I. Allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria

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In 2018 the conflict in Syria entered its seventh year and, as in previous years, allegations of chemical weapon (CW) use continued to be made. The most recent of these allegations came on 28 November when the Syrian authorities notified the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of an incident of alleged CW use in Aleppo on 24 November. As well as analysing and investigating such allegations through its Fact-finding Mission (FFM), the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) continued its efforts to clarify outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration submitted by Syria.

Questions continued to be asked about the CW-related activities conducted at Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC). Documents submitted to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in November 2017 and analysed in early 2018 reportedly acknowledge the SSRC’s role in Syria’s CW programme, but the Secretariat determined that these activities require further clarification. The 89th session of the OPCW Executive Council noted that ‘the nature and substance of the information that has been provided to the Secretariat do not enable it to resolve all identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies’ and ‘there has been an increase in the number of issues with the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration’. Consequently, the Executive Council was unable to verify that Syria’s declaration under the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) was accurate and complete.

On 7 June and 23 June 2018, the two remaining declared CW production facilities in Syria were destroyed. The OPCW verified the destruction as complete on 12 July. A fourth round of inspections at SSRC facilities located in Barzan and Jamraya took place on 4–6 December.

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1 On the conflict in Syria see chapter 2, section V, in this volume.
5 OPCW, Executive Council, ‘Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme’, Note by the Director-General, EC-87/DG.1, 24 July 2018, pp. 2–3.
7 OPCW (note 5), p. 2.
The chemical weapon attack on Douma

The 7 April attack on Douma, Syria, came in the context of a continuing offensive, which had begun in February, against the remaining resistance in the region of eastern Ghouta. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 1700 civilians were killed in February alone.\(^8\)

Initial accounts of the 7 April attack seem to draw primarily on a joint statement issued the following day by the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) and Syria Civil Defence (the White Helmets), which claimed that ‘more than 500 cases—the majority of whom are women and children—were brought to local medical centres with symptoms indicative of exposure to a chemical agent. Patients have shown signs of respiratory distress, central cyanosis, excessive oral foaming, corneal burns, and the emission of chlorine-like odor’.\(^9\) In another news report, SAMS is quoted as suggesting that there may have been two CW attacks in Douma that day—one involving a ‘chlorine bomb’ and another with ‘mixed agents’, including a nerve agent that hit a nearby building.\(^10\)

International condemnation of the attack by political and religious leaders was swift.\(^11\) United States President Donald J. Trump tweeted that there would be a ‘big response’.\(^12\) The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the attack was ‘largely suspected to have been carried out by the regime’.\(^13\) However, the governments of Syria, Iran and Russia issued statements suggesting that these allegations had been fabricated.\(^14\) The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, told the press that ‘Our military specialists have visited this place, along with representatives of the Syrian Red Crescent . . . and they did not find any trace of chlorine or any other chemical substance used against civilians’.\(^15\)

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\(^12\) @realDonaldTrump, Twitter post, 8 Apr. 2018, 06.00.

\(^13\) Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Press release regarding the attack in Douma’, Statement no.101, 8 Apr. 2018.


\(^15\) Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of Tajikistan Sirodjidin Aslov, Moscow, 9 Apr. 2018.
Consideration by the UN Security Council of the chemical weapons attack at Douma

Prompted by the Douma incident, Russia (alone) and the United Kingdom, France, the USA, Poland, the Netherlands, Kuwait, Peru and Côte d’Ivoire (jointly) called for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, where the reported chemical attacks were discussed under the agenda item ‘threats to international peace and security’. The published proceedings of the meeting suggest a tense atmosphere where strikingly different accounts of the incident were presented. For example, Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia of Russia characterized the information on human suffering at Douma as ‘fake news’, a sentiment repeated by Ambassador Bashar Ja’alfari of Syria when he spoke of ‘fabricated information on social media’. By contrast, the representatives of the other members of the Security Council did not dismiss the allegation as fabricated. In their statements, Ambassador Francois Delattre of France stated that victims showed signs ‘symptomatic of exposure to a potent neurotoxin mixed with chlorine to heighten the lethal effect’ and Ambassador Nikki Haley of the USA that ‘History will record this as the moment when the Security Council either discharged its duty or demonstrated its utter and complete failure to protect the people of Syria. Either way, the United States will respond’. Three draft resolutions concerning a mechanism to investigate alleged CW attacks such as the one in Douma were voted on at the meeting. Two draft resolutions seeking to establish a UN Independent Mechanism of Investigation (UNIMI)—one authored by Russia and the other led by the USA—had been circulating before the Douma attacks. The principal difference between these draft resolutions concerned where the authority to assign responsibility should reside. In the Russian draft such a decision would be made by the Security Council after the UNIMI had reached its findings ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’. In the US-led draft the investigatory mechanism bore that responsibility. A third draft resolution concerning the work

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17 United Nations, Security Council, Provisional record of the 8225th meeting, S/PV.8225, 9 Apr. 2018. The members of the UN Security Council that did not dismiss the allegation were Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the USA, the UK, France, Sweden and Poland.
18 United Nations (note 17).
of the OPCW FFM was also tabled. The Security Council failed to reach agreement on any of the three draft resolutions.\textsuperscript{20}

Over the next four days tensions increased. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, said during a televised interview: ‘We have the proof that last week chemical weapons, at least chlorine, were used and that they were used by the Bashar al-Assad regime’.\textsuperscript{21} NBC News quoted two US Government officials who stated that they now had blood and urine samples that ‘suggest the presence of both chlorine gas and an unnamed nerve agent’.\textsuperscript{22}

The idea that more than chlorine had been used in Douma received less emphasis in a French National Assessment of the incident released on 14 April.\textsuperscript{23} The assessment concluded: ‘(i) that, beyond possible doubt, a chemical attack was carried out against civilians at Douma on 7 April 2018; and (ii) that there is no plausible scenario other than that of an attack by Syrian armed forces as part of a wider offensive in the Eastern Ghouta enclave’.\textsuperscript{24}

In their assessment of the Douma attack, US intelligence services held ‘with confidence’ the view that the ‘Syrian regime used chemical weapons’, basing their conclusions on ‘descriptions of the attack in multiple media sources, the reported symptoms experienced by victims, videos and images showing two assessed barrel bombs from the attack, and reliable information indicating coordination between Syrian military officials before the attack’.\textsuperscript{25} On whether more than just chlorine had been used, the US report concluded that ‘a significant body of information points to the regime using chlorine in its bombardment of Duma, while some additional information points to the regime also using the nerve agent sarin’.\textsuperscript{26}

**US, British and French air strikes**

A third meeting of the UN Security Council on the Douma attacks was held on 13 April 2018. The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, briefing the Council, stated that ‘the cold war is back with a vengeance’. He expressed concern that ‘increasing tensions and the inability to reach a compromise in the establishment of an accountability mechanism threaten to lead to a


\textsuperscript{24} French Government (note 23), p. 6.


\textsuperscript{26} White House (note 25).
full-blown military escalation’. The following day, the US, French and British militaries carried out more than 100 air strikes against three sites: the Barzeh Research and Development Center in the Barzeh district of Damascus, and a chemical weapons storage facility and a bunker facility, both located at Him Shinsar, west of Homs.

Russia requested a meeting of the UN Security Council immediately after the air strikes, at which a statement from President Vladimir Putin claimed that: ‘An act of aggression against a sovereign State on the front lines in the fight against terrorism was committed without permission from the Security Council and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles of international law’. Bolivia, China, Kazakhstan and Equatorial Guinea, among other members of the Security Council, also criticized the air strikes. Some Council members, such as the USA, the UK, France and Poland, justified the air strikes, and the representative of the Netherlands described the response as ‘understandable’. The polarization of the Security Council was further cemented when a Russian draft resolution condemning the ‘aggression’ against Syria by ‘the US and its allies in violation of international law and the UN Charter’ failed to be adopted.

At a meeting of the OPCW Executive Council on 16 April, similar divisions were apparent. Expressions of support for the ‘proportionate response’ of the USA, the UK and France to the use of CWs in Syria were made by Australia, Canada, Bulgaria on behalf of the European Union (EU) and, in their national capacities, Albania, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia and Turkey. In contrast, the public webpage for the Executive Council meeting recorded Russian and Iranian criticism of the airstrikes. Later in the month, the Russian delegation informed the Technical Secretariat that on 26 April it would hold a briefing for states parties on the Douma incident, where Douma residents would provide testimony. The Secretariat advised the Russian delegation that these witnesses should be interviewed by the FFM and recommended that the briefing take place once the FFM had completed the interviews. The Russian delegation chose to proceed with the briefing, at which Douma residents insisted that there had been no chemical attack.

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30 United Nations (note 29).
32 See OPCW, ‘Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the Executive Council: Documents’.
34 OPCW (note 33).
A joint statement by 17 OPCW member states denounced the briefing as ‘nothing more than a crude propaganda exercise’ and called ‘for an end to the unacceptable defamation of the OPCW by the Russian Federation’.\(^{35}\)

**The OPCW Fact-finding Mission related to Douma**

On 6 July 2018, the FFM issued an interim report concerning the alleged use of toxic chemicals in Douma on 7 April.\(^{36}\) The interim report noted that an advance team was dispatched on 12 April, and a follow-on team dispatched the next day; a second team was dispatched to a neighbouring country on 16 April. However, the FFM was unable to enter Douma for almost a week, and the first of five visits to sites of interest only took place on 21 April. These sites included a warehouse and another facility that the Syrian authorities suspected had been producing CWs. The FFM collected more than 100 samples from these sites of interest; and the team deployed to the neighbouring country also gathered and received biological and environmental samples. The teams conducted a combined total of 34 interviews.

Given the large number of samples taken, the FFM prioritized a set of 31 samples for initial analysis. Analyses of environmental samples and plasma samples showed no organophosphorus nerve agents or their degradation products. However, various chlorinated organic chemicals were found in samples taken at two locations in an apartment building, along with residues of explosives. The interim report noted that the work of the FFM team to establish the significance of these results was ongoing. With regard to the warehouse and the facility suspected by the Syrian authorities to be producing CWs, the interim FFM report noted that, based on its observations of equipment and chemicals during the two onsite visits, there was no indication that either facility was involved in the production of chemical warfare agents. The Final Report was published 1 March 2019.

**Other OPCW Fact-finding Mission reports released in 2018**

The FFM in Syria issued four reports in 2018. In addition to the Douma interim report, there were reports concerning alleged incidents at Saraqib on 4 February 2018 and at Ltamenah on 24 and 25 March 2017; and a report that

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\(^{35}\) For the text of the joint statement see OPCW, Executive Council, ‘Joint Statement by Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America’, EC-M-58/NAT.5, 26 Apr. 2018.

\(^{36}\) OPCW, Technical Secretariat, ‘Interim report of the progress of the Fact-finding Mission regarding an incident of alleged toxic chemical use as a weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018’, S/1645/2018, 6 July 2018. On 10 July, a corrigendum to this report was released under document code S/1645/2018/Corr.1, adjusting the coordinates of a location visited by the FFM.
covered both Al-Hamadaniyah on 30 October 2016 and Karm Al-Tarrab on 13 November 2016.\(^\text{37}\) On the alleged incident in Saraqib, the FFM was not able to gain access to the location and so relied on alternative methods of investigation, such as interviews with individuals linked to the reported incident, a review of documentation and hospital records provided by interviewees, as well as analyses of environmental samples and metal objects received by the FFM on 19 February. Through its investigation, the FFM determined that ‘11 people displayed medical signs and symptoms associated with exposure to a chemical that primarily irritates tissue such as eyes, nose, throat, and lungs’.\(^\text{38}\) In addition, ‘chlorine, released from commercial gas cylinders through mechanical impact, was likely used as a chemical weapon’.\(^\text{39}\) The FFM also noted the presence of chemicals ‘that can neither be explained as occurring naturally in the environment nor as being related to chlorine . . . [and that] some of the medical signs and symptoms reported were different to those that would be expected from exposure to pure chlorine’.\(^\text{40}\) On this latter point, the FFM stated that it did not have sufficient information or evidence to draw any further conclusions at that time.

The FFM’s report on the two alleged incidents in Ltamenah was issued in June 2018. The conclusions reached by the FFM on both allegations were derived from an analysis of interviews and supporting material submitted during the interview process, analyses of environmental samples, and subsequent cross-referencing and corroboration of evidence. However, the samples received by the FFM were not analysed immediately ‘due to the priority assigned to other samples including but not limited to those relating to the incident at Khan Shaykun on 4 April 2017 and Ltamenah on 30 March 2017’.\(^\text{41}\) Nonetheless, the FFM determined that 16 people displayed signs and symptoms consistent with acetylcholinesterase inhibition on 24 March 2017. Sample analysis results showed the presence of sarin and other chemicals, including potential impurities and breakdown products related to sarin, leading the FFM to conclude that sarin was very likely to have been the CW used. The FFM also noted that the results were consistent with those from the incident in Khan Shaykhun, where sarin was used, and the incident in


\(^\text{38}\) OPCW, S/1626/2018 (note 37), para. 7.2.

\(^\text{39}\) OPCW, S/1626/2018 (note 37), para. 7.4.

\(^\text{40}\) OPCW, S/1626/2018 (note 37), para. 7.5.

\(^\text{41}\) OPCW, S/1636/2018 (note 37), para. 5.34.
Ltamenah on 30 March 2017, where sarin was ‘very likely’ to have been used as a CW.\(^{42}\) With regard to the alleged attack on the following day, the FFM determined that ‘33 people displayed medical signs and symptoms associated with exposure to a chemical that primarily irritates tissue in the eyes, nose, throat, and lungs’.\(^{43}\) The report concluded that chlorine was ‘very likely’ to have been used as a CW on this occasion.\(^{44}\)

The FFM report concerning the alleged use of toxic chemicals in Al-Hamadaniyah and Karm Al-Tarrab was issued on 2 July 2018. These incidents were brought to the attention of the Technical Secretariat by the Syrian authorities and formed the basis of five deployments between November 2016 and April 2018. Based on information received and analysed during these deployments, the FFM found that the narratives established during interviews and from statements were consistent with information included in the incident reports that approximately 60 casualties from Al-Hamadaniyah and 40 from Karm Al-Tarrab presented with similar symptoms, though none suffered any long-term effects and there were no fatalities.\(^{45}\) However, the FFM determined that it could not ‘confidently determine whether or not a specific chemical was used as a weapon in the incidents that took place in the neighbourhood of Al-Hamadaniyah on 30 October 2016 and in the area of Karm Al-Tarrab on 13 November 2016’.\(^{46}\) It put forward the view that ‘persons affected in the reported incidents may, in some instances, have been exposed to some type of non-persistent, irritating substance’.\(^{47}\)

The FFM continued its work with regard to a number of other alleged instances of use reported in six separate notes verbales sent in 2017.\(^{48}\) These notes verbales refer to incidents at Qalib al-Thawr, Al-Salimayah on 9 August 2017; at Khirbat Masasinah, Hama Governorate on 7 July and 4 August 2017; at Al-Balil, Souran, Hama Governorate on 8 November 2017; and around Yarmouk Camp in Damascus on 22 October 2017. FFM activities in relation to these incidents involved translating relevant documentation, transcribing interviews and analysing information either provided by the Syrian authorities or collected by the FFM teams during deployment.

Towards the attribution of responsibility for chemical weapon attacks

The expiry of the mandate of the OPCW–UN Joint Investigative Mechanism in November 2017 left a lacuna in the international community’s ability to

\(^{42}\) OPCW, S/1636/2018 (note 37), para. 6.8.

\(^{43}\) OPCW, S/1636/2018 (note 37), para. 6.5.

\(^{44}\) OPCW, S/1636/2018 (note 37), para. 6.9.

\(^{45}\) OPCW, S/1642/2018 (note 37), paras 9.9 and 9.10.

\(^{46}\) OPCW, S/1642/2018 (note 37), para. 9.11.

\(^{47}\) OPCW, S/1642/2018 (note 37), para. 9.11.

attribute responsibility for use of CWs when such use has been established. In an attempt to fill this gap, on 23 January 2018 France launched an International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. The partnership aimed to bring together member states from all OPCW regional groups in order to uphold and strengthen the implementation of the CWC against the use of CWs, promote the CWC’s objectives, give all possible support to the OPCW to fully carry out its mandate in this respect and deter any future use of such weapons. Over the course of 2018, membership grew from 25 countries plus the EU to 38 countries plus the EU.

Among other things, members of the partnership commit to ‘collect, compile, retain, and preserve relevant information to support efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the proliferation or use of chemical weapons’ and to ‘publicize the names of individuals, entities, groups or governments placed under sanctions for their involvement in the proliferation or use of chemical weapons through a dedicated website’. Accordingly, the public website associated with the partnership maintains a list, which is updated twice a year, of individuals and entities that have been identified as having been involved in CW use or having contributed to the development of CW programmes, and are subject to sanction measures by France, the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and the EU.

Three further meetings of the partnership were held in 2018. The first took place in Paris in May, where participating states exchanged information on incidents and the perpetrators involved in the development and use of CWs. A second meeting was held in New York in October. The report from the meeting noted that discussions included setting out the action required to strengthen the OPCW in the light of the decision taken at the June Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties (see section III). A further meeting was scheduled for early November 2018, before the regular session of the Conference of the States Parties and the Review Conference. At the time of writing, no report from that meeting had been made available.

52 As of 28 May 2018, there were 348 names of individuals or entities recorded. See <https://www.noimpunitychemicalweapons.org/-en-.html>.