I. Global trends and developments in peace operations

TIMO SMIT

Multilateral peace operations in 2018

The United Nations, regional organizations and alliances, and ad hoc coalitions of states conducted 60 multilateral peace operations in 2018 (see figure 3.1).¹ This was three fewer than in the previous year and the lowest number of multilateral peace operations active in one year since 2013. The year was relatively static in terms of operations either beginning or ending their deployment. Of the 60 operations that were active in 2018, one was new and two were terminated during the year (see below). In comparison, there were five new operations in 2017 while four ended.²

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Mission in Iraq (NMI) was the only new multilateral peace operation in 2018. NATO formally launched the NMI on 31 October 2018.³ The expectation at that time was that the NMI would initially consist of approximately 580 personnel and achieve full operational capability in early 2019.⁴ However, NATO did not disclose any further details on the progress of the deployment of the NMI in the remainder of 2018, and it has not been possible to verify its strength at the end of the year. The two peace operations that ended in 2018 were the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAPMIL). UNMIL had been active for almost 15 years when it terminated in March 2018, whereas SAPMIL had only been deployed for one year.

¹ The quantitative analysis draws on data collected by SIPRI to examine trends in peace operations. According to SIPRI's definition, a multilateral peace operation must have the stated intention of: (*a*) serving as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place; (*b*) supporting a peace process; or (*c*) assisting conflict prevention or peacebuilding efforts. Good offices, fact-finding or electoral assistance missions and missions comprising non-resident individuals or teams of negotiators are not included. Since all SIPRI data is reviewed on a continual basis and adjusted when more accurate information becomes available, the statistics in this chapter may not always fully correspond with data found in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook or other SIPRI publications.

² Van der Lijn, J. and Smit, T., Peace operations and conflict management', *SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2018), p. 103.

³ NATO, 'NATO continues to strengthen Iraqi security structures through new mission in Iraq', 31 Oct. 2018.

⁴ Government of Canada, 'Canadian Armed Forces General to be appointed Commander of the new NATO Mission in Iraq', 22 Aug. 2018.




Figure 3.1. Number of multilateral peace operations by type of conducting organization, 2009–18

Organizations conducting multilateral peace operations

The UN led 21 multilateral peace operations in 2018.⁵ This was three fewer than in the previous year, during which three UN peace operations had ended.⁶ One UN peace operation closed in 2018: UNMIL had deployed to Liberia in 2003 after the negotiated settlement of the second Liberian Civil War. Its closure marked the end of UN peacekeeping in the coastal area of West Africa comprising Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which had hosted UN peace operations for most of the 21st century. The UN did not establish a new peace operation in 2018, although it did deploy an 'advance team' to Yemen in December 2018 that would become one in January 2019, when the UN Security Council established the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA).

Regional organizations and alliances led 33 multilateral peace operations in 2018. This was the same number as in the previous year. The one new peace operation in this category was the NMI. The number of regional peace operations did not increase as a result because the Pacific Island Forum (PIF)-led

⁵ This includes all UN peacekeeping operations and the UN Special Political Missions (SPM) in Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Libya and Somalia. The African Union (AU)/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is counted as a UN operation and not as an AU operation because it is commanded within UN peacekeeping structures and fully financed by the UN peacekeeping budget, even though the UN shares political authority over the mission with the AU.

⁶ These were the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Mission in Colombia (UNMC).




Figure 3.2. Number of personnel in multilateral peace operations, 2009–18 ISAF = International Security Assistance Force.

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands was terminated in 2017. The European Union (EU) decided in December 2018 to expand the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), which qualified it as a peace operation. (It had not qualified previously due to its narrow focus on border management.) However, the decision and the new mandate did not take effect until 1 January 2019.⁷ Eight regional organizations and alliances conducted missions and operations that qualified as multilateral peace operations in 2018: (*a*) the EU, which conducted 12 such operations; (*b*) the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which conducted nine; (*c*) the AU, which conducted four, not including UNAMID; (*d*) NATO, which conducted three; (*e*) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which conducted two; and (*f*) the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Organization of American States (OAS) and SADC, which conducted one each.

Ad hoc coalitions of states conducted six multilateral peace operations in 2018. These were the same peace operations that came under this category in 2017.

⁷ European Council, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2009, 17 Dec. 2018.




Figure 3.3. Largest multilateral peace operations, 31 Dec. 2018

AMISOM = AU Mission in Somalia; MONUSCO = UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNMISS = UN Mission in South Sudan; RSM = Resolute Support Mission; MINUSMA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; UNIFIL = UN Interim Force in Lebanon; UNAMID = UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNISFA = UN Interim Security Force for Abyei; KFOR = Kosovo Force.

Personnel in multilateral peace operations

The combined personnel strength of all multilateral peace operations was relatively stable during 2018, at approximately 145 000 (see figure 3.2).⁸ This was lower than in any other year in the 2009–18 period. However, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the strength of which peaked at more than 130 000 troops, was very significant in the period in 2009–14. If ISAF is left out of the equation, the number of personnel serving in multilateral peace operations was slightly higher in 2018 than in the period 2009–13. Of all the personnel serving in multilateral peace operations led by the UN. The remaining one-third were deployed in operations led by regional organizations and alliances or by ad hoc coalitions of states. Of all those deployed, approximately 86 per cent were military personnel, 8 per cent were police officers and 6 per cent were international civilian staff.

⁸ The analyses of personnel levels in this chapter are based on estimates of the number of international personnel (military, police and international civilian staff) deployed at the end of each month in each of the multilateral peace operations that were active in the period Jan. 2009 to Dec. 2018. In previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook, similar analyses used annual snapshot data on the number of international personnel in multilateral peace operations at the end of each year or, in the case of an operation terminated during a calendar year, on the number at their closure. Consequently, the data in this chapter does not exactly match the data used in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook.

Trends in personnel deployment, 2009-18

The total number of personnel serving in all multilateral peace operations did not fluctuate much during 2018. There was a minimal decrease of 0.8 per cent during 2018, from 145 911 to 144 791.⁹ This was the third year in a row in which personnel deployments fell at the global level. However, this decrease was very small compared to the 4.5 per cent decrease during 2017 (from 152 822 to 145 911) and the 5.7 per cent decrease during 2016 (from 162 107 to 152 822). The primary reason for this three-year decline is that the UN reduced the number of personnel it maintained in its peace operations, especially in Africa (see section II).

The number of personnel serving in multilateral peace operations led by the UN decreased by 2.9 per cent during 2018, from 98 354 to 95 488. As a result, it reached its lowest level in the 2009–18 period. The number of personnel serving in UN peace operations peaked at almost 115 000 in April 2015. Between 2016 and 2018, the UN cut the number of personnel it maintained in its peace operations by almost 20 000, significantly reducing the number of UN peacekeepers in places such as Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Haiti, and withdrawing altogether from Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. On the one hand, these reductions cannot be seen in isolation from the successive decreases in the UN peacekeeping budget since 2016. On the other hand, the timelines for the gradual departure of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and UNMIL were already in place, and the drawdown of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), MONUSCO and UNAMID had also been discussed previously.

The number of personnel serving in non-UN multilateral peace operations—that is, those led by regional organizations and alliances or by ad hoc coalitions of states—increased by 3.7 per cent during 2018, from 47 557 to 49 303. NATO accounted for most of this increase by reinforcing the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. The closure of SAPMIL had a minimal impact on the number of personnel serving in non-UN peace operations, given that it was only around 250-strong. The level of personnel deployments in the non-UN peace operations has been relatively stable within the 45 000–50 000 range since the termination of ISAF in December 2014.

The largest multilateral peace operations

The 10 largest multilateral peace operations accounted for approximately 90 per cent of all the personnel deployed in such missions in 2018. Of the 10 largest operations, 7 were UN peacekeeping operations and 7 were deployed in countries in Africa. The ranking of the 10 largest operations changed little

⁹ Between 31 Dec. 2017 and 31 Dec. 2018.




Figure 3.4. Largest military contributors to peace operations as of 31 Dec. 2018

throughout 2018. UNAMID was the fifth largest at the beginning of the year but the eighth largest at the end.

The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was the largest multilateral peace operation in 2018 (see figure 3.3). It was also the only peace operation with a strength that exceeded 20 000 personnel; it had 20 889 personnel as of 31 December 2018. The UN Security Council had authorized a reduction of AMISOM's military component by 1000 troops by 31 October 2018, but this was postponed until February 2019 (see section II). AMISOM has been the largest multilateral peace operation since 2015.

Besides AMISOM, six other multilateral peace operations had more than 10 000 personnel as of 31 December 2018. UNAMID had 14 886 personnel at the start of 2018, but its strength reduced gradually during the year to 8971 by 31 December. The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) were also among the 10 largest multilateral peace operations, although they each had fewer than 5000 personnel in 2018.

The largest troop-contributing countries

Ethiopia remained the largest troop contributing country (TCC) to multilateral peace operations in 2018 (see figure 3.4). As of 31 December 2018, it was contributing 11 646 military personnel to multilateral peace operations. This was 825 fewer than a year earlier, primarily as a consequence of the downsizing of UNAMID during 2018. Practically all the military personnel from Ethiopia were deployed in AMISOM, UNAMID, UNISFA or UNMISS. These operations are all deployed in neighbouring countries of Ethiopia— Somalia, Sudan (Darfur and Abyei) and South Sudan. Ethiopia has been the largest TCC since 2014, when it joined AMISOM.




Figure 3.5. Largest police contributors to peace operations as of 31 Dec. 2018

The United States was the second largest TCC to multilateral peace operations in 2018 and the only TCC in the top 10 from the Global North. As of 31 December 2018, it was contributing 9617 military personnel, most of which were serving in the RSM. In 2018, the USA announced plans to withdraw half of the troops it has based in Afghanistan (see section II). This would affect its position as a major TCC.

The other countries among the 10 largest TCCs to multilateral peace operations as of 31 December 2018 were all from sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. Burundi, Kenya and Uganda ranked highly because of their participation in AMISOM. The contributions of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have been declining over the past decade but they remain major TCCs to UN peace operations. In contrast, Nepal has stepped up its troop contributions to UN peace operations in recent years and became a top 10 TCC in 2018. The ten largest TCCs accounted for more than half of all the military personnel serving in multilateral peace operations as of 31 December 2018.

The largest police-contributing countries

Senegal was the largest police contributing country (PCC) to multilateral peace operations in 2018 (see figure 3.5). As of 31 December 2018, it was contributing 1375 police to multilateral peace operations. Most of these were part of the formed police units that Senegal deployed in the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMI and the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG). Senegal has been the largest PCC since April 2016. Four of the 10 largest TCCs, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Rwanda, were also among the 10 largest PCCs as of 31 December 2018. The 10 largest PCCs accounted for more than 60 per




Figure 3.6. Fatalities in UN peace operations, 1990-2018

cent of the police serving in multilateral peace operations as of 31 December 2018.

Fatalities in UN peace operations

There was much debate in 2018 on the findings and recommendations of a report on improving the security of UN peacekeepers.¹⁰ The report, which was completed in December 2017 and officially published in January 2018, was the outcome of an independent high-level review of fatalities and injuries among UN peacekeepers caused by acts of violence. It is better known as the Cruz Report after the retired Lieutenant-General, Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil), who led the review.¹¹

Some of the recommendations of the Cruz report were controversial and not universally accepted.¹² For example, the report stated that 'hostile forces do not understand a language other than force' and called, among other things, for a more flexible interpretation of the core principles of UN

¹⁰ Dos Santos Cruz, C. A., Phillips, W. R. and Cusimano, S., *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business*, United Nations Independent Report (United Nations: New York, 19 Dec. 2017); and United Nations, 'Summary of the action plan to implement the report on improving security of peacekeepers', Jan. 2018. For a more detailed discussion of the content of the Cruz Report see Van der Lijn and Smit (note 2), pp. 109–12.

¹¹ United Nations, Secretary-General, 'Secretary-General appoints Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz of Brazil to lead review of peacekeeping fatalities, injuries', SG/A/1772*-BIO/5045*-PKO/688, 17 Nov. 2017.

¹² See e.g. Boutellis, A., 'Hostile forces: Cruz report risks distracting from strategic context', IPI Global Observatory, 5 Feb. 2018.

peacekeeping—consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except for self-defence or in defence of the mandate—to allow the proactive and pre-emptive employment of 'overwhelming force' in high-risk mission environments.¹³

The UN secretariat presented a first action plan on implementing the Cruz Report in January 2018 and a revised version in April 2018. The action plans set out a list of measures that the UN secretariat and the four most affected UN peacekeeping operations—MONUSCO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, UNMISS and UNAMID—had already taken or would be implementing in order to reduce their casualties.¹⁴

Trends in fatalities

The release of the Cruz Report in January 2018 was timely given that there had been a noticeable increase in preceding years in the number of fatalities among UN peacekeepers caused by what the UN refers to as 'malicious acts' (hostile deaths) (see figure 3.6). Indeed, UN peace operations had suffered more hostile deaths per year in 2013–17 than in any year since the mid 1990s. Approximately half of all hostile deaths in these years concerned personnel from MINUSMA, which had been active in Mali since July 2013. UN peacekeepers in Mali have regularly been attacked by armed groups, terrorists and criminals, and by means that are more reminiscent of a counterinsurgency than a peacekeeping environment, such as indirect fire from mortars, improvised explosive devices (IED) and complex suicide attacks involving vehicle-born IEDs and multiple assailants.¹⁵

There was a notable increase in the number of hostile deaths of UN peacekeepers in 2017, when 59 UN peace operations personnel were killed by acts of violence. All but one were serving in MINUSCA, MINUSMA or MONUSCO. Among them were 15 Tanzanian troops in MONUSCO who were killed in an attack on their camp in the Kivu Province of the DRC in December 2017.¹⁶ This was the deadliest attack on UN peacekeepers since June 1993, when 22 troops from Pakistan were killed by combatants in Mogadishu.¹⁷ The UN established a special investigation in January 2018, which found that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group had probably been behind the attack.¹⁸

¹³ Dos Santos Cruz, Phillips and Cusimano (note 10), Executive Summary.

¹⁴ United Nations, Secretary-General (note 11); and United Nations, 'Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers: Action plan for implementation of fatalities report', 9 Apr. 2018.

¹⁵ On the conflict in Mali see chapter 2, section VI, in this volume.

¹⁶ Mahamba, F., 'Rebels kill 15 peacekeepers in Congo in worst attack on UN in recent history', Reuters, 8 Dec. 2017.

¹⁷ Gladstone, R. and Cowell, A., 'At least 15 UN peacekeepers are killed in Congo', *New York Times*, 8 Dec. 2017.

¹⁸ United Nations, Secretary-General, 'Note to correspondents on the findings of the Special Investigation on recent attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers', 2 Mar. 2018.




Figure 3.7. Fatality ratios for uniformed personnel in UN peace operations, 1990–2018

MINUSMA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

The number of hostile deaths fell in 2018. UN peace operations suffered 27 hostile deaths, less than half as many as in 2017 and the lowest number in a single year since 2012. The 27 fatalities were military personnel from MINUSCA (7 hostile deaths), MINUSMA (11 hostile deaths, the lowest number since 2013), MONUSCO (8 hostile deaths) and UNMISS (1 hostile death). Seven of the eight MONUSCO hostile deaths in 2018 occurred during an operation against the ADF in North Kivu conducted jointly with the DRC army on 14 November 2018.¹⁹ Of the 27 UN peacekeepers who died as a result of hostile acts in 2018, 20 were from countries in Africa and 7 from countries in South Asia.²⁰

Trends in annual fatality ratios

The ratio of hostile deaths per 1000 uniformed personnel (that is, military personnel and police) was relatively high in the years 2013–18 compared to most other years since 2001 (see figure 3.7). However, it was not unusually high compared to the 1990s. In addition, the annual ratios for 2013–18 look quite different when MINUSMA, which accounted for half of all hostile deaths but for only 10–15 per cent of all uniformed personnel in these years,

¹⁹ United Nations, 'UN chief condemns killing of 'blue helmets' in DR Congo, as violence erupts prior to elections', UN News, 15 Nov. 2018.

 $^{^{20}}$ In 2018, the fatalities among UN peace operations personnel linked to hostile acts were from Bangladesh (6), Burkina Faso (3), Burundi (2), Chad (2), Malawi (6), Mauritania (2), Niger (1), Pakistan (1), Rwanda (1) and Tanzania (3).

is taken out of the equation. The annual ratios for hostile deaths would have been significantly lower in 2013–18 if it were not for MINUSMA. Indeed, without this mission the annual ratio would have been as low as 0.08 per 1000 in 2014 and 0.07 per 1000 in 2016—and these would have been the lowest annual ratios for hostile deaths in the entire 1990–2018 period. This means that the number of hostile deaths in all other UN peace operations was very low in these years in the context of the number of personnel serving in UN peace operations.

This was not the case in 2017, however, when the number of hostile deaths increased sharply. MINUSCA and MONUSCO suffered a high number of hostile deaths in that year, as did MINUSMA. The annual ratio of hostile deaths increased even more sharply in 2017 than the number of hostile deaths (from 0.31 per 1000 in 2016 to 0.61 per 1000 in 2017) because the average number of uniformed personnel serving in UN peace operations was lower in 2017.

The annual ratio of hostile deaths among uniformed personnel in UN peace operations was much lower in 2018 than in 2017. The annual ratio was 0.3 per 1000 uniformed personnel for all UN peace operations and 0.21 per 1000 uniformed personnel for all UN peace operations excluding MINUSMA. Although these ratios constitute significant improvements on the previous year, 2017 was quite extreme and therefore probably not the most useful frame of reference. In fact, the annual ratio of hostile deaths in 2018, either including or excluding MINUSMA, was similar to that in 2013–16.

The Action for Peacekeeping Initiative

The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, announced a new initiative, Action for Peacekeeping (A4P), during a high-level debate on UN peacekeeping operations in the UN Security Council on 28 March 2018. He called for a 'quantum leap in collective engagement' in order to make UN peacekeeping fit for purpose in the light of the changing and increasingly challenging contexts in which modern peace operations function.²¹ Building on the outcomes of the Cruz Report and the Final Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations of 2015, Guterres argued that this collective engagement should focus on realistic expectations and mandates, stronger and safer missions, and greater support for political solutions and for ensuring that UN peace operations are adequately structured, equipped and trained.²²

During the debate in the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that the UN secretariat, for its part, had already taken important steps towards

²¹ United Nations, Secretary-General, 'Secretary-General's remarks to Security Council High-Level Debate on Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations', 28 Mar. 2018.

²² United Nations, Secretary-General (note 21).

these ends. He specifically mentioned the initial implementation of the recommendations of the Cruz Report, such as on performance accountability measures, the strategic reviews of UN peacekeeping operations, the 2017 strategy to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse, and the proposed reforms of the UN's peace and security architecture to make it more effective. The latter were approved by the UN General Assembly in July 2018 and will come into effect on 1 January 2019.²³

In launching the A4P Initiative, the Secretary-General invited the UN member states, and other partners and stakeholders such as regional organizations, to commit to improving UN peacekeeping. This culminated in a 'Declaration of Shared Commitments', which was drawn up following extensive consultations with member states and relevant international organizations in the summer of 2018. The declaration consists of 24 principles and commitments focused on strengthening UN peacekeeping's political impact, the protection of civilians, safety and security, performance and performance accountability, the impact on sustaining peace, partnerships and professional conduct.²⁴ The Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting on A4P on 25 September 2018 in the margins of the 73rd meeting of the General Assembly. By then, the Declaration of Shared Commitments had been endorsed by 146 UN member states, including all the key TCCs and PCCs, several host countries and all the members of the Security Council.²⁵

²³ United Nations, Secretary-General (note 21); and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/262 C.III, A/RES/72/262 C, 18 July 2018.

²⁴ United Nations, 'Declaration of shared commitments on UN peacekeeping operations', [n.d.].

²⁵ United Nations, Secretary-General, 'Note to Correspondents on the High-Level Meeting on Action for Peacekeeping', 26 Sep. 2018.