4. Euro-Atlantic security and institutions: rebalancing in the midst of global change

ALYSON J. K. BAILES AND ANDREW COTTEY

I. Introduction

The year 2009 was one of change, reflection and reassessment for the countries of North America and Europe. The reasons included the shock of armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, the setbacks faced by Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the impact of the global financial and economic crisis starting in the autumn of 2008. The inauguration of Barack Obama as president of the United States in January 2009 was both a result of, and a factor for, change. However, just as the difficulties exposed in 2008–2009 had built up over a longer period, finding remedies will be a tough and time-consuming challenge for the major security institutions involved—with no guarantee of success. It thus remains too early to judge whether a turning point has occurred in Euro-Atlantic security relations, let alone to map the new direction of advance.

This chapter examines the developments of 2009 and the trends they reflect with special reference to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Respectively, these organizations symbolize three different but interlocking approaches to security management in the Euro-Atlantic space: transatlantic cooperation, European integration and the pan-European approach. All of them are evolving in a global security environment where ‘security’ is increasingly interpreted in wide, multifunctional terms; where security interactions of all kinds (e.g. between regions and different categories of actors) are increasing; and hence, where institutions’ success and standing increasingly depend on their outward-looking as well as inwardly directed roles. Behind this institutional picture lies the more fundamental set of power relations and power rankings among different ‘poles’ in the world system, where—at this stage in history—the clear trend is towards a reduced dominance by the West.

Against this background and not least in the light of the last point, 2009 was ushered in with hopes of improved Western unity. President Obama’s interest in dialogue and non-coercive solutions and his openness to working with and strengthening institutions were as welcome to most Europeans as his specific policies on issues such as disarmament and climate change. However, 2009 failed to become one long celebration of renewed
transatlantic closeness for numerous reasons, including the fact that the worst tensions of US President George W. Bush’s first term in office had eased during his second term. Obama’s very style dictated a gradual exploration of new solutions, many of which received a cool initial welcome from supposed beneficiaries (including Russia). Europe and the USA still had to share the daunting burden of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, and frictions persisted over Europe’s limited military contributions there and elsewhere. Finally, the main new departures in European–US cooperation—including policy and institutional developments in response to the economic crisis—took place at the global level and in a multipolar rather than transatlantic setting. They did not necessarily strengthen the Europe-based institutions as such, and they underlined that the USA has many tasks and priorities that lie beyond—and potentially compete with—its engagement in Europe.

This chapter explores all these themes while documenting the major developments in each featured institution during 2009. Section II deals with NATO, section III with the EU and section IV with the OSCE and pan-European relations. Section V sums up the conclusions and revisits the general theme of European–US relations, present and future.

II. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO marked its 60th anniversary in 2009 with a summit meeting in April, jointly held in Strasbourg in France and Kehl in Germany, symbolizing peaceful cooperation and integration among Euro-Atlantic states since the end of World War II. In addition, in March French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France would rejoin NATO’s integrated military command system; in April Albania and Croatia became the 27th and 28th members of NATO; and in August former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen took office as NATO’s new secretary general. The year, however, was not one of celebration for NATO. Rather, it was marked by difficult debates over three issues in particular: NATO’s ongoing operation in Afghanistan, NATO’s troubled relationship with Russia and the development of a new strategic concept for the alliance.

Afghanistan

The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, by far the largest and most challenging military operation NATO has faced to date, was the biggest issue confronting the alliance in 2009. The situation in Afghanistan in 2009 was an increasingly worrying one from the perspective of the international community: the central government remained weak, unable to exert control or implement policies across much of the country; violence against both
NATO forces and Afghan army, police and government personnel and facilities—primarily in the form of gun attacks, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—continued to escalate; and the Taliban were able to operate relatively freely in significant parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan and exercised de facto control over some areas. These issues, along with deep uncertainty about the long-term political direction of the country, severely limited efforts at economic reconstruction and development.

The number of troops under NATO command in Afghanistan, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), rose from 55,100 in January 2009 to 89,400 troops by March 2010. Given that the USA is by far the largest contributor of troops in Afghanistan, US policy inevitably drives wider NATO policy in the country. The Obama Administration came to power committed to withdrawing US troops from Iraq but equally to intensifying US efforts in Afghanistan, and it initiated a comprehensive review of Afghanistan policy. Even before the policy review was completed, President Obama took two decisions that indicated important elements of the new policy. First, on 22 January Richard Holbrooke—a highly experienced diplomat, known in particular for his role in ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s—was appointed as US special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and tasked with coordinating policy towards the two countries across the US Government. The decision indicated not only the belief that US policy needed to be better coordinated but more importantly the view that Afghanistan cannot be addressed separately from Pakistan. Second, on 17 February Obama announced the deployment of an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan, stating that ‘the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan demands urgent attention and swift action . . . This increase is necessary to stabilize a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan’.

The conclusions of the Obama Administration’s policy review were announced on 27 March. The ‘core goal’ of US policy was defined as ‘to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan’. Key elements of the


policy were (a) an integrated Afghanistan–Pakistan policy, treating the two countries as ‘one challenge’ to be backed up by significantly increased US and international counterterrorism support to Pakistan; (b) increased international troop numbers in Afghanistan, with a particular emphasis on supporting the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police Force (ANP), including 4000 more US troops in addition to the 17 000 announced in February for training Afghan security forces; and (c) increased civilian resources to support stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.5

NATO’s leaders reaffirmed the alliance’s ongoing engagement in Afghanistan at the Strasbourg–Kehl Summit in April 2009, stating that ‘we remain committed for the long-run to supporting a democratic Afghanistan that does not become, once more, a base for terror attacks or a haven for violent extremism that destabilises the region and threatens the entire International Community. For this reason Afghanistan remains the alliance’s key priority’.6 In addition, NATO’s leaders agreed to establish the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to oversee the training of the ANA and ANP and to provide more trainers and mentors for the ANP, with the European member states agreeing to provide an additional 5000 troops (3000 for security relating to the September 2009 presidential elections and nearly 2000 for training the ANA).7

One central aspiration of the new NATO–US strategy was to reverse the Taliban’s gains in southern Afghanistan—in particular in Helmand province, a major centre of Taliban influence—by using the increase in troops to not only defeat the Taliban in particular engagements, but also to hold territory gained and provide security for the local population. In June a British-led offensive, involving nearly 5000 NATO troops (700 British and 4000 US) and 650 ANA troops, was launched against Taliban forces.8 This was followed in July by a US-led offensive, involving about 4000 US troops and 650 ANA and ANP troops.9

---

A second important objective of NATO–US strategy was to ensure that the Afghan presidential election would go ahead as planned in August 2009 and not be fundamentally disrupted by Taliban violence. In this basic objective NATO was successful: although insurgent attacks increased before the election, the election went ahead. Nevertheless, voter turnout was low, with some estimates putting it at only 35 per cent nationwide and less than 10 per cent in some districts of Helmand and Kandahar. The election also appears to have been seriously marred by fraud in favour of the incumbent president, Hamid Karzai. Amid much controversy, Karzai was forced to accept a run-off election against his main challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, in November. Just before the run-off election, however, Abdullah withdrew, arguing that a transparent election was not possible. The run-off election was then cancelled and Karzai declared president. The presidential election was a significant setback for democratic development in Afghanistan and seriously damaged Karzai’s standing.

In the wake of the August presidential election, President Obama ordered a further review of US policy towards Afghanistan. In December Obama announced the outcome of this review, arguing that ‘the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated . . . Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards . . . The status quo is not sustainable’. Specifically, he announced the deployment of an additional 30 000 US troops to join the roughly 70 000 troops already in Afghanistan and an initial withdrawal date of mid-2011. According to Obama, the US strategy was threefold: an intensified military effort to turn the tide against the Taliban but also to create the circumstances in which security could gradually be handed over to Afghan forces and NATO and US forces could leave; a parallel civilian surge to support reconstruction and development in Afghanistan; and a strengthened partnership with Pakistan to counter terrorism. Following Obama’s announcement, foreign ministers from NATO members and other ISAF participating states announced that they would be ‘investing more in training, equipping and sustaining’ Afghan security forces, and non-US states agreed to supply an additional 7000 troops. This was followed by an international donor conference in London in January 2010 that brought the Afghan Government together

with the more than 70 countries and international organizations engaged in the country.\textsuperscript{13} The conclusions from the conference called for a phased transition to an ‘Afghan security lead’ beginning in late 2010 or early 2011, an expansion of the ANA and ANP, an increase in international forces to train Afghan security forces and a parallel increase in international civilian personnel and resources in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14}

As of early 2010, the outcome of NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan remained deeply uncertain. The extent to which the US-led military surge would succeed in defeating the Taliban, enabling NATO forces to hold territory and thereby facilitate reconstruction, was unclear. Strengthening the Afghan security forces to the point where NATO can transfer responsibility for the country’s security will be an extremely difficult task. Meanwhile, there is ongoing debate over how far it is desirable or possible to negotiate with the Taliban—or elements thereof—in order to bring them into Afghanistan’s political process.\textsuperscript{15} Although other NATO governments have formally supported the US-led strategy in Afghanistan, there is significant scepticism about the direction of that strategy.\textsuperscript{16} This scepticism was reflected in decisions by the Canadian and Dutch governments to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, discussions of similar withdrawals in other NATO countries and the reluctance of France and Germany to significantly increase their troop presences in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{17} Afghanistan appears likely to pose deeply troubling challenges for NATO in 2010 and beyond.

\textbf{NATO and Russia}

The August 2008 conflict in Georgia severely disrupted NATO–Russia relation. In response to Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, NATO’s foreign ministers decided that NATO ‘cannot continue with business as usual’ with Russia and put meetings of the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) on hold.\textsuperscript{18} In 2009, however, political and institutional ties between NATO


\textsuperscript{18} NATO, Statement: meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers, Brussels, 19 Aug. 2008, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_29950.htm>; and NATO,
and Russia were gradually restored. The process began in December 2008 when NATO’s foreign ministers agreed on ‘a measured and phased approach’ to re-establishing relations with Russia; ‘mandated the Secretary General to re-engage with Russia at the political level; agreed to informal discussions in the NRC; and requested the Secretary General to report back to us prior to any decision to engage Russia formally in the NRC’.\textsuperscript{19} Russia responded by stating that ‘the alliance is returning to positions of realism. A majority of its countries did not tow behind attempts to reanimate the imaginary threat from the East in the Cold War spirit and are aware of the counterproductiveness of the absence of dialogue with Russia on key security issues’.\textsuperscript{20} In March 2009 NATO’s foreign ministers went further, agreeing to resume NRC meetings at the foreign ministerial level.\textsuperscript{21} At the Strasbourg–Kehl Summit, NATO’s leaders endorsed the decision to resume cooperation with Russia, stating that

Despite our current disagreements, Russia is of particular importance to us as a partner and neighbour. NATO and Russia share common security interests ... We are committed to using the NATO–Russia Council as a forum for political dialogue on all issues—where we agree and disagree—with a view towards resolving problems, addressing concerns and building practical cooperation.\textsuperscript{22}

In June 2009 the first foreign ministerial–level meeting of the NRC since the conflict in Georgia took place. Summarizing the meeting, NATO’s secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stated that ‘the NRC, which has been in the neutral stand for almost a year, is now back in gear’, the spirit of the meeting had been ‘open and constructive’ and that, while differences over Georgia and other issues had not been papered over, there was agreement ‘not to let those disagreements bring the whole NRC train to a halt’.\textsuperscript{23} NATO and Russia agreed to restart relations at the political level and to re-establish military-to-military contacts. They discussed specific areas for cooperation, including Afghanistan, counterterrorism, fighting piracy, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and counternarcotics. After taking office as NATO’s secretary general in August 2009, Anders

Fogh Rasmussen signalled that building a more durable partnership with Russia would be one of his key aims. In his first major speech, Fogh Rasmussen called for a ‘new beginning’ in NATO–Russia relations and proposed three steps to accomplish that goal: reinforcing practical cooperation, rejuvenating the NRC and conducting a joint review of 21st century security challenges. In December 2009 the NRC met at foreign ministerial level again, agreeing to launch a joint review of 21st century common security challenges, adopting an NRC work programme for 2010 and approving a set of measures aimed at improving the working methods of the NRC. This was followed by a visit to Moscow by Fogh Rasmussen, during which he met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, parliamentary leaders and other Russian officials. In January 2010 NATO and Russian chiefs of defence met—the first high-level NATO–Russia military contacts since the conflict in Georgia—and agreed on a framework for military-to-military cooperation.

Developments in three other areas—NATO enlargement, missile defence and Afghanistan—had a significant bearing on NATO–Russia relations in 2009 and helped to facilitate improved ties. NATO’s eastward enlargement has been a source of tension with Russia since the alliance’s post-cold war enlargement process was launched in the mid-1990s. The issue of former Soviet republics, specifically Georgia and Ukraine, joining NATO is particularly sensitive, with Russia strongly opposing such a development and NATO divided on the issue. While stopping short of formally offering membership to Georgia and Ukraine, NATO’s Bucharest Summit statement in April 2008 that these countries ‘will become members of NATO’ and that it had decided to ‘begin a period of intensive engagement’ with them in order to conclude membership action plans (MAPs) was an important part of the background to the August 2008 conflict in Georgia.

In the wake of the conflict, however, the likelihood of Georgia or Ukraine joining NATO has diminished: NATO members appear reluctant to antagonize Russia by rapidly advancing either country’s membership pros-

---

pects. In 2008–2009 NATO adopted the position of formally reaffirming its 2008 Bucharest decisions but not concluding MAPs with Georgia and Ukraine and instead supporting them through the NATO–Georgia Commission (NGC, established in 2008) and the NATO–Ukraine Commission (NUC, established in 1997) and annual national programmes (ANPs) of cooperation. For the short-to-medium term, NATO membership for Georgia or Ukraine appears to be off the political agenda, and the issue has been at least partly neutralized as a source of tension between NATO and Russia. Nevertheless, differences of principle between NATO and Russia over the alliance’s enlargement remain and could re-emerge in the future.

US missile defence plans were a further source of tension between NATO and Russia in the 2000s. In particular, the Bush Administration’s plans to deploy missile defence interceptors in Poland and related radar systems in the Czech Republic, as part of larger plans for missile defence of US national territory, were strongly opposed by Russia. The Obama Administration came to power committed to reviewing US missile defence policy. In September 2009 President Obama announced the outcome of his administration’s missile defence policy review: US policy was refocused on existing short- and medium-range missiles, rather than on long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles, which it argued posed a less immediate threat, and on existing available technologies, rather than on those under longer-term development. In effect, the Obama Administration’s policy shifted US policy towards defending NATO territory from attack by short- and intermediate-range missiles and away from the longer-term goal of defence of US territory from long-range missiles, while not entirely abandoning the latter goal. Specifically, the new policy included shelving the plans for the deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. While reflecting a reassessment of threats and technology, it was clearly hoped that the review would also help to address Russia’s concerns.

NATO and the USA also sought to strengthen cooperation with Russia on missile defence. At their July 2009 Moscow Summit, Obama and Medvedev agreed that their countries would undertake a joint assessment of the threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation and explore the spectrum of options for responding to missile threats; and, later in the year, Fogh Rasmussen argued that missile defence should be a central element of

---

NATO–Russia cooperation. While these shifts contributed to the overall improvement in NATO–Russia relations in 2009, tensions remained over missile defences. At the end of 2009 Putin warned that US missile defence plans still posed a threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent; that Russia would, if necessary, enhance its offensive nuclear forces to counter US missile defences; and that progress in Russian–US strategic nuclear arms control was linked to the missile defence issue.

Afghanistan was another factor in renewed NATO–Russia cooperation in 2009. NATO members and Russia share common concerns in relation to instability in Afghanistan, Islamic extremism and the drug trade. The most substantive area of NATO–Russia cooperation in relation to Afghanistan has been the transit across Russian airspace and territory of supplies and equipment for NATO forces in Afghanistan. In response to the increasing attacks on NATO’s supply convoys in southern Afghanistan (coming via Pakistan, the main route for the transit of such supplies), from late 2008 Russia indicated willingness to expand its bilateral transit arrangements with NATO members that had been limited to air transit of non-lethal equipment. In November 2008 Germany became the first NATO member to gain Russia’s permission to use its railway system to transit military goods bound for Afghanistan. In July 2009, during the Medvedev–Obama summit, Russia and the USA concluded an agreement that permits 4500 US flights per year through Russian airspace to Afghanistan, including those carrying lethal equipment.

In 2009 NATO–Russia relations took on a new tone that was characterized by political will on both sides to rebuild and, if possible, deepen the relationship. There was a willingness to pursue cooperation despite significant disagreements and a desire to develop more substantive practical

---


cooperation. The relationship, however, is still a fragile one. Differences remain—over NATO enlargement, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), missile defence, Georgia and Russia’s policies in the former Soviet space.\textsuperscript{36} Much of the Russian political and military elite still perceives NATO as a major threat. In NATO there is ongoing debate over the extent to which Russia poses a military threat, with some Central European member states calling for enhanced defence planning and preparations vis-à-vis Russia. The fragility of the relationship was indicated by other developments in 2009: the expulsion from NATO headquarters of Russian diplomats accused of spying and the retaliatory expulsion of diplomats from NATO’s information office in Moscow, NATO military exercises in Georgia in May which Russia described as a ‘provocation’ and Belarusian–Russian military exercises in Belarus in September which Poland’s defence minister, Bogdan Klich, described as ‘a demonstration of strength’.\textsuperscript{37} As illustrated by the 1999 conflict in Kosovo (when Russia broke off ties with NATO) and the 2008 conflict in Georgia (when NATO broke off ties with Russia), the NATO–Russia relationship can easily be disrupted by policy decisions on either side or by unexpected events. Building a more durable NATO–Russia partnership will remain a challenging, long-term task.

\textbf{Towards a new strategic concept}

At the Strasbourg–Kehl Summit, NATO leaders agreed to develop a new strategic concept for NATO. There was consensus that the alliance's existing 1999 strategic concept—coming before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA and NATO's intervention in Afghanistan—was now an outdated document and that NATO needed a redefined mission that could act as the basis for consensus among member states and sustain long-term public support.

The mandate from the Strasbourg–Kehl Summit tasked the secretary general ‘to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit’.\textsuperscript{38} The new strategic concept will be developed in a three-phase process: (a) a reflection phase, which began in September 2009 and is to be completed in early 2010,

\textsuperscript{36} For a summary and other details of the CFE Treaty see annex A in this volume. On developments in 2009 see chapter 11, section II, in this volume.


involving a series of seminars to discuss the range of issues and challenges facing NATO; (b) a consultation phase, during which the group of experts will visit NATO member states to discuss their findings and proposals and which will conclude with the group of experts submitting their analysis and recommendations to the secretary general in April 2010; (c) and a drafting and negotiation phase from summer 2010, during which the secretary general will prepare a draft strategic concept, which will then be presented to heads of state and government for approval at a NATO summit to be held in Lisbon in late 2010.39

NATO’s two post-cold war strategic concepts, of 1991 and 1999, were developed through standard processes of intergovernmental drafting and negotiation among NATO’s member states. In contrast, the 2009–10 strategic concept process resembles that surrounding the 1967 Harmel Report, which involved a wide-ranging process of reflection in NATO in 1966–67 on NATO’s purposes and strategy.40 The Harmel Report was particularly significant because it crystallized a new NATO political strategy (the Harmel Doctrine) combining NATO’s traditional roles of defence and deterrence with the parallel tasks of engagement and cooperation with the Eastern bloc—a strategy that provided the broad political consensus on which NATO operated for the next two decades. Clearly, it is hoped that the new strategic concept can provide a similar long-term basis for NATO.

The list of issues facing NATO in developing its new strategic concept is dauntingly long: the fundamental *raison d’être* of NATO; the balance between NATO’s role in defending members’ territory and its role elsewhere in the world; the nature and implications of the Article 5 security guarantee at the heart of the NATO treaty; the long-term direction of, and limits to, NATO enlargement; the nature and future development of NATO’s various partnerships with non-members and other international organizations; the long-term character of NATO’s relations with Russia; NATO’s role in addressing ‘new’ security threats such as proliferation, terrorism, cybersecurity, energy security and climate change; the place of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy and NATO’s roles in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; the long-term development of NATO’s military infrastructure and member states’ armed forces; and NATO’s internal political and military decision-making structures. The difficulty of the policy challenges that these issues raise and the diversity of views in NATO—both on its overall future and on specific issues—suggest that

39 The 12-member group of experts is chaired by Madeleine Albright, the former US secretary of State, with its members reflecting the geographic breadth of NATO’s membership. On NATO’s new strategic concept see the special section on NATO’s website, <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>.

achieving the kind of long-term consensus embodied in the Harmel Doctrine will be a difficult task indeed.

III. The European Union

In a report to the European Council in December 2008 about the implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, wrote that ‘The European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.’ Solana quoted the three main factors he cited were the enlargement of the EU, which had ‘spread democracy and prosperity across our continent’; the commitments enshrined in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards non-member states in the east, south-east and south; and the EU’s interventions in crises and conflicts abroad using the instrument of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP), which celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2009. If Solana had been speaking of the totality of EU activities, not just the sphere of CFSP, he could also have cited the EU’s growing role in such non-military dimensions of security—at home and abroad—as financial and economic stability, energy, the management of climate change, public health, migration and border control, transport safety, and the combating of terrorism, crime, smuggling, human trafficking and proliferation as well as the promotion of human security through aid and good-governance policies.

Solana recognized, however, that the EU has struggled to cope with its expanding and increasingly explicit strategic role in its own continent’s security and in the world. Like NATO, it faces the challenge of transforming its policies and its instruments in a testing environment, while trying to integrate and reconcile a much larger range of members. Solana himself, in the December 2008 report, called on the EU to be ready to ‘shape events’, to think strategically, to be ‘effective and visible around the

---


42 The ENP is based on European Commission strategy proposals dating from 2004; participants include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The Commission’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. See the ENP website, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/>; and European Commission, External Relations, Eastern Partnership, 29 Mar. 2010, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/>. The ESDP was launched by European Council decisions in Dec. 1999 in the framework of the CFSP dating from the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. It allows military as well as civilian capabilities to be used under EU command for purposes of crisis management, and humanitarian and rescue missions. The first ESDP missions both inside and outside Europe were approved in 2003.
world' and to 'operate in a timely and coherent manner'. The whole aim of the redesign of EU governance enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon was to overcome these weaknesses by deepening European unity to match the scale of geographical and functional widening. The treaty finally entered into force on 1 December 2009—more than five years after the EU enlargement in 2004 whose concomitant and corrective it was meant to be.

**EU enlargement**

Since the entry of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 into the EU, the EU has had 21 members in common with NATO; and its challenges regarding further expansion lie primarily in the same areas, namely the Western Balkans and the nearer parts of the former Soviet Union. Turkey has also been negotiating for EU membership since 2006 but has had some chapters of its talks frozen since October 2008 because of disputes arising from the lack of a reunification settlement on the divided island of Cyprus. This problem was highlighted again in December 2009 when Turkey missed a deadline for opening its ports to vessels from the Republic of Cyprus, although some progress was made by the Turkish authorities during the year on other contentious fronts such as Turkey’s relationship with Armenia. Some EU members, such as France and Germany, hold more general reservations about Turkish membership. An application for EU entry was also received from Iceland in July 2009 in the wake of the especially severe impact in that country of the economic crisis. A quick start to accession talks—perhaps in the spring of 2010—was expected at that time, although the outcome will be subject to a referendum in Iceland, and Icelandic public support for the EU declined steeply during 2009.

---


44 In 2004, 10 countries joined the EU: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

45 EU membership candidates include Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; potential EU membership candidates include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Kosovo (under UN Security Council Resolution 1244), Montenegro and Serbia. Croatia, Turkey, Albania and Iceland are also members of NATO. ‘Candidate country’ status is granted to a state when its application to join the EU is officially accepted by the European Council; ‘potential candidates’ are those states that are pursuing membership application. On the framework for EU negotiations with the Western Balkan countries see European Commission, ‘The stabilisation and association process’, [n.d.], <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/index_en.htm>.

46 The Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU, although Turkey recognizes only the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and UN negotiations have yet to produce a peace settlement. One of Turkey’s disputes with the Republic of Cyprus is regarding the non-implementation of promised EU benefits for Northern Cyprus.
EU public opinion has for some years reflected an enlargement fatigue linked with concerns on migration, employment and cultural dilution. The more general problem of overstretch was highlighted again in late 2008 and 2009 by the depth of the economic crisis in such new member states as Hungary and Latvia, requiring EU neighbours and banks to help sustain them and incidentally further deferring the prospect of most new members' adoption of the euro.\(^{47}\) Only in the Western Balkans does the EU have such powerful motives to consolidate peace through integration that the enlargement process continues to move cautiously forward. Croatia has been in accession talks since 2005, and an obstacle regarding sea boundary disputes with Slovenia was overcome during 2009. Following the earlier examples of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Montenegro—which applied for entry in 2005 and 2008, respectively—Albania formally applied for EU entry in April and Serbia in December 2009. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a further potential candidate holding a Stabilization and Association Agreement. The feasibility of Kosovo's eventual entry is under consideration, although some EU members do not recognize its independence.

**Eastern neighbours**

Unlike NATO, the EU has not yet seriously contemplated membership for states like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine but rather handles these—with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus—in the ENP framework, where each partner may negotiate an action plan for cooperation and reform.\(^{48}\) On 7 May 2009 a joint meeting of the EU and these states at Prague adopted a joint declaration on 'Eastern Partnership' designed to add new dynamism but also more rigorous standards for internal reform, following the lessons of the 2008 Georgia–Russia conflict when EU leaders were drawn in as mediators and the EU supplied a monitoring force.\(^{49}\)

EU–Russia relations returned to near-normalcy in 2009 following the EU's postponement of negotiations on a new cooperation agreement in

---

\(^{47}\) Slovakia adopted the euro on 1 Jan. 2009.

\(^{48}\) While generally seen as an advance, the current ENP falls short of the Eastern partners' hopes regarding free trade and visa-free travel, since France, Germany and Italy rejected more generous provisions. On the ENP and Eastern Partnership see note 42.

mid-2008 because of the Georgia–Russia conflict. The EU sought to broker difficulties between Russia and Ukraine that might lead to further interruptions of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine, and in December 2009 Ukraine reached agreement with Russia on nuclear energy cooperation.\footnote{On this and other details regarding EU–Russia developments see the Russian section of the European Commission’s External Relations website, \textless http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/\textgreater .}

Also relevant to EU–Russia relations was the Council of the European Union’s adoption on 8 December 2009 of guidelines for an EU policy in the Arctic that would prioritize the environment and seek to pre-empt conflict over resources by strengthening multilateral governance in the region.\footnote{Council of the European Union, ‘Conclusions on Arctic issues’, Brussels, 8 Dec. 2009, \textless http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/111814.pdf\textgreater .}

What remains more elusive is a clear EU strategy for managing Europe’s own energy dependence on Russia—or indeed, any other critical aspect of energy policy. Familiar issues include the differences between Germany and several smaller states over the security implications of such dependence, and reluctance in France and elsewhere to liberalize the internal energy market even for EU suppliers.

### EU operations


Following the launch of five missions in 2008, none were created in 2009.\footnote{See appendix 3A in this volume.}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccccccc}
\hline
 & France & Germany & Italy & UK & Spain & Poland & Netherlands & Sweden \\
\hline
Military missions, 2008 & 5 470 & 2 045 & 1 274 & 805 & 708 & 774 & 504 & 472 \\
Civilian missions, 2009 & 275 & 259 & 282 & 125 & 64 & 158 & 62 & 143 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Selected European Union member states’ personnel contributions to Common Security and Defence Policy missions}
\end{table}
The proliferation of small missions has caused concern given the administrative burdens involved and has been aggravated by lack of clear organizational models (among others for civil–military interaction), poor lesson learning and complicated funding systems. Those who originally saw the CSDP as a way to harmonize member states’ defence efforts at higher levels have also been disappointed, since great disparities remain in member states’ total spending, in the effectiveness of that spending (including the share of equipment), and in what states will give for missions abroad (including the CSDP ones). Countries do not necessarily contribute to CSDP actions in proportion to their ability, as some see reason to prioritize other NATO-led, United Nations-led or ad hoc operations—an obvious case being the United Kingdom’s much larger troop contributions in Afghanistan and (formerly) Iraq (see table 4.1). The basic quandary is that CSDP efforts are doubly a matter of choice: the missions are not designed for member states’ direct security needs, and the assignment of assets is left to states’ own initiative in ‘bottom-up’ and ad hoc fashion. There are limits to what the tightening of common qualitative specifications—currently enshrined in the Headline Goal 2010—can achieve so long as nothing in the CSDP is legally binding, and the limited objectives of the CSDP prevent the EU, in effect, from addressing the total design of members’ forces (including nuclear assets).

Frustrations over deficient capabilities and limited impact have inspired much debate on the way forward in the CSDP, with prescriptions that range from concentrating on the few most capable states to finding a way around the remaining obstacles to EU–NATO cooperation. The need to accommodate a wide variety of national aims and attitudes has kept the basic aim of the CSDP somewhat vague and ambiguous from the start. The Helsinki decisions of 1999 spoke of ‘conflict prevention and management’ without specifying which conflicts particularly required EU intervention and with what desired outcomes.

In practice, the pattern of CSDP missions has followed opportunity more than design, falling roughly into three categories: major efforts in the Bal-

---

54 For military missions, only limited ‘common costs’ are covered from EU funds under the ‘Athena’ financing mechanism, which was updated by the Council in Dec. 2008.
kans, serving Europe's own security; moderately risky but transient missions in developing regions, often echoing former colonial responsibilities; and very small, specialized, low-risk deployments in neighbouring areas such as the Caucasus and the Middle East. The conservative approach to risk has, at least, avoided any serious scandals or disasters and the EU has not, as some feared in 1999, undergone a general militarization of its strategic character and image. In this light, the CSDP’s limitations also reflect the overall balance of EU purposes and competences which are heavily slanted towards non-military, non-conflict dimensions of security. The longer-term question is, of course, whether NATO can indefinitely—and effectively—relieve the EU of the need to assume a heavier role in Europe's own defence.

The Treaty of Lisbon

When the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon finally came into force on 1 December 2009, it created (among other things) the posts of a long-term president of the European Council and a high representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will also (unlike Solana) be a vice-president of the European Commission. The European Council’s decision in November 2009 to give these jobs to the little-known Herman van Rompuy (of Belgium) and Catherine Ashton (of the UK), respectively, disappointed those who sought strong central leadership and a clearer ‘single address’ for external partners. The choices may be explained by states’ caution over transferring the initiative to Brussels too fast, but perhaps also by a focus on administrative competence. The HR in particular must negotiate with the Commission the creation of a single European External Action Service combining all previously separate EU staffs and funds for diplomacy, security and defence (as well as staff to be seconded from national foreign ministries). It has been argued that the right time for bolder appointments will come the next time around, in 2013.

Other security-related innovations of the treaty are more subtle and incremental, not least because several concrete ideas from the Constitutional Treaty of 2004 had been implemented earlier. The principle of unanimity still prevails in the CFSP and the CSDP, and no joint, standing EU forces are foreseen. The powers of the Commission and the European Parliament in this sphere of policy remain limited. Four significant

---

59 On the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe see note 43.
novelties are (a) an expanded definition of the missions covered by the CSDP, to include military assistance and disarmament tasks among others; (b) the introduction of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ in defence, whereby a limited group of member states can adopt higher standards and specific goals for equipment cooperation and deployable forces—operational tasks may also be delegated to such groups; (c) a provision for mutual assistance in the case of armed aggression against a member state, qualified by references to the primacy of NATO for its members, and to the ‘specific character’ of non-allied countries’ policies; and (d) the incorporation into the Lisbon Treaty of a ‘solidarity’ commitment based on a political declaration in March 2004 (after terrorist attacks in Madrid), whereby states will aid each other with military and other resources, on request, in response to terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters.\(^{60}\)

While the treaty defines steps to elaborate items b and d, all four elements are essentially formulaic and permissive, their translation to action depending on each country’s choice in specific cases. A more serious limitation is that all of these elements apply in the traditional ‘second pillar’ of Council-led external action and cannot solve the larger challenge of coordination between the CFSP, the CSDP and the EU’s financial, economic and functional strengths, or indeed its internal security and border security policies. Yet such synergies are ultimately the key to EU effectiveness in specific crises and to the coherence of the EU’s whole strategic personality. The next opportunity to review the EU’s progress in these areas should be in June 2010 when the European Council is due to receive a report on future strategy from an independent ‘reflection group’, who were selected in 2008.\(^{61}\) Most likely, however, as in the past, the power of events will determine the speed and success of Europe’s strategic maturation.

IV. Renewing pan-European security cooperation?

Developments since 2008 have triggered an intense new round of debate on pan-European security structures. The 2008 conflict in Georgia was a dramatic failure for Europe’s existing security institutions. In the wake of that conflict, concerns over a possible new cold war between Russia and

\(^{60}\) A further change important for internal security is the introduction of qualified majority voting on police and judicial matters in the EU’s area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Ireland and the UK have an opt-out from this clause but may opt in to new decisions on a case-by-case basis (as Denmark will also be able to do in the future). See Quille, G., *The Lisbon Treaty and its Implications for CFSP/ESDP*, Briefing Paper (European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union: Brussels, Feb. 2008).

\(^{61}\) The international group consisting of 8 men and 4 women and led by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales was nominated by the European Council in Oct. 2008 and given its mandate 2 months later, following a French initiative. Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, 14368/08, Brussels, 16 Oct. 2008; and the Reflection Group website, <http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/>. 
the West intensified, triggering debate on what measures might be taken to avoid such a confrontation. In the USA, one of the first major foreign policy steps of the Obama Administration was its call to ‘press the reset button’ on relations with Russia. More concretely, since 2008 Russia has explicitly called for new pan-European security arrangements and in particular a new European security treaty. In response to these Russian proposals, the OSCE launched the ‘Corfu process’ to review and revive the OSCE’s role.

**Russia’s proposed European security treaty**

Russia’s proposals for a European security treaty were first advanced by President Medvedev in a speech to German political, parliamentary and civic leaders in Berlin in June 2008. Medvedev argued that ‘we cannot resolve Europe’s problems until we achieve a sense of identity and an organic unity between all of its integral components, including the Russian Federation . . . Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day. We need to talk today about unity between the whole Euro-Atlantic area from Vancouver to Vladivostok’. As a concrete step towards these objectives, he called for ‘a legally binding treaty on European security . . . a regional pact [which] could achieve a comprehensive resolution of the security indivisibility and arms control issues in Europe that are of such concern to us all’. Medvedev’s proposals were further developed in October 2008 when he called for ‘a new European security treaty’ as the basis for ‘an integrated and solid system of comprehensive security’. These proposals have been a central theme of Russian diplomacy since 2008.

In November 2009 Russia published a draft of its proposed European security treaty, arguing that the treaty would ‘finally get rid of the legacy of the Cold War’. Under the draft treaty, ‘security measures’ taken by states (individually or collectively, including by military alliances) will ‘be imple-

---

62 On the proposed European security treaty also see chapter 11 in this volume.
63 Medvedev, D., President of Russia, Speech at meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders, Berlin, 5 June 2008, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml>.
66 ‘European security treaty “to end cold war legacy”: Medvedev’, Agence France-Presse, 29 Nov. 2009.
mented with due regard to security interests’ of all signatories. States would agree (a) not to ‘undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting significantly [the] security’ of other signatories; (b) not to allow decisions taken by ‘military alliances, coalitions or organizations’ of which they are members to ‘affect significantly [the] security of any Party or Parties to the Treaty’; (c) and not to allow the use of their own or other states’ territory for ‘the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack’. If a signatory determines that ‘a violation or a threat of violation’ of the treaty exists, it may request ‘consultations’ with the relevant parties, which shall be held in an agreed number of days. Any party to such consultations may propose the convening of a ‘Conference of the Parties’, which shall be held in a specified number of days and where decisions will be taken by consensus and be binding. ‘In case of an armed attack or a threat of such attack’ against a signatory, an extraordinary conference of the parties will be convened ‘immediately’; the decisions of such a conference would ‘be taken by unanimous vote and shall be binding’, but the state or states which have carried out the attack would be excluded from the decision. In addition, ‘every Party shall be entitled to consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself. . . . it shall be entitled to render the attacked Party . . . the necessary assistance, including the military one’. Clearly, the Russian proposal envisages something closely approximating to a pan-European collective security system in which all states commit to act if any signatory faces armed attack.

A number of motivations appear to lie behind the Russian proposal. The overarching objective is to establish a new European security architecture in which Russia is included as a full and equal partner. More concrete Russian motivations, however, relate to NATO—in particular the desire to prevent further enlargement, unilateral military action (such as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999) and the eastward extension of NATO’s military infrastructure. Medvedev has thus argued that the new European security architecture should be based on three ‘nos’: ‘no ensuring one’s security at the expense of others. No allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the unity of the common security space. And finally, no development of military alliances that would threaten the security of other parties’. Securing the right to take unilateral action if deemed necessary also seems a concern: hence, the reference in the draft treaty to the right of

68 European security treaty (note 67), Article 2.  
69 European security treaty (note 67), Article 5.  
70 European security treaty (note 67), Article 6.  
71 European security treaty (note 67), articles 7 and 8.  
72 European security treaty (note 67), Article 7, para. 2.  
73 Medvedev (note 64).
a state to consider an armed attack on another state as an attack against itself and to provide assistance to any state so attacked.

The OSCE Corfu process

In response to Russia’s proposals and the emerging debate on pan-European security, at the December 2008 OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki, Finland’s foreign minister Alexander Stubb, as OSCE chairman-in-office (CIO), organized an informal working lunch, attended by 52 OSCE ministers, to discuss the future of European security. As Stubb summarized the meeting, ‘It was refreshing, it was frank, it was open, and it was analytical, and that in and of itself to me is part of the spirit of Helsinki.’\(^{74}\) According to Stubb, there was ‘a broad understanding’ that the OSCE was ‘the most suitable venue’ for further discussions of European security.\(^{75}\) Finland also included in the statements and decisions from the meeting a CIO perception paper that sought to reaffirm the role of the OSCE and the principles and commitments on which it is based and to place the OSCE as the primary venue for further discussions.\(^{76}\)

The dialogue initiated at the December 2008 Helsinki Summit was continued at a series of meetings in Vienna—where the OSCE is based—in the first half of 2009. These discussions were followed by an informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers, convened by the Greek CIO, on the island of Corfu. The Corfu meeting was attended by 51 foreign ministers and resulted in agreement on ‘the need for an open, sustained, wide-ranging and inclusive dialogue on security’ to be taken forward through a ‘Corfu process’.\(^{77}\) Following this, OSCE ambassadors met regularly in Vienna in the second half of 2009 to take the process forward.

In a document adopted at the December 2009 Ministerial Council meeting in Athens, OSCE foreign ministers reaffirmed ‘the vision of a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security’, declared it their ‘highest priority . . . to re-establish our trust and confidence, as well as to recapture the sense of common purpose that brought together our predecessors in Helsinki almost 35 years ago’ and agreed ‘to


continue and further develop’ the Corfu process.\(^\text{78}\) The Corfu process should ‘build on three basic guidelines’: ‘adherence to the concept of comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security’, ‘compliance with OSCE norms, principles and commitments in all three OSCE dimensions’ and ‘determination to strengthen partnership and cooperation in the OSCE area’.

OSCE foreign ministers also tasked the OSCE chairmanship in 2010 (held by Kazakhstan) to continue to develop the Corfu process through ‘regular informal meetings, at the level of permanent representatives’, with the chairmanship to provide, by the end of June 2010, an interim report summarizing the proposals put forward.\(^\text{79}\) The dialogue is to focus on eight areas: (a) implementation of all OSCE norms, principles and commitments; (b) the OSCE’s role in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; (c) arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes; (d) transnational and multidimensional threats and challenges; (e) economic and environmental challenges; (f) human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as democracy and the rule of law; (g) enhancing the OSCE’s effectiveness; and (h) interaction with other organizations and institutions.\(^\text{80}\)

**Prospects**

What are the prospects for a new deal on pan-European security? There are good reasons to doubt that a European security treaty will be adopted in anything like the form proposed by Russia and that, even if it were, it would change pan-European security dynamics in the ways hoped for by Russia. From a theoretical perspective, all-encompassing collective security systems of the type proposed by Russia face severe and probably insuperable obstacles. In particular, they presume that states, especially the major powers, will be able to agree on what constitutes a threat, an act of aggression or a situation warranting the use of military force and on how to respond in such circumstances. Such agreement is rarely, if ever, the case—as the two defining European crises of the post-cold war era, in Kosovo in 1999 and in Georgia in 2008, starkly illustrated.\(^\text{81}\) To the extent that Russia’s goal is to constrain NATO, NATO member states are unlikely to

---


accept any agreement which formally limits NATO’s decision making or the right, in principle, to extend membership to other European states. Western governments are also sceptical of approaches that emphasize legally binding constraints, arguing that such treaties are unenforceable and cannot resolve what are essentially political differences between states. In addition, legally binding treaties require ratification by relevant national procedures, creating an additional obstacle to their conclusion and implementation (in particular in the USA, where the Senate zealously guards its right to ratify treaties).

The proposal raises an additional sensitive issue: how far to reopen the existing OSCE acquis, in particular in the area of democracy and human rights. Here, Russia and some of the other former Soviet states favour a ‘Helsinki II’ approach that would involve reopening OSCE commitments on democracy and human rights or downgrading existing OSCE processes and institutions for the monitoring and promotion of these commitments. In contrast, the ‘Helsinki plus’ approach, favoured by Western states, emphasizes maintaining the existing OSCE acquis in this area and exploring how it and mechanisms for implementing and supporting it may be strengthened. Behind this issue are deep—perhaps even fundamental—differences between the Western democracies and Russia and some of the former Soviet states. Nevertheless, the inclusion in the December 2009 Ministerial Council document of a commitment to develop the Corfu process on the basis of ‘compliance with OSCE norms, principles and commitments in all three OSCE dimensions, in full and in good faith, and in a consistent manner by all’ suggests the basis of an approach on this issue to which all OSCE states may be able to agree.82

In summary, the development of the Corfu process suggests that there is a new level of political commitment among all OSCE states to reform and strengthen pan-European security structures, but there also remain important substantive differences between OSCE member states. In particular, there is a real gap between Russia’s interest in a legally binding European security treaty constraining NATO and Western states’ views of how best to proceed. It is uncertain whether this gap can be bridged at all; but any hope of doing so, and thereby giving real new substance to pan-European security cooperation, will demand sustained high-level political attention and more creative diplomatic thinking than Europe has seen for a while.

82 OSCE (note 78), (emphasis added).
V. Conclusions

The 20th anniversary in 2009 of the fall of the Berlin Wall offered a chance to review how far European security has come since the cold war, where the transition remains incomplete and what new challenges demand solution. The EU, NATO and the OSCE can all claim credit for allowing much of Europe to be reunified through enlargement without East–West violence, for damping down conflict in the Western Balkans, and for starting to seriously tackle new functional and global aspects of security. As this chapter illustrates, however, the unresolved aspects of coexistence with Russia, the future of the post-Soviet space generally, and European action in the wider world are the focus of serious self-examination in the EU, NATO and the OSCE which began in 2009 but will continue in 2010 and beyond.

Experiences from September 2001 to 2009 will lend these reviews a tone of sober realism. Scars remain from divisions provoked by the USA’s ‘global war on terrorism’ and by the application of military force to proliferation issues, while both sides of the Atlantic have digested hard lessons about the limitations of Western power. In addition to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, setbacks and violent outbreaks in the Middle East and in western former Soviet Union states have underlined that ‘integrated Europe’ is surrounded by less stable zones which it seems singularly powerless to influence or control. The vulnerability of both large and small Western economies to the global financial crisis has added new reasons for concern and created new difficulties over spending for defence and security. Early responses to the crisis often revealed nationalistic, beggar-my-neighbour instincts not far below the surface, even in heavily integrated EU states.

Europe’s institutions should not, however, let the new realism of diminishing Western power translate into defeatism. Scaling down ambitions too far would leave them, at best, managing rather than resolving their problems—including problems of internal consensus. None of the institutions reviewed will help its survival by standing still or slipping backwards, even if all could benefit from revisiting certain past wisdoms and adapting them to the present. In the last resort, the goals of security, democracy and Atlantic partnership are the primary concern, and the region’s institutions in their present form are secondary instruments. From the evidence presented in this chapter, the longer-term viability of the EU instrument may seem better guaranteed than that of NATO and the OSCE—and the strength of will shown by EU leaders in finally pushing through the Lisbon Treaty, for avowed purposes of self-renewal, could be the latest proof.

Any review of Euro-Atlantic security in 2009 that is limited to Europe and North America must, however, give an incomplete and slanted impression. The larger lessons of the year have all been about shifts of power at
global level, including the increased readiness of non-European players to parlay their strength into institutional representation and policy influence. The decisive role played by China in economic, financial and climate matters, and its increasing strategic stake in Africa and South America, are obvious examples. India and Brazil have also survived the global crisis as ‘rising powers’, contrasting with Russia which has seen some of the vulnerabilities behind its recent more ‘assertive’ stance exposed. The replacement of the Group of Eight industrialized nations (G8) by the G20 has given leverage also to smaller countries and poorer regions. Similar shifts can be seen in the functional composition of security priorities, where some issues—proliferation, terrorism, energy, climate change, food security, population and migration—can only be mastered through complete global cooperation, while the pattern of active conflict is dominated by non-Euro-Atlantic regions (Africa, Asia and the Middle East). In combination, these changes do not necessarily neutralize the still considerable military and economic strengths of the West, or the relevance of its political models and expertise. However, they do require the Euro-Atlantic partners to seek solutions increasingly through global institutions, frameworks and agreements, where other power centres are represented at the table, and non-Western voices are more often decisive.

In such a world, it is not practical for the European–US partnership to retain the same meaning and content, or limit itself to the same methods, as 60 years ago when NATO was created. The relative importance of what Europe and the USA do together in NATO, or even along the bilateral EU–US axis, is bound to be reduced, but there are new openings, too, for them to work jointly or share burdens at global level. It was not easy for the two sides of the Atlantic to maximize these chances while the Bush Administration propounded a vision of global confrontation and unilateral US leadership that most Europeans could not share. President Obama’s recognition of US limitations and interest in peaceful accommodation with other powers could correct that or, conversely, could lead to the USA seeking solutions with China (as the ‘G2’), with Russia, or with other states that leave the EU on the sidelines. Europe might even see advantage, on some issues including the ‘harder’ security ones, in being left aside to pursue its own (as yet) more limited interests and ambitions.

These are the basic reasons why this chapter cannot end by celebrating a new dawn in Euro-Atlantic relations. The relationship seems certain to stay less fraught, for some while, than it was during the previous two US presidential terms. Whether it will be closer and more productive depends less on the institutions discussed here, and more on whether, in a multipolar future, the two parties will see more benefit in togetherness or in freedom to play the field.