

II. Organizations conducting multilateral peace operations

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The United Nations remains the main organization deploying multilateral peace operations, accounting for about one-third of all operations and 70 per cent of all personnel deployed on 31 December 2022 (see figure 3.6).¹ However, most peace operations were deployed by regional organizations and alliances, which led 38 multilateral peace operations in 2022—one more than in 2021. These took place primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. Ad hoc coalitions of states conducted six multilateral peace operations in 2022, the same as in 2021. In addition to these, there was a series of multilateral operations that aimed to contribute to security and stability but were not classified as multilateral peace operations under SIPRI's definition.

United Nations

In 2022 the UN deployed 20 multilateral peace operations—the same number as in 2021. Over the course of 2022 the number of personnel deployed in UN peace operations increased by 1.47 per cent, from 79 343 to 80 508. This modest increase breaks a trend since 2015 of consecutive year-on-year decreases in UN personnel in peace operations. The increase occurred primarily among uniformed personnel, in which deployments on 31 December 2022 were 1.6 per cent higher in comparison with December 2021. Meanwhile, the number of civilians deployed decreased by 0.68 per cent. On 31 December 2022, uniformed personnel represented 94.4 per cent of the personnel deployed in UN peace operations.

Central African Republic: MINUSCA

On 31 December 2022 the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was the largest UN peace operation, deploying 17 321 international personnel. This represents an increase of 20.1 per cent compared to 31 December 2021, when it ranked as the fourth largest UN peace operation, after the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), respectively. The increase in MINUSCA personnel reflects a UN Security Council decision to strengthen the peacekeeping operation in response to heightened

¹ 'Multilateral peace operations' include both United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions.




Figure 3.6. Number of personnel in multilateral peace operations, by type of conducting organization, 2013–22

ISAF = International Security Assistance Force; UN = United Nations.

Note: Personnel numbers are based on monthly data, with the last observation from Dec. 2022.

instability and violence in the country.² There were disagreements during the negotiations on the renewal of MINUSCA's mandate in 2021, and China and Russia both abstained in the vote. In 2022 disagreements continued and were in part related to the text's reference to 'all parties to the conflict', which would in theory include the Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armées Centrafricaines, FACA) and the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company closely tied to the Russian government and implicated in human rights abuses in the Central African Republic (CAR).³ In 2022 China and Russia abstained once again in MINUSCA's mandate renewal. However, unlike in previous years, the 2022 mandate excluded 'support for the extension of State authority' from the peacekeeping operation's priority tasks. Supporting state authority over territories was another activity in which the Wagner Group has become increasingly involved in CAR.⁴ Following the 2020–21 general elections, Wagner engagement in counteroffensives to reclaim rebel-held territory increased significantly.⁵ Moreover, the presence and activities of the Wagner Group was an increasing point of tension between the UN peacekeeping operation and the CAR government in 2022.

² UN Security Council Resolution 2566, 12 Mar. 2021.

³ On the role of the Wagner Group in sub-Saharan Africa see chapter 4, section II, in this volume.

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2659, 14 Nov. 2022.

⁵ Serwat, L. et al., 'Wagner Group operations in Africa: Civilian targeting trends in the Central African Republic and Mali', ACLED, 30 Aug. 2022.

South Sudan: UNMISS

UNMISS, which had been the largest UN peace operation since 2019, dropped to second place on 31 December 2022 with 15 579 personnel deployed—a decrease of 3.48 per cent. The security situation in South Sudan remained dire: subnational violence, abductions and revenge killings continued to take place in 2022, as well as an alarming spike in conflict-related sexual violence, which increased by 96 per cent.⁶ Nevertheless, the number of killings in South Sudan decreased by 16 per cent in 2022.⁷ Since the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the total number of violent incidents reported—including killing, injury, abduction and conflict-related sexual violence—has notably decreased.⁸ In 2022, it decreased by 27 per cent.⁹ While most violent incidents were perpetrated by community-based militias or civil defence groups (54 per cent), subnational violence involving parties to conflict victimized the largest proportion of civilians (48 per cent).¹⁰

Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO

With 15 108 deployed personnel, MONUSCO was the third largest UN peace operation on 31 December 2022, which represents a decrease of 1.34 per cent compared to 31 December 2021. During negotiations in December 2022 for its mandate renewal, some UN member states advocated for a reduction in the number of troops deployed in order to progress towards the transition plan for MONUSCO agreed in 2021.¹¹ However, the final text maintained the peacekeeping operation's strength due to the deteriorating situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resurgence of March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars, M23, see section I).¹²

Despite the UN decision to continue the peacekeeping operation until the end of 2024, demonstrations among local populations opposing MONUSCO's continuation took place in July 2022 in eastern DRC, where the operation is primarily deployed. MONUSCO's limited achievements in addressing the conflict and the consequent discontent from local populations fuelled anti-MONUSCO sentiment and violent protests. The protests left dozens

⁶ United Nations, Security Council, 'Situation in South Sudan: Report of the secretary-general', 13 Sep. 2022; and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Human Rights Division, 'Annual brief on violence affecting civilians: Jan.–Dec. 2022', 18 Mar. 2023.

⁷ UNMISS (note 6). On fatalities related to the conflict in South Sudan see chapter 2, table 2.6, in this volume.

⁸ UNMISS Human Rights Division, 'Quarterly brief on violence affecting civilians: Oct.–Dec. 2022', 17 Feb. 2023.

⁹ UNMISS (note 6).

¹⁰ UNMISS (note 6).

¹¹ Security Council Report, 'Democratic Republic of the Congo: Vote on MONUSCO mandate renewal and the 1533 sanctions regime', 19 Dec. 2022.

¹² UN Security Council Resolution 2666, 20 Dec. 2022; and United Nations, Security Council, Record of UN Security Council 9081st meeting, 29 June 2022.

dead, including four UN peacekeepers, and culminated in the operation's intervention brigade opening fire at a border post and killing two civilians.¹³ The deterioration in relations between the UN peacekeeping operation and the host country resulted in the Congolese government expelling the spokesperson of MONUSCO and discussing how to speed up the operation's withdrawal. A UN secretary-general report expected by July 2023 is supposed to discuss the potential reconfiguration of the peacekeeping operation, considering the transition plan for MONUSCO and the role of the East African Community Regional Force in the DRC (EACRF-DRC) and other existing initiatives in support of the DRC.¹⁴

Mali: MINUSMA

MINUSMA was the fourth largest UN peace operation on 31 December 2022, with 14 666 international personnel deployed—a decrease of 1.68 per cent compared to 2021. The peace operation's mandate was renewed for another year on 29 June 2022 by the UN Security Council, but with 'firm opposition' from the Malian representative at the UN to the language in the document allowing freedom of movement of MINUSMA personnel to conduct human rights investigations.¹⁵ Moreover, despite the increased reporting of human rights violations and abuses, the Malian representative affirmed that the country did not intend to implement the mandate's related provisions.¹⁶

Since MINUSMA's mandate was expanded in 2019 to include supporting the stabilization of central Mali, the peacekeeping operation has been stretched beyond capacity. The withdrawal of French troops and the suspension of most German military operations in Mali in August 2022 put MINUSMA under further stress.¹⁷ According to a UN secretary-general report from 30 March 2022, the withdrawal of the French-led Operation Barkhane and Takuba Task Force would 'undoubtedly create a security gap, with implications for MINUSMA'.¹⁸ The decisions to end these counter-terrorism operations in Mali were partly a result of heightened tensions with the Malian transitional authorities and partly due to the deployment of the Wagner Group in the country since December 2021.¹⁹

¹³ United Nations, 'DR Congo: Guterres 'outraged' over peacekeepers' aggression, calls for accountability', UN News, 31 July 2022.

¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2666 (note 12).

¹⁵ United Nations, Security Council, Record of UN Security Council 9082nd meeting, 29 June 2022.

¹⁶ UN Security Council (note 15); and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Mali: UN expert gravely concerned by deterioration of security and human rights situation', 15 Aug. 2022.

¹⁷ 'EU's Takuba force quits junta-controlled Mali', France 24, 1 July 2022; and Payen, C. and Garland, C., 'France withdraws last soldiers from Mali amid jihadist resurgence', France 24, 17 Aug. 2022.

¹⁸ United Nations, Security Council, 'Situation in Mali: Report of the secretary-general', 30 Mar. 2022.

¹⁹ On the role of the Wagner Group in Mali see chapter 4, section II, in this volume.

In November 2022, two force-contributing countries (Germany and the United Kingdom) announced their gradual withdrawal from MINUSMA following the activities of the Wagner Group.²⁰ Earlier in 2022, Sweden and Benin had already declared that they planned to withdraw from the peace operation by the end of 2023.²¹ In a clear reference to the Wagner Group, the 2022 UN Security Council resolution that renewed MINUSMA's mandate condemned 'the use of mercenaries and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses perpetrated by them'.²² In late March 2022 in the town of Moura, an estimated 300 civilians were executed by Malian armed forces and foreign soldiers, with the latter identified by several sources as Russian.²³ Moreover, troop contributors are increasingly reluctant to deploy their personnel to MINUSMA, which has been the deadliest UN peace operation for the past two years (see below).²⁴

The UN peacekeeping operation in Mali also experienced increased opposition and hostility from civil society in Bamako and the government in 2022.²⁵ On 14 July 2022 the Malian authorities suspended MINUSMA's troop rotations after arresting 49 soldiers from Côte d'Ivoire, accusing them of being mercenaries. The soldiers had travelled to Mali to support the German contingent in the peacekeeping operation.²⁶ The rotations were resumed in August, but at the end of 2022 most of the Ivorian troops, except for three female soldiers who were released as a 'humanitarian gesture', remained in detention.²⁷ Tensions between MINUSMA and the host country were further escalated when the operation's spokesperson was expelled under accusation of publishing 'false information' about the arrival of the Ivorian troops.²⁸

A UN strategic review of MINUSMA with options for its configuration was due to be published in January 2023, as requested by the UN Security Council.²⁹ In advance of the operation's mandate renewal, UN Secretary-General António Guterres suggested that an AU peace operation with a Chapter VII Security Council mandate could be an alternative to MINUSMA.³⁰

²⁰ AFP, 'UK to end deployment of 300 troops to UN mission in Mali', Defense Post, 15 Nov. 2022; 'Ivory Coast to withdraw from Mali peacekeeping force—Letter', Reuters, 15 Nov. 2022; and Köpp, D. and Hairsine, K., 'Germany deliberates pulling out of UN's Mali mission', Deutsche Welle, 17 Nov. 2022.

²¹ 'UN says Benin will terminate contribution to peacekeeping mission in Mali', Reuters, 19 May 2022; and 'Sweden announces early pullout of troops from UN Mali mission', Reuters, 3 Mar. 2022.

²² UN Security Council Resolution 2640, 29 June 2022.

²³ Human Rights Watch, 'Mali: Massacre by army, foreign soldiers', 5 Apr. 2022.

²⁴ Jezequel, J.-H., Nossiter, F. and Maiga, I., 'MINUSMA at a crossroads', International Crisis Group, 1 Dec. 2022.

²⁵ Dessu, M. K. and Yohannes, D., 'What do protests say about UN peacekeeping in Africa?', Institute for Security Studies, 28 Oct. 2022.

²⁶ 'Mali authorizes UN troop rotations after standoff', Africanews and AFP, 14 Aug. 2022.

²⁷ 'Mali releases three women from among 49 detained Ivorian soldiers', Reuters, 4 Sep. 2022.

²⁸ 'Mali expels UN spokesman adding to growing diplomatic tensions', RFI, 22 July 2022.

²⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 2640 (note 22).

³⁰ 'UN chief wants African Union force with tougher mandate for Mali', RFI, 6 May 2022.

Lebanon (UNIFIL) and South Sudan/Sudan (UNISFA)

In addition to the ‘big four’ UN peace operations, two other UN operations featured significant numbers of deployed personnel: the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Although the deployments to UNIFIL remained relatively stable in 2022, the deployments to UNISFA had decreased by 17.7 per cent on 31 December 2022 compared to 2021. This decrease to 2970 personnel reflected the UN Security Council decision to reconfigure the peace operation with a slightly reduced troop ceiling.³¹ UNISFA’s most recent mandate renewal, on 12 May 2022, maintained its new troop ceiling.³² UNISFA deployments were also affected by Ethiopia’s decision to withdraw its contingent (by far the peace operation’s largest) by April 2022 following border tensions with Sudan over the al-Fashaga area (see section I).

The Wagner Group and peace operation–host country relations

Developments in UN peace operations in 2022 demonstrated the worsening relations between some peace operations and host governments. In the cases of Mali and CAR, this deterioration was exacerbated by the presence of the Wagner Group, which (a) carried out activities within the scope of peace operations, such as the extension of state authority; (b) was accused of human rights abuses that national authorities either refused to act on or refused to acknowledge; and (c) targeted UN peace operations with disinformation campaigns that inflated anti-UN sentiment and weakened peace operations’ relations with host countries.³³ These new challenges faced by UN peace operations were directly affected by the intensification of geopolitical tensions, in particular between Russia and the West and linked to the war in Ukraine.

Fatalities in United Nations peace operations

During 2022, 74 international personnel and 27 local staff died while serving in UN peace operations (see figure 3.7), which was 21 fewer fatalities than in 2021.³⁴ Of the 74 international personnel fatalities, 53 were military personnel, 13 were international civilian personnel and 8 were police. There was a decrease in the number of fatalities across all categories of personnel compared with 2021, except for police, which had registered 2 deaths in 2021. The fatality rate for uniformed personnel in 2022 was 0.81 per 1000 uniformed personnel (see figure 3.8), 0.04 points lower than in 2021.

³¹ UN Security Council Resolution 2609, 15 Dec. 2021.

³² UN Security Council Resolution 2630, 12 May 2022.

³³ Trithart, A., ‘Disinformation against UN peacekeeping operations’, International Peace Institute, 7 Nov. 2022.

³⁴ The figures for fatalities in this section do not include the UN’s personnel category described as ‘other’, and they refer to international personnel unless otherwise specified.




Figure 3.7. Fatalities among international personnel in United Nations peace operations, 2013–22

MINUSMA = United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

Note: Fatality numbers are represented annually.

Even though the total number of fatalities in 2022 decreased, the number of hostile deaths (i.e. fatalities caused by malicious acts) among international personnel increased from 24 in 2021 to 32 in 2022. In contrast to 2021, when most of the deaths were caused by illness, in 2022 the main cause of peacekeepers' deaths was malicious acts. Military personnel, the category which tends to be most targeted by malicious acts, accounted for most of these deaths (28). In 2022, 22 peacekeepers died from illness, 11 died due to accidents, for 8 the cause of death was undetermined or unknown and 1 death was self-inflicted.

In 2022 MINUSMA continued to be the deadliest peace operation for peacekeepers, with 25 fatalities registered, although this was 10 fewer than in 2021. Of these, 15 were caused by malicious acts, meaning that even though the number of fatalities within the peace operation decreased, the proportion of hostile deaths increased from 54.3 per cent in 2021 to 60 per cent in 2022. These 15 fatalities in MINUSMA accounted for 46.9 per cent of the 32 hostile deaths registered within UN peace operations in 2022 (compared to 79.2 per cent in 2021). Excluding MINUSMA, the number of uniformed personnel fatalities was the lowest number for the past decade (49). In contrast, the rates of hostile deaths excluding MINUSMA reached their highest levels since 2017, mainly due to the high number of hostile deaths within MONUSCO.

The proportion of hostile deaths within MONUSCO increased from 7.69 per cent in 2021 to 61.9 per cent in 2022. This increase was largely due a MONUSCO helicopter that was shot down in March and killed eight




Figure 3.8. Fatality rates for uniformed personnel in United Nations peace operations, 2013–22

MINUSMA = United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

Note: Fatality numbers are represented annually.

peacekeepers in an area where clashes between M23 and the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) were taking place and due to the killing of four peacekeepers in a week of violent anti-MONUSCO protests.³⁵ Over the past decade, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and MONUSCO have been the deadliest UN peace operations for peacekeepers, but in 2022 the fatality rates of hostile deaths increased exclusively for MONUSCO (see figure 3.9).

Regional organizations and alliances

All five new operations in 2022 were established by regional organizations or alliances. As of 31 December 2022, multilateral peace operations established by regional organizations or alliances deployed a total of 32 192 personnel, an increase of 6.69 per cent compared to the 30 174 personnel deployed in 2021.

Africa

Five African regional organizations—the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—conducted a total

³⁵ UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 'MONUSCO pays tribute to the blue helmets killed in helicopter crash', 2 Apr. 2022; and 'UN honors five peacekeepers killed in eastern DRC', Africanews, 1 Aug. 2022.




Figure 3.9. Hostile death rates for uniformed personnel in three key United Nations peace operations, 2013–22

MINUSCA = United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central Africa Republic; MINUSMA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MONUSCO = UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

of 11 multilateral peace operations in 2022, which was 2 more than in 2021. The total number of personnel increased by 15.2 per cent from 21 562 to 24 840. This increase was primarily due to SADC's additional deployments to the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), ECOWAS launching the Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau (SSMGB) and the EAC launching the EACRF-DRC.

The AU was the regional organization conducting most of the African operations and deploying most personnel. This was largely due to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the largest multilateral peace operation in 2022, with 19 723 personnel on 31 December 2022. Other AU peace operations, namely the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), the AU Mission for the CAR and Central Africa (MISAC), the AU Mission in Libya, the AU Military Observer Mission to the CAR (MOUACA) and the AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (AU-MVCM) are much smaller peace operations.

On 31 October 2022 the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) requested that the AU Commission initiate the gradual drawdown and closure of MOUACA, and its mandate activities be undertaken by MISAC.³⁶ The context for this decision was the fragile security situation in CAR and uncertain financial

³⁶ African Union, 'Communiqué of the 116th meeting of the PSC, held on 31 October 2022 on the topic: The situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the operations of the African Union Military Observer Mission in Central African Republic (MOUACA)', 31 Oct. 2022.

support to MOUACA. The peace operation's deployment had already been suspended on 31 July 2022 following the end of the European Peace Facility funding, with little prospect of a funding extension.³⁷ Moreover, the security situation in the country had prevented MOUACA's deployment beyond the capital Bangui, thereby limiting the operation's ability to carry out its mandate.³⁸ By the end of 2022, the PSC had not yet established a deadline for the closure of MOUACA.

In addition to the SSMGB, ECOWAS also led the ECOWAS Mission in Gambia (ECOMIG), which has been in place since January 2017 to address the constitutional crisis that followed the 2016 national elections. On 4 December 2022 ECOWAS extended ECOMIG's mandate for a further year, instructing a gradual downsizing of the peace operation and the training of Gambian defence and security forces.³⁹ As of 31 December 2022, it deployed 1001 personnel, primarily military.

IGAD led the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), which has been monitoring compliance with the South Sudan peace agreement since 2018. Prior to that, the peace operation (under different names) successively monitored other ceasefire agreements.

SADC established SAMIM in 2021 to support Mozambique's fight against violent extremism in the province of Cabo Delgado.⁴⁰ On 12 April 2022 SADC approved the transition of SAMIM from AU scenario six (rapid deployment capability) to scenario five (multidimensional mission) with a robust mandate.⁴¹ This implied the deployment of civilian, police and correctional service personnel, in addition to military contingents currently on the ground. However, by the end of 2022, none of these additional components had been deployed to Cabo Delgado. In 2022 SAMIM almost doubled its troop deployments from 1077 in December 2021 to 1900 on 31 December 2022, largely due to an increase in the deployments from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)—the largest contingent of the peace operation.⁴² The Joint Force of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and the Rwanda National Police (RNP) also increased its presence in Mozambique from a strength of 1000 to around 2500 personnel. The Joint Force is not a multilateral peace operation, but a single-country contingent deployed through a bilateral agreement with

³⁷ Amani Africa, 'Update on the situation in CAR and the operations of MOUACA', 31 Oct. 2022.

³⁸ Amani Africa (note 37).

³⁹ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 'Final Communiqué, sixty-second ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government', 4 Dec. 2022.

⁴⁰ Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 'Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government', 23 June 2021.

⁴¹ SADC, 'Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Organ Troika of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) plus SAMIM personnel contributing countries and the Republic of Mozambique', 12 Apr. 2022.

⁴² Cabo Ligado, 'Cabo Ligado Weekly: 28 Mar.–3 Apr. 2022', 5 Apr. 2022.

the government of Mozambique. Finally, on 20 June 2022 the EAC launched the EACRF-DRC.

Europe and North America

Regional organizations and alliances from the northern hemisphere—the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—conducted 25 multilateral peace operations during 2022, which was 2 less than in 2021. While 2021 saw the closure of the largest NATO multilateral peace operation, namely the Afghanistan-based Resolute Support Mission (RSM), in 2022 the largest OSCE multilateral peace operation, the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), came to an end. The combined number of personnel deployed by these organizations decreased by 14.7 per cent, from 8588 on 31 December 2021 to 7325 on 31 December 2022.

In 2022 the EU conducted 15 missions and operations in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that met SIPRI's classification of a multilateral peace operation, which was the same number as in 2021. The EU established two military CSDP missions in 2022—the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) and the EU Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), which provides military training to the Ukrainian armed forces in Germany and Poland—but neither of these constituted a multilateral peace operation. On 17 October 2022 the Council of the EU amended the mandate of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) to enable the temporary deployment of 40 civilian monitors from that mission to Armenia. This was to monitor the international border with Azerbaijan in order to build confidence between the two countries, following a series of deadly clashes in September 2022.⁴³ However, the deployment—referred to as the EU Monitoring Capacity to Armenia (EUMCAP)—was not a separate entity and had its tasks carried out by EUMM Georgia. Therefore, it did not constitute a new peace operation. The EU eventually established a fully fledged civilian CSDP mission in Armenia that would succeed EUMCAP, but this decision was not taken until January 2023.⁴⁴ The EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Mali Sahel) and the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) remained in place despite worsening relations between the EU and the Malian authorities, but suspended their training of the Malian armed forces,

⁴³ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 Oct. 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L279/93, 18 Oct. 2022.

⁴⁴ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 Jan. 2023 on a European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L22/29, 24 Jan. 2023.

national guard and gendarmerie in April 2022 amid concerns over the presence and role of the Wagner Group in Mali.⁴⁵

With the closing of the RSM in 2021, NATO conducted one less multilateral peace operation in 2022. Kosovo Force (KFOR), which has been active since 1999, is now NATO's largest multilateral peace operation with 3747 international military personnel deployed on 31 December 2022. A slight reduction in KFOR personnel explains the decrease of 0.54 per cent in NATO personnel deployed in peace operations to 4247 on 31 December 2022. In February 2021, at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to expand the NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI).⁴⁶ However, by the end of 2022 there were no official reports of an expansion having been carried out.

The OSCE conducted eight multilateral peace operations in 2022, although only seven were active by the end of the year. As of 31 December 2022, the organization had 198 personnel, almost half of them in the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). With 87 deployed personnel, OMIK became the largest OSCE peace operation following the closure of the SMM. Also due to the SMM closing, the number of international personnel deployed to OSCE field operations had decreased by 80.8 per cent on 31 December 2022 in comparison with December 2021. Most of the OSCE operations maintained fewer than 30 international personnel during 2022 and have been active since the 1990s. In 2022 the SMM registered one fatality associated with the war in Ukraine, when a national civilian member of the operation died in an attack on Kharkiv.⁴⁷

Ad hoc coalitions

With the closure of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao, five operations conducted by ad hoc coalitions of states were active at the end of 2022. These were the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Joint Control Commission (JCC) Joint Peace-keeping Forces (JPKF) in the disputed Trans-Dniester region of Moldova; the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula; the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) on the Korean peninsula; and the Russian–Turkish Joint Monitoring Centre (RTJMC) in Azerbaijan. The number of personnel deployed in multilateral peace operations in this category decreased by 2.43 per cent in 2022, from 2341 on 31 December 2021 to 2284 on 31 December 2022.

⁴⁵ 'EU halts military training in Mali, German foreign minister to hold talks with junta', France 24, 12 Apr. 2022.

⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 'NATO Mission Iraq', accessed 28 Feb. 2023.

⁴⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'OSCE mourns death of national mission member of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine', 2 Mar. 2022.

The role of the OHR remained an internationally disputed issue in 2022, since neither China nor Russia recognized the authority of the High Representative Christian Schmid. This led Russia to suspend financial support for the OHR in April 2022.⁴⁸ The debate was heightened by the high representative's decision to impose a series of amendments to the constitution of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the election law of the country on the eve of the 2 October 2022 general elections.⁴⁹ According to the high representative, the measures aimed to improve the functionality of the federation and to ensure timely implementation of the election results.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the action was met with mixed reactions from international stakeholders, with the EU delegation to Sarajevo stressing that the decision was 'of the High Representative alone'.⁵¹

The war in Ukraine increased tensions in the region and altered the dynamics of the JCC, which comprised 10 Ukrainian observers, and the JPKF, which is made up of military contingents from Moldova, the break-away region of Trans-Dniester and Russia. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities closed the border with the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova, in part because they considered the Russian contingents stationed in the area (including the peacekeepers within the framework of the JPKF) as a potential threat.⁵² Moreover, on 8 March 2022 the Ukrainian government announced the recall of all its peace operation forces, including military observers within the JCC, to return to Ukraine and assist in the war effort.⁵³

Other multilateral operations

Multilateral organizations and ad hoc coalitions of states are increasingly deploying operations that aim to contribute to security and stability. These sometimes resemble multilateral peace operations but cannot be classified as such according to the definition applied by SIPRI. Besides EUMAM Ukraine and EUMPMP Niger, the main examples of such operations include the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, officially conducted under the political auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and

⁴⁸ Trkanjec, Z., 'Russia suspends financing of high representative in BiH', Euractiv, 20 Apr. 2022.

⁴⁹ Sahadžić, M., 'The Bonn Powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between a rock and a hard place', ConstitutionNet and International IDEA, 29 Nov. 2022.

⁵⁰ Sahadžić (note 49).

⁵¹ Delegation of the European Union (EU) to Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'EU in BiH on the decision by the high representative to amend the BiH election law and the constitution of the Federation of BiH', 2 Oct. 2022.

⁵² Calugareanu, V. and Verseck, K., 'Will the war in Ukraine spell the end of Transnistria?', Deutsche Welle, 12 Jan. 2023.

⁵³ 'Ukraine to pull troops and equipment from UN missions', Reuters, 9 Mar. 2022. At that time, in addition to the JCC, Ukraine had peacekeepers deployed to MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNISFA, UNMIK, UNMISS, UNFICYP, KFOR and OM Moldova.

the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (JF-G5S). Both are combat operations mandated by the AU and are made up of national contingents operating primarily within, and occasionally across, their own national borders. The MNJTF and the JF-G5S were established in 2015 and 2017, respectively. On 22 November 2022 the member states of the Accra Initiative—a regional security arrangement established in 2017 comprising Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger and Togo—announced another 10 000-strong military operation with the code name Multinational Joint Task Force/Accra Initiative (MNJTF/AI). The objective of the force is to halt the spread of terrorist and violent extremist groups from the Sahel to the coastal states of West Africa, including by means of joint cross-border military operations.⁵⁴

Whereas some success has been attributed to the MNJTF in terms of its ability to suppress Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, the JF-G5S has not been very successful in reducing the threat from armed groups in its main areas of operation in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.⁵⁵ In 2022 the JF-G5S was badly affected by the worsening political relations between Mali's transitional authorities and its neighbours, including the other members of the G5 Sahel, and with the European countries that have a military presence in the region, especially France. In May 2022 the Malian government announced its withdrawal from the G5 Sahel, including the JF-G5S, at which point Niger's president declared the joint force 'dead', even though the remaining contingents continued to conduct operations thereafter.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, France ended its counterterrorism Operation Barkhane in 2022 and withdrew its military from Mali in August.⁵⁷ Task Force Takuba—a multinational task force under the command of Operation Barkhane, comprising special forces from France and several other European countries—also withdrew its forces from the country in July 2022.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Africa Defence Forum, 'Accra Initiative takes aim at extremism's spread', 13 Dec. 2022.

⁵⁵ Onuoha, C., Yaw Tchie, A. E. and Llorens Zabalena, M., *A Quest to Win the Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force* (NUPI: Oslo, 2023).

⁵⁶ 'Niger president says G5 Sahel force is "dead" after Mali's departure', Reuters, 18 May 2022; and United Nations, Security Council, 'Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the secretary-general', S/2022/838, 9 Nov. 2022.

⁵⁷ Payen, C. and Garland, C., 'France withdraws last soldiers from Mali amid jihadist resurgence', France 24, 17 Aug. 2022.

⁵⁸ UN Security Council (note 56).