a failure to recognize the intersection between age, geographic localization, community status and sexual orientation.

Peace processes privilege particular groups and tend to favour stability over inclusion. Even in the effort to promote inclusion, difficulties are often encountered in measuring inclusion along a peace process. It is not easy to map inclusion throughout every step and many guarantees made to groups during peace negotiations are disregarded during the implementation stage. The very nature of peace processes—secretive and occurring behind closed doors—also results in a lack of dissemination of knowledge to other local groups and at the community level. Track 1 negotiations are more exclusive, partially due to the dilemma of inclusion versus efficiency in a highly formal structure. Track 2 negotiations are more community-driven and allow for the inclusion of many groups. Given that women, youth and marginalized groups are often proactive in civil society organizations, constant inclusion of such groups in the informal process would be a way to promote their inclusion in the process when bridging track 1 and track 2.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Ensure inclusive participation at all stages of peace processes: not only at the stage of formulation of peace agreements, but also at the stage of designing the process and implementing the agreement.
• Institutionalize mechanisms to ensure that inclusion is continuous during the implementation phase after an agreement is signed. Noteworthy examples include the special body responsible for guaranteeing gender focus in the implementation of the Colombian Peace Accord.

• Create mechanisms for self-evaluation and monitoring the level of inclusion of different groups as well as spaces where excluded groups can feel safe to generate discussion.

• Adopt localization strategies to increase inclusion of marginalized group with a focus that communities can relate to, such as ‘la minga’ in Colombia or ‘hijab troops’ in the Bangsamoro, the Philippines.

• Promote alliances between different marginalized groups, such as indigenous, women, rural and LGBTI groups to increase their visibility and lobbying power among powerful actors during peace processes.

• Continuously emphasize the grievances and concerns of the LGBTI community and other neglected groups particularly at higher political levels.

SESSION QUOTES
‘If it is not inclusive by design, it is hard to bring it to the table at a later stage.’

‘People who are not visible in your horizon would not be visible in your answers.’

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


LINKING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GOOD GOVERNANCE OF SDG 16

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

MODERATOR
Hans Born
Assistant Director, Head of the Policy and Research Division, The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

OVERVIEW
The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development acknowledges the central role of effective, accountable and transparent institutions in contributing to peace, justice and the prevention of violence in the context of sustainable development. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, and its related targets (Agenda 16+), is the SDG most closely associated with the peacebuilding agenda. National security sectors that are both effective and accountable in a framework of democratic control, the rule of law and respect for human rights are core elements of achieving the good governance ambitions of SDG 16. Under SDG 16+, all countries are responsible for delivering on their obligations to ensure safety and justice for their populations. In meeting these obligations, each state will need to redouble its efforts to ensure that public and national security are provided in an effective and accountable way. Many states, particularly those in transition from war to peace, will need international support in pursuit of SDG 16+. Based on the work of the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) in long-term support to national human rights institutions, this session focused on the role these institutions play in supporting states to achieve SDG 16, specifically targets 16.6 and 16.7.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the session were (a) to explore linkages between security sector governance and SDG 16 from the point of view of ombudsman institutions, (b) to comparatively assess current engagement of ombudsman institutions with the 2030 Agenda, and (c) to discuss the road ahead for ombudsman institutions, in particular their involvement in the 2030 Agenda. The session focused on practical experiences working for independent oversight bodies. The overall goal of the session was to confirm that independent oversight bodies are key actors in the 2030 Agenda and have a lot of potential to contribute to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
SDG 16 has a broad target on issues ranging across violence, accountability and justice. Among the target, emphasis can be placed on accountability, grievances and building effective national institutions. The 2030 Agenda serves as a new holistic approach to reaching sustainable development. Citizens’ access to good services can be seen as a key aspect of the importance of the SDG 16 targets. Overall, there are good links between SDG 16 and oversight institutions, such as ombudsmen.

The work of ombudsman institutions has developed from managing individual complaints to devising strategies to find patterns, identify weak institutions and concentrate on structural changes to improve good governance. Different institutions and systems share the common goal of developing towards proactive management of complaints. One area for improvement is how
existing data can be used strategically to shift towards preventative action and to address emerging issues before they become severe.

A key challenge is to sensitize the public to the ombudsman institutions and its capabilities. Awareness of ombudsman institutions could be used to enhance the work towards SDG 16 and the 2030 Agenda. Wider awareness might further restore faith in institutions, which is an important contribution to prevention of conflict and destabilization.

In conflict contexts, transparency, accountability and access to services might be limited. One solution to this is to advocate for laws that establish the public’s right to information. The right to information further links with educational outreach, to improve the public’s awareness and accessibility to services.

Lack of financing limits further progress and sustainable policy reforms. To enable further work on identification of structural problems and research, donors could contribute to achieving sufficient funding.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Make greater effort to use the data that ombudsman institutions possess on current grievances with public institutions, especially within reporting on SDG 16 and its subtargets.
- Raise awareness of the role that ombudsman institutions can, and already do, play in contributing to the good governance elements of SDG 16. Increase efforts to explore their full potential in contributing to SDG 16.

**SESSION QUOTES**

‘The more unhappy the government is with the ombudsman institution, the better the job of the institution.’
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON MILITARY SUPPORT TO RULING PARTIES

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Institute for Integrated Transitions

MODERATOR
Mark Freeman
Executive Director, Institute for Integrated Transitions

OVERVIEW
This session examined a number of current cases—Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Algeria—in which the interaction between party hegemony and military control has provided strong political protection against attempts by social or opposition movements to precipitate greater democracy, even when the regime has lost its initial electoral appeal or its international legitimacy. The role of a professional military can change from safeguarding peace and national sovereignty to one in which the armed forces control and manage key industries (legally or illegally) in a country. In exchange for access to these economic rents, the military may agree to be ‘loyal to the revolution’, thereby limiting policy options for peaceful transition.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session aimed to consider the implications for crisis management and peacebuilding of the political phenomenon of military support for the ruling party. By comparing cases, the session aimed to provide a more precise understanding of the specific dynamic.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
It is key to understand the nature of state information and the military’s independence. In the case of Zimbabwe, the liberation forces connected to nationalist ideals aimed to secure their position of power. The right of political leaders to rule the country is deeply legitimized by connections to military and liberation actors.

In addition to military–political ties is the military’s ability to hold economic power. In Venezuela, the economic interest of the military arises from its involvement in oil and food distribution. Seeing the military as an economic actor is key to understanding its position of power.

International cooperation between military institutions creates a private and bilateral marketplace that can influence the political agenda a great deal. External actors and foreign policy have played a role in all three cases studies, both through military cooperation and international pressure.

Finally, given the intricate and determinant position that the military has, there is poor understanding of these institutions—both of how they operate and what their motive is.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Delink the military, the party and the revolutionary ideal since the military can exploit the importance of revolutionary ideals in their interest for self-legitimization.
- Improve understanding of the military’s incentives. This is best achieved through direct communication, regardless of ideological convictions.
- Consider the three factors of political party, military and the president when understanding the creation of co-dependence over multiple years.
REVISITING POST–CONFLICT STABILISATION AND EARLY RECOVERY: INSIGHTS FROM FIELD OPERATIONS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
European Union Institute for Security Studies

MODERATOR
Giovanni Faleg
Senior Analyst, European Union Institute for Security Studies

OVERVIEW
Mali and Somalia are confronted by the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. They are at the heart of the international community’s efforts to support stability. In this session, practitioners from the security, development and humanitarian communities discussed the lessons from and prospects for post-conflict stabilization in these two countries. Practical aspects include the sustainability of a military presence to maintain security, the shift in development aid from business as usual to a new way of working in post-conflict settings, tensions and trade-offs between different approaches to promoting recovery and resilience, and the potential role of the private sector in stabilization efforts.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session focused on the challenges of coordination on the ground, such as the sequencing of interventions and the intersection of mandates between actors, as well as the strategy to ensure a transition from stabilization to long-term peacebuilding goals. The objective of the session was to give participants a deeper understanding of the operational challenges of stabilization in Mali and Somalia and to explore new policy options and solutions for more effective international support.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Stabilization should be redefined in terms especially of partnerships, the regional dimension, the intersection of mandates and the soft aspect of stabilization.

In Mali, this involves overall engagement by the United Nations, stabilization actions by the European Union (EU) in Segou and Mopti, and the World Bank project for the reconstruction of the port of Konna. Stabilization requires inclusion. Whatever happens in Mali spills over into the region. There has been a rapid escalation of the conflict from the north to the south—there has not been a quick response. Cooperation between different actors operating in Mali is difficult.

In Somalia, there are criticalities and challenges in UN stabilization assistance and the relationship with state authorities. A key element for stabilization is the relationship between the government and the host country. The international actors are becoming more and more disconnected from the field. The outcome of the withdrawal of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) should be clarified, especially since the Somali National Army (SNA) is not ready to guarantee security and stability in the country.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Focus on quick wins for stabilization that can bring immediate, visible results.
• Look at the political dimension of stabilization and dialogue for reconciliation in Mali and Somalia.
• Make sure that the stabilization operation is flexible and adaptive to the context.
• Link short-term action with long-term objectives.
• Make sure that leadership accepts the risks of stabilization operations and that people who are deployed are well trained and knowledgeable about the crisis situation—the human factor.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMANITARIAN AID AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE MEDIATION: THE CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
United States Institute of Peace

MODERATOR
Payton Knopf
Advisor, Africa Program, United States Institute of Peace

OVERVIEW
This session explored the interaction between humanitarian operations and mediation efforts in South Sudan and the impact of aid on the political economy of conflict. It examined issues such as: (a) the extent to which the aid operation in South Sudan affects the legitimacy of political and military actors; (b) whether aid has been instrumentalized by the warring parties in support of their political and military strategies; (c) which strategies for collective diplomatic action have succeeded in addressing efforts at political manipulation; and (d) whether concern about retribution against aid staff by belligerents has led to international reticence to exert the political pressure required to advance a sustainable political settlement.

FOCUS
The session focused on larger lessons for both the diplomatic and humanitarian communities about effectively navigating the challenging dynamics of peace processes in the context of large-scale humanitarian emergencies.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
It is unavoidable that humanitarian aid has political consequences because the allocation and distribution shapes power dynamics between international and local actors on the ground.

Accountability for aid effectiveness tends to be upwards to donors rather than downwards to aid recipients. To address this asymmetry, donors and humanitarian partners must integrate political economy and conflict analysis into their operational planning. They must also draw upon local experiences and knowledge to adapt the use of humanitarian aid to different contexts and minimize the potential harm due to an emphasis on the speed and quantity of aid delivered rather than the quality of that aid.

Safe spaces for sustained inclusive dialogues among donors, humanitarians, local communities and other stakeholders are essential for ensuring that humanitarian principles are respected equally and that the complexities of the humanitarian environment are addressed rather than ignored.

There is a need for long-term planning of humanitarian aid operations. The constraints for humanitarian aid workers to work cost-efficiently and show positive results within a short time frame has a negative effect on the ability to help populations in the long term. Moreover, there is a need for short turn-over of personnel to allow aid workers to develop an understanding of the local context.

The indicators that are used by the humanitarian aid community to measure success must therefore be reconsidered. Measuring success by the amount of money spent on aid or the quantity of food delivered is inadequate in tracking effectiveness over time, particularly in an environment such as South Sudan where, despite a peace agreement, the humanitarian emergency persists unabated.
SESSION QUOTES

‘Aid is not a bad thing. It is the way it is managed’

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


LANCET–SIGHT COMMISSION: ADVANCING EVIDENCE AND ACTION ON THE INTERLINKAGES BETWEEN HEALTH, GENDER EQUALITY, PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Swedish Institute for Global Health Transformation

MODERATOR
Sigrún Rawet
Deputy Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is an ambitious agenda that provides a unique opportunity to take a radically different approach to development. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are interdependent, designed to encourage a holistic approach to promoting health and well-being across many sectors. The linkages between some SDGs have been explored, but evidence is largely lacking.

The Lancet, the world’s leading medical journal, has invited the Swedish Institute for Global Health Transformation (SIGHT) to host a new commission on the linkages between the SDGs for good health and well-being (SDG 3), gender equality (SDG 5), and peace, justice, and strong institutions (SDG 16). The Lancet–SIGHT Commission will help identify opportunities to accelerate progress on SDGs 3, 5 and 16 by shedding light on overlooked and important relationships between health, gender equality, peace, justice and the quality of institutions.

The Lancet–SIGHT Commission will take an interdisciplinary approach to generate evidence on opportunities for synergistic work across these SDGs and will raise awareness and mobilize action on the commission’s evidence-based policy recommendations. The commission will be composed of an independent, international group of experts representing a diverse set of disciplines and geographies.

FOCUS
The session was an opportunity to learn about and provide inputs on the work of the Lancet–SIGHT Commission.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
The new Lancet–SIGHT Commission focuses on the linkages between the SDGs for good health and well-being (SDG 3), gender equality (SDG 5), and peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16). These are three fundamental but also challenging goals for Agenda 2030. The commission will generate evidence and recommendations on how health and gender equality can contribute to peaceful, just and inclusive societies.

The SDGs are linked and reinforce each other. For instance, strong and accountable institutions are essential for peaceful societies, as well as for promoting health and gender equality. Healthcare is not only important to meet basic human needs but is also a precondition for gender equality. Weak governance and violence hinder the delivery of health services and impede stabilization, development and peace.

Several topics are related to these linkages: Can meeting basic human needs—such as health, education, and employment—reduce the risk for conflict? Although health is a fundamental pillar of democratic societies, it tends to be overlooked in discussions on peace.
Delivery of basic public goods is part of building trust and the social contract with the government. Health service is one important way that institutions demonstrate what they can deliver, as people commonly perceive health as an important component of their security. There is a concept of health as a bridge to peace. However, evidence for the importance of health services in peace processes is lacking and needs further research.

One challenge is the lack of data, particularly for SDG 5 on gender equality and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions. More data is available for parts of SDG 3 on good health and well-being, as many indicators were also part of the Millennium Development Goals. The lack of data is due to underreporting, lack of capacity, and the sensitivity and political nature of certain topics, such as sexual and reproductive health and rights.

Lack of health provision in post-conflict societies is not solely due to lack of capacity or awareness but is sometimes caused by deliberate and structural issues. A peacebuilding lens can be used to analyse the impact of health services, improve service delivery in fragile environments, and avoid creating or reinforcing injustice and factors that contribute to conflict.

Moreover, the local context and cultural awareness are important features when working across health, gender and peacebuilding issues. For example, cultural awareness is key in mental health and addressing issues related to trauma and fear. Another issue that needs further research is how parental care is affected by conflicts.

A long-term perspective, strengthening transparent and accountable institutions, and identifying and addressing the root causes of conflicts are all important. The challenge is that these are context specific. Furthermore, prevention and early warning systems are of critical importance. A relevant question is whether health can prevent conflict or be part of an early warning tool.

Finally, the changing nature of conflict is a challenge, with increased civilian suffering as well as frequent attacks on aid and health workers.

Jocalyn Clark
@jocalync1ark

Sensational Day 1 of the inaugural mtg of @TheLancet @SIGHT_SWEDEN Commission on #peace, health & #genderequity. Amazing group. Requisite Canadian huddle (I almost wrote cuddle) 🇨🇦

 Hearts 53 6:47 PM - May 9, 2019

15 people are talking about this
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Invest in SDG 3 on good health and well-being, SDG 5 on gender equality, and SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions as key for achieving Agenda 2030.
• Face the challenge of the lack of data, particularly for SDGs 5 and 16, is a challenge—which highlights the need for the Lancet–SIGHT Commission’s work.
• Incorporate local context and cultural awareness as critical elements of effective action.
• Recognize that mental health is an often underestimated and underfinanced area of global health.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS

MEASURING ILLICIT ARMS FLOWS: KEY CHALLENGES FOR SDG GOAL 16.4 AND INDICATOR 16.4.2

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Mark Bromley
Programme Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
Arms, and small arms and light weapons (SALW) in particular, are the cause of the majority of conflict-related deaths. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 16.4 calls on states to, among other things, significantly reduce illicit arms flows by 2030. However, establishing an indicator to enable meaningful assessment of achievement of this target and collecting the relevant data have proved challenging. Moreover, these efforts are disconnected from attempts to measure the achievement of other aspects of target 16.4, which focus on reducing illicit financial flows, increasing the recovery of stolen assets and tackling organized crime. In advance of the High-level Political Forum in New York in July 2019, where the indicators and data-collection efforts associated with SDG 16 will be discussed, this session reviewed the work being done to measure illicit arms flows and achieve target 16.4. This included a discussion of the challenges associated with data collection in these areas and an attempt to identify where lessons can be learned from and progress made on developing meaningful indicators and generating reliable data.

FOCUS
The session focused on SDG target 16.4 and the indicators and data-collection efforts that have been established, specifically elements dealing with illicit arms and financial flows: indicator 16.4.1 on ‘Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)’ and indicator 16.4.2 on ‘Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments’.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
There are three key challenges related to data collection. First, there are no agreed common definitions of key terms (e.g. for indicator 16.4.1, ‘illicit’, ‘financial’ and ‘flow’ have no agreed definition while for indicator 16.4.2 ‘illicit’ and ‘flow’ are also contested). Second is the general difficulty in collecting data on activities that are intentionally hidden. The third challenge is that many of the states most affected by these phenomena lack the capacity to collect data effectively.

There is considerable value in developing additional national, regional and international indicators that can supplement 16.4.1 and 16.4.2 and that take account of the particular modalities and challenges associated with illicit arms and financial flows. There is no need to develop additional global reporting instruments; instead, it is better to apply existing ones (e.g. those attached to the UN Programme of Action on SALW, the UN Firearms Protocol, the International Tracing Instrument and the Arms Trade Treaty). Indicator 16.4.2 should not just been seen a data-collection activity but also as a means to facilitate state capacity building in areas such as marking, tracing and destruction.

National contexts (e.g. European countries, Brazil, El Salvador, Namibia, Nigeria) are important. There could be benefits from sharing success stories and other type of information sharing.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Implement existing instrument effectively, rather than creating new instruments.
• Improve the cooperation between national authorities and more generally between involved actors and levels of action.
• Focus more on capacity building and not only on the collection of data (e.g. improve national measures for controlling illicit flows).
SHORT-TERM, LONG-SIGHTED: HOW CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AID CAN EMPOWER LOCAL RECONCILERS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers; Mercy Corps; Crisis Management Centre Finland

MODERATOR
Mahdi Abdille
Head of Secretariat, Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers

OVERVIEW
National and international actors in conflict areas are often guided by the short-term time frames of the media, politicians and donors. This risks harming the locally led work of reconcilers and peacemakers, which is often framed by religious or traditional values. These can underpin local social fabrics and are thus often the best basis for long-term peacebuilding and sustainable reconciliation. In this session, a panel of local religious peacemakers, civilian crisis-management experts and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) discussed humanitarian assistance and crisis response in relation to local dynamics. How can humanitarian assistance and crisis response be adapted to promote a peaceful recovery and begin to lay the foundations for sustainable peace? What are the strengths and limitations of international organizations in peacebuilding and what is best done by local reconcilers, such as religious leaders, tribal elders, local and national government officials, the police, the military and business leaders? The panel also explored how international organizations can identify legitimate and effective local reconcilers and peacemakers, how to ensure alignment of interests across local and international actors and how to plan inclusive humanitarian assistance that supports locally led peacebuilding.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session discussed how civilian crisis management can best take local views and values into account; how can humanitarian actors engage local actors in creating an enabling environment for sustainable peace; and how local reconcilers see these interventions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Humanitarian assistance and crisis-management actors should combine forces with national and international actors working on peacebuilding. Humanitarian actors and crisis-management missions should also support the primacy of local actors and reconcilers within the constraints of their respective mandates. Moreover, while international NGOs use humanitarian assistance to support local reconcilers and peacemakers, there are challenges and opportunities in working together. Finally, there are challenges and opportunities for local reconcilers and peacemakers when working with international civil society organizations, but collaborations can be built so that the sustainability of the work is ensured.

There is a wide recognition that there is conceptual tension between the way that humanitarians and peacebuilders on the one hand and international and local actors on the other work on the ground. There is also a recognition that there is a capacity difference.

There is a need to coordinate and find ways for humanitarians and peacebuilders to collaborate. More attention should be paid to the risk that usually arise from conflicts. Since the work of the international peacekeeping community takes it to diverse communities, it needs to be culturally sensitive.
When programming, designing and planning, the structural drivers should be taken into account, while at the same time addressing vulnerabilities on the ground. There should be understanding, and be sensitivity to, what affected communities are going through.

There should be clarity on respective roles and goals. It is important that mandates are not mixed. Humanitarian assistance and crisis-management actors should remember why they are there in the first place and, for the sake of transparency and better relations, clarify their mission to local actors. All conflicts are different, so it is important that international actors find their space and understand their role.

Finally, there is an emerging trend to include community cohesion in humanitarian work; something that is appreciated.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Clarify how and what role local actors should play in the peace process.
- Find ways for humanitarians and peacebuilders to collaborate.
WHAT IS LEGITIMATE STABILITY? DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Jaïr van der Lijn
Programme Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
This session explored the stabilization interventions of external actors, such as international non-governmental organizations and peace operations, to strengthen the provision of security and justice in order to contribute to legitimate stability. It looked at how such interventions influence renegotiation of the social contract between local authorities, other non-state actors and the local population, and affect inclusiveness and representativeness.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session focused on the discrepancies and similarities that exist between international actors' aims and the local population's needs and expectations in peacekeeping missions. It aimed to analyse risks and opportunities that arise from these differences and similarities for peacekeeping missions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
The main convergence between the aims of international actors and the wishes of the local population is that both see a necessity for the state to take on a central role in achieving stabilization. The main point of debate then becomes what is understood and meant when speaking about the state. The state should not be equated with the government. This becomes particularly important when aiming to set up missions with a people-centred approach. At the same time, missions need the state's consent and work within the framework of international institutions.

Besides the state, informal structures play an important role in processes of stabilization. These coexist and are interrelated with the formal structures, which create complex, hybrid systems. Internal conflicts within the society, informal structures, hierarchies, local stakeholders, norms and alliances need to be taken into consideration when trying to bring changes to the formal state structures in efforts to stabilize the country. A main risk is that neither the formal, state structures nor the local, informal structures should be idealized.

The main differences between international actor's aims arise in different threat and security evaluations as well as the mandates that different actors have. Whereas international actors tend to focus on armed groups as infringing on security for the local population, the local population formulates everyday security concerns that relate also to crime and social insecurity.

In terms of the local population's wishes concerning peacekeeping missions, there is a gap between the limitations that peacekeeping missions face and the extremely high expectations of the local community as to what they can achieve. This can be understood as a need to better convey to the local population what a peacekeeping mission can achieve, what its mandate means and what limitations missions have more generally.

Processes matter. It is often about how things are done to stabilize rather than what is done. In particular, inclusiveness and equity of processes are important.
Finally, creating stability cannot be only seen as a technical problem with technical solutions. Any policies put in place for stabilization will have a political backdrop, particularly in the post-conflict settings in which peacekeeping operations work.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- For a people-centred approach, involve the local population from the beginning, throughout the mission and in the debates around ending missions.
- Undertake more research on local perceptions, expectations, needs and wishes.
- Refrain from idealizing 'the local'.
CULTURE EATS STRATEGY FOR BREAKFAST: USING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TO REIMAGINE AGENCY AND INCLUSION

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium

MODERATOR
Jago Salmon
Advisor, United Nations

OVERVIEW
How can behavioural research on conflict-affected situations help de-fragment current policy developments? International interpretations of stabilization and prevention are changing, and there is a shaky consensus on which institutional arrangements to promote in fragile states. This fragmentation feeds the trend for locally owned solutions to trump internationally supported institutional approaches. For this trend to be meaningful, however, individuals need to experience their own agency and inclusion.

FOCUS
The session focused on the ways in which people behave and operate (the ‘culture’) versus the sometimes more pre-planned strategies used by the United Nations and the international community, which then seek to influence actors in those countries that have these very specific cultures or ways of working. What balance needs to be found between these? What might help improve understanding of these behaviours and cultures?

KEY TAKEAWAYS
New insights from behavioural sciences—still in the embryonic stage of research—indicate that conflict profoundly shifts individual’s cognitive bias, not only individually, but also collectively, by simply recalling the conflict. This raises questions about how local ownership can be achieved if cognitive bias and behaviour are not well understood by external actors. An important takeaway is that there is a need for constant self-evaluation of perspective on-site. This is a constant challenge in dynamics when addressing the relationship between inclusion and stakeholders; measuring the level of engagement needed, if continuous or punctual; and paying attention to indicators of higher contexts that need to be addressed. Behaviours of different actors can be understood as culture. This contrasts with strategies that international actors are more comfortable using.

How to create change and the balance between culture and strategy is a difficult challenge and each person has to try to understand their own cognitive bias. Future investigation, especially towards peacebuilding, is needed. However, there is a need to try to address and make programmes more inclusive and aware of the local voices. This is not only important to people’s dignity, but this is also a strategic decision to further contribute to expectations on the ground and seeking more long-term effective implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Include narrative engagement and storytelling as important mechanisms moving towards reconciliation.
• Continue the development of behavioural science and seek inclusion in peacebuilding programmes.
• Develop projects with bias consciousness and constant re-evaluations of the context and actors: people and context change.
• In programmes, address a broader approach to peacebuilding, not limiting its focus to short-term and technical points, but taking into consideration the context and conflict sensitivities.
• Create communication space with local partners.
• Build inclusive coalitions involving local, national, regional and international stakeholders, having in mind that not only one actor will bring all the solutions.

SESSION QUOTES
‘Research and practice always help us to make it better.’

‘We need to explain why people are getting something and explain why they are not getting something. We need to mainstream fairness and accountability procedures on the post-conflict work.’

‘The most important thing in reconciliation is being heard.’

HIGHLIGHTS
Doing something is not always better than doing nothing. Official development assistance can raise people’s expectations alongside their frustrations. This raises standards of fairness over time, making it more difficult to meet people’s continuously increasing expectations. A better assessment must be done with regards to people’s cognitive biases and perceptions—as well as needs.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS
NEGOTIATING THE STABILITY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE MAGHREB REGION: POWER, LAW AND REFORM

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Laboratoire de recherche en droit international et européen et relations Maghreb–Europe

MODERATOR
Haykel Ben Mahfoudh
Director, Centre for International and European Law and Maghreb-Europe Relationships, University of Carthage

OVERVIEW
Changes witnessed by Maghreb states offer an overview of different levels of political bargaining and how they contribute to shape institutional reform and political decisions in deferring transitional moments. Unsurprisingly, reforms are negotiated primarily based on internal power play of each country but are also largely linked to a wider context involving the influence played by external actors. Hence, critics of such processes may question both their institutional legitimacy and sustainability. Then, more broadly, the formalization of the impact of the reforms through the means of unified legal approaches invites further examination. Internal models of governance are heavily defined by the role of international expertise. However, there is still doubt about whether the standardization of institution-building offers guarantees of sustainable peace and long-term stability. The importance of bringing these questions to the table from the perspective of Maghreb states converges towards deconstructing the foundational elements of peace building, not only within regions but also with regards to their neighbours.

OBJECTIVES
The session had five objectives: to deconstruct the discourse on negotiated political reforms; to considered how legal standards work in different contexts; to demystify the role of consensus in building peace and reaching political solution; to link the transformation of political order with the ‘new’ identity of the country; and to identify the real actors with whom to negotiate.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
There is a need to identify the objectives for parties during negotiation process. Offered solutions are not matching expectations—when it comes to implementation, they are useless. Contextualization is necessary.

Legal reform does not bring political stability. Ownership of the processes is a key factor for success. Consensus is important, but there must also be an opportunity for dissent.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Be humble and learn what the country is offering and who are the key actors.
• Build the capacities of local experts.
• Adjust and adapt offered solutions.
• Strengthen accountability of the actors (government, political parties, non-governmental organizations, international community).
• Create proper infrastructure before starting any institutional reform process.
• Adopt a realistic time frame for any negotiation and implementation process.
SESSION QUOTES
‘We need to invent a new normative identity of the state.’
‘Lack of balance between negotiating people creates chaos.’
‘The context is more important than the content.’
‘Libya: not to rebuild the state but build it.’
‘Focus on failures rather than successes.’
‘How to negotiate with someone who does not exist?’
‘They focus more on front than on the functions.’
‘It is important not to lose sight and clear political ideas.’
‘Legal reforms become a factor of bargaining.’

HIGHLIGHTS
Thinking of how international donors can help with political processes.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


This session report was produced onsite at the 2019 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development hosted by SIPRI and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The report aims to reflect the session discussion. The views, information or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of SIPRI, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs or other institutes associated with the session.
OPERATIONALIZING SDG 16 AND THE TRIPLE NEXUS: EXPLORING LESSONS FROM CURRENT PEACEBUILDING PRACTICE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED CONTEXTS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
International Rescue Committee

MODERATOR
Wale Osofisan
Deputy Director for Governance,
International Rescue Committee UK

OVERVIEW
This session was a problem-solving deep dive into exploring practical examples of the operationalization of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 and the humanitarian–peacebuilding–development triple nexus. Grand bargain commitments to durable solutions and to the triple nexus emphasize the importance of the synergies between these areas of intervention. To meaningfully connect crisis response to peacebuilding, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states, the international community must break down the artificial barriers that tend to create siloes. The triple nexus offers an opportunity for actors from across the spectrum to learn from and work with each other to deepen their understanding of the linkages between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions. These three are fundamentally important to achieving SDG 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
This session aimed to discuss and share learning generated thus far, including from the Sida-funded Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Program of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia. It also addressed how change happens and how this can be catalysed by bridging or removing the often artificial siloes that separate humanitarian, development and peacebuilding work.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Grand bargain commitments to durable solutions and to the triple nexus (humanitarian-peace-development) emphasize the importance of synergies between these areas of intervention. To meaningfully connect crisis response to peacebuilding, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states, it is necessary to break down the artificial barriers that tend to create siloes.

The nexus offers the opportunity for actors from across the spectrum to learn from and work with each other to deepen understanding of the linkages between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions. These three are fundamentally important to achieving SDG 16.

This event was a valuable opportunity to bring together a range of implementers, think tanks and donors from peacebuilding, humanitarian and policy backgrounds to share experiences and explore practical examples and solutions for operationalizing SDG 16 and the humanitarian–peacebuilding–development triple nexus.

It enabled participants to explore ways of bridging or removing the often artificial siloes that separate humanitarian, development and peacebuilding work, to improve the response to the needs of the people we serve.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Donors should consider joint funding streams, jointly managed by their humanitarian, development and peace teams for protracted crises to invest in ‘nexus’ programmes. Interventions in this joint funding stream would be designed to intentionally build in positive peace elements, such as conflict-sensitivity analysis, inclusion, institutional capacity building and local ownership. Where possible, these initiatives should be in alignment with national development plans, policies and processes.

- Increase efforts to ensure the inclusion of local people in the processes, establishing dialogue platforms.

- Focus on context and conflict analysis. Donors can also promote context-driven programming by supporting more flexible approaches that build learning into the programme cycle and allow for adaptation.

- Mainstream the idea of peace responsiveness (a more ambitious approach than conflict sensitivity and do no harm) in the United Nations and other institutions

- To be able to practically implement the triple nexus in complex conflict situations, there is a need for documentation of both successes and failures.

- Invest in measuring peacebuilding outcomes, including through qualitative methods such as storytelling. It is important in peacebuilding to recognize that not everything that counts can be counted. Rich qualitative analysis can give us deeper insight into peacebuilding dynamics and results than purely quantitative methods.

HIGHLIGHTS

Humanitarian action can have both negative and positive consequences.

People do not live their lives in siloes, though the aid community tends to be organized and operate in siloes

Proper knowledge of and regular analysis of the context is integral to the impact of programmes.

Trust and confidence building should operate both vertically and horizontally.

The speakers highlighted the importance of inclusion of all voices—ethnic groups, women and youths.

Strengthening state institutions and accountability for service delivery is important in peacebuilding, including at the local level.

Service delivery can be a useful entry point, or platform, around which to organize people-to-people peacebuilding and build social cohesion.

It is possible to continue development activities, even in ongoing conflicts; there are always pockets of peace that would enable this.

Work on the peace part of the nexus so that more international actors can understand the peace responsiveness part, and see how to build positive peace programming into development and humanitarian approaches.

Multilateral collaboration is important in establishing convening spaces, where people come together on shared issues. Work on the existing mechanisms on the ground.

Collective outcomes should be ‘people focused’, but for it to work it needs leadership and effective coordination among donors. It is not enough to talk about it without having functioning mechanisms to make it reality.
RESOURCES LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


TIMING AND SEQUENCING OF POST–WAR ELECTIONS: ‘MAKE HASTE SLOWLY’

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
International IDEA

MODERATOR
Sead Alihodzic
Senior Programme Officer, International IDEA

OVERVIEW
While the holding of elections is always a critical moment for any democracy, in countries that transition from war to peace its importance is even greater. It is common practice for peace agreements to include provisions on the organization of democratic elections. However, decisions on when elections should take place and how to sequence them against other peacebuilding processes are often controversial. What criteria should guide the timing and sequencing of elections that strengthen broader peace and state building efforts? If organized soon after the end of violent conflict, election organizers must confront the lack or weakness of democratic institutions, security challenges, and unresolved grievances. Delaying elections, however, postpones the establishment of a legitimate government, risks renewal of conflict and reduces the prospects of receiving international development support.

OBJECTIVES
The objective of the session was to promote understanding of the importance of adequate timing and sequencing of post-war elections, challenges to it, and the lessons learned from different country contexts.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Elections are an important undertaking in countries that transition from war to peace. They serve as a means of achieving political stabilization, stronger institutions and government legitimacy, and they have a symbolic value in signalling a break with the past. However, a high-stakes election can increase tensions and spark violence. Therefore, timing and sequencing of elections should be informed by a good understanding on the impact of elections on peace processes.

While there is a general understanding that elections are an instrument that may facilitate peace-and state-building, they should not be mistaken for a means to an end. Rather, credible elections are a building block in a broader transformative mechanism.

The organization of elections in a transitional context is always a challenge. A range of accommodative measures may be put in place to bring different parties to negotiating tables and into an election process. However, some of these measures may be undemocratic in nature and therefore have a negative impact on the democratization process in the short and long terms. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a case were accommodative measures that discriminate parts of the population have become permanent positions.

The push for, and support of, quick elections by the international community can have positive implications in restoring democracy and stability. However, elections should not be used as an exit strategy or means to an end, but as a long-term instrument. The elections in Liberia following peace agreements in 1997 and 2003 are examples of these different interventions and strategies by the international community.

There is a trend for departure from assessments and interventions based on values towards an interests-based approach. Along these lines, core value associated with human rights, rule of law and development should be defended, instead of interests.
Context-specific approaches and solutions are important. While in Nepal elections were postponed due to differences between the stakeholders—and the process is today perceived as successful—the postponement of elections in other contexts could increase tensions. Exchange of experiences and thoughts on timing and sequencing of elections can help to engage in future transformative contexts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ensure a level playing field for all stakeholders and that key decisions on timing and sequencing are results of an inclusive process with representation from different groups such as women and youths.
- Include education as a key component to improve citizens’ electoral and political knowledge, to make citizens aware of choices and to enable them to make qualified criticism of given choices. This would build the resilience and capacity of societies to manage manipulation.
- In support to elections in transformative contexts, emphasize long-term planning and sustainability, rather than short-sighted interventions.
- Remain committed and do not lose sight of important matters even though in transformative contexts there is a tendency to deal with urgent matters while important matters may be neglected.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS

IT TAKES DIALOGUE: PROMOTING SUSTAINING PEACE

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

MODERATOR
Sigrid Gruener
Programme Director, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

OVERVIEW
This session sought to stimulate discussion and learning on the relationship between mediation efforts to resolve violent conflict and reach peace agreements, and the broader, longer-term dialogue processes needed to implement these agreements and to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session focused on the role and potential of mediation and dialogue in advancing the UN agenda on sustaining peace. Discussion was contextualized with examples from Israel and Palestine, Pakistan, Somalia and Sweden.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Dialogue and mediation are understood in different ways by different actors across all levels, and there is often not a neat categorisation of what these processes entail and how they are used. Some see dialogue as a crisis response. Some refer to mediation as what takes place at a higher level involving main political actors, whereas dialogue is considered a longer-term process that engages stakeholders at all levels of society.

Others express concern that dialogue is viewed merely as a trendy word and exercise that is used to tick a box and show inclusivity in peace and development processes. Mediation and negotiation are considered by some as forms of dialogue—a form of exchange. The design and facilitation of dialogue processes is critical and require non-judgemental attitudes, empathetic presence, and curiosity. It is important to ensure that dialogue is not being utilised as a stalling tactic or employed as window dressing in the name of peacebuilding.

Dialogue and mediation processes are most successful when built on partnerships across different actors and across different levels—local, regional, national and international. This requires communication, cooperation, and coordinating across different actors, drawing on the different strengths and roles of these actors. In the context of South Asia, there is insufficient inclusion of marginalized groups in dialogue to address the frozen security issues, especially women. These processes are highly masculine and are not seen through a humanitarian lens. Seeing it in this way would allow for the inclusion of marginalized groups that are overwhelmingly affected by conflict dynamics. Inclusion of these groups would bring new perspectives on how conflict is viewed and may open up new avenues to overcome these conflict hurdles and pave the way for sustainable peace.

Intra-group dialogue is often crucial for peacebuilding. In the context of Somalia, for example, inter-clan and political conflict are widespread and groups are not monolithic. Before bringing different groups or levels together for dialogue there is often a need for dialogue within the groups to establish a foundation of understanding and common vision on which to build discussion and create foundations for sustainable peace and development.

Dialogue is a critical tool and approach for addressing polarization, low levels of trust in state institutions and inter- and intra-communal tensions resulting from issues such as immigration or decentralisation even in contexts that are considered relatively peaceful, including European cities. Dialogue can be a critical tool for diffusing ongoing conflict as well as applied at an earlier stage of
mounting tensions to prevent escalation or outbreak of violence. It is also highly instrumental in promoting reconciliation. Some people feel that dialogue should be based on common ideals—democracy, civil rights, and human rights.

One-off attempts at dialogue are typically harmful to peace processes and exacerbate polarization. In the context of Palestine and Israel, failed cycles of dialogue have led to a lack of trust in peace processes as a whole, in particular within the youth population. The international community as well as national actors should invest more in long-term dialogue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Build dialogue and mediation processes on partnerships across different actors and across different levels—local, regional, national and international.
• Support dialogue with financing that facilitates coordination across organizations.
• Use dialogue more often to deepen inclusivity through intra- and inter-group sessions at country level and with provisions to include marginalized voices.
• Do not use dialogue as a stalling tactic or for ticking the box of inclusivity.
• Be creative in thinking about how to bring people together, building on existing networks and forums where dialogue is already taking place in communities and outside formalized spaces.
• Integrate into dialogue storytelling, listening and showing respect even if you do not agree.

SESSION QUOTES

‘[In this context] we must go from a dialogue of coexistence, to a dialogue of co-resistance.’
STAKEHOLDERS AND LOCAL REALITIES: 360 DEGREES ON SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Mamadou Bodian
Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
This small, in-depth workshop brought together decision makers, academics and knowledge brokers from the Global North and the Global South to explore emerging synergies in response to growing insecurity in the Sahel. The discussion sought to address the structural limitations of current approaches and enrich perspectives for collaborative peacebuilding in the region. Building on the forum’s theme, the session attempted to challenge conventional wisdom across all development sectors and explore the duality of urgent or rapid responses and long-term mechanisms vital for attaining sustainable peace. The session provided a diversity of perspectives on security and development issues in the Sahel and explored strategies for stabilizing a region of increasing concern among the global community. SIPRI’s quantitative findings on the Sahel served as prompts for points of discussion on human security.

OBJECTIVES
The session had three objectives. First was to address structural limitations of current approaches and enrich perspectives for collaborative peacebuilding in the region. Second was to challenge conventional wisdom across all development sectors and explore the duality of urgent, rapid responses and long-term mechanisms vital for attaining sustainable peace. The third objective was to provide a diversity of perspectives on security and development issues in the Sahel and explore strategies to stabilize a region of increasing concern among the global community.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
The Sahel region faces great complexity. There are confusing situations: they were predictable (created by outsiders as well), require long-term solutions, and will have unexpected effects. The insecurity takes multiple forms: jihadist insurrections, intercommunal conflicts, herders and so on. Insecurity in Niger and Burkina Faso is increasing acutely. There are multifaceted challenges: in addition to security and development issues, are displacement, climate change, droughts, malnutrition, food security, drugs trafficking etc.

There are challenges in coordination. The aid sector is unable to track the flow of money and account for results: despite numerous pledges, little has been shown. Many agencies means many agendas: it is more relevant to seek ‘cohesion’ rather than ‘cooperation’. When resources are scarce, it is not clear how to tackle security issues in a coordinated manner.

The challenges in implementation (other than coordination) are numerous. There is a dilemma over state weakness in general: aid is not delivered if it goes through states. State weakness is also a result of outside interventions, such as structural adjustments and democratic transitions from outside (it is not an accident). States prioritize their military sectors over other issues, such as development (education, health etc.): are they forced to do so? Even if they prioritize, their military capacities are too small to overcome security problems in the region. Security is becoming an excuse for not investing in development. The G5 Sahel’s main problems include its problematic foundation (the armies and security sectors of these countries had not been developed for political reasons, and are thus unable to ensure security). Prevailing security concerns and frustration
over them are the primary factor that facilitates recruitment by extremists. Also, these countries have little history of collaboration and military cooperation takes time. It also became a way for donor countries to avoid bilateral aid. There needs to be a common strategy. Human rights and fighting impunity are one priority for the United Nations. The UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) also lacks cohesion and has created a distortion: by asking states with weak capacity to maintain security to reinforce the security in neighbouring countries (and incentivizing them to do so by financial rewards). It also invests more time and money (80 per cent) in its own security (which is often the case in a peacekeeping mission). For localization, the international community tends to define social contracts, but it needs to respect the choices that states make, even if it is not comfortable with them. Regarding inclusivity and integration of women and youth, inclusivity is a key for the state's legitimacy.

However, most of these critiques are common in many similar contexts, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. There have also been some achievements and positive elements. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in Mali means that 2000 ex-rebels are to be integrated in the Malian forces. While it should not be assumed that it will lead to strengthening the Malian armed forces automatically, it is a necessary path and has been a complicated process. It is thus an element of success itself. Democratization in Niger has made some progress. Leadership of traditional religious leaders can keep girls in school.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Understand and analyse incentive structures of all stakeholders, including those of international communities (including individual career motivations etc.).
- Decentralize support to bring coordination to regional and national levels, not concentrated at the international level, and to bring local voices upwards. The Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Liptako-Gourma Authority are good examples.
- Conduct locally based projects.

**SESSION QUOTES**

‘Elections are problems themselves, if not well managed.’

‘Forget coordination, let’s try to find a coherence.’

‘We have to focus on the causes of problems, not symptoms.’
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RESOURCES LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


CHINA’S RISING ROLE IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING CONTEXTS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Mistra Geopolitics

MODERATOR
Jiayi Zhou
Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
This session explored China’s growing economic and political footprint in fragile and developing country contexts, including but not limited to situations of protracted conflict. Since the early 2000s, China has become an increasingly significant development actor and source of foreign direct investment, operating alongside and parallel to traditional donors and institutions associated with the Global North. In the past decade, China has also increased its profile and contribution to peacekeeping operations and conflict mediation, and it has even begun to engage in peacebuilding. China’s emergence as a donor, financier, and political and security actor warrants an updated understanding of the developmental and geopolitical landscape. How are China’s modalities of aid and investment, perspectives on security–development linkages, and relations with political actors—including civil society—affecting outcomes related to peace, security and sustainable development in the Global South? Are there implications for achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including those related to the environment? Are local actors and traditional donors engaging with China?

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session explored three guiding questions. Over the past decade or longer, what shifts have been observed in the role of Chinese actors in the various domains of expertise, and what predictions can be made regarding the future of China’s role in such contexts? Does China’s increasing involvement in these domains complement or contrast with traditional donors and actors from the Global North, and to local actors’ (governmental, civil society) ideas regarding how to sustainably achieve development or peace? How does this influence the local, national and geopolitical landscape for achievement of the SDGs?

KEY TAKEAWAYS
China’s ability to act as a positive contributor or impetus for more sustainable outcomes in developing country contexts depends on local partners as well as on China’s own modalities of acting. In certain country contexts, China has been a catalyst for greater attention to national development, and it has helped stakeholders shift from security-centred to growth-centred models or paradigms. In others, China has fed into systems of corruption and low institutional capacity, and results have not been seen as people-centred but rather as inefficient projects that contribute to an asymmetric relationship between China and the counterpart.
China’s tools, instruments and modalities of operating are similar to those of traditional development actors in certain aspects, but also differ. There is growing recognition that China needs to update its way of operating and bring it into line with Western standards (e.g. the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)). In addition, there needs to be more coordination with traditional donor communities, and more engagement with local actors and stakeholders outside of simply ‘the (local) government’. In this regard, China has in several regards followed the footsteps of previous or traditional development actors and funders, including West states, Japan and South Korea, and committed the same kinds of mistakes (e.g. tied aid, low transparency, scandals). These must be addressed if China is to be perceived and act as a legitimate and genuine contributor to sustainable development.

On peacebuilding, China has increasingly expanded its overseas security footprint. While this is mostly tied to its growing economic interests abroad, there are cases where economic relationships follow strategic interests. In general, China is not socialized into thinking about ‘peacebuilding’ in the conventional (traditional developmental community) sense of the term, but it works through its own model; for example, quiet diplomacy and economic development as the basis of peace. It is learning, including through its participation in peacekeeping operations. On environmental questions, China has labelled its flagship Belt and Road Initiative as ‘green’. But the lock-in effects of its previous and continuing ‘brown’ investments (e.g. coal-fired power plants) is concerning.

China has said many times that its ‘model’ of development is not exportable; however, many developing countries have increasingly looked to the Chinese experience of poverty alleviation. In conjunction now with the sheer amounts of assistance that China is able to provide, a new alternative to traditional or Western developmental models and assistance is clearly emerging. There continue to be strong concerns over how this will benefit the SDGs and climate goals, including issues of transparency, civil society engagement, corruption, strategic motivations and geopolitical problems. However, many are hopeful, and suggest that there is no getting around a more inclusive global framework for achieving the SDGs and sustainable outcomes without China or Chinese resources.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Overall, there is a need for the international donor community to engage more with China.
• In general, China should follow OECD DAC guidelines for aid; it is increasingly trying to do so but needs to incorporate traditional donors in a dialogue.
• Donor coordination groups at national levels do not engage in dialogue with China; this communication gap needs to be bridged in order to prevent duplication and ensure that synergies in programming can be achieved.
• Local governments need to come up with their own national development plans and to channel Chinese funds appropriately. The aid frameworks need to be more open, transparent, rules-based (good governance) and people-centred not only on the Chinese side but also among national governments and local stakeholders.
• There is a need to understand Chinese models and theories of change when it comes to both economic development and peacebuilding. Although they are themselves still engaged in a learning process, differing definitions and concepts lead to lack of a clarity in how China is fitting in and transforming the landscape for sustainable development. Chinese concepts of ‘development’ and ‘peacebuilding’ require clarifying.
• Disaggregate Chinese investments between ‘green’ and ‘brown’ and consider the impact of the latter on the achievement of the 1.5-degree climate target as well as relevant SDGs.
COLOMBIA: FROM THE BRINK TO SECURITY EXPORTER

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
PRISM at National Defense University

MODERATOR
Michael Miklaucic
Senior Fellow and Editor-in-chief of PRISM, National Defense University

OVERVIEW
Plan Colombia was an initiative of the Colombian President Andres Pastrana, supported by the U.S. government, aimed at providing military and economic aid to Colombia. It aimed to combat Colombia's guerrilla groups and drug cartels. It was conceived in 1999 and was enforced between 2000 and 2015. The objectives of Plan Colombia were related to ending the Colombian civil war and installing an anti-drug strategy to eliminate illicit crops. This session explored how the evolving vision of Plan Colombia helped Colombia step back from the brink of state failure to navigate a path to its current level of stability in an increasingly unstable region. The discussion also explored how the Plan Colombia process might be a useful learning experience in other contexts.

FOCUS
The session aimed to make a close examination of Plan Colombia and the implications it had and continues to have on Colombia and on the US–Colombia relation.

OBJECTIVES
The session had four objectives. First was to determine the role of Plan Colombia in making Colombia a more stable and secure country. Second was to examine the critiques of Plan Colombia. Third was to discuss the relevance it may have for different international circumstances. The fourth objective was to assess the role of Colombia as an ‘exporter of security’.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
On determining the role of Plan Colombia in making Colombia more stable and secure, it gave the Colombian military a massive upgrade in their intelligence and air capacity to fight the war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and provided more security. The aim was not only security, but also peace. No doubt achieving security was important, but it was not enough.

On the successes and failures of Plan Colombia, there are successful elements: the US–Colombian relationship is successful (state to state, military to military). It is key to international relations, and so it is critical that both states continue to cultivate it. Also, conditions in Colombia are significantly better now than before for most Colombians.

Plan Colombia needs to be assessed in comparison with its high financial and human costs and also the lack of sustainability of the work fighting drug trafficking and the lack of adaptation in the closing stages of the conflict.

Colombia can be classified as an exporter of security, with security assistance programs in numerous Latin American and other countries. It does this by emphasizing and focusing on air power, intelligence and, eventually, professionalization and values, and a training approach of the military.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- When thinking about replicating Plan Colombia in other countries, the international and national contexts should be carefully taken into account.
- In assessing the effort oriented towards eliminating illegal crops, it is important to recognize that, regardless of what methods are used (spraying, etc), if people are not provided with alternatives to survive and economic opportunities, such an endeavour will not be successful.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


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THE ROLE OF LEGITIMACY IN TRANSITIONS FROM FRAGILITY TO RESILIENCE

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
United States Institute of Peace

MODERATOR
Joseph Hewitt
Vice President, Policy, Learning, and Strategy, United States Institute of Peace

OVERVIEW
In February 2019 the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States published its final report. Following this and building on the findings of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, this session offered an opportunity to discuss the role of legitimacy in consolidating transitions from fragility to resilience.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The goal of the session was to exchange views and build consensus among stakeholders that come at this challenge from different perspectives—donors, governmental and non-governmental entities in situations of fragility, civil society actors and academics. The discussion looked at a set of key questions: What do we know about how state legitimacy is constructed? How do state-provided services feature in the process of building political legitimacy? What are the policy and programme implications?

KEY TAKEAWAYS
The element of learning is key and has become even more important. However, there is a challenge in deliverables ‘eating knowledge for breakfast’ in that over-emphasizing short-term deliverables may be counter-productive, impeding long-term impact and progress.

One overarching question is why—when there is agreement on and understand of the questions on the table, the tools available, the various shortcomings, knowledge of where there has been failure—do we continue to make the same mistakes? Do not enough people share this understanding? Is it a question of not being conscious of what is being done? Or is it for some other reasons?

One important impediment to making progress is the lack of flexible funding on the donor side. Additional efforts are needed to build trust and strengthen relations with legislators. This will ensure they provide the flexibility and longer time horizons necessary for learning to occur and a long-term impact to occur on the ground.

The need for adaptive approaches continues to come up in discussions. However, the critique of adaptive approaches—where’s the evidence that adaptive program management works?—needs to be addressed.

How do existing projects and new projects leverage structures and institutions—including traditional social networks? There is a need to build on and complement local institutions, rather than imposing structures from the outside that may not be fit-for-purpose.

Short time horizons are a huge challenge. Donors have expectations of quick results and there is a lack of patience.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Continue the discussion on what the process of learning and discovery should look like.
- Empower field missions to engage more with local communities and take into account the local understanding of what legitimacy should look like.
- Learn from cases where donors are addressing issues of legitimacy well.
- Donors need more flexibility and adaptive management programmes.
- Continue to deepen and expand ‘do no harm’ approaches and build safeguards in decision-making processes to more systematically consider policy trade-offs.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


WHAT ROLE FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN PEACE PROCESSES?

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

MODERATOR
Hans Born
Assistant Director, Head of the Policy and Research Division

OVERVIEW
Security sector reform (SSR) seeks to improve state and human security by ensuring that the provision, management and oversight of security are anchored in a framework of democratic governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights. SSR and related security programmes—such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, and mine action—are about the control of violence in society. This makes them central to every peace process. Negotiations and the agreements that follow set the agenda for post-conflict security reform. What little guidance exists on SSR and peace processes emphasizes the importance of including security-related considerations early on in the negotiations, and it tends to assume that comprehensive peace agreements with extensive and detailed provisions are a precondition for quality outcomes. However, the constraints within which mediators operate and the current conflict landscape hamper decisions about SSR and related security agendas. Moreover, peace agreements that address these issues in depth do not necessarily lead to successful policies.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
Based on the results of a research project by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)—which was finalized in the first quarter of 2019 and seeks to bridge the gap between the mediation and SSR communities—this session aimed to explore how provisions on SSR and related activities emerge from peace processes, and the role of SSR and related activities in war-to-peace transitions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Security sector reform can support a peace process in a number of ways. This support can be through brokering and building trust between conflict actors. This is especially the case between state and non-state actors. SSR can address conflict drivers which might be the root causes of the conflict. Finally, it can create the necessary conditions for moving a peace process forward.

There is often a lack of understanding about peace mediation among SSR practitioners and a lack of understanding about SSR among mediators. While mediators are commonly concerned with short-term violence reduction and consensus and initiative for change coming from the conflict parties themselves, SSR practitioners focus on promoting the principles of democratic governance of the security sector, as adapted to the local context.

The perspective from the international community is that states have a monopoly of violence in conflict area. Hence, the state security sector often sees itself as leader in SSR matters, therefore excluding non-state actors from negotiations and SSR processes. In reality, many non-state actors are providing state-like services, including security, which has to more effectively be dealt with in SSR and peace mediation.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Share knowledge between mediators and SSR practitioners and make assumptions about the goal of the process explicit.
- During the implementation phase of a peace agreement, clarify the roles of parliament and civil society in the security sector, in particular with regard to their oversight function.
- Sequencing and the level of specificity or detail of SSR negotiations are context-specific, but there is often a need for ‘strategic ambiguity’ in order to prevent talks from collapsing and to give stakeholders more room for adaption during SSR implementation.
- For viable SSR, include all the stakeholders of the peace process
- Connect peace processes and SSR to local perspectives and needs.
CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACEBUILDING AND SUSTAINING PEACE

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Florian Krampe
Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
Building peace is rarely, if ever, straightforward. Peacebuilding gets exponentially more difficult in countries affected by climate change, because the compounded consequences of climate change and violent conflict exaggerate the human costs of war long after active combat has ceased. However, the links between climate change, security and peacebuilding are neglected in discourse, research and policymaking. It is necessary to make further efforts to bring these elements together and move the discussion forward into the field of peacebuilding.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session brought together senior peacebuilding professionals from the United Nations and African civil society to (a) collect experiences on the impact of climate on multilateral peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts; (b) discuss how climate is challenging implementation of mission mandates; and (c) discuss how peacebuilding missions adapt to the challenge in their everyday operations. The session’s aim was to formulate lessons learned so that multilateral peacebuilding efforts can better respond to the compounding risks of conflict and climate change.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Climate change should be considered an existential risk for building and sustaining peace. The effects of climate change before, during or after a conflict have the potential to undermine the initiatives of peacebuilding missions, but they are not currently commonly recognized as issues that are crucial to address in mission mandates. For example, while the media prominently focuses on the conflict and insecurity caused by the terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria, conflicts over resource access between farmers and herders in the region have a higher casualty rate but less media attention. Participants have called for climate change risks to be accepted within the peacebuilding community as necessary, to be comprehensively discussed and integrated into mission work, and have highlighted the role that peacebuilding missions can play in facilitating a normative acceptance of this.

Intersecting effects of climate change and conflict can disrupt local and national dynamics and peacebuilding efforts due to mass internal displacement. A large-scale migration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into urban areas can fundamentally affect internal social, economic and political relationships on multiple levels. This can have added security implications as insurgent groups often use IDP camps as recruitment sites. It is necessary to understand local contexts and needs, and to incorporate traditional methods—where possible—surrounding resource use and management into strategic frameworks aimed at addressing climate change risks in conflict or post-conflict settings. To be appropriately actionable by peacebuilding missions, a normative discussion of the existential risks to sustainable peace posed by climate change needs to be contextually constructed from the bottom-up, integrating the perspectives of all affected stakeholders.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• It is crucial for peacebuilding missions to recognize climate change as an existential risk to their work and the peace they aim to build. Peace missions thus need to address climate-related challenges accordingly, even if climate change is not specifically incorporated into their respective mandates.

• Discussions and expectations surrounding climate change risks and impacts need to become normative in peacebuilding work and peacebuilding missions. Peace missions and, moreover, UN country teams can then help to facilitate normative change and acceptance of climate change in their interactions with local governments.

• At the same time, existing measures towards addressing climate-related security risks that exist in many regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), need to be successfully implemented on multiple scales to support peacebuilding efforts more broadly.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS


INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO OVERCOME SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL REGION

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
World Bank

MODERATOR
Aly Rahim
Practice Manager, Social Development West Africa, World Bank

OVERVIEW
Violent conflict has become more complex, protracted, and intractable—and after decades of decline it is once more on the rise in many parts of the world, including Africa. Increasing levels of violent conflict and fragility pose a significant threat not only to human lives and national security but also to economic and social development. The impacts of these trends are enormous: instability in Mali and the escalation of violence by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region have displaced more than 4.5 million people and dramatically increased food insecurity across the Sahel. This roundtable session discussed the underlying causes of violence in the Sahel and innovative approaches to overcome fragility and development challenges in the region.

FOCUS
The session focused on the themes of countering violent extremism, social inclusion and cohesion, citizen engagement, and country platforms. It is critical to have a coherent understanding of these themes to successfully address development and security challenges in the Sahel.

Violent extremism—“the beliefs and actions of people who support or use ideologically motivated violence to further social, economic, or political objectives”—is especially on the rise in the region. Defining this threat and formulating, monitoring and evaluating effective interventions against it has remained a challenging effort.

Social inclusion and cohesion leads to the empowerment of disadvantages, marginalized and vulnerable groups leading to stronger economies, achieving development and sustainability goals and improving the quality of life. Social cohesion is necessary to build trust between members of society and state institutions.

Citizen engagement also contributes to rebuilding trust between communities and institutions. It helps to promote citizens’ ownership of development interventions through their participation in decisions regarding access and the distribution of resources.

The use of disruptive technology and reinforced donor coordination and transparency around renewed country platforms, which broaden the collaboration within and across government, society and humanitarian and development organizations, are essential to overcome FCV challenges and achieve results.
KEY TAKEAWAYS

Operational responses in the Sahel can only be successful if they focus on the drivers of conflict and fragility, and if these are integrated and coordinated in the responses. Participants raised the problem of coordination of actors at the country level and regionally, as shown in the response to the Boko Haram crisis around the Lake Chad Region. The importance of area-based approaches was also highlighted—such approaches are based on the differences in security and risk-levels in the region (this is especially crucial when a response is regional) and will be designed and implemented along the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (triple nexus).

Furthermore, innovative and sustainable delivery models that invest in conflict prevention and CVE were discussed and participants raised the issue and importance of finding operational models that are scalable in different settings across the Sahel. Participants also identified the need to improve early warning systems and responses at the community level through risk monitoring and risk management.

Discussions centred on the delivery of peace dividends and participants agreed that successful operational models need to include the re-establishment of the social contract via citizen engagement, social inclusion and cohesion. Experiences and lessons learned from solutions in Burkina Faso and Niger were shared. These cases shared a strong engagement and inclusion of civil society, and addressed social inclusion challenges. The role of religion in the conflicts in the Sahel was debated.

There is a need to improve early responses at the community level through risk monitoring and risk management. Regarding regions and a regional approach, the differences in security and risk-levels should be considered. Target areas require different responses along the triple nexus.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Operational solutions have to focus on the drivers of conflict and fragility in the Sahel, which range from poverty and rising inequalities to poor service delivery, slowing growth and job creation, weak institutions and poor governance as well as social and economic exclusion.
- Actors along the triple nexus need to comprehensively address structural issues, the reform of institutions and direct incentives of actors while targeting grievances across arenas of power, security, service delivery and natural resources.
- Successful operational models include, community-driven development (CDD) approaches; territorial approaches aiming at reconnecting lagging regions through economic corridors; and citizen engagement approaches that help to re-establish the social contract between societies and strengthen the capacity and legitimization of government and local institutions.
- Organizations need to change their operational models to focus on (a) conflict prevention and quick implementation and (b) innovations through the use of information communication technologies (ICT) to enhance the measuring of results and monitoring and evaluation of interventions.
- Regional, sub-regional and local approaches and their coherence with each other should be strengthened. In many instances, a focus on regions in terms of humanitarian and development investments is more effective than single national responses.
THE ROLE OF SECURITY ACTORS IN PROTECTING CIVILIANS

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Center for Civilians in Conflict

MODERATOR
Shannon Green
Senior Director of Programs,
Center for Civilians in Conflict

OVERVIEW
Protection of civilians is an important aspect of conflict-resolution efforts and there is a need to involve security actors in the protection of civilians. There is ample research to show that one of the primary reasons why young men across the world join armed non-state actors is violence against their families and communities. The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) with others have been working for many years to change the mindset of military actors by making legal, ethical and strategic arguments for better protection of civilians and providing concrete tools for enhancing protection.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The session aimed to raise awareness of the concrete ways in which security actors can better protect civilians in conflict. It profiled specific approaches that the Nigerian military, civil society and conflict-affected communities are taking to improve protection and mitigate civilian harm in conflict areas. It also highlighted the tangible impact of these efforts on civilians’ lives and on the relations between armed actors and civilians.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
The protection of civilians in conflict areas is of paramount importance, not only legally, morally and ethically, but also strategically. For security actors, not protecting civilians means losing support as the space can easily be filled, thus protracting and prolonging conflicts.

An overarching approach at the strategic, institutional and operational levels have been proven to be effective in furthering the protection of civilians. In the case of Nigeria, supporting the drafting of national legislation on the protection of civilians, institutionalizing education of international humanitarian law in the military, and confidence building at a local level between communities and the military have all had positive effects.

Channels for communication are important to build trust and understanding between civilian communities and the military. It is important for the military to take local experiences from civilians into account to more effectively formulate policies that help the communities instead of hurting them.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Take an overarching approach on strategic, institutional, and operational levels when furthering the protection of civilians.

• The military should take local experiences from civilians into account when formulating policies.

• The military should understand conflict dynamics and the perspectives of local civilians not to cause further conflict, especially when crafting programmes for re-integration of armed groups back into society.

• Address the issues plaguing the military, such as low morale, trauma and psychological problems, which may erode their ability and inclination to protect civilians.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS

POLICING IN STABILIZATION ENVIRONMENTS

TIME 16 May, 15.00–17.00
ROOM Meeting Room 4

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

MODERATOR
Marina Caparini
Programme Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

OVERVIEW
Peace operations are increasingly being deployed to countries that are unstable and where there is little or no peace to keep. In such conflict-affected contexts, peacekeeping personnel encounter a complex mix of non-state armed groups, militias, rebel groups and criminal groups that attack civilians, challenge the state, and sometimes one another. This is seen in the Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Somalia and South Sudan. From a police perspective, what are the practical challenges when peace operations seek to establish order, stability and protect civilians, in contexts where force may be used to contain aggressors, while also pursuing a political solution and helping to rebuild state institutions?

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
The aim of this session is to have an in-depth discussion about the challenges and opportunities presented especially for policing and the rule of law in conflict-affected ‘stabilization’ contexts.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
While there is a tendency to think of stabilization in terms of military use of force, police roles should be emphasized in stabilization, as police are key agents of long-term stabilization. Police are mandated to go into communities and open windows of interaction, work with communities to build trust, and move beyond tribal understandings.

Many police who are deployed to international peacekeeping missions have not received pre-deployment training, nor have they seen armed conflict before. There is a steep learning curve that may take six months or more. This combined with the more challenging aspects of understanding the local culture and building trust and local relationships while helping to reform and build capacity of police institutions suggests that police should have longer rotations than one year.

The police role is underarticulated at the United Nations headquarters level, and the respective functions and roles of police and military are frequently misunderstood. Police have one leg in the security field, with operations, and have the other leg in rule of law and the reform of police and rule of law institutions. Police are the bridge between the fields.

Difficult conditions in the mission area may include hostility from the host government, and weak or absent host state institutions in criminal justice system.

Individual police officers (IPOs) rely on formed police units and the military for protection. Coordination in the field is essential, so that the military and police at operational level work effectively and do not see each other as rivals. But cooperation is often personality-driven.

In public order situations such as demonstrations, police need to be involved. The military is an essential asset of last resort if the threat escalates to the military level. However, since the military are trained to focus on an enemy, the first line of response to demonstrations should be the police—individual police officer and specialized police teams that are working on building trust.
The Force Intervention Brigade of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is considered part of the conflict. The DRC example is instructive: if military and police conduct joint patrols in such contexts, the police will be considered a legitimate target.

There is no clear UN definition of stabilization, although various governments have articulated their own definitions.

Peace operations need a legal basis in either consent from the host state or through a Security Council decision. Consent is not legally required when the Security Council acts under its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But the reality of peace operations is that political consent is required in the long term, enabling local ownership of the peace process. Thus, consent of the host state is not legally required initially but as a practical matter it is necessary to achieve the longer-term objectives of the mission. There may consequently exist a tension between the obligation to implement Security Council decisions under Chapter VII and the need to obtain political consent from the host state. This possible tension between legal obligations and political requirements deserves more attention than it has received to date.

It is not well understood that the primary legal framework for peace operations is human rights law. The law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law applies only in armed conflicts, and only for parties to the conflict, so is of limited applicability in peace operations. Aims in armed conflict are to force an enemy to submit or to eliminate an enemy. The law of armed conflict allows status-based targeting: a legitimate target can be killed just for their membership of state military or an organized armed group. Civilians, although protected from direct attack, can be legally killed as long as it is not excessive in relation to the military advantage sought. This is very different from human rights law, which prohibits force unless permitted through exception.

The UN is very actor-oriented regarding tasks and roles. Guidance is directed to actors, not functions, despite the military often being tasked with policing (functions outside combat)

In certain theatres the military must come in to stabilize a situation before handing over to the police. The military must be trained on how to support the police, hand over to them and take over when the situation requires. With the changing context of missions (i.e. asymmetric war, use of improvised explosive devices, etc.), training has to adapt, as the traditional training is no longer appropriate.

There is a general trend since the attacks on the United States in September 2001 of interpreting threats to be of a military nature. Police have become more militarized, including in Europe and the USA. But it is clear that, as police become more militarized, they become less able to do their jobs and building trust among the local populations they serve in law enforcement.

Just as there has been trends in the militarization of police, the ‘policization’ of the military is also visible in some countries. For example, in the Central African Republic (CAR), there is little state presence outside the capital city. The military is better trained, and people have tended to look to them as the answer. As one participant mentioned, people’s view of the solution to instability and their problems is more army, and more arms to the army.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Emphasize police in discussions and policies on stabilization since they are key agents of stabilization through their work building trust with local communities and maintaining public order.
• Better train police deployed to missions in advance, give them longer rotations in the mission, and make them more diverse (more women).
• To counter the growing militarization of police, consider sunsetting and converting paramilitarized police into regular police.
• Recognize that researchers can contribute to better understanding of the different roles of the military and police, the limits of their different roles and, most importantly, how they can work together to achieve the best possible conditions for stabilization.

SESSION QUOTES
'UN headquarters thinks of stabilization as needing offensive military force. But in the field, stabilization is about building trust. The HQ and field perspectives are very different.'

'The police are into building trust with the host nation, not being part of the conflict.'

'It is important for the UN Police to be a role model for police in host states.'

'In a peace operation, people can't stand out as individuals, they must work in teams.'

'A Chapter VII mandate does not determine which law applies. It is the context that determines whether the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) or human rights law applies.'

'Stabilization is a military role in situations of occupation and a police role in domestic contexts. Peace operations blur these roles.'
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND PEACE INNOVATION

INSTITUTIONAL LEAD
SaferGlobe

MODERATOR
Maria Mekri
Executive Director, SaferGlobe

OVERVIEW
The increasing complexity of conflict situations requires new understandings and mechanisms, which create partial solutions for stability. Technological solutions may not just aid understanding of conflict, but may create tailored solutions for local conflict drivers and may also enable broader understanding of what effectiveness in peacebuilding and peacekeeping is. Technological innovation also has the potential to increase inclusivity, create local business potential and provide mechanisms for conflict-affected societies to leap-frog in terms of economic development. Emerging technologies and the development of peacetech create possibilities for development of peace processes to ensure their sustainability.

FOCUS AND OBJECTIVES
This session focused on the role of technologies in bridging gaps in current knowledge and the potential for innovation in peace through practical examples of peacetech. It aimed to engage experts in peace research with technology and to introduce new concepts and thinking around technology, especially regarding creating synergies and strengthening present mechanisms of analysis, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It also aimed to strengthen and broaden the overall community around peace technology and create potential for further discussion.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
Technology can be used for war as well as for peace. In an increasing fast-changing world, technologies cannot be seen simple as a tool anymore. It changes the world, individuals and how they relate to each other. Nowadays, the ongoing development of technology and humanity is intertwined, and this must be taken in account. As the point where the human mind limits understanding has been passed, technology can be used to move this forward and help to better visualize and understand conflict situations. However, despite all the advances and opportunities in technology for peace, it must also be remembered that most of the technology is currently being developed by private companies that, in the end, will always seek to monetize and sell that technology, creating challenges for its wide use and in global governance.

At the grassroots level, it can be seen that peacetech initiatives are already being implemented and used for peacebuilding in user-based initiatives. It has also been showing possible use for open participatory peace processes. Nonetheless, the issues of security and data protection still remain a strong challenge to be met.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Push past the initial stage of understanding how technology and innovation has a role in peace, and move forward with discussions and practice.
- Consider strategic use of existing and widely available technology.
- Further develop best practices and use of technology.
- Empower peacebuilders, activists and academics to fill gaps of information, making it possible to identify patterns and trends in conflict.
- Take into consideration cyber and technological attacks to basic infrastructure, such as broadband and communication, in the humanitarian sphere.
SESSION QUOTES

‘In times where we make decisions much faster than the validation of the technology, we might have an issue of bias.’

‘We don’t want research to be forgotten; we want it to create impact.’

HIGHLIGHTS

Empowerment and disempowerment of technology? What is the responsibility in controlling technology? Denying access to technology can also be a cause of a conflict.

Technology is really changing, and many more discussions are needed. Everyone must challenge themselves in conferences and forums: technology must be more widely discussed in the field of peace and development. Opportunities must be created.

Access to connectivity is increasingly a basic right; in some cases, denying it is an act of war.

RESOURCE LINKS AND DOCUMENTS
