RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

IMEMO CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN EDITIONS OF SIPRI YEARBOOKS (1997-2000)
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(IMEMO)

RUSSIA:
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AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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TO THE RUSSIAN EDITIONS OF SIPRI YEARBOOKS

Compiled and edited by
Vladimir BARANOVSKY and Alexandre KALIADINE

Moscow 2001
INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO)

IMEMO is a research institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was established in 1956. IMEMO conducts fundamental and applied research and comparative studies focusing upon contemporary economic, social and political processes in the world, Russia’s involvement in global developments, problems of arms control, disarmament and international security.

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PREFACE

This volume presents the result of research on topical issues of Russian national security, defence and arms control policy conducted at IMEMO and published in 1997–2000 as Special supplements to the Russian editions of the SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

Since 1993 these editions have been undertaken jointly by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO). Several volumes published so far in this series have convincingly shown that this publication has become an authoritative and regularly used source in Russian language for scholars, politicians, lawmakers, diplomats and security analysts who need reliable information on problems of conflict, armaments, arms control and international security.

In addition to the articles translated from the English edition, Russian versions of the SIPRI Yearbooks contain various contributions written by Russian authors and focused upon those aspects of arms control and disarmament that were (and still are) of particular relevance to the RF. However, these analyses may be of interest to the non-Russian audience as well – which explains the logic of translating them into English. Indeed, understanding Russian views on arms control and international security is as important as spreading objective information on these issues in Russia itself.

Our intention in publishing this volume is to present facts, data and analyses concerning Russia’s perception of, and its attitude towards, fundamental problems of international security. We strongly believe that promoting openness and transparency in arms control developments might contribute to the unbiased assessment by the international community of the Russian security situation and needs and stimulate responsible debate on the measures to enhance world stability. The book could be helpful to policy-makers, journalists, researchers and specialists from universities, academic institutions and non-governmental organisations – all those who deal with international security problems.
The focus of study is on Russia’s arms control policy. The authors proceed from the assumption that steps towards protecting legitimate national security interests must take into account requirements of international strategic stability. In the view of the authors, the maximum expansion and enhancement of the role of such multilateral security structures as the UNO and the OSCE in settling conflicts is in Russia’s interest and the RF possesses many unused resources in this field too. Similarly, Russia has an interest in the expansion and reinforcement of the regimes of the limitation of armaments and military activities, disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery means.

The purpose of the present volume is to explain the factors that prompted Russia to adopt its current positions on the issues of arms control, disarmament and international security and to investigate how Russia, its defence and foreign policy and its security environment should evolve in order to make new steps in the direction of international disarmament feasible.

The 18 chapters of the volume are grouped into three parts.

Part I addresses conceptual dimension of the quest for security, related to the post-cold war strategic environment and the new position of Russia in the world. It also considers risks and challenges confronting Russia, analyses current military strategy, ponders the importance of arms control agreements.

Part II deals with the military reform in Russia. It also addresses budgetary problems as major factors shaping Russian arms control policy.

Part III focuses upon Russia’s approaches towards specific issues of arms control and disarmament. It analyses problems that constitute a real or potential threat to international stability and the measures aimed at improving and consolidating international security.

To assist readers who may want more details from official documents the texts of some laws of the Russian Federation related to arms control and disarmament are also included in the book.

IMEMO researchers wrote sixteen of the chapters; two chapters were prepared by prominent experts from outside IMEMO, whom I hereby would like to thank for their contributions.
I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Vladimir Baranovsky and Dr. Alexandre Kaliadine who had the responsibility for compiling and editing the volume. My thanks also go to the members of the IMEMO staff – Boris Atlas, George Bechter, Tamara Farnasova, Olga Maltseva, Valentina Matveeva and Jeanna Shatilova, who were actively involved in the preparation of the book.

I’m extremely grateful to Dr. Theodor Winkler, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), who provided support for the publication.

Finally, I would like to pay tribute to Dr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – not only for initiating eight years ago the idea of joint SIPRI—IMEMO project, but also for his considerable efforts to promote debates on Russia’s role in international security.

Academician Nodari Simonia
Director
Institute of World Economy and International Relations
Russian Academy of Sciences
March 2001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM Treaty</td>
<td>Treaty on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
<td>Armoured combat vehicle</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>Australia Group</td>
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<td>ASAT</td>
<td>Anti-satellite weapons</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-submarine warfare</td>
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<td>ATTU</td>
<td>Atlantic to the Urals (zone)</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic missile defence</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence-building measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE Treaty</td>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence- and security-building measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Co-operative Threat Reduction, Nunn-Lugar Program</td>
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<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical weapon/warfare</td>
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<td>CWDF</td>
<td>Chemical weapon production facility</td>
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<td>CWDP</td>
<td>Chemical Weapon Destruction Program</td>
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<td>CWPF</td>
<td>Chemical weapon production facility</td>
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<td>CWSF</td>
<td>Chemical weapon storage facility</td>
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<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (USA)</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy (USA)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Federal Assembly (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Federation Council (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBR</td>
<td>Fast breeder reactor</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBS</td>
<td>Forward-based system</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>General-purpose forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GosNIIOKhT</td>
<td>State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly enriched uranium</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>International Data Centre</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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IMS International Monitoring System
IMEMO Institute of World Economy and International Relations
Khimbiokom Presidential Committee on Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions
MD Military district
MNLH Maximum national levels for holdings
MW Megawatt
Minatom Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia)
MIRV Multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
MOD Ministry of Defence (Russia)
MOUS Memorandum of Understanding on Succession (1997)
MTC Military-technical co-operation
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NC National ceiling
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NIS New independent states
NMD National missile defence
NNWS Non-nuclear weapon state
NPT Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty)
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NTM National technical means (of verification)
NWFZ Nuclear weapon-free zone
NWS Nuclear weapon state
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Outer Space Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAROS Prevention of an arms race in outer space
PJC Permanent Joint Council
PPP Purchasing power parity
R&D Research and development
RAM Russian Agency on Munitions
ROSTO Russian Defence Sport-Technical Organisation
RF Russian Federation
RSA Russian Space Agency
SAR Search and Rescue Service
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>State Duma (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Sea-launched cruise missile</td>
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<td>SLMB</td>
<td>Submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNDV</td>
<td>Strategic nuclear delivery vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Strategic nuclear forces</td>
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<td>SRF</td>
<td>Strategic Rocket Forces (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Nuclear-powered submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Territorial ceiling</td>
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<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Theatre high-altitude area defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLE</td>
<td>Treaty-limited equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNF</td>
<td>Tactical nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre missile defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>WA</td>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organisation</td>
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PART I. SEARCHING FOR SECURITY: CONCEPTUAL DIMENSIONS

Chapter 1. Russian and western security interests: problems and prospects

Chapter 2. Russia’s national security and a multipolar world

Chapter 3. Towards a new arms control agenda

Chapter 4. Problems of international security in basic documents of the Russian Federation
1. RUSSIAN AND WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS*

Aleksei ARBATOV

The missile and bomb attacks on Yugoslavia by NATO, which started on 24 March 1999, gave rise to the most serious and dangerous crisis in European security and relations between Russia and the West since the Berlin and Caribbean crisis in the beginning of the sixties.

Whatever reasons were advanced to justify the use of force by NATO, it constituted a clear act of aggression and flagrant violation of international law, the UN Charter and the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

However cruel the punitive actions against the Albanian separatists and, incidentally, against peaceful citizens by the Serbian armed forces may have been, the air strikes put President Milosevic fully in the right. These air strikes eclipsed the armed clashes on the ground and aggravated the suffering of the populations of Kosovo and the rest of Serbia. They raised a local ethnic conflict (by standards of the nineties on a less than average scale) to the level of an international, political and, potentially, armed conflict in which nuclear powers participated and which might spread beyond the Balkans and even the whole of Europe.

In Moscow the apocalyptic scenarios of a Third World War, which, were presumed to have been permanently discarded and remained only as subjects of thrilling best sellers, returned to the table as practical policy making and military operational planning issues. NATO was again looked upon as the main potential opponent and the principal foreign threat was again seen to come from the West and not from the South or the East.

The thesis that the main threats to Russian security have their roots at home is from now on understood by many to mean only that the economic and military weakness of the country enables the West to ignore it and has become, in fact, an external threat.

Much of the constructive work completed at the cost of enormous effort in the relations between Russia and the West in the field of

security, not only in the last decade, but in the eighties and even the seventies, was erased in one stroke.

The Russian people was seized by a fit of genuine anti-American feeling, which had not happened, in spite of all the official propaganda, even at the worst periods of the Cold War. The slogan “Today Serbia – Tomorrow Russia” took hold of the masses. The positions at home, on the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections, of left wing, national and barefaced militarist circles were immeasurably reinforced.

Two elements precondition the particular danger of the crisis, even as compared to the Cold War years. One constitutes the glaring inequality of forces and possibilities of Russia and NATO in the area. The West is too strong and too sure of being in the right to agree easily to a compromise. Russia is too weak and humiliated, from an economic and political point of view, to make yet another concession and finally lose its prestige, influence and status of a great power. The second is that the growing Russian democracy narrows the freedom of manoeuvre of the government, which now has to worry about the reaction of parliament, public opinion polls and coming in elections.

At first sight these dramatic events render consideration of questions of co-operation between Russia and the West in the field of peacekeeping and arms control untimely. On further thought, however, the Yugoslav crisis only confirms the correctness of the following conclusions.

Firstly, the observation that Russia and the West understand each other’s priorities, motives and concerns less and less has been fully and dramatically confirmed. They look differently at the problems of security and move on courses, which in the end may bring them into collision. The tragic events in Yugoslavia constitute the culmination of the diverging courses of Russia and the West, which started a long time ago but have, with every year, become more and more accentuated.

Secondly, many of the recommendations, which are listed below, have been articulated before. The crisis could have been avoided if the Heads of state had adopted these recommendations. This concerns in the first place the proposal to work out a mechanism for the implementation of peacekeeping operations by Russia/CIS and NATO (including enforcing peace), both in the post-Soviet zone and outside it, in particular, the Balkans, but exclusively based on a UN or OSCE mandate.

It would, of course, be much more difficult and time-consuming to co-ordinate a specific operation by such a mechanism than to act unilaterally. But there would then be no danger that, as a result, such actions would lead to an international conflict and they would be,
moreover, much more effective in achieving the sought for result. What is more, the very existence of such a system would deter potential aggressors from flouting international standards, the rights of national minorities and human rights.

The same applies to the recommendations for settling the controversies in connection with the expansion of NATO, and cooperation in the field of nuclear arms reductions, chemical and conventional weapons, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles technology, the disposal of nuclear wastes, etc.

Thirdly and finally, when the Yugoslav crisis will have been settled (which requires a revision of NATO policy in the Balkans) and necessary lessons drawn, the resolution of the existing security problems, in all their manifestations, will again stand high on the agenda of relations between Russia and the West and other countries. The possible solutions of these problems suggested below may then prove to be useful.

The end of the decade compels one to make an attempt to draw certain conclusions. But it is not only a question of the calendar, but of the widespread feeling that in the history of the Russian Federation and its relations with other countries and, first of all, the USA and other Western countries a certain era has come to an end. We now stand at the beginning of a transitional period which, as often happens in history, has, in some respects, already started and, in the coming years, will acquire ever more distinct outlines.

I should like to characterise the previous era, despite all its complexity and ambiguity for Russia, in the first place, as an era of missed historical opportunities. At the beginning of the nineties, for a number of reasons, a unique situation developed, which made it possible to take an abrupt turn both in Russia’s internal development and in its relations with other countries.

By an abrupt turn in internal development, I mean economic reforms, effective conversion of the defence industry – the main component of the Soviet economy, – military reforms and many other transformations, which, even in such a short historical period as a decade, could have formed the foundation for the further democratic development of Russia.

In the foreign policy field, too, unique historical prospects opened up during this period for a fundamental change in the traditional relations between Russia and other countries and for guiding them from the ways of confrontation and rivalry, along which they had moved over the course
of many decades and even centuries, into the ways of co-operation and partnership.

Today, after the passing of ten years, it has, unfortunately, to be noted that for a whole range of objective, but also many subjective reasons these opportunities have been missed. This does not mean that the way to a civilised form of co-existence is now barred forever. This possibility remains open and it is well worthwhile to work for its sake. There is no doubt, however, that all attempts to move in this direction will be much more contradictory, lengthy and difficult. They may well be marked by serious retreats and demand great expenditure.

What is the principal reason why this unique chance was not used? In the first place, I should like to put forward certain considerations about the internal development of Russia in as much as these are linked to relations with the USA and the West and the basis of these relations affects the problems of international security. It seems to me that both the West and Russia, or to be more exact and use our old terminology, the ruling circles of the West and the new Russian elite, which came to power as a result of the events at the end of 1991, made two enormous, fundamental, historical mistakes in their attitude to the internal development of the Russian Federation and its foreign policy.

What was the West’s mistake? It seems to me that the USA, the international financial institutions and the West, as a whole, rather presumptuously took upon themselves the enormous responsibility for the internal reforms of such a vast, complex and important country as Russia. It should be recalled that, in the beginning of the nineties, not one Federal budget was worked out without preliminary, detailed consultations with the USA and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The involvement of the West in the Russian economic reforms, both in the form of recommendations and direct participation and in the form of loans, was without precedent. In consequence, the West assumed responsibility for reforms intended to move a country with a thousand-year history from its traditional ways into a completely new direction. I do not cast doubt on the possibility of such reforms, but I suggest that they should have been implemented, in the first place and mainly, by Russia itself, perhaps not consistently, perhaps in a contradictory fashion, but by Russians themselves and not under the direction of the Western partners. Nobody puts in doubt the need for closer co-operation and for some participation and help from the West. But to assume full responsibility, as was done, including the appointment of officials in the higher reaches of government, amounted on the part of the West to a colossal manifestation
of presumption and the conviction that the Western models are suitable for all countries, including Russia. But the results were not very good.

As far as international relations and security problems are concerned, in those areas where the West could, indeed, have played a big, positive role, together with Russia, not enough effort was made. These problems were put on the back burner. It was assumed, in accordance with principles going back to the time of President Wilson, that democracies do not wage war against each other. Those who supported this approach argued that if Russia implemented the reforms, necessary for a transition to a market economy and for building a democracy, all other problems, including military-political questions, disarmament, the settling of international conflicts would be resolved, as it were, automatically. It was thought that no serious problems in relations between the West and Russia could arise in this field. In this way these questions were pushed into the background and for many years not enough attention was paid to them. Such, in principle, new problems as Western assistance and co-operation in questions of the transfer of the nuclear forces from the territories of the former Soviet republics to Russia and help in dismantling and disposing nuclear weapons and atomic submarines, constituted the only exceptions. In fact, quite utilitarian questions occupied the foreground while the serious traditional questions related to the military-political relations between Russia and the West were looked upon as belonging to the old way of thinking, as a legacy of the past. They did not get the attention they deserved.

As far as Russia is concerned, the fundamental historical mistake of the young, if one may use this qualification, Russian ruling circles, the political elite, who governed the country since 1991, came down to this. They could not resist the temptation of Western financial aid to implement economic and internal reforms. For the sake of this aid and its continuation from year to year, they blindly followed the recipes and models imported from abroad.

After one or two years already, it turned out that these models did not work, that they led to enormously destructive consequences both in the social sphere and for the proper functioning of the state. All the same the Russian leaders persevered on this course because it was linked to large financial infusions to which they became quickly addicted as to a drug. As a result, Russia began to move in a vicious circle. At first, it was supposed that the loans from the IMF and other organisations would be a means to implement the Russian economic reforms. After a few years, it turned out that the Russian economic reforms had become a means for obtaining more and more loans from the West. We have now reached the
absurd stage, in the full meaning of that word, when Russian budgetary, financial and economic policies, as a whole, have become a means for servicing the foreign debt and its restructuring and not for obtaining new credits. This is what this course has led to.

I am far from sharing the view of the representatives of the left-wing opposition that all this was done in order to destroy and sell out Russia and that the politicians were bought from the start (although this may have been so in some cases). This wasn’t, of course, the main factor for determining on this course. Nevertheless, this fundamental mistake led the political elite to the present deplorable results.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, I remember very well the time when it was quite impossible to talk to any official about questions related to security, strategic and military-political problems for the simple reason that these questions were considered unnecessary, inappropriate and of no interest.

On the Russian side, it was assumed that Russia, the USA and the West were close partners and, in the future, might even become allies and that, therefore, there was no reason to concern oneself with these questions.

In the first years after 1991, Russia’s foreign policy was shaped in a very simple way. It followed the American course. We were being persuaded that the RF and the USA were no longer enemies that everything should be done in exactly the same way as in the USA and everything would be fine. But after a few years (in the middle of the nineties), it became clear that inside the country things were not going at all as had been supposed and that on the international scene the USA and the West ignored Russian interests and did not care about them. That was the beginning of a drift towards the opposite side. As a result of this drift, the RF, with certain reservations, in principle, returned to the traditional, strategic concepts, policies and views of the former Soviet Union, with the provision, of course, that Russia commands considerably less economic and military capacities and finds itself in an extremely vulnerable financial-economic situation. We are more and more going back to where we started.

What was not done in Russia? Most importantly, the problem of national security was not given enough attention. Experts, who were available, including in the IMEMO, were not invited to start serious work, in 1992 already, on the elaboration of a concept of national security in the new conditions. Such a concept would organically link together traditional interests, related to Russia’s geo-political and geo-strategic environment and the new nature of its economy, ideology, political
regime and relations with its immediate neighbours and other foreign states.

The dilemma between limited resources and continuing heavy responsibilities was also neglected in those years. No serious attempts were made to resolve the difficult problem of radical reduction of Russian economic and military capacities and the continuation of functions connected with the global responsibility of the RF as a nuclear superpower. Russia plays an important role in Europe and Asia and it carries responsibility for global problems (such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and many others) as well as for peacekeeping operations.

What we have come to as a result of the main mistakes made by the West and by Russia was clearly demonstrated by 17 August 1998.

In my opinion, a situation has now arisen when the urgent demand for a policy to overcome the deepening economic crisis has come in a contradiction with the need to service the accumulated debt of the Russian Federation. This contradiction is the main problem with which the Government is faced.

To agree on restructuring and servicing the foreign debt on the conditions suggested by the IMF means to finally pull down and destroy what remained of the economy after the so-called reforms in this country. To refuse to pay back the debts and declare a sovereign default and bankruptcy would amount to a similar economic catastrophe. The affirmation by the communists that it is possible to maintain a self-sufficient economy in the present circumstances is just rubbish.

This is what Russia has come to as a result of the economic course and co-operation with the West followed in the course of the last few years. This has not simply become the main economic problem, the main problem of internal policy, it has, in my view, become the principal problem of national security. In comparison to this all other problems – START II, Chechnya, etc – are of less importance. It is the principal problem in our national security, in our security relations with the West and, in the first place, the USA. It may, in the end, destroy relations with the West and force Russia to return to the state of the Cold War and isolation. All other problems are of secondary importance compared to this one. All the others derive, to a large degree, from a solution to this principal problem related to our overcoming the economic crisis and resolving the problem of the foreign debt.

Russia is financially greatly dependent on the West. This dependence does not improve Russia’s relations with the West, however, but constitutes one of the main areas of contradiction because this
dependence arose as a result of loans which, far from enhancing Russia’s prosperity, served the economic model which led to disastrous consequences for Russia. That is why nobody in Russia (with the exception, possibly, of few individuals) feels any particular gratitude towards the West for these loans and financial assistance. The West cannot understand this. Many here in Russia have come to the conclusion, propagated by the left-wing opposition and nationalist circles, that the entire Western financial aid amounts to injections of drugs, designed to destroy Russia as an industrial power, to de-industrialise it, eliminate its military potential and turn it into a dependent state akin to a developing country. I, myself, do not agree with this thesis, which, unfortunately, as a result of the consequences of the last ten years, has won many adherents in Russia.

This financial dependence, on the other hand, tempers the West to use this lever to solve political questions — from the Kosovo problem to the question of Russia’s relations with Iran, India and other countries. It is quite understandable that it is difficult to resist such a temptation and one should give the West its due for not linking these questions directly and not confronting Russia with an ultimatum. In this connection the Western powers act with a certain degree of flexibility and delicacy. I believe that, if we changed places, Russia would act with much greater insistence and rudeness, at any rate, to judge by the attitude of some representatives in our parliament. The West acts in a different way but a linkage, nevertheless, exist. This linkage arouses indignation and opposition inside the country on the part of the people who do not agree with the official economic policy. They do not feel gratitude towards the West for the financial aid and conceive that the simplest way of determining Russia’s interests is to assess those of America and adopt exactly the opposite position.

I think that the IMF (and the West as a whole) even if not explicitly, should recognise its share of responsibility for what has happened in Russia. What does this mean? Should they rush financial aid to Russia? No, of course not. No one expects this from them and they will never do it. Rather they should show flexibility and foresight in the question of restructuring the Russian debt and not link it to the measures, which don’t help Russia to overcome the present crisis. Common sense and their own interests require them to do this. For the consequences of events developing in another way in Russia could be deplorable, not only for Russia, but for the West also. I believe that our government should find a way of convincing the IMF to leave Russia for a few years alone with its own financial and budgetary policies. The IMF should give
Russia the possibility to sort things out for itself and give assistance only in restructuring the debt and its re-payment in part, and deferment of payments. That shouldn’t be too difficult for the IMF to do.

If this were done, the possibility opens up for a significant breakthrough in respect of Russia’s relations with the West in the field of security. One should abandon the idea that Russia and the West are motivated in the same way and have the same priorities. They are different. This should be recognised and Russian interests in those areas where the RF feels threatened should be linked to the Western interests in those areas where the West feels threatened.

What exactly does this mean? Roughly speaking this: Russia makes the maximum concessions in those questions, which constitute a main priority for the USA – the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology and trade in dual-use technologies. At the same time the USA and the West should meet Russia half-way in questions of the nuclear balance, tactical weapons in Europe, the reduction of arms and general purpose forces, the expansion of NATO eastward, etc.

What has Russia achieved in the field of foreign policy and, in particular, in the sphere of its security relations, in the first place, with the USA and their allies in Europe and the Far East? Russia hasn’t achieved any important objectives. They were realistic for those times and could be accomplished if the Russian Government had concentrated its efforts together with the West and in co-operation with it on refashioning the Russian economy and developing it, in the shortest possible time, along market orientated lines.

If we had concentrated our efforts on the economy, without involving the West so deeply in the process, and had made, on the contrary, the greatest efforts in foreign policy in order to change the situation and create favourable, foreign policy conditions for the Russian reforms, we would, I feel sure, have achieved better results.

The possibilities for transforming the UN Security Council into an effective, supreme, global mechanism for settling conflicts and managing peacekeeping operations were not used. The UNO is pushed in the background in favour of other organisations and is, in fact, becoming a marginal body.

No new security edifice was built in Europe that could have taken the place of confrontation between the blocs. No European branch of the UN based on reform of the OSCE was set up. It could have effectively and on a just basis resolved such problems as the Yugoslav crisis and, if necessary, have carried out operations to enforce peace and maintain it on
the basis of a working mechanism, in accordance with international law and in close co-operation between Russia and the West.

Instead of this, we see something quite different: NATO assumes all these functions, advances up to Russia’s borders, acts more and more in contravention of international law and Russia’s interests and positions and in circumvention of the UN Security Council and the OSCE.

No decisive steps were taken to bring about a mutual, verifiable and regulated reduction of nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical.

Nothing was done to make significant advances in the field of conventional arms in Europe, accumulated during the decades of the Cold War, to reduce them drastically, reconstruct and integrate them for use in peacekeeping operations.

No serious effort was made to effectively, and not only on the basis of the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), put an end to the creeping spread of these weapons over the Earth. A series of nuclear explosions carried out in India and Pakistan reminded people that the non-proliferation process had stalled because of the absence of co-ordinated action on the part of the great powers in spite of the extension of the NPT for an indefinite time.

Nothing was done on other disarmament problems that could inspire hope that they would be resolved in the near future. This concerns the elimination of chemical weapons, the dismantling and utilisation of accumulated nuclear munitions and materials, the cutting up and safe utilisation of decommissioned atomic submarines that represent scores and scores of floating Chernobyls.

It can’t be said, of course, that nothing was done at all. Treaties were signed, though many of them have not been ratified up to now. All steps, however, taken in this direction were half-hearted and not brought to a proper conclusion. As a result problems now blow up, one after the other, like mines which remain after a war and then start blowing up. These problems have emerged as extremely serious questions, new controversies between Russia and the West, which may even lead to another Cold War, although history, of course, never repeats itself in the same way. If such a misfortune were to happen again it would manifest itself in completely different forms as compared to what we experienced in the fifties.

Ten years after the end of the Cold war, paradoxically, Russia and the USA and indeed Russia and the West (though there are, of course, significant differences between the positions of the USA and those of its allies) understand each other much less than in the years of the Cold War. Then we were opponents, but played more or less according to the same
rules. We understood these rules and the importance of not breaking them because this would mean danger for all. Our priorities were comparable and we knew each other well whereas now we exist, as it were, on different planes. What is a priority of the first importance for the USA represents for us a secondary problem and the other way round.

It is not simply a question of delusions on the part of politicians or a wrong understanding by them of the reality. Ten years after the end of the Cold War Russia and the USA find themselves, objectively, in quite different situations.

The USA and, in a certain measure, their allies acquired unprecedented security (not just only in the post-war years, but, in general, for the foreseeable future) in the sense that the traditional threats no longer exist, i.e. from the point of view of the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons, the possibility of aggression, the correlation of forces at sea, etc. Their security is unprecedented due for much, of course, to the end of the Cold War, but also because Russia has been weakened and its economic and military potential considerably limited. It should be pointed out here that the Federal budget for 1999, the budget of the state, that still has the status of a nuclear and space superpower, allocates two times less money to national defence, at the official exchange rate, than is envisaged for the military budget of India, which has an army of the same size as Russia (1.2 million men). In other words, the Indian army is twice as well provided as the Russian Army. The Turkish military budget is 1.5 times as large as the Russian is. Such are the parameters of the present situation. No wonder the West feels complete security from a military standpoint.

As far as new threats are concerned, the situation is different. The challenges of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology have put the USA in a completely unprecedented situation, for they got accustomed to a state of affairs, where their territory could only be reached by the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and Russia and by nobody else’s. All the other nuclear powers were their allies or their nuclear weapons could not reach the US territory. Today, technical progress and the spreading of technology, in part as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, have brought about a new situation. More and more states (in the first place North Korea, Iran, Iraq and India) have already acquired or will acquire in the near future, the possibility of attacking the US territory. This represents for the USA the collapse of the world, to which it is accustomed. That is why, their attention is focussed on those problems and the USA look at all other problems only through their prism, including questions related to relations with the RF.
For Russia the situation is quite different. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, Russia, which, of all the states, made the greatest contribution to its ending, found itself in a most vulnerable position, both in the West and in the East, while in the South the situation is extremely unstable. Its military budget is 1.5 times less than that of Turkey and it is beset by grave economic problems. For all these reasons Russia is in a most vulnerable position including in respect of traditional threats.

We cannot neglect our relations with the countries, which surround us as something of secondary importance and not bear in mind the considerable lag between the RF and the West in all aspects, today, and the East, in the future.

The main problem of Russian security (apart from its internal difficulties) is related to long-term prospects. It consists of Russia’s strategic relations with NATO, China and the new states on Russia’s southern borders, which are becoming stronger. Here, too, the prospects for Russia are far from bright. Ten years ago the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) was three times superior to NATO in major categories of conventional weapons. The Soviet Union alone was twice superior to NATO. In another ten years, Russia will lag behind NATO five to six times in all these categories.

As far as nuclear forces are concerned, Russia has maintained, up to now, approximate parity with the USA as it did ten years ago. But in another ten years Russia may lag behind the USA five to six times in this category of weapons too, if the START II Treaty is not implemented. If it is ratified, the lag will probably be only three times and comparable to that in the middle of the sixties. These questions cannot leave Russia complaisant. In addition, the situation of the RF in respect of early warning, space, and combat control systems, in short, of everything without which strategic deterrence cannot exist, is far from favourable.

Russia borders on China, which is 5 times superior to Russia in economic capacity and whose population is 11 times bigger than Russia’s. It will also not remain static. In ten years time, China will be superior to Russia in conventional arms and perhaps equal to it in nuclear strategic weapons.

For Russia these issues have now become the principal problems. As far as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology is concerned, this is an important theme, but for Russia it is not the main question, if only because we are already used to living under the threat from third nuclear powers. Unlike the USA, already in fifties, Russia was within reach of the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France, and, later, of those of China and Israel. Today, the emergence of two or four
other nuclear powers does not change the situation in essence. It simply means a new unpleasant situation. Nobody is enthusiastic about it, of course, but it doesn’t mean the end of the world for Russia as it is in respect of other questions, which I mentioned earlier. As far as nuclear proliferation is concerned, that is, of course, a negative phenomenon. But to Russia it does not represent, in principle, a new threat, not to mention the fact that many of the new nuclear states, though located close to Russia, would not necessarily direct their nuclear weapons against it.

This is, in my view, the main reason for the complete lack of understanding between the USA and Russia. We are thinking in different categories, we talk past each other. For them non-proliferation is the main problem and the main criterion for assessing relations, while for us the main problems are quite different.

We do not violate the NPT and act, more or less, within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). But Russia considers it impossible to make certain sacrifices in its relations with Iran, India and other countries, simply because the USA wants it, when Russian interests in traditional fields, which are important to the RF, are not taken into account.

The most important question for Russia is that of strategic nuclear weapons. How can we overcome the existing deadlock before the Americans raise the question of revision of the ABM Treaty (1972), which, of course, will not make it any easier for Russia to ratify the START II Treaty. How can we get out of this situation?

It seems to me, that it is essential to convince the USA to hold rapid negotiations with Russia on the START III treaty. The USA refuse to do this until Russia has ratified it. Bearing in mind that the USA have raised the question of the ABM Treaty, it seems to me, that Russia has now grounds for asking the USA to abandon the position adopted by the US Senate and quickly start new negotiations on the START III treaty. A new treaty should be very short, limited, possibly, to one article. This article should lay down that, in ten years time, the strategic arms of the RF and the USA would be reduced, not to 3000–7000 warheads, but to 1000–1500. In addition, the agreement should also stipulate that in all questions in which the START III treaty is in contradiction with the START II Treaty, the former should prevail. There is a precedent for this as the same was done in respect of the START II Treaty and START I Treaty.

As far as the question of a revision of the ABM Treaty is concerned, I would recommend not taking up a too irreconcilable position. I would say that there are two ways to address this problem. The
first is for the USA to stick to their positions that the RF and the USA revise it together. In that case the RF should demand changes in the START II Treaty and obtain the right to develop and deploy a new generation of ground-based ICBMs with MIRVed warheads as a guarantee that the American BMD system will not be directed against Russia, but only against third countries. This would not necessarily mean a new arms race. We could simultaneously negotiate the same sharp reduction of warheads, which I mentioned earlier. Within this framework, it will be much easier and less costly for us to return to our traditional system.

The second way is different. The clause about ICBMs with MIRVed warheads should not be revised and we should proceed further with the reduction of strategic offensive forces and the number of warheads they carry, but agree to amending the ABM Treaty and a new BMD system as a joint undertaking only. There can logically be no objection to this. It is said to be a defence system against third countries, which could create a threat, i.e. it is directed against adventurist regimes and, therefore, should be jointly created. Whether it will be possible to do this politically is another question. It seems to me, however, that such a position would be quite convincing and justified.

As far as Europe is concerned, there are a few very important factors to be borne in mind.

First, it is necessary to conclude a full-scale treaty on non-deployment of nuclear weapons in Central Europe, including not only the new members of NATO, but also the countries of Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic countries and even the Kaliningrad region. It will then be an equitable treaty and there will be no serious reasons for not becoming a party to it, provided, of course, NATO is not directed against Russia.

The same applies to the reduction of conventional armed forces and weapons. In the course of military reforms, Russia has drastically reduced and will reduce further these weapons. This is dictated by the financial situation. It is, therefore, in Russia’s interest not to link the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) to the enlargement of NATO to the East, but to make this Treaty a guarantee that this enlargement will not create a threat to Russia’s security. For instance, a 50 percent reduction of the ceilings of armaments, laid down in the CFE Treaty should be accepted. There are no reasonable considerations which can explain why NATO, ten years after the end of the Cold War, should need 20 000 tanks and 6000 aircraft in Europe. No peacekeeping operation would require forces of this size. The largest
operation in 1991, required 1000 aircraft and 5000 tanks (I refer to the operation “Desert Storm”). There are grounds, therefore, for raising the question in this way. Russia can, of course, not expect to have armaments equal to those of all the NATO countries together, but quite reasonably demand that NATO enlargement to the East should not increase but reduce this gap.

As far as the Russian–NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) is concerned, it seems to me that it should discuss one very important problem – a mechanism for co-operation between Russia and NATO on the basis of the program “Partnership for Peace” in the form of joint troop contingents. This will turn this body from a talking shop into a bridge between Russia and NATO and between the NATO of today and the NATO of the future.

Russia’s military-industrial complex should be allowed to participate in the rearmament of the countries of Central Europe. This is not so much a question of economics as of politics and objections are more of a political than of an economic or military-technical nature. Of course, the West will provide electronics, information and radio-communication systems. Those are the standards on the basis of which rearmament should be conducted. But all the basic technologies, systems and military equipment should be Russian and in providing this, the RF, at the same time, obtain additional guarantees that the armed forces of these states, which remain linked to Russia, will not be destined for operations against us.

Recently the question of a tactical BMD and a theatre missile defence has often been discussed and become a popular topic. Attention should be drawn to the fact that Russia has important blueprints in this sphere and in many respects is in advance of the West. Russian C-300 system is twice as good and cheap as the American THAAD which is only in the stage of development (three unsuccessful tests of this system have been carried out). If NATO is not directed against Russia, why can’t the RF and members of NATO create a joint theatre TMD system that would protect Europe and Russia and Japan? This would be for us an even greater guarantee that the NATO armed forces will not be used against Russia. If there are joint BMD and AD systems we shall have nothing to worry about.

What can Russia do in the field of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems? It could, for instance, considerably reinforce its control of exports of nuclear technology, materials and dual-use technology. If Russia’s interests are
taken into account in those spheres, which I have listed, Russia can do a great deal to remove US concerns in respect of new threats to its security.

All that has been said above leads me to the conclusion that it is of vital importance to set a new course in Russian–Western relations in the field of economics and finance, as well as in that of international security. Without this, we shall end up with a new Cold War and the isolation of Russia. This will be bad both for Russia and for the rest of the world.
2. USSR’S NATIONAL SECURITY AND A MULTIPOLAR WORLD*

Aleksei ARBATOV

The problem of the international and national security of individual states has traditionally been treated as the complex of military-political relations of powers and alliances. In recent years, the specific weight of new, untraditional parameters in this area has grown and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future: these are economics, finance, modern communications and information systems, the latest advances in scientific-technical development, international crime, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration, etc.

At the same time, while recognising the importance of research into these new phenomena of the coming 21st century, we should not lose sight of the more traditional themes of the dynamics of the world power centres, the balance of their strength and influence, what interests they have in common and what divides them. They will continue to play the role of forming the framework of the system of international relations, which will carry, in principle, new parameters of security. In this system-forming segment of world politics not everything is clear and unambiguous.

As a counterweight to the claim of the USA to a global monopoly, the concept of a multipolar world has found widespread acceptance in Russia as corresponding most to the national goals of the state. But this idea, too, has its “for” and “against”.

In the first place, the question arises what will be the role, weight and influence of Russia in such an international system?

Secondly, how will the parameters of the military balance change on a global and regional level and how will this influence the sources and level of threats to Russian security?

Thirdly, how acute will the international conflicts and their “geography” in such a system be and how will they reflect on the military-political situation of Russia?

Fourthly, how stable will the multipolar system be and how great is the probability of it separating again into a new bipolarity?

Fifthly and finally, what foreign policy and military course should Moscow follow in order to render the system as stable as possible and assure Russia a worthy political role in it and reliable security.

In spite of all the volatility of the internal and foreign policies of many countries, the economic and military development of states can, nevertheless, be predicted in the long term and with an acceptable degree of error. As historical experience shows, the evolution of the economic basis, over long periods, largely determines the military-potential, the role in foreign policy and the projection of international influence of any country.

According to official statistics, the share in the aggregate world GDP of the leading powers, calculated in dollars at the official exchange rate and parity of purchasing power of their national currencies, was distributed, at the end of the nineties, as follows: USA – 21%, Western Europe – 20%, Japan – 7.5%, China – 12.5% and Russia only 2.4%. Calculations show, according to the forecasts based on research at IMEMO, that within the framework of growing regional, economic integration, by the end of the year 2015, the USA will provide 18% of the aggregate world GDP, Western Europe 16%, China 16.5% and Japan 5.5%. At best, according to this research, Russia, with an annual economic growth of 5–6%, will raise its share to 3% of the world GDP.

Economic integration within the CIS, if our neighbours achieve the same growth rate, will provide the Commonwealth with a share of 4.5–4.8% of the world GDP.

Having achieved in 15 years a maximum of 3% of the world GDP, it is extremely problematical whether Russia will be able to claim the role of one of the independent poles of the multipolar world. Bearing in mind the specifics of the Russian economy and the structure of its exports, Russia’s share in the world trade turnover will amount to no more than 1.5%, in aggregate foreign investments about 1% and in military exports a maximum of 8–10%. The enormous foreign debt makes the Russian budget, in fact, a hostage to the yearly negotiations on restructuring the debt and of new Western loans to service the debt. Otherwise, the full repayment of the debt will amount, over the next 10 years, to 60–80% of the expenditure part of the Federal budget and refusal to pay back the debts (sovereign default) would mean complete financial isolation and, in fact, a trade embargo against the RF.

The international influence of Moscow will be shaped in accordance with these circumstances in as much as it will depend on the economic potential of the states. Such dependence is bound to grow considerably as the level of conflict lower in a multipolar system. If, on
the contrary, it grows, the role of the military component as a pillar of the national security and international influence of the leading world powers will be enhanced. But here, too, economics will influence politics, though not directly, but through the increase of military budgets and their allocations under various heads, forces and assets.

Armed forces, large weapon systems and military equipment, the main programs for their modernisation and replacement by new generations possess enormous inertia because of the length of their service life, their great complexity and cost. Today, for instance, Russia’s military budget is many times smaller than that of the USA, but in their strategic, nuclear forces approximate parity is preserved because of the retention of forces and facilities, built in the seventies and eighties. But over a period of 15–20 years, the economic basis will inevitably correlate to the military component of the country’s international status and its national security while decisions on the budget, technology and organisation, taken, today, will determine Russia’s place in the global and regional military balances.

At the most optimistic estimate of the economic growth rate (5–6% per year) and defence allocations of not less than 3.5% of the Russian GDP (at present 2.6%), Moscow will, in principle, be able to retain the status of one of the two nuclear superpowers even in 10 – 15 years. This means maintaining its strategic nuclear forces (SNF) and their command, control and information systems at the level of the START I Treaty – 6000 warheads, if the USA deploys a NMD system, and at the level of START II Treaty – (3000 warheads) if the present limitations imposed by the 1972 ABM Treaty remain in force.

In this case, however, 60–50% of Russian entire military budget would have to be allocated to the SNF, which would lead to a minimum level of general-purpose forces (GPF). But as the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the new Chechen campaign of 1999 – 2000 have shown, the role of GPF in ensuring national security will relatively increase, a fact, which is reflected in the new edition of the Military Doctrine, adopted in May 2000. It is more likely that the share of expenditure on the maintenance and modernisation of the SNF will not exceed 15–20% of a defence budget of 3.5% of the GDP. This will enable Russia to maintain its SNF, in 10–15 years time, at a level of 2000 warheads. If the defence expenditure remains, as at present, at 2.6–2.8% of the GNP, Russia’s SNF will not exceed 1000–1500 warheads. Within the framework of the START I Treaty, this would mean a six to eight-fold superiority of the USA (as in the beginning of the sixties), and,
within the framework of the START III treaty (as agreed in 1997), a two-
fold superiority.

The only way to maintain the balance by means of an up-dated
version of a START III treaty (1500 warheads for each side) is to agree to
the US proposal to amend the ABM Treaty. Even in that case, with equal
SNF, the USA will, nevertheless, retain a superiority of some kind by the
deployment of its NMD. For Russia to follow this example, in the
foreseeable future and within the existing budgetary constraints, would
mean to lower the SNF to a level of about 500 warheads (as France has at
present) or to sacrifice its GPF.

This raises the question: why not consider 1000 or even 500
warheads sufficient if this provides a guarantee against direct aggression
even if the USA has a manifold superiority in SNF. The fact of the matter
is, however, that Russia’s nuclear potential does not discharge a purely
military mission – to inflict on an aggressor a certain level of material
damage, but a broader one – to deter militarily and politically any
opponent or combination of opponents from both nuclear aggression and
large scale conventional aggression (for instance, of the type of the
NATO action in the Balkans in 1999). The concept of the first use of
nuclear weapons in a critical situation, proclaimed in the Military
Doctrine, is also linked to this wider meaning of deterrence. With a
manifold nuclear lag behind the USA and NATO (and extended
deterrence is directed against them), one can hardly count on a convincing
deterrent effect of the Russian nuclear forces and the Military Doctrine,
for which at least a strategic equilibrium is needed.

The strategy of a first use of nuclear weapons, with a manifold
lagging behind the other side in nuclear weapons (the quantitative and
qualitative indices in many ways “flow” into each other, like
communicating vessels), will, at best, be ignored as bluff and confront
Moscow with the decision to actually resort to nuclear weapons in
response to a non-nuclear act of aggression and, at worst, provoke a
preventive disarming nuclear strike by an opponent. This is all the more
dangerous as a multipolar world presupposes a new situation of
multipolarity in the nuclear balance of forces as well.

Under the conditions of the Cold War and bipolarity, the nuclear
potentials of the USSR and the USA were so superior to those of third
nuclear powers (Great Britain, France and China as well as the secret
potential of Israel) that the influence of the latter on the strategic balance
was a question of secondary importance for the security of the two
superpowers. The nuclear weapons of China mounted on the strategic
delivery vehicles could not reach the territory of the USA, while the
British and French were not directed at the USA and, all together, did not amount to more than 8% of the Soviet SNF.

The most important negative aspect of multipolarity – the proliferation of nuclear missiles and other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) fundamentally changes this picture. The reduction of the nuclear forces of the RF and the USA, (under the conditions when nuclear missiles are further proliferating, may, in the next 10–15 years, make the arsenals of third countries in the aggregate comparable (and, at worst, even superior) to the Russian SNF. In addition to Great Britain, France and China, India, Pakistan and Israel (unofficially) have already become members of the nuclear club and North Korea, Iran and, on a pessimistic forecast, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, South Korea, Taiwan and even Japan may join them.

This will, for a number of reasons, affect Russian security much more in as much as the forces of all third countries may be directed against it (Russia has no nuclear allies) and will be deployed much closer to the Russian territory. The USA in all probability will embark on the creation of a strategic BMD a defence against third countries and this will, objectively, affect the Russian deterrent potential as well. The economic possibilities of Russia to modernise and expand a strategic BMD are much less than those of the USA. A classical type of mutual deterrent relations may not be achieved with the regimes of new countries – members of the nuclear club who may turn out to be irrational, inhuman or fanatically suicidal in their actions. Apart from this, their nuclear weapons may be much more open to unauthorised or accidental launching, stealing or ecological disasters or become involved in a civil war or coup d’etat.

In addition, it is not at all clear how the regime of reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons, of verification and exchange of information, which has come into existence in the course of thirty years between the USSR/RF and the USA and has shown its effectiveness, will extend to third countries. What is more, this regime itself may collapse under the impact of the proliferation of nuclear-missile weapons and the new requirements of the two leading powers in the field of offensive and defensive strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

As far as conventional armed forces are concerned, here too a multipolar world may bring with it new dangers and complications. It may influence military requirements of Russia both in respect of GPF and of nuclear weapons. Fifteen years ago, in all, the USSR possessed the most powerful army in the world, numbering about 4 million men. Together with its allies in the WTO, it had a three-fold superiority over
NATO in Europe in respect of all the main types of conventional arms of the land forces and the Air Force. In the Far East its forces were significantly superior to the forces of the USA, China and Japan, not to mention the correlation of forces on the southern flank – with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

At the present time, Russia still possesses the third largest army in the world (after China and the USA) in spite of its three-fold reduction to 1.2 million men since the end of the eighties. The situation has, nevertheless, radically changed and will change further for some fundamental reasons. Firstly, the prolonged economic crisis of the nineties and the sharp reduction of the defence budget (nearly 4 times in dollar equivalent since 1994) render even such an army too heavy a burden for the RF. About 70% of the defence spending have gone in recent years to the maintenance of the Armed Forces (at a beggarly level and without sufficient degree of combat readiness) exhausting the possibility of financing those items of expenditure on which the real might of modern armed forces, in the first place, depends: R&D, the procurement of arms and military equipment, aviation and construction projects. This leads to the loss of combat readiness and capability of the army and the collapse of the military-industrial complex (the share of new weapons and equipment has already fallen to 20% and, in 5 years time, will drop to 5% while in developed countries it amounts to 50–60%).

Secondly, the armed forces of the surrounding countries will grow in relation to the Russian armed forces. In the West NATO will acquire a three to four-fold superiority, in the next 10–15 years. In the East, China, on account of a twice as large military budget and large-scale purchases of Russian weapons will also acquire significant superiority. Even Japan will have the advantage in ground and naval forces over Russian contingents in the Far East. In the South, too, the situation in the future will be a completely new one. India, traditionally the junior partner of the USSR, now has an army equal in size, a military budget twice as large and is superior to Russia in a number of scientific-technical fields. Turkey has armed forces half the size of the Russian Army. Together with Iran, the two countries have armed forces equal to the Russian Army. Together with Pakistan, they have a one and a half-fold superiority. The quality of these armed forces is, of course, not very high, but even in this aspect the former Russian superiority is quickly disappearing. It is not very probable that these states will become a threat to Russia directly or as a united front, though a threat may well arise if they provide assistance
to regimes or movements in the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia itself, directed against Moscow or its allies.

Thirdly, Russia is more and more being drawn into conflicts and operations, in which GPF are used: in the Northern Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus, in Central Asia and in the Balkans. NATO action against Yugoslavia in 1999 has imposed the task of strengthening the Russian AD forces, the Air Force and the Navy to parry such a threat (this is especially noted in the Military Doctrine). But even with a defence budget of 3.5% of the GDP these requirements can only be met by cutting expenditure on the strategic nuclear forces. This would lead, in the course of the next 10–15 years, to a reduction of the nuclear deterrent forces to a level of third nuclear powers and deprive Russia of its special status in the global strategic balance and in negotiations with the USA. In order to avoid this, Russia would have to cut its Armed Forces even more in order to save money on its maintenance (by 30 or 50%) and substantially reduce the tasks of its GPF, its military obligations and presence abroad and even in Russia itself (for instance, in the Far East).

In conditions of a multipolar world – in contrast to a bipolar one – apart from the objective correlation between economic and military potentials, the nature of the interrelationship and degree of co-operation between the principal centres of force will play an enormous role. They will determine the probability of a combination of the efforts of the new centres against one of them. Here, too, Russia is faced with a far from favourable situation.

On a global level, its relations with the USA will grow worse as a result of the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology in the world, the creation of an American NMD system and Russia’s co-operation with China, India and Iran in the field of nuclear energy and military technology. In the West, the RF comes into ever-sharper conflict with NATO on the question of its further enlargement eastward, the unilateral out-of-the-area use of force by the bloc and the domestic military policy of Russia. Aggravation of the economic and political controversies with the expanding European Union is also not to be excluded. In the South, the involvement of the RF in the Northern Caucasus, the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia will lead to confrontation with the Muslim world, with the West adopting a far from benevolent position. In the East, the absence of a solution to the territorial dispute hinders the development of co-operation with the Japan.

Joint action by Russia and some of the CIS countries is undoubtedly a positive factor in itself. But it cannot constitute sufficient compensation since none of them separately or all of them together form
a centre of power and add little to Russian economic and military potential. Notwithstanding all the importance of the development of co-operation of Russia with China, India and Iran, not one of these countries can, for various reasons, become a fully-fledged ally. In some cases they create additional difficulties for Russia in its relations with the USA, Western Europe, Japan and Muslim countries. Moreover, China and India are rivals. One can not also exclude the possibility of a growth of tension between Russia and the People’s Republic of China in connection with resources and territories in the Far East as well as demographic problems.

It follows from all this that in a multipolar world, if existing tendencies develop further, Russia may find itself in a most unfavourable and vulnerable position. Both because of its growing retardation in respect of all the attributes of national might and because of its distance from the main groupings and centres of economic, military and political integration (NATO, the EU, the “Asian tigers” and ASEAN, China and Japan). Relations with several of them are becoming more and more tense or may worsen in the future. This may lead to Russian isolation and the complete loss of international influence and participation, the exhaustion of its resources in the growing confrontation on different azimuths. At worst, Russia can be suppressed by a coalition of a few centres of power in the West, the South and the East.

Judging by the predictable tendencies in economic and military development, unipolarity, headed by the USA, will hardly be possible in the 21st century. It should be recalled that in 1945 the USA provided more than 40% of the aggregate world GNP, had a monopoly of nuclear weapons and of their delivery means. The USA enjoyed complete invulnerability of its territory. In spite of this, there existed no unipolarity. The premises for it in the foreseeable future, in 10 or 20 years time, are even weaker. We may see, however, as an alternative to unipolarity, not only multipolarity. A new bipolarity may arise, as at the end of the forties, with the two poles of confrontation becoming the USA and China and the principal arena of their rivalry shifting from Europe to the Asia-Pacific super-region. As a possible variant Japan, Taiwan and South Korea may, with the support of the USA, form the front line of confrontation with China.

Russia may then find itself between the grindstones of this confrontation. Joining the USA (together with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) would doom it to the opposition to China in conditions of a very vulnerable Russian Far East and a significant regional, military superiority of China. A fully-fledged alliance with China against the West, towards which there is a certain tendency at present, would be even
more dangerous. The US allies in NATO could open a second front of military-political tension on the Western borders of the RF. In addition to the Baltic States, they can try to bring over to their side Ukraine, Moldova and the Trans-Caucasus and aggravate as much as possible relations between Moscow and the Muslim world.

In the Russian-Chinese coalition, in contrast to the fifties, the role of “an elder brother” would devolve on China where as Russia would find itself in the position of a weak and dependent client. China would be superior to it in economic and military might, not to mention numbers of population. The Russian Far East and Mongolia might become areas of Chinese domination, its base of resources and a space for demographic expansion, as Manchuria was for Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. It is not even to be excluded that, in its confrontation with Japan and its allies because of resources and spheres of influence in the western Pacific, at a certain moment, China may do a deal with Japan and cede it economic dominion over the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin with its rich oil shelf in exchange for the Russian continental Far East, Taiwan, part of Indochina and the shelf of the South Seas.

Such an end would be as tragic as it would be absurd for Russian national interests. In its struggle against unipolarity headed by the USA it would come under domination of China – a country much further removed from Russia in civilisation, with an authoritarian regime, enormous needs in resources and living space and a tradition of cruel suppression of national minorities (as the Russians may become in the Far East). Complete subjection to China or the break away of the Asian part of its territories from Russia would be the catastrophic result of such a new bipolarity.

The above analysis makes it possible to draw a number of important conclusions. First of all, apart from a unipolar world under leadership of the USA, the probability of a new bipolarity between the USA and China represents a no lesser and even greater danger. In this world Moscow would be hardly likely to succeed in preserving an equal distance and neutrality while, at worst, it would lose its sovereignty over Siberia and the Far East.

The probability of such a bipolarity seems to be more real than the prospect of either an American monopoly, which Russia is resisting with all its strength, or a multipolarity, which it is in every way promoting. What is worse, in resisting an American unipolarity, Moscow is so shaping its policy that it involuntary pushes international relations towards a new bipolarity instead of towards multipolarity, although the responsibility for this rests, in no lesser degree, on the policies of the
USA and NATO. Even if it were possible to avoid the first two, unfavourable models of the international system, a multipolar international configuration, by itself, in no way guarantees the promotion of Russian national interests and security if the existing tendencies, examined above, continue. These tendencies must be halted. A consistent and clearly co-ordinated, strategic course for Russia over the next 10–15 years is needed to achieve this goal.

It goes without saying that the first and the main task will be to overcome the economic crisis Russia is passing through, provide stability and create a favourable investment climate for Russian and foreign investors. In the first place a “purge” of the state apparatus is needed and an adjustment of all branches of the administration at the highest and regional levels, a consolidation of the Federation and the suppression of corruption and crime. All this should be done on a democratic, legal basis. A rapid cessation of the war in Chechnya, on the basis of a political settlement, should be brought about. New conflicts of this kind in the country must be prevented.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, the present priorities, actions and international contacts are, it would seem, in the long term, not lined up in the best possible way.

Joint action with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and other CIS countries is necessary, both for the sake of Russia’s security and some of its social-political and humanitarian interests.

Conflicts with the neighbours would be disastrous for Russia, though closer ties with them, in no way, resolve principal questions. These countries are not in a position to provide Russia with what is the most important: investments in the real economy, inclusion in the world economic and information integration processes, assistance in overcoming unfavourable geo-strategic tendencies and advance to favourable economic, political and military positions in a multipolar world.

The development of economic and political relations, military-technical co-operation between Moscow and China, India, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea may offer certain advantages, on condition, of course, that this does not violate existing, international agreements and UN resolutions. There can be no question, however, of any real integration or alliance, here, in view of the enormous social-economic and cultural, geopolitical and strategic differences. What is more, excessive rapprochement with some of these states may represent a danger to the independence and sovereignty of Russia, and involve it in conflicts alien to its interests.
Relations with the USA will certainly remain important, in the first place, in the sphere of resolving international conflicts, arms limitations and non-proliferation. It is impossible, moreover, to broaden co-operation with international economic and financial organisations against the will of the USA. Bilateral relations between the two powers will become looser, however, because of the enormous and growing economic, military and political disparity, the unwillingness of the USA to deal with Russia on an equal footing and the latter’s unwillingness to reconcile itself to and legitimise a subordinate position for itself.

It would seem that relations with countries of Western Europe and Japan, on which the economic growth of Russia, the attraction of large foreign investments and the expanding participation in international trade and financial organisations depend, should be the first priority in Russian foreign policy. These countries could play a decisive role for Russia from the point of view of its long-term political and security interests. These relations could help Moscow to avoid such a bipolarity, in which Russia would be faced with a confrontation “on all azimuths” in a weak economic and military position. In a multipolar world the rule always obtains that, among the leading powers, that state is in an advantages position, which maintains relatively better relations with other centres of power than the latter amongst themselves. Such a position may compensate for temporary economic and military weakness and provide the possibility of gradually closing the retardation in the parameters of national power.

At the same time, the maximum expansion and enhancement of the role of such international security structures as the UNO and the OSCE in settling conflicts and peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations is in Moscow’s interest and Russia possesses many unused resources in this field too. By acting through international organisations, it is often more difficult and takes longer to attain one’s national goals than by unilateral action, especially in the case of conflicts close to or inside one’s borders. But the affirmation, in every way, of the principles of international law and multilateralism reduces the possibility of arbitrariness on the part of other, more powerful states that are capable of damaging Russian interests, there where they are vulnerable.

In exactly the same way, in view of the unfavourable tendencies in the economic and military correlation of forces in the world, Russia is more than any other state interested in the expansion and reinforcement of the regime and system of the limitation of armaments and military activities, disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. After many years of passivity, the State Duma and the Council of
the Federation made a good start in this field by the ratification of the START II Treaty and the CTBT. Nevertheless, the long-term danger for Russia of the proliferation of nuclear missiles is, at present, underestimated in deference to current, commercial and departmental interests. In arms control policy, the priority of the dialogue with the USA on strategic weapons and with NATO on conventional arms is clearly overstated as are a number of other traditional questions of Russian-Western military relations (anti-submarine warfare limitations, forward-based nuclear weapons, etc.). In a multipolar world, the non-proliferation problem should become a priority for Russian policy (tightening the NPT, CTBT, MTCR, and the elaboration of new approaches to the BTWC).

On the European continent the high way for Russia leads in the direction of a gradual, carefully thought out and corresponding to Russian specificity rapprochement with the European Union and all the structures of a Greater Europe. In 15 years Russia may not occupy the first place in the list of world centres of power. But on a European scale it may remain one of the leading powers in economic and military strength, not to mention population, territory and resources. A democratic Europe, cannot and will not make Russia a raw-material appendage and will not put its sovereignty and territorial integrity in doubt. Europe has acquired a great deal of experience in integration while preserving the national and cultural distinctiveness of all its peoples. The integration of Russia with Ukraine and Belarus can become mutually profitable and conflict-free, within the framework of wider European integration, as can its return to the economies and politics of Central and Southern Europe.

The consistent rapprochement between Russia and the European Community in economic, political and military matters (including a possible theatre BMD system) should become an alternative to NATO becoming the foundation of European security. Russia’s partnership with NATO can be planned on a large-scale, but should be made strictly dependent on halting NATO enlargement eastward and on excluding the use of force in violation of international law and without UN sanction. The significant military presence of the USA in Europe serves no longer as a guarantee for military-political stability on the continent.

The establishment of more balanced relations with China and Japan is the main task of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region, apart from energetic measures to improve the economic and social situation in Siberia and the Far East. The maintenance of the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region corresponds to Russian interests, in as much as the alternative is a full-scale (including nuclear) remilitarization of Japan with the Russian Far East becoming an objet of rivalry between
the two Asian giants. Widening co-operation and links with Japan will create a more balanced and stable system of relations in the Asia-Pacific region and remove the threat of both confrontations between China and the USA and Japan and a reorientation of Chinese pressure northward. At the same time, Russia should actively promote the peaceful reunification of Korea on the “German model”. It is necessary to create in the Far East, like in Europe, a limitation regime of arms and military activities, military transparency, confidence-building measures and the non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles.

In the Black Sea – Caspian basin, Russia will have to approach very selectively any direct involvement in armed conflicts in order to avoid confrontation with the whole Islamic world. Local centres of opposition to aggressive fundamentalism and nationalism (Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) should in every way be strengthened and the co-operation of the West should be solicited in settling conflicts, exploiting the natural resources of the region and building its transport infrastructure.

In the defence field, even in the present difficult financial situation, it is necessary to increase the military expenditure to 3–5% of the GDP simultaneously with the reduction by about 30% of the Armed Forces (down to 0.8 million men). The correlation in spending on investments and maintenance should be changed from 70% : 30% to 55% : 45% and, within the investments, in favour of science so that the correlation between the purchase of arms and military equipment and R&D should be about 50% 50%. This would make it possible to preserve the advanced elements of the military-industrial complex and – what will be difficult to recreate once lost – the schools and collectives of applied and fundamental science. This would make it possible to maintain the strategic nuclear forces at a level of the START II Treaty (3000 warheads) and preserve parity with the USA in 10–15 years time. It is also in Russia’s interests to have more compact, but much better trained and equipped GPF for selected local operations and deterrence of threats like the one of NATO in the Balkans while, in the course of five years, completing the transition to a volunteer-contract army.

In view of probable proliferation of nuclear-missile weapons, Russia will in the foreseeable future, have to invest considerable resources in the creation of a theatre BMD to defend administrative-industrial centres from medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, posing a threat from the South and the East. The 1972 ABM Treaty does not prohibit the creation a TMD. In order to persuade the USA to lower the ceiling of the START III treaty to 1500 warheads and ease the
financial burden of maintaining parity, it may be necessary to broaden the framework of the 1972 ABM Treaty. For example, permit more than one area for basing BMD, with a proviso that measures are taken to preserve the Russian deterrent potential (through lifting the ban on MIRVed ICBMs). An agreement with the USA on a strategic BMD and the further reduction of offensive nuclear weapons would open the way to the creation of a joint TMD of Russia and the other European countries, with the American participation.

Undoubtedly, the considerations listed above by no means exhaust the theme of the international policies of a multipolar world and the even narrower sphere of security. Other important spheres – the economy and finance, modern communication and information technologies, access to energy resources and demographic problems, scientific-technical development and new problems of security, international crime, drug and arms trafficking, religious and ethnic extremism and terrorism, illegal migration and ecology – all this will have an enormous effect on the world and Russia’s security in the 21st century.

The propositions advanced above touch only on the more traditional themes of the configuration of the world centres of power, the correlation of their power and influence, the interests they have in common and which divide them. Nevertheless, it would seem that here, too, there is not enough clarity. Many serious problems are neglected while negative processes are developing. They will have to be seriously addressed in order to avoid the formation of an unfavourable systemic configuration of world politics.

If such an undesirable system comes about, it will not only undermine Russian security itself, but also will certainly result in other problems not being resolved at all or resolved to the detriment of Russian interests. If the new system, on the other hand, proves favourable for Russia, it will itself, apart from anything else, be able to make a far greater contribution to and exercise corresponding influence on the solution of, in principle, new questions of security and international life.
3. TOWARDS A NEW ARMS CONTROL AGENDA*

Vladimir BARANOVSKY

Approximately in the middle of the nineties, relations between Russia and the West began to be marked not only by the end of the euphoria of the first post-Soviet period, but also by the emergence of more and more serious problems. By the end of the decade, so many problems have accumulated that a real threat arises of qualitative changes. One could foresee a strengthening of the confrontational element in these relations and, in essence, a change in their direction. Without examining the diverse reasons for these developments, we would only point to the dramatic (and possibly fatal) role of the Kosovo crisis.

The arms control risks to become one of the first “victims” of this turn of events. Indeed, not only its future, but its previous achievements, too, may be in danger – all those numerous propositions and practical measures to limit military rivalry, which, not so long ago, were considered as great accomplishments in promoting international political stability.

For many people in Russia the Kosovo problem became an alarm signal, which showed that the country had to pay much more attention to military instruments of ensuring national security. It is sometimes argued that the Russian approach to arms control should be reassessed. Russia should demand a sufficiently “high price” for its co-operation in respect of problems, which cause concern in the West and perhaps even withdraw from certain agreements and renounce obligations existing in the field.

This might be a move in the wrong direction. Indeed, a reassessment of the theme of arms control is necessary, but not in order to make it null and void – in as much as this would throw us back to the times of the Cold War. Rather, the goal should be to single out the most important problems, requiring urgent attention. The requirement of preserving the balance of interests goes, of course, without saying. If Russia is worried, today, by the emergence of a substantial disproportion in the field of conventional forces and arms and the West is concerned to a much greater extent with the problem of the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means, the idea of exchanging one for the other looks quite pragmatic and capable of producing results.

However, this does not, by itself, prove that the fundamental interests of the sides in the field of arms control diverge. Russia’s weakness today in virtually all the “traditional” parameters of the military balance does not mean that Russia could underestimate other themes and suppose that they should only worry the West. On the contrary, it is Russian security interests, in the context of certain long-term tendencies in the international arena that should make us more sensitive about these problems.

There are here three central themes for thought – both for Russia and other international actors.

The first one concerns the role of nuclear deterrence. We are facing here a real conceptual crisis, which affects Russia directly. On the one hand, Russia seems to aim at building a non-confrontational model of relations with the USA, and within such a model, the very logic of mutual nuclear deterrence is irrelevant (just as it does not exist in the relations between the USA and Great Britain or France). On the other, it is not clear to what extent the transition to a post-confrontational era is irreversible; all the more so, as serious doubts to this effect arise more and more frequently.

In practice, we seem to live both in the present and in the past simultaneously. And this upsets all our bearings in the sphere of nuclear arms control: retaining the potential for a retaliatory strike seems important while, at the same time, an idea of global (i.e. organised together with the Americans) protection against a nuclear missile attack seems attractive. One can hardly stay for very long in such an ambivalent position.

The confusion is increased by ambiguous trends in defining the role of nuclear weapons. In the beginning of the nineties, there was a great deal of arguing to the effect that this role was becoming marginal. Then we became prone to considering that the weight of the nuclear factor in our calculations should, on the contrary, be increased – in order to compensate for the overall weakening of our conventional forces and arms. One of the consequences of this is the paradoxical situation where the Americans are trying to persuade Russia to ratify the START II Treaty, although, when it comes into force, the real limitations will affect the USA and not Russia.

But it is not only a question of the Russian-American balance of strategic nuclear arms. By refusing agreed reductions of the nuclear arsenals of the RF and the USA, we decrease or even block the possibility of drawing other nuclear powers into this process. Meanwhile, in two
decades or so, China’s nuclear potential will, by some parameters, be comparable to that of Russia.

The trends in the sphere of nuclear arms are not the same in different regional contexts. To argue about a lessening of the role of the nuclear factor is justified with respect to Europe (where the number of deployed nuclear arms has been reduced since the beginning of the eighties by 70%) or Russia and the USA. However, in Asia things are moving in exactly the opposite direction. China (as has already been noted) has strengthened its nuclear potential, India and Pakistan have become de facto nuclear states, Israel is unofficially such a power (being now the only “threshold” state) while Iraq and North Korea are officially accused of violating their commitments under the Nuclear non-proliferation regime. If one bears in mind that South Korea and Taiwan carried out nuclear programs in the sixties through seventies, Iran is suspected of activities in contravention of the NPT, while Japan has the technological capability of acquiring nuclear weapons in the shortest time, a clear (but depressing) picture emerges. If in Europe, the fall of the Berlin wall heralded the end of the 20th century, in Asia, the nuclear tests in 1998 represented a sinister sign that the 21st century had started. In other words, this century may become the century of a nuclear arms race in Asia. It should be remembered, in this context, that Russia with full justification considers itself to be also an Asian power.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan signifies, at the same time, the failure of the Nuclear non-proliferation regime. It may be supposed that in 1974, after the first explosion of a nuclear device by India, it had been “technically” possible to stop the expansion of the nuclear club, but this was not done for political reasons (connected, in the first place, with the bipolar confrontation). Today, bipolarity no longer exists, but we still don’t know how to react to the expansion of the nuclear club and again political motives are prevailing. (Germany refused to sell diesel-driven submarines to the Indian Navy, the USA broke off negotiations with India on military supplies and joint military manoeuvres, whereas Russia expressed regret at the nuclear tests and began preparing for a “major treaty” on strategic partnership, simultaneously negotiating the sale of a large number of tanks.)

One can understand why the RF is seeking a rapprochement with India: it is not just a question of immediate short-term interests, but of serious strategic considerations. At the same time, one has a feeling that

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there is a kind of thoughtless attitude towards the problem of nuclear non-proliferation and, most importantly, towards the question of its significance for Russia. Meanwhile, even if only the geographical factor is considered, the problem is much more serious for Russia than for the USA. We should be concerned about defending our territory against the threat or blackmail on the part of adventurous regimes or terrorists, and we should try, as much as possible, to minimise risks (risks to Russian security!) connected with the erosion of the Non-proliferation regime. Against this background, taking the initiative would be more than appropriate and reaching mutual understanding with the West in this field would be easier than in many other areas of arms control.

If in the immediate future, the most urgent task is to draw China into the negotiation process and the arms control regime, the need is ripening, in the long-term interest of international security, for a radical reassessment of nuclear arms. This reassessment, carried out by all the nuclear powers, should be directed, in the first place, towards the creation of mechanisms of unprecedented transparency; secondly, to the development of compatibility and interoperability of the nuclear arsenals – up to the point of joint control (initially with respect to some segments of them); and, thirdly, to their internationalisation (even if slowly and gradually). Raising a question of this kind might seem absurd from the perspective of the present political circumstances, but this is perhaps the only way to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons from turning into an epidemic.

Another important theme in the area of arms control concerns its role as an instrument of countering various existing and potential threats to international security arising in a regional and even local contexts rather than in the global one (low intensity inter-state conflicts, conflicts within a state, regional arms races, etc.). This theme is of great relevance for Russia in view of the outbreak of conflicts in various zones adjacent to its borders.

But it is not only a question of Russian interests. With the end of the Cold War, conflicts of this type are becoming more frequent. Bearing in mind a relatively limited nature of the conflicts, large-scale treaties on arms control (such as the START II and the CFE) have no effect on their development.

That is why regional arms control will most probably acquire ever-greater importance. An example of this kind is represented by the 1996 Florence Agreement that established limits on five categories of armaments and the strength of the armed forces in Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia. It is well known that this has not become a panacea and has
not made the Dayton Agreement free of criticism; however, the possibility of a military misbalance and a build-up of instability in the region have been prevented.

Sadly, little attention is being paid to the regional aspect of arms control. Many people don’t even know that anything concrete is being done in this field. However, it is on a regional level that a number of interesting results have been achieved – such as the signing of a five-lateral agreement on confidence-building measures between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia in 1996 and a bilateral agreement between India and China.

It must be admitted that other examples are less inspiring. Thus, in 1995, a declaration was adopted on confidence- and security-building measures within the framework of the OAS and a Central-American Treaty on democracy and security was signed, envisaging arms limitation and a number of confidence-building measures, but their implementation has yet not started. There have been regional arms control negotiations in the Middle East, but they are hardly likely to be renewed until the overall peace process there enters a final phase. Interesting ideas have been expressed in respect of confidence- and security building in the Baltic region but this theme has not been followed by practical development on a political level. The example of the ASEAN Regional forum (which was formed in 1994) looks more encouraging: confidence-and security-building measures in the region are being elaborated within framework of this organisation – although, paradoxically, this goes in parallel with an unprecedented arms build-up in the region.

This brings us to the third major theme in the sphere under examination – the control over trade in arms and military equipment, the sale of military technologies, etc. On the one hand, there is international co-operation on a considerable scale in this field – which is, on the other hand, open to serious criticism in regard to its effectiveness.

Apart from the UN Register of Conventional Arms which fulfils a purely informational function, there exist six multilateral control regimes of arms exports. Most of them are focused upon specific exports: the so-called Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) deal with nuclear materials, the Australia Group (AG) monitors exports of chemicals and biological agents, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods (WA) addresses issues related to conventional arms. There exist also the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and a system of the export control of dual-use goods set up in framework of the European Union (EU).
The example of Iraq provides a convincing evidence of disappointing results of the functioning of all these regimes. They were virtually unable to prevent this country from making substantial advances towards the development of weapons of mass destruction. It should be added that there is also a problem with the membership in these regimes; China, for instance, has not joined the NSG. Also, gaps exist in the compliance mechanisms; for instance, quick development of biotechnology and genetic engineering makes it possible to acquire biological weapons in one or two years, in spite of the 1972 Convention prohibiting them.

Apart from this, no collective decisions are taken within the framework of these regimes and the implementation of the recommendations is left to the discretion of the member-states (even in the EU). Meanwhile, decisions on a national level are the synthesis of at least four components: defence policy, foreign policy, economic policy and scientific-industrial policy; and a compromise between them is not always reached in favour of the requirement of strengthening international security.

All this results in the erosion of the efforts directed at minimising the destabilising consequences of international supplies of arms and military equipment. This tendency can only be halted if progress is made towards international regulation of the arms trade, gradually giving the decisions, taken in this sphere, mandatory and “intrusive” force (when limitations can be introduced in spite of possible objections on the part of certain personalities functioning on a national level).

This is an extremely complex task and, of course, one which is far from popular among the representatives of the military-industrial circles of any country including the Russian Federation. In this sense, any reproaches addressed to Russian defence industrialists are quite inappropriate. They operate, as they should, proceeding from their corporate interests, in the same way as this is done in any other state with a developed defence industry. To inscribe the interests at this level in a wider, strategic context and, if necessary, subordinate them, is the task of the country’s political leadership. Unfortunately, far from all political regimes are able to pass this test of political maturity, including those considered the most democratic.

Nevertheless, it is necessary for both Russia and the West to advance on this path – otherwise they will be, again and again, supplying new Saddam Husseins with the deadly tools to wage war. Afterwards, some will be using missile and bomb-attacks against them (viewed, quite rightly, as most dangerous potential aggressors), while others will be
treating such acts as a flagrant violation of international law (also quite rightly).

In this way, the traditional approaches are liable to lead the international community into a vicious circle. To find a way out, a new paradigm of arms control is needed. Its key words should be transparency, accountability, intrusiveness, binding commitments and international regulation gradually evolving towards the transnational and even supranational one. Both Russia and the countries of the West are objectively interested in this, however great may be today the stresses to which their mutual relationship is exposed.
4. PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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In the year 2000 Russia has adopted new state documents, such as the National Security Concept, Military Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept. All these three papers touch upon problems of international security: they formulate the most important conceptual provisions of the Russian official stance as well as determine the principal state policy’s directions in this field.

The three documents, when treating problems of international security, are naturally interconnected – down to the literal reproduction of the same provisions and formulations. But there are some peculiar discrepancies or specific nuances to be taken into account. In some cases it is worth drawing a comparison to the former versions of the documents.

It should be noted that the preparations, approvals and publications of the above-stated documents were accompanied by rather wide discussions though their level, format and actual repercussions were unequal from a practical standpoint.

The most detailed debates were focused on the National Security Concept. Its previous version was officially approved in December 1997. After that the plenty of comments, criticisms and even alternative drafts appeared in the country’s press. The RF Security Council considered a new draft of the Concept in October 1999. However, there were no wide debates afterwards. Only some corrections were introduced on Vladimir Putin’s orders in this new version that was finally adopted by President’s Decree on 10 January 2000. The Military Doctrine draft was published

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1 See text in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 Dec. 1997.
3 Only the deputies from the two committees of the RF Federal Assembly discussed the new draft of the National Security Concept and even that took place only during one week. See P. Belov, “What should be the National Security Concept”, Obozrevatel, 2000, no. 1, p. 8.
4 Actually it was the first document signed by Vladimir Putin after taking presidential office. See text in the Diplomatichesky Vestnik, 2000, no. 2, pp. 3–13.
5 Before its acceptance the official document in force was called “Principal Guidelines of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” It was approved in 1993.
in October 1999. The comparison of this draft to the final Doctrine’s text that was approved on 21 April 2000 testifies to introducing significant changes into the initial version of this document in the process of its finalising.

President Putin approved the Foreign Policy Concept on 28 June 2000. Though the preparatory works over of this document began at the end of 1999, its draft was not published and was not discussed in Russian press.

“Two trends” on the world scene

The National Security Concept contains a thesis about “two mutually-exclusive trends” that took shape in the international-political development after termination of the bipolar confrontation era. The first of the trends “shows itself in strengthened economic and political positions of a significant number of states and their integrative associations and in improved mechanisms for multilateral management of international processes”. In this trend, according to the Concept, finds its expression “the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world” which would be supported by Russia by all possible means. The second trend shows itself in attempts “to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership”.

This dichotomy is more clearly stressed in the Foreign Policy Concept. The formation of “a multipolar system of international relations” is opposed to “the trend to create a unipolar world structure under US economic and power domination” (it is clear that Russia supports the first trend and that the second one represents a threat to its national interests).

It is interesting to note that the question about these “two trends” was not even raised in the previous version of the National Security Concept (1997). The latter simply admitted as a leading trend of the world development the movement in the direction to multipolarity (though it was recognised that there were “relapses” of the unipolar domination attitude). Today – at least on official level – there is a certain reassessment of the situation.

It is worth mentioning that the thesis about “confrontation” of these two trends was also present in the Military Doctrine draft but later it was eliminated from its final text. In this sense the Doctrine has appeared

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7 See text in Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 May 2000.
8 The previous Foreign Policy Concept formally was effective since 1993.
9 See text of the RF Foreign Policy Concept in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 July 2000, and in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 July 2000.
to be more balanced and somewhat more realistic. Indeed, the “confrontation of two trends” does not represent but one of the features characterising the situation on the world arena, and it is far from evident that it is the most important one. Furthermore, there are hardly reasons to expect that a formation of a multipolar world in itself would minimise threats to international security as well as to Russia’s security. It is also important that such a vision of the world situation contains a certain potential of confrontation in regard for both the USA and Western countries as a whole (this fact was particularly singled out in many foreign comments concerning the new National Security Concept).

**Threat assessments**

The Military Doctrine testifies to “a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war”. This thesis is the first in the list of factors determining world military-political situation. The Foreign Policy Concept is even more unequivocal in this regard: a threat of a global nuclear conflict “has been reduced to a minimum”. Positive changes on the international scene (as it is emphasised in the Military Doctrine) have resulted in reducing as well of a threat of a direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.

At the same time such a similar provision that was contained in the “old” National Security Concept of 1997 (“a threat of a large-scale aggression against Russia is practically absent in the foreseeable future”) was eliminated from its present variant. Instead of it there is another thesis in this document: “The level and scope of military threats are growing”. According to the Military Doctrine, “…threats to military security… persist and in certain areas are increasing”. This change of the assessment vector (though it is not radical but still rather serious) has demonstrated a shift in the feelings of the Russian political circles. While it is officially recognised that “Russia has no enemies”, time, when external military threats were considered as something ephemeral has vanished into the thin air.

However, the concrete definition of external threats has been systematised not very convincingly. The appropriate list in the Military Doctrine includes rather trivial clauses: territorial claims; armed conflicts or build-up of groups of troops close to the Russian state border (and the borders of its allies); creation of armed formations or groups on the other states’ territories with a view to transferring them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies; attacks on the Russian Federation military installations located on the territories of foreign states, on the RF state border or in the high seas; actions aimed at hampering the work of Russian systems of state rule and military command and control
systems (for example, against strategic nuclear forces or missile-attack early-warning systems), etc. There are also more specific theses. Thus, the introduction of foreign troops on the territories of friendly states in violation of the UN Charter would be regarded as a military threat.10

At the same time, what might be a matter of concern is the expanded interpretation of military threats. It includes such threats that have nothing to do with military ones – for example, “discrimination and the suppression of freedoms and legitimate rights of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states”11. The Military Doctrine also includes international terrorism into category of external threats; the National Security Concept pays to this problem even greater attention12. The Foreign Policy Concept as well calls for wide interaction of states in struggle against international terrorism.

Use of force

Use of force is one of the subjects that were discussed in these documents. Spreading local wars and armed conflicts is characterised in the Military Doctrine as one of the major peculiarities of the present-day situation on the international arena. The Foreign Policy Concept ascertains “the preservation of military force significance in interstate relations” (although an increasing role of non-military factors, such as economic, political, scientific-technical, ecological and information ones, is also recognised)13.

At the same time “Russia is in favour of further weakening of the factor of force in the international relations” (the Foreign Policy Concept) and “prefers political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military means” in preventing wars and armed conflicts (the National Security Concept).

However, these Russian documents openly or implicitly recognise possible situations, when the use of force on the international arena could become a reality. But the National Security Concept reflects sharp refusal

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10 It could relate, for example, to an eventual use of “Kosovo scenario” against Belarus. However, a deployment of foreign military contingents on the territories of neighbouring countries – for example, Georgia or Estonia – at their request (i.e. not in violation of the UN Charter) should not be considered, according to the text of this document, as a military threat to Russia.

11 The National Security Concept defines as one of foreign policy aims the following: “to protect legitimate rights and interests of the Russian citizens abroad, through the use of political, economic and other (sic!) means”.

12 It was on Vladimir Putin’s initiative that these problems were reflected in the National Security Concept.

13 It should be noted that this provision practically literally reproduces a similar paragraph from the previous version of the National Security Concept. However, it was not included in the updated variant of the Concept.
to resort “to unilateral and, in the first instance, military-force to settle world problems in violation of the fundamental norms of international law”. Thus, in the first place, use of force is rejected as a unilateral action (does it mean that it is acceptable on a multilateral basis?) and, in the second place, this action should be legitimate from the standpoint of international law.

These two criteria are also formulated in the Foreign Policy Concept as follows: “strategy of unilateral actions can destabilise the international situation” and “use of force methods contravening the effective mechanisms of international law cannot eradicate... deep contradictions, causing the conflicts, and only undermines the bases of law and order”. And this Concept has even more specific formulations: “only the UN Security Council is empowered to authorise peace-enforcement measures”, whereas “use of force in violation of the UN Charter is not legitimate and endangers the stabilisation of the whole system of international relations”.

Russia also sticks to a clear-cut traditionalist approach in case of a collision between use of force and sovereignty. “Attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as a basic element of international relations create a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs”, says the Foreign Policy Concept. It announces as inadmissible any “attempts to introduce in the world practice such concepts as “humanitarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty” for the sake of justifying unilateral actions with use of force in circumvention of the UN Security Council”. However, it is remarkable that negativism on these problems is also formulated, as a matter of fact, in conditional mood. In allows assuming that the concepts of “humanitarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty”, if they are not carried out on a unilateral basis and in circumvention of the UN Security Council, would not probably cause idiosyncratic feelings in Russia.

In particular, the Foreign Policy Concept supports “the rational UN reforming in order to develop its mechanism of quick reaction to events, occurring in the world, including build-up of its capabilities to prevent and settle crises and conflicts”. All the three documents articulate in a clear-cut and consistent form the idea of Russia’s readiness to participate in international peacekeeping operations under aegis of the United Nations and other international organisations. According to the Military Doctrine, peacekeeping operations they are one of the principal forms of the use of armed forces that are assigned the task of “ensuring the implementation of peacekeeping activities by the Russian Federation both independently and as part of international organisations”. At the same time the Foreign Policy Concept brings in an important qualification: any decision about necessity and level of the Russian
participation in peacekeeping operations "will commensurate to the
national interests and international obligations of the country".

On the same ground, according to the National Security Concept,
there may arise a necessity for Russian military presence in some
strategically important regions of the world ("on basis of agreements and
international law as well as on principles of partnership"). Such presence
(military bases, army contingents and naval ships) would "contribute to a
formation of a stable military-strategic balance of forces in regions and
enable the Russian Federation to react to a crisis situation at its initial
stage and promote the achievement of the foreign-policy goals of the
state".

As to the principles of using armed forces by Russia itself
(including situations of international character), they are in detail
formulated in the Military Doctrine (as it should be in such a document). In
particular, it defines goals of using armed forces in large-scale, regional and
local wars, international and internal conflicts, peacekeeping and peace-
restoring operations, and all this is done in a proper and balanced way. For
example, in case of a large-scale war there are no plans to gain an absolute
and final victory over an enemy but only "to force an enemy to cease
hostilities on such terms that would correspond to the interests of the
Russian Federation and of its allies". This could be compared to the
considerably less apt formulation in the Military Doctrine and in the
National Security Concept about country’s nuclear forces that have a task
“to ensure a predetermined damage to any state-aggressor or any coalition
of states under all possible conditions”.

At the same time the final text of the Military Doctrine omits the
following thesis from the published draft of this document:\(^{14}\): Russia “will
not be the first to begin military actions, … if it is not subject to
aggression (or its allies are not)” (paragraph 1.7). In strict sense, it is this
clause that would give grounds to speak about the Doctrine’s defensive
nature. Such a withdrawal of the above-mentioned clause in itself might
be interpreted as Russia’s claim to reserve the right of initiating hostilities.
Of course, there could be arguments in favour of such an approach.
However, there are also obvious minuses for Russia in this context, both
of propagandistic character and of political one. Indeed, this would accept
the legitimacy of military-force decisions in the international practice,
something what Russia itself vigorously criticises with reference to the
USA and NATO, including in this very text of the Military Doctrine.

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Nuclear weapons

Many foreign commentators paid special attention to the lowering of nuclear threshold that was envisaged by the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. It seems that there are no very serious reasons to dramatise this problem. In any case, a qualitative shift had occurred much earlier when the Russian leadership, in the “Principal Guidelines of the Military Doctrine” of 1993, retracted from the no-first-use policy with respect to nuclear weapons.

In fact, the documents approved in 2000 do contain a broader interpretation of the conditions that give Russia the grounds for nuclear weapons use. The previous version of the National Security Concept (1997) permitted this use, “if as a result of aggression there is a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation”. The new National Security Concept acknowledges the possibility of nuclear weapons use, “if all other measures to settle a crisis situation were exhausted or appeared to be inefficient”. A threat to the very existence of the state, on the one hand, and inefficiency of non-nuclear means, on the other hand, really represent very different criteria for nuclear weapons use.

Let us specify, however, that in both cases the question is about situations of countering an armed aggression, and only about them. Besides, in both cases there might be a comparison to the idea of using nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort”, which seemed to be accepted by the Western nuclear powers. And at last, the Military Doctrine envisages a possibility of nuclear weapons use “in situations, critical for the RF national security”, i.e. it establishes a higher nuclear threshold than it is stated in the National Security Concept. In general, it seems that there are no reasons to see here radical shifts in addressing the problem of nuclear weapons use; rather, we witness some routine specifications on this score.

It might be noted that an idea of extended nuclear deterrence, i.e. of providing the allies with nuclear guarantees, is formulated in the new Military Doctrine approximately in the same terms as before (in the “Principal Guidelines…” of 1993 and in the 1997 version of the National Security Concept). Nuclear weapons are considered to be “a factor of ensuring the military security the RF and its allies”. They can be used “in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of WMD against it and/or its allies”. Noteworthy, the above-mentioned provision on a possibility to use nuclear weapons in response to a large-scale conventional aggression was referred, in the draft of the Military Doctrine,

15 For example, during the first Chechen war (1994–1996) Russian military actions against the separatists obviously were not highly efficient but it would be absurd to put in this context a question regarding possibility to use nuclear weapons (which would allegedly conform to the logic of the above-mentioned provision of the National Security Concept).
to “situations, critical for national security” both in Russia and in its allied states. But the finally approved text omits words about allies. The renewed variant of the National Security Concept keeps silence altogether regarding nuclear guarantees to allies16.

**Arms control**

All the above-mentioned documents pay attention to the problems of arms control.

First of all, they stress the necessity to observe all the existing treaties and agreements in this field (the National Security Concept), whereas their violation is viewed as a factor destabilising the world military-political situation (the Military Doctrine). The documents proclaim Russia’s adherence to the unswerving fulfilment of the appropriate obligations (the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine). They raise a question of “control over mutual observance of the treaties in the sphere of arms limitation, reduction and liquidation”17.

The requirement to comply with arms control agreements is accompanied by a reference to their possible “adaptation to the realities of the new world” (the National Security Concept). Still it is not clear what treaties could be subject to this adaptation. The Foreign Policy Concept does not apply it to the 1972 ABM Treaty that should be kept intact as “a key-stone of strategic stability”.

It is remarkable that the other two documents avoid ritual invocations on this score. At the same time the initial draft of the Military Doctrine proclaimed “the preserving and strengthening” of the ABM Treaty as a precondition for further nuclear reductions. But the final variant omits this link. Another “precondition” in the earlier version of the

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16 According to the National Security Concept, Russia’s allies would benefit from “deterrence in the interests of prevention of an aggression of any scale, including nuclear weapons use”. If we try to interpret this thesis literally, it means assurances to allies in case of a nuclear attack against them but not the promise to defend them with Russian nuclear weapons. In other words, there are no Russian nuclear guarantees in this context. Since the above-stated corrections, which were introduced in the Military Doctrine in the process of its completion, look identical, there are grounds to assume that the Russian “extended deterrence” does not envisage a nuclear response to a conventional strike. Another way of formulating this thesis is that Russia, by reserving the right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, does not correlate it to the problem of protecting the allies.

17 This provision was formulated in the Military Doctrine (paragraph 10). It is interesting to note that the initial version of this document referred only to monitoring compliance of foreign states with their obligations in the sphere of arms limitation, reduction and liquidation as well as in the sphere of confidence-building measures. The final text of the Military Doctrine states that this control should be mutual.
Military Doctrine, that of “retaining the balance of strategic armaments”, shared the same fate. Instead of it the Foreign Policy Concept puts forward a condition of non-infringement of nuclear arms strategic stability. The latter, however, is not specified in any way, except for the above-mentioned references to the ABM Treaty. The theme of a further reduction of nuclear potential – both in bilateral (Russian–US) and multilateral format – is especially singled out in the Military Doctrine and in the Foreign Policy Concept. But the task of complete elimination of nuclear weapons (even if as a long-term aim) is not articulated in these documents, and this fact rather adequately reflects those changes that occurred in Russian thinking on this score.

All three documents addressed the problems of non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. According to the National Security Concept, “there is the continuing objective commonality of interests of Russia and other states in this field”. The Foreign Policy Concept stresses Russia’s adherence to the strengthening and developing of the appropriate international regimes, including creation of a Global system of control on the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The National Security Concept advocates ensuring “an international control over dual use goods and technologies as well as over military and dual use services”. It also supports an idea “to assist in establishing zones, free from weapons of mass destruction”. The Military Doctrine states that Russia “acts for giving a universal character to the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, for radical increase of efficiency of this regime by a combination of prohibitive, control and technological measures, for termination of nuclear tests and comprehensive nuclear test ban”.

Noteworthy, negative nuclear assurances (which are usually considered as a means of minimising the impetus to nuclear weapons proliferation) are treated in the Military Doctrine of 2000 in the same way as it was in the similar document of 1993. Similarly, as regards for problems of non-proliferation as a whole, the new documents do not contain any innovations of principle character. However, they seem to

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18 The previous version of the National Security Concept (1997) had a provision that Russia does not aim at “maintaining parity in armaments and armed forces with leading world powers” (which, according to the logic of this document, applied also to nuclear weapons). Thus, abolishing in 1997 the task of keeping up the parity, Russia attempted to return to this term (“balance of strategic armaments”) in 2000, but then renounced this intention.

19 The subject of complete elimination of nuclear weapons was mentioned for the last time in the “Principal Guidelines of the Military Doctrine” (1993).

20 The Foreign Policy Concept provides some specificity to this theme (Russia “will support the line on the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones in Asia”).
reflect an aspiration to more precisely and unambiguously formulate a position of Russia as well as to indicate its readiness for a more co-operative interaction with other participants of the international life. At the same time, there are no references to specific questions, being a subject of great attention in the context of non-proliferation and connected both with the emergence of new nuclear powers and with fears in respect of a number of other countries.

According to the Foreign Policy Concept, arms control is of priority importance in relations between Russia and the USA. Problems of regional stability are also correlated to the process of conventional arms reduction and limitation in which Russia is going to participate. The adapted CFE Treaty is especially singled out in this regard.

Finally, problems of confidence-building measures in the military sphere should be mentioned. The Foreign Policy Concept twice emphasises their necessity and formulates a goal of making them universal and overwhelming (by extending to coalition activities and to operations of naval forces). The National Security Concept, when referring to new arms control arrangements, directly gives a priority to agreements “on confidence- and stability-building measures”.

**Attitude toward NATO**

Some commentators stress that Russian attitude toward NATO has become more rigid. It seems that the texts of the above-mentioned papers do not give grounds for such assessment. Of course, they reflect increased negativism in the Russian position to this Alliance and its policy. However, this negativism has much lesser dimensions than it could be expected in light of the large-scale campaign against NATO expansion and especially in light of the drastically negative position on the aggression against Yugoslavia.

Thus, for example, the most “radical” thesis on the issue of NATO enlargement can be found in the National Security Concept that refers to this process as “the main threats in the international sphere”. But of interest is the fact that the analogous provision in the Military Doctrine is formulated only in a general form and even with a remarkable specification pointing to “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security”. (Does it mean that if there is no such a “detriment”, then the expansion is not viewed as an external threat?). Furthermore, the Foreign Policy Concept

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21 Thus, it should be noted that the USA “were shifted” in the system of Russian priorities to a rather modest place, after CIS, European Union, NATO, leading countries of Western Europe, former allies from Central–Eastern Europe and even Baltic states (the Foreign Policy Concept).
has limited itself by the phlegmatic statement that “Russia maintains its negative attitude toward NATO expansion”.

Russian objections to use of force contravening the international law, certainly, refer implicitly to NATO. The National Security Concept condemns “NATO’s transition to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanctions – transition that is elevated to the rank of a strategic doctrine”. The Foreign Policy Concept puts this problem on the first place among those, on which the present NATO positions do not coincide with the Russian security interests or even bluntly contradict them.

At the same time the Foreign Policy Concept maintains a rather balanced line on interpreting the problem of relations with NATO. On the first place, it emphasises the importance of co-operation with this structure in the interests of maintaining security and stability in Europe. It stresses the openness of Russia to constructive interaction and the significance for this interaction of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which was signed in 1997. The intensity of co-operation with the Alliance will depend on the fulfilment of the essential provisions of this document – in particular, on the non-deployment of foreign armed forces, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems on the territories of the new state-members. If Russian “terms” of co-operation with NATO are defined in such a way, then they could hardly be considered as excessively demanding.

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The Russian official documents that appeared in 2000 have several common features as to the treatment of the problems of international security. Among them: the straightforward orientation on realistic (pragmatic) approach and at the same time minimisation of ideological aspects; very noticeable geopolitical components; the idea of interaction between external and domestic threats; the highlighting of new security dimensions (and at the same time retaining of strong attention to traditional ones); the emergence of some new accents with respect to the use of force instruments (including nuclear weapons); declared adherence to co-operative interaction with the surrounding world (without however excluding unilateral actions); a clearly traced line on strengthening the status quo rather than on its erosion.

Taking into account that Russian public debates on the appropriate problems are developing within rather wide spectrum of opinions, it should be noted that there is a relative balance and moderation in the above-mentioned documents. At the same time the question is left open as
to what degree they will become a basis for practical policy (for example, when taking specific decisions on the military reform). However, these documents of a conceptual-doctrinal character give a rather adequate presentation of the moods in the Russian political class, and it is from this standpoint that they deserve serious attention.
PART II. REFORMING RUSSIA’S DEFENCE

Chapter 5. Military reform in Russia

Chapter 6. Problems of the 1998 defence budget

Chapter 7. Defence appropriations in the federal budget for the year 2001

Chapter 8. The SSN *Kursk* catastrophe and the condition of the Russian Navy
5. MILITARY REFORM IN RUSSIA*

Report of the Working Group of the Russian Academy of Sciences**
(Excerpts)

[...] 2. MAIN DIRECTIONS OF MILITARY REFORM

The old Ministry of Defence (MOD) practice of soliciting maximal appropriations regardless of the real budget size has completely disappeared now. Previous Ministry officials did everything possible to stick to the existing military structure. As a consequence, the Armed Forces personnel experienced chronic lack of funding and the loss of fighting efficiency. Many officers and contract soldiers were sacked, while the draft, on the contrary, gained in numbers and scope for the sake of making the army “cheaper”. Funds appropriated for purchases of

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armaments and for R&D were actually used to pay wages to the Armed Forces personnel. This situation exacerbated the decline of defence industry and military science. The responsibility for non-payments was placed on the political leadership that allegedly had refused to allot money for the army.

In order to overcome such an impasse it is necessary to change the system of the military reform development, financing and administration as well as the military policy as a whole.

2.1. The objectives of the Armed Forces

Clear division of functions between the Armed Forces and all other so-called “armed agencies” is very important for carrying out the aforementioned reform in the right direction. Unfortunately, at the moment there are serious difficulties in this area.

Russia’s existing military doctrine allows, under certain circumstances, for the use of the Armed Forces inside the country. The most obvious example of such “circumstances” and actions of the regular army units under these “circumstances” was Chechnya.

The tragic results of this war have proved once more that there are certain domestic problems that cannot be solved in principle by military force, least of all by using regular army whose purpose is to defend the country from external military threats. The problem of ethnic minorities is considered to be one of the most complicated, especially if it is exacerbated by economic and social hardship in a given region or in the Federation as a whole.

The settlement of internal ethnic conflicts will require strenuous efforts on the part of Russia for the foreseeable future, not only in Chechnya but also in a number of other regions. It would be inadmissible to spread “the Chechen experience” to the whole country. Military reform should envision that under no conditions the Armed Forces of Russia are to be involved in solving ethnic problems and political conflicts among different groupings inside the country as well as among the branches of power by resorting to punitive and other armed actions on the Russian territory. The only normal internal function of the Armed Forces is participation in rescue operations in case of natural disasters, epidemics and technological catastrophes.

One of the main tasks of the Armed Forces of the RF is to ensure the security of the country and of the allied states from external military threats to their territorial integrity, sovereignty, and economic and political interests. The Armed Forces should also participate in
international peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE and the CIS and in accordance with the status of Russia as a great power and a legitimate successor of the USSR, in support of international security and arms limitation and disarmament measures.

At the same time, the authors of the present report proceed from the assumption that such internal problems as armed separatism, ethnic and social conflicts, organised crime, etc. may become the principal threat to Russia’s security in the nearest future. There is no probability of an attack from abroad. Hence increased attention to the so-called “other troops” (that is, military formations of government agencies other than the Ministry of Defence) whose task is to ensure the country’s internal security. This issue is highly complicated and deserves a separate analysis. However, it is evident that the increase in numerical size of these “other” armed structures and formations (which compete with the Armed Forces for finance, material and manpower resources) is an undesirable process and that it may not be the best method of strengthening internal security. In any case, the country needs improved co-ordination of these agencies’ activities under the direction of a specially established or appointed body (Security Council or Defence Council).

The nuclear deterrent will remain the pivot of Russia’s national defence. In the first place, it should be considered as a reliable security guarantee in the process of fundamental changes in the country, including the implementation of military reform, but not just as one of the last resorts to retain the high status of a great power, and not as an instrument of current policy.

The reduction of the Russian Federation’s nuclear arsenal is to continue within the framework of US-Russian bilateral agreements, under condition of preserving the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty of 1972 and other arms control agreements. It is vital for Russia to activate the negotiating process in order to conclude START III treaty with the US which would envisage more substantial cuts in the number of nuclear warheads (up to 2500–2000 on each side). If an agreement on such bilateral reductions is not reached, the Russian nuclear and missile potential will by all means dwindle, as a result of the obsolescence of military equipment and the impossibility to maintain arms arsenal at the present level due to insufficient budget appropriations.

In principle, it is reasonable and acceptable for Russia to maintain its Strategic Nuclear Forces at a minimum level, which might be less than that of the US strategic nuclear forces. However, it would be much more advisable to move toward these lower levels of SNF gradually
and in co-operation with the US (and later with other nuclear powers as well), within the framework of the existing START arrangements. Meanwhile, all parties concerned should work out and disclose to the public opinion a convincing justification of the assured nuclear deterrent, under conditions of close co-ordination of both START negotiations and SNF programs.

A landslide reduction of Russia’s strategic armaments due to natural reasons (the exhaustion of their resources with simultaneous shortage of replenishments) should not be allowed to occur under any circumstances.

As regards deterrence against a hypothetical large-scale attack by a great power, we believe that such a deterrence can be reliably ensured with a limited tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) arsenal of up to 300 warheads, which would be dispersed, guaranteed survival in case of an attack, and would be primarily in the service of the front-line aviation. These weapons would be used as a last resort to strike at key military bases and groupings of a superior adversary.

As to the conventional armed forces and conventional armaments, Russia has neither reasons nor possibilities to seek parity with the West, because of the West’s gigantic superiority in its economic potential and manpower resources (by 10 and 4 times accordingly), and of its technological and geo-strategic advantages (advanced bases, communications, etc.). It should also be taken into account that nuclear deterrent would remain an effective factor for the foreseeable future.

There is an ongoing debate over different approaches to the optimal build-up of the general-purpose forces and the Russian Armed Forces as a whole. Each of the existing approaches has its pros and cons. The option that we advocate here can be viewed as one of the potential alternatives. In formulating these proposals, we have taken into account existing scenarios of potential conflicts, optimal tasks of Russian army units in accordance with the above-mentioned scenarios, and rational correlation between the presumable fighting efficiency of the corresponding army components and their cost. These have been our principal criteria.

The use of the cost-benefit criterion can be seen best of all in the context of the SNF. The proposed emphasis on further development of the SNF is explained not only by their decisive role in ensuring credible deterrence against a potential aggressor but also by its much higher cost efficiency as compared to the other components of the Armed Forces. At present, the SNF strength, together with the manpower of the supporting missile attack warning systems and military outer space systems, amounts
to circa 250,000 servicemen. However, expenditures in this sector do not exceed 10–15% of the total defence budget.

The maximal level of the Russian Federation’s SNF is to be limited to the total number of warheads envisaged in the START I and START II Treaties. At the same time, it is advisable to develop such a structure and composition of the Russian strategic forces which would not copy any foreign pattern but would require minimal expenditures while ensuring the most survivable and reliably controllable military and political deterrent against any nuclear-weapon state.

The optimal composition of the Russian Federation’s SNF is to be determined according to the basic purpose of their hypothetical use: that is, the so-called retaliatory strike or, in other words, a response to a reliable information about an actually initiated nuclear attack against Russia.

The emphasis on a retaliatory strike as the basic idea of response to a nuclear aggression predetermines the paramount importance not only of the most survivable nuclear force components (in the first place, mobile ground missile complexes at their launching positions and SSBNs fulfilling combat patrolling missions) but also their warning, control, and communications system. As far as the funding is concerned, the latter system must have priority vis-à-vis the nuclear weapon itself. This is particularly so in the context of significant reductions in the quantity of nuclear arsenals which will take place in the next decade due to economic and technological reasons (both within the framework of the existing agreements and irrespective of them).

Although the means of a nuclear launch-under-attack (i.e. an immediate response to the information from warning systems) are, from an economic point of view, less costly, it seems that under new conditions Russian security interests allow for the preservation of the concept of a launch under attack and corresponding means as an additional factor to ensure deterrence. In this connection, mobile ground complexes and SSBNs which are less survivable and less combat-ready under usual daily conditions (at places of their constant dislocation and at bases) are protected from a surprise nuclear attack by silo missile complexes, since these complexes are permanently ready for an immediate launch under attack.

Taking into account the preferable correlation between fighting efficiency and costs, it is advisable that the Air Force (mostly the frontline aviation and the fighters) should be singled out among general-purpose forces as the first priority component. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated that air superiority plays a decisive role and helps
ensure success by ground forces in their struggle with an enemy superior in personnel. It is the Air Force that demonstrates the pre-eminence of the higher quality of aircraft, weaponry and command and control systems over their quantity.

Russia needs compact and combat-ready ground forces, not exceeding in strength the German or French armed forces (270–330 thousand servicemen), equipped with means of transportation from west to east (or to south) and supported by tactical aviation of the Air Force and Air Defence that would be so strong and modern as to be comparable with its American equivalents. Under condition of severe shortage of resources, the mobility of rather large force contingents has become one of the urgent requirements. Since the Russian Federation cannot maintain large troop groupings in its western and eastern regions on a permanent basis (as was the case of the USSR in the 70s and 80s), the only solution is to build a ground-air “transcontinental” bridge between the western and eastern parts of Russia (along the lines of the NATO “transatlantic” sea-air bridge), in order to provide for the operational redeployment of large troop contingents and materiel with the corresponding development of ground and air communication nets, advanced arms depots and systems of their defence and protection. The increase in significance of the military aviation is especially pertinent to the role of cargo and combat helicopters whose effectiveness was proved during the Persian Gulf War.

The naval order of battle should be sufficient for the protection of the sea-based strategic nuclear forces in the North and for the support of peacekeeping and rescue operations in the Black Sea-Caspian basin, for defence of the sea coasts, sea economic zones and communications in the Far East, as well as for a limited participation in multilateral naval operations under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE, or within the framework of the “Partnership for Peace” program of co-operation with NATO. The reduction in the quantity of naval ships will enhance the significance of the ship-based and shore-based aviation.

Given Russia’s vast borders, the size of Russia’s border guard troops (which are not a part of the RF Armed Forces) should be sufficient to provide protection and be an advanced line of defence of the country and its allies’ territories. This is even more important in the context of local conflicts (such as in Tajikistan) and for countering unconventional security threats (smuggling, including narcotics and arms, as well as illegal migration, poaching, etc.).

The above-mentioned considerations with regard to defining the missions of the Armed Forces more clearly imply the necessity of a thorough revision of Russia’s present military doctrine, a reappraisal of
strategic goals and military requirements, and a corresponding change in operational plans.

2.2. Directions of reform in the Armed Forces

2.2.1. The scope and pace of the Armed Forces’ reduction

In the opinion of many Russian experts, shared by the authors of the present report, a total size of Russia’s Armed Forces of up to 800,000 – 1 million servicemen would be sufficient to effectively defend Russia from any external threat, under condition that the nuclear deterrent remains strong.

Under condition of a two-year compulsory conscription and of reducing the Armed Forces personnel to the above-mentioned level, and if it were possible to retain in service the current strength of 600,000 officers and ensigns plus 110,000 contract soldiers. These numbers would correspond to the existing pool of potential draftees that is available in the country. In future, an increase in the number of contract soldiers, together with the optimisation of the Armed Forces’ size, might allow for the restoration of a 1.5-year obligatory conscription.

It is advisable not to adopt a slow pace for the Armed Forces’ reduction (as in the plans to curtail the authorised strength only by 3% in 1997). Rather, the Army should be downsized by 30–40% of the muster roll or of the real strength at a minimum, and no later than in three years. This would bring the Armed Forces’ strength in line with the present appropriations, which are assigned for their maintenance, and satisfy, according to the MOD, the minimal requirements in an amount of only 52%.

A rapid reduction and reorganisation of Armed Forces would demand 13–15 trillion roubles per year over the above-mentioned three-year period. The results of these measures, expressed in real savings that are necessary for an increase in arms’ purchases and R&D, would become apparent only in 3 or 4 years. However, the reasons for such a radical decision are quite clear, since the army is not capable of bearing the present miserable situation for some years more. Besides, the defence industry and military science would collapse under the heavy burden of expenditures for the maintenance of Armed Forces.

2.2.2. The process of reduction and simultaneous quality upgrading

The reduction of the Armed Forces should be compensated by the
increase of their combat readiness. The reform’s main emphasis should be made upon equipping the army with modern weaponry and manning it on a professional basis.

As to the technical rearmament of the Armed Forces according to up-to-date demands, it is necessary to reorganise the defence industry and revise the R&D priorities. Such measures should be carried out on condition of retaining the available scientific and technological potential, essential production facilities, and skilled personnel.

During the first three-year period, the numerical reduction of the Armed Forces should be implemented predominantly at the level of rank-and-file soldiers and through the downsizing of the draft. Meanwhile, efforts should be made to retain as many officers as possible in the Armed Forces and to create a professional sergeant corps. It is necessary to take all measures required to preserve the Russian officers’ best and brightest, the high professionalism and the best traditions of Russia’s Armed Forces. In the course of this transition period, it may be possible (under condition of retaining the SNF and their support systems in full strength) to have a small number of completely manned combat-ready formations in the general-purpose forces and – as to everything else – to keep cadre units and military equipment depots, to guard installations and depots and to carry out simple auxiliary works by a minimal contingent of the rank and file.

The growth of the Armed Forces’ combat readiness under conditions of their overall quantity reduction might be reached at the next stage (4–5 years) only through transition process for several years to a professional army, in conjunction with coming into force of the law on alternative civil service. In this way, the composition of the Armed Forces will be properly balanced and include as a rule fully manned formations, while at the same time retaining cadre units only as a core, in order to be able to build up the Armed Forces strength in case a serious threat emerges in the future.

According to several independent assessments, Russia might afford a professional-contract military personnel of up to 800,000–1 million servicemen even within the limits of the presently available financial resources. Even in this case, it would still be two or three times more than the personnel strength of any national army in Europe.

In his Decree no. 723, Russian President Boris Yeltsin set the task of transition to a professional army by the year 2000. This is one of the few examples when official intentions expressed by the country’s top leadership go in the right direction of the Armed Forces’ reforming. It seems, however, that such a short time framework for the creation of a
complex army manning system is not realistic, because up to now there have been no serious practical steps for the implementation of the above-mentioned declaration.

2.2.3. Improving the Armed Forces’ structure

On the eve of the 21st century, the structure of the Russian Armed Forces is a subject of sharp debates in the official circles as well as among experts. According to the majority of the authors of this report, of all the approaches to the prospective composition of the Army which are currently being discussed, the most preferable option is the four armed services structure: Strategic Nuclear Forces – SNF (or, in other words, Strategic Deterrent Forces), Ground Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy.

Although the issue of eliminating Air Defence from the list of the country’s armed services is complicated and highly controversial, participants of the Working group have reached a consensus to the effect that the original main tasks of this armed service (that is, defence of the air space of the USSR against strategic and tactical aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons, cruise missiles and massive conventional air strikes in a large-scale conventional war with the US and their allies) are losing their significance both for the present and the foreseeable future. Currently, the main missions of the Air Defence should be limited to the control over the national air space and the prevention of illegal flights, air smuggling and enemy aviation actions in local and regional conflicts.

It is probably most advisable for these tasks to be handled by Air Force only, which would unite aviation and its support resources (of the Air Force and Air Defence), but all the Air Defence ground weapons should be transferred to the Ground Forces.

As regards such elements of Anti-Aircraft Defence as Missile Space Defence, which includes the nuclear attack warning system and the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), it is closely connected, from the functional point of view, with the SNF and should be incorporated into the Strategic Deterrent Forces. For a number of technological and operational reasons, a BMD system appears to be a rather questionable means of defence against a nuclear missile strike. Therefore, its further upgrading is hardly justified, except for the need to maintain radar systems in combat-ready conditions. If sufficient funds are available, it would be better to concentrate them on the development of new Theatre Air Defence systems with improved characteristics which would be able to intercept both operational-tactical and intermediate-range missiles.
Transition to the proposed four-service structure in the Armed Forces should be carried out after a detailed study of all the emerging organisational and technical problems, especially those connected with the restructuring of the command system. Perhaps, the implementation of such a reform of the Armed Forces’ structure would not be feasible before the year 2000.

Some experts are exploring the issue of whether a different structure for the Armed Forces might be more expedient. Some of them are considering, for example, a three-service structure (Air Force, Navy and Missile-Space Forces). Taking into account the fact that the transition to this or any other structure would require considerable time, there is an opinion in favour of making a prompt decision in principle regarding the improvement of the structure of the Armed Forces.

2.3. Reorganisation of the defence industry

Increased government support for arms production and, at the same time, regulation of the process of conversion of defence plants would be a way out of the deplorable condition of the defence industry.

International experience indicates an existing tendency towards reducing the number of small firms and plants engaged in manufacturing arms and creating big corporations which become near-monopolists in the corresponding sectors. This considerably improves the quality and competitiveness of military products. Thus, for example, in the near future the US will have no more than one or two big manufacturers of the most important arms, i.e. military aircraft of diverse use (Lockheed-Martin and Boeing), missiles (Raytheon), and military satellites (Lockheed-Martin and TRW). In most West European countries, the situation is the same.

Likewise, in Russia, it is advisable to initiate a transition from multiple and rather small defence industry organisations in each field of arms production to the creation of few large enterprises. At the same time, it is necessary to carry out the reorganisation, closure, conservation and, if possible, conversion of a greater part of the remaining enterprises and to secure employment for the discharged personnel.

As a matter of fact, complete reorientation of a section of the defence industry to conversion programs will solve the problem of priorities, namely by “severing” those enterprises which are not needed. In order to define specific measures for the reorganisation of such enterprises, the Ministry of Economy should be assigned the task of conducting a survey in accordance with a list, to be presented by the
MOD, of enterprises for whose products there is a demand.

It is also necessary to provide for privileged financing and the issuance of credits for investments in conversion programs, which envisage the integration of defence enterprises into large nation-level conglomerates and their financing through such conglomerates. This would stimulate interest among leading conglomerates in attracting enterprises converted to the mass production of consumer goods, increase the quality of technologies through the use of military science and technology, and instil mutual responsibility among enterprises for the restructuring of production. The proposed model is most suitable for the conversion of less important enterprises (they constitute a majority in the defence industry), that is, developers and manufacturers of complementary weapon elements, control systems, power installations, motors, instruments, etc.

The implementation of the proposed strategy for resolving the problems of defence industry will be accompanied by certain negative side effects in social terms, first and foremost the growth of unemployment. However, the hidden unemployment that already exists in the defence industry is not less dangerous and much more burdensome for the country’s economy. In the long run, attempts to divide the sharply diminished budgetary pie into equal parts entail the risk of a complete destruction of the defence industry and of a collapse, not only of redundant production sectors but also of those which are needed today and will be needed tomorrow.

Under conditions of active state support, the development of co-operation between Russia and foreign countries in the sphere of military technology may become an important factor in boosting economically healthy defence industries. However, expectations for such a co-operation to resolve all problems of Russian defence industry seem not only naive but, moreover, dangerous, since they may postpone the making of other difficult, much needed decisions. Co-operation in the area of military technology may be an effective tool only after a profound restructuring and consolidation of the defence industry. Such co-operation should not be limited to the massive sale of Russian arms and technologies but also extend to the sphere of R&D and production.

It would be advisable to develop critical, basic military technologies and maintain those national technologies which occupy leading positions in the world, at an advanced level. As to those sectors where we are seriously lagging behind, it would be better to purchase technologies than try to develop them.

One important feature is the requirement for defence enterprises
to hold the so-called mobilisation stockpiles which are necessary in case of an emergency. These mobilisation reserves are a heavy burden on every defence enterprise. Storage is very expensive and is fully included in the main production costs as additional overhead charges.

It appears that this system which was absolutely indispensable in the past has started to lose its importance. A modern big war, even a conventional one, is unlikely to be lengthy. Therefore, belligerents would have to use available and stored weapons, combat materiel and reserve stocks. In any case, a party to a conflict would practically have no possibility of producing and transporting military hardware from the rear to the front line, since the enemy would resort to high-precision, mass-destruction and long-range weapons during hostilities. As to the local conflicts, they would not require arms and equipment in such quantities as to necessitate the mobilisation of defence industry.

It would therefore be expedient to give a critical re-evaluation to the need of maintaining mobilisation stockpiles as previously. At first, in order to bring the bulk of the unused mobilisation reserves in circulation certain privileges should be granted, such as exemptions from VAT, permission to the enterprises to lease out unused mobilisation stocks and, accordingly, make accelerated deductions for depreciation.

Later, the principle of maintaining mobilisation reserves could be totally abandoned, and the availability of reasonably sufficient stocks of arms and equipment, which could be periodically replenished in peacetime, would be sufficient.

A great deal of work has to be undertaken to create a normal legislative basis for managing the complex of defence industries. There is need for laws covering conversion of defence industries, state defence orders, commercial secrets, co-operation in the sphere of military technologies, state policies in the field of arms reduction and disarmament, leasing, and a few others. They should be made more specific than usual and approved in accordance with the established procedure. It would be advisable to consider the benefits of re-establishing a co-ordinating government agency, along the lines of the former Soviet Military-Industrial Commission.

Investments in the development of defence resources should be encouraged through government support for defence production, centralised capital investments, protectionist measures aimed at domestic high-tech manufacturers (until the time when their production becomes competitive on the international market), the financing of the restructuring of defence production and the creation an advanced technological base drawing upon dual-use technologies.
It would make sense to attract talented youth, young scientists and specialists for work in defence organisations and enterprises for the sake of retaining and developing the human potential of the military-industrial complex. With this purpose in view, government should enhance the attractiveness of those faculties and departments in higher education establishments which are training specialists for defence industry (for example, by raising students’ stipends). It would be advisable to defer military service requirements for young specialists and to consider work at defence enterprises as an alternative military service. It would be desirable to include lecturers specialising in the corresponding disciplines on the list of people working on state defence orders, with the introduction of increased coefficients for them in the single payment tariff scale.

2.4 Sources and additional reserves to carry out military reform

If the above-mentioned measures are fully implemented, it can be expected that the military reform will have the desired effect. The main funding for this purpose should naturally come from federal budget appropriations. As has already been mentioned, a rapid large-scale reduction of the Armed Forces over a three-year period would require large additional expenditure at the rate of 13–15 trillion roubles annually. These sums are to be allocated under strict financial control and partly outside the “National defence” budget chapter.

In order to achieve such an important social goal in the absence of sufficient domestic financial sources, it would be advisable to increase the federal budget deficit by 10–15% bringing it up to 4% of the GDP (at present, it is set at the level of 95 trillion roubles, or 3.5% of the GDP). This would imply allowing for a certain growth of inflation, in spite of the likely internal and external opposition to such a course.

The government should actively search for financial sources for the military reform, in order to minimise the negative impact of this radical and certainly unpopular measure. The authors of this report do not claim to present an exhaustive analysis but rather suggest to examine the following possible additional sources of funding:

– Russia possesses a unique resource which makes it possible to increase the number of persons who are interested in the military contract service, and do it at a fairly low cost. Why not permit Russian-speaking citizens from the neighbouring states to become contract servicemen in the Russian Armed Forces? The fact is that the level of income of the population in all CIS countries is much lower than in Russia. The
enlistment of such citizens in the Russian army would give them a chance to improve their material conditions and, if they wish, to be repatriated to their historic homeland at the end of their military service. Future contract soldiers from near abroad would have real prospects of receiving Russian citizenship, studying at Russian higher education institutions, etc. By adopting necessary laws in this regard, Russian authorities would demonstrate that they are not indifferent to the fate of their compatriots who were left behind in the new independent states (NIS) against their will;

– It is necessary to revise fundamentally the inflexible, inflated and obsolete reserve system in the Armed Forces inherited from the Soviet Union. Is it reasonable to waste money for the sake of retaining on the reserve list all Russians up to the age of 50–60? Perhaps, it would be better to concentrate the available (very limited) financial resources on more intensive retraining of a smaller number of those young reservists who have served in the Armed Forces and other troops. Future participation in the active reserve and fulfilment of the corresponding requirements should become a condition for the enlistment of a volunteer on contract;

– Efforts might be continued to obtain from foreign countries additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the military reform by direct assistance similar to the one given at present for the purpose of housing construction for demobilised servicemen, arms elimination or utilisation, the conversion of defence enterprises, etc. A great deal depends on how this is presented to potential investors as well as to the domestic opposition. If it is done out in accordance with officially signed international agreements and kept within their framework, such foreign aid to the Russian military reform may be viewed as a quite legitimate and natural act;

– A certain amount of savings on defence spending could be obtained through a redistribution of expenditure within the national budget. For example, it would be proper to exclude appropriations intended for the maintenance of those facilities in the so-called military towns, which have nothing to do with defence expenditure, (i.e. spending on elementary and secondary schools, kindergartens and day nurseries, medical facilities for civilians) from the national defence chapter of the federal budget. These expenditures should be transferred to the education and health care chapters of the budget. The same could apply to financing the construction of apartment blocks for servicemen’s families on municipal land (the “Housing construction” budget chapter), but not on the territory of army units. After this reallocation of expenditures among
different budget chapters the MOD would continue to receive, as in the past, the corresponding sums, but these allocations would no longer be included in the defence budget.

In the context of search for financial resources for the military reform, one should keep in mind the ongoing disarmament processes in which Russia is participating. Disarmament itself may be either beneficial or harmful for a country, depending on how it conducts itself in this sphere. If a state adheres to all the provisions of the corresponding agreements, disarmament will contribute to savings in the long run. However, if the agreed international rules are violated, Russia’s total expenditure may drastically increase, and this will produce an indirect influence on the process of reforms, including the military one.

Let us take, for example, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which came into force on 29 April 1997. Russia has not ratified it yet. This fact, as well as potential non-compliance with the Convention’s provisions after its ratification, are fraught with international, economic, trade and other sanctions against Russia. Besides, Russia would have to spend large sums of money to eliminate obsolete and dangerous toxic agents anyway. In the case that the CWC is not ratified or not observed, Russia will have destroy its chemical weapons at its own expense, in the absence of any foreign aid.

Success of the Russian military reform will largely depend on how actively and consistently the RF will co-ordinate its implementation with the national policy on disarmament, including the conclusion and implementation of the treaties on strategic and conventional arms reduction (START I, II, III and CFE 1, 2) and such questions as the delimitation of ABM systems, the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, etc.

3. THE POLITICAL MECHANISM FOR THE MILITARY REFORM

3.1. Civil control and management over the Armed Forces and transparency

The establishment of effective civil control and management of the army and the maximum admissible transparency in military matters in the whole of Russian society are the most important conditions for a successful military reform and the maintenance of the necessary defensive capabilities.

First of all, it is necessary to achieve greater transparency in and
accessibility to the defence budget. This could lead to more reliable civil control and would reduce the risk of budget funds being spent for purposes for which they were not allocated, or their direct embezzlement.

The Russian parliament should possess real levers of control over the Armed Forces and defence matters, in the first instance, through control over the budget. This would ensure openness of the decision-making process and a more objective approach to the selection of developmental priorities for the army. It is necessary to create a mechanism for independent parliamentary supervision of the implementation of the budget and for the institution of criminal proceedings against those officials who provide false information and violate the adopted budget law. This would require, among other, amending the Constitution.

We need an independent system of auditing the MOD financial activities in order to eradicate mismanagement and unjustified overspending of the appropriations.

It is important to put an end to the uncontrolled use of the Armed Forces, as well as other armed agencies, military formations and organisations for carrying out both internal and external missions which go beyond their sphere of competence. We propose that in each individual case expenditures for these activities be approved by the State Duma.

It is necessary that the parliament and public opinion have full access to any information on the planning of the military reform (except, of course, for strictly technical and operational details). This concerns plans for the reduction and reorganisation of the Armed Forces, reform of the defence industry, the mobilisation bases, etc.

For the sake of expediency, the functions of the MOD and of the General Staff should be precisely differentiated. The MOD should be responsible for general defence policy and defence priorities; control over the defence-industrial complex; administrative control; questions affecting levels of the Armed Forces; R&D programs; procurement and social security policy.

The General Staff and the Commands of all the service arms should carry out functions of operational control and combat training, as they did before.

Civilian administration of national defence presupposes a legal provision for the appointment of civilians, rather than military officers, as defence ministers.

A civilian minister of defence would not be burdened with the function of representing the army’s social and institutional interests and
thus would be able to take a broader view of military requirements, with due regard for political and economic realities. The position of the Armed Forces vis-à-vis a civilian minister would be represented by the General Staff, the Commands of the service arms and directorates. If they do not agree with a civilian minister, they should have the right to uphold their position and appeal to the president and the parliament. Under a military officer in the ministerial seat, such a disagreement tends to be severely and immediately suppressed, and the officers criticising the minister are usually forced to retire. Such an artificially monolithic unity of opinion often conceals and perpetuates serious problems, errors and contradictions in the sphere of defence policy. A military officer in the ministerial capacity is more inclined to provide a rosy picture of the situation in the Armed Forces and to exaggerate their combat capability. This could lead to fatal miscalculations, as was, for instance, the case in Chechnya.

Regular replacements of defence ministers would help discover and rectify errors, which are inevitable in the process of reforms. A civilian minister could be dismissed in the same way as any other member of the government. The dismissal of a military minister who is supposed to be the best and most authoritative representative of the Armed Forces always inflicts damage on the prestige and morale of the Armed Forces.

The appointment of a civilian minister of defence should enhance the stability of the highest military personnel. It would also help avoid the situations in which many talented commanders are dismissed from their posts because of a general from a rival group coming to power in the MOD.

Perhaps a separate line item in the budget should be devoted to funding the office of a civilian minister, which would consist of both civilian and military specialists. This would contribute to creating a body capable of generating and implementing ideas concerning military reform, irrespective of lobbying on the part of those military and economic elements which are to be reformed.

The mass media plays a great role in improving transparency in the field of defence. The list of secret information about the Armed Forces and the state’s defensive capabilities (which it is prohibited to publish or openly discuss) should be clearly established by the legislators, with the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the mass media in this sphere without prejudice to national security.
3.2. Principles of financing the military reform

The chronic underfinancing of the army and military-industrial complex (or, for the sake of accuracy, the incomplete fulfilment of the MOD’s requests) can be explained, to a large degree, by the lack of clear-cut and specific formulation of the real needs as well as their justification. If the country’s military leadership could clearly state and prove the need for the levels and composition of the planned Armed Forces as well as the number of formations and units and clearly explain their missions and methods to execute them, the parliament and the government would satisfy the MOD’s budget requests. In any case, many controversial issues would be removed from the agenda.

It would be advisable to analyse thoroughly all aspects of the military reform and create an efficient mechanism for its financing, in order to avoid the above-mentioned negative practice of underfunding reform. At the same time, the following recommendations should be taken into account:

a) Military budget should be broken down in accordance with the following three types of appropriations:
   – based on the functional principle;
   – by service arms, fighting arms and their main components;
   – by targeted programs.
   It is necessary to considerably augment those budget requests which are subject to approval by the Federal Assembly.

b) Funding priorities should be rearranged with the purpose of establishing a better balance between the investment and expenditure budget classifications for the maintenance of the Armed Forces. This would help prevent waste of defence budget money and would provide the basis for the implementation of long-term military build-up programs, defence R&D, arms production and procurement. In the first stage, expenditure on R&D and arms purchases, priority should be given to appropriations for research in order to economise funds while simultaneously preserving existing levels of advanced military science and technology. As the economic situation improves, it would become possible to embark on the mass production and procurement of arms and military equipment corresponding to the most advanced world standards.

c) The funding for the reduction of army personnel should figure outside the national defence chapter of the federal budget or, at least outside the subhead dedicated to the “build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces”. These funds should be included in the so-called “off-limit items” (that is, expenditures which cannot be slashed). In addition to
payments of personnel benefits through MOD, these funds should be channelled directly into such spheres as housing construction, purchases of apartments, as well as toward the related expenses of the Social Welfare Ministry, Transportation Ministry etc. In the absence of these provisions, the MOD would be disinclined to carry out these reductions in the optimal fashion and to reallocate the funds for maintenance needs, since it is one government agency which, in principle, is not interested in the reduction of the Armed Forces.

d) Any sequestration of expenditure (due to arrears of revenue or unplanned expenses) ought to be approved as amendment to the budget by the parliament, with a full account of the potential consequences of this approval for the country’s defence and military reform. Expenditure for combat operations should to be financed through amendments to the budget in a separate article.

e) Debts accumulated in the process of arms procurement and as a result of expenditures on R&D, in the cases when the accumulation of these debts was not the fault of the MOD and the industry, should be excluded from the defence budget. This should be done in order to “cleanse” the military budget and stimulate the viability of the defence industry and its conversion. Expenditure should remain at the same level as in the past but the debts on state orders (and credit debts) should be financed by a separate article in the federal budget and be lowered by mutual offsets in payments.

f) The article on repairs of arms and military equipment and the supply of spare parts (which could reduce expenses on equipping the Army and the Navy under conditions of limited production of advanced materiel), at present neglected in spite of its importance, should be given priority and protected status. This article should be transferred from the “maintenance” to the “arms procurement” budget item.

g) Expenditure on the elimination and utilisation of arms (in the first place, chemical and nuclear weapons and nuclear power facilities) should be financed in full and by “off-limit” articles in the interest of national security (meanwhile, in 1997, only 3.1 trillion roubles, or 32% of the required sum, were appropriated for these items).

h) All the funds appropriated for the maintenance of the Armed Forces should be transferred to the Federal Treasury’s system, in order to establish strict supervision of the implementation of the budget in accordance with allocation classification;

i) Given the fact that the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation is unable to cope with the task of control over the implementation of the military budget, controlling powers of the
parliament in this sphere ought to be increased.

3.3. How to administer the military reform

It would be logical for civilian rather than military agencies to design and to administer the implementation of the military reform. The President should abolish numerous commissions and councils tasked with designing and implementing military reform. Instead, he should establish a single agency for this purpose, put its functioning under his personal control and ban direct access to himself from various lobbies. It would be best to entrust one of the Vice-Premiers with the implementation of the military reform or appoint another one specifically for this purpose.

All the armed agencies and departments should be part of the government, subordinate to the Chairman of the government and participate, in co-operation with other ministries, in the formation of the basic government policy and its financing. Direct subordination of the “armed chiefs” to the President should be abolished.

The military reform may be carried out in two or three stages. Let us consider the following variant as one of the available options:

The first stage (a two- or three-year period) should be devoted to designing and adopting a new military doctrine; reducing force levels down to one million soldiers; optimisation of the structure of armed agencies outside of the MOD; real combat training of the remaining, fully-manned, formations and units; beginning of the reorganisation of the defence industry, accompanied by the necessary financing of essential R&D and priority appropriations for procurements in the interests of SNF and the Air Force; preserving a research-production base which is minimally needed for other armed services, including the expansion of military-technical co-operation.

The second stage (a four or five year-period) should be devoted to a further reduction of the Armed Forces down to an optimal level (that is, 800 000–900 000 people) and transition to a volunteer army; an improvement of the army’s structure; completion of the reorganisation of the defence industry; financing of weapons and materiel procurement for all armed services and fighting arms; expansion of R&D with an emphasis on the next-generation armaments.

The first stage of the reform should be preceded by “a zero phase”, in which all the necessary legislative acts would be put in place, together with the corresponding organisational measures, including, perhaps, a broad-based debate over its main ideas.
In order to improve the organisation of research work in the defence-industrial complex, the introduction of planning in the military R&D should be considered. If the above-mentioned proposal to revive such an agency as the State Military-Industrial Commission is adopted, it would make sense to attach to it a Science and Technology Council with the participation of chief engineers of military labs. This Council should examine the R&D priorities.

The scope, complexity and significance of the military reform predetermine the necessity to plan and organise it on the basis of scientific principles. It should be noted that, up to now, practically nothing has been done in this regard. In the absence of clear-cut ideas about the first steps required to reorganise the army and the defence industry, as well as about the resources and time necessary for their realisation, the implementation of the military reform is put in doubt. In any case, this situation helps different opposition circles derive political benefit from criticism of the military reform plans.

We think that it is advisable to carry out research in the MOD, the main ministries of the defence industry and in governmental and parliamentary structures in order to come up with convincing argumentation in support of the most reasonable ways of conducting military reform in Russia. For this purpose, one should employ modern methods of systems analysis and mathematical simulation which proved their worth in our country and abroad. Similar research work should be organised in the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

It would perhaps be expedient to establish, on a temporary basis, a special expert body under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which would evaluate different proposals for the military reform and prepare a report with the Academy’s conclusions on this subject.

CONCLUSIONS

In the light of what was said above, the authors of this report have formulated the following basic requirements which, in their opinion, should be taken into account in the process of conducting military reform in Russia:

– In order for the military reform to be successful, it is necessary to improve the general situation in Russia by adjusting the course of economic and social transformations and eradicating criminality and corruption at all levels; however, the absence of tangible changes in the life of the country cannot justify the deferment of radical reforms in the
sphere of defence, which should be started without delay and taking real possibilities into account.

– Decisions on financing the military reform from the state budget, on the social protection of servicemen and civilian personnel in the Armed Forces, on the reorganisation of the defence industry, etc. should be accompanied by measures, which would permit to eliminate or minimise the negative effects of these decisions on the general socio-economic situation in the country. The prevention of crisis situations as a result of its implementation and the maintenance of stability in society should be the imperative of the military reform. The military reform should not undermine the national economy and prevent efforts to solve other important problems of the Russian people.

– As far as the foreign relations are concerned, military reform should not be a Russian response to Western “challenges”, including NATO expansion eastward. Instead of having recourse to military countermeasures, it would be preferable to activate diplomatic efforts in all directions, including the so-called “Russian expansion”, by restoring closer ties with the countries of Eastern Europe and strengthening relations within the framework of the CIS (Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, and other states).

– National defence should be maintained at the level of minimal necessity, taking into account the probable future geo-strategic situation. At the same time, the capability for a rapid build-up of this system, in case of unfavourable developments in the world, should be preserved.

As regards external conditions for conducting military reform in Russia, they can be, on the whole, considered favourable.

However difficult it may be for the country’s economy, the reduction and reorganisation of the army and defence industry requires large investment of resources, while returns on these and other steps in military reform will become tangible only several years after its completion. Nevertheless, these resources ought to be found, even if this requires such emergency measures as an increase in the federal budget deficit and an additional monetary expansion.

The plans for the military reform should be transparent and understandable. They should be based on a wide socio-political consensus and carried out through a new mechanism of management and financing and under the strict control of the parliament and public opinion.

Military reform is not a whim of politicians or a tribute to fashion. It is an essential condition for the salvation of the Armed Forces and defence industry and the warding off of a serious threat to Russian internal security, in the short run, and, possibly, an external threat in the
long run. Therefore, military reform should become one of the major priorities in the activities of the Legislature and the Executive.
6. PROBLEMS OF THE 1998 DEFENCE BUDGET*

Pyotr ROMASHKIN and Valery YARYNICH

On 31 March 1998, the Federal budget law for 1998 entered into force. It was passed in difficult economic and political conditions.

The budget was adopted with expenditure totalling 499 945.2 million roubles (17.6% of the GDP), with revenues amounting to 367 548.0 million roubles (12.94% of the GDP) and a deficit limited to 132 397.2 million roubles (4.66% of the GDP). The forecast of the GDP amounted to 2840 billion roubles.

When the Government submitted the draft budget to the State Duma, the main budget indices were lower: for expenditure by 27.9 billion roubles, for revenue by 27.5 billion roubles and for the deficit – by 0.4 billion roubles. Changes in the main features of the budget were introduced as a result of the work of the trilateral conciliation commission, made up of representatives of the State Duma, the Council of the Federation and the Government.

For comparison: in the 1997 federal budget, expenditure represented 19.4% of the GDP, revenue – 15.9% and the deficit – 3.5%. In this way, expenditure was reduced by 13%, revenue by 28% and the deficit grew by 37%.

This shows that in the summer of 1997, i.e. before the financial crisis in Southeast Asia and the drop in oil and gas prices, the Government assumed in 1998 “reduced obligations” in respect of tax collection. Reduction in tax collection by nearly 30% and growth of the deficit by 37% may lead to a further increase in inflationary expectations. The growth of the deficit is accounted for, in the main, by servicing the internal debt, which, it is expected, will grow in 1998 more than twofold.

When the 1998 draft federal budget was debated on the first reading, a clause, proposed by the State Duma Defence Committee, was introduced in the draft resolution of the State Duma to the effect that, in accordance with the ruling of the President of the RF, spending on national defence should amount to 3.5% of the GDP. The Government was in agreement with this figure. In accordance with the resolution adopted by the State Duma, the Working commission set up in the State

Duma to examine the defence clauses of the budget and the SD Defence Committee introduced an amendment to the effect that expenditure under the chapter “National defence” should amount to 99.4 billion roubles. This represents 3.5% of the GDP (2840 billion roubles), as adopted on the first reading.

In the draft budget submitted by the Government, allocations for defence amounted to 81.75 billion roubles. The amendment, therefore, meant an increase in spending on defence of 17.65 billion roubles or by 21.6%.

The Working commission of the State Duma and the Defence Committee proceeded from a clause in the Law of the Russian Federation on the budget classification in the R.F., adopted in 1996. In accordance with this clause expenditure on pensions of the military personnel should be transferred to the chapter “Social policies” as being more in keeping with the reality since this expenditure has a specific purpose not directly connected with ensuring the combat capability of the Armed Forces.

In the 1998 draft budget, submitted by the Government, allocations for pensions for the military personnel to a sum of 11 billion roubles are included under the chapter “Social policies”. The Ministry of Finance, however, when preparing the 1998 draft budget, included this expenditure in the chapter “National defence” as well as other expenditure, which according to the law “On the budget classification in the Russian Federation” are not related to national defence. But even when taking these additions into account, spending on national defence represented in all 3.3% of the GDP.

As a result of such “castling”, expenditure under the head “National defence” remained the same (81.75 billion roubles) representing 2.88% of the volume of the GDP as adjusted by the trilateral commission.

In this way, when preparing the 1998 draft budget for a second reading in the State Duma, the Ministry of Finance, in fact, ignored presidential instructions in respect of national defence allocations.

For what purposes is it necessary to increase spending on national defence in 1998?

In recent years, when the military reform stalled, the MOD applications for funds, at the stage when the draft federal budget was in preparation, were, as a rule, twice or higher than the funds, which were later allocated for national defence. This only reflected the intention of the MOD to get as much money as possible. Today, the requested increase of just 21.6 % in expenditure on defence has become a vital necessity. The following circumstances point to this.
The first steps to implement the military reform have already been taken. It is planned to reduce the Armed Forces in 1998 by over 200 thousand servicemen. A radical, structural reform of the administration of the whole military organisation of the state has started.

The reform of the Armed Forces should become a priority objective of the Government. Without sufficient funding they may cease to be a support of the state and turn into a potential threat. A hungry, dishevelled, homeless, morally broken, numerous army, equipped with obsolescent armaments, may become extremely dangerous, not so much for other countries as for the people of the RF. Such a situation may push a considerable number of military personnel into the arms of extremist groups, who are becoming particularly active.

The defence industry in recent years has fallen more and more in a state of decline. Enterprises are not paid for even the small number of defence orders they complete. No concrete measures are taken to convert the defence industry for civilian production. The meagre allocations, which are envisaged in the federal budget for this purpose, in fact, do not reach those for whom they are destined.

Military reforms cannot be carried out without money. Reduced federal budget allocations for national defence can only lead to the degradation of the Armed Forces while creating a mass of heavily armed, deeply aggrieved people. The amendments to the draft 1998 budget, proposed by the Working group and SD Defence Committee, were examined at a meeting of the SD Committee on the budget, taxes, banks and finances, but found no support there. Members of the Committee did not take account of the fact that the chapter “National defence” is virtually the only chapter, which is funded from the federal budget only. All other expenditure chapters are funded from the consolidated budget, which is made up of the federal budget and the budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation. Such questions as agriculture, for instance, are not even jointly managed by the Federation and the subjects of the Federation. Nevertheless, the group of agrarian deputies succeeded in obtaining from the Government the allocation of additional 6 billion roubles for agriculture, although this request was considerably less substantiated than the requirements of military reform.

If the Government is short of money, as it never ceases to repeat, it is all the more necessary to determine clearly what the national priorities are and to finance them at a minimally sufficient level. The military reform belongs, without any doubt, to the top priorities. It is not simply a question of strengthening defence capability, but of internal social-political stability in Russia.
When the State Duma debated the 1998 budget on the fourth reading, the Government introduced amendments, which, in essence, reverted the main features of the budget to its original version. At first, the proposal was not accepted. But as a result of the examination of the draft law “On the 1998 federal budget”, on the fourth reading a new version of Art. 102 appeared in the final text. It envisages that in case the combined revenue in the budget varies from the amount envisaged, the Government in strict proportion to the yearly allocation, taking into account the actual revenue received, will fund the expenditure. In this way, the Government has been given the mandate to adjust the budget, depending on the revenue collected, without having to introduce a corresponding draft federal law in the State Duma. In this case, the only thing it has to do is to give notice of this, within three days, to the recipients of the budget funds, the Federal Assembly and the mass media.

In 1998, expenditure, under the head “National defence”, was planned to amount to 81 765 million roubles. This represents 2.88% of the GDP and 16.36% of the aggregate expenditure of the federal budget.

In Table I are shown the dynamics of the change in expenditure on defence in the federal budgets in 1994–98, in shares of the GDP and the aggregate expenditure of the federal budget.

Table 1. The dynamics of change in expenditure on defence in the federal budget, 1994–98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of the GDP in %</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of the aggregate expenditure in the federal budget in %</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>18.92</td>
<td>19.69</td>
<td>16.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official data from the State Duma

As can be seen from Table I, the share of expenditure under the head “National defence” in the federal budget dropped considerably in 1998 as compared with 1994–1997. It is true, that account should be taken of the fact that, in 1994–1997, expenditure on national defence included allocations for pensions of military personnel. In 1998 this amounted to 11 billion roubles (0.39% of the GDP and 2.20% of the aggregate expenditure of the federal budget) and was included in the chapter “Social policies”. However, even taking into account the spending on pensions of military personnel, expenditure on national
defence amounts to 3.27% of the GDP and its share in the federal budget totals 18.56%. This is much less than in the previous years and less than the 3.5% of the GDP, fixed in the Presidential instruction of June 1997.

In this way, the main conclusion to be drawn is that spending on national defence in 1998 was considerably reduced. This is happening at a time when at last the military reform begins to gather speed, for which additional funds will be needed (the real positive effect from its implementation can only become tangible in a few years).

In which way will the funds in the chapter “National defence” be spent?

National defence – 81 765.0 million roubles, including:

1. Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces – 79 403.0 million roubles (97.11% of expenditure on national defence) among which:
   a) Salaries of personnel of the Central Administration – 319.0 million roubles (0.39% of expenditure on national defence);
   b) Maintenance of the Armed Forces – 43 552.5 million roubles (54.24% of expenditure on national defence) among which:
      — personnel – 33 267.9 million roubles (40.68% of expenditure on national defence);
      — combat training and military-technical maintenance – 9282.6 million roubles (11.35% of expenditure on national defence);
      — maintenance and exploitation of military facilities – 942.0 million roubles (1.15% of expenditure on national defence);
      — maintenance of experimental, scientific-research and other institutions – 60.0 million roubles (0.07% of expenditure on national defence).
   c) Development, procurement, operational use and repair of armaments, military equipment, communications systems and property within the framework of defence orders – 27 848.4 million roubles (34.06% of expenditure on national defence) among which:
      — procurement of armaments and military equipment – 15 148.4 million roubles (18.52% of expenditure on national defence);
      — R&D – 10 800.0 million roubles (13.21% of expenditure on national defence);
      — repairs and manufacturing of arms, military equipment and property – 1900.0 million roubles (2.32 % of expenditure on national defence).
   d) Construction works in the interest of national defence – 3300.0 million roubles (4.03% of expenditure on national defence);
   e) Departmental expenditure on education – 115.0 million roubles
(0.14% of expenditure on national defence);

f) Departmental expenditure on health care – 251.0 million roubles (0.31% of expenditure on national defence);

g) Expenditure on the implementation of military reform – 3995.0 million roubles (4.88% of expenditure on national defence) among which:

— one-time retirement benefits for military personnel, transferred to the reserve list – 1186.0 million roubles (1.45% of expenditure on national defence);

— payment of compensation for clothing – 448.0 million roubles (0.55% of expenditure on national defence);

— payment of transport services – 261.0 million roubles (0.32 % of expenditure on national defence;

— provision of housing for military personnel, discharged from the military service – 2100.0 roubles (2.57% of expenditure on national defence), including provision of housing on the territory of the Russian Federation for persons discharged or to be discharged from military service on the space launching site Baikonur – 200.0 million roubles;

h) Expenditure of military training establishments – 17.0 million roubles (0.02% of expenditure on national defence);

i) Russian defence sport-technical organisation – 17.0 million roubles (0.02% of expenditure on national defence);

2. Military activities of Minatom – 2095.0 roubles (2.56% of expenditure on national defence);

3. Mobilisation and extra military training – 250.0 million roubles (0.31% of expenditure on national defence).

Analysing this information, the conclusion may be drawn that in 1998 the structure of expenditure on defence began to change in favour of expenditure on the development, procurement and repair of armaments and military equipment, as compared to previous years, when 22–26% of expenditure on national defence was spent for these purposes. In 1994-1997, there was a reverse trend, with this part of defence expenditure reduced from 22 to 24%.

In 1998, it is planned to spend already more than 34% of the national defence appropriations for these purposes.

Well-grounded apprehension has, however, been expressed that the level of implementation of the planned appropriations for the procurement of arms, military equipment and R&D will be considerably less than for the maintenance of the Armed Forces as has also been the case in previous years. There is a precedent in this respect when, at the
end of 1997, a federal law was adopted which amended the current defence budget by increasing expenditure on the maintenance of the Armed Forces at the expense of reduced spending on procurement of armaments, military equipment and R&D.

The trend towards an increasing share of procurement of armaments, military equipment and R&D in the defence budget is a positive factor. It shows that the state begins to understand that further reduction of spending on procurement of armaments and military equipment will lead to the complete degradation of the Armed Forces as an instrument ensuring military security of the country.

In absolute figures, however, expenditure on procurement of armaments and military equipment was reduced in 1998 as compared to 1997. Then it was planned to spend about 21 billion roubles against 15 billion roubles in the current year, and spending on R&D was accordingly reduced from 11.5 billion roubles to 10.8 billion roubles. In this way, in spite of the increased share of allocations for procurement of armaments, military equipment and R&D, less money was appropriated for these purposes in 1998. This is a result of the reduction of expenditure on national defence, as a whole, from 104 billion roubles to nearly 82 billion roubles.

1998 is to become the year of active military reforming. Figures for the military reform appeared in the budget for the first time in the 1997 budget when it was planned to spend 3.7 billion roubles on the military reform or 3.56% of the expenditure on national defence. In 1998 it is intended to spend about 4 billion roubles for these purposes or 4.88% of expenditure on national defence. The first impression is that the state is increasing expenditure on the military reform. It should be borne in mind, however, that it is planned to reduce the number of the Armed Forces in 1998 nearly twofold as compared to 1997. So one could expect that expenditure under this head would correspondingly have risen almost twice. This has not happened, however. Bearing this in mind, the State Duma, together with the Government, included in the law “On the 1998 federal budget” Art. 28 and 30 which provide for the possibility of increasing funding for the military reform.

In accordance with Art. 28 revenue received from the privatisation of organisations taken away from the Armed Forces as well as revenue from the sale of armaments, military equipment and property shall in full measure be included in the revenue of the federal budget and is to be used for funding military reforming over and above the sum envisaged in the chapter “National defence”. This will make it possible to obtain additional 1–2 billion roubles.
In accordance with Art. 30 and in view of the cuts in the Armed Forces and the need to provide for the social rights of discharged military personnel, in conformity with existing legislation, it will be necessary in 1998, during the period of implementation of the military reform, to attract for these purposes additional funds over and above those envisaged in the chapter “National defence”.

A special-purpose budgetary fund for assistance in the military reform is, therefore, to be set up. 1% of all the expenditure chapters of the federal budget will be paid into the fund in the course of the year (with the exception of expenditure on national defence and the servicing of the national debt) with corresponding reductions in expenditure under those chapters. 5% of the revenue received from the privatisation of the federal property at auctions or tenders as well as the sale of shares in companies, set up in the course of privatisation shall be paid into the fund, too. On a preliminary estimate, it will be possible to obtain additional 3 billion dollars for spending on the military reform from 1% of all the expenditure chapters, and from the 5% from the privatisation of the federal property and the sale of shares – about 250–300 million roubles. In this way, in addition to the chapter “National defence”, about 4.25 to 5.3 billion roubles may become available to carry out the military reform. On the whole, this money will be used to build housing for discharged military personnel.

Account should be taken of the fact that, in conformity with the existing Federal law “On the budget classification of the Russian Federation”, expenditure on the military reform should be transferred from the chapter “National defence” to a separate chapter of the federal budget, since the military reform is not the responsibility of the MOD only. It is a national mission, which affects other military and law enforcement agencies as well. It is possible that such a separate chapter will be introduced in the 1999 federal budget.

As has already been noted above, expenditure on pensions for military personnel to an amount of 11 billion roubles is included in the chapter “Social policies”. In spite of the fact, however, that the number of military personnel on pension will considerably increase in 1998 as a result of the reduction in numbers of the Armed Forces, the planned spending on pensions for military personnel was reduced, in comparison with 1997, by 2.28 billion roubles. This may lead to additional difficulties in the payment of pensions for military personnel.
## Table 2.1 Comparable table of main indices of the federal budgets, 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>1994 budget</th>
<th></th>
<th>1995 budget</th>
<th></th>
<th>1995 budget</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Billions</td>
<td>Share of total budget expenditure in %</td>
<td>Billions</td>
<td>Share of total budget expenditure in %</td>
<td>Billions</td>
<td>Share of total budget expenditure in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of roubles</td>
<td>In % of GDP</td>
<td>of roubles</td>
<td>In % of GDP</td>
<td>of roubles</td>
<td>In % of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State administration</td>
<td>3369.3</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>5175.2</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.33(0.56)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International activities</td>
<td>10619.8</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>21006.5</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>1.33(2.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defence</td>
<td>40626.0</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>59378.8</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>3.76(6.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-enforcement and national security</td>
<td>12734.2</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>19398.6</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>1.23(2.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial branch</td>
<td>1182.3</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1384.9</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.09(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental research and promotion of scientific-technical progress</td>
<td>5047.6</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>7455.1</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.47(0.80)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry, power production and construction</td>
<td>28590.0</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>32441.4</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td>2.05(3.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and fisheries</td>
<td>12415.7</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>10204.2</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>0.65(1.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the environment and natural resources, hydro-meteorology, cartography and geodesy</td>
<td>1083.6</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1672.4</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.11(0.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport, road construction and maintenance, communications and information</td>
<td>931.0</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>600.4</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.04(0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of the market infra-structure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters and emergency situations</td>
<td>1818.9</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>2770.0</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.18(0.30)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7306.9</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>10981.4</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>0.70(1.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture and art</td>
<td>1032.5</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1644.8</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.10(0.18)</td>
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<td>Mass-media</td>
<td>1322.9</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1893.8</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.12(0.20)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of expenditure</td>
<td>1994 budget</td>
<td>1995 budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Billions of roubles</td>
<td>Share of total budget expenditure in %</td>
<td>In % of GDP</td>
<td>Billions of roubles</td>
<td>Share of total budget expenditure in %</td>
<td>In % of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care and sport</td>
<td>3914.7</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>5034.3</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.32(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social policies</td>
<td>217.1</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>11926.0</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>0.75(1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servicing of the national debt</td>
<td>15312.2</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>22941.8</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>1.45(2.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replenishment of state stocks and reserves</td>
<td>5900.0</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>10199.4</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>0.65(1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization preparation of the economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
<td>24839.1</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>32884.5</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>2.08(3.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation and destruction of armaments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>In % of GDP</td>
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* taking into account the financing from special budget funds (% of the achieved GDP in comparison to the planned)
Table 2.3 Comparable table of main indices of the federal budgets, 1998

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<td>In % of GDP</td>
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1 without pensions
2 taking into account pensions for military and law enforcement personnel
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<th>Implementation in billions roubles</th>
<th>% of implementation</th>
<th>% of the federal budget</th>
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Table 3.2. The level of the implementation of the 1994 federal budget

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Table 3.3. The level of implementation of the 1995 federal budget

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<th>% of implementation</th>
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<th>% of the federal budget</th>
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<th>% of the federal budget</th>
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A serious situation is emerging in respect of expenditure under the head “Utilisation and elimination of armaments, including the implementation of international treaties”. The volume of allocations in this chapter was reduced nearly twofold in 1998, as compared to 1997 – from 3.2 billion roubles to 1.9 billion roubles. Of this money, 500 million roubles are allocated for the implementation of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), although compliance with the CWC will require additional funding.

The considerable reduction of expenditure in the chapter “Utilisation and elimination of armaments, including the implementation of international treaties” will, in all probability, also affect the implementation of the START I Treaty, since in 1997 for this purpose alone, more than 1.8 billion roubles were allocated; i.e. almost as much as is allocated this year for the whole chapter.

The hope remains that Art. 29 of the Federal law “On the 1998 federal budget” will be implemented. This article envisages that additional funds, received in 1998 from the sale of products, resulting from the utilisation of armaments and military equipment, from the use of the property belonging to the Armed Forces and from the services rendered by the Armed Forces on a contract basis, will be included, in full, into the revenue of the federal budget. These funds should be used for financing the utilisation of armaments and military equipment, promoting the military reform and solving the social problems of military personnel, over and above the sums allocated for these purposes in the chapters “Utilisation and elimination of armaments, including the implementation of international treaties” and “National defence”. As a result of the implementation of this article, additional 500 million roubles may become available for these purposes.

But even in case the implementation of international treaties does not stall, virtually no funds remain to spend on the utilisation and elimination of armaments and military equipment (outside the framework of the implementation of the international treaties). It should be recalled that, at present, about 130 decommissioned atomic submarines, in which the nuclear power installations have not been deactivated, are subject to utilisation. Apart from this, we are witnessing the decommissioning of a great quantity of armaments and military equipment, which have reached the end of their service life. They will all be stockpiled in arsenals and storage facilities of the Armed Forces to await their turn to be utilised and eliminated.
Table 4.1. Comparative evaluation of the planned expenditure on national defence from 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Billions of roubles</td>
<td>Share in total budget expenditure in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defence as a whole</td>
<td>40626</td>
<td>20.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>37758</td>
<td>19.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>22105</td>
<td>11.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money allowances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11393.2</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>2430.4</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing allowances</td>
<td>1860.6</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment and storage of special fuel</td>
<td>2591.2</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence provisions</td>
<td>4721.7</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs and manufacture of armaments and military equipment, property of self-</td>
<td>1347.8</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supporting enterprises of the Armed Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport expenditure</td>
<td>1734.7</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease of electric communications</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational, economic and other expenditure related to the functioning of the</td>
<td>5665.0</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and health resort provisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of armaments and equipment, of which:</td>
<td>8442</td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
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<td>Repayment of debts of the previous year</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D, of which:</td>
<td>2433</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayment of debts of the previous year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital construction</td>
<td>4778</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of expenditure</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Billions of roubles</td>
<td>Billions of roubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share in total budget</td>
<td>Share in total budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expenditure in %</td>
<td>expenditure in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of expenditure on</td>
<td>Share of expenditure on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>defence in %</td>
<td>defence in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds to implement military reform, including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharge benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of housing for military personnel transferred to the reserve list</td>
<td>1993.0</td>
<td>4866.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>8.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions for military personnel</td>
<td>873.6</td>
<td>1016.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure of the Ministry of Atomic Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation and extra military training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Billions of roubles</td>
<td>Share in total budget expenditure in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defence as a whole</td>
<td>82462.3</td>
<td>18.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>68466.8</td>
<td>15.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>41120.0</td>
<td>9.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money allowances</td>
<td>15000.0</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>3200.0</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing allowances</td>
<td>2400.0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment and storage of special fuel</td>
<td>4200.0</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence provisions</td>
<td>6100.0</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs and manufacture of armaments and military equipment, property of self-supporting enterprises of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>1820.0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport expenditure</td>
<td>2200.0</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease of electric communications</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational, economic and other expenditure related to the functioning of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>6000.0</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and health resort provisions</td>
<td>600.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of armaments and equipment, of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayment of debts of the previous year</td>
<td>13213.1</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D, of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayment of debts of the previous year</td>
<td>8751.7</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of expenditure</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Billions of roubles</td>
<td>Share in total budget expenditure in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital construction</td>
<td>7636.7</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds to implement military reform, including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3717.0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharge benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of housing for military personnel transferred to the reserve list</td>
<td>2148.2</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions for military personnel</td>
<td>9899.1</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure of the Ministry of Atomic Energy</td>
<td>1512.5</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation and extra military training</td>
<td>306.7</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the special section
Table 4.3. Comparative evaluation of the planned expenditure on national defence from 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>Share in total budget expenditure in %</th>
<th>Share of expenditure on defence in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National defence as a whole</td>
<td>81765.0</td>
<td>16.335</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>79403.0</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>97.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>43552.5</td>
<td>8.71</td>
<td>53.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money allowances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing allowances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment and storage of special fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence provisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs and manufacture of armaments and military equipment, property of self-supporting enterprises of the Armed Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease of electric communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational, economic and other expenditure related to the functioning of the Armed Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and health resort provisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of armaments and equipment, of which:</td>
<td>115148.4</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayment of debts of the previous year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D, of which:</td>
<td>10800.0</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>13.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayment of debts of the previous year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital construction</td>
<td>3300.0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of expenditure</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Billions of</td>
<td>Share in total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>roubles</td>
<td>budget expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds to implement military reform, including:</td>
<td>3995.0</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharge benefits</td>
<td>1186.0</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of housing for military personnel transferred to the reserve list</td>
<td>2100.0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions for military personnel</td>
<td>11000.0*</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>113.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure of the Ministry of Atomic Energy</td>
<td>2095.0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation and extra military training</td>
<td>250.0</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (in the chapter on “Social policies”)
From all this it is clear that the 1998 federal budget can not fully assist in the implementation of the military reform, the utilisation and elimination of the required quantities of armaments and military equipment, lowering social tension in the Armed Forces and overcoming the deep crisis in the defence industry. The situation may be made worse by the fact that, as experience of previous years has shown the budget will be funded for only 60–70% from what was voted for.

In the course of debating the draft federal budget, the SD Defence Committee introduced a great number of amendments. They were directed at increasing expenditure, in the first place, on the military reform, the procurement of armaments and equipment, R&D and the utilisation and elimination of armaments and military equipment, both within the framework of the implementation of international treaties and outside it. Not one of these amendments was passed, however. The level of expenditure on defence remained the same as proposed by the Government when it submitted, in September 1997, the draft Federal law “On the 1998 federal budget” to the State Duma.

It is worth while looking at the figures of the federal budget from 1994 to 1998, an analysis of which makes it possible to determine the tendencies which have influenced the financial policy of the Russian Federation in recent years, as a whole, and on defence expenditure, in particular.

Table 2 (pp. 98-103) shows the figures according to the classifications of the expenditure side of the federal budgets for 1994–1998, as laid down in federal laws.

An analysis of these figures shows that, in the last five years, expenditure in the federal budget dropped from 26.83% of the GDP in 1994 to 17.6% in 1998. Revenue dropped from 17.17% of the GDP in 1994 to 12.9% in 1998 and the deficit from 9.66% of the GDP in 1994 to 4.6% in 1998. This means that the share of the federal budget in the GDP, as a whole, is constantly decreasing. An ever greater part of the GDP passes, on the one hand, into the budgets of a lower level (subjects of the Federation and local self-government), and, on the other, into the hands of private enterprise.

As has already been noted above, the share of defence expenditure of the GDP and its share of the federal budget, as a whole, has also dropped in the course of these five years. It should be borne in mind that this is an indication that the share of defence expenditure has decreased not only because of a reduction of the share of the federal budget of the GDP, but also as a result of changes in the structure of the federal budget itself.
It should, at the same time, be borne in mind that this was an analysis of the budgets as enacted while, in actual fact, the implementation differs considerably from the enacted version.

In tables 3.1–3.5 (pp. 104-108) figures are given on the implementation of the federal budgets from 1993–1997. An analysis of these figures makes it possible to draw the following conclusions:

1. The average level of revenue collection and confirmed expenditure amounts to about 87%. At the same time, even in favourable circumstances, when the level of revenue collection (1993 and 1995) was higher than the one planned, the expenditure part did not exceed 90%.

2. The lowest level of funding in recent year has been for expenditure on conversion of the defence industry (about 40%). This explains why this industry finds itself in a distressing situation. The orders from the MOD have diminished by ten times, and practically no conversion has been carried out.

3. The level of financing defence expenditure reached approximately 83%, which is 4% lower than the average level of the implementation of the federal budget. This shows that the interests of the Armed Forces were not a priority for the Government and this explains the critical situation, in which they now find themselves.

The statistical data given below show the internal structure of the expenditure on national defence for 1994–1998 (table 4, pp. 110-113).

An analysis of the data presented show that the policy which leads to the greater part of the defence budget (about 53%) being spent on the maintenance of the Armed Forces is continuing, but even so these funds are continually insufficient. Delays in pay and salaries of military personnel are of the order of two to three months. At the same time, expenditure under such heads as the procurement of armaments and military equipment, R&D and capital construction amounts to no more than 35% and delays in payment extend from six months to a year. This indicates that the quantity of new models of armaments in the Army and Navy will continually diminish and the equipment of the Armed Forces will be one of the worst in the world.

Parliamentary control of the implementation of the federal budget, as a whole, and the defence budget, in particular, is carried out, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation by instructing the Auditor General’s Office to check that the budget funds are correctly spent in accordance with the Federal law “On the federal budget” for the respective financial year. Such checking have already repeatedly been carried out but the Executive paid virtually no attention to their results. These measures showed that a considerable part of the funds from the
federal budget assigned for defence needs do not reach in full those, for whom they are destined. And those, which do, are often not spent as intended.

Such a situation can only exist in conditions of permanent insufficiency of funds for the expenditure heads of the budget, when any unlawful act can be explained away by the fact that there is not enough money in the federal budget for a full coverage of defence costs.

As has already been noted, however, even when the budget revenue is fully collected, the implementation of the expenditure part of the budget does not exceed 85–90% of the planned level.

In this way, the conclusion may be drawn that the financial policy of the Government should be radically reshaped if the defence capability of the country is to be enhanced.
# Appendix 6A

The law “On the 1998 federal budget”. Chapter “National defence”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National defence (total)</td>
<td>81 765 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build-up and maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>79 403 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial maintenance of the Central administration</td>
<td>319 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>43 552 500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>33 267 900.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat training and material-technical procurement</td>
<td>9 282 600.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance and operational use of military facilities</td>
<td>942 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of experimental, scientific research and other institutions</td>
<td>60 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development, procurement, operational use and repair of armaments, military equipment, communications and property in the framework of defence orders</td>
<td>27 848 400.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of armaments and military equipment</td>
<td>15 148 400.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>10 800 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair and manufacture of armaments, military equipment and property</td>
<td>1 900 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction in the interest of national defence</td>
<td>3 300 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental expenditure on education</td>
<td>115 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental expenditure on health care</td>
<td>256 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on military reform</td>
<td>3 995 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>among which:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of one-time discharge benefits to military personnel transferred to the reserve list</td>
<td>1 186 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of compensation for clothing</td>
<td>448 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of transport</td>
<td>261 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of housing for military personnel discharged from military service</td>
<td>2 100 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of housing on the territory of the Russian Federation to personnel discharged from military service on the space launching site Baikonur</td>
<td>200 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training expenditure of military training institutions</td>
<td>17 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Russian Defence Sport and Technical Organisation</td>
<td>17 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military program of the Ministry of atomic energy of the RF</td>
<td>2 095 000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation and extra military training</td>
<td>250 000.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The law was passed by the State Duma on 4 March 1998, approved by the Council of the Federation on 12 March 1998, signed by the President on 26 March 1998, no. 42-FZ
## Appendix 6B

Excerpts from the Federal law “On the introduction of changes and addenda in the Federal law “On the budget classification of the Russian Federation” in respect of the specification and unification of heads of expenditure of the federal budget on national defence, security and law-enforcement of the state”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Money allowances of military personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central administration (the central organs of the military administration)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined forces, formations, military units and organisations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0401)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Salaries of civilian personnel**                   |       |
| The central administration (the central organs of the military administration) |       |
| Combined forces, formations, military units and organisations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation |       |
| (0401)                                               |       |

| **Provisions for the military personnel**            |       |
| Food provision                                      |       |
| Payment for clothing                                |       |
| Payment of benefits for housing and municipal services |       |
| Payment of compensations for health resorts         |       |
| Medical treatment and holidays                       |       |
| Provision of transport                              |       |
| Other expenditure related to provisions for military Personnel |       |
| (0401)                                               |       |

| **Combat training and material-technical provision of the forces** |       |
| Payment and storage of special fuel and lubricants |       |
| Maintenance, operational use and running repairs of armaments, military equipment and property |       |
| Provision of communications                          |       |
| Transport expenditure                                |       |
| Operational use and running repairs of special facilities (command posts, airfields and other special installations) |       |
| Operational use and running repairs of scientific-research and experimental-testing facilities |       |
| Operational use and running repairs of training facilities for combat and physical training |       |
| Housing-maintenance expenditure                     |       |
| Other operational and logistic expenditure related to the functioning of the military forces |       |
| (0401)                                               |       |

<p>| <strong>Research and Development (R&amp;D)</strong>                   |       |
| Fundamental and applied research (including military technology) |       |
| Missile complexes and intercontinental ballistic missiles |       |
| Other missile installations (including ABM systems, anti-aircraft missile complexes, anti-aircraft missile systems, cruise missiles, operational and tactical-operational missile complexes) |       |
| (0401)                                               |       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procurement of armaments, military equipment, assets and property for technical production purposes</th>
<th>(0401)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missile complexes with inter-continental ballistic missiles, other missile systems (including ABM, anti-aircraft missile complexes and systems, cruise missiles, tactical and operational-tactical missile complexes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space systems and complexes (including communications, navigation, intelligence, early-warning and space-control facilities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines and surface vessels, launches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armoured vehicles</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire arms and cold steel weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automated command-, communications-, intelligence-, early-warning-, counter-information systems and other electronic equipment, engineering and rear services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear munitions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other munitions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other armaments, military equipment, assets and property for technical production purposes</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repairs of armament, military equipment, assets and property for technical production purposes</th>
<th>(0401)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missile complexes with inter-continental ballistic missiles, other missile systems (including ABM, anti-aircraft missile complexes and systems, cruise missiles, tactical and operational-tactical missile complexes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space systems and complexes (including communications-, navigation-, intelligence-, early-warning- and space-control facilities)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Automated command-, communication-, intelligence-, early-warning-, counter-information systems and other electronic equipment, engineering and rear services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear munitions</td>
<td>Other munitions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other armaments, military equipment, assets and property for technical production purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of special and other facilities</td>
<td>Special facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of military personnel, discharged from the military service</td>
<td>Discharge benefits of military personnel discharged from the military service</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation for benefits of military personnel discharged from the military service</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction and acquisition of housing for military personnel discharged from the military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of military, professional training establishments</td>
<td>Maintenance of training equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental expenditure on nurseries and schools</td>
<td>Nurseries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Schools-nurseries, elementary, semi-secondary and secondary schools</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental expenditure on health care. Sanitary-epidemiological</td>
<td>Policlinics, hospitals, out-patients treatment, diagnostic centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inspection</td>
<td>Sanatoria and holiday centres                                                                 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanitary-epidemiological inspection establishments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory state insurance of military personnel</td>
<td>Insurance provision for compulsory state insurance of life and health of military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One-time benefits in case of death or damage to health of military personnel in the discharge of military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation and extra-military training, training of reservists, military</td>
<td>Provision of mobilisation readiness of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the reserve list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rallies of citizens of the Russian Federation on the reserve list</td>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of students in accordance with the training program for reserve</td>
<td>Additional allowances for students in training in accordance with the training program for reserve officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>officers at military courses in state educational establishments for</td>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher professional education</td>
<td>Training of specialists in the Russian Defence Sport-Technical Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military co-operation within the framework of the CIS, Provision for the staff for the co-ordination of military co-operation of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of the CIS and its working organs</td>
<td>(0404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for the Co-ordination Committee on questions of Anti-Aircraft Defence of the CIS member states. Provision for the Inter-state Co-ordination Centre for the remembrance of the defenders of the Fatherland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in military programs of the CIS member-states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure in connection with international activities</td>
<td>(0301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision for international military co-operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities in connection with the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security</td>
<td>(0302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and participation of civilian personnel in connection with the maintenance and restoration of international peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of military personnel during the period of their participation in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures related to the plan for mobilisation of the economy</td>
<td>(2301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of pensions for military personnel and their next of kin</td>
<td>(1804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions for length of service</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensions for invalids</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensions for loss of the breadwinner</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Payment of state allowances for the children of military and civilian personnel</td>
<td>(1807)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures in connection with the military reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The closing down (conservation) of special and other facilities</td>
<td>(2401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other measures in connection with military reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial provision for military personnel, discharged from the military service in connection with military reform</td>
<td>(2402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharge benefits of military personnel discharged from the military service in connection with military reform</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Compensation for military personnel, discharged from the military service in connection with military reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provision of housing for military personnel discharged from the military service in connection with military reform</td>
<td>(2402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and acquisition of housing for personnel discharged from the military service in connection with military reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditure related to the provision of military personnel, discharged from the military service in connection with military reform</td>
<td>(2402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure in connection with transport to the chosen place of residence and other expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation and elimination of strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with international treaties</td>
<td>(2201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D in connection with the utilisation and elimination of armaments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Elimination of armaments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilisation of armaments</td>
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<td>Category</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilisation and elimination of chemical weapons in accordance with</td>
<td>(2201)</td>
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<tr>
<td>international treaties</td>
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<td>R&amp;D in connection with the utilisation and elimination of armaments</td>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation and elimination of conventional armaments in accordance with</td>
<td>(2201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international treaties</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D in connection with the utilisation of armaments</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditure in connection with the utilisation and elimination of</td>
<td>(2201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armaments in accordance with international treaties</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation and elimination of nuclear weapons, exclusive of international treaties</td>
<td>(2202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D in connection with the elimination and utilisation of armaments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation of armaments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elimination of armaments</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D in connection with the elimination and utilisation of armaments</td>
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<td>international treaties</td>
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<td>R&amp;D in connection with the elimination and utilisation of armaments</td>
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<td>Other expenditure in connection with the utilisation and elimination of</td>
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<tr>
<td>armaments exclusive of international treaties</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provision for the navigational safety of shipping</td>
<td>(1004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation and current repairs of navigational equipment and facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of vessels, navigational equipment, other equipment and property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of facilities of the navigational infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The law was passed by the State Duma on 4 March 1998, approved by the Council of the Federation on 12 March 1998, signed by the President on 26 March 1998, no. 40-FZ.

7. DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 2001

Pyotr ROMASHKIN

The 2001 federal budget was submitted to the State Duma (SD) and approved on the second reading on 20 October 2000.

The principal indices of the budget were as follows: the GDP – 7750 billion roubles, revenues 1 193 482.9 million roubles, and expenditure – 11 193 482.9 million roubles. Level of inflation – 12%.

The categories of the principal expenditure of the budget changed as follows (see Table 1).

It is, therefore, premature to draw conclusions about militarisation of the new budget in as much as many other heads of expenditure considerably exceed the average level of budget increases, as a whole.

In the draft budget for the year 2001, submitted to the SD, expenditure under the head “National defence” is fixed at 218 924.3 million roubles which represents 2.82% of the GDP and 18.34% of the aggregate expenditure of the federal budget. It should be noted that in the adopted budget, expenditure on national defence represents 2.63% of the GDP and 16.47% of the aggregate expenditure. The general indices of expenditure on national defence for the year 2001 practically did not change as compared to those of the year 2000. Thus, the Presidential directive that expenditure on national defence should represent not less than 3.5% of the GDP was not followed.

If this directive has been implemented it may have become possible to increase the pay of personnel not by 20% (as of 1 December 2000, in accordance with the Presidential Decree of 17 August 2000, which compensates mainly for the payment of income tax by military personnel, introduced as of 1 January 2000), but twice. Additional funds could also be allocated to so-called “investment expenditure” including expenditure on R&D, the procurement and repair armaments and military equipment and capital construction work, i.e. expenditure, which will determine the future of the Armed Forces. President Putin stated that it was necessary to change the correlation between spending on personnel and that on investments in favour of the latter. In actual fact, however, in accordance with the draft 2001 budget this correlation is changing in exactly the opposite direction towards an increase of personnel costs. Thus, if in 2000 the correlation was 60:40, in 2001 it is planned to be

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In this way, the new budget will allocate funds only for ‘‘subsistence’’ and survival at a very low level.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of the federal budget</th>
<th>Correlation between expenditure in 2001 and that in 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All expenditure of the federal budget</td>
<td>1.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State administration</td>
<td>1.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial branch</td>
<td>1.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International activities</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defence</td>
<td>1.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>1.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental research and promotion of scientific-technical progress</td>
<td>1.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, power production and construction</td>
<td>2.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the natural environment</td>
<td>1.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, road construction and maintenance</td>
<td>18.617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and emergency situations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, art and cinema</td>
<td>1.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass-media</td>
<td>1.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care and sport</td>
<td>1.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servicing of the national debt</td>
<td>1.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replenishment of state stocks and reserves</td>
<td>2.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial aid to budgets of other levels</td>
<td>2.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilisation and elimination of armaments, including the</td>
<td>2.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation of international treaties</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilisation preparation</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration and exploitation of space</td>
<td>1.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special budget funds</td>
<td>0.229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greatest shortcoming of the draft federal budget submitted by the Government is that the chapter ‘‘National defence’’ is presented, not in accordance with the budget classification adopted in the summer 2000 and approved by the President on 5 July 2000, but in the form considerably modified by the Ministry of Finance. (These changes are set out in one of the volumes of the draft federal budget).
As a result of these changes, spending on the Railway troops (1851 million roubles) is included in the chapter “National defence”. These troops are mostly engaged in the building and repair of the railways and, in accordance with the budget codex in force, should be presented in the chapter “Industry, power production and construction”. In addition, under the chapter “National defence”, spending is included (in foreign currency) on participation in peacekeeping activities though, in fact this money is transferred in part to the Ministry of Finance and in a smaller part to the MOD. This expenditure as well as other spending on ensuring external security (in foreign currency) was formerly classified under the head “International activities”. One cannot escape the conclusion that the Government is trying, in every way, to increase expenditure in the chapter “National defence” in order to come as close as possible to the Presidential directives. If all this expenditure is deducted, spending under the chapter “National defence” will represent 2.66% of the GDP and 17.32% of the aggregate expenditure of the federal budget. Bearing in mind the above explanations, it would have been appropriate to present the draft federal budget for the year 2001 in accordance with the Federal law “On Budget Classification of the Russian Federation”.

Another substantial shortcoming of the chapter “National defence” is its almost complete secrecy. Only five subheadings are open to public scrutiny, although it has been repeatedly pointed out that such secrecy leads to money, allocated to national defence, being used for quite different purposes and sometimes being misappropriated. It is therefore, suggested that all sub-headings, special-purpose items and types of expenditure on the maintenance of the Armed Forces be open to public scrutiny so that public could exercise control of how this money is spent.

In the 2001 federal budget it is proposed that all military personnel and veterans should fully pay for municipal transport and other expenses from which they have been exempted up to now by the Federal laws “On the Status of Military Personnel”; “On Veterans” and others. Subsequently, having presented the necessary documents, they will then receive from the MOD and other federal agencies, which presuppose military service, as well as from agencies of the subjects of the Federation, which for this purpose will be granted subventions from the federal budget, corresponding compensation. This measure is bound to lead to yet further arbitrariness on the part of the officials and will require interminable visits to various departments and long queues in order to get the necessary certificates. That is why the SD Committee of Defence has proposed that all these payments be made directly to the recipients and the money allowance of military personnel, military pensioners and other veterans be increased by the corresponding sum.
In accordance with Art. 71 of the Russian Constitution, all expenditure on defence and security is expenditure of the federal budget only and can in no way form part of the expenditure of the subjects of the RF and local government agencies. Expenditure on law-enforcement activities can, in part, be included in the expenditure of the subjects of the RF, since the municipal militia, for instance, is not financed from the federal budget.

From the 25 classifications of the federal budget only 7 are financed exclusively from the budget. Among these are those “connected with the military functions of the state: “National defence”, “the Utilisation and elimination of armaments including the implementation of international treaties”, as well as a new classification, proposed by a number of deputies – “the military reform” which, incidentally, existed in the federal budget classification in the period 1996–2000.

The removal of expenditure on the implementation of the military reform from the chapter “National defence” to a new, separate chapter is due to the fact that the military reform is a much wider notion than the reform of the Armed Forces, since not only the Army and the Navy are to be reformed, but other components of the military organisation of the state as well; the Internal troops, the Frontier troops, the Railway troops and other troops and military formations. Up to now, only the Armed Forces, which have been reduced from 3 million to 1.2 million servicemen, have been subject to military reforming (though not quite to the end). From the five service arms of the Armed Forces only three have been preserved and the number of military districts, armies and divisions has been reduced. It is true that in the process of implementing these reforms almost nothing was done to improve the quality of armaments and military equipment. With one exception: a new missile complex Topol-M was developed and is beginning to be deployed. This could enhance the effectiveness of the Armed Forces while at the same time reducing them. Expenditure on the development of new weapon systems should remain under the chapter “National defence” since they remain an integral part of the Armed Forces. The so-called “passive” expenditure on the implementation of military reform should be included in the spending on the military reform, as a whole. These are allowances for personnel discharged from the Armed Forces as a result of the reforms, provision for their housing and costs connected with the transportation to their permanent places of residence.

In recent years the financing of military expenditure has been conducted on the “residual” principle and the level of spending, planned in the budget, was in practice never attained.

The federal budget has been implemented in respect of military expenditure for not more than 50–60% while, as we have already said, the
money in the federal budget is the only source of financing military expenditure.

In table 2 the dynamics in the changes in the share of the GDP of expenditure in the general expenditure of the federal budget under the chapter “National defence”, in the period 1994–2001, are shown according to data from the adopted federal budgets.

Table 2

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of the federal budget</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>18.92</td>
<td>19.76</td>
<td>17.32</td>
<td>16.29</td>
<td>16.45</td>
<td>18.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should at the same time be noted that in the developed countries (USA, Great Britain, France) the share of expenditure on national defence represents 3.5–4.5% of the GDP while in such countries as Turkey, South Korea, China and some others this share amounts to 8–10%.

At the present time, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are in a sad condition – low pay, obsolescent armaments and military equipment and lack of money for combat training. All this points to the necessity, on the one hand, to increase the share of expenditure on national defence and, on the other, to reduce the personnel of the Armed Forces.

In the 2001 budget a considerable increase of expenditure under the chapter “Utilisation and elimination of armaments including the implementation of international treaties” is envisaged as compared to the 2000 expenditure. Thus, in that year, expenditure under that classification was confirmed to a sum of 2070 million roubles, while in 2001 it is planned to spend 6036.4 million roubles, i.e. 2.91 times more, though the general expenditure of the federal budget grew only 1.4 times.

A considerable increase in expenditure is envisaged for the implementation of the CWC. It is planned to assign 3085 million roubles for these purposes. It should, however, be taken into account that, in 1999–2000, practically no funds were assigned from the federal budget for the implementation of the Convention and a great deal of planned work was not carried out. In 2001, in accordance with Russia’s obligations to the international community, it will be necessary to allocate 6364.7 million.

For the first time there appeared in the federal budget a sub-heading “Utilisation and elimination of arms, excluding international treaties”, in accordance with which multipurpose, atomic submarines, taken out of service in the Russian Navy and at present afloat with loaded
nuclear reactions in their permanent bases, will be utilised. However, very little money has been assigned under this sub-heading – 20 million roubles only, of which 2.5 million are for R&D and 17.5 million for inspection activities and other expenditure, i.e. nothing is actually allocated for the utilisation of these submarines itself while scores of them have accumulated in the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

It is astonishing that money is allocated for inspection activities, which are not even envisaged for the utilisation of multipurpose, atomic submarines in any international treaties. It is highly necessary to allocate at least 400 million roubles for the utilisation of these submarines as this will make it possible to unload the nuclear reactors of about 20 of them.

To carry out extremely urgent work, therefore, on the utilisation and elimination of armaments in 2001, it is necessary to allocate, additionally, at least 3680 million roubles. The aggregate expenditure under this classification should amount to 9716 million roubles.

It should be noted that funds to increase expenditure both under the head “Utilisation and elimination of armaments including the implementation of international treaties” and the chapter “National defence” should be found by increasing the revenue part of the federal budget. This money can be obtained by realistic calculation of the predicted price of oil on the world market. In addition, experts in the State Duma are of the opinion that revenue may grow from the fact that inflation will be considerably higher than 12%. In principle, other sources for increasing the state revenue may also be found. They should all be taken into account in the federal budget. An understated level of revenue of the federal budget may lead to uncontrolled spending of additional income.
8. THE SSN _KURSK_ CATASTROPHE AND THE CONDITION OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY*

Boris MAKEEV

On 12 August 2000, under obscure circumstances, the most modern Russian SSN Kursk sank with its crew on board, one of the best and highly qualified crews in the Northern Fleet. This most serious disaster in the history of Russian submarines has given rise to numerous speculations both at home and abroad. The Kursk tragedy was discussed by the deputies of the State Duma at a special meeting. A Governmental Commission is engaged in investigating the circumstances surrounding this accident.

The Kursk catastrophe has highlighted once more the acute problem of reforming the Russian Armed Forces and defining priorities in military build-up. It has underscored the need for thorough scientific expertise of the decisions to be taken in this sphere.

At present it is difficult to estimate the long-term consequences of this disaster for Russian naval policy. Some considerations can and must, however, be offered on the basis of the available information.

Material constraints on rescue operations for the crews of Russian submarines are evident. The reasons are chronic underfunding of the Russian Navy and economising on those essential elements which determine its combat readiness and fighting capability, including its SAR (search and rescue) Service (before the loss of the SSN Komsomolets, it was called the Salvage and Rescue Service).

Let us now look at some facts, which of course do not pretend to be an exhaustive estimate of the availability and condition of the means to salvage sunken submarines. Up to 1995 we had well-trained deep divers who could submerge and work at a depth of maximum 240 meters. The present recourse to assistance from Norwegian deep divers is explained by the fact that, though we also have such highly trained divers, no adequate equipment is available for them to work with. Isn’t this an indication of insufficient funding for such an important service as SAR? Another possible explanation for this sad state of affairs is the sweeping reduction of SAR Service personnel, including the divers, a reduction which is allegedly compensated for by the improvement of the autonomous salvage systems of the submarines. But this tragic accident

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and other emergency situations at sea have demonstrated that the emphasis on the salvage systems of the submariners themselves is not always justified. Admiral Eduard Baltin, who for 27 years served as a submariner and was captain of several modern SSNs, corroborates this view. Rear Admiral Anatoly Shtyrev, who served as an analyst on the Staff of the Russian Pacific Fleet specialising in submarine accidents, compares submariners to rope-walkers who perform without safety nets. In his opinion, every sea mission of Russian submarines is an act of heroism, as all submariners know that there are practically no salvage systems at the disposal of the Fleets. On my part, while expressing my support for Adm. Baltin’s and Adm. Shtyrev’s point of view, I believe that the aforementioned explanation is an attempt to rationalise the thoughtless, unbalanced reduction of the Armed Forces which leads to a situation when, in order to achieve the planned quantitative targets, the remaining combat units are very often left without the necessary support facilities.

Prof. Lev Tomashevsky, the former section chief in the Navy’s Scientific and Technical Committee, states that the reason for such serious failures to save submariners is the considerable reduction of the SAR Services in all the Russian Fleets, as well as the insufficient training of their personnel as a result of shortage of the necessary funds.

By refusing to allocate sufficient money for the construction of modern nuclear submarines, the country’s leadership economised, in fact, on their support facilities and on the development and procurement of up-to-date types of rescue equipment for submarines and underwater communications means.

10 years ago, the Omsk Research Institute for Tool Building offered the Russian Navy unique equipment, which provided reliable emergency communications for submarines in case of a disaster at sea. According to Valery Levchenko, the Institute’s Director, the implementation of the project was frozen due to financial problems.

The same occurred to a few other types of reliable non-contact radio communications with sunken submarines that had been developed by this Institute, which occupies a leading position in this field. No need to emphasise that the availability of such communications with a submarine in an emergency is half the success in recovering its crew.

The Moscow Research Bureau of Special Technical Equipment has developed a number of manned, deep-sea submersibles, such as

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1 Argumenti i Fakti, no. 34, Aug. 2000.
“Osa-3” (Wasp), “Osminog” (Octopus), “Shmel” (Bumblebee), “Vikhr” (Whirlwind), “Triton”, “Quatran” and “Langoust” (Lobster). Many of them can function at a depth of more than 6000 meters and resist underwater currents. Some of these unique vehicles have acquired an excellent reputation in the process of underwater experiments at different sea depths.

Our science and defence industry is rich in ideas and developments in the sphere of R&D, but the realisation of these ideas often amounts to zero. There is no prospect of experimental models being put in production because of the usual lack of funds and underestimation of the necessity of rescue equipment for submarines. The military and political leadership of the country does not think seriously about sailors’ safety in particular and the Navy’s development in general.

The weakening of the role of the state in naval activities has had a very negative effect on the Navy’s condition. The sharp reduction of funding for the Navy has led not only to shortcomings in SAR work but also produced defects in the more important sphere of the Russian Navy’s combat capability. The Navy’s share in the total allocations of the MOD has been declining (23% in 1989 and only 9% in 1998). It should be noted that these appropriations were barely sufficient to cover the remuneration of the personnel. As a result, there has been a sharp decline in armament procurements and a change for the worse in the Russian Navy’s quantitative and qualitative indices. Warships and auxiliary vessels are often in their berths due to lack of fuel. The officers and rank and file who no longer go to sea are losing their qualifications. Shore simulators cannot replace combat training at sea, for which there is no money. Sad to say, last July the combat training of the personnel of the Northern Fleet was financed for less than 1% of the annual requirements. During the last decade the total number of warships has decreased nearly twice while the personnel strength was reduced by 2.5 times. The situation with regard to the commissioning of new warships to replace old ones is especially serious in view of the intolerably slow construction rate and rise in costs. The process of ageing has been steadily accelerating and the number of warships which are only partly fit to carry out their missions or require refitting is also increasing. Thus, many Russian ships are decommissioned before the expiry of their service life. The situation with regard to the unfinished construction of ships and craft is also very serious. More than 50 ships are now in process of being built. Their construction has been suspended due to lack of financing. It is worth noting that, for example, the annual cost of one unfinished SSN on the slip-way amounts to about
30 million roubles.

It is predicted that by 2015, under the current level of financing, the number of Russian ships will be 10 to 12 times less than in the NATO navies at that time (approximately 800 units). We do not intend, as in the past, to maintain the global rivalry with the NATO naval forces on the high seas and keep up with them, but in the long run the present condition of the Russian Navy will lead to the complete cessation of its activities. The loss of the capability to defend the country’s interests on the high seas will have disastrous consequences for the national security of the Russian Federation.

Today it is necessary to concentrate our efforts on preserving the combat capability of the remaining commissioned warships (which have a service life of no less than 12–15 years) and their support facilities (which will contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of their operational use and safe navigation). All these measures will help guarantee the defence of our national interests on the high seas, our military security on seas, and the fulfilment of our international obligations in the course of humanitarian and military operations at sea.

The process of further improving the condition of the Navy should take into account the country’s economic capabilities. Efforts should be concentrated on the maximum enhancement of the naval potential and, in the first instance, of the Naval strategic nuclear forces as the most effective deterrent. The construction of the general-purpose naval forces should be oriented toward the balanced development of all fighting arms (submarines, naval aviation, surface warships and units of the shore service) and towards increased effectiveness under conditions of personnel reduction owing to higher qualitative parameters of the new armaments. Special attention should be paid to the qualitative improvement of submarines as the main naval striking force. Their development should be concentrated on enhancing their construction characteristics which will make it possible to increase diving depth, speed, reserve buoyancy, heightened concealment and survivability, as well as improving the quality of the EW equipment, missiles and torpedoes.

In the view of a majority of naval specialists, based on a cost-effectiveness analysis, the minimal number of ships in the Russian Navy in the first decades of the 21st century should be made up be as follows: 14-15 SSBNs (there were 26 in the Russian Navy in 1999), approximately 100 tactical nuclear and diesel submarines, about 200 surface warships of all types, and up to 1000 combat aircraft and helicopters of diverse use. Such a naval order of battle, together with support units and facilities,
will be optimal, balanced and capable of fulfilling its missions with the required effectiveness (owing to the introduction of high-precision weapons) and at the same time at a minimal cost. The Navy is now more compact than in the past. (Numbers are twice less as compared to 1990. At present there are up to 100 commissioned submarines and about 330 surface ships of all types).

Russian naval policy should be based on the principle that the Navy should not be seen by other states as a threat to their security. Russia does not consider any country in the world as its enemy and has no territorial or other claims against any state. Therefore when deciding on the future naval order of battle, we should take into account only real threats which might be posed by navies in the operational zones if our Fleets.

The implementation of the Navy’s construction plans will depend on the actual levels of financing. Much is determined here by the extent that the country’s leadership and its legislature understand the need for a naval power sufficient to ensure national security in peacetime and the impossibility of building up this power in the course of a war. In view of the lengthy period needed for their development and construction, the country’s interests on the high seas and the repulsion of any aggression from the maritime direction will have to be accomplished with the forces build up before a war.

In the view of experts, the level of the Navy’s funding required to provide a minimal defence capability should not be less than 25% of the MOD budget, on condition that the appropriations are spent with the maximum effectiveness. This can be achieved by the optimal distribution of expenditure among the different arms, combat and support services, social needs and weapon procurement as well as other spheres of naval activities, including R&D, shipbuilding problems and combat and operational training.

The effectiveness of the naval expenditure is based on a high standard of professionalism, a high level of organisation and management, control and utmost rigor on the part of the commanders responsible for the distribution of funds.

However, in practice, the expenditure of appropriations leaves much to be desired in terms of economic soundness. For example, last year the total losses in the Northern Fleet alone amounted to 139 million roubles and were due to misappropriations and violations of financial discipline, errors in the sphere of financial and economic activities and economically unsound and irrational spending. A serious problem is posed by the expenditure of budget funds for purposes for which they were not
assigned. The total sum of last year’s budget allocations spent for purposes for which they were not assigned amounted to 78.7 million roubles.

In the other Russian fleets the financial and economic situation is no better. Under conditions of an acute shortage of funds for the Russian Navy that the state cannot fully provide for, the introduction of a strict discipline in the use of allocated funds has become an urgent and vital objective.

The task of relieving the federal budget from part of the burden of financing the Navy is no less important. This can be partially solved by attracting the out-of-budget allocations for the Fleets’ development.

The possibility of increasing expenditure on the Navy’s development by seeking investments from the state and non-governmental organisations or private persons should not be neglected. There are examples of this in difficult periods of the Russian Navy’s history. Additional funds for the Navy can be attracted by the optimisation of expenditure on the development of other branches of Russian sea power within the framework of a unified state policy, for example, with regard to, those maritime-economic facilities the safety of which is protected by the Navy and which may therefore be interested in allocating a part of their profits to the Navy.

Appropriations for the Navy can also be augmented by reducing the SRF in favour of the general-purpose forces in the process of creating a three-service arms system in the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) and including the SRF as a fighting arm in the Air Force.

There are other ways of preserving the qualitative and quantitative level of the Navy’s composition, which would allow for a reduction in the number of naval accidents in peacetime and their losses in case of hostilities.

At present, public opinion and the political and military leadership are beginning to pay more attention to the critical situation of the Navy.

The decisions on Russian maritime activities, shipbuilding and the Navy development that have been adopted by the RF Security Council, the Government and the President reinforce this tendency and give grounds for expectations that Russia will revive as a full-fledged sea power, capable of providing efficient solutions to its political, economic and military problems on the high seas. The 21st century will be the century of the World Ocean, and Russia should be prepared for this.

It is important that the World Ocean’s resources and space be exploited under conditions of military and political stability. The World
Ocean must unite and not divide nations. It should become an arena of co-operation and partnership and not of dissension and confrontations. These objectives are easily attainable if sea powers activate their diplomatic efforts. They should be aimed at restricting naval activities, preventing dangerous confrontations at sea and reducing the threat of a surprise attack against maritime economic facilities and the naval units which protect them, as well as excluding the possibility of launching large-scale offensive naval operations. Certain regions of the World Ocean could be closed for naval operations, and the number of naval units that can be present in these regions simultaneously could be limited.

This objective is quite attainable, since the financing of a Navy is a heavy burden on any country and maintaining excessive numbers of naval personnel and materiel is not in the interest of any country and, under present circumstances, especially of Russia.

The restriction of the number of regions in which naval operations are allowed would automatically lead to the reduction of naval forces. By balancing the composition of the forces in the regions of mutual interests within the framework of the global armaments’ reduction process, reduction of naval activities may mark the beginning of naval arms limitation talks. Despite its numerous interests in the World Ocean, Russia has long ago embarked on the unilateral reduction of its Navy without concluding any prior international agreements in this respect. If other sea powers follow Russian example, these reductions (although unverified at present) may play a positive part in stabilising the situation on the high seas, provided they are implemented on condition that they will be followed-up by a treaty lowering the levels of naval armaments. Only mutual arrangements, within the framework of a normal negotiating process on balancing forces in the regions of common interest and appropriate monitoring of existing agreements, would constitute a reliable guarantee of the military-political stability in the World Ocean.

Activisation of the Russian diplomacy in this direction could greatly contribute to the development of naval forces capable of fulfilling all necessary missions on the high seas with minimal expenditure of financial and other resources and, in the long run, help advance the development of Russian economy as a whole.
PART III. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

Chapter 9. The ABM Treaty and the prospect of further deep reductions of strategic offensive weapons

Chapter 10. The ABM Treaty and Russia’s position

Chapter 11. Russian approach to further reductions of strategic offensive arms (on the ratification by Russia of the START II Treaty)

Chapter 12. The ratification by Russia of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

Chapter 13. Challenges to international nuclear and missile non-proliferation regimes

Chapter 14. Preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons

Chapter 15. The CWC regime and Russia

Chapter 16. The problem of the limitation of conventional weapons

Chapter 17. Weapons and technology export controls in Russia

Chapter 18. Preventing an arms race in outer space
9. THE ABM TREATY AND THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER DEEP REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS*

Alexandre SAVELYEV

After the signing of the Russian-American START II Treaty in 1993, the intensity of the dialogue on the limitation and reduction of armaments between the two countries has considerably diminished. The continually growing economic and social-political crisis in Russia, the incursions of separatists, escalating into large-scale armed conflicts in the south of the country, terrorism and the open and bitter struggle for power waged between the largest financial-industrial and political groups in Russia, with the direct participation of semi-criminal and criminal gangs, as well as a number of other factors have pushed disarmament questions in the background in Russian politics of the end of the nineties.

The protracted process of ratification of the START II Treaty has stalled the whole disarmament process to which, in the beginning of the nineties, much importance was attached in Russia in connection with the fundamental changes in the political situation in the world.

Still, all this does not mean that the RF, in view of the above-mentioned problems, can simply freeze the dialogue on disarmament at its own behest. In any case, it can hardly be considered that such an action, or more exactly inaction, answers the interests of the country’s security in the widest meaning of that word. The accumulated, unresolved questions and problems will anyway have to be addressed sooner or later. But in a number of disarmament spheres, the time lost can only be retrieved if the RF makes a serious effort, today already, to settle the most important, outstanding problems in its relations with the USA.

The fate of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) of unlimited duration, signed in 1972 between the USSR and the USA is one of the major problems in the field of arms limitation. In my view, the preservation of this most important agreement is no less important than the ratification of the START II Treaty, and the continuation of the policy of seeking further, significant reductions of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF), within the framework of follow-up agreements.

It is quite clear that if the 1972 ABM Treaty, for one reason or another, is not preserved, the whole arms limitation system, which was created in the course of the post-war period will be destroyed. Enormous efforts will be needed, on the part of all the participants of this process, to restore it.

In view of the intention, announced by the USA, of deploying a limited national missile defence system (NMD) after 2003, and the statements by the US Administration on the need to amend the ABM Treaty, a number of questions arise for Russian foreign policy. The most important among them, it seems to me, are the following. How far are the US intentions to deploy a NMD system on its territory, which goes beyond the framework of the ABM Treaty, serious? Is there a possibility of avoiding such an eventual development? And, finally, will it be possible to preserve the ABM Treaty, in case the USA deploys such a system and the ABM Treaty is correspondingly amended?

It should be noted that the USA seriously intends to deploy a NMD. The driving motive for the building and deployment of a strategic NMD in the USA is, first of all, the problem of the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Over a number of years, the USA has voiced serious concern about this problem and made great efforts in this field. It must be recognised that, in the nineties, it has achieved considerable successes in a whole range of directions. Thus, the USA has succeeded in settling the question with North Korea in view of the possibility of this country producing weapon-grade, fissionable materials on its atomic electric power stations. The USA also played a key-role in obtaining certain guarantees that Iraq lacks the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons. The Nunn-Lugar program should be included in this list. In accordance with this program former Soviet republics yearly received and continue to receive considerable sums of money for effective action in the field of nuclear disarmament, enhanced safety in the transport, dismantling and storage of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials. American money played an important role in the three “nuclear” republics of the former USSR deciding to accept a non-nuclear status and join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) which, in turn, made it possible for the START I Treaty to enter into force.

At the same time, in spite of the existing arms control regime, it is not always possible to effectively prevent "third" countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. No international-juridical mechanisms exist, in fact, which could prohibit India or Pakistan (who are not parties to the NPT) to conduct nuclear
weapon tests or North Korea and some other states to test ballistic missiles with ever increasing ranges.

These facts reinforced by active propaganda of the possibility of creating defence against this threat, influence increasingly American society and US legislators. This has led to the above-mentioned decision to build a so-called “national missile defence” (NMD), adopted, at first, by the Senate and then by the House of Representatives of the US Congress.

Another important factor, which prompts the USA to such a decision, is the development of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems and existing plans and ideas of deploying such systems in various regions of the world.

It seems to me that for the USA to build missile defence systems for its allies and troops abroad, without providing a corresponding defence for the American continent, would be quite unacceptable from the point of view of a balanced domestic policy. There can be no doubt that if the USA really offers its allies in Europe or Asia to deploy for their defence a regional non-strategic TMD, permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty, the campaign for the deployment of a BMD on its own territory will gain force. The closer the USA will come to the deployment of a tactical BMD beyond its borders, the greater the pressure will become on the executive and legislative authorities to deploy a territorial NMD in the USA.

It can, of course, not be denied that certain circles in the USA consider that the building and deployment of a limited, strategic BMD may serve, in the future, as the foundation for a “dense” defence. It will be capable of weakening, to a certain degree, the existing deterrent factor of the Russian SNF. It is here that the question will play a key role of whether the main quantitative and qualitative limitations, imposed by the ABM Treaty on the systems and components of a strategic BMD will remain in force, or whether the deployment of the NMD by the USA will not be subject to any constrains and only be limited by “good will” and objective, financial and technical reasons or other considerations on the part of the US government. But, in any case, if the “endeavour by the USA to change the strategic balance in its favour”, frequently mentioned by Russian experts in the field of security, does indeed exist, it cannot be regarded as the principal factor, which prompted the USA to take the decision to deploy NMD.

Already at the time of the Reagan Administration and the “Strategic Defence Initiative” – the SDI program – proposed by him in 1983, the Soviet and, later, the Russian leadership, widely supported by
public opinion and independent experts, waged a bitter struggle against “US plans to militarise space” and the very idea that a strategic BMD system could, in any way, contribute to the strengthening of strategic stability and security. It cannot be said that this struggle was completely unsuccessful. At the negotiations on defence and space, the Soviet side succeeded in upholding the traditional, or “narrow”, interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the correctness of which was recognised by the US Administration. As far as the SDI program is concerned, it ended its existence “in a natural way” rather than as a result of the bitter resistance on the part of the Soviet side. Namely because of the practical impossibility of implementing the ambitious plans to build an “impenetrable”, ground- and space-based, anti-missile shield.

Today, it is a question of far more modest tasks – the interception of, at most, a score of missile warheads, which could be launched against the US territory as a result of an “accident”, unauthorised action or for terrorist purposes by a third state.

In its policy of opposing proliferation, Russia puts the main emphasis on non-military methods to resolve this problem. Very often doubts are expressed, on the one hand, as to whether such a threat to the USA really exists and, on the other, as to the effectiveness of a BMD to counter this threat, in as much as missiles are one of the least probable means of “nuclear blackmail”. But such arguments, as experience shows, have virtually no effect on the American side, who looks upon the building and deployment of a BMD (both tactical and strategic) as a useful and even necessary “complement” to the measures already taken to counter proliferation.

The demonstrative indifference on the part of Russia in respect of the proliferation threat, which, after all, affects it in the first place, in as much as the sources of this threat are located much closer to its territory than to that of the USA, is looked upon in the West through the prism of the well-known saying: “What is good for a Russian, is death for a German” (read “an American”).

In view of this, it is clear that the political-diplomatic methods directed at preventing the deployment in the USA of NMD are hardly likely to have any tangible effect.

Another means of pressure on the USA to abandon their plans for NMD is the threat by Russia to withdraw from the START I Treaty and abandon the START II Treaty already signed, but so far not ratified.

As is known, when START I Treaty was signed, the Soviet side issued a unilateral statement, reserving for itself this right if the USA violated or withdrew from the ABM Treaty. In the bill on ratification of
the START II Treaty, tabled on 22 March 1999 by the Russian President, a similar clause is included.

It may be supposed that in other circumstances such threats might have been quite effective. At any rate, some 8 or 12 years ago, the Republican US administration, looked upon negotiations as practically the only way of solving the ABM problem. It proposed to the Soviet side, in the course of the negotiations on defence and space, different variants for a “joint transition to a regime with a greater emphasis on defence”. At the same time, only the most radically minded representatives of NGOs advocated a unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty and even then on the pretext that the USSR was violating the Treaty (the Krasnoyarsk Radar station) and by a functioning ABM system around Moscow.

Today, the situation has radically changed. Russian threats to abrogate the START I and II treaties, in case the USA withdraws from the ABM Treaty, cannot, in practice, be shored up with real actions. It is no secret to anybody that the strategic might of Russia is rapidly declining. On the most optimistic predictions (leaving aside the fantastic idea of the possibility of renewing in a short period the manufacture of heavy ICBMs, the building of 4-5 atomic missile submarines in the course of ten years and prolonging the service life of existing strategic systems beyond all conceivable limits) the Russian SNF will number not more than 1000-1500 nuclear warheads within a decade. According to statements by authoritative officials, such as Yuri Maslyukov, the figure could be as small as a few hundred warheads. It is no coincidence that one of the main arguments in favour of the ratification of the START II Treaty by Russia, at present, is the fact that it envisages what is a virtually a unilateral reduction by the USA in as much Russia will have to lower the quantitative level of its SNF.

In these circumstances, there remains only one way for Russia to oppose the USA in its plans to deploy NMD, exceeding the limits imposed by the ABM Treaty. That is to force the USA to take upon itself the responsibility for the consequences of a unilateral withdrawal from this treaty and launch a propaganda campaign (which has already started) in the hope of organising powerful, international pressure on the USA by states in favour of preserving the ABM Treaty in its unchanged form, in the first place, China, as well as try to bring over to its side the US allies – Great Britain and France – whose nuclear arsenals, in case of the beginning of a race in defensive armaments, may sharply decline in value.

It is difficult to predict whether such tactics on the part of Russia will be successful, i.e. force the USA to abandon its plans. Historical
experience, however, shows that, even at the time of bitter confrontation, in the beginning of the eighties, similar policies by the USSR did not always produce the desired result. In this connection, it is worth adducing the example of the plans for the deployment of American nuclear IMRMs in Europe. Even the powerful anti-missile movement in the majority of Western countries, on which the Soviet leadership put so much stakes, was not successful. Today, it can hardly be expected that Russia will be able to launch a campaign of even comparable size against the deployment of US NMD. Without mentioning Russia’s limited possibilities and its considerably diminished international influence, it should not be forgotten that, in the case of BMD, unlike in that of IMRMs, it is a question here of non-nuclear defence systems. To present these arms in the eyes of US public opinion and that of the West as almost more dangerous than offensive nuclear weapons will not be easy. All the more so, since, as we have pointed out earlier, Russia is not really in a position to threaten to withdraw from the existing START treaties and start a new spiral in the arms race. It is not difficult to guess to what results such a policy will lead in the end as far as the ABM Treaty is concerned. Faced with the inevitability of the beginning of the deployment of NMD in the USA and its withdrawal from the Treaty, Russia will have to agree, in haste, to amendments to the Treaty, dictated by the USA. In the opposite case, being committed to retaliatory measures, Russia will find itself confronted by the removal of all limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms, which, objectively, gives a free hand to the USA and complete freedom of action in all areas of the military build-up. There is no need to point, once again, to the following fact. For Russia, in its current situation and in the absence of any prospect of a rapid transition to a qualitatively new level of economic development, such a turn of events would mean its final reduction to the rank of “third countries”.

It should also be noted that in the field connected with BMD problems, objectively, time is against Russia. So far the present US Administration is virtually its ally in preserving the ABM Treaty. Its official representatives have repeatedly reiterated US adherence to the clauses of this treaty. It is for the US Administration not a question of abrogating the ABM Treaty, but of introducing certain changes, which will enable the USA to deploy a limited BMD of its territory. But pressure on the Clinton Administration on the part of radically minded American legislators to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is continually growing. If, as a result of the presidential elections, the
Republican candidate wins, which is more than probable, the fate of the ABM Treaty may be considered sealed.

Today, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov and other high-ranking government officials stubbornly refuse to even consider any amendments to the Treaty. This position leads objectively to its abrogation. The US side argues that the ABM Treaty in its present form ceased to answer US interests and, what is more, stands in the way of strengthening the security of the USA in the light of the growing threat of the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the world. The very refusal to consider amendments may be interpreted in the USA as a violation by Russia of Art. XIV of the ABM Treaty, which provides for the right of each of the parties to propose amendments.

It should be borne in mind that even the supporters of the ABM Treaty in the USA understand that it has no choice but to withdraw from it, if strict adherence to its clauses, without the introduction of certain amendments, leaves no alternative but a sharp diminishing of the country's security. In these conditions, Russia’s position on the question of possible amendments to the ABM Treaty will pay a key role.

It should again be emphasised that Russia has today no means at its disposal to prevent the deployment of NMD system in the USA. The decision rests in a sphere beyond the reach of Russian policy and is determined mainly by the technical and financial capabilities of the USA, as well by the internal political situation in that country.

At the same time, a positive answer can be given to the question of whether there is a way of amending the ABM Treaty which would allow the deployment of a limited NMD in the USA while retaining its fundamental principles, although many experts consider this not possible.

The main idea behind the ABM Treaty consists in both sides desisting from the deployment of ABM systems for the defence of their national territories and from providing a base for such a defence (Art. I). This fact forms the basis of the conclusion that any territorial defence system is not compatible with the clauses of this Treaty. At the same time, the Treaty does not give a definition either of the notion “ABM system of the territory” or the notion – “the providing the base for such a defence”.

The ABM Treaty itself gives a clear definition of what defence system should not be considered as an ABM system for a defence of the territory. The document states that each side has the right to deploy an ABM system in only two areas, having a radius of 150 km and separated by not less than 1300 km. In each of these deployment areas not more than 100 ABM interceptors may be deployed and a fixed number of ABM
radars. In other words, such a defence is not considered under the Treaty as the deployment of an ABM system of the territory of the country or providing a base for such a defence. The ABM Treaty also lays down that one of the areas of deployment of an ABM defence should be the national capital of the parties to the treaty and the second an area, containing ICBM silo launchers (Art. III). The treaty does not lay down any limitations on the action-range of the ABM interceptors.

In 1974, the USSR and the USA signed a protocol to the ABM Treaty, which restricted deployment of strategic defence systems to one area for each of the sides.

For the USSR, Moscow was chosen as a deployment area and for the USA – the Minutemen ICBMs deployment area of Grand Forks in the state of North Dakota.

Each of the sides was given the right to move the ABM deployment from the national capital to a deployment area of ICBMs (for the USSR) or from such an area to the national capital (for the USA). In this way, without any violation of its treaty obligations, the USA could, already today, start the deployment of a NMD system in North Dakota or in the area of its capital (dismantling the ABM system in Grand Forks, which in a state of conservation) consisting of 100 silo-based interceptor launchers.

What could be the nature of amendments, which would not undermine the foundation of the ABM Treaty? It would seem to us that there are a number of variants, which might be acceptable to Russia.

The abandonment of the 1974 Protocol, with full and unchanged retention of the ABM Treaty itself, could be the least “painful” compromise for the Russian side.

This would not require any amendments, but give the USA the right to deploy two ABM complexes of 100 interceptors. One – in the Grand Forks area and one – in the Washington area. As we have already explained, from the point of view of the ABM Treaty, this would formally not amount to a defence of the territory system. Although, with the existing level of technological development, such a system could assure the protection of a considerable part of US territory against individual or limited launches of ballistic missiles. At the same time, it is almost certain that such a variant of deploying NMD would hardly suit the USA in as much as it will not be the most efficient way of accomplishing their missions.

From this follows a second variant of possible amendments: to change Art III of the ABM Treaty while fully preserving all its other clauses. Each of the sides will have the right to deploy ABM in two areas
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of their choice, but at a distance from each other of not less than 1300 km. According to the treaty’s logic such a deployment will not be considered either “an ABM system of the territory” of the country or “the providing a base for such a defence”. It could also be said that the logic of the ABM Treaty would not be contradicted by the deployment of an ABM system in one area only but with 200 silo-based interceptors.

In this way, at least two ways of amending the ABM Treaty may be considered quite acceptable from the point of view of the preservation of the Treaty and the fundamental principles of strategic stability on which it is based.

What can Russia gain if it gives the USA to understand that it is ready to consider certain amendments to the Treaty? In our view, the advantage of such a step, in comparison to the rigid position, at present adopted towards this agreement, is quite evident.

Firstly, Russia retains the status of an equal partner of the USA in the field of the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms through the existing system of bilateral and multilateral agreements on this issue, built up in the course of many post-war decades.

Secondly, agreeing to some variant of the amendments examined above and, in this way, preserving the main limitations imposed by the document, Russia may, in fact, prevent a more dangerous development of the means of waging war, namely the deployment of weapons in outer space.

Thirdly, by expressing its readiness to discuss amendments to the ABM Treaty, Russia acquires the possibility of influencing, to a certain degree, US plans to build and deploy NMD and “keeping it within the limits” of possible amendments. In other words, the possible structure of the US NMD would be dictated by the nature of possible amendments to the ABM Treaty. Amendments, which Russia would be willing to accept rather than by technical, military and other factors, which could happen if the decision was taken to deploy a NMD, before agreement on the corresponding amendments to the ABM Treaty was reached. In the latter case (if the moment is allowed to pass), it is quite possible that the USA will propose amendments to the ABM Treaty, proceeding, in the first place, from the plans, already adopted; to deploy its NMD rather than from the preservation of the basis principles of this treaty.

Finally, and this is the most important. Russia will have the chance of “trading-off” its readiness to agree to certain concessions in respect of the ABM Treaty for corresponding concessions on the part of the USA in the question of further reductions of the SNF within the framework of the START III treaty. It seems to us, that the USA lacks
any stimuli to negotiate and conclude a new treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, if the START II Treaty is not ratified by Russia. The agreement reached at the Cologne Summit, in June 1999, to hold discussions in respect of the ABM Treaty and the START III treaty, at the end of the summer of 1999, opens up such prospects. It may be that Russia, perhaps for the last time, will take part in these negotiations as an absolutely equal partner of the USA, in spite of all the economic, domestic-political and social problems, including the steep decline of the strategic potential of the country, which have already excluded Russia from the ranks of the super powers.

This situation makes it possible, in our view, to insist, in the course of discussions, on a packet deal on the solution to the problem of the ABM Treaty and the START III treaty. Within the framework of the START III treaty the Russian side should demand that all the disputed and unsolved issues, “inherited” from the START II Treaty, should be fully taken into account, in the first place, by revising the clause in the START II Treaty prohibiting the deployment of MIRVed ICBMs. In the very least, Russia should reserve for itself the right to deploy mobile ICBMs with multiple warheads. Another clause in the START II Treaty, which provoked serious criticism in the course of the debates in Russia, is the problem of the upload potential – i.e. the possibility of a rapid uploading of warheads on the strategic delivery vehicles remaining after reductions. This question should also be resolved in the new agreement on strategic nuclear weapons as well as a number of others which cause quite justified concern on the part of Russian lawmakers and experts.

It seems to me, that even before substantive negotiations start, the list of questions, which have to be resolved within the framework of the START III treaty, should be agreed with all the departments concerned, the Legislature and the Executive. A clearly articulated and agreed position of Russia at the negotiations with the USA on this question should make it possible to achieve the desired results in a relatively short time and avoid controversies and contradictions, which have arisen as a result of a not sufficiently thought-out Russian position at the time of concluding the START II Treaty.

In conclusion, it should be emphasised once more, that Russia is unlikely to be able to prevent the deployment of NMD on the territory of the USA. The main task of Russian policy should now be both the prevention of the damage to the maintenance of strategic stability and the preservation of the existing regime of arms limitation as well as obtaining certain political, strategic and economic benefits from the deployment of NMD by the USA.
It is still possible to resolve these questions with the present US Administration. It would be unforgivable to let such a rare and favourable chance for Russian policy to preserve and strengthen contractual relations with the USA in the field of the limitation of strategic offensive and defensive arms pass.
10. THE ABM TREATY AND RUSSIA’S POSITION

Summary of the discussions at IMEMO

Alexandre SAVELYEV

On 8 December 1999, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the editorial staff of the journal of the same name held a round table conference on the theme “the ABM Treaty and Russia’s position”. A number of leading specialists of the Institute and invited experts took part in the conference, which was chaired by the Deputy Director of the Institute, V. Baranovsky. Present were: V. Martynov (Director of the IMEMO), S. Blagovolin (Deputy Director of the IMEMO), A. Kaliadine (Deputy Director of the IMEMO Centre for Political and Military Forecasts), A. Savelyev (Head of the military policy sector in the Department of Strategic Analysis of the IMEMO), G. Diligensky (Chief Editor of the journal World Economy and International Relation), N. Detinov (Consultant of the Centre of Program Research of the Russian Space Agency), V. Koltunov (Russian Representative in the Standing Consultative Commission on the ABM Treaty), V. Lebedev (Deputy Director of the Centre of National Security Problems of the Moscow State University), S. Oznobishchev (Head of the Analytical Directorate of the Russian Academy of Sciences). In this review, the material, presented to the conference by A. Arbatov (Director of the IMEMO Centre for Political and Military Forecasts) is also included.

In his introductory address, V. Martynov noted that the ABM Treaty and Russia’s position on this issue are of vital importance to the overall Russian foreign policy. In recent times, certain negative tendencies have manifested themselves in Russian–American relations and the negotiations on the ABM Treaty are very likely to bring about changes in these relations. These changes may be both positive and negative. The topicality of the questions submitted for discussion is beyond any doubt in as much as the existing publications have, so far, not offered a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s position on the question under examination. Of particular importance is the answer to the question of how important are for Russia relations of partnerships with the USA.

and what role the ABM Treaty plays in these relations. V. Martynov then stressed that Russia should adopt a firm position, though not to such an extent as not to leave any room for manoeuvre in its policy. Russia should be able to advance towards the goals it set itself, bearing in mind the changing situation in this sphere and stand by principles without depriving itself of the possibility of looking for a compromise. The present economic situation of Russia should be taken into account and, in this connection, it should be recognised that, for a long time still to come, the country will not be in a position to sharply increase its defence spending. That is why, it would be useful to evaluate not only the political, but also the military-technical co-operation with the USA in the sphere we are examining.

In conclusion, V. Martynov called on the participants to discuss the questions on the agenda in an open, confiding way in order to try, in the first place, to look at the problem of the ABM Treaty and Russian–American relations in this field from all sides. The conference should not set itself the task of elaborating a single point of view on all the questions under examination, but a clear and well-grounded exposition of the views of each expert in order to address the problem in all the variety of ways suggested for its solution.

In the course of the work of the conference, the participants focussed their attention on the examination of a few key questions, on each of which they were given the opportunity to express their opinion.

New factors, acting for and against the preservation of rigid constrains on defensive systems

In the course of the discussions, a short historical review of the problem was given, including the prerequisites for concluding the 1972 ABM Treaty, the course of the Defence and Space Talks between the USSR and the USA in 1985–1991 and the consideration of these issues between Russia and the USA in the nineties. The point of view was expressed that the firm position of the Soviet Union in respect of ABM, which it was able to uphold in the course of the negotiations with the USA, was reinforced, apart from other considerations, by the military-technical and economic might of the USSR. The Americans recognised very clearly that, in case of the withdrawal of the USA from the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union would be in a position to take adequate measures to parry the threat, which the deployment by the USA of a strategic defence of its territory would pose. Apart from this, the USA lacked, at the time, ready technical and technological solutions, which
would enable it to start building a sufficiently effective nation-wide missile defence (NMD) immediately. All these factors combined made a withdrawal by the USA from the ABM Treaty difficult.

Today the situation has changed radically. In particular, Russia lacks, in practice, the possibility (both technical and material) to respond adequately to a possible deployment of US NMD and such a capacity is hardly likely to appear in the course of at least 5 to 10 years to come. Thus, Russia would have been unable to maintain military-strategic parity in the middle of nineties without the treaties with the USA, which limit and reduce the latter’s nuclear weapons.

At the same time, in the period since the end of the negotiations with the USA, the situation in that country has also changed. In the first place, the number of supporters of building and deploying NMD against the growing threat of proliferation of nuclear missiles to third countries rose sharply.

Russian large defence-industry corporations, which were formerly engaged in the construction of strategic arms and at present are short of orders, also bring their influence to bear. They hope to recuperate today’s losses by switching to the construction of ballistic missile defence systems.

Apart from this, the erosion (although, possibly, so far, not fully) of the Non-proliferation regime adds to the number of cardinal changes in the military-strategic situation in the world, which contributes to the heightened interest in BMD. One should not close one's eyes, in this connection, to the refusal of a number of “threshold states”, including Israel, to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as to the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan.

It should also not be forgotten that for Russia itself, bearing in mind its geographical location and its proximity to the sources of potential danger, the building and deployment of BMD could be of considerable interest for the provision of its own security. A certain role in these questions may be played, unlike in former days, by the regional policies of the subjects of the RF. The existing plans for deploying a limited US NMD no longer suffers from the ambitiousness of the SDI program. This is true both of the technological aspect of the question and the proposed expenditure on its implementation. From this standpoint it can be said that the USA is fully capable of deploying such a limited defence system on the basis of the proven technology of non-nuclear interception of the warheads of strategic missiles.

The Legislature, in the person of the Congress, has openly expressed its support for the construction and deployment of NMD. As
far as the US Administration is concerned, it takes up a very inconsistent position. On the one hand, it acknowledges that the ABM Treaty is the basic document, which contributes to strengthening strategic stability, while, on the other, it persistently seeks to have this agreement modified. A certain amount of clarity will be brought into this question in the summer of 2000, when the US Administration will have to finally decide on how it will act in the matter of NMD and the 1972 ABM Treaty.

**Impelling motives and limiting factors influencing US intentions to deploy NMD**

Some of the experts put in doubt arguments advanced by the USA in favour of deploying a limited NMD. They pointed out that the development of strategic missiles, capable of reaching USA territory, by third countries was unrealistic in the foreseeable future. In this case it was a question of North Korea, Iran and Iraq. It was noted that to develop a missile with a range of 10 thousand km was a completely different matter from the development of a missile with a range of about 1500 km. The scientific-technical development of these countries makes this impossible. That is why the argument, advanced by the USA, does not stand up to criticism and is completely unfounded.

As far as the defence against non-strategic missiles is concerned, the USA has the right to deploy TMD as laid down in the 1997 Russian–American agreements.

Statements about the need to deploy a strategic BMD against accidental and unauthorised launches of ballistic missiles as well as a response to the proliferation of missile technology in the world were called equally far-fetched. In respect of the first question, it was pointed out that, already in the development stage of missile complexes, one of the most important objectives has been to exclude the possibility of this happening. The missile powers have already accumulated great experience in the handling of missile complexes and during the whole period of their existence there has not been one case, which demonstrated even the possibility of an unauthorised or accidental launch of these missiles. As far as measures to counter proliferation are concerned, the deployment of NMD by the USA can only accelerate the arms race in this sphere, bearing in mind the negative reaction to this plan on the part of many countries.

The conclusion was drawn that the real task, which the USA set itself, in planning the deployment of “limited” NMD, was the building, in the future, of a “dense” BMD directed against Russia. The idea advanced,
at present, of building limited nation-wide NMD and modifying the 1972 ABM Treaty represents only the first step towards this final goal which is aimed at consolidating the dominant position of the USA in the world.

While not disputing this conclusion, a number of participants of the conference expressed doubt as to whether all the actions of USA in this field are directed exclusively against Russia. What is more, the opinion was expressed on the need for intensification of the Russian-American dialogue on the whole range of security problems, not only in respect of bilateral relations between the two powers, but in the wider perspective of strengthening international security in a multipolar world. In this respect, Russian reaction to USA actions in the NMD sphere will be of crucial importance.

Some speakers argued that the situation should not be “dramatised” since, even in the USA itself, the question of the deployment of NMD gave rise to serious doubts. There exist even greater objections against these plans in the world community. Thus, voting in the UNGA on the resolution on the preservation and compliance with the ABM Treaty tabled by Russia, China and Belarus showed that the majority of states consider it necessary to preserve this treaty. 80 states voted in favour of the resolution and only 4 - against (USA, Albania, Israel and Micronesia). That is why it will not be so easy for the next US Administration (not to mention this one) to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. It will be equally difficult for the USA to “ignore” their allies.

It should be borne in mind, here, that the efforts on the part of the USA to parry a possible nuclear missile threat from “third” countries are meeting with success. In particular, the framework agreement on control of the nuclear program of North Korea is functioning quite effectively.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that in the US Congress there are sensible representatives and senators who entertain serious doubt on the need of deploying NMD. In this connection attention was drawn to the inadmissible passivity of Russia in entering in an active dialogue with those forces in the USA, including the political and scientific-technical communities, who could become our allies in the matter of the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the improvement of Russian–American relations as a whole.

It was also suggested that there was a need to intensify the dialogue with those states, which advocate the preservation of the ABM Treaty in its unchanged form. In the first place, this concerns China as well as US allies in NATO, including Great Britain and France, who might be worried that their nuclear arsenals will depreciate as a result of the deployment of strategic BMD, first in the USA and then possibly in
Russia. At the same time, it was noted that not too great hopes should be placed on the international community in respect of the preservation of the ABM Treaty. This is, after all, in the first place, a matter of a bilateral agreement between Russia and the USA and not of a multilateral treaty. Other countries are no parties to it. Secondly, the deployment of non-nuclear defences against nuclear weapons can hardly be presented to public opinion as a more threatening act than a build-up of arsenals of WMD and their delivery vehicles. Finally, to judge by historical experience, even the powerful anti-missile movement, which engulfed the countries of Western Europe, at the end of the seventies – the beginning of the eighties, could not prevent the beginning of the deployment of American IRBMs. Although many in the USSR thought, at the time, that the USA would not dare to take such a step in the face of a possible worsening of their relations, not only with the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty countries, but also with the NATO allies.

Most of the participants of the conference tended to think that the USA would, in any case, deploy NMD. As far as Russia is concerned, it will hardly succeed, bearing in mind its limited possibilities, in preventing such a development by political-diplomatic methods. That is why, the possibility of introducing certain changes in the existing limitation regime established by the ABM Treaty should not be entirely excluded on the absolute condition that the foundations of deterrence and strategic stability are not undermined.

At the same time, in the view of some experts, there are no serious grounds, at present for supposing that the USA will immediately announce its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It could start work on BMD in the one permitted deployment area, in the state of North Dakota, without formally reneging on its obligations under the ABM Treaty. In that case, the Russian government will be confronted with the serious question of how to react to this step.

**US NMD and its effect on Russian security**

In the opinion of some experts, the transition of the USA to “dense” NMD will, in the end, weaken the deterrent potential of the Russian SNF and a “limited” NMD will be the first step in that direction. A key-element in the planned NMD will be the space-based sensors, which, in fact, fulfil the function of ABM radars. After the deployment of such sensors and the perfection of their functioning it will be quite easy for the USA to build up the NMD to any desired limits, in a relatively short time, by the rapid deployment of additional interceptor missiles. In
the opinion of some of the participants of the conference, this is exactly what the USA was planning to do when it announced the program to build NMD. That is why, Russia should neither “help” nor “make it easier” for the USA to implement such plans.

Against this point of view, it was argued that it is very difficult, at present, to judge the effectiveness of the US NMD, based on ground-based ABM interceptors. If not more than 200 such anti-missiles are deployed, such a system will influence in no noticeable way strategic stability and the effectiveness of the Russian deterrence. As far as US “plans” to sharply build up its defence potential, there are no grounds whatsoever for saying that the USA harbours such plans. Even if such ideas were to exist, agreed amendments to the ABM Treaty may prevent their implementation in as much as it will be very difficult for the USA, from a political point of view, to raise once more the question of a revision of the ABM Treaty in a few years time.

At present, the main source of concern in respect of the provision of the external security of Russia is the predictable growth of the misbalance in the strategic armaments of the USA and the RF, in the course of the next 10–15 years. In political circles and among experts in the country, there is a widespread opinion that without a powerful nuclear deterrent Russia, will not only slide down to the level of a second-rate state and be completely ignored by the West, but could be treated in the same way as Yugoslavia or Iraq, as communist and nationalist circles argue, will happen. From this point of view, the maintenance of the existing regime of agreements on the limitation and reduction of the strategic armaments of Russia and the USA as well as advance towards even deeper cuts in the accumulated nuclear arsenals of the two sides is of vital importance.

Options for Russian policy in the near future

Opposite views emerged from the discussions on what action Russia should take in order to strengthen its security and preserve the structures of international, contractual relations with the USA in the sphere of strategic armaments limitation. According to some experts, the withdrawal of the USA from the ABM Treaty, in the course of the implementation of the program of the NMD deployment was inevitable. They argued that Russia should agree to the introduction of certain amendments in the Treaty so as to preserve its main limitations. Other participants completely denied the need for this and envisaged a number
of measures of a political-diplomatic nature to hold the USA back from withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Those who shared the first point of view pointed out that the current US Administration was virtually an ally of Russia in the matter of preserving the principal limitations of the ABM Treaty. Both the US President and the most influential members of his Administration have repeatedly affirmed their adherence to this agreement. At the same time, the US government is exposed to increasing pressure on the part of the legislature and public opinion in the country to take concrete steps to defend the US territory against the growing threat of proliferation of missiles and WMD. The arguments of those specialists who argue that such a threat is not real, in a foreseeable future, have very little effect on wide circles of US public opinion who are more inclined to believe the reports of the CIA. If the Clinton Administration is still able to keep control of the situation in this sphere, were the Republicans to come to power as a result of the elections, in November 2000, the fate of the ABM Treaty can be considered sealed. That is why, Russia should agree to concerted amendments to the ABM Treaty while there is still time.

In this way, Russia, in the first place, could preserve its contractual, strategic relations with the USA and the prospect is opened up for the continuation of the dialogue in this sphere. Secondly, the possibility would be preserved of preventing unrestrained deployment of BMD as would happen if the USA withdraws from the ABM Treaty. Thirdly, in this way, it will be possible to avoid a new stage in the strategic offensive arms race. Adherence to the ABM Treaty is a condition of the existing agreements in the field of strategic offensive weapons. In case the USA withdraws from the ABM Treaty, Russia will have no alternative but to announce its withdrawal from the START I Treaty and, possibly, from other agreements as well. Fourthly, it may be predicted that if the USA announces its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as its unalienable right, Russia will still have to concert amendments to this Treaty in order to avoid a “worse-case scenario” development of events. In that case, Russia will have no alternative but to agree to the proposals put forward by the USA, which are unlikely to take into full account Russian interests. At present, the real possibility exists of “trading-off” amendments to the ABM Treaty against corresponding concessions by the USA in a new treaty in the field of strategic offensive arms. Bearing in mind the mutual interest of Russia and the USA, such a deal is quite realistic. The Russian side could agree to the abrogation of the 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty, which limits the number of areas, where the deployment of ABM systems is permitted from two to one as
well as to minimal changes in Art. III of the Treaty, which would allow
the parties to deploy ABM systems in two areas by their choice each (that
is – not only in the area of the national capital of each of the states and
the deployment areas of ICBMs). Amendments could be introduced not in
the text of the ABM Treaty itself, but in a separate protocol.

The opinion was also voiced that, in case clear guarantees were
obtained that the USA will not unilaterally withdraw from the ABM
Treaty, Russia could even agree to more serious concessions in the
revision of this treaty. For instance, the number of permitted deployment
areas could be increased to two, three or more, depending on the
predicted threat of proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles with
WMD warheads becoming real. It would also be possible, if necessary, to
remove certain qualitative restrictions, imposed by the ABM Treaty, such
as the prohibition of ground-based, mobile launchers for ABM
interceptors and other ABM components, on rapid reloading systems,
multiple interceptor warheads and other restrictions.

In its turn, the USA would have to agree to the conclusion of a
START III treaty without prior ratification by Russia of the START II
Treaty. In this case, after the signing of START III treaty, Russia could
ratify this treaty simultaneously with START II Treaty, and the USA
simultaneously with the ratification of the 1997 New York Agreements of
on TMD and the extension of the implementation period of START II
Treaty. The arrangement would lay down lower permitted ceilings of SNF
of the parties and solve the problem of the “upload potential” (the rapid
growth of the strategic potential through the return on delivery vehicles of
earlier removed warheads) as well as re-establish the right of the parties
to deploy MIRVed ICBMs.

The latter condition is very important in view of the limited
economic possibilities of Russia to deploy large numbers of single-
warhead delivery vehicles. This right, moreover, would give Russia the
assurance that it could overcome the US ground-based BMD, numbering
a few hundred interceptors. Other measures could also be envisaged in
connection with corresponding shortcomings of START II Treaty, which
cause concern on the Russian side.

An opposite point of view was voiced to the effect that no
amendments to the ABM Treaty of any kind should be agreed to and that
Russia does not need any MIRVed ICBMs. The main argument in support
of this position was the assertion that such an agreement would amount to
the complete annulment of this treaty. The American side is intent on the
deployment of NMD and this undermines the basic clauses of the ABM
Treaty, directed at not permitting the deployment of the ABM system for
a defence of a territory of the state or provide a base for such a defence. Russia’s consent to even a limited deployment would mean abandoning this basic principle with all the consequences resulting from this. As far as the MIRVed ICBMs are concerned, with the lowered ceilings of strategic offensive arms, the deployment of MIRVed ICBMs will lead to a reduction of the number of targets for a first strike and, in consequence, undermine strategic stability.

Countering these assertions, some experts pointed out that it is just this rigid position by Russia in respect of amendments to the ABM Treaty, which may lead to such an undesirable development. If the USA, faced with Russian intransigence, will be forced to announce its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, all limitations on BMD will be removed and the USA will be given complete freedom to act in this sphere. If, today, an agreement is reached on the amendments mentioned above, both the present and the future Administration of the USA will be “bound” by the limitations preserved in the modified ABM Treaty. This makes it possible not to allow events to take an uncontrollable course.

At present, it is a question of the concrete problems with which Russia is faced and which can be resolved by a mutual “trade-off” of the concerns of the two sides, referred to above. The restoration of Russia’s right to deploy ICBMs with multiple warheads represents a guarantee that the USA will not withdraw from a modified ABM Treaty in order to weaken the Russian nuclear potential.

As far as Russian security policy as a whole is concerned, it should be based on objective factors and not on all kinds of guesses. We already have the unfortunate experience with the American SDI program when the, in many ways, fantastic scenario of the deployment of “space strike weapons” extremely negatively affected the possibility of reaching agreement in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. As a result, it turned out that, in the end, the SDI program came down to attractive pictures and cartoons about the interception of thousands of nuclear warheads and missiles. No real anti-ballistic missile weapon was created as a result of many years of development.

In any case, Russia should work out a few options or scenarios for its “behaviour” in case of different developments in the sphere of ABM. In particular, Russia should not be taken by surprise by possible declarations on the part of the USA in its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It must have a clear position in case the USA starts work on the deployment of BMD in a permitted area only (in North Dakota) without formal infringement of its treaty obligations.
The prospects for the development of Russian–American relations and the role of the ABM Treaty

The participants of the conference examined global questions of world politics and the role of Russia in international affairs. A number of speakers stressed the fact that in the course of the last ten years radical changes have taken place on the international political scene. Serious developments occurred in the scientific-technical field, which affect, in the first place, the most developed countries and particularly the USA. These changes affected also the priorities, which formerly existed in the foreign policy course of the USA. In particular, the Chinese factor is making itself more and more felt and now occupies one of the first places in America foreign policy. What is more, in these conditions, a situation may emerge when Russia may find itself, once more, in a bipolar world, this time on the line China – USA. This could happen in the foreseeable future.

Several participants stressed that it would be a serious mistake, in contemporary conditions, to reduce all questions of security and stability only to the mutual Russian–American strategic relations. Unfortunately, some analysts continue as before to look at the whole complex of these questions as a bilateral problem. At the same time, a number of countries are solving their long-term, strategic tasks independently and in a way they themselves think necessary. While Russia and the USA are facing each other with increasing intransigence, these countries are beginning to exercise ever-greater influence on strategic stability and the balance of power on a world scale.

Russia’s possibilities of influencing international affairs are, today, extremely limited and if Russia does not take serious steps to raise the level of co-operation with the USA, it may find itself in total isolation. In respect of the ABM Treaty, this means trying to use this treaty as an instrument of co-operation with the USA and other industrially developed countries, instead of trying to preserve it inviolate like a kind of “holy cow”.

On the question of the need to activate Russian policy in the sphere under examination, many speakers drew attention to non-strategic TMD systems, where there exist real possibilities to broaden military-political and scientific-technical co-operation with many countries. Russian–American agreement on the parameters of TMD and its components, which do not come under the notion “strategic”, signed in September 1997 in New York, permits activities connected with the building, testing and deployment of such non-strategic TMD. What is
more, Russia has repeatedly put forward proposals for joint work in this sphere in the international arena. Unfortunately, they have so far not elicited a positive reaction, neither on the part of the USA, NATO or Japan and the countries of the Asian Pacific region.

At the same time, the interest in ballistic missile defences, both strategic and tactical, is growing. In this connection, it should be noted that only few countries, in the first place Russia and the USA, have the technical capacity to create up-to-date defence systems. This opens wide prospects for co-operation between Russia and the USA as well as for wider international co-operation in this field. The present moment favours this and it would be unpardonable for Russia to let it pass.

Ideally, Russian–American co-operation in this sphere could consist of a joint modification of the ABM Treaty and the building of common defences. This system would then defend both powers and their allies against a missile threat from third countries, but neither the RF nor the USA would have to worry about maintaining the capacity of their offensive forces to overcome ABM systems, since this would now be a common system. In this way, the strategic relationship based on deterrence would belong to the past and both sides could effect even more radical reductions of their strategic offensive weapons.

After Russia and the USA, at the beginning of the nineties, proclaimed that they had established new relations of partnership between themselves, they did little to comply with this principle. As a result, the strategic potentials of the two countries continue to be looked at from the point of view of confrontation and the level of strategic stability is evaluated by the capacity of each side to destroy the opponent in a retaliatory strike. When introducing into this question the factor of BMD, many military and civilian specialists unambiguously declare that a strategic defence leads to the undermining of stability.

One can find many explanations for the existing state of affairs. One of them is the absence of a real bilateral dialogue between Russia and the USA on a wide range of basic problems of security and strategic relations. In the course of such a dialogue, it will be necessary to clear up fundamental questions, which continue to remain matters of controversy between the sides, including the influence of the ABM factor on stability and security. First, agreement should be reached on common notions in the whole range of questions under discussion, in as much as, in many cases, the sides attach a different meaning to such notions as strategic stability, security, deterrence etc. It would seem that the present US Administration also feels the need for starting such a dialogue.
The idea was put forward that an authoritative Russian–American forum should be set up which could initiate discussions on a wide range of unresolved questions, which have accumulated in the relations between the RF and the USA, including the problem of security, stability and the role of the ABM Treaty. Diplomats, military officers, members of the intelligence community, parliamentarians, representatives of the military-industrial complex and the independent, scientific and academic communities of the two countries could make up this forum.

It could be invested by the leadership of Russia and the USA with powers to draw concrete conclusions on the nature of existing and future threats to international security, on possible ways to counter them and on the spheres and concrete options of strengthening international co-operation. If in the course of its work, the forum comes to the conclusion that the deployment of a limited, strategic BMD would enhance the security of both sides, corresponding updating of the ABM Treaty should be recognised as being necessary and even useful. If, in the final instance, Russia and the USA obtain the right to deploy a limited BMD, capable of intercepting strikes of 10–15 nuclear warheads, such an option would clearly be preferable to an uncontrolled, offensive and defensive nuclear arms race as could happen if the USA were to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

The events of the summer and early autumn of 2000 have shown that the Russian leadership has, in the end, chosen the most intransigent and conservative approach to the question of the future of the ABM Treaty. As it would seem, the key role in taking the decision to reject any amendments of the treaty was played by the Ministry of Defence. The MOD is the harshest and most persistent critic of the American idea of deploying NMD and agreement with the USA on the corresponding changes in the ABM Treaty.

Thus, still before Putin’s election as President of the RF and the ratification by the State Duma of the START II Treaty, the MOD openly declared its position in respect of the prospects of arms control and relations with the USA on these questions. In February 2000, the Chief of the Directorate of International Military Co-operation of the MOD, General-Colonel Leonid Ivashov, stated in Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review): “The Ministry of Defence is not interested in the START II and START III”. Apart from other things, this conclusion followed from the assertion that the USA is striving to acquire a unilateral superiority by deploying NMD, which will ultimately lead to an “American dictate by force”. In such conditions, Russia has no
alternative but to conduct its own independent nuclear policy and abandon any further joint steps to reduce nuclear arsenals.

Nevertheless, two months later already, in April 2000, the State Duma and then the Council of the Federation ratified the START II Treaty without any serious opposition with the proviso that Russia reserves the right to withdraw from the this treaty if the USA withdraws from or violates the ABM Treaty. What deserves attention is the address to the State Duma by Vladimir Putin on 14 April 2000, just after the voting on the ratification of START II Treaty. In this address a list of measures was enumerated, which Russia would take in case the USA violated the clauses of the ABM Treaty.

Among those measures were not only Russia’s withdrawal from the START I and START II Treaties, but also from the INF Treaty. It was, moreover, announced that, in certain conditions, Russia could embark on an independent nuclear policy, i.e. an almost word for word repetition of the thesis enunciated by L. Ivashov.

By the way, the idea of Russia acting more independently in shaping and implementing its own nuclear strategy was voiced before, including in papers prepared by the IMEMO. In this connection, it was suggested that the idea of maintaining parity in strategic nuclear weapons with the USA should be reassessed and the question of unilateral reductions of those weapons by Russia while preserving the capacity to cause unacceptable damage to any probable aggressor in a retaliatory strike, be examined.

Such a sharply negative reaction on the part of Russia’s leadership to the American plans for deploying NMD, which could consist of about 200 ground-based, interceptor missiles would be quite difficult to explain if there had not been the “experience” of the opposition to the SDI, the “American plans to militarise space” and build “space strike weapons”.

In the eighties, the leadership of the USSR reacted extremely sharply to the idea, advanced by President Reagan in 1983, of rendering strategic missiles “impotent and obsolete” by building and deploying new, missile defences, including those based on so-called “other physical principles”. As became subsequently known, the USSR made a substantial effort to create counter measures against the SDI which, in many ways, were in advance of the US program.

The SDI program itself came practically to nothing. First, it was “cut down” by President Bush to the level of a “Global Protection against Limited Strikes” and later completely abandoned by President Clinton. But evidently the belief in “American military-technical superiority” still
makes itself felt and hinders the Russian leadership from assessing the existing situation and the real potential of the NMD, proposed by the USA, more soberly.

In our view, it would be quite appropriate, before taking any decision in respect of the American program, to analyse the military-technical and political aspects of this problem more thoroughly and weigh up the pros and cons.

It would seem that it is the military-technical component of the NMD, on which Russian officials most focus attention, which is the least “weighty” aspect of the question, in comparison with the political side. In any case, the 200 interceptor missiles, which, anyway, will never be tested against real ICBM warheads or SLBMs with nuclear warheads, can hardly influence, in the foreseeable future, in any appreciable way the Russian nuclear deterrent potential. Simple arithmetic calculations show that to neutralise a nation-wide US NMD not more than a few scores of warheads mounted on Russian missiles are needed. What is more, in real conditions, in order to put such a system out of service, not more than two or three nuclear explosions in space may prove sufficient.

As far as the political side of the question is concerned, it is not quite clear what Russia wants to achieve by adopting such a rigid position in respect of the ABM Treaty. Russian interests can hardly be served by a new stage of confrontation with the USA and the West European countries. But this will inevitably happen if Russia really carries out the complex of measures, which President Putin announced on the day of the ratification of the START II Treaty. In particular, if Russia withdraws from the CFE and INF Treaties, in response to the violation by the USA of the ABM Treaty. In that case, it can hardly be expected that the European NATO countries will give support to the deployment of intermediate and lesser range missiles in the European part of Russia.

On the other hand, bearing in mind the manifest interest of the USA in negotiating with Russia on the deployment of BMD, the latter has the possibility of solving, on a basis of compromise, the real problems of its security. Nevertheless, for reasons, which are not quite clear, the Russian leadership chose to militate for the preservation of the ABM Treaty in its unaltered form and refuses to envisage the introduction of any amendments in this document, which would allow the USA to deploy NMD.

It should be noted that such an uncompromising position on the ABM Treaty deprives Russia of freedom of manoeuvre in resolving a broad range of security problems. It is also quite clear that, at best, Russia may obtain a short “breathing space” after which it will, anyway, have to
take concrete measures in reaction to the practically inevitable deployment by the USA of BMD on some scale.

In any case, Russia’s position would in no way look worse, in our view, if it rejected amendments to the ABM Treaty, proposed the USA, not on the grounds of the need to preserve this treaty. It should have done it on the grounds that the American lawmakers are dragging out the ratification process of the New York documents, including the Demarcation Agreement, specifying the demarcation line between strategic missile defences, which are not permitted under the ABM Treaty, and non-strategic or theatre missile defences (TMD), which are permitted under this treaty. In this connection the American “experience” could be used. Namely, the Russian Legislature could adopt the following position. Russia would refuse to consider any agreements in the field of strategic, offensive and defensive weapons, which might be reached with the USA and recommend to President Putin not to conduct any such negotiations at all until the USA ratifies the 1997 New York agreements.

After the ratification of START II Treaty and the declarations to the effect that the ABM Treaty should be preserved, the Russian leadership demonstrated great activity in strengthening its position and seeking the support of a number of interested states. The impression was created that the preservation of the ABM Treaty was even more important than the continuation of the process of nuclear arms reduction and the entering into force of the START II Treaty. In any case, in the course of summit meetings with the US leaders, the Russian side, judging by reports, put the main emphasis on the problem of “strengthening strategic stability” and the preservation of the ABM Treaty rather than on the need for the USA to ratify the documents signed in New York, in September 1997, which would make it possible for the START II Treaty to enter into force. President Putin also raised the question of the ABM Treaty at virtually every meeting with the leaders of foreign states, including members of the CIS. Any sign of approval on their part of the idea of preserving the ABM Treaty was presented as a significant achievement of Russian policy and diplomacy.

Realising that to shape one’s policy in this sphere only on the negation of the American approach to resolving the security problem is, to say the least, counter-productive, in contemporary circumstances, the Russian leadership put forward a kind of alternative plan to building a NMD by the USA. It proposed to build, together with the West-European countries, tactical ballistic missile defences. This idea was put forward, for the first time, during a working visit by President Putin to Italy, in June 2000, – immediately after the summit meeting with President
Clinton. On this occasion President Putin asked the Head of the Italian government, Giulio Amato, to act as a mediator and sound out other European capitals on this question.

In spite of the fact that President Putin proposed that the “American partners should also be involved in this idea”, it is quite clear that behind this proposal lay the intention to reinforce pressure on the USA to preserve status quo in the sphere of strategic defence, laid down in the 1972 ABM Treaty and the 1974 Protocol to it. It is no coincidence, in our view, that on every suitable occasion, Russian officials “accept with gratitude” the position of leaders of individual countries that advocate the preservation of the ABM Treaty. It would seem that Putin’s “initiative” was quite well thought out from a political point of view. Thus, only a few days after it had been put forward, the Minister of Defence, Igor Sergeyev, speaking at a meeting of the Russian-NATO Permanent Joint Council, in Brussels, gave corresponding clarifications on how Russia sees the elaboration of a joint development of a European anti-missile defence system.

Among the areas of possible co-operation with NATO the following were cited:
– Joint evaluation of the nature and scale of missile proliferation and possible missile threats;
– Joint elaboration of the concept of a common European TMD system, the order of its development and deployment;
– Joint development of a common European multilateral warning centre of missile launches;
– Conducting joint staff exercises;
– Joint research and testing;
– Joint development of non-strategic TMD;
– Creating a non-strategic TMD for joint or co-ordinated action in the defence of peacekeeping forces and the civilian population.

It was also stated that Russia is ready to proceed to “further, close, joint action”. But all this “will only be possible if the ABM Treaty is preserved”.

It should be noted that in presenting these initiatives, Russian policy had to accept certain costs – in this case the position of China, a staunch supporter of the preservation of the ABM Treaty, who fully supports Russia on this question. This was confirmed in the course of Putin’s visit to that country in the middle of 2000. At the same time, as is known, China opposes any programs of TMD systems, which are not limited by the 1972 ABM Treaty. That is why, evidently, Russia proposed a program for the building of joint TMD with Europe and not
one on a broader scale (although the Russian side stated that it was ready to co-operate in this sphere with practically any country).

Apart from the proposals for the joint building of TMD, President Putin tried to resolve the problem, which underlies the American program for NMD. Namely that of the danger, declared at an official level, of a missile strike against US territory, delivered by third countries, in the first place, North Korea and Iran.

As a result of talks with the North Korea leader, Kim Jong II, (19-20 July 2000), President Putin made a statement at the meeting of the G-8 on Okinawa, which followed immediately afterwards, to the effect that the North Korean leader was ready to halt his missile program if other developed countries helped North Korea to implement its national space program, carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Nevertheless, it should be admitted that Putin’s efforts to preserve the ABM Treaty have borne some fruit. In any case, it has become clear that far from all Western leaders, including US allies in NATO, unconditionally support the American idea of building NMD. What is more, the USA itself (more exactly the Clinton Administration) takes up quite an ambiguous position. On the one hand, the US President and his Secretary of State, reiterated their adherence to the ABM Treaty while, on the other, they proposed such amendments to it, which deprive this treaty of all its meaning. Among other suggestions, the USA proposed to change the basic Art. I. This article forbids the parties to deploy nation-wide ballistic missile defences and to provide a base for such a defence. If these prohibitions are lifted, the ABM Treaty will, to all intents and purposes cease to exist, as the majority of experts, quite rightly, pointed out.

In these conditions the unsuccessful testing of NMD system on 8 July 2000 may be considered as a kind of welcome present to the US Administration. It enabled President Clinton to announce in September that he will not take a final decision on the NMD and, this way, put the responsibility for this decision on the shoulders of the next US President.

Nevertheless, as has already been noted, all this provides only a temporary “breathing space” for Russia, who shall have to decide, one way or another, how to respond in case the USA is bent on deploying strategic missile defences.
11. RUSSIAN APPROACH TO FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (ON THE RATIFICATION BY RUSSIA OF THE START II TREATY)*

Alexandre PIKAYEV

The START II debates

From the very beginning the START II Treaty was the subject of serious criticism in Russia. Even moderate politicians, although the majority of them supported its ratification, criticised this document. They believed that its deficiencies should be corrected during the follow on START III negotiations. In their opinion, since the START II Treaty was signed, it should be ratified, albeit with amendments. Refusal to ratify it could lead to a number of negative consequences. Particularly, the collapse of the START II Treaty and further erosion of overall American-Russian strategic arms control might provoke other nuclear powers (e.g. China) to build up their nuclear potential. The international non-proliferation regime could also be eroded. This would directly affect Russia’s security, since many recent and potential proliferators are located near its borders.1

Both START II Treaty opponents and supporters agreed that the document contained significant deficiencies. For Russia it is not disarmament, but a rearmament agreement. After Moscow, in accordance with the document’s provisions, dismantles all its MIRVed ICBMs, it would still possess approximately 350 deployed SS-25 single warhead ICBMs, and, for a limited period of time, 105 SS-19 ICBMs downloaded to one warhead per missile. Thus, in order to comply with the START II ceilings, Russia would have to produce something like 1000 new single-warhead, land-based ICBMs. That is absolutely unrealistic within the initial timetable of the START II implementation – by 2003. Such a production rate is unattainable in Russia’s economic conditions. It would contradict the nature of post-confrontational, international relations.

To a certain degree, for the United States the was not a disarmament agreement at all. While Russia ought to physically destroy the majority of strategic systems, to be reduced under the START II provisions, the USA, which traditionally relied to a much lesser degree on MIRVed ICBMs, could carry out reductions mainly by downloading (e.g. by removing extra warheads from their carriers). That asymmetry permits

Washington to obtain a significant advantage over Moscow in the case of withdrawal from the START II Treaty. The USA could relatively quickly upload warheads earlier removed from Minuteman III ICBMs and Trident II SLBMs. In that way, they could rapidly come back to the START I ceilings. Moscow possesses much more limited capabilities, because it can reload only approximately 500 warheads earlier removed from SS-19 ICBMs. But that possibility exists for a limited period only, since the SS-19, will most likely, be decommissioned in this decade already.

As a result of the implementations of the START II Treaty the Russian strategic triad would primarily rely on SLBMs and mainly mobile single warhead ICBMs. This would mean a radical restructuring of the traditional composition of the SNF, the cornerstone of which consists of silo-based, MIRVed ICBMs. Transition to SLBMs raises concerns about US predominance in anti-submarine warfare capabilities (ASW). Moreover, contrary to American practice, a much smaller percentage of Soviet strategic submarines were permanently on patrol. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the situation deteriorated, and an even smaller portion of Russian SSBNs is permanently on patrol. SSBNs in their bases, some of which can carry up to 200 warheads, represent very attractive and potentially destabilising targets. With one or two warheads a potential adversary could plan to destroy several hundred Russian warheads in one strike. Therefore, excessive concentration of nuclear submarines in their bases may provoke a potential adversary to deliver a pre-emptive strike and destabilise the nuclear balance.

Reliance on SLBMs and mobile ICBMs could negatively affect strategic command and control. Reliability of communications with strategic nuclear submarines on patrol has always been considered the Achilles heel of the Soviet nuclear deterrent. According to US data, Russian SLBMs – in contrast to their American analogues – cannot be launched from SSBNs on patrol without deblocking codes being sent by the National Command Authorities. Transmission of these codes could be prevented if the communication facilities were destroyed by nuclear – or non-nuclear – attack, or interrupted by means of electronic warfare. Recently, because of the general decline of Russia’s military power, and the new geo-strategic realities, concerns are increasing about insufficient positive control of the sea-based leg of Russia’s strategic triad.

In peacetime, mobile ICBMs are located in lightly protected hangars and, like SSBNs in their bases, are vulnerable to surprise nuclear and conventional attacks. On patrol, mobile ICBMs could be destroyed from the air by gravity bombs and highly accurate cruise missiles. They

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2 Positive control of nuclear systems guarantees their authorised launch; negative control prevents their unauthorised launch.
are also vulnerable to sabotage both in peacetime and during a war.

Opponents of the START II Treaty do not deny the argument, that, irrespectively of the future of this treaty the Russian SNF will be smaller than those of the USA and, probably will fall even below the ceilings. However, they are of the opinion that, in the absence of this treaty, the gap might be smaller. On some estimates, taking into account US advantages in upload potential, at a certain stage, the gap might be six to one in favour of the United States. In the absence of the START II Treaty, the gap might be smaller – approximately three or four to one. In addition, Moscow could retain the most reliable part of its arsenal – MIRVed land-based ICBMs. Those systems could provide assurance against undesirable nuclear build-ups by third powers, first of all, China.

The Federal law on the START II ratification

The Federal law on the ratification of the Treaty was passed by the State Duma (SD) on 14 April 2000. (See Appendix 11A) It consists of ten articles. Eight of them contain various conditions for the implementation of the START II Treaty. Art. 9 is the most important. It prohibits the deposition of the instruments of ratification until the US Senate ratifies the START II Extension Protocol and the Memorandum of Understanding on Succession (MOUS). Both documents were signed in New York in September 1997.

The US Senate ratified the START II Treaty in its original form in January 1996. In September 1997 Russia and the United States agreed to extend its implementation period until 31 December 2007. In accordance with the original text, the document was to be implemented by 2003. The extension was in Russia’s interests, because it synchronised the implementation period with the rate of the natural decommissioning of ICBMs at the expiration of their service life.

After signing the New York Agreements, the US administration stated that it would submit them to the Senate for ratification only after Russia had ratified the START II Treaty. However, the US Congress, controlled by the Republicans, made it clear that it would not approve these agreements. In the view of the Republican senators, the ABM Treaty was no longer valid as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Thus, approval of the New York 1997 Agreements might be interpreted as a retreat from that position and the recognition that the ABM Treaty is still in force.

Under those circumstances, Art. 9 of the Federal Law on ratification is intended, on the one hand, to exercise pressure on the US Senate to change its attitude towards the ABM Treaty, while, on the other, its permits Moscow to avoid responsibility for the collapse of the
START II Treaty. If the Senate does not approve the 1997 New York agreements, Washington would bear the responsibility for the START II Treaty nor entering into force.

Art. 4 links the implementation of the START II Treaty with negotiations on a new START III agreement. It permits Russian President, after consulting with the Federal Assembly (FA), to make a decision on the future of the implementation of the START II Treaty, if the START III treaty is not concluded before 31 December 2003. Art. 4 mentions Section 5 of the Federal law “On International Treaties of the Russian Federation”, which permits, if necessary, Russia’s withdrawal from international treaties. In addition, Art. 4 contains six main provisions, which should be taken into account in the new agreement. The most important of these are:

– Strategic nuclear arms should be reduced to low levels guaranteeing strategic stability;
– Upload asymmetry should be eliminated;
– Counting rules of the weapons should correspond to their factual payload and all types and systems of strategic arms should be taken into account;
– A necessary field of manoeuvre should be preserved for Russian strategic modernisation programs.

The first provision, most likely, requires deeper reductions under the START III treaty than was required by the START II Treaty. The very fact, that Art. 4 does not mention ceilings of 2000–2500 warheads, agreed on by US and Russian presidents in Helsinki in March 1997, shows that the ratification resolution implicitly envisages even lower levels, although not so low as to undermine strategic stability. This provision becomes clearer if one bears in mind that in 1999 Moscow proposed to the USA to agree on START III ceilings of 1500 warheads. This level is considered optimal in Russian difficult economic conditions.

The last provision, very likely, indirectly suggests the removal of the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs from the new agreement. This ban makes the production of new systems, compensating for those reduced under the START II Treaty highly expensive.

The provision calling for taking into account all types and systems of strategic weapons, probably, refers to long-range SLCMs. They represent a traditional subject of concern for the Russian side, but have remained consistently outside the framework of bilateral strategic arms control agreements. This provision might be also interpreted as referring to the US FBS capable reaching targets located on the Russian territory.

Although Art. 4 can be interpreted very broadly, and many of its possible requirements cannot be realistically achieved in the course of practical talks, it does not, in contrast to Art. 9, contain any direct
prohibitions. This leaves the Executive with a considerable field of manoeuvring both when negotiating detailed provisions of a future agreement, and in case the START III treaty would not be concluded by the deadline mentioned in Art. 4.

Art. 2 specifies conditions, in which Russia could withdraw from the START II Treaty. Among these:

– US withdrawal from the START II or the ABM Treaties;
– Activities by the US or other countries and alliances, including NATO, which might threaten Russia’s security, especially, if nuclear weapons are deployed on the territories of new NATO member-states;
– A large scale nuclear build-up by a third party;
– Deployment of weapon systems threatening Russia’s early-warning capabilities.

Like Art. 4, Art. 2 is not mandatory, if necessary, the Executive could ignore it.

Other articles mention the responsibilities of the President, the Government and the FA. in respect of the implementation of the START II Treaty. Special mention is made of the need to provide sufficient funding of the SNF. By 1 October of each year, the Government must submit to the FA its annual report on the state of the implementation of the START II Treaty.3

The ratification law partially permitted the SD to take a greater part in monitoring the decision-making process of the implementation of the START II Treaty. Indeed, Art. 8 obliges the Government to submit its annual report on the treaty implementation in October. This links the report with the debates on the Federal budget for the coming year, which usually starts in autumn. In that period the Executive usually finds itself more dependent on the lawmakers, and vulnerable to pressures from the SD.

In addition to the ratification law, the SD adopted two non-binding resolutions. The first stated its position on reductions of the SNF. It suggested in particular possible countermeasures in the case the USA deploys nation-wide missile defences. The resolution also demands broader parliamentary participation in decision-making on key questions of nuclear security, including sending Duma representatives to the START III talks.

As a result of this resolution, in July 2000 the SD. established a Commission on the implementation of the START II, ABM and CTBT Treaties and on negotiating the START III treaty. The Commission is to co-operate with the federal executive agencies on questions of nuclear security, the preparation of international agreements on strategic arms

reductions and nuclear non-proliferation, as well as on the implementation of the relevant ratified agreements.

The second non-binding resolution explained the Duma’s position on maintaining the combat readiness of the SNF. The essence of the position is that Russian security depends not only on the START II Treaty, but also on the condition of the Armed Forces, defence industrial complex, and military science. In accordance with the resolution, the SD and the Government are to establish a mechanism, which would guarantee the modernisation of the Armed Forces, and their main resource – the officers and soldiers.

The process of ratification

The text of the bill on the START II Treaty ratification was elaborated as early as in November–December 1998 in the course of informal and tense consultations between the Duma fractions, committees and commissions, as well as representatives of the Executive. In mid-December 1998 the draft text of the bill was distributed among the deputies. The intensity of the debates around this document could be illustrated by the fact, that it was formally submitted not by a fraction or committee, but by two individual deputies – Vladimir Lukin and Roman Popkovich. At that time they held the positions of, respectively, chairmen of the SD Committees on international affairs and defence of the.

Most likely, the text of the draft bill was agreed inside the SD by 17 December 1998. It was expected that during the meeting of the Council of the SD scheduled for that date a procedural decision would be made to ask the President of the RF to submit the bill in its agreed version to the SD. However, the Anglo-American air strikes against Iraq, which started the same day, prevented the anticipated approval. Only in March 1999 discussions on the bill resumed and, after insignificant amendments, the Council of the SD adopted a decision on the procedure on 16 March. On 19 March, even before the bill was formally submitted to the SD, a plenary session of the Duma agreed on a date for its consideration – 2 April.

President Yeltsin formally submitted the ratification bill in its agreed version on 22 March 1999. Previously, ratification bills had been submitted to the Russian parliament three times – in 1993, 1995, and 1998. Two days later, on 24 March 1999, NATO started air strikes against Yugoslavia. The SD met in an emergency session on 27 March to protest against NATO bombing. Among countermeasures, it asked President Yeltsin to withdraw the ratification bill. However, the Executive continued to support the bill. On 27 March the Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov, in his address to the SD, noted that despite NATO air strikes he remained committed to the START II Treaty ratification, as a move in Russian interests. Nevertheless, he agreed that ratification would not be timely as long as air strikes continued. On his part, President Yeltsin ignored the Duma’s demand to withdraw the ratification bill.

During the G-8 summit held in June 1999 in Cologne (Germany) Yeltsin and Clinton, in a joint statement, expressed their firm intention to achieve completion of the START II Treaty ratification process. In that statement, Russia and the USA made some mutual concessions, aimed at resuming the strategic arms reduction process. These concessions partially helped to remove the damage inflicted by the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia to bilateral strategic arms control.

In order to increase the chances for ratification of the START II Treaty in Russia, Washington confirmed its willingness to hold new consultations on strategic arms control. These consultations would aimed at reducing the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and elaborating measures, which would guarantee irreversibility of deep strategic nuclear reductions. Presidents expressed their hope for the early achievement of substantial results in the course of the consultations.4

The Cologne Statement confirmed the commitment of both sides to the START II Treaty and reiterated their intention of ratifying the 1997 New York Agreements as soon as possible. Russia and the USA also agreed, in accordance with Art. XIII of the ABM Treaty, to consider possible changes in the strategic situation, which could affect the ABM Treaty, including potential proposals, aimed at more effective implementation of that document under new conditions.5

The Cologne Statement demonstrated readiness of both powers to continue the dialogue on strategic arms control during election campaigns in both countries. The START III treaty/ABM Treaty consultations permitted Moscow and Washington to save time needed for searching bilateral compromises, and, at the same time, delay negotiating agreements until political situation in Russia and the USA permits the ratification of old and the conclusion of new arms control treaties.

On 27 July 1999 during the Washington meeting between Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin and US Vice President Albert Gore, the parties reiterated their intention to intensify consultations on the START III treaty and to commence consultations on compliance with the

4 “Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and Further Strengthening of Stability”, the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 20, 1999, p. 2.
5 See note 4.
ABM Treaty. The consultations resumed in August 1999, but soon reached a deadlock.

As was anticipated, in the autumn of 1999 the START II Treaty was dropped from the list of priorities of the State Duma. This is explained by a number of factors. First, the SD election campaign started and its left-wing majority wanted to avoid accusations of co-operating with the unpopular president. Secondly, the relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated again because of the latter’s criticism of Russian military operations in Chechnya. Finally, intrusion of the Chechen terrorists into Dagestan and their unprecedented attacks in August-September diverted the attention of public opinion and decision-makers from issues of nuclear disarmament.

Only in December an attempt was made to use one of the last plenary sessions of the 2nd State Duma for the ratification of the START II Treaty. The Kremlin probably reckoned that the deputies – many of whom faced uncertain chances of re-election – would be more obliging and ratify the START II Treaty. On 13 December 1999 the SD planned to gather for an extraordinary plenary session to discuss the START II Treaty on the foundation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. On 8 December Secretary of the RF Security Council Sergey Ivanov, and Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, tried to convince the Council of the SD to include the question of the Treaty ratification in the agenda of the plenary meeting to be held on 13 December. However, the Council transferred the issue for the consideration to the SD Committees on international affairs, defence and security, responsible for the ratification the START II Treaty.

Discipline inside fractions, which opposed its ratification, was quite strong. The Committee on international affairs, where the majority belonged to members of left-wing and nationalistic factions, refused to include the ratification in the timetable of the 13 December plenary session. It only recommended that the 3rd State Duma should consider ratification of the START II Treaty at the earliest possible date.

After the parliamentary elections on 25 December the composition of the SD significantly changed. The pro-Kremlin Unity fraction and the People’s Deputy group control approximately 40 percent of the votes. Together with other fractions, like Yabloko, Union of the Right Forces and Fatherland-All Russia, the Kremlin could reasonably expect a majority of votes in favour of ratification. Only the Communists continued to oppose the START II Treaty, though their opposition was primarily motivated by electoral considerations.

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Already in late December and early January 2000 Vladimir Putin asked leaders of the new Duma to approve the START II Treaty. In February the SD Committee on international affairs completed preliminary review of the START II Treaty and decided to hold closed parliamentary hearings together with the SD Committees on defence and security. The hearings were scheduled for 21 March 2000. Most likely, the date of the hearings – just a few days before the presidential elections – was a compromise between advocates and opponents of the ratification. While the supporters wanted to complete the process as soon as possible, the opponents clearly attempted to minimise the importance of the hearings by scheduling them for a date when the attention of public and decision-makers would be primarily focused on the presidential election campaign.

On 21 March 2000 closed parliamentary hearings on the START II Treaty ratification were held in the building of the General Staff. Heads of interested federal agencies took part. Representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, as well as of other agencies, expressed their unanimous opinion in favour of the ratification of the START II Treaty, including its 1997 Extension Protocol, the MOUS and TMD Demarcation Agreement. They testified that the ratification of the START II Treaty, together with the 1997 New York agreements, would be in the national security interest of the RF, and strengthen strategic stability in the world. It was noted, that ratification would open the door to official American–Russian negotiations on further reductions of strategic nuclear arms under a new START III treaty.7

At the end of March, as the second stage of the hearings, the Executive arranged for the deputies to visit the General Staff and Command and Control Centre of the Strategic Rocker Forces (SRF). During these visits military experts briefed the lawmakers and answered their questions. The visits were organised as mini-parliamentary hearings and helped parliamentarians to understand better the nature of the ratification.

In early April opponents of the START II Treaty, mainly, from the Communist fraction, made another attempt to postpone ratification. As was expected, they argued that closed hearings took place at a time, when deputies were working in their constituencies outside Moscow: in the week before the presidential elections no SD plenary sessions were held. That is why, many Duma members were unable to attend the hearings. Opponents of ratification demanded new hearings.

However, the Communists’ defeat in the presidential elections further weakened the position of the START Treaty opponents in the

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7 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 22 March 2000.
The SD Council decided to consider ratification at the plenary meeting scheduled for 14 April. New closed hearings were scheduled for 13 April. The decision of the Council turned the hearings into simple formality, since the date of the ratification was already fixed.

The closed hearings took place in the Big Hall of the SD on Thursday, 13 April. Senior officials from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Atomic Energy, as well as other experts, testified. An unprecedented number of deputies participated at the hearings. As a result of the hearings, the earlier decision of the SD Council was endorsed and it was recommended to include the START II Treaty ratification in the agenda of the next plenary meeting to be held on Friday, 14 April.

On 14 April 2000 the Duma devoted almost the whole day to the START II Treaty ratification. At the request of Vladimir Putin, the meeting was closed. Opponents of the ratification from the Communist fraction, and partially – from the Agrarian-Industrial group asked the elected president to personally participate in the plenary meeting. The Duma supported this request and postponed the discussion till after the lunch break. President Putin arrived at the Duma premises in the afternoon and during the lunch break consulted with the SD leaders. Evidently, agreement was reached during these meetings, and the afternoon session presented no surprises.

During the plenary session, V. Putin took the floor. Highlighting the need to ratify the START II Treaty, he cited the conditions of ratification, set out in the ratification bill. Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs and other top officials also addressed the plenary session. There were few questions from the floor. The leaders of fractions and groups made statements after the vote. The Federal law “On Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” was passed by a considerable majority. 288 deputies voted “for”, 131 – “against” and 4 – abstained. Apart from Unity, People’s Deputy, Fatherland-All Russia, the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko, the document was supported by the Liberal Democrats. The Duma also adopted two resolutions on this issue.

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Ratification of the START II Treaty may help to break the deadlock in the American–Russian strategic arms control process. Russia fulfilled its part of the package agreed on by presidents of the two countries in Helsinki in March 1997 and formalised in the 1997 New York Agreements. At the same time, Washington failed to fulfil its part of the package. The situation requires initiatives from both parties. A possible
compromise could include a new START III treaty, which would correct the deficiencies of the START II Treaty. The Russian side is interested in this correction. On the other hand, measures might be agreed, which would help the USA to achieve its objective of countering the threat of a missile attack from states possessing small nuclear and missile capabilities, while maintaining the credibility of Russia’s deterrent.

Appendix 11A


Passed by the State Duma on 14 April 2000.
Approved by the Federation Council on 19 April 2000.

Article 1
To ratify the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the START II Treaty, including its integral parts:

Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bombers Data Relating to the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, done at Moscow on January 3, 1993;

Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, done at Moscow on January 3, 1993;


Article 2
Extraordinary events giving the Russian Federation the right to withdraw from the Treaty in exercising its national sovereignty and in compliance with Article VI of the START II Treaty shall be:

1) breach of the START II Treaty on the part of the United States of America, which jeopardises the national security of the Russian Federation;

2) the United States of America’s withdrawal from the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the ABM Treaty, or the infringement of the aforesaid Treaty and respective agreements;

3) build-up of strategic offensive arms of the states that are not parties to the START II Treaty in a way that poses a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation;
4) taking and implementation by the United States of America, or any other state whatsoever, or alliances, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation among them, of decisions in the field of military development, which threaten the national security of the Russian Federation, including deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the states having joined NATO after the date of the START II Treaty signature;

5) deployment by the United States of America or any other state whatsoever of armaments, preventing the normal functioning of the Russian system of early warning of missile attack;

6) extraordinary events of economic or technical origin, which make it impossible for the Russian Federation to fulfil its obligations under the START II Treaty or jeopardise the environmental security of the Russian Federation.

1. In case of extraordinary events, provided for in Article I of this Federal Law or in any other extraordinary situation whatsoever, jeopardising the supreme interests of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian Federation shall:

   a) take political, diplomatic and other measures in order to eliminate the aforesaid threats or neutralise their consequences;

   b) provide for immediate consultations with the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and, taking into account the results of these consultations, take decisions relating to the START II Treaty, including introduction of motions under the Federal law "On International Treaties of the Russian Federation".

2. The Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, if they consider events to be extraordinary and subject to the immediate action under Article VI of the START II Treaty, shall address the President of the Russian Federation with a proposal to begin consultations, advise him or undertake any other steps, provided for in the Federal Law "On International Treaties of the Russian Federation".

Article 4

The President of the Russian Federation shall hold consultations with the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and, taking into account the results of these consultations, take decisions relating to the START II Treaty, including the introduction of motions under Section V of the Federal Law "On International Treaties of the Russian Federation", if no later than December 31, 2003 the Parties conclude a new Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which shall:

1) envisage the preservation and further enhancement of strategic stability at the lowest possible levels of strategic offensive arms of the Russian Federation and the United States of America;

2) enable the Russian Federation to apply multifarious approaches to the development of its strategic nuclear forces, including their organisation and structure, necessary to maintain national security of the Russian Federation with regard for existing economic situation;

3) exclude the possibility of rapid increase in the number of nuclear warheads attributed to all types on launchers;

4) provide for equal rights and opportunities for the Parties in the process of elimination and disposal of nuclear warheads;

5) secure the optimal economic use of the existing infrastructure of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, essential cost reduction for the implementation of the programs of elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms, and broadening of the Russian capabilities to use the reduced components of the aforesaid arms and their infrastructure in the interests of national economic development.

6) provide for accounting of all types and systems of strategic arms.
Article 5
The obligations under the START II Treaty shall be fulfilled on the basis of:
1) preservation of the might of Russian strategic nuclear forces, at a level, which provides for the maintenance of national security of the Russian Federation;
2) appropriate financing of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and of the work on safe elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms;
3) the United States of America’s compliance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START II Treaty;
4) reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the Russian Federation, provided for in the START II Treaty, taking into account their period of operation;
5) maintenance of combat readiness of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, irrespective of any development of strategic situation, preservation of laboratory and experimental base and production capabilities;
6) providing for the safe use, storage, elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms;
7) equal rights and opportunities for the Parties of the START II Treaty in carrying out inspections and other verification procedures; preservation and improvement of the Russian Federation’s national technical means of verification in order to observe the United States of America’s fulfilment of the START I and the START II Treaties, and the ABM Treaty.

Article 6
The Russian Federation fulfils its obligations, provided for in the START II Treaty, in compliance with this Federal Law and other legal documents of the Russian Federation regulating measures and procedures relating to the implementation of the START II Treaty.

Financing of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation as well as of the production, use, elimination and disposal of nuclear weapons is carried out in compliance with the federal legislation.

The President of the Russian Federation shall approve the Federal Program of Development of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation and submit it to the Chambers of the Federal Assembly no later than two months after entry into force of this Federal law.

No later than three months after entry into force of this Federal law, the Government of the Russian Federation shall work out and submit to the President of the Russian Federation the Special Federal Program for Elimination and Disposal of Weapons and Materiel of Strategic Nuclear Forces, subject to his approval and providing for use of reduced components and infrastructure in the interests of national economic development.

Article 7
In the process of implementing the START II Treaty:
I. The President of the Russian Federation shall:
a) determine the principal directions of the state policy in the field of development of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and nuclear disarmament; define procedures and deadlines for the activities in fulfilling the START II Treaty, which imply preservation of the Russian strategic nuclear forces’ potential and maintenance of their combat readiness at a level, providing for guaranteed deterrence from aggression against the Russian Federation or its allies;
b) take decisions on the terms and procedures of decommissioning and deactivation of strategic offensive arms, provided for in the START II Treaty, and on commissioning of the new models of strategic offensive arms;

c) formulate the Russian policy for further international negotiations in the field of strategic offensive arms and anti-missile defence, hold consultations and discussions with the heads of other states desiring to enhance strategic stability and maintain the national security of the Russian Federation.

2. The Government of the Russian Federation shall:

a) provide for stable and primary financing of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, of the work on safe elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms, and of activities in carrying out the obligations under the START I and START II Treaties, in compliance with the federal legislation and special federal programs;

b) ensure the preservation and development of the laboratory and experimental base and production capabilities, required to maintain the nuclear might and combat readiness of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation;

c) submit to the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation a regular report on the state of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and on the course on the implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, and the ABM Treaty, as provided for in the Article 8 this Federal Law;

d) submit to the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation the data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bombers Data Relating to the START II Treaty;

e) secure the effective use of national technical means of verification under the START I and START II Treaties, and the ABM Treaty, the technical improvement of the aforesaid means and fulfilment of verification procedures, for in the above-mentioned treaties.

f) take measures to ensure the safe use, storage, elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms, nuclear warheads and rocket fuel, and to exclude unauthorised access to nuclear warheads;

g) take measures to use optimal economic methods and means of elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms;

h) implement, on the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation, foreign policy decisions in the field of reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

i) invite the representatives of the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to participate, if they so wish, in discussing the course of negotiations in the field of strategic offensive arms and anti-missile defence.

3. The Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation shall:

a) in considering the annual federal bill on the federal budget, participate in taking decisions on the amount of allocations for the purpose of scientific research and experiments in the field of strategic offensive arms, of their purchase, of the development, repairs and modernisation of major bases for the Russian strategic nuclear forces and their managing, as well as of the work on safe elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms and activities to implement the START I and the START II Treaties;

b) take part in elaborating federal laws and special federal programs, pass federal laws, required to maintain strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation at the level providing for national security of the Russian Federation, and carry out activities in the field of reduction of nuclear arms;

c) consider the annual report of the Government of the Russian Federation on the state of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the course of implementation of the START I and the START II Treaties, and the ABM Treaty, and take decisions as appropriate;
d) charge, as is deemed necessary, the Board of Auditors of the Russian Federation with the mission to audit the spending of the financial means allocated for the implementation of the START I and the START II Treaties;

e) if necessary, take measures provided for in Section V of the Federal law “On International Treaties of the Russian Federation”.

Article 8
After entry into force of the START II Treaty, and no later than October 1, each year, the Government of the Russian Federation shall send to the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation a report on the state of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and on the course of the implementation of the START I and START II Treaties, and the ABM Treaty, which shall include the following information:

1) the changes in the organisation and structure of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, financial provisions and the results of the completed work on maintaining their potential and combat readiness;

2) the fulfilment on the part of the Russian Federation and the United States of America of the obligations set out in the START I and START II Treaties, and the ABM Treaty;

3) the course of elimination and disposal of decommissioned strategic offensive arms of the Russian Federation, the state of financing of activities under the START I and the START II Treaties, including the use of foreign assistance;

4) environmental conditions in the locations of storage, elimination and disposal of strategic offensive arms, above all nuclear warheads and rocket fuel;

5) the course of negotiations on elaborating new agreements in the field of reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and anti-missile defence;

6) the state of development of projects in the field of strategic offensive arms and anti-missile defence, the situation regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the United States of America and any other state or alliance whatsoever.

Article 9

Article 10
This Federal Law shall enter into force upon the date of its official publication.
On 21 April 2000, the State Duma (SD) ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It was signed by Russia on 24 September 1996 and submitted to the SD for ratification by the President of the RF on 20 November 1999.

Russia took an active part in the elaboration of the CTBT and exercises considerable influence on the activities of the international mechanisms set up within its framework.

The CTBT combined with the START II Treaty and Memorandum of Understanding on Succession (MOUS) will contribute to strengthening Russia’s international position in the sphere of arms control and disarmament and the consolidation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and enable Russia to follow a more effective foreign policy course.

The debate in the SD was very lively. Its three Committees (on international affairs, defence and security) held hearings during which both the positive and negative aspects of the ratification of the CTBT were noted.

The following aspects were considered positive:

– Strengthening of Russia’s international positions, including its relations with other NWS as well as advocates of radical nuclear disarmament among the non-CTBT states;

– Ratification by Russia of the CTBT will be welcomed by the international community, and speed up the accession of all nuclear and so-called “threshold” countries to this treaty and its entry into force;

– The possibility of carrying out further work on the maintenance of Russian nuclear stockpiles in reliable and safe conditions and their production, provided an appropriate experimental-modelling facility is set up;

– The possibility of Russia withdrawing from the CTBT in case the highest national interests of the state are threatened.

On the other hand, concern was expressed about possible negative consequences:
– The need to maintain the combat readiness, reliability and safety of the Russian nuclear arsenal at a level which ensures national security, bearing in mind its present economic and financial situation;
– The need to build new experimental-modelling facilities for refining nuclear warheads, which may require considerable expenditure;
– The probability that doubts may arise as to the reliability and safety of the nuclear arsenal during the carrying out of these tasks, which would threaten the supreme national interests.

Ratification of the CTBT should provide, therefore, for measures to overcome the negative results, which may occur in the course of the implementation of this international agreement.

It should also be borne in mind that, on 13 December 1999, the US Senate rejected the CTBT, while China is in the process of preparing for its ratification. France and Great Britain have ratified the CTBT already, while de-facto nuclear states – India and Pakistan – have not signed it and neither has the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.

The RF has not carried out any nuclear tests since October 1990. Under the CTBT regime Russia would need to carry out work on maintaining its nuclear stockpile in a reliable and safe condition and its reproduction by the setting up of a corresponding experimental-modelling base. It should include necessary main components, such as a powerful laser installation for the purpose of physical modelling the processes, which occur in a nuclear explosion; multi-sequence X-ray installations with a large radiation dose in order to study the qualities and behaviour of materials under very heavy pressure; a super-computer of very high productivity (the so-called teraflop class) in order to carry out digital modelling with the help of three-dimensional calculations to ensure the reliability and safety of the nuclear arsenal in the absence of nuclear test explosions.

The absence of full-scale tests requires additional expenditure on the development of fundamental and applied research. Cost of the maintenance of the operational readiness of the Central test-site of the RF should be also taken into consideration.

In the view of the Russian Government, the total expenditure on these tasks, is estimated at $1.4 billion in 2000–2010, as is envisaged in the program Development of the Nuclear Arms Complex of the Russian Federation for 1998–2005 and the armaments program for 2000–2010.

It should not be forgotten that adherence to the existing moratorium on nuclear testing requires the same expenditure on providing for the effectiveness, safety and maintenance of the nuclear arsenal as when the CTBT will have entered into force.
A broad range of measures connected with the need to prepare the RF for the CTBT entry into force, including the verification of compliance with its provisions is undertaken in Russia.

In accordance with the CTBT, Russia should house on its territory 31 stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS): 6 seismic stations of the main network (working in a regime of uninterrupted transmission of seismic data), 13 seismic stations of the auxiliary network (data are to be transmitted at the request of the International Data Centre), 4 infra-sound and 8 radio-nucleic stations as well as one certified radio-nucleic laboratory.

The places of their location has been chosen by taking into account their link to the appropriate observation points of the special control service of the MOD (23 stations) and 8 seismic stations of the auxiliary network of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The approximate cost of the above stations amounts to about $18 million.

After the stations and the equipment installed in them have been put into operation, they will become the property of the RF. Russia’s adherence to the CTBT will make it necessary for it to take part in the building and functioning of the Russian segment of the Global Communication System of the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) (about $4 million) and a National Data Centre (about $2 million). It is necessitated by the importance of providing effective monitoring control of the transmitted information, the comprehensive use of the data provided by the IMS in Russia’s national interests, the prevention of unauthorised access to Russian technology as well as accumulating revenue on the Russian territory.

This money is envisaged in the Federal special program Development of the Nuclear Arms Complex of the Russian Federation for 1990–2005.

The CTBT organisation (CTBTO) will provide about $18 million for building and modernising the IMS stations and about $2.2 million (in the course of 10 years) for compensation payments to the Russian side for the use of the communication sub-system.

It is necessary to make reliable financial provisions for the activities connected with the CTBT since severe sanctions are envisaged, within the CTBTO framework and the UN (including the Security Council), against those states which do not comply with their treaty obligations. That is why, when examining the Federal budget in the SD, close co-operation between the legislators and the Government when discussing and adopting the corresponding items of the budget is required.
In the period from 1997 to 2000, a great deal of work was done within the framework of the Preparatory Committee of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Organisation to start the process for the entry into force of the CTBT. The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Committee of the CTBTO, working groups A (on budget and administrative questions) and B (on questions of CTBT monitoring) were set up. A scale of contributions by the states, which signed the CTBT and the budgets of the Preparatory Committee for 1997–2000 were adopted. Work started on the building of the IMS, the IDC, the infrastructure of the communication system and the equipment for on-site inspections. Equipment requirements and the location of IMS stations were agreed on. Work on the elaboration of guidance documents was started and a number of other questions dealt with.

In October 1999 the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT was held. The budget of the Preparatory Committee of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Organisation for 1999, amounted to $74.7 million, and for 2000, to $79.9 million.

Russia’s contribution in 1999, amounted to $995.9 thousand (1.5%) and, for 2000 (tentatively) to $861 851 (1.1%). On the whole, starting in 1997, Russia’s contributions to the Preparatory Committee of the CTBTO amounted in all to about $3.7 million. At the same time, more than $7 million have already been allocated in the CTBTO budget, to the building of the Russian segment of the mechanism for verifying compliance with the CTBT.

Appendix 12A


Passed by the SD on 27 April 2000.
Approved by the FC on 17 May 2000.

Article 1
To ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed on behalf of the Russian Federation at New York on 24 September 1996 (further on – the Treaty).

Article 2
The implementation of the Treaty is carried out on the basis of the following:
1) maintenance of the operational readiness, reliability and safety of the nuclear arsenal of the Russian Federation at a level ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation;
2) maintenance of the federal nuclear centres, enterprises and organisations which are included in the nuclear weapon complex of the Russian Federation, and realisation of the programs in the field of theoretical and applied research and technological development for the purpose of ensuring necessary scientific and technical and industrial potential in the field of nuclear weapon, the experimental – test base, skill level of scientists, designers, workers, civil servants and other experts engaged in the nuclear weapon complex of the Russian Federation, as well as an adequate level of their social security;

3) preservation and development of nuclear weapon technologies at all stages of the development and production of nuclear charges and nuclear ammunition, modernisation of the technical base of the nuclear weapon complex of the Russian Federation;

4) maintenance of the base potential for possible resumption of nuclear testing in case of the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty; maintenance in readiness for large scale testing of the Central range of the Russian Federation and its adaptation to carrying out work on nuclear charges and ammunition, not prohibited by the Treaty;

5) the enhancement of the capabilities of the national system of monitoring nuclear tests outside the Russian Federation;

6) further perfection of informational and analytical means, including reconnaissance, to ensure receiving reliable and timely information on nuclear arsenals, possible covert developments of nuclear armaments and other activities of other states, important for the purpose of nuclear weapon;

7) guaranteed and priority financing of the state programs on the maintenance of the nuclear weapon complex of the Russian Federation, perfection of the national system of monitoring nuclear tests outside the Russian Federation, as well as other work and measures related to the implementation of the Treaty, including provisions for the creation and functioning of the Russian segment of the Global Communication Infrastructure under the Treaty and of the National Data Centre.

Article 3

During the implementation of the Treaty:

1. The President of the Russian Federation shall:
   exercise state regulation of activities in the field of ensuring the maintenance of the nuclear arsenal of the Russian Federation, reliability and safety of the nuclear weapon;
   approve the structure of the state administration of activities in the field of nuclear weapon;
   approve federal programs in the field of nuclear weapon and control of nuclear tests;
   take other necessary decisions related to the implementation of the Treaty.

2. The Government of the Russian Federation shall:
   supervise the development of the appropriate programs of work on ensuring the maintenance of the nuclear arsenal of the Russian Federation, the reliability and safety of nuclear weapon, as well as work and measures related to the perfection of the national system of monitoring nuclear tests outside the Russian Federation and the compliance of the Russian Federation with the Treaty obligations, and ensure guaranteed and priority financing of these programs, work and measures;
   determine the functions of the federal bodies of the executive authority in implementing the Treaty;
   take within the limits of its competence decisions on signing agreements with the authorised bodies of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (until the
entry of the Treaty into force – with the Preparatory Committee) on questions related to
the creation and functioning on the territory of the Russian Federation of the infrastructure
of the International Monitoring System, and also, if necessary, on other questions of the
interaction with the Treaty Organisation, related to its implementation;
nominate or establish a National body on the Treaty;
submit to the President of the Russian Federation an annual report on the state of
the reliability and safety of the nuclear stockpile and the capabilities of the Russian
Federation on the reproduction of nuclear warheads without carrying out large-scale
nuclear tests;
elaborate and ensure the implementation of a complex of measures on the
protection of information during the realisation of the Treaty;
implement the yearly contribution of the Russian Federation into the budget of
the Organisation on the Treaty;
carry out on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation external political
measures related to the implementation of the Treaty.
3. The Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation shall:
participate – during the annual examination of the draft Federal budget – in
taking decisions on the volume of financing the measures required for the implementation
of the Treaty;
participate in the elaboration of federal bills, pass federal laws, required for
carrying out the obligations of the Russian Federation,
consider annual information of the Government of the Russian Federation
submitted in accordance with Article 5 of the present Federal Law, and take appropriate
decisions;
if necessary take measures, stipulated by section V of the Federal law on the
international treaties of the Russian Federation.

Article 4
Prior to the entry of the Treaty into force, the Preparatory Committee,
established for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its personnel and the delegates of the states, which
have signed the Treaty, enjoy in the territory of the Russian Federation, accordingly, such
rights, privileges and immunities, which are necessary for the realisation by the
Preparatory committee of its functions, as well as such privileges and immunities, as are
necessary for the independent realisation by the said personnel and delegates of their
functions in connection with the Preparatory Committee.

Article 5
One year after the entry into force of the Treaty and from there on annually, the
Government of the Russian Federation shall submit to the Chambers of the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation information on the following questions:
compliance of the Russian Federation with the Treaty obligations;
the state of the national system of monitoring nuclear tests outside the Russian
Federation;
the activity of the Treaty Organisation and the participation of the Russian
Federation in the activity of this Organisation;
compliance of other states parties with their Treaty obligations;
the course of realisation of the program of development of nuclear weapon
complex of the Russian Federation.
Article 6
1. Under the exceptional circumstances related to the contents of the Treaty, which jeopardise the supreme interests of the Russian Federation, and which give, according to the article IX of the Treaty, the right to the Russian Federation, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, to withdraw from the Treaty, the President of the Russian Federation:
   - take political, diplomatic and other measures for the purpose of correcting these exceptional circumstances or neutralising their consequences;
   - ensure holding immediate consultations with the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and taking into account such consultations adopt decisions concerning the Treaty and, if necessary, submits proposals, stipulated by the Federal law on the international treaties of the Russian Federation”.
2. Each of the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, if it considers, that circumstances have emerged, which belong to the category of exceptional in the sense of the article IX of the Treaty, shall propose to the President of the Russian Federation to hold consultations and submit its recommendations or take other actions, stipulated by the Federal law on the international treaties of the Russian Federation”.

Article 7
In case of the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty, nuclear tests are carried out under the mandate of the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 8
The present Federal Law enters onto force from the date of its official publication.
13. CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES

Alexandre PIKAYEV

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery vehicles represents an important national security priority of the Russian Federation. Establishing and developing international non-proliferation regimes has become an important element of preserving Russia’s status on the world arena, and has helped to achieve a number of key national security and foreign policy goals.

Particularly, four main areas, where the above mentioned regimes have contributed to the promotion of national interests, should be mentioned. The regimes:

– have become important elements in developing co-operation both with the West and a number of the Third World nations after the end of the Cold War;
– have facilitated the joining of various privileged clubs of developed states;
– have prevented nuclearisation of some key states;
– have helped to withdraw nuclear weapons from territories of new independent states.

Contrary to traditional arms control, co-operation in the non-proliferation field represents a much more efficient tool for developing partner relationship in the post-confrontational era. Indeed, arms control regulates interaction between potential adversaries by establishing common rules of behaviour, a more stable balance of forces as well as through providing enhanced transparency of military activities. It relies to a considerable extent on quantitative calculations of weapons levels and imposes their binding, semi-binding or non binding limitations in order to assure the other side of the diminishing risk of a surprise attack or rapid crisis escalation to a level of armed conflict.

However, after the end of the Cold War, traditional arms control criteria, as well as some of its goals, have become obsolete. In the absence of confrontation between states such notions as levels of arms and armed forces, their approximate quantitative parity, are becoming less and less relevant. If the states do not consider each other as enemies, they, by definition, lose interest in regulating their military activities by traditional arms control instruments. Moreover, in the transitional period from confrontation to co-operation, when changes have not become irreversible

yet, automatic continuation of arms control might create the risk of a continuous reproduction of Cold War paradigms. Certainly, this negatively affects the overall relationship and even, in the absence of mutual restraint, could lead to recidivism of confrontation.

Under those circumstances, non-proliferation plays a stabilising role. In the majority of the existing regimes former Cold War adversaries generally share common goals and are interested in co-operating with each other. This interest objectively establishes co-operative relationship and, in favourable conditions, gradually expands co-operative segments of post-confrontational relations.

Co-operation in the non-proliferation area can be divided into two parts: domestic and international. Internationally, both the West and Russia want to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies not only among the Third World nations, but among the developed states as well. In 1995 Moscow actively assisted the USA and its allies in steps aimed at indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – a cornerstone of the overall non-proliferation regime. In 1998, together with the other G-8 powers and China, the RF criticised Indian nuclear tests. It was a difficult decision, taking into account the close relations existing between Moscow and New Delhi.

“Domestic” co-operation in the non-proliferation area represents more complicated phenomena. In the 1990s, doubts in the inability of the Russian federal authorities to adequately fund the physical protection and dismantling of nuclear weapons and materials, as well as to develop modern accounting and control systems caused considerable concern in the West about the risk of their unauthorised use, or proliferation to “rogue states” or terrorist groups. This induced Russia to accept international assistance in this field, which was accompanied by quite intrusive US penetration of Russian nuclear facilities.

On the other hand, the positive side of “domestic” co-operation can be seen in the fact, that as a result of implementing various assistance programs, the level of transparency of both Russia’s and the US nuclear complexes has significantly increased. Under Moscow’s pressure, Washington had to agree to accept reciprocal access of Russian inspectors to its facilities. This transparency contributes to a gradual retreat from the assured mutual destruction strategy in American-Russian nuclear relations.

Recently, it became clearer, that the consolidation and even preservation of the non-proliferation regimes is becoming increasingly difficult. This due to:

– the discriminatory character of nuclear and missile non-proliferation regimes;
– the undermining of nuclear non-proliferation norms by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests conducted in May 1998;
– the erosion of the MTCR as a result of the emergence of a group of states, possessing missile technologies and remaining outside the MTCR (India, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea);
– the general deterioration of American–Russian relations and the different level of priority given to asymmetry in position of the non-proliferation in the scale of the national security interests of both powers.

As mentioned above, the NPT, which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, is a cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. Together with the United States and the United Kingdom, Russia is a depository of the NPT. In 1995 during the NPT Review and Extension Conference, it was extended for an indefinite time. According to the NPT, only countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 are recognised as nuclear weapon states (NWS). All other countries are legally considered as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Although a number of “threshold” states have remained outside the NPT, under the NPT regime they can join it only as NNWS.

Therefore, the NPT has divided all countries into two unequal groups – nuclear and non-nuclear, which has led to accusations from a number of states that it is discriminatory in nature. As a result, many influential Third World nations refrained from joining the NPT. Although their number is gradually decreasing, India, Pakistan, Israel, Cuba and, de facto, North Korea still remain outside the NPT.

The MTCR is even more discriminatory. It was established by the then G-7 in 1987 with the aim of preventing deliveries of missiles and their technologies to some Third World states, which caused concern in respect of proliferation. Gradually, the number of MTCR member states increased. First, more Western countries joined it and later – Hungary, Argentina, South Africa, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Ukraine. At present, there are more than 30 MTCR member states. Besides, Israel and China have signed bilateral memoranda with the United States, in accordance with which they have assumed obligation to follow the MTCR guidelines.

In fact, the MTCR prohibits export to non-member states of missiles with a range of more than 300 km and a payload of over 500 kg and relevant technologies. Unlike the NPT, the MTCR is not a legally binding agreement. In fact, it is not a legal instrument. The MTCR member states voluntarily agreed to prohibit or limit export of missile technology in accordance with their national export control lists, which must be compatible with the MTCR guidelines. During regular meetings (usually twice a year), member states may accept additional restrictions on their export to countries, which cause concern in respect of proliferation. These restrictions could include obligations not to co-
operate with organisations, placed on ‘black lists’ – even in non-missile fields. Reportedly, the Iranian SANAM state-owned company is placed on such a list.

As an informal club, the MTCR does not possess an international body monitoring compliance with it.¹ In practice, this leads to discrimination against some member states. As the most powerful member, the USA, in fact, usurped the role of a monitoring agency and on several occasions pressed other states parties to cancel contracts signed with non-MTCR nations. For instance, in the late 1980s Washington successfully forced France to cancel a deal with Brazil, which later joined the MTCR. Russia faced the strongest pressure. Even before it join the MTCR, the United States imposed sanctions against Glavkosmos for its contract to deliver liquid cryogen boosters to India. Later Moscow was accused of allegedly illegal missile co-operation with Brazil (which adhered to the MRCR at the same time as Russia), Syria, and, especially, Iran.

The USA capitalises on the absence of an international monitoring agency. Thus, they accused several Russian missile enterprises of illegal co-operation with Iran on the basis of intelligence data about contacts between Russian industrialists and the Iranians. However, neither the MTCR, nor Russian domestic laws prohibit contacts, negotiations and even the signing of contracts in the missile field. They only require that an appropriate governmental agency should be approached by an enterprise for an export license. The agency may refuse the application, if the contract covers missiles and their technologies on the Russian export control lists in respect of MTCR non-members. The authorities must also prevent the illegal export of such technologies.

Referring to the secret nature of the information, the United States often refuse to provide the Russian side with any details of supposedly illegal activities. This leads to accusations and even sanctions, which Moscow considers unjustified. Moreover, Washington uses intelligence data from Israel – the country, which is not a MTCR member and which has a dubious proliferation record.

While in relations with Russia the USA follows a broad interpretation of the MTCR restrictive rules, they sometimes do not pay sufficient attention to the concerns of member states. Thus, after joining the MTCR, Moscow expressed concern in respect of the US-Turkish missile co-operation. Initially, the United States dismissed this concern, but later contributed to Turkey’s adherence to the MTCR. In another case, in 1994–95, Washington objected to the Russian-Brazilian missile co-operation, although it was already known that both countries would soon

¹ Formally, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as a point of contact for the MTCR.
become members of the MTCR.

In May 1998 the NPT regime faced an unexpected and serious challenge. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and became de facto NWS. One more country – Israel – does not acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons, but does not deny it either.

Although both New Delhi and Islamabad have not formally violated their treaty commitments, Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests seriously challenged the universality and credibility of the NPT regime. Both countries refused to join the NPT as NNWS. At the same time, their recognition as NWS would have created an undesirable precedent for other nations – both NPT non-members (Israel, Cuba, and partially, North Korea), and member states (Iran and, probably, Japan as a reaction to possible nuclearisation of North Korea). Apart from this, formalising the NWS status of India and Pakistan would require a change of some of the NPT provisions. Such a revision of the NPT might have affected the multilateral consensus on the indefinite extension of the NPT, which was achieved with so much difficulty in 1995. Furthermore, negotiations on modifying the treaty provisions might present a suitable occasion for some countries to withdraw from the NPT, or apply for a NWS status. Finally, for many Third World nations the negotiations might provide a unique opportunity to advance their other objectives, including some demands, unrelated to nuclear non-proliferation.

The US unilateralist approach to nuclear non-proliferation represents another tangible problem for the NPT regime. This is especially apparent in Washington’s attitude towards the development of peaceful nuclear energy in some NPT member states that maintain uneasy relations with the USA. For example, Washington desires to prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran. Through pressure on allies it obtained the refusal of the Western European countries to co-operate with Tehran in the area of nuclear energy. Similarly strong pressure is put on China as well, which had to promise the US to halt its co-operation with Iran in nuclear field. Only Russia, despite strong US objections, agreed to complete the construction of a commercial reactor in Bushehr, which was started by Siemens in the seventies.

It should be noted that putting obstacles in the way of developing peaceful use of nuclear energy by NNWS-parties to the NPT violates Art. 4 of the NPT. This article directly obliges NWS to assist the NNWS in this area. In fact, Art. 4 represents a key component of the basic deal behind the NPT, which presupposes agreement of non-nuclear countries to forgo acquiring nuclear weapons.

While objecting to Russian assistance in the building of a light water reactor for the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant, the United States, together with South Korea, Japan and Western European countries
are assisting and financing the delivery of a similar reactor to North Korea – the country, which is accused of being in incompliance with the NPT. North Korea continues to refuse to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards. Washington and its allies are, in this case, violating the regulations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), prohibiting deliveries of nuclear technologies and materials to a country, which does not accept the IAEA safeguards.

The 1998 became a difficult year for the MTCR, as well. Missile tests by Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan put in doubt its credibility. A group of states has emerged outside the MTCR, which possess national missile capabilities and technologies, and which are not restricted by any obligations not to proliferate them. For some of these countries, particularly North Korea, missile-related export has become a significant source of income. According to the US data, that this export provides Pyongyang with revenue of approximately $100 million annually.

It should be noted that the MTCR member states have failed so far to formulate their response to the new challenges. The United States increased pressure on Russia with the aim of further restricting its cooperation with Iran. At the same time, Washington adopted a co-operative approach towards such ‘near MTCR’ countries, as Ukraine and China. As early as 1994, Kiev signed a bilateral memorandum with the United States, agreeing to follow the MTCR criteria and guidelines. However, the US objected to full Ukrainian membership of the MTCR.

Under US policy, no country, except Russia and China, can adhere to the MTCR without renouncing the possession of missiles with a range exceeding 300 km (probably, this condition has prevented several Central European countries – former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation – from joining the MTCR as well). According to the INF Treaty, Ukraine cannot possess missiles with a range of between 500 and 5000 km. Kiev wanted to keep missiles with the range between 300 and 500 km. It was also worried about the future of its unique missile producing enterprises, which previously produced ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 5000 km. The Ukrainians wanted to continue to operate them for making boosters for satellite launches, and thus to maintain the status of a missile power.

After 1998 North Korean and Iranian missile tests, Washington decided to make an exception. Under US pressure Kiev withdrew from a relatively big contract with Russia for delivering turbines from Kharkiv to

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2 Only in October 2000 during the MTCR meeting in Helsinki a decision was taken to establish a code of conduct for non-members. According to the proposal, states joining the code of conduct might enjoy satellite launches by a member-country at discount rates in exchange for their prior notification of planned missile launches.
the Bushehr nuclear power plant. As a reward, in the fall of 1998 Ukraine was finally recruited to the MTCR.

After the USA removed domestic restrictions on cooperation with China in the area of nuclear energy and the aerospace industry, negotiation on China’s adherence to the MTCR were also resumed. It was expected that the talks would be successfully completed in 1999. However, in March 1999 the negotiations were complicated by US refusal to deliver a satellite to the China.\(^3\)

Deteriorating American–Russian relations also directly affect international non-proliferation regimes, and complicate co-ordinated actions aimed at preventing proliferation. In 1998 India quite effectively capitalised on disagreements existing between Moscow and Washington and prevented co-ordinated pressure from the international community in response to its nuclear tests. Despite the fact that Russia, together with other G-8 powers and China criticised Indian tests, it far from restricting its military co-operation with New Delhi, expanded it. Some Russian experts even expressed the opinion, that Indian accession to the nuclear club did not contradict Moscow strategy aimed at building a multipolar world. It is interesting, that India was ready to conduct nuclear tests as early as 1995, but decided not to do this at the time. Probably, this restraint may be partially explained by the better relations, which existed between Moscow and Washington in the mid-1990s.

In the present situation Russian diplomacy faces favourable conditions for capitalising on Russia’s role in maintaining international non-proliferation regimes thus obtaining benefits in other important areas.

Efforts are made aimed at partially involving India and Pakistan in the Nuclear non-proliferation regime. The accent is put on their signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and, in the future, a convention, prohibiting production of weapon-grade nuclear materials. Indian, Pakistani and Israeli adherence to the CTBT would have helped to include for the first time all the three de-facto NWS into legally binding nuclear non-proliferation regimes. It would make the CTBT even more universal, than the NPT. Furthermore, membership in the CTBT would impose certain technical restrictions on developing nuclear arsenals of these states. This is especially true for Pakistan, which, unlike India and Israel, lacks computer technology necessary for simulating nuclear tests.

Finally, the CTBT could become an argument permitting nuclear powers to demonstrate their commitment to their obligations under Art. 6

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\(^3\) In May 1999, after the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was destroyed during the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, the talks were halted. As of early 2001 prospects for Chinese adherence to the MTCR remain unclear.
of the NPT, reiterated at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Even in the absence of progress in the American–Russian strategic arms reductions since the previous Review Conference held in 1995, the entry into force of the CTBT would symbolise a real breakthrough in multilateral nuclear arms control. Successful consultations at the CD in Geneva on a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) could become the next, even more important move towards restricting nuclear arsenals. The CTBT’s entry into force might help to promote the fissile material cut-off process, as well.

Possible Chinese accession to the MTCR would open new opportunities for diplomatic efforts aimed at establishing an independent international body to monitor compliance with the MTCR. This body could significantly limit US claims for becoming the sole guarantor of compliance with the MTCR and their ability to raise unjustified objections to the activities of other member states. The international organisation would also help to solve the problem of Washington ignoring other member states’ concerns about US missile exports.

Moscow could also be more active in lobbying for further enlargement of the MTCR membership by the accession of other missile states, like India, Pakistan, Israel and, perhaps, North Korea. In fact, including in the MTCR those states, which possess missile technologies, would represent the most efficient way of preventing further missile proliferation by non-member states. The more universal the MTCR, the wider the field of manoeuvre Russian diplomacy would enjoy inside this regime and the more difficult it would be for the USA to dominate there.

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4 After a seven-year delay, Russia finally ratified the START II Treaty in April 2000. However, the Federal law on the ratification contains a provision prohibiting the Treaty from entering into force until the US Senate ratifies the START II Extension Protocol and the ABM Treaty Succession Memorandum (MOUS). The Senate indicated its unwillingness to ratify anything linked with the ABM Treaty.

5 The chances for the CTBT entering into force were significantly diminished by a refusal of the US Senate to ratify it. China and Israel used this as a pretext for their own inaction and, as of early 2001, failed to ratify the Treaty. India and Pakistan followed suit and refrained from signing the CTBT. Russia ratified the Treaty in May 2000.
14. PREVENTING DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FROM PEACEFUL USES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS*

Alexandre KALIADINE

At the Millennium Summit of the states – members of the UNO, held in New York on 6–8 September 2000, President Putin advanced two major initiatives. The first aims at the effective prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons through the exclusion of the use of weapon-grade nuclear fissile materials (in practice, highly enriched uranium – uranium-235 and plutonium-239) in civilian power systems. The second represents a proposal to convene in Moscow in 2001 an international conference under the UN auspices on the prevention of weaponization of outer space.1

Both proposals are central to achieving the objectives of global security. They attracted attention of Governments, the UNO, the IAEA and other international organisations, the scientific community and peace activists. It is true that specific ways to implement these proposals are yet to be explored. Purposeful consideration of Putin’s initiatives by interested governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations are important not only from the point of view of the solution of specific tasks. It also would help to enhance the efficiency of multilateral institutions of the world community in building security structures for the 21st century.

The National Security Concept, approved by Putin on 10 January 2000, has elevated the strengthening of the regimes of non-proliferation of weapon of mass destruction to the highest priority. The need to reinforce the NPT regime is emphasised in another high official document – the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted on 28 June 2000. In this document Russia reaffirmed its commitment to work together with other states for the prevention of non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery as well as relevant materials and technologies. According to the Military Doctrine, approved by the Presidential Decree of 26 April 2000, Russia “acts for giving a universal character to the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery

1 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 9 Sept. 2000.
systems, for radical increase of efficiency of this regime by a combination of prohibitive, control and technological measures, for termination of nuclear tests and comprehensive nuclear test ban”.

This task has become more urgent on the threshold of the 21st century with the erosion of the regime established by the NPT and a number of subsequent international agreements of the legal, political and technical character. The fragility of the NPT regime is caused, to a considerable degree, by the fact that the technology and the materials used in weapons and civilian power systems have been largely the same: nuclear fuel cycles have involved weapon usable material that can be separated using a relatively straightforward chemical process.

The military potential of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle is related to its capacity to supply fissile material – plutonium-239 and uranium-235 – useful for nuclear warheads.

Natural uranium, of which less than 1 percent is uranium-235 – the rest is more or less inert uranium-238 – if mixed with a moderator – a material that slows down neutrons – such as heavy water or graphite, a large enough quantity of natural uranium can be made to sustain a slow chain reaction. This is the principle of the nuclear reactor. After capturing a neutron a uranium-238 nucleus is converted into a plutonium-239 nucleus, that is the plutonium isotope of atomic weight 239. This is the basis of plutonium production. The spent uranium fuel is removed periodically and plutonium is separated out by chemical methods. The “plutonium route” to nuclear weapons is to a large degree connected to a phase of the nuclear fuel cycle – the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel and extraction of its plutonium. The civilian plutonium, after it is chemically separated, can be used as fuel in present-day reactors, or it can be stored for future use in plutonium-fuelled reactors such as ‘fast breeders’. Concern is that it can also be diverted to military use. Under normal commercial operating conditions, light water reactors produce 200–300 kg. of plutonium per year for every 1000 Mwe (megawatts) of electric generating capacity. Natural uranium power reactors typically produce plutonium at about twice this rate. Plutonium from reprocessed civilian reactor fuel can be used to make nuclear weapons. (5 kg. of plutonium is the nominal warhead equivalent).

To produce the highly enriched uranium (needed for nuclear explosives – uranium containing 90% or more of the isotope uranium 235) the natural uranium must be processed in enrichment facilities (isotope separation facilities based on the gaseous diffusion, the gas

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centrifuge or other methods). Most of the civilian power reactors so far installed in the world use slightly enriched uranium fuel, about 2–4 percent of uranium 235. It does not now appear that highly enriched uranium will be commonly used in civilian nuclear power programs. There are, however, efforts under way in a number of NNWS to develop domestic enrichment technology, particularly gas centrifuge technology. Successful development of this technology could lead to the existence of relatively small national enrichment plants in many countries. Commercial gas centrifuge enrichment plants, designed to produce slightly enriched uranium can be modified, or at least easily enlarged, to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU). It is important to note that it is much easier to extract HEU from low enrichment uranium than from natural uranium. An enrichment facility of given capacity can produce highly enriched uranium several times more rapidly if fed with low enrichment uranium than if supplied with natural uranium. (20 kg of uranium-235 is the nominal warhead equivalent).

Thus, due to the relationship between the civilian and military atom, future nuclear weapons programs may be initiated with technologies and materials diverted from civilian nuclear fuel cycles.

Attempts undertaken so far to design a diversion-resistant atomic power system have not produced appreciable positive results. Policies of restriction of transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies to NNWS have also proved to be ineffective in regulating the diversion of nuclear material for weapon purposes.

By the year 2000 out of 145,000 tons of spent nuclear fuels 100,000 tons were stored in the 236 facilities in nuclear power stations of 36 countries. Thus, many countries, besides officially recognised NWS, have access to materials, which can be reprocessed and used to make nuclear weapons. About 300 tons of weapon usable plutonium have been already reprocessed from spent nuclear fuel. According to the IAEA, by the end of 1999 approximately 20 tons of separated plutonium was placed under the IAEA safeguards in the NNWS.

The proposal, advanced by President Putin, is based on new technologies and work, carried out in Russia, which confirm that a civilian nuclear power system can be designed to satisfy stringent non-proliferation criteria, making the nuclear power route an unattractive one for acquiring nuclear weapons. Putin suggested that an appropriate international project be developed and carried out under IAEA auspices. Explaining the technical aspects of Putin’s proposal, the then Minister for

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4 See note 2, p. 45.
Atomic Energy of the RF Yevgeny Adamov argued at the Moscow international conference on non-proliferation, on 6 October 2000, that key technologies of uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction are not indispensable for the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

He showed that a sequence of actions can be built, in which in the final stage, the separation of plutonium would be excluded in fuel reprocessing. In this connection, Adamov described the design of a reactor on fast neutrons (“fast reactor”). The reactor is devoid of a uranium blanket, in which pure plutonium is produced automatically. The reactor uses nuclear fuel of equilibrium structure: pure plutonium is not separated when reprocessing the irradiated fuel (plutonium is burnt).5

Research, carried out in Russia, confirmed that the task of extending nuclear power without proliferation could be solved. The program of development of civilian atomic power of the Russian Federation for the period till 2010 stipulates the design of advanced atomic power plants, in particular, the construction and commissioning of a reactor БН-800 at the Beloiarskaya atomic power plant, based on perspective nuclear technologies. The БН-800 reactor has certain constructive characteristics meeting stringent non-proliferation criteria.6

Russia offered its experience in this area to create by joint effort a reactor on fast neutrons, in which fuel will burn out to substances unsuitable for weapon application. The spent nuclear fuel is not to be removed from the reactor separately – uranium and plutonium – but in a mix, which will also complicate their military use.

The concept of such a reactor is realised by Russian scientists in a design of the reactor “Brest”.7

The proposed approach not only meets the criterion of nuclear non-proliferation, but helps to solve two other major problems crucial for the future of humanity: a long term assured supply of electrical energy and ecologically acceptable management of radioactive wastes. The proposed closed fuel cycle allows for the transmutation of the most dangerous isotopes: the wastes are offered for burial with radioactivity and toxicity not higher than that of uranium ore.

Putin’s initiative envisages the joint design by technologically developed countries of innovative reactor technologies that address cost, safety; waste management and proliferation concerns. Russia proposes to

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5 Adamov’s presentation on 6 Oct., 2000 at the Moscow international conference on non-proliferation, organised by the Moscow Carnegie Center and the PIR Center.
7 Project "Brest" is developed in the Research and Design Institute of Energy Technology (NIKIEY).
carry out this work on the basis of broad international co-operation under the auspices of the IAEA.

The mastering of new technologies would be a gradual long-term process of transition to reactors of a new generation and herald large-scale expansion of nuclear power.

The 44th annual General conference of the IAEA, held in September 2000, supported Putin’s idea that new reactors and fuel cycles should be designed so as to reduce the production of weapon usable material in spent fuel to very low levels. The IAEA Director General M. El-Baradei stressed the importance of this objective. The elaboration of an appropriate world strategy would constitute an important stage in the implementation of this new international project. It is pertinent to note in this connection that the General conference decided to establish a Special group on innovating technologies and fuel cycles. The group is to analyse, select and develop promising nuclear technologies and to elaborate a program of joint action of countries that are potential supporters of a principally novel approach to the nuclear power system. A joint demonstration project would be the next step. The special IAEA Committee, which considers priorities in the activity of the Agency, has adopted a resolution to the effect that the Agency should strengthen its activity in the field of science and technology and concentrate on innovating technologies. The General conference has approved an appropriate document on the subject.

Nevertheless, there still is no unequivocal approval of the Russian initiative by the IAEA members. This lack of support is caused not so much by disagreement on the need to design new reprocessing techniques, which do not involve the separation of pure (weapon-grade) plutonium but is rooted in the specific interests of individual states. Some states are concerned about competition in case of large-scale introduction of the Russian industrially mastered technologies. They are inclined to perceive the Russian offer as a sort of lobbying of its own new reactor types and fuel cycles. Other countries, which lack the technical expertise but have means, prefer to consider foreign projects, which so far exist only “on paper”. Political considerations may play a role in the choice of technologies or partners. To this effect the position of the USA, a most influential IAEA member, is of importance. The USA, according to Bill Richardson, US Secretary of Energy, “have not yet made a decision on nuclear reactor of the next generation”.8 The US has boycotted a meeting on the new Russian project, held under IAEA auspices, and is

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reported to have told the Agency that its initiative to co-ordinate the development of future reactors and fuel cycles is unwelcome. This attitude seems strange: the realisation of the Russian initiative on reactors of a new generation would have removed concern of the USA over the uncontrolled proliferation of weapon-grade fissile material in the world. The lukewarm attitude to the joint effort is certain to reduce the chances of a speedy realisation of Putin initiative for a nuclear system that avoids the use of proliferation-prone nuclear material.

Much will depend on the capacity and will of the IAEA and the countries, interested in this international project, to overcome political controversies and work persistently to develop and commercialise new reactor types. This would reaffirm nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of international behaviour in the nuclear field and as a key principle of the security system of the 21st century.

Creating new technologies, which ensure the unambiguous separation of the peaceful from the military atom is necessary. But no technical fix can by itself guarantee the achievement of the nuclear non-proliferation objective.

The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is not only a question of technical sophistication. To a much greater degree it is a problem of the military strategies of states, of the general state of international political relations. Developments in this sphere are of an ambiguous, controversial character.

Reliable stability of the global NPT regime can be ensured only on the basis of a complex approach.

The technological measures will be effective tools of nuclear non-proliferation, if they are accompanied by parallel progress on the part of the international community towards new forms of inter-state relations. This should lead to a diminished role of nuclear weapons in security policies and their eventual total elimination. In this connection it is necessary to emphasise the importance and urgency of the implementation of the nuclear and other related arms control and disarmament measures, initiated or supported by Russia. They include: deep reductions of strategic offensive arms of Russia and the USA (up to 1500 deployed nuclear warheads); the engagement of all the nuclear-weapon states in the nuclear disarmament process; preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty; creation of a global system for the control of the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies; the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones; the implementation of the Trilateral initiative, under which nuclear material withdrawn from the military programs of Russia and the USA will be put under the IAEA safeguards; start of negotiations
on a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, etc.
15. THE CWC REGIME AND RUSSIA

Alexandre KALIADINE

15.1. The problem of CWC implementation in Russia

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the first and still the only multilateral disarmament treaty ratified by the Russian Federation (RF). Russia’s participation in the Convention will largely determine the viability of the global regime established by the CWC and Russia’s role in shaping the international arms control system.

On 31 October 1997 the State Duma (SD) passed the federal law on the ratification of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction (no. 138-FZ) (288 votes for vs. 75 against). It was approved (practically unanimously) by the Federation Council (FC) on 5 November, and signed the same day by the President of the Russian Federation. Russia submitted its instrument of ratification on 5 November and the Convention entered into force for Russia on 5 December 1997. Russia became a member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in that same month. On 12 May 1998 Russia became a member of the OPCW Executive Council.

By ratifying the CWC and becoming a fully-fledged member of the OPCW, Russia assumed legal obligations to destroy the CW stockpile inherited from the former USSR (40 000 agent tons), as well as to destroy or convert their associated production facilities (CWPFs) within 10 years of the entry into force of the CWC (29 April 1997). Russia is also required to comply with the intermediate destruction deadlines and other procedures, established by the Convention, and bear the costs of international verification, including inspections.

Complying with these undertakings will have consequences for the RF on many levels, primarily because Russia possesses the world’s largest stockpile of chemical weapons. In addition, Russia operates big civilian industrial chemical complexes subject to international monitoring while its economy and financial system have been weakened by a chronic crisis.

The federal law on the ratification of the CWC has defined the powers of the President, the Federal Government, the Federal Assembly and the bodies of the state authority in the subjects of the Federation in

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solving questions affecting the implementation of the obligations assumed under the Convention.

The ratification act covers basic questions affecting compliance with the CWC. It deals with the management of the chemical disarmament process; the legislative and regulatory basis for meeting the requirements of the CWC; financing chemical disarmament; the creation of technology for destroying CW stocks; order of storage, transportation and destruction of CW; conversion of former CWPFs; ensuring safety of the population and the environment during the destruction of chemical weapons; application of a safe destruction technology; verification measures; Russia’s activity in the OPCW; international co-operation to facilitate the achievement of the Convention’s objectives.

The ratification act pays special attention to reducing the costs of CW destruction as well as to ensuring the protection of Russia’s economic interests in the process of the CWC implementation, including those related to the conversion of the former CWPFs for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. According to the ratification act, financing of chemical disarmament is provided in the structure of the federal budget by a separate line. The purpose of this provision is to strengthen financial measures targeted at CW disarmament.

The ratification act has obliged the President of the RF to take account of the economic situation in the country in the process of complying with the destruction schedules, established by the Convention. Under this act the Federal Government is required to implement measures directed at the reduction of expenditure on carrying out inspections, stipulated by the Convention, in the territory of the RF. The ratification act stipulates that on the instruction of the President of the RF, the Government is required to submit annually a report on the status of the implementation of the Convention to the Chambers of the Federal Assembly (FA).

Art. 4 of the ratification act contains another important stipulation. It states the following. In case of extreme events, including events of an economic or technical nature, affecting the subject matter of the Convention and jeopardising the supreme interests of the Russian Federation, appropriate procedures established by section V (on the termination or discontinuity of the operation of the international treaties of the Russian Federation) of the Federal law “On International Treaties of the Russian Federation” can be used to abrogate or suspend the CWC for the RF. For example, Russia may resort to these procedures in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law and its international treaties, if the OPCW rejects RF requests for the conversion of former CWPFs to peaceful purposes, or if other measures detrimental
to the RF are taken. (The federal law on the ratification of the CWC is reproduced in Appendix 15A).

On the way towards chemical disarmament

In the early 1990s, Russia was already doing much work to prepare to fulfil the requirements of the CWC, which was signed by the RF on 13 January 1993.

Russia’s ratification of the CWC gave rise to a new situation. All further actions in the field of chemical demilitarisation not only had to conform to the timetable, procedures, and safety standards established by the CWC, but also had to be carried out under the regime of international monitoring of activity related to the chemicals covered by the Convention.

In 1993–1995, the Government had already taken preparatory measures for CW destruction (elaboration of the state program of CW destruction by 1993, Federal government decrees no. 764 of 2 August 1994 and no. 881 of 4 September 1995). In the years since, a set of legislative and administrative documents has been adopted on the major issues of chemical disarmament. About 30 major legal and other regulatory documents have been adopted in Russia on this subject (federal laws, presidential decrees and directives, and federal government decrees and directives). Together with the law on the ratification of the CWC, they constitute the regulatory and administrative framework for implementing the Convention and provide the national legislative basis for elimination of chemical weapons, stockpiled on the territory of the RF.

Several of these documents deserve closer examination. The federal law on the destruction of chemical weapons (no. 76-FZ) was adopted on 2 May 1997. Prior to this, on 21 March 1996, the Russian government approved (by the Governmental decree no. 305) the Special federal program: destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation (further on referred to as the Chemical weapon destruction program – CWDP). The CWDP was elaborated with the provisions of the CWC in mind. According to the CWDP, the Russian CW stockpile must be destroyed within ten years. Another five years are provided for decommissioning the chemical weapon destruction facilities (CWDFs), cleaning the sites, and operating the landfills. In particular, the CW destruction procedure proposed in the CWDP was similar to the

1 A detailed list of the legal and regulatory documents governing chemical disarmament work in Russia is given in N. Kalinina’s article “Rossia, khimicheskoye oruzhiye i problemy yego unichtozheniya” (Russia, Chemical Weapons, and Problems of their Destruction), in: Unichtozheniye khimicheskogo oruzhiya v Rossii: politicheskiye, pravoviye i tekhnicheskiye aspekty (Chemical Weapon Destruction in Russia: Political, Legal, and Technical Aspects), Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 1997, pp. 14–38.
timetable imposed by the Convention. The CWDP provided for a wide range of measures directly related to the obligations stemming from the Convention. They include: ensuring safety during CW destruction, performing R&D on CW destruction, constructing CWDFs and landfills, enacting federal laws on CW destruction, making CW storage and destruction facilities ready for international inspections, etc.

The Convention provisions that prohibit private individuals from engaging in any activity prohibited by the CWC are reflected in the Criminal Code of the RF, which took effect on 1 January 1997 (articles 188, 189, and 355 of the Criminal Code).

Russia’s system of export controls on dual-use goods and technologies is aimed at preventing the proliferation of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. Appropriate control lists have been compiled and enacted in accordance with the recommendations of the Australian Group (AG), an informal international association of states, which deals with developing measures to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The Russian national export control regime was developed for monitoring exports of chemicals, their associated equipment, and technologies that could be used to produce chemical weapons (Presidential decree no. 621-rp of 7 December 1994).

Government decree no. 57 on strengthening the export control of dual-use goods and services relating to weapons of mass destruction and rocket means of their delivery was adopted on 22 January 1998 to further improve the mechanism of monitoring exports of dual-use goods and services. It obliged all Russian firms – whatever their form of ownership – to refrain from export deals involving any dual-use goods and services not subject to the RF normative legal enactment on export control if they are aware that these goods and services will be used to make or operate nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or the rocket means of their delivery (development, production, testing, etc.), and to inform the RF State Commission on Export Control thereof. If Russian participants have grounds for suspecting that the given goods and services might be used for these purposes, they are obliged to make a corresponding enquiry to the Government Commission on Export Control.

In accordance with the provisions of the CWC, Russia has established a National Authority to act as co-ordinating centre for communication with the OPCW and other states parties to the CWC. Since 1995, the Presidential Committee on Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions (Khimbiokom) has been assigned these functions.

On 5 January 1998, in accordance with the provisions of the CWC, Russia submitted its initial declarations to the OPCW. These declarations included information on 24 former CWPFs and 7 chemical
weapon storage facilities (CWSFs), as well as on the enterprises producing scheduled and other concrete chemicals subject to international verification. Of the 24 declared former CWPFs, five have been physically destroyed, and specialised equipment has been destroyed at eight others. The remaining 11 facilities are to be converted to purposes permitted under the CWC (appropriate applications have been sent to the OPCW). A separate Special federal program has been developed to achieve these ends.

After Russia ratified the CWC, the work related to international inspections on the RF territory became more earnest. A representative delegation from the OPCW held talks in Moscow on the procedure for conducting inspections in Russia, the payment of expenses for them, the use of inspection equipment by the inspectors, etc. From March through July 1998, Russia received initial international inspections of all its declared former CWPFs (24) and CWSFs (7). The OPCW endorsed the inspection results in Russia.

Governmental decree no. 334 of 21 March 1998 approved the plan of basic measures to carry out the Federal laws on CW destruction (no. 76-FZ, no. 138-FZ). A plan of major measures for carrying out these laws has been attached to this decree (including a list of the measures, the implementers – federal executive agencies or pertinent organisations, and the deadlines for completion).

Some work has been done on material preparations for complying with the Convention’s basic requirement to destroy CW, despite sharp deterioration in the general economic situation in Russia and serious shortfalls in the federal budget (See next section for more details.) The Federal government approved the Ministry of Defence (MOD) proposal to establish the MOD Training Centre for Specialists in Chemical Weapons Stockpile Destruction in the RF at the Training centre for Military Unit 25260 (Chapayevsk, Samara Region). It obliged the MOD to submit to the RF Government in the first quarter of 1998 a draft statute of the proposed training centre approved by the pertinent federal executive authorities and organisations.

Construction of a pilot CWDF has been started in Gorny in Saratov region. Preparatory work has included the construction of an 18-km water pipe line, a wastewater treatment system, gas pipe lines, electric power lines, a road between Gorny and Berezovo with a river crossing bridge, and housing for the future CWDF and the local area. Plans for building a CWDF in Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) have been completed.

In collaboration with US specialists, a technical-economic feasibility study (TEF) has been made for a CWDF in Shchuchye (Kurgan region) to destroy chemical artillery munitions. In April 1998 the Russian government issued a decree permitting the construction of infrastructure
facilities in Shchuchye for the future CWDF, as well as housing for specialists.  

Availability of safe CW destruction technology is an important prerequisite for the timely elimination of CW. Russian chemists have developed methods of eliminating the CW arsenal. Experts from various disciplines evaluated these methods, including at the weapon storage sites. The technology has been proven in practice. Russia and USA conducted a joint research program to evaluate the Russian two-stage process for the CW destruction, which includes the processes of chemical neutralisation of the CW and bitumenisation of the neutralised products by placing them in an asphalt-like material suitable for burial.

Although effectiveness of this technology was demonstrated in laboratory tests, there remain a number of unresolved technical issues concerning industrial scale-up and the long-term environmental consequences, such as those related to the leaching of toxic chemicals from the bituminous mass into ground waters. According to information from the SD Committee on Environment, there was no open competition for CWD technologies in order to select the ones safest for the public and the environment. Moreover, neither the government environmental monitoring agencies, nor the Ministry of Health, nor the MOD have monitoring instruments that can detect CW agents such as sarin, soman, or V-gases at the level of the maximum allowable concentrations (MAC) for populated areas. The MOD insists that instrumentation for detecting CW agents in air is under development. However, they have been saying that since 1992.

One factor that can not be ignored in implementing the CWC is the attitude of the population to the construction of CWDFs near CWSFs. The people in these areas manifested their concern about the detrimental effects of CW destruction on public health and the environment.

Work to educate the public is aiming to overcome these difficulties. Guidebooks are distributed and public hearings held to discuss various problems of storing and destroying CW. Hearings have been conducted in Gorny, Kambarka, and Shchuchye. They have done much to relax the tension surrounding the CW destruction plans. A key circumstance contributing to the relaxation of tensions about the proposed CWDF in Saratov region (in the town of Gorny) was the concrete achievement of building a social infrastructure. Positive shifts have occurred in the regions of other proposed CWDFs. For example, the participants at hearings in Shchuchye on 7–10 July 1997 approved a final

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2 Segodnya, 29 Nov. 1997.
4 See note 1, pp. 99–113.
memorandum supporting the need for CW destruction and asking the governments and international organisations to support this process with technical and financial aid.

In late March 1998 a group of specialists came to meet the public at Pochep (Bryansk region), the site of a chemical munitions storage facility that holds 7500 tons of organic-phosphorus CW agents. The Russian Green Cross (a non-governmental organisation) and the Bryansk regional administration undertook this initiative. A wide range of issues was discussed at the meeting: the future construction of a CWDF, the actions of the regional administration on chemical disarmament issues; the combining of efforts by the public, local governmental bodies, and the military to resolve this problem; a comparative risk analysis of CW storage and destruction; and the establishment in Pochep of an information centre on various aspects of chemical disarmament.\(^6\)

**The chemical weapon destruction timetable: a victim of financial and organisational disarray**

The most difficult chemical demilitarisation issue for Russia is to achieve adequate funding levels for the work of eliminating the CW stockpile inherited from the Soviet Union.

Since the CWDP is funded from the federal budget, shortfalls in the federal budget exacerbated by the August 1998 financial collapse have seriously undermined the possibility of getting resources to fund chemical disarmament projects. In this regard it is pertinent to remind the reader of the constantly growing federal budget deficit, the inability of successive governments to find enough revenues and fulfil budget obligations, the budget sequestration (in 1997–98), and the increasingly enormous domestic and foreign debts of the RF. All this culminated in the devaluation of the national currency and a moratorium on debt payments. As a result, all these negative processes disrupted the construction schedule for CWDFs.

The official cost estimate of the CWDP, approved by the Federal government in March 1996, was 16.6 trillion roubles (in terms of 1 January 1995 prices, not adjusted for the subsequent re-denomination). In late 1997 the Government revised the cost estimates. It declared that the total federal budget expenditure for chemical disarmament would be about 35 trillion roubles (about $5.7 billion) plus $330 million (to pay for international monitoring of compliance; namely, $250 million for inspections and $80 million for dues to the OPCW) over a period of 10 to

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15 years. A large share of the costs (the construction of CWSFs and landfills, the development of infrastructure, etc.) falls on 1997–2000; i.e., during the first phase of destruction deadlines.

Under the CWDP the first CW agents to be destroyed are blister agents – mustard, lewisite, and mixtures of the two – stored at Gorny and Kambarka. These comprise 18.8% of the total CW stockpiles or 7500 tons (15.9% at Kambarka and 2.9% at Gorny).

Under the Convention, Russia must begin destroying CW no later than two years after the CWC has entered into force for it (i.e., in December 1999). Not later than three years after the entry into force of the Convention (i.e., by 29 April 2000), Russia is required to destroy 1% of the CW stockpile (i.e. 400 agent tons). By 29 April 2002, Russia must destroy 20% of the CW stockpile (i.e. 8000 agent tons).

The CWDP stipulates that CW destruction facilities for blister agents will be built first at Gorny and Kambarka. They are to have a total capacity of 1850 agent tons/year. The Gorny facility is to be certified in 1998 and destroy CW agents during 1999–2002. The Kambarka facility is to be certified during 2000 and destroy CW agents during 2001–2005.


Thus if the CWDP timetable for CWDF construction and operation had been met, Russia would have had no problem meeting the intermediate destruction deadlines under the Convention: 400 tons by 29 April of 2000, then 8000 tons by 29 April of 2002, etc. However, inadequate funding for CWDF construction has been delaying the progress on these facilities. As of the beginning of October 1998, CWDF construction was 3.5 years behind the schedule established in the CWDP and 1.5–2 years behind the CWC timetable.

For 1995–97, the factual budget appropriations were considerably less than planned. In 1995 the funding was about 30% of the level approved by the federal budget and less than 10% of the need. In 1996 the actual funding was less than 5% of the budgeted amount. The Federal budget law for 1997 appropriated 190 million (new) roubles for the

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7 A detailed description of the expenditure for fulfilling the CWC is given in the financial-economic feasibility report presented by the Government in the State Duma during the CWC ratification debate in October 1997.

8 Both CW storage bases belonged to the Chemical troops. Prepared munitions (32 500 tonnes), which comprise 81.2% of the total amount, are stored on two bases belonging to the Main Administration of Rocket forces and Artillery (GURA) at Shchuchye and Kizner (Udmurt Republic) and on three Air Force bases at Maradikovsky (Kirov region), Leonidovka (Penza region), and Pochep (Bryansk region).

9 These data were provided by A. Ivanov, First Deputy-Chairman of Khimbiokom at a seminar at the Moscow Carnegie Center on 27 October 1998.
CWDP, although the latter called for an expenditure of 2095.7 million roubles for 1997. The Ministry of Defence received less than 20 million roubles for these purposes. After the 1997 federal budget was adopted, the approved expenditure was reduced because of the rigid sequestration policy.

The 1998 funding for the section “Utilisation and elimination of weapons, including the implementation of the international treaties” was cut to nearly half from the 1997 amount: from 3.2 billion roubles to 1.9 billion. The 1998 federal budget appropriated 500 million roubles for the CWDP, while the needs in this area amounted to 2.8 billion roubles.\(^{10}\)

Considering the country’s economic situation, it is very unlikely that the appropriated sum will be released.\(^{11}\)

If the funding for the construction of CWDFs and landfills continues to be as unsatisfactory, then, at the beginning of the next decade the Russian government may find itself in a situation of non-compliance with its major obligation under the CWC. It would have to request the OPCW Executive Council to extend the intermediate destruction deadline for the RF. In this case Russia would have to submit a proposed change of the intermediate destruction deadline to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. However, an extension of the intermediate deadline does not alter the main obligation of a state party to destroy CW stockpiles not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force.

Based on current estimates, it will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve the goal of destroying the entire CW stockpile in Russia by 2007. Russia may ask the OPCW EC to extend the deadline for completing CW destruction. Such a request must be submitted no later than nine years after the entry into force of the Convention. An extension of up to five years can be granted. If the deadline for CW destruction were extended by five years, Russia’s total cost for eliminating chemical weapons is estimated to increase by 6.4 billion (new) roubles.

The implementation of the CWDP depends not only on the amount of resources provided, but also on the effectiveness of the work of the concerned agencies.\(^{12}\) The disarray in the Russian economy is not the only factor hampering the progress of chemical demilitarisation work. Another negative factor is the scattered organisation and the lack of co-ordination between the ministries and agencies involved in this work.

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\(^{10}\) Information provided to the State Duma by the Government on 24 June 1997.

\(^{11}\) Data received from Khimbiokom, 24 August 1998.

\(^{12}\) According to some press reports, a portion of the appropriated money was misused. According to the data from the Audit Chamber of the RF, as of 1 September 1997, a substantial portion of the funds actually appropriated for the CWDP was illegally spent on the construction of housing and other facilities for the Military Unit 42734 in Shikhany, Saratov region, where CW are neither stored nor will be destroyed (Segodnya, 29 Nov. 1997.)
Presidential decree no. 314 of 24 March 1995 designated the MOD to be the state customer. The MOD receives the federal funds allocated for chemical disarmament. The participants in the CWDP include nine ministries and agencies. Strangely, Khimbiokom is not listed among them. Khimbiokom has been assigned the functions of the National Authority on Chemical Disarmament and is to act as the co-ordinating centre for relations with the OPCW and other states parties to the CWC. However, the Committee has not been given any managerial functions and is not a state executive agency, so it has only limited administrative capabilities. In order for it to be effective in carrying out the functions of the National Authority on Chemical Disarmament, it must be transformed into a federal executive agency and given the proper authority in this area.

At the same time, an interagency commission on chemical disarmament was established under the RF Security Council. It was mandated to prepare recommendations on federal budget appropriations, oversee the spending of budget funds, and co-ordinate the activities of various agencies (these functions of the Commission should have been given to the Presidential Committee on Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions).

The State customer (the MOD) was assigned the task of organising the work of carrying out the CWDP. However, in July 1997 the Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev announced that the MOD was anxious to relinquish these functions, which he characterised as very costly and not suited to the Armed Forces.13

It must be stated that no concise state system has been yet created to manage the chemical disarmament process, and the lines of responsibility for solving the pressing problems in this area have become blurred. Better mechanisms are needed for accomplishing and organising the management of the CWDP. A delay in resolving this matter will affect executive discipline.

There is an obvious need to optimise the management mechanism for the CWDP, to rationalise procedures for co-ordinating the efforts of participating agencies, improve decision making processes, and make effective use of the foreign financial assistance for chemical demilitarisation.

In the present situation, taking effective measures to optimise the mechanism of managing the CWDP and large-scale foreign financial assistance for destroying the inherited CW stockpile seem to be the two main prerequisites for moving ahead in eliminating the CW stockpile in Russia under the CWC regime.

International assistance to Russia’s chemical weapon destruction program

The assistance already granted by several countries to Russia for its chemical disarmament needs has been limited and provided mainly through bilateral intergovernmental agreements. The sharp deterioration in the condition of the government finances made it urgently necessary to finance and conduct the chemical demilitarisation work on the basis of broader international co-operation.

The rich states are expected to pay more serious attention to increasing their contribution to the destruction of the former Soviet CW stockpile following the ratification by Russia of the CWC and its moves to meet the requirements of the Convention. This approach is dictated by considerations of security, by interests of international stability and the need to prevent proliferation of chemical weapons. The timely and orderly elimination of the Russian-based CW stockpile would greatly contribute to the efficiency of the CWC and its regime of global disarmament.

The effectiveness of the CWDP depends directly on rescheduling Russia’s foreign debt and lightening the burden of servicing that debt. There is an obvious correlation between the external financial burden and the country’s ability to meet the international timetable for the CW destruction.

The cancellation of the Soviet debt in direct relation to the accomplishment of the CWDP is important, because servicing this debt diverts investment resources that could otherwise be used for the chemical disarmament effort. The problem of lowering the debt principal cannot be resolved without prominent participation by official international credit institutions. The debts incurred by the USSR amount to about $110 billion and annual payments on these debts in 1996–97 exceeded $7 billion.

14 USA, Germany and Sweden have given aid to Russia for chemical demilitarisation, From 1993 through 1998, USA gave $168.7 million for that purpose and Germany gave 41.7 million marks (about $23.3 million). Sweden gave $125 000 and announced it was willing to provide another $2.6 million Swedish crowns (about $350 000). Also willing to sign agreements to provide aid in 1998 and subsequent years were Netherlands ($12.5 million), Finland (6 million marks, or about $1.2 million), and the European Union (10–15 million ECU’s, or about $11–16.5 million). Beginning in 1999, Italy intends to provide from $6.7 to $8.3 million of financial aid over three years. The agreement with the USA to prepare the former CWPF at OAO Khimprom in Volgograd for conversion began to be implemented in 1998. During that year, the first portion of the project is to be accomplished using 2.2 million roubles of American aid.


16 The actual payments on all types of the foreign debt of the RF were $7.7 billion in 1996, $7.4 billion in 1997, and $2.2 billion in the first quarter of 1998 (Finansoviye Izvestia, 11 Aug. 1998. Major payments are due on Russia’s foreign debt in 1998. In particular,
The rescheduling and partial writing-off of the debts could be done with the understanding that Russia will use the funds thus saved to pay for actual work related to the construction of the CWDFs and the socio-economic infrastructure in the regions where CW are stored and will be destroyed.

This idea has received support not only in Russia, but also in the West. Joint political statement adopted by delegations from the Atlantic Council and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in November 1997 states: “Clearly, Russia requires substantial foreign financial aid in order to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile”. This document mentioned three possible ways of obtaining this aid, among them: “a review of the conditions and a change in the structure of the Russia’s foreign debt so that the money thus freed could be directed toward the destruction of chemical weapon stockpile”.17 A similar proposal was advanced by the Monterey-Moscow study Group on Russian Chemical Disarmament in a report entitled Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War: Overcoming Obstacles to Russian Chemical Disarmament, published in Moscow in 1998. One of the group’s main conclusions is to “reschedule some of the debt that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union, with the understanding that the money saved on interest payments would be used to build social infrastructure”.18

The countries offering financial assistance could create an international mechanism to co-ordinate the implementation of appropriate projects, related to the CWDP. This approach would provide for international co-operation on a multilateral basis, which is less subject to internal political pressures in the donor countries.

As far as possible, the assistance should be provided directly to the regions where CW destruction will take place (Gorny, Kambarka, Shchuchye, Pochep, etc.). As these towns have small populations, it would be relatively inexpensive to fund projects at local level. For these purposes, the donor countries could offer to sign direct agreements for funding the construction of socio-economic infrastructure facilities. In addition, this would help relieve the psychological stress on the people living in the areas where chemical weapons are to be destroyed.

payments are due on debts that Russia assumed from the former USSR. On the other hand, the grace periods for credits taken by Russia five years ago are ending.


18 Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War: Overcoming Obstacles to Russian Chemical Disarmament. Report, editors: A. Pikayev, J. Tucker, Moscow, 1998, p. 7. The study group included scientists and experts from the Center for Non-proliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (USA), Russian Academy of Sciences, Rosneftekhimprom Company (RF), Carnegie Moscow Center, Sussex University (Great Britain), Stimson Center (USA), Lobbe Xenex GmbH (Germany), and DuPont Corporation (USA).
The role of non-governmental organisations

The course of events has shown that chemical demilitarisation in Russia is a complicated, multilevel process. If it is to move forward, more than just official decrees and regulations are needed. Public (non-governmental) bodies must be alerted to oversee and monitor the progress in accomplishing the CW destruction.

In this regard, the above-mentioned Monterey-Moscow Study Group advanced a noteworthy initiative on Russian Chemical Disarmament. The Group proposed to establish a national commission on chemical disarmament comprised of federal government officials, members of the Federal Assembly, local administrators, business executives, and scientists. These individuals would serve on a voluntary basis without compensation and would provide oversight of the CWC implementation in Russia, particularly CW destruction and conversion activities. If properly selected, this commission could an effective counterweight to entrenched bureaucratic interests, draw public attention to the CW destruction issue, and make it more difficult for federal officials to divert funding away from this important program. The commission could provide independent monitoring of the chemical disarmament process and generate recommendations for the federal authorities, as well as take suitable public information measures. Within the framework of the commission, representatives for government agencies and business circles in Russia and other countries could review proposals for the conversion of former CWPFs.

The commission could do much to make the chemical demilitarisation work more transparent, resolve suspicions about the alleged development of novel CW by Russia and eliminate concerns about the status of the former Soviet CWPFs that were converted before the CWC entered into force. Such independent oversight would help to build public confidence in the safety and effectiveness of the CW destruction program.

The commission’s activities in these areas might boost the confidence of the international community in the efforts that Russia is making, under difficult circumstances, to free itself of chemical arsenals and comply with the provisions of the CWC. This in turn would help expand international assistance to Russia that the latter greatly needs in order to eliminate its CW stockpile.

19 See note 18, pp. 15–16.
Conclusions

For Russia the complex of problems in eliminating the CW arsenals inherited from the former Soviet Union within the deadlines imposed by the Convention is especially difficult, considering the size of its CW stockpile and critical economic situation. Some of the prerequisites for resolving these issues are in place thanks to the adoption of legislative and administrative measures and efforts to accomplish the CWDP and to meet the requirements of the Convention.

Russian society remains committed to active participation in the chemical disarmament process. However, the general economic and financial situation in the country during 1997–98 was extremely unfavourable for keeping up to the planned schedule of the CWDP. A continuation of the crisis situation might necessitate the extension of the CW destruction deadlines for Russia.

Chemical demilitarisation could be stimulated to some extent by optimising the management system for the CWDP and by engaging NGOs in this activity. However, under the present circumstances, this process can truly gain the necessary dynamism only with broad financial support from the international community and the industrially developed states parties to the CWC.

Recommendations, as discussed above, have been advanced in Russia and some Western countries. If implemented they could effectively help Russia along the path of chemical demilitarisation.

15.2. The joint Russian-Western venture for the destruction of the former Soviet CW stocks**

Destruction of CW stocks of the former Soviet Union, stationed on the territory of the Russian Federation, should start in December 1999 according to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). By 29 April 2000 (i.e. by the end of year 3 after entry into force of the CWC) Russia is required to destroy first 400 agent tons of chemical weapons (1% from the total amount). By 29 April 2002 – 8000 tons (20%) should be destroyed, by 29 April 2004 – 18 000 tons (45%). By 29 April 2007 Russia must destroy 40 000 tons (100%). However, it is improbable that the level of destruction required at the end of phase 1, 2 or 3 will be achieved, as not a single chemical weapon

destruction facility (CWDF) has yet been built in Russia by the end of 1999.

This is a problem of concern not only to Russia. It affects the interests of a wide circle of the states and, first of all, those who have assumed political and material commitments to actively participate in the process of eliminating the chemical arsenals of the former Soviet Union. Orderly, safely and timely destruction of these largest declared stockpiles of chemical weapons is of paramount importance from the point of view of the achievement of the objectives of the Convention. The resolution of this problem is an essential condition of the effective functioning of the global regime of chemical disarmament and non-proliferation created by the CWC.

It should be noted that out of the 15 former Soviet republics only Russia agreed to assume responsibility for destruction of the stocks of the chemical weapons of the former USSR. Other eight former Soviet republics – members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), originally have agreed to take part in funding such measures, having signed together with the Russian Federation the appropriate agreement concerning the chemical weapons (15 May 1992), but failed to keep the promise.

The remaining six former Soviet republics have declined altogether to participate in the solution of this most complicated problem of the dangerous Soviet heritage. Experts believe that the total cost of destroying the former Soviet CW stockpile within the timelines stipulated by the CWC, stands at approximately $6–7 billion. From the very beginning it was clear, that it is an excessive financial burden for the country facing enormous economic hardships and undergoing radical transformations.

On the question of foreign assistance in this area, Russia and Western states achieved in 1992 a “gentlemen’s agreement” on sharing costs among them for the destruction of the Soviet CW stockpile. The essence of this arrangement can be summed in the following way. Russia agreed not to block the consensus on the final text of the Convention after receiving assurances that a solution to its chemical demilitarisation-financing predicament would be found. Thus, according to this arrangement the financial burden of the responsibility for the destruction of 40 000 tons of chemical warfare agents of the former USSR was to be shared among the states parties to the CWC interested in countering the chemical threat.

Having joined to the CWC (on 13 January 1993 the RF signed the Convention and on 5 November 1997 ratified it) Russia began to fulfil its commitments.
The subsequent developments have shown that the RF has undertaken persevering efforts to meet the requirements of the CWC. A broad range of legislative and administrative measures on the basic questions of chemical disarmament has been enacted. Over 30 major legislative and other regulatory acts in this field were approved. The legislation enacted so far allows the forward movement of the Chemical weapons destruction program (CWDP) in accordance with the CWC requirements.

To this effect several positive developments in Russia should be noted, including

– Presentation to the OPCW of initial declarations from the RF;

– Elaboration of the Federal program of the destruction and conversion of former CWPFs;

– Verification by OPCW inspectors of the CW stock, related munitions and containers as well as the enterprises producing scheduled chemicals;

– Construction activities in the regions where the CWDFs and the infrastructure necessary for their construction are to be established;

– Application of additional export control measures on the sale of dual-use chemicals, such as the adoption of the federal law on export control (18 July 1999).

– Development of technologies for CW destruction that safeguard citizens health and environment and minimise costs.

The serious shortfalls in the federal budget and the delays in the provision of the pledged large-scale international financial and technical assistance placed severe constrain on Russian CW destruction program. The August 1998 financial crash led to the four-fold depreciation of national currency, the budgetary crisis of major proportions, general rise in prices, the higher costs of maintaining the CW arsenals in a safe condition, etc. In October 1999 the cost estimate for destroying the Russian CW stockpile was 50 billion “new” roubles (without the account of the expenses on international control and inspection). In coming years financing such extremely expensive program was clearly outside the possibility of the federal budget. In this connection it would be pertinent to note that more than a third of the revenues of the federal budget had to be allocated for servicing the huge external debt, largely inherited from the former Soviet Union. (The CWDP is funded from the federal budget).

The inadequate financing has led in the end of 1999 to the slowing of the work related to the construction of the CWDFs. By this time the Russian CWDP was four years behind schedule (and two years behind the CWC schedule). In an effort to speed up the CW destruction process the Ministry of defence (MOD) offered to use mobile complexes for the destruction of faulty chemical munitions (KUASI), operated by the
Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops. Some experts believe that the use of KUASI would enable Russia to achieve the level of destruction required at the end of phase 1. However, in the final analysis, only the achievement of adequate funding levels for the purposes of construction of CWDFs would move forward the Russian CW destruction process.

In this connection the sizeable international support for the Russian chemical demilitarisation program acquires crucial importance for ensuring timely elimination of the CW stocks within the timelines set by the Convention.

During 1990s several Western countries pledged to provide assistance to the Russian chemical demilitarisation efforts. The implementation of assistance programs contributed to the solution of some problems related to Russia’s chemical demilitarisation financing predicament.

The USA, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden provided assistance in this area. Other European countries pledged assistance or are about to embark on an assistance program (Finland, the Netherlands, Italy as well as the European Union.) In the period 1998–1999 two conferences of donor countries were held attended by representatives of 30 countries and several international organisations. These events led to a deeper understanding by the donor states of the problems faced by Russia and encouraged new donors to join the assistance effort.

By August 1998, when Russia faced enormous financial problems, foreign assistance (thus far provided or pledged) at Russian chemical-disarmament locations amounted to just over $100 million. Experts believe that the international assistance available to Russia amounted to roughly 2% of the total cost of destroying the CW arsenal of the former Soviet Union. According to Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, after the financial crash of August 1998, Russia did not receive till May 1999 a cent from abroad, where as the country had to pay about $6 billion as the interest on the external debt (including the debt inherited from the Soviet Union).

Lack of co-ordination between Russia and the donor states in the area of CW destruction has led to inconsistency in the application of international assistance funds.

When contrasted with the magnitude of what must be done in Russia, the current Western assistance for Russian chemical disarmament is unimpressive. (In particular, the funds as a rule are not provided for socio-economic infrastructure projects of the regions affected by destruction of CW stocks; the US Congress has expressly forbidden the expenditure of the funds under the Co-operative Threat Reduction Program to support infrastructure projects). The promises of the Western
governments to significantly increase their contributions to Russia’s CW destruction program, once the RF has ratified the Convention remain largely unimplemented.

Moreover, some influential circles in the West tend to go back on the pledges and arrangements with Russia for the destruction of the CW of the former Soviet Union. The US Congress passed a resolution in October 1999 to suspend funding for the construction of the Shchuchye CWDF. The US funds were to be used to finance initial phase construction work. So far Russia has prepared the justification of investments and the feasibility study for this facility. However, the actual construction work has not yet started and is not likely to start under conditions of a closedown of US financial support for Shchuchye. (It is supposed, that the capacity of the CWDF in Shchuchye would amount to 1200 tons/year).

As was pointed out earlier in this text, after August 1998 the financial situation in Russia deteriorated. Nevertheless Russia moved forward on socio-economic infrastructure projects directly related to the construction and operation of CW destruction facilities. Russia has the right to expect that the Western partners in this business will observe their obligations to offer assistance in the fields related to the CWC.

If more tangible results are to be attained, the circle of the countries participating in this process should be expanded. It is desirable to secure the participation of the international financial community in the Russian CWDP, and first of all, involve the IMF and the World Bank in these activities. This is not a question of philanthropy. The essence of the problem as it is perceived by many Russian experts, consists in practical implementation by the Western participants of the 1992 Arrangement of their commitments to ensure expanded Western assistance for Russian chemical disarmament. Their material participation in the destruction of the former Soviet CW stocks, incidentally, continues to be in line with their own long-term national interests.

Of particular value to Russia would be willingness of the OPCW states parties to take into account Russian concerns on two issues.

First, the provision to Russia of gratuitous loans targeted at regions where the CW destruction is scheduled to take place to address such needs as the improvement of the local infrastructure, medical and health-related services, housing, telecommunications, environmental monitoring, conversion of former CWDFs. Such form of assistance could supplement the Federal CWDP and facilitate the safe, secure and environmentally sound elimination of the former Soviet CW stockpile and CW production infrastructure. It should be stressed that the provision of such loans would be in line with the declared objectives of the World Bank and other international financial institutions (the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), who seek to promote
development, health, environment, international security, disarmament; and the like. On its part, Russia should agree that the states providing financial assistance create an international mechanism, which would coordinate implementation of the appropriate projects. This approach would allow to create a multilateral framework for the implementation of assistance programs less susceptible to domestic pressure in the donor states.

Second, the radical rescheduling and annulment of the debt that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union. The correlation between the debt burden and the capacity of the country to sustain the Russia’s CW destruction deadline set by the CWC is obvious. (The total sum of Russia’s external debt amounts to about $160 billion: $50 billion accumulated by Russia since 1992, while the remaining sum represents the debt inherited from the USSR. A substantial proportion of this debt – Russia owes to members of the Paris Club (about $40 billion) and of the London Club ($32 billion). If the diagram of payments on the external debt is not reconsidered Russia would have to pay annually from the federal budget during the period of next 10–15 years roughly from $10 to 17 billion. The burden of the debt repayment seriously undercuts Russia’s attempts to eliminate the CW stockpiles of the former Soviet Union within the CWC deadline.

Since the servicing of the external debt diverts investment resources, which could otherwise be directed on work in the field of chemical disarmament, it is essential that the Soviet debt be annulled with the understanding that Russia would earmark some of the money saved for projects associated with CW destruction.

It would be justified to ask creditor countries and major holders of Russia’s debt securities (G-7 states, leading members of IMF, World Bank and the Paris and London Clubs) to consider the annulment of the Soviet debt, provided that debt relief funds are used in a targeted way to finance the chemical disarmament effort in Russia. In this connection it is pertinent to note that all states – members of the listed international establishments are members of the OPCW.

If $70 billion of the Soviet debt is annulled, the remaining debt restructured and the interest payments due in for the period of 1999–2000 postponed for 5–10 years, it would enable the Russian government to improve the domestic social and economic situation, allocate additional resources for the elimination of the CW stocks as well as to boost Russia’s efforts to fulfil obligations under other disarmament treaties.

By voluntary assuming a commitment to destroy over a period of 10 years, 40 000 tons of chemical warfare agents stockpiled by the former USSR, Russia has undertaken to solve a global problem, which transcends
purely national boundaries and which has implications for the entire international community.

The timely, safe and environmentally sound elimination of the world’s largest stockpile of chemical warfare agents would have important and diverse positive ramifications. From the strategic perspective: it would enhance viability of the global Non-proliferation regime established by the CWC and strengthen international co-operation in the field of chemical disarmament. The elimination of the former Soviet CW stockpiles would remove a potential source of large scale poisoning of the Earth biosphere.

Economically the success in this field would help rationalise international exchanges of chemical goods.

The understanding by the world community of the magnitude of the tasks which Russia aims to resolve in its efforts to comply with the CWC is a decisive factor in assuring the destruction of the former Soviet stockpiles of chemical warfare agent within the timelines imposed by the CWC.

Neither Russia, nor the West, nor the international community as a whole would benefit if the global regime of chemical disarmament and non-proliferation becomes the hostage to financial disarray or political conjecture. All the parties to the 1922 Arrangement must build up their efforts to eliminate CW stock of the former USSR. The world leaders should show political wisdom and work persistently to relieve the Earth of this dangerous heritage of the Cold war.

15.3. Modification of the first intermediate destruction deadline for Russia

Difficult start of the CW elimination process

Under the CWC the Russian Federation is required to eliminate 400 tons of category 1 chemical warfare (CW) agents by 29 April 2000. However, the Government was unable to attain this objective in time.
In the autumn of 1999 Russia submitted, in accordance with relevant provisions of the CWC, a request to the Executive Council of the OPCW for a delay in the implementation of the first intermediate destruction deadline (phase 1). At its 19th session, held in the Hague on 3–7 April 2000, the Executive Council recognised the objective nature of the circumstances, which prevented Russia from reaching the required destruction level and granted the extension to Russia. The 6th Session of the Conference of the states parties of the OPCW took a decision extending the first intermediate deadline for Russia to 29 April 2002. By this date Russia is required to fulfil its commitments both on phase 1 and phase 2, that is to eliminate 8000 agent tons.21

Russia’s delay in implementing phase 1 was a consequence neither of internal political tensions nor of opposition from any quarters. Rather it was due to the budget deficit, debt burden and problems related to the implementation of international assistance programs.22

In this connection it should be stressed, that no political or social grouping in Russia (party affiliations, movements, NGOs, etc.) advocates the retention of the CW arsenals. The Armed Forces have manifested no interest in these weapons. In fact under the revised Military Doctrine, recently adopted, these weapons do not play any role in the system of ensuring national security. It is true that some ecologists argue that Russia should withdraw from the CWC. But their position is motivated by concern for safe and environmentally sound elimination of the CW stockpile. They do not oppose CW disarmament.

One needs to highlight these facts because some observers in the West allege that intrigues of the ecologists and extreme nationalists have led to Russia’s failure to achieve the level of destruction required at the end of phase 1.

The 1999 federal budget earmarked 370 million roubles to chemical weapons elimination (the funding level for this purpose in the 2000 budget – 500 million roubles). But only a fraction of the budgeted amount was actually allocated due to the extremely difficult economic situation prevailing in Russia. The appropriation to prepare for CW destruction in 1999–2000 was considerably less than the amount planned. The planned funding for pre-construction activity in 1999 amounted to about 230 million roubles (over 100 contracts concluded). 76 million were

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actually allocated. The debt of the MOD (at that time, the state customer on CW destruction) amounted to 150 million roubles.

By May 2000 the CW destruction facility at Gorny, Saratov region (the first stage of CW destruction) was not yet completed. (The CWSF at Gorny stores in balk 1160 tons of CW agents – 2.9% of the total agent stockpile – mustard, lewisite, and a mix of the two; the technological equipment for the CWDF has been delivered by Germany). The facility at Gorny was scheduled to begin operation in 1998.

The actual initial phase construction works is yet to start at another major industrial destruction complex in the town of Shchuchye (Kurgan region). The CWSF in Shchuchye stores 5440 tons (13.6% of the total agent stockpile): phosgene, sarin, soman and V-gas in missile and artillery munitions. So far Russia has prepared the justification of investments and the feasibility study for the Shchuchye CWDF, which is to be built with the US financial and technical assistance. The institutions, involved on this project, are now focusing on designing and manufacturing chemical munitions dismantlement process lines as well as on scaling up the chemical weapons destruction process for the facility. Russian firms are making progress on infrastructure development related to the Shchuchye destruction complex (15 housing units in various stages of construction, water line design done and installation underway, gas line and hospital renovation underway).

By autumn 2000 the preparatory works at other five CWDFs were at initial stage.23

Some positive developments

In 2000 Russia has elected a new president and a new parliament. The general economic situation has improved (a rise in the state revenues was registered, the self-supporting budget prepared, etc.) Positive developments allow Russia to move forward on chemical disarmament.

The normative regulation of the process of chemical disarmament has advanced. In 2000 the State Duma passed the Federal law (on the second reading) the federal law on social protection of the citizens engaged at works with the chemical weapons. The law has laid legislative base for social protection of citizens working with chemical weapons. This law is of particular significance from the point view of ensuring broad support of the CW destruction plans. Of social-economic and political importance are the decrees issued by the Government in 2000, on the protection of the zones adjacent to the CWSFs and CWDFs sites at Gorny, Shchuchye, Kisner

23 Sites for the construction of the CWDFs chosen, the justifications of investments and feasibility studies prepared for five other CWDFs: at Pochepe (Bryansk region), Kambarka, Kisner (Udmurt Republic), Leonidovka (Penza region) and Maradikovsky (Kirov region).
and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic), since major social guaranties are provided for the citizens living and working in these areas. Indicative of Russia’s moving forward on legislative preparedness are regulatory documents on various aspects of chemical disarmament. Among them are regulatory documents on the program of the demilitarisation (conversion) of the former CWPFs, on the procedure for the use of products created during the CW destruction, on compensatory payments for damage caused by toxic chemicals to the public health and to the property interests of natural and legal persons as a result of extraordinary situations arising during the storage, shipment and destruction of chemical weapons. As a whole the system took shape for the legal, ecological and medical safeguarding of the CW destruction allowing Russia to proceed with concrete work in the field of CW destruction. Nevertheless the legislation, related to the implementation of the CWC, need further adjustment.

Thousands of people – civilians and servicemen – are involved in the chemical disarmament process in the federal centre and in the affected regions.

The Central Analytical Chemical Weapons Destruction laboratory (CAL) was opened in Moscow in April 2000. The CAL’s function is to control activities in the field of chemical disarmament. The laboratory operates on the premises of the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, the leading researcher and developer of CW destruction technologies.

Russia continues to regularly receive the OPCW inspections of CWSFs, of former CWPFs, industry inspections. Russia has submitted to the OPCW detailed plans for the construction of its largest chemical weapons destruction facility.

Indicative of the intentions of the new political leadership is the planned, sharp increase in the appropriations for the CWDP in the 2001 federal budget.

The budget provides 3.085 billion roubles for CW destruction, including 2.695 billion – for the construction of CWDFs, 320 million – for R&D and pre-construction activity, connected with the implementation of the CWC, 69 640 million – for verification and other measures. Thus, the budget increased funding for the purposes of chemical disarmament by over six times in comparison with what was stipulated in the 2000 federal budget (while the total expenditure of the federal budget increased only 1.4 times). Russia has thus demonstrated its commitment to increase the flow of funds into CW destruction projects. It is the major prerequisite for the acceleration of the works in the field of chemical disarmament.

At the same time it would be incorrect to reduce the problem only to financial levers. Much would depend on the efficiency of the use of the funds, management, technological capability and other factors.
Magnitude of the unsolved tasks

Originally (1995) the total annihilation of the former Soviet CW stock was to be achieved by 2005. In 1997 the deadline was extended to 2007. In April 2000 the then Commander of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops, General-Colonel Stanislav Petrov argued that the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Program (CWDP) can not be completed earlier than by 2013.\(^{24}\) It should be noted that modification of the final destruction deadline is envisaged in the CWC. The Conference of the states parties of the OPCW may grant an extension of up to 5 years of the final destruction deadline. (Such a request must be submitted no later than 9 years after the entry into force of the CWC.)

On 11 July 1999 the State Duma adopted a resolution (no. 4096-11) in which it expressed concern about the implementation of Russia’s obligations under the CWC. The resolution has drawn attention to the failure of the executive authorities to observe the timelines of the construction of the CWDFs and to ensure the social guarantees for the population of the affected regions. The State Duma recommended to the Government to modify its CWDP, taking account of the available opportunities and actual performance. The Government is also requested to carry out measures to increase funding levels for the implementation of the CWC and strengthen control over the use of the earmarked funds. The State Duma recommended to the Government to take measures to ensure the participation of the representatives of the public and take stock of public opinion in the decision-making process on the question of siting the CWDFs and on other questions affecting the interests of the population.

As has already been mentioned above, by 2000 Russia did not yet possess any large scale CW destruction plant ready to start operation.

Practical plans for the construction of CWDFs in Russia have been hampered by lack of consistency in the application of Western assistance funds. As far back as 1992 Russia and a number of Western countries reached an understanding on sharing costs of the destruction of the CW stockpile of the former Soviet Union.\(^{25}\) The financial assistance provided to Russia in the subsequent years helped to alleviate the costs of the preparation for CW destruction. However, it was hardly consistent with the magnitude of the tasks, which confronted the RF in this field. Moreover, the foreign donors have used part of the funds allocated by them to finance their own administrative and technical costs associated with the implementation of assistance programs.

As a positive example one can cite the assistance program of the Federal Republic of Germany, although in money terms this is a small

\(^{24}\) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 Apr. 2000.

\(^{25}\) See note 18, p. 80.
investment. Since 1993 Germany has been providing assistance for the CWDF at Gorny in Saratov region, where construction is nearing completion. Up to the beginning of 1998 Germany has provided assistance, mainly in the form of technological equipment, which amounted to $18 million. In 1998 and 1999 funding was at an annual average of $5 million. In August 1999 it was announced that Germany will provide $23 million for the destruction of CW at Gorny – in addition to $11 million contributed earlier to this project.

On 21 January Italy announced that it would provide $8.3 million towards construction of the necessary infrastructure to destroy CW in the Udmurt Republic (at CWDFs at Kambarka and Kisner) in 2000–2002.  

In 2000 it was announced that Canada, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain and the Netherlands would provide assistance to Russia for the elimination of the former Soviet CW stockpile. Assistance was also pledged or allocated by Finland, Switzerland and the European Union.

At the same time the USA, which in the 1990s were the largest donor (70% of the total declared foreign assistance to Russia – which amounted to about $200 million, was provided by the USA)) seem to reverse their policy on Russian chemical disarmament.

The US assistance for chemical weapons disarmament in Russia is provided in the framework of the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which grew out of proposals made in 1991 by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. Under the CTR program the USA have undertaken to provide funds for the construction of the CWDF at Shchuchye. However, Washington opted in 1999 to cut financial support to the Russian chemical demilitarisation effort. In October 1999 the US Congress passed a resolution to suspend funding for the construction of the Shchuchye CW destruction facility. The US Congress in the 2000–2001 budgets allocated no funds for this project. In fact, US Public law 106–65 contains a prohibition on funding the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. As of FY 2000 no CTR funds may be obligated or expended for the planning, designing or construction of a CW destruction facility in Russia. No CTR funds may be used for housing, environmental restoration or retraining, related to the Russian CWDP. In the FY 2000 US allocated $20 million toward enhancing security at Russia’s CW storage site. However, these funds were not used. In FY 2001 no funds at all are earmarked for the Russian CWDP. Thus, US funds for the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility in the town of Shchuchye have, in fact, been suspended. The US DOD estimates that the total amount of US assistance needed for the completion

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of this project will be almost $900 million. A closedown of US financial support for Shchuchye CWDF would have an impact on Russia’s capability to meet its obligations under the CWC.

Thus, at the time when Russia is sharply increasing its funding levels for the destruction of former Soviet CW stockpile the USA opted to cut funding for it. Under these conditions it seems unlikely that the CW destruction process for the facility in Shchuchye will move forward soon.

**The Russian Agency on Munitions obtains power over CW destruction**

It follows from the previous analysis that the Federal CWDP adopted in 1996 needs to be adjusted in order to ensure the timely destruction of the CW stockpile within the timelines set by the Convention.

In 2000 two variants were advanced of further actions in this field.

The supporters of the first variant proceeded from the impracticability of the CW destruction of 8000 agent tons by 29 April 2002 and of 18 000 agent tons by April 29, 2004. (These deadlines are set by the CWC for phase 2 and phase 3 of the destruction process). The total projected (design) capacity of the seven planned CWDFs amounts to 10 500 agent tons /year. Even if the construction of all of them is completed and they can begin operating by spring 2001 (a purely hypothetical assumption), during the first year they will be able to destroy no more than 3500 agent tons (as they can operate at 30% of their projected capacity). This means that Russia will not be able to achieve the level of destruction required at the end of phase 2 (8000 agent tons by 29 April 2002). During the second year about 7500 agent tons could be destroyed (under the 70% projected capacity assumption). Only at the end of the third year when the CWDFs would have reached full projected capacity that is by 29 April 2004 Russia could have achieved the level of destruction required at the end of phase 3 (18 000 agent tons).

In 2000 it was estimated that construction of the seven planned CWDFs would cost 40 billion roubles. It is obvious, that the allocation and mastering of the funds within one-two years is unfeasible. Therefore the Russian Government, argued the proponents of the variant, should request the OPCW to extend the final deadline for complete CW destruction from 10 to 15 years. According to their assessments, the revised CWDP would cost 100 billion roubles during the period of 2001–2013 (with the major expenditure to fall on the period of 2001–2004:

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The proponents of the second variant have offered a new concept of achieving CWC stockpile destruction. The Russian Agency on Munitions (RAM) submitted this concept recently to the Federal Government. It should be noted that by presidential decree the functions of the disbanded Committee for the Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons were transferred to the RAM in May 1999. The Government made a decision to transfer to the RAM the responsibility for the destruction of CW stockpile in order to ensure more efficient implementation of Russia’s obligations under the CWC. The RAM is now in charge of leading chemical research, development and industrial institutions.

On 7 April 2000 Zinoviy Pak, the head of the RAM, announced that Russia intends to meet its CWC commitments before May 2002 and destroy 8000 agent tons. This would be feasible, he argued, if annually the federal budget allocates 2–3 billion roubles to CW destruction and if adequate assistance from abroad is forthcoming. According to the RAM, it is feasible, prior to the completion of the construction of costly and unwieldy CWDFs, to achieve this objective. The RAM proposed to carry out accelerated detoxification of the stored chemical weapons at the CWSFs through a chemical degradation, reducing most CW agents to a negligible level of toxicity. This process results in a product that cannot be reconstituted into a CW agent. The products (being no longer weapons) can be safely transported at long distances; they can be stored (to reduce costs) until the completion of the plants for their reprocessing and utilisation. The activity, based on this principle, would allow Russia to achieve a number of benefits (remove at the earliest the risks to population of the affected regions, make it unnecessary to build expensive CW destruction industrial complexes at the CWSFs). It is argued that the design of a CW destruction facility will be simpler and not provide for a complete cycle of the utilisation of CW agents.

The need for a more efficient solution of CW disposal calls for-administrative changes. Some changes seem to make sense. It is logical to charge the RAM with the task of implementing a practical plan for destroying CW agents. Whereas the MOD is called upon to fulfil tasks related to the maintenance of the military capability of the country. The problem is how to smoothly rebuild the management mechanism under

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28 See note 24.
29 See note 24.
30 Presentation of Alexandre Gorbovsky, Head of the Department on Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions of the Russian Agency on Munitions, at the Moscow International Conference on Non-Proliferation on 6 Oct. 2000.
the pressure of time and to overcome interdepartmental disagreements, bureaucratic intrigues and collisions of corporate and personal interests.

Besides, there are difficulties of an objective character related to the transfer of administrative and other additional functions to the Russian agency on munitions and the maintenance of effective interaction of the various bodies of the executive authority, involved in CW disposal.

**Adequate involvement of public opinion is necessary**

The complicated organisational and educational tasks will have to be resolved in a very short time span (processing regulatory documents, reconsidering design documentation, adjusting relations with the authorities and the public of the affected regions, etc.). The new tasks can hardly be resolved by resorting to habitual bureaucratic procedures. Support of the expert community, citizens groups, concerned NGOs and the mass media is crucial.

But, as in the previous years, important changes in the roles and functions assigned to individual ministries and agencies, involved in the chemical disarmament process, occur as if in an information vacuum, without appropriate participation in this process of scientists, non-governmental organisations and citizens groups concerned. The press and electronic mass media are not involved in this process either.

In May 1999 a group of parliamentarians (N. Bezborodov, B. Gromov, V. Ilyuhin, N. Sapozhnikov and O. Shinkarev) submitted to the State Duma a bill On the Formation and Activity of Citizens Advisory Commissions on Destruction of Chemical Weapons. The bill aims to take account of the opinions of residents of the zones situated around the CWSFs and CWDFs. The commissions are to include representatives of the public, regional executive authorities and municipal bodies and to meet regularly with the representatives of the state customer for the CW destruction work and other state authorities concerned. They are to receive current and authentic information on measures undertaken in the field of CW disposal. Although the bill was accepted for consideration, as early as 1 June 1999, no movement forward on this initiative has been registered.

Implementation of the proposals, contained in the bill, would help to alleviate concerns about the lack of public support for recent undertakings of the Government on an accelerated schedule for CW stockpile destruction.

The bill is not devoid of shortcomings: the issue of public opinion is reduced to a regional (local) level, whereas the problem of the CW stockpile destruction affects Russian society as a whole and is a matter of national concern. Insufficient awareness of the population of the existing governmental plans in this field may cause tensions in the society.
In its turn, negative attitudes of the population to these plans may undermine international confidence in the intentions of the Russian leadership.

The timely implementation of the CWDP is not only a question of Russia’s compliance with the CWC. It has implications for ecological security. Over 30% of chemical munitions have been stored for more than 40 years. The number of the faulty (defective) munitions is growing and there is a danger of the leakage of toxic gases with serious health implications.\textsuperscript{31}

The CW stockpile represents a potential target for terrorists. Besides, as long as CW arsenals continue to exist there remains a risk that these chemical warfare agents may fall into the hands of malefactors. This is therefore the problem of ensuring common security of nations, and the maintenance of international strategic stability.

It is in the interests both of Russia and other states parties to the CWC to work consistently and purposefully to eliminate the deadly chemical legacy of the 21st century. This can and should be done on the basis of international co-operation within the framework of the global regime of chemical disarmament and non-proliferation established by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

\textit{Appendix 15A}


Passed by the State Duma on 31 October 31, 1997.
Approved by the Council of the Federation on 5 November, 1997.
Signed by the President on 5 November 1997.

\textit{Article 1.} Ratification of the Convention


\textit{Article 2.} Ensuring implementation of the convention

1. The implementation of the obligations of the Russian Federation following from the Convention, is ensured by the federal bodies of the state authority, bodies of the state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation within the limits of their powers according to the provisions of the present Federal law, of the Federal law “On the Destruction of Chemical Weapons”, of other federal laws, as well as of the Special federal program “Destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation”.

2. Financing of chemical disarmament is provided in the structure of the federal budget by a separate line.

\textsuperscript{31} See note 24.
3. The President of the Russian Federation shall:
   a) define principal directions of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of chemical disarmament, measures which are required for ensuring security of the citizens and the protection of the environment during the destruction of chemical weapons in conformity with the Convention, as well as verification procedures of their realisation;
   b) establish, proceeding from the provisions of the Convention, the time-table of the destruction of the chemical weapons with due regard to the economic situation in the Russian Federation and of the need of use of the most safe technologies of destruction of the chemical weapons;
   c) ensure the ability of the Russian Federation to counteract the development, acquisition, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons by other states; the maintenance at a sufficient level of means of protection from chemical weapons, of the military potential to deter the use of such weapons, as well as the appropriate intelligence capability;
   d) exercise the general direction of the activity of the Russian Federation in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, ensure the participation of the Russian Federation in taking decisions on questions related to the Convention, including changes and amendments to it, and submit for ratification the amendments to the Conventions adopted by the Conference for considering the amendments in conformity with Article XV of the Convention;
   e) establish the order of the formation of a uniform state management system of the process of chemical disarmament.

4. The Government of the Russian Federation shall:
   a) define the order of realisation and the amount of work needed for the implementation of the Convention, as well as carries out measures required for the safety of the population and the protection of the environment during the destruction of chemical weapons;
   b) ensure the funding of works on chemical disarmament on the necessary scale at the expense of the budget and extra-budget sources, including gratuitous assistance and possible external borrowings in the form of untied credits;
   c) elaborate federal draft bills aimed at ensuring the safety and social protection of the population, protection of the environment during the destruction of chemical weapons, as well as on other questions related to the implementation of the provisions of the Convention by the Russian Federation;
   d) provide for the creation of a technical base for the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons, including conducting Research and Development for the purpose of ensuring preferential use of domestic technology during the realisation of the Convention, as well as take measures to create favourable conditions for the involvement of domestic and foreign investors into the projects for the conversion of the chemical weapons production facilities;
   e) ensure the development of the social infrastructure in the places of storage and destruction of chemical weapons, in conformity with the legislation of the Russian Federation and co-ordinates with the subjects of the Russian Federation questions related to the realisation of the Convention, including the order of he realisation and the amount of work on a storage, transportation and destruction of chemical weapons, develops a system of indemnification to regions, in which chemical weapons destruction facilities are sited;
   f) carry out measures aimed at ensuring the protection of the economic interests of the Russian Federation during the realisation of the Convention, including conversion of the appropriate chemical weapons destruction facilities, the reduction of expenditure related to the participation of the Russian Federation in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the carrying out of inspections, stipulated by the Convention, on the territory of the Russian Federation;
g) co-ordinates international co-operation on the realisation of the Convention with due regard to the necessity for reduction of expenditure on chemical disarmament and, the development and use of advanced domestic technology of destruction of chemical weapons;

h) take the necessary measures for the purpose of ensuring complete and strict compliance with all the provisions of the Convention by other states parties, provide for an indiscriminatory regime for the Russian Federation, in particular in respect of the implementation of measures of the verification and conversion stipulated by the Convention;

i) elaborate and implement a system of measures for preventing and combating possible terrorist acts with the use chemical weapons.

5. The Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation shall:

a) take part in elaborating federal bills, pass federal laws needed for ensuring the safe destruction of chemical weapons, the safety and social protection of the population and the protection of the environment in the areas affected by the implementation of the Convention, as well as pass federal laws on other questions related to the implementation by the Russian Federation of provisions of the Convention;

b) consider the annual information report of the Government of the Russian Federation on the state of the implementation of the Convention and adopt appropriate decisions;

c) participate, within the framework of the annual consideration of the bill on the federal budget, in taking decisions on the amount of allocations for chemical disarmament, the social protection of the population and on measures for the protection of the environment during the implementation of the Convention;

d) give assignments to the Audit General Office of the Russian Federation, if necessary, about carrying out audit of the use of the means allocated for the purpose of chemical disarmament;

e) consider the information, including from the regions, about the state of implementation of the Convention, measures for social protection of the population and protection of the environment and take appropriate decisions.

6. The bodies of the state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation shall:

a) participate, within the limits of their powers, in elaborating federal bills and acts regulating questions of ensuring the safety and social protection of the population and protection of the environment during the destruction of the chemical weapon, as well as on other questions related to compliance with the obligations of the Russian Federation, following from the Convention;

b) elaborate and adopt in accordance with federal laws the normative legal acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation ensuring the safety and social protection of the population and the protection of the environment during the realisation of work on the destruction of chemical weapons in conformity with to the Convention.

Article 3. The information report on the state of the implementation of the convention

On the instruction of the President of the Russian Federation the Government of the Russian Federation shall annually submit to the chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation a report on the state of the implementation of the Convention containing information on the following questions:

a) volumes of destroyed chemical weapons, construction of chemical weapons destruction / conversion facilities, the condition of the chemical weapons in the Russian Federation, the ecological situation in the places of storage and destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation, the state of health of the personnel of the facilities and the population living in the places of storage and destruction of chemical weapons;
b) the funding of the measures on the implementation of the Convention, the social protection of the population and the protection of the environment in connection with the implementation of the Convention, the attraction of the extra-budget sources of funding, volumes of the international assistance and the level of total financing of the implementation of the Convention in comparison with the requirements fixed in the Special federal program Destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation;

c) activity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the participation of the Russian Federation in the activity of this Organisation;

d) compliance of the other state parties with the provisions of the Convention, the activity of other states, which can affect the realisation of the Convention; measures carried out by the federal bodies of the executive authority for the purpose of ensuring of universality of the membership of the Convention;

e) major problems faced by the Russian Federation in connection with the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, cases of the use of the information received by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical weapons in order to inflict damage to the interests of the Russian Federation; decisions on changes of the conditions of the implementation of the Convention for the separate states;

f) the state of the chemical protection of the population and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the state of the force for radiation, chemical and biological protection, the state of the manufacture of means of protection from chemical weapon, as well as of research and development in this area, the financing of the measures related to the maintenance of a high degree of readiness of the armed forces and formations of civil defence to repulse an attack or possible terrorist acts with the use of chemical weapons.

Article 4. Protection of the interests of the Russian Federation in connection with the convention

1. In case of disputes concerning the use of the right of verification with regard to the Russian Federation, rejection by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of the request of the Russian Federation for the conversion of the facilities or in case of the adoption of other measures, which inflict damage to the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation, for the purpose of protecting its interests, shall resort to the procedures in accordance with the generally accepted principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation.

2. In case extreme events, including events of economic or technical nature affecting the subject of the Convention, will jeopardise the supreme interests of the Russian Federation, the procedures established by section V “The Termination (discontinuance) of the operation of the international treaties of the Russian Federation” of the Federal law “On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation” are used.

Article 5. The entering into force of the present Federal law

The present Federal law enters into force from the date of its official publication.
16. THE PROBLEM OF THE LIMITATION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS*

Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV

The nineties turned out to be, in many ways, a period of lost chances in the field of arms control. The beginning of the decade was marked by a declaration of partnership with the West. This partnership did not come about in the measure it could and should have, however, and was reduced to what might be called “cautious, mutual relations”.

In the sphere of the reduction and elimination of armaments, we have not been able to, up to now, do the “home work”, inherited from the “Cold War” period. In a great part, work is continuing on the treaties and agreements, which were initiated in the eighties and were based on principles, inherent in the confrontation between the military blocs in the bipolar world.

Against this background, the new agreements reached in the sphere of conventional arms reduction appear as a real achievement since they make it possible to take the first steps in the search for new approaches. Unfortunately, at the end of the nineties, we are no longer able to wield the “disarmament sword”, in the way the first President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev did, and reach rapid agreement on further reductions amounting to, say, half the existing holdings.

The specific feature of the current situation, the considerable worsening of relations between Russia and the West in the security sphere, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to consider variants of “massive” reductions, both in the sphere of conventional weapons and in any other.

The main burden of guilt for the existing situation rests on those Western politicians and officials who have initiated a series of processes, which reflect negatively on our relations, such as the enlargement of NATO and the initiation of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia with complete disregard of the principles of the UN Charter. These and certain other elements, which make up the short-sighted policies of the West, have met with a sharply negative reaction on the part of the Russian political community and virtually all-political parties. As a result of these policies, the foundations and possibilities of constructive co-

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operation between Russia and the West in the security sphere have been undermined.

When the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was still in the stage of being signed, its basic principle – bloc by bloc, bilateral, equal and balanced reductions – was already inadequate for the rapidly changing geopolitical reality. The communist regimes collapsed, while the allies of the USSR in the Warsaw Treaty distanced themselves more and more from their former leader.

This could not remain unnoticed by the participants in the negotiations, but they were faced with the political task of concluding a treaty by a certain date, agreed on by the leaders of their states. The negotiators themselves were given the important, but limited, role of implementing the political agreements reached at the top.

However, it proved difficult, if not impossible, to get rid of the old stereotypes, including the counting of quantitative balances, which had their origin in a confrontation mentality, and were difficult to abandon in political practice. The ratification of the CFE Treaty, it turned out, did not remove Russian concerns in regard to its own security in the sphere of conventional arms. Many experts remember that Gorbachev, speaking in the course of the ratification process, in the autumn of 1990 mentioned with apprehension the maintenance of NATO’s numerical superiority over the Soviet Union. Even in the new conditions, when the end of confrontation with the West was proclaimed and partnership affirmed, Soviet and, later, Russian leaders could not fully accept the reality of the political dimension in the provision of security.

In his turn, the Chief of arms procurement of the Armed Forces of the RF, General V. Mironov, though noting the positive nature of the CFE Treaty for European security and the strengthening of confidence, nevertheless stressed that the CFE did not fully answer current realities. He also stated that not all the provisions of the document fully satisfied the Russian side. Thus, the signal was given for Russia to put in doubt the grounds for the flank limitations affecting its territory.

Soon after that, the Russian military began to voice their concern about the small quantity of military equipment, which could be held in the flank zones in accordance with the limitations set by the CFE Treaty. Indeed, the RF was allowed to keep, in all, only 580 armoured combat vehicles (ACV) in the regular units stationed in the flank area, including the Leningrad and North-Caucasian military districts.

On the other hand, if one addresses the political aspects of providing security and bears in mind that the strict treaty obligations apply equally to Russia’s neighbours, it is by no means clear to
everybody why Moscow should wish to increase the quantity of armaments on the flanks, limited by the CFE Treaty. The disparity between the political declarations and the climate of confidence and partnership, inspired from above, on the one hand, and the realities of military-political thinking at a decision-making level, on the other, was, on the whole, characteristic of that period. This disparity became one of the factors, which undermined the partnership with the West in the sphere of security and arms control.

In spite of the arguments about the external, military threat to Russia’s security, especially from the South, what was, in fact, meant, was the growing instability in the Caucasus and, more especially, in Chechnya, which, strictly speaking, was not directly related to the “ideology” of the CFE Treaty. Subsequent events – the start of military operations in Chechnya in 1994 – demonstrated that this hypothesis was correct.

In the process of adaptation of the CFE Treaty, new principles were introduced which, earlier, had not been applied to arms control. For instance, national ceilings for each of the five categories of the Treaty limited equipment would be set at levels reflecting the concerns of each individual state party in the security sphere, without damaging in any way security of any other state.

The parties to the adapted CFE Treaty abandoned the group principle of limitations. One of the postulates underlying the CFE Treaty was the following thesis. The states themselves would conclude to what cuts they were ready to agree for the purpose of achieving a substantial reduction of the aggregate quantity of TLE, permitted in a given area, compatible with the legitimate needs of each state party for its defence.

A positive and truly revolutionary achievement in adapting the CFE Treaty was the elimination of zone limits on TLE, fixed on the “cascading” (“matreshka”) principle. It presupposed a considerable thinning out of armaments on the lines of contact between the two military blocs, but allowed the possibility of substantial build-ups of armaments as the distance from the centre increased. This principle did not exclude either the possibility of a considerable “transfer” of armaments from one zone to another and, correspondingly, their concentration. For instance, in the fourth zone one could have 7500 tanks but in the third already 10 300.

The Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, signed on 19 November 1999 in Istanbul, introduced a strict scale of quantities of TLE within the framework of territorial (for ground forces) and national (for all categories of TLE) entitlements. Instead of a zone division, a
scale of territorial limits – 28 territorial entitlements – according to the number of European states parties to the CFE Treaty and two sub-entitlements for Russia and Ukraine is introduced.

This means, figuratively speaking, that instead of a big retort, representing Europe in the old version of the CFE Treaty, a great many test tubes appear from which the arms entitlements, set by this document, cannot be poured from one into another.

More specifically, for each state party to the CFE Treaty a fixed entitlement of armaments is established. In particular, in Central Europe reduced territorial TLE ceilings are set for Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, which, like the ceilings for Germany, Ukraine and Belarus, will not be reviewed upwardly. Taking into account Russia’s concern, the limitation regime is supplemented by obligations of a political nature – not to deploy NATO forces on a permanent basis on the territories of the new members of the alliance. All this ensures a regime of stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

In this way, the agreement marks an important step towards a complete change in the “ideology” of the arms control process. Namely, it means departure from the “bloc” principle of reductions, based on a balanced and commensurate elimination of the armaments of the two military alliances (or “groups of countries” as they were called in the 1990 CFE Treaty) confronting each other. The adapted CFE regime is directed towards ensuring the security of each of the parties, independently of its membership of one or another alliance.

The new limitations put an obstacle in the way of a possible, large-scale deployment and significant concentration of armaments. Therefore, although the experts speak of the NATO superiority in all categories of armaments over Russia, it will be virtually impossible for the NATO members after the signing of the Treaty, to exploit this superiority, in as much as the adapted CFE Treaty does not permit the transfer of significant quantities of TLE within the borders of the European territory.

It is in this that the political, “contractual” dimension of security, which is so often forgotten, consists. It is difficult to blame our politicians and experts for the fear that Russia’s security interests may be threatened.

It should, nevertheless, be noted that, in accordance with the new agreement, the obligation to reduce the national ceilings does not extend to Russia. This insignificant lowering of the Russian ceiling of armaments is connected with the transfer of part of the quotas to Kazakhstan.
Thanks to the persistence and stubbornness of Russian diplomats and the military, an entitlement was obtained in the flank zone of 2140 ACVs, which the RF may hold in two military districts, instead of the earlier mentioned entitlement of 580 ACVs in regular army units. In this way a nearly four-fold increase was successfully negotiated. The entitlement of tanks in the flank zone amounts to 1300 units and of artillery to 1680 units. These figures are even more impressive if one bears in mind that now all TLE can be held in regular army units (formerly a considerable part of them – in some cases more than half – were to be put in storage.) These achievements by the negotiators are considered a tangible contribution to the military component of Russia’s security.

In accordance with the agreements, the right to deploy, on one’s own territory, in a temporary, emergency situation up to 459 tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery systems belonging to another state or states, is accompanied by additional, special measures of transparency and control. The prohibition of temporary emergency deployments by states, immediately neighbouring on Russian territory, contributes to the creation of a special regime of security and stability in the flank zones on Russia’s borders.

In this way, the very possibility of a destabilising concentration of conventional arms is excluded. This possibility is removed of what, in the language of the CFE Treaty, is called the creation of “the potential for a large-scale offensive”. This constitutes an undoubted and important achievement of the adopted CFE Treaty.

Tables, which establish exactly the entitlements of each party to the Treaty, have been drawn up. In case of any changes in these entitlements the states parties should consult each other. It should be emphasised that, compared to the original version of the CFE Treaty, which was drafted in Vienna 10 years ago, the number of its participants has considerably increased and embraces virtually the whole of Europe as well as, traditionally, the USA and Canada.

It is true to say that the provisions of the adapted CFE Treaty, as a whole, substantially strengthen the security regime on the borders of Russia.

An additional and new quality of the agreement is the fact that all movements of TLE are covered by measures of constraint, inspection and notification, laid down in the CFE Treaty. In this way, thanks to these additional transparency measures any substantial redeployment of conventional armaments is subject to verification and notification. In cases of temporary emergency deployments, the convening of a special
conference is envisaged with subsequent notification of the OCSE. Once every five years, the principal parameters of the CFE Treaty are to be re-examined with a view to ensuring reliable security on the continent. Every party has the right to convene an extraordinary conference.

In the nineties, the CFE Treaty system has already resulted in the elimination of 56,000 units of combat equipment: approximately 26,000 units by the states, which were formerly members of WTO and 30,000 by NATO countries. It would, of course, be desirable that the vast reduction processes, started at the beginning of the nineties, were continued on the same scale. For the time being, the states basing themselves on the ceilings established in 1990 assume in accordance with the new agreements, the obligation to further lower the levels of TLE. The aggregate quantity of TLE to which the NATO members are entitled (the permitted, not the factual ceiling of TLE) is reduced as follows: for tanks by approx. 4800 units, for ACVs by approximately 4000 units, for artillery by more than 4000 units. These reductions affect mostly the American forces in Europe.

There is no doubt that the negotiators have taken an important step forward on the way to further reducing armed forces in Europe. Unfortunately, from a political point of view, this process did not unfold in an atmosphere of full partnership and co-operation and was not accompanied by the exchange of far-reaching initiatives. Instead, Russia, sometimes virtually alone, had to uphold its own position and views on European security.

This was one of the reasons, which made it impossible, in the end, to achieve more substantial reductions in conventional arms. Another, more important one, was that the outlines of final agreements should have been drawn by the politicians, but this was not done.

The representatives of the governments of the states parties to the negotiations could not reach agreement on large-scale reductions (comparable to those carried out within the framework of the CFE Treaty in 1990). The final level of conventional forces in Europe, which should have been “the task set to the negotiators” was politically not established, as had been done in 1989 when the negotiations had just started. The sad state of the relations and the low and unsatisfactory level of co-operation between Russia and the West in the sphere of security and arms control prevented a significant advance in this direction.

But before we start criticising the CFE Treaty, we should ask ourselves the question: what would have been the consequences for the Russian position in the sphere of security if it had not proved possible to reach agreement on new limitations and if it had remained possible to
concentrate and reinforce those conventional armed forces which existed in accordance with 1990 Treaty? An objective answer to these questions can only lead to the conclusion that the adaptation of the CFE Treaty has been successfully accomplished. This happened, however, in a system of “geo-political co-ordinates”, less favourable, less friendly to Russia rather than in one so optimistically predicted in the beginning of the nineties. All the same, it would seem, that in a situation when partnership has collapsed and military-political co-operation with the West is deteriorating, the negotiators have done all that was possible not only simply to reach agreement, but to begin to implement new approaches to arms control.
17. WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS IN RUSSIA

Elina KIRICHENKO

17.1. Export control of Russian dual-use goods and technologies*

One of the top priorities of the Russian export control regime is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and promote the maintenance of international stability.

Russia actively co-operates with other states in this field. It is a member of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). All these regimes elaborate and recommend for use lists of goods subject to control and establish the principles and criteria for their transfer. The restrictions prescribed by international institutions and sanctions imposed on those who violated them are applied on the basis of national legislation.

The Russian export control mechanism

Russia had to create anew an export control mechanism, bearing in mind, on the one hand, the transition to a market economy, the emergence of a private sector and the liberalisation of foreign economic transactions and, on the other, the need to integrate in the world economy. A system of export controls has accordingly been worked out which meets the requirements of multilateral regimes. A legal basis made up of laws, presidential and government decrees was created. Control lists and licensing procedures worked out. One should mention also a complex of safeguards ensuring that the goods supplied will only be used for the declared purposes (in particular the requirements of the import certificate), and an enforcement mechanism.

The foundation of this legal basis is formed by the 1995 law “On State Regulation of Foreign Economic Activity”, the 1995 law “On the Use of Atomic Energy” as well as more than 60 presidential decrees and government resolutions. A number of articles in the Criminal Code provide for both fines and imprisonment for infringement of the export control regulations.

In Russia, six control lists have been drawn up and are in force in the interest of national security and the prevention of proliferation of WMD (apart from a list of armaments and military hardware).

Nuclear Materials, Equipment, Special Non-nuclear Materials and Corresponding Technologies. The list is adopted by the Presidential decree no. 202 of 14 February 1996.

Equipment, Materials and Technologies of Dual-use Utilised for Nuclear Purposes. The list is adopted by Presidential decree no. 228 of 21 February 1996.

Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Designed for Peaceful Purposes but which can be used in the Manufacture of Chemical Weapons”. The list is adopted by the Presidential decree no. 621 of 7 December 1994.

Pathogens of Diseases, Fragments of their Genetic Materials, Genetically Changed Pathogens and Equipment which can be used to Develop Bacteriological Weapons. The list is adopted by the Presidential directive no. 298 of 14 June 1994.

Equipment, Materials and Technologies used in the Development of Missiles. The list is adopted by the Presidential decree no. 1194 of 16 August 1996.

Dual-Use Goods and Technologies subject to Export Control. The list is adopted by the Presidential decree no. 1268 of 26 August 1996. The lists are drawn up by technical experts from the corresponding state institutes and are concerted between the interested ministries and other departments. They are then confirmed by the Russian government and signed by the President of the RF in the form of special decrees and enter into force three months after their official publication.

Although Russia is not a member of the Australia Group, it has elaborated national export control regimes for chemicals, technologies, pathogens and equipment, which can be used for the development of chemical and bacteriological weapons, in accordance with the recommendations of the AG.

As regards the control regime for missile technologies, the presence of two categories of goods and services are regulated as well as the relations with states-members of the regime and states which are not members of the MTCR.

In accordance with the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (INFCIRC 254 (part 1 and 2), Russia has elaborated its own regulations as well as lists of nuclear exports and dual-use goods used in the nuclear field. The first applies to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), the second to all countries.

The national list of dual-use goods and technologies is divided into sections headed: “dual-use goods”, “sensitive” and “especially
sensitive” goods and technologies. In regard to the two latter categories, a stricter control regime has been established. They are also subject to a different form of notification of licenses’ denials. This regime also regulates relations with states, which do not participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

As changes are introduced in the lists and regulations of multilateral regimes, Russia introduces corresponding changes in its own national lists and in the regulation on the procedure for export and import of goods, subject to control.

The evolution of the Russian export control system has passed through several stages. In the present stage, particular attention is paid to control of the compliance with the established regulations and norms.

From 1 January 1997, a new Criminal Code has come into force. Art. 189, “the unlawful export of technologies, scientific-technical information and services, used in the development of weapons of mass destruction, armaments and military equipment” provides for punishment ranging from fines to prison sentences of from three to seven years. In accordance with Art. 355, “the manufacture and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” may entail a prison sentence of from 5 to 10 years. Art. 188 contains a new specification of contraband goods, the movement of which across the frontiers of the RF is subject to special regulations. These goods are either very dangerous or of particular importance and include radioactive or explosive substances, arms, explosive devices, firearms or munitions, nuclear, chemical, biological or other types of WMD and materials and equipment which can be used for the development of WMD. The smuggling of these goods is punished by a prison sentence of 5–10 years and, if it is done by an organised group, from 7 to 12 years with confiscation of property. In 1997–1998, a number of criminal investigations were instituted into violations of the export control regime.

A bill on Export Control has been introduced in the State Duma, which codifies the regulating system for dual-use goods and technologies. An important government decision has been taken to implement comprehensive control in Russia (a “catch-all” clause) which we shall describe in detail below.

The decision-making process

The export control system presupposes the setting up of a corresponding, organisational-administrative structure in the framework of which should be a division of rights and duties. The state agencies, responsible for taking decisions in the export control sphere should have
the capability of providing the political and technical evaluation of a deal as well as administrative competence to carry out control.

In Russia the following structure has been created to take decisions.

In Russia, according to the Constitution, it is the President who is responsible for foreign policy, including policy in respect of the non-proliferation of WMD. In the field of export control, the President approves and signs the control lists and issues decrees and directives. He has the right to veto laws passed by the Federal Assembly (FA).

The Federal Assembly ratifies treaties and adopts laws. In 1995, after long delays, the FA passed the law on state regulation of foreign trade activity and the law on the use of atomic energy and, in 1998, the law on military-technical co-operation of the Russian Federation with other states. The State Duma (SD) tries from time to time to play a more active role in the decision-making process in the field of export control. The introduction of a draft law on export control in the SD may give a new impulse to these ambitions. Thus, when the draft law on state regulation of foreign trade activity was debated in the SD, the Committee on Economic Policy introduced an amendment. It required every control list to be passed as a separate law (in other words, the State Duma wanted to take the prerogative of confirming the lists away from the President). After the President had vetoed this, as a result of the work of a conciliation commission, the mechanism for adopting control lists was not changed. The Government submits to the President the lists for adoption.

The Government elaborates the lists and submits them for signing to the President, issues directives setting out the procedure for the export and import of sensitive goods and technologies and takes decisions on holding negotiations with foreign countries in respect of co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical field.

The Export Control Commission co-ordinates state export control policy for the purpose of non-proliferation of WMD. The Commission is responsible for the organisational-methodical supervision and inter-branch co-ordination in the field of export control. The Deputy Heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Science and Technology, Economy, Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Atomic Energy, the Russian Space Agency, the State Customs Committee, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Security Service, the Federal Supervisory Service for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and the Russian Academy of Sciences are members of the Commission. The composition of the Commission changes as the executive structures are reorganised. A reorganisation of ministries, in 1998, has also affected the structure of the Commission.
The working body of the Commission is the Directorate of export control of the Federal Service of Currency and Export Control (FSCEC). It fulfils the function of implementing export control in the RF. It is this body which elaborates corresponding draft documents for the government and draws up control lists. This Directorate provides expertize of license applications and submits its conclusions on the possibility of concluding contracts for the supply of nuclear goods and the export of sensible, dual-use goods.

The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (in 1998, its functions were transferred to the newly created Ministry of Industry and Trade) has been responsible for issuing all licenses. The Directorate for the regulation of foreign economic activity of the Ministry examines applications for licenses, in the first place, from the point of view of their economic expediency. It sets up data banks of licenses issued and violations of export regulations, supplies information to exporters, issues import certificates and end-user certificates and takes part in negotiations and consultations on questions of export control. The Ministry has the right to impose administrative sanctions (suspend or annul licenses) on those who have violated the regulations.

The Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) reviews all contracts and agreements concluded by enterprises, subordinate to it and takes part in drawing up the control lists of goods and technologies used for nuclear purposes. In accordance with Russian legislation, Minatom gives its conclusions on the possibility of non-critical nuclear export and is the consultative body in respect of critical nuclear products and dual-use items applied for nuclear purposes.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for overseeing the international aspects of export control policy. It holds consultations on these questions with other departments, which take part in the decision-making process on export control. Representatives of the Ministry take part in negotiations and meetings with multilateral groups and regimes. Through the Ministry’s channels requests are transmitted by Russian exporters for on-site inspections abroad if there are doubts that the sensitive goods are not used for the declared purposes.

The Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service have special departments responsible for non-proliferation and export control matters. The departments provide consultations and information to other state bodies, involved in the decision-making process in the field of export control.

The Ministry of Defence has set up within its framework a Committee on Export Control. Decisions on the possibility of exporting dual-use goods are taken by the Export Control Commission on the basis of the results of inter-departmental examination of the circumstances
surrounding individual deals with the mandatory participation of the MOD.

The Customs verifies the conformity of the export license with the custom declaration. It issues a certificate confirming the delivery of imported goods. In 1995, in the framework of 18 regional administrative offices of the State Customs Committee divisions have been set up for non-tariff regulation and export controls.

The procedure for export from the RF of dual-use goods and technologies, declared to be used for non-military purposes envisages: consultation between the Export Control Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on draft international agreements of the RF on the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies; preparation and submission of conclusions on the possibility of exporting dual-use goods and technologies; licensing the export of the corresponding goods and technologies; customs control and customs procedures.

In accordance with Russian legislation, the licensing process also requires inter-departmental consultation. The Directorate of export control of the Federal Service of Currency and Export Control, after inter-departmental examination, gives its conclusions on the possibility of exporting dual-use goods. The decision on the possibility of exporting dual-use goods, on the list of the Wassenaar Arrangement, is taken with the mandatory participation of the Ministry of Defence. The FSCEC maintains close links with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consulting with it on political and international aspects. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, on the basis of its own expert knowledge, issues all export licenses. If the available information on the partners in a deal raises doubts various law-enforcement, customs or military agencies may be consulted.

It is only natural that various state bodies have their own departmental interests. Sometimes, this leads to controversy between them and struggle for authorities in export controls.

Thus, in 1996, the decision was taken to disband the Federal Service of Currency and Export Control, but a few months later this decision was rescinded. The Head of the export control directorate of the FSCEC was promoted to the rank of Deputy Chairman of the Export Control Commission and the Commission was given the status of, not just an interdepartmental, but of a governmental one. This strengthened the position of those responsible for export control in the hierarchy of the Executive. Judging from various reports, lobbying to subordinate the FSCEC to this or that ministry is still continuing.

In the nineties, the issuing mechanism of licenses changed a few times. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade instituted, for the convenience of exporters, the regional authorized offices that
accepted all applications locally and, after approval by the federal Ministry (and corresponding departmental consultations), technically issued the license. Permits for nuclear exports were always issued in Moscow only, by the office of the Central Region. Later, in order to strengthen control, all licenses for goods on the international lists were technically also issued by this office. In 1998 the Department of regulation of the foreign trade activity of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade again took on this function, arguing the need to make control more effective. Undoubtedly, this will provoke criticism on the part of exporters who complain of the complication of the licensing procedure.

In 1998, the disbanding of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade was announced and the formation, on the basis of various structures, of a new Ministry of Industry and Trade, which assumed the functions of the old Ministry, including the licensing. The disbanding of the Ministry was delayed, however, in the first place, because of the lack of clarity as to which Ministry should issue licenses for the delivery of armaments for which contracts had been concluded and supervise military-technical co-operation between Russia and foreign countries.

It should be noted that, in 1997–1998, the Export Control Commission began to be convened on a more regular basis. On its agenda were questions of a strategic nature (drafting a new law on export control, the implementation of internal compliance programs in organizations) as well as urgent questions (in particular, the July meeting was devoted to investigations in cases of infringement of the export control regime).

Efforts are continuing to enhance the effective functioning of the customs services. In 1993–1995, their technical basis was broadened and their staff increased. The year 1998 saw the strengthening of internal discipline. The federal law on service in the customs agencies of the Russian Federation raised conditions to the level of other law-enforcement agencies and brought them nearer to those in the system of the Ministry of the Interior. The new Head of the State Customs Committee V. Draganov signed an order to set up an operational centre for the fight against crime and customs violations. These processes are not directly connected with non-proliferation of WMD, though the Customs Service is one of the most important and vulnerable links in the national system of export control. Its strengthening will contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of export control. It should be stressed, however, that the situation in the custom service is only a reflection of the general social-economic situation in the country.
Adherence to the multilateral export control regime

Russia is, at present, faced with the problem of working out a strategy of export control in the context of a reassessment of national security, in many ways similar to that in other developed countries. How to evaluate the effectiveness of export control? How to conciliate the contradictory tasks of promoting national goods on the world markets with observance of the international obligations on non-proliferation of WMD, the development of international, technological co-operation (presupposing among other things access to foreign technologies) and limitations on the transfer of one’s own “critical” technologies.

Russia is consistently opposed to any “black lists” of “rogue states”. It considers that when there is a possibility of exports to any country these should only be restricted by UN sanctions and membership of treaties and agreements on non-proliferation and that the introduction of any other limitations can only undermine the international non-proliferation regime.

Some Western experts, especially in the USA, try to put in doubt the consistency of the Russian policy course directed at strict observance of the regulations of multilateral agreements on export control. At present, the greatest tension is caused by the question of Russia’s adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The USA suspects that these technologies are finding their way from Russia to Iran. Russian officials deny these allegations. The Head of the Russian Space Agency, Yuri Koptev, admitted that certain organisations in the country had had contacts in connection with the supply of dual-use technologies to Iran, but he stressed that these attempts had at once been stopped by the state and, therefore, any talk of alleged deliveries of missile technologies to Teheran was far-fetched. Yuri Koptev pointed out, in particular, that “on a state level, Russia categorically does not take part in supplying any missile technologies, not only to Iran, but to other countries either and fully observes the non-proliferation regime of these technologies”.

Similar assurances were given by the Russian Prime Minister at the March 1997 meeting of the American-Russian Commission on economic and technical co-operation.

Export control policy should not be considered outside the context of the non-proliferation problem, which does not enjoy in

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Russia’s national security interests such a high priority as in Western states. Non-proliferation questions are not considered to be of great importance in the SD either. Many deputies do not see a real threat to Russia’s security even if its neighbours, in particular, in the South, acquire “sensitive” technologies.

Part of the Russian political establishment has arrived at the conclusion that the West uses export control to undermine the position of Russian exporters on the world markets. The USA attempts to force Russia to renounce certain foreign contacts, in particular, for the building of a light-water reactor in Iran (in the town of Bushehr), but at the same time the West supports the supply of a similar reactor to North Korea, though Russia abandoned that market for political reasons. It is quite probable that a flexible policy towards North Korea, under certain conditions, will turn out to be more productive in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime than a boycott. In the Russian government the opinion predominates that an uncompromising policy in respect of a number of other states is also ineffective. Whether Russia would be able to influence the policies of such partners as Iran by concluding agreements on technical co-operation with it, is another question.

It should be noted that a number of leading American experts are working out models of possible positive changes in the relations of the USA, both with India and Iran. That is always a symptom that the US political establishment has “matured” and is ready “at the right moment” to seek a compromise and rapprochement. An example of this is provided not only by North Korea, but also by China. At the end of 1997, the USA Secretary of Defense, W. Cohen, during a visit to China, promoted the sale of American military equipment to that country. All this against a background of a sharp condemnation of this kind of co-operation between Russia and China. This policy of double standards does not serve to strengthen confidence between countries.

In spite of the fact that Russia has become an equal partner in the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that it still meets with discriminating barriers on the part of its other partners in respect of the acquisition of advanced technologies.

At the same time, the importance of export control in order to further non-proliferation of WMD and the maintenance of stability in the world, in accordance with the international obligations of the RF, has noticeably risen in the list of Russia’s national priorities, in the course of the last year.

Russian officials carefully investigate all cases of infringement. An investigation is under way in connection with attempts to export to Iran a consignment of high-quality, alloyed steel under false
documentation through Azerbaijan. The Russian special services have also become more active. In April of this year, the Court found two officials, belonging to a defence scientific-research institute in Tula, guilty of trying to conclude a contract with a firm in one of the CIS countries for the development of electronic guidance systems for missiles “presumably in the interest of a third country”. A Russian citizen was arrested in St. Petersburg while attempting to smuggle out of the country samples of dual-use materials. Unfortunately not many cases have reached the Courts. One of the reasons for this, in the view of experts, is the imperfection of Russian legislation and the fact that certain articles in different laws contradict each other. In particular, the absence, in article 188 of the Criminal Code, of the notion “delivery means” of WMD was the reason why the case of smuggling gyroscopes to Iraq collapsed.

The Russian government has taken a number of measures, in 1997–1998, which show that Russia is determined to strengthen confidence in its export control policy.

On 2 September 1997 the President issued decree no. 972 “On measures in respect of the implementation by the Russian Federation of the resolution of the UN Security Council related to the setting up of an international mechanism of permanent monitoring and control of deliveries to Iraq”. The decree approved a special list of dual-use goods and technologies and other items, the export of which to Iraq is subject to control and notification or is prohibited. On its basis, the government approved the Procedures for controlling the exports to Iraq of dual-use goods and technologies, and other items subject to international permanent monitoring and control mechanism (Government decree no. 1403 of 7 November 1997).

The Export Control Commission has begun an investigation of infringements of the export control regulations by such organisations as the scientific centre INOR, the Research Institutes “Grafit” and “Polius”, the “Tikhomirov Institute”, “GlavKosmos”, the “Komintern” factory (Novosibirsk) the “MOSO” company, the Baltic State Technical University and the “Yevropalas 2000” company. This is the first investigation on such a scale. Basing himself, in part, on this investigation, the President of the USA signed a directive prohibiting the importation into the USA of the production of seven Russian organisations and any financial or technical assistance to them on the part

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of American private or state bodies. Moscow reacted painfully to the introduction of these sanctions. There is understanding, however, of the fact that these sanctions may help to prevent the passing of a law which would introduce automatic sanctions against foreign companies which transfer sensitive technologies and materials to Iraq, especially as the degree of reliability of the information on violations is not defined in the law.

In conditions of transparent frontiers and closely interwoven economic links with former Soviet republics, Russia attaches much importance to the co-ordination of export control policies with them. On 26 June 1992, the Heads of Government of the CIS states signed an agreement, in Minsk, on co-ordination of questions related to the export control of raw materials, materials, equipment, technologies and services, which may be used for the manufacture of WMD and missiles for their delivery. This important agreement remained, in fact, only a declaration, although Russia initiated a number of meetings and, had it been approached, would have helped to set up national export control systems. Recently Russia has decided to try and reanimate this important agreement. In October 1997 a meeting of the CIS states was held to co-ordinate the export control system. It was proposed to set up a working group on export control under the aegis of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the CIS states.

The use of the catch-all principle in regulating the export of sensitive goods

In order to improve further the export control mechanism of dual-use good and services, the Government has given instructions to establish catch-all control rules. This means that Russian participant in foreign trade transactions should refrain from export deals with any dual-use goods and services, not subject to the control lists, in cases where it is known to them that these goods and services will be used in the development or operational use of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons or means for their delivery and inform the Export Control Commission of their decision. In cases where the exporters have grounds to suppose that the goods to be supplied by them may be used for the specified purposes, they are obliged to address inquiries to the Commission.5

5 Government decree of 22 January 1998, no. 57 “On reinforced control of the export of dual-use goods and services related to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems”.
Undoubtedly, Russia, like other countries, will be confronted with difficulties in the practical implementation of these instructions. There are differences in the interpretation and application of the catch-all principle between various countries. A heavy burden rests on the intelligence services. At present, as has already been noted, they have intensified their activities in investigating violations.

**Interaction between the state and business**

The Export Control Commission has worked out and published the Methodical Guidelines for setting up within Russian organizations, internal compliance export control systems.

Enterprises are strongly recommended to appoint a member of their staff responsible for export control questions. He should be directly subordinated to the Head of the firm and have sufficient powers to effectively carry out his functions, including the right to halt export deals in case any circumstances arise which may lead to violation of Russian legislation or neglect of its international obligations. The person responsible for export controls should be appointed to a position in the firm in which he is independent of departments responsible for commercial sales.

The functions of the internal export control department of the firm include screening foreign trade deals, ensuring the implementation of the export control requirements when the firm is participating in international exhibitions, conferences and seminars, instructing the firm’s employees in export control questions, drafting documents necessary to obtain, in the prescribed order, export licenses and other permits issued by the competent agencies and keeping export control documentation. The Guidelines are supplemented with instructions of how to verify the end user and a list of indications pointing to the risk of a possible diversion of the goods to an unauthorised destination.

Within the general context of enhancing the commercial skills of Russian businessmen, it is very important to acquaint them with the regulations and norms, practised in world trade. Instruction in the regulations and principles of export control occupies a special place. Exporters should not only know how the system of export control functions (aims, legislation, licensing mechanism, responsibilities), but be clearly aware of why the state is prepared to accept certain restrictions on foreign trade in order to prevent the proliferation of WMD and maintain international stability, what the advantages are of adhering to the accepted norms and the negative effect of violating the export control

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regulations. Only in that case can the co-operation between industry and the state be effective.

Government agencies, having set up the export control regime, have done nothing, in its first stage, to train exporters in this sphere. The last two years have seen a beneficial change in the mentality of the representatives of government departments. They have begun to pay greater attention to questions of co-operation with business and industry. They are now quite ready to speak at seminars and conferences, organised by independent centres. The MOD and Minatom attach particular importance to the question of developing internal compliance export control programs in large enterprises and organizations. State agencies have begun to pay attention to training. Minatom has been particularly active in promoting the instruction of representatives of enterprises, subordinate to it. In 1997 and 1998, it organised a number of scientific-practical conferences.

NGOs, in many ways, assumed the task of training exporters. The non-governmental the Center of Export Control (CEC) has worked out and implemented, in recent years, a strategic training program for Russian enterprises. In 1998 seminars and conferences were organised on practical questions connected with export control in Moscow (together with the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Russian Space Agency), St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Nizhni Novgorod and Tula. The Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center) put the emphasis on instructing those who take part in decision-making in the sphere of export controls. In 1997 PIR Center together with the University of Georgia (USA) organised a seminar for deputies and the administrative staff of the State Duma on the theme: “Export Control in the Russian Federation: situation and prospects for legislation “. Deputies, members of the administrative staff and official and independent experts were invited. Another seminar was organised – on export control in the sphere of technology used in the production of arms and military equipment (representatives of various departments being invited).

The monthly journal Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control), published by PIR Center, informs public opinion on non-proliferation of WMD in Russia and the NIS (including questions of export control). The journal is distributed free of charge to various departments, concerned with the problems analysed. Very important, from an educational point of view, is the regular publication of the bulletin Export Control in Russia by the CEC.

Unfortunately, the government agencies themselves do very little in the way of distributing materials on the issues of export controls. In many ways, this is due to lack of funding. Legislative acts (without reviews) are published in the “Compendium of Enactments” and partly in
Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The exporters have difficulty keeping track of all the decrees concerning export controls.

In the last two years there have been more publication in the press and on television on questions of the non-proliferation of WMD. The mass media, however, are still little involved in explaining the national policy on export control and the tasks of the international regimes.

A no less important step towards enhancing the effectiveness of the export control system is the training program for graduates of institutes and universities. For instance, in the teaching plans of the graduate courses of the Moscow Physical-Engineering Institute a special course is included on “The international, political, legal and economic aspects of nuclear safety”. (This course envisages lectures and seminars on export control questions). The expediency of organising and conducting such courses is determined by the fact that a number of students, when graduating from technical institutes of higher education, will start working for companies which produce and export nuclear and dual-use goods, materials and technologies. It is quite probable that many young specialists will, in the near future already, be confronted with problems of export controls. Such courses in higher educational institutions will make it possible to enhance, in a short time, the quality of the staff of ministries, departments and enterprises.

Russian Customs Academy has been opened which prepares specialists for the Customs Service – this is the first higher educational establishment of its kind.

The further evolution of the national export control regime will, naturally, depend on the political and economic situation in the country and the general geopolitical situation in the world.

17.2. Federal law on export control**

On 22 June 1999, the SD passed the Federal law “On Export Control”, which was signed by the President of the RF on 28 June. It laid down the principles of the implementation of state policy in this sphere: conscientious observance of the international obligations of the RF pertaining to the non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles and to the control of exports of military and dual-use products; the legality, transparency, and accessibility of export control information; the priority of state security interests; the performance of export control to

the degree necessary for the attainment of its goals; the unity of the customs territory of the RF; harmonisation of the procedures and regulations with generally recognised international norms and practices; interaction with international organisations and foreign states in the sphere of export control for the purpose of strengthening international security and stability and preventing the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems.

The 1999 law filled some gaps in the legal basis of the country. It developed Art. 16 of the 1995 federal law on state regulation of foreign trade activity by detaching export control for the purpose of non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery and the maintenance of international stability as a special sector of state regulation.

The Law widened the area of control, codifying such a notion as “foreign economic activity”, which is defined as foreign trade, investment and other activity, including cooperative production, in the international exchange of goods, information, work, services, the results of intellectual activities, including the exclusive rights to them (intellectual property”).

The new law contains articles enhancing the status of some export control mechanisms, which were earlier set up by government decrees. Thus Art. 20 codifies catch-all regulation. If previously the state recommended the development of internal compliance export control programs in organizations, this has now become mandatory for organizations conducting scientific and / or for production activity for the satisfaction of federal state defence needs and regularly eaning income from foreign economic operations with controlled goods and technologies.

The responsibility of Russian organisations increased since the identification of the goods and technologies subject to control has become an obligation of the Russian participant in foreign economic transactions (Art. 24).

The Law envisages the possibility of obtaining a general export license (i.e. a license specifying the quantity of goods without identifying the specific users). Up to now, general licenses could be approved by a government decision only for reliable suppliers of non-critical nuclear products; for the export of dual-use controlled goods, only a one-time license was issued. A general license may be issued to a Russian legal entity, that has set up an internal compliance program and received the official certificate of state accreditation.

The American export control system widely uses the method of the carrot and the stick. The role of the former is played by general and specific licenses, the granting of which encourages reliable suppliers to strictly follow the rules. In Russia, the need is beginning to be felt for closer interaction with industry and the creation of mutual confidence in
order to enhance the effectiveness of export control. A general license could be an instrument to achieve this aim.

Attention should be drawn to Art. 25. It envisages the possibility of introducing prohibitions and restrictions of “foreign economic activity with goods, information, work, services and the results of intellectual activities, that could be used in the development of WMD, their delivery systems, and other types of armaments and military equipment”. Such prohibitions and restrictions are instituted: a) pertaining to certain foreign states in the interest of the national security of the Russian Federation, by federal law; b) pertaining to the international obligations of the RF, by Presidential decrees; c) pertaining to certain foreign entities, by Government decrees.

Art. 11 is devoted to the activities of a special authorized federal executive body in the sphere of export control. At present, government departments are working out a normative basis in order to bring it in conformity with the new law.

17.3. Export control in Russian-American relations***

One of the priorities in current relations between Russia and the USA is the question of export control for the purpose of promoting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their systems vehicles and the maintenance of international stability.

Great progress has been made in co-operation on this question, though, at the same time, a considerable number of grievances against each other are expressed, often in a very emotional way. Co-operation between Russia and Iran and the building project of the “Kudan Kulam” atomic power station in India worry the USA. Russia is wary of these grievances and considers that the USA is intending on pushing Russia exporters out of the advanced-technology market. In its turn, Russia has repeatedly raised the question of the continuing discriminatory regime in respect of the supply of American advanced-technological goods to our country.

Why has the export control regime, being one of the components of the international WMD non-proliferation regime (and not a crucial one, it would seem), put such a deep imprint on relations between the two states in the second half of the nineties? A number of factors explain this phenomenon:

there exists a close interconnection between all the components of the WMD non-proliferation regime;

export control acts in two manifestations: it is a measure of non-tariff regulation of foreign trade and, at the same time, an important foreign policy instrument, which affects, in various ways, national interests;

all countries participating in the multilateral export control regime are confronted with the dilemma of how to conciliate compliance with international obligations to restrict exports with the economic interest of promoting national products on the world markets;

export control exercises substantial influence on the international transfer of advanced technologies and, in this way, on the competitiveness of many companies and countries;

multilateral export control regimes are based on national legislation and mechanisms of the participating countries and these have their own specificity;

export control regimes were set up in the cold war years and up to now they are regarded by a part of society as a weapon of confrontation, although the mechanisms were adapted to fulfil the new objectives of preventing the spread of WMD;

national export control systems cannot but be susceptible to the general economic and political situation in the country and the world.

There is a close interdependence between all the components of the international WMD non-proliferation regime. This includes such elements as corresponding multilateral international treaties, bilateral treaties on disarmament (for example, the START I), bilateral agreements (in particular, between the IAEA and states in connection with the requirements of the NPT), multilateral export control regimes (the Zangger Committee, the NSG, the MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the AG).

Russia inherited from the USSR membership of the Zangger Committee, the NSG and it became a full member of the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement. What are the advantages of Russia’s membership of these regimes? Firstly, co-operation between various states helps to strengthen international and national security. Secondly, joining an agreement makes it possible to take part in the shaping of a collective policy. Thirdly, the partners exchange important, often confidential, information. Fourthly, companies belonging to member-states can be certain that they will be treated in favourable manner. Fifthly, the American export control policy is not so severe in respect of partners in agreements. Finally, it is important for Russia that co-operation in the export control sphere facilitates its integration in the world economy.
Multilateral regimes do not deny the right of “third countries” to acquire advanced technologies and do not pursue the aim of prohibiting their international transfer, but to prevent their use for the manufacture of weapons, which threaten stability and peace. Parties to agreements base themselves on recommended, international lists and guiding principles when examining the possibility of specific, foreign economic transactions. Each country, however, interprets these principles from the standpoint of its national interests. The introduction of sanctions against violators also depends on national legislation.

In the terminology of the World Trade Organisation, export control belongs to non-tariff measures of foreign economic regulation. At the same time, export control occupies a special place in this regulation since it is also an important instrument in foreign policy. Each country resolves the conflict of interests in its own way.

The USA possesses a well-functioning and developed export control system. Two key differences may be distinguished between the export control systems of Russia and the USA. Firstly, in the USA, apart from the lists of commodities, subject to control, there exist lists of “countries subject to control”. To be more exact, all countries are divided into groups in respect of which different degrees of severity are applied. Some of Russia’s traditional trading partners are on the “black list”. Secondly, US laws contain a clause, which envisages extraterritorial application of sanctions against violators of American legislation. The use of these instruments leads to conflict situations.

The RF and the USA are confronted with the serious dilemma of how to conciliate the contradictory objectives of stimulating export and its limitation in the interest of international security. Both directions are important strategic objectives of the two states.

Lobbying to soften the export restrictions is very intense in all countries. In the USA it is even more intense than in Russia, because in the USA there exists a well-oiled mechanism of participation of industry in the shaping of export control policy. As a result of historic development, the possibilities of the American state for direct intervention in private business is limited. Nevertheless, the country follows a most severe policy in the field of export control, retaining up to now unilateral restrictions, which, without any doubt, undermine the competitiveness of American exporters on the world markets. The truth of the matter is that the USA has succeeded in forming public opinion in support of export control policy for the purpose of WMD non-proliferation and maintaining international stability. These problems rank very high in the hierarchy of US national security interests.
For Russian producers of advanced-technological goods any limitations on foreign economic transactions are particularly distressing in view of the serious, economic situation in the country.

At the same time, the RF is continuing to improve its national export control system, in part, under the influence of the USA.

Russian and US legislation provide for punishment of national exporters who violate the export control regulations. However, as has already been noted, the USA has adopted a number of laws, which give the Administration the possibility of imposing sanctions on foreign producers and states supplying sensitive goods and technologies to countries on the American “black list”. The Congress has approved a number of bills, which require the mandatory application of sanctions in case of certain actions on the part of other states. Thus, in 1981, a provision (the Glenn Amendment) was adopted requiring the cessation of assistance to non-nuclear states which have carried out a nuclear explosion. In 1994 a new amendment was introduced which widened the sanctions (in particular refusal to grant loans and credits both on the part of government agencies and of international institutions). The American Administration was obliged to apply these sanctions against India and Pakistan after these two states had conducted nuclear tests. The President is also empowered to impose certain penalties in respect of foreign violators of the export control regulations at his own discretion.

In June 1998, President Clinton vetoed a draft law, adopted by the Congress, which envisaged sanctions against Russia in connection with accusations of deliveries of missile technologies to Iran. In order to pacify the Congress, the Administration issued a directive confirming sanctions against a number of Russian organisations. President may lift these sanctions if the suspected organisation can prove that it is not involved in transactions with Iran. The application of unilateral sanctions is, today, one of the principal instruments of American foreign policy. This raises the question of how effective economic sanctions are in contemporary circumstances.

Attempts by the USA to obtain the agreement of the international community to introduce sanctions against India and Pakistan, after these countries had carried out nuclear tests, in fact, failed. The USA itself acted inconsistently. At first, in May, it forbade American banks to grant credits and suspended financial and trade assistance. In addition, Washington demanded of the IMF and the World Bank that they ceased any kind of assistance to India and Pakistan except humanitarian aid. In June, under pressure of the farmer’s lobby, the US Administration succeeded in reaching agreement with the Congress and continued food credits. In October a law was adopted allowing to the administration to waiver the introduction of most sanctions for 12 months (this does not
apply to prohibitions on arms deliveries). This measure was inspired by the idea that sanctions hit, in the first place, national exporters. In addition, according to expert calculations, Pakistan, a traditional ally of the USA in South-East Asia, suffers most from the sanctions. At the same time, this measure gives the USA the possibility of manipulating with sanctions and uses them as an instrument of barter.

There is a number of objective factors, which undermine the effectiveness of the export control system and call for the need to revise many elements of this policy, in particular, sanctions.

Firstly, objective economic trends, in the first place, the information revolution and the internationalisation of scientific-technical knowledge undermine the effectiveness of sanctions, especially if they are unilateral. Scientific-technical progress speeds up the “international diffusion” of advanced technologies. New suppliers of advanced-technological products appear on the world markets. The creation of international information networks strengthens global links. At the same time, all these factors render sanctions, in general, and unilateral sanctions, in particular, ever more ineffective, since the “punished” can ultimately acquire analogous items and technologies on the expanding world markets.

Secondly, the civilian sector has overtaken the military in some areas of generating the latest technologies that also have important military applicability, particularly in computer production. That is why, sanctions affect practically all producers of science-intensive goods. All this provokes growing resistance to restrictions on trade in the country, which imposes sanctions. The USA may be accused of adopting a policy of “double standards” though the Administration is forced, whether it wants to or not, to apply “double standards” seeking to conciliate the interests of exporters and foreign policy objectives.

Thirdly, sanctions compel the other side to develop its own production of sensitive goods. Thus, after Russia, under US pressure, had almost ceased to supply India with cryogenic boosters (by removing from the contract supplies of corresponding technologies), the Indians concentrated their efforts on stimulating their indigenous sources in order to develop the missile-space sector.

Fourthly, account should be taken of the voting in the UNGA, in the autumn of 1998, on a resolution appealing to abrogate laws, envisaging unilateral, extraterritorial sanctions.

At the same time, the accelerating processes of globalisation strengthen the dependence of individual national economies on world economic links. Access to foreign technology and information is a most important factor in maintaining both national competitiveness and national security. From a long-term standpoint it is this factor which
becomes critical. India was ready for international sanctions after its nuclear tests and, in contrast to Pakistan, suffered only slightly from their application. India is very interested in attracting foreign capital (in the first place in science-intensive branches) as well as in access to foreign technologies. This will encourage it to seek compromises.

The carrot and the stick remain, in this day, the traditional tools of foreign policy and they will not disappear soon. A debate is going on as to which of these two instruments is the most effective and in which proportion they should be used. Some analysts support the policy of sanctions, looking on them as the “last refuge” from the use of military force.

American sanctions are becoming a strong irritant in Russian-American relations. The Russian Prosecutor’s Office investigated, in the summer of 1999, a number of enterprises and organisations against which US sanctions were directed and did not discover any violations of the national regulations on export control.

Unfortunately, export control policy, for the purpose of non-proliferation of WMD, however paradoxically this may sound, is excessively politicised. Decisions are often taken not so much in order to attain foreign policy objectives, or in the interest of national security as for internal political considerations. This is a very dangerous development, which may damage the international, non-proliferation regime. Unilateral sanctions undermine the international legal space created with so much difficulty.

It is important to understand the specific nature of decision-making in the two countries. The difference in approach between Russia and the USA should be objectively assessed, but not be made absolute. The measure of common interests is too great.

17.4. Export control in conditions of administrative reform

The coming to power in the country of a new president in Russia poses two questions. Firstly, should one expect changes, in principle, in the WMD non-proliferation policy and export control, all the more so, as in Russia, it is the President of the RF who, in accordance with the Constitution, is responsible for foreign policy? Secondly, in how far does the reorganisation of the administrative structures influence the already created and functioning mechanism of export control?

The following aspects should be borne in mind.

Four regimes may be singled out in the Russian system of export control. Firstly, control of the trade in armaments and military hardware. Secondly, restrictions on foreign economic transactions in goods and technologies that can be used in the development of armaments, weapons of mass destruction or their delivery vehicles. Thirdly, the introduction of foreign trade quotas and licensing in order to attain certain internal, economic or external, economic objectives.Fourthly, control of specific exports and imports (precious stones, metals, substances with narcotic content etc) subject to licensing. The mechanism of confirming licenses for various lists, however, has its own specificity. This is quite natural since each of them pursues different objectives. Control of foreign trade of purely nuclear goods, as well of dual-use goods and technologies, is introduced by the state as a component of the non-proliferation policy and the maintenance of international stability. The 1999 law on export control assigned the term “export control” to precisely that sphere of state regulation.

A multileveled mechanism has been set up in Russia for decision-making in the field of export control. Nevertheless, no mechanism for balancing the interests of various groups in shaping export control policy has been worked out so far in Russia.

Apart from a decision-making hierarchy the export control system presupposes the creation, a corresponding bureaucratic infrastructure. This means the organisation of corresponding sections within departments as well as a division of rights and duties between the state agencies involved in the licensing process. From the point of view of their authorities, three groups of departments may be distinguished involved in export control: those responsible for issuing licenses; those responsible for giving official conclusions on the possibility of export; consulting departments. It is usually this level of authority, which is changed when the government changes.

In the course of the current reforms of the federal, executive agencies, the Federal Service of Currency and Export Control and the Ministry of Trade were disbanded. The export control function was transferred to the new Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT); in the framework of which the Export Control Department was set up. It is made up of officials from the former Export Control Directorate of the FSCEC and the Ministry of Trade specialising in export control questions. What is important is that the potential of professional specialists has been preserved and made use of. As before, the Department of non-tariff regulation which earlier issued licenses

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continues to function (it was moved from the former Ministry of Trade to the MEDT). Only after further elaboration of the normative, legal basis, will the mechanism for licensing become clear.

The 1999 law sets up an interdepartmental, co-ordinating body on export control and a specially empowered, federal, executive body for exports controls. In accordance with a Government decree, the latter functions were, before the administrative reforms, the responsibility of FSCEC; quite logically they are transferred to the Export Control Department of the new Ministry. At the time of writing this chapter, the staff of the interdepartmental co-ordinating body (the new Export Control Commission) is in the course of being recruited. The President should sign a decree instituting it\(^8\). The law introduces the notion “governmental expertise” on foreign economic transactions of goods, subject to control, but does not specify the procedure and conditions to be followed for such expertise. It looks very much as if the interdepartmental commission will be invested with these powers.

A great deal of work will have to be done on the normative basis in order to bring it into conformity with the new law. The ambiguous formulations are due to the instability of the executive branch.

Which questions can the reorganisation of the Executive branch resolve in the sphere of export control?

Firstly, there was strong rivalry for competencies in the export control system. The duties between departments and inside them were repeatedly redistributed. It is probable that the current reorganisation completes a stage in the redistribution of competencies.

Secondly, up to now a Russian exporter if he wanted to get permission to deliver goods, subject to control, had to apply to a number of agencies. The procedure of inter-departmental consultation was at many levels and extremely complicated. Now that the function of export control has been transferred to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, this Ministry will transmit the documents for inter-departmental consultation which, it is to be hoped, will simplify the licensing process for exporters. Judging by everything, the role of the Ministry of Justice in the export control system will be more clearly defined.

Thirdly, as has already been noted, the 1999 law detached export control of the goods and technologies, enumerated in the six control lists, corresponding to multilateral agreements, into a separate sector of state regulation. It is logical that, within the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the licensing function for these goods will be given to the newly created Department of Export Control and the

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\(^8\) In 2001 President Putin issued a decree instituting a new Export Control Commission.
Department of non-tariff regulation will continue, as before, to issue licenses for specific goods and good subject to quotas, although it will retain, for the time being, the function of issuing permits for the export of non-critical nuclear products.

The administrative reform greatly influenced the process of improving the legal basis. The new law contains articles, which enhance the status of some of the export control mechanisms, which formerly functioned on the basis of governmental or presidential decrees. At the same time, its adoption required a great deal of work on subsidiary legislation in order to bring them into conformity with the new law.

The announcement of presidential elections out of term halted the work on subsidiary legislation until such a time, as the new structure of the executive branch would become clear. At the time of writing this chapter, the draft provisions, enumerated above are in the stage of interdepartmental consultation.

As far as the decision-making hierarchy is concerned, it may be supposed that the President, through his Administration, will take a more active part in this process. It is indicative that the RF Security Council plays an ever-greater role in the shaping of policy of non-proliferation and export control. In 1988 already, the former President Boris Yeltsin, gave direct instructions to the Secretary of the RF Security Council to deal with questions related to the adjustment of the Russian export control system.9. In the past year, the Security Council has intensified its activity in this sphere. A number of meetings with the heads of the departments concerned have been held under its auspice. The Council assumes more and more the function of maintaining contact with officials of foreign countries, responsible for questions of non-proliferation of WMD.

This tendency to submit decisions to the Presidential Administration is clearly visible in the evolution of the export control system in respect of armaments. When the new government was formed, questions of so-called military-technical co-operation (MTC) were transferred to the competence of the Ministry of Industry and Science. Already on 4 November 2000, however, the President of the RF in a decree took the function of controlling deliveries of arms and military equipment away from the Ministry of Industry and Science and transferred it to the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of Defense, although a member of the Government, is directly responsible to the President as Commander in Chief.

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9 N. Uspensky “Export control – one of the key elements of national security”, Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control), PIR–Center, no. 3, 1999
When analyzing export control policy after the presidential elections clear elements of continuity can be noted. In the National Security Concept adopted in January 2000, the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime in respect of WMD and their delivery means is treated as one of the main tasks in the provision of national security.

Russia continues to take an active part in multilateral agreements on export control (the NSG, MTCR, and Wassenaar Arrangement) bringing the national lists in conformity with the international ones. In particular, on 29 February 2000, Presidental decree no. 6 was signed and, later, on August 2000, decree no. 1477, which introduced changes and addenda in the list of dual-use goods and technologies subject to control. These decrees were issued in order to ensure the implementation of the international obligations under the Wassenaar Arrangement.

In the year 2000, the Government has continued to work on improving the export control system. The emphasis was put on a number of directions enhancing the effectiveness of export control.

The state is trying to place all the channels of international technology transfers under control. In the 1995 law on state regulation of foreign trade activity, export control was treated as a combination of measures to implement the “export procedure” for stated goods, technologies and services. The 1999 law defined more precisely the sphere of control, codified such a term as “foreign economic activity”.

Particular attention was paid to so-called intangible forms of transfer of technologies, including visual contacts (scientific conferences, meetings, discussions, scientific exchanges, public addresses, inspections, consultations, demonstrations, technical assistance, lectures, seminars, training, including the training of foreign students etc) and communication by electronic mail, fax and telephone. Interdepartmental meetings were held to discuss these issues. In May 2000, IMEMO together with the Center for Export Control (Moscow) and the Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia (USA) held a seminar “New challenges to export control in the 21st century: globalisation and control of intangible forms of technologies transfer” were organized. Discussions showed that the problem merits further elaboration and attention. Representatives of the scientific community, governmental departments in Russia, the CIS states, the USA and Western Europe stated their positions during these discussions. It will still require a lot of effort and intensified international co-operation to work out a single approach to this problem.

Work is continuing in Russia on the setting up of internal compliance programs in commercial organizations. NGOs play a significant role in propagating this idea. In particular one of them – the
Center for Export Control – has this year expanded geographically its network of training seminars.

On the first legal enactments signed by President Putin was Decree no. 822 of 6 May 2000, introducing changes in Decree no. 312 of 27 March 1992 on control of the export from the Russian Federation of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies which stated that export from the Russia of nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, installations and special non-nuclear materials, destined for their processing, use or production, to any NNWS, is only permitted on condition that the entire nuclear activity of that state is placed under the IAEA safeguards. At the same time, the issuing of this decree made it possible for the NSG to adopt a memorandum on full-scope safeguards. This memorandum provides, however, for the possibility of such supplies, in extraordinary circumstances, in order to ensure the safe operation of existing nuclear installations.

Decree no. 812 filled this hiatus in the Russian legal basis. It lays down: “In extraordinary circumstances, such exports from the Russian Federation to a state, non possessing nuclear weapons and not having placed its entire nuclear activity under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, may take place by an individual decision of the Government of the Russian Federation, provided the following conditions are observed:

the delivery does not violate the international obligations of the Russian Federation;

the government of the receiving state has given official assurances which exclude such use of the delivered materials, equipment and technologies as to lead to the development of a nuclear explosive devise;

the delivery is made exclusively in order to ensure the safe operation of nuclear installations, located on the territory of the receiving state;

the IAEA safeguards are applied to those installations. The Government of the RF has the right to impose additional conditions, necessary for such export.”

The decree received much comment, both at home and abroad. It is a question here not of any nuclear exports, but of deliveries exclusively to ensure the safe operation of existing nuclear installations. This does not contradict the Guidelines of the NSG, of which Russia is a member. The May decree supplemented the norms in force in Russia which

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regulate exports by the inclusion of the above-mentioned clause. This was particularly stressed by the representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Atomic Energy in their commentaries:\(^1\)

This poses the question, whether there exists a contract which incited the Minatom to lobby for the issuing of the May decree. There is no official confirmation, however, of the existence of such a contract:\(^2\)

Vladimir Putin uses every convenient opportunity to convince world public opinion of the idea that Russia adheres to the course of strengthening the export control regime and of preventing activities, which may lead to the proliferation of WMD.

In a joint statement the Presidents of Russia and the USA stressed that the international community is faced by the dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. They emphasized their determination to reverse this process, having recourse, among other things, to existing and possible, new international, legal mechanisms. Presidents agreed that the question of this emerging threat to security should be considered and resolved on the basis of mutual co-operation while taking into account each other’s security interests.”\(^3\)

It is important that, with the coming to power of the new leadership, the old channels for dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral level are not cut off. What is more, the Russian side showed its readiness to look for new ways of strengthening confidence between the partners in the international, non-proliferation regimes of WMD.

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\(^1\) From personal conversations with representatives of the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy.

\(^2\) In similar circumstances, in 1996, a provision was included in the Regulation on the procedure for nuclear exports, which lays down that the requirement of full-scope safeguards does not extend to contracts, treaties and agreements concluded before 4 April 1992 taken over from the NSG Guidelines. Referring to this proviso the Ministry of Atomic Energy began the construction of the atomic power station in Kudan Kulam (India). An agreement between the USSR and India on cooperation in the building of the atomic power station was signed on 27 September 1988. In 1989 India made an application to place this facility under IAEA safeguards. In the 1992 Regulation for nuclear exports (brought into force by government order no. 1005 of 21 December 1992) a clause containing the “grandfathered proviso” was not included. It appeared in the new Regulation on the procedure for export and import of nuclear materials, equipment, special non-nuclear materials and corresponding technologies, approved by the Government directive no. 574 of 8 May 1996.

\(^3\) The Joint statement of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the principles of strategic stability. "Rossiyskaya Gazeta", 6 June 2000
Appendix 17A

In order to improve further the export control mechanism of dual-use goods and services the Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

Russian partners in foreign trade transactions, irrespective of forms of property, will refrain from export deals in any dual-use goods and services, not subject to the normative, legal enactments of the Russian Federation on export control, in case, it is known to them that these goods and services will be used for the development or operational use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their delivery missiles (designing, production, testing etc) and will inform the Government Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation of their decision.

In case the Russian partners in foreign trade transactions have reason to suppose that these goods and services may be used for those purposes they should address corresponding inquiries to the Government Commission on Export Control of the Russian Federation.

The materials necessary for investigation of these inquiries will be sent for examination to the Federal Service of Currency and Export Control of Russia, which is responsible for ensuring the activities of the Government Commission on Export Control of the Russian Federation.

The Government Commission on Export Control of the Russian Federation, together with other interested Executive agencies, examine the inquiries of the partners in foreign trade transactions, submitted in accordance with para 1 of the present decree and send them a reply in writing.

The Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the RF, the Ministry of the Economy of the RF, the Russian Space Agency, the Federal Service of Russia for Currency and Export Control, the Federal Security Service of the RF and the Presidential Committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons shall ensure that the present decree is elucidated among the Russian partners in foreign trade transactions.

Appendix 17B

[Text as published by Itar-Tass]

Russia allows for exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies to countries which do not have nuclear armaments and have not put their activity under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but only in exceptional cases and on a number of conditions.

“In exceptional cases such exports from the Russian Federation to a country, which does not have nuclear armaments, and has not put all of its nuclear activity under guarantee of the International Atomic Energy Agency, can be done on particular resolutions of the Russian Cabinet under the following conditions:

– the supply does not run counter to the international commitments of the Russian Federations;
– the government of the importing country gives official assurances to exclude the use of supplied materials, equipment and technologies for works that may result in the creation of a nuclear explosive;
– the supply is made exclusively for the safe operation of nuclear facilities on territory of the importing country”.
18. PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

Gennadiy ZHUKOV

Addressing the UN Millennium Summit, on 6 September 2000, President Vladimir Putin proposed to hold under UN auspices in Moscow an international conference on the prevention of militarisation of outer space to cope with pressing problems in this field.

From the beginning of the space age, military considerations constituted key factors in the activities of states in this environment. Satellites with various functions (early warning, communication, data acquisition, reconnaissance and navigation) were actively used and continue to be used for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of the ground forces. These satellites are not weapons in the strict sense of the word since they do not pose a threat of an armed attack from outer space.

Moreover, they promote stability in international relations. For this reason reconnaissance and data acquisition satellites used for verifying compliance by states with arms limitation agreements are under international protection as national technical means of verification (NTM). Early warning satellites enjoy similar protection. Reliable and rapid communication for statesmen is organised in tense situations with the help of space facilities. In this way the probability of making incorrect decisions on reprisals in critical political situations is reduced. On the other hand, it is necessary to note that such satellite systems are closely connected with the activities of the armed forces.

In accordance with the rules of international law, NTM have obtained some kind of immunity from foreign interference, for example, from attempts to remove or put them out of order. It is forbidden to interfere with verification activities by using camouflage measures on the Earth. It is not allowed either to interfere with early warning systems or attack them.

Today the efforts of the international community are directed at prohibiting the development, testing, deployment and use of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), which are capable of damaging, putting out of order or destroying satellite systems of states, used for servicing the ground forces. From the point of view of international law, the use of this kind of weapons would be qualified as an armed attack against a state, with all the tragic consequences flowing from it.

A ban on ASAT would be the logical development of existing international agreements. These agreements impose on states legal
obligations to refrain from placing any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of WMD in outer space, as well as the development testing and deployment of the fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and the deployment of space-based ABM systems or their components.

The rules of international space law ban the placing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) only, in orbit around the Earth. This situation, from the point of view of international law, may be qualified as establishing a partial demilitarisation regime in outer space.

As the legal successor of the former USSR, Russia has assumed all its obligations contained in both multilateral and bilateral treaties on arms limitation and disarmament.

The process of the partial demilitarisation of outer space originated in the signing on 5 August 1963 in Moscow of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT).\(^1\) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature on 24 September 1996.\(^2\)

The significance of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty is that it prohibited any nuclear explosions in outer space. This prohibition discouraged the proliferation of the nuclear arms race in outer space and eliminated the hazards for the normal operation of satellites, which are very sensitive to electromagnetic impulses resulting from nuclear explosions in outer space. The 1963 Treaty has put an end to the contamination of “immediate” outer space by nuclear-test explosions, as well as prevented the use of this environment for experimental tests of X-ray lasers with nuclear pumping.

The 1963 PTBT, while protecting outer space from any nuclear explosions, did not contain prohibition on the placing of nuclear weapon there. This gap was filled by the conclusion of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) in 1967.\(^3\) Of particular importance is Art. 4 of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or their stationing in outer space in any other manner.

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The term WMD covers nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or other weapons comparable to them in destructive power, including those, which can be developed in the future.

The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of the Environmental Modification Techniques (Enmod Convention)\(^4\) plays an important role in establishing rules to curb the use of new means of warfare. The Convention defines both the term “environmental modification technique” and the boundaries, within which the Convention is applicable, including outer space. The Enmod Convention aims to constrain the threat of the so-called “geo-physical war”. It addresses some possible modifications of the environment through the use of special satellites. The Convention does, to a certain extent, protect satellites against interference resulting from disturbance of the environment, through which they travel. The Convention provides for consultations between parties to the Convention, or through the UN machinery. In particular, the convening of the Enmod Consultative committee of experts provides an appropriate means of verifying the compliance of the states with the obligations, which they assumed under the Convention.

However, discussions concerning various interpretations of the understandings reached during the negotiations, which define the terms “widespread”, “long-term” and ‘severe” consequences have not ceased to this day. Unfortunately, only 66 states have joined this Convention.

Bilateral agreements between Russia, as a legal successor to the former USSR, and the USA contain a number of limitations on military uses of outer space (both in a quantitative and a qualitative sense). Among these, the 1972 ABM Treaty is a significant arms limitation agreement.\(^5\)

The objective of the ABM Treaty is to limit defence systems designed to counter strategic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. The limitation covers the development, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems and/or their components (Art. 5). This provision helps to avert an arms race of this specific type of weaponry in outer space.

Recently, the US Administration started to press for the revision of this treaty to legitimise the creation of a prohibited, strategic BMD system.

Up to now, it has been a question of banning individual kinds of weapons in outer space. However, more far-reaching prohibitions on

militarisation have been laid down in the existing agreements concerning the Moon and other celestial bodies.

Pursuant to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the Moon and other celestial bodies should be used “for peaceful purposes only” and, therefore, any activity of a military character on them is prohibited. The approximate list of the kind of activity forbidden on the Moon and other celestial bodies (other than the Earth), includes a ban on placing any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres. The use of military personnel for scientific research or any other peaceful purposes as well as the use of any equipment or facility necessary for the peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies is not prohibited.

The list of possible forbidden kinds of weapons on the Moon and other celestial bodies was supplemented and extended by Art. 3 of the 1979 Agreement Governing Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. This agreement prohibits, along with the already listed kinds of forbidden activity, placing in orbit or other trajectory to or around the Moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as placing or using such weapons on the surface of the Moon or in the subsoil thereof.

The 1979 Agreement contains also a provision prohibiting any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the Moon. It is likewise prohibited to use the Moon in order to commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in relation to the Earth, the Moon, spacecraft, personnel of spacecraft or man-made space objects. It should be noted here, that the provisions of the 1979 Agreement apply also to other celestial bodies of the solar system (other than the Earth).

In legal terms the regime established for the Moon and other celestial bodies, may be qualified as complete demilitarisation. As to the “immediate outer space” environment, only a regime of partial demilitarisation is established. The law of the Russian Federation on space activity does not allow “space activity, forbidden by the international treaties, to which the Russian Federation is a party”.

The problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been debated at the sessions of General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) for decades. Since 1981 the GA adopted a number of resolutions containing recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament (1979–1983) and since 1984, – to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in

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Geneva to negotiate, as a matter of priority, a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In 1982 an item “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) was included in the agenda of the Committee of Disarmament. Since the conclusion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty the international community has not succeeded in reaching a uniform understanding on further measures to be undertaken to prevent an arms race in outer space. In 1985 an agreement was reached on the establishment of the ad hoc PAROS Committee within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The Committee has not become a permanent subsidiary body of the CD. Therefore, since 1984, GA resolutions have requested the CD to establish or re-establish the ad hoc Committee “...with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space”. In reality these negotiations have never started. Every year the agreement on the mandate of the PAROS Committee is subject to consultation.

Over the past period a number of ideas and proposals on this problem have been put forward by states. In the first place the proposals on the prevention of an arms race in space should be mentioned. This problem has been debated at the sessions of UNGA and CD for decades already.

Two proposals were put forward to the UNGA by the Soviet Union: in 1981 and 1983. The first proposal was the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The second proposal was presented as the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth.

From the very beginning, the ad hoc PAROS Committee was focusing on three themes: 1) issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; 2) existing agreements governing outer space activities; 3) existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The ad hoc PAROS Committee examined both proposals of a general nature and those concerned with particular aspects of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Among proposals of a general nature, one should mention the document presented by Venezuela on August 2, 1988: “Proposed Amendments to the Outer Space Treaty” The essence of the amendments was to expand the prohibition laid down.

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in Art. 4 of the Outer Space Treaty to cover the placing of any object carrying any type of weapons or systems of weapons in orbit around the Earth, as well as to assume the obligation not to develop, produce, store or use such weapons. It was also proposed to adopt a protocol, providing for the creation of a verification mechanism to ensure the global prohibition of space weapons. A similar proposal was submitted in 1989 to the CD by the delegation of Peru.13

Proposals on the complete prohibition of ASAT, were put forward at the UNGA sessions. It should be taken into account, that an express prohibition on carrying out ASAT tests is not contained in the existing agreements.

The delegation of India to the CD proposed in 1987 to conclude a multilateral agreement on this matter. The agreement would transform the de facto moratorium on the development of ASAT, observed by the USSR and the US, into a universally binding norm covering both the dismantling of existing systems and the ban on the production of new ones.14

A number of developing countries, as well as China and the USSR supported this idea. In 1989 Sweden put forward a proposal on the prohibition of ASAT systems.

Attempting to break the deadlock, a number of states put forward the idea of adopting partial measures on ensuring “immunity” for artificial satellites of the Earth.

In practice the ABM Treaty as well as the START I and START II Treaties provide for the immunity of satellites performing verification functions on arms limitation and disarmament.

All these agreements are bilateral (between the RF and the USA), and in this connection the problem of the entitlement of other countries to similar “inviolability” repeatedly arose.

The discussions in the CD have demonstrated that the states have been unable to make any progress in respect of space activities.

More positive results may be achieved in the field of confidence-building measures (CBMs). These measures can be subdivided into three main categories: 1) measures intended to obtain greater transparency and predictability by prior notification of a space object launch, including pre-launch inspection procedures of satellites; 2) measures within the framework of the “traffic rule”, sometimes referred to as the Rules of behaviour, which would enhance the safety of space objects and the predictability of space activity, including notification of a change of orbit, rules concerning space debris and space manoeuvres; 3) the space code of conduct as guidelines to reduce misinterpretation of space activity and avoid inadvertent collisions with other space objects. The elaboration of

this space code of conduct would constitute a concrete step towards the development of order in outer space, and is at the same time an important “institutional” measure.

Lately, a number of countries have attempted to attract attention of the CD participants to the necessity of taking measures to enhance transparency and predictability in space activity and, in particular, in respect of problems of verification and control. In 1989 the French Government reiterated its 1978 proposal for the establishment of an International Space Monitoring Agency (ISMA) by proposing, in addition, the creation of an International Trajectography Centre (UNITRACE) and Satellite Image Processing Agency (SIPA). In 1993 a similar proposal was made with regard to the Centre of Notification on the Launching of Space Objects and Ballistic Missiles. In 1987 the USSR put forward a proposal for the creation of an International Space Inspectorate (ISI) to verify the non-deployment of weapons of any kinds in outer space, and in 1988 – an International Space Monitoring Agency (ISMA).

In 1987 Canada proposed the “PAXSAT Concept” as a verification measure, which provided for the use of a space-based remote technology for verification of the non-deployment of ASAT weapons and compliance with the relevant treaty. It also provided for space-to-ground observation, first of all in Europe, for regional verification of conventional forces and weaponry.

There is no arms race in outer space at present, but plans to place various kinds of BMD and ASAT in outer space do exist.

The CD has a real possibility to move ahead with the elaboration of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space. From the point of view of international law, it would mean the establishment of a regime of neutralisation of outer space.

Neutralisation of outer space means the establishment of an international legal regime in outer space, which would prohibit carrying out combat operations in this environment, the destruction of objects in space, on the ground, in the air and in water by means of space-based weapons, as well as the destruction of space objects by means of ground, sea and air-based weapons, the flight trajectory through space of ballistic missiles designed to strike ground and sea – based targets.

The neutralisation of space would prevent its transformation into a theatre of warfare and a platform for armed attacks. In the absence of a

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complete neutralisation regime of outer space the flight of ballistic missiles for military use through outer space is not considered forbidden.

The neutralisation regime of outer space would be based on the fundamental principle of contemporary international law – the non-use of force or threat of force. In outer space as well as in any other environment of human activity, states should be guided by the fundamental principles of international law laid down in the UN Charter, including the principle, which obliges all UN members to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations (Art. 2). Thus, in accordance with the general norms of international law, states are obliged to abstain from any hostile operations when carrying out space activity and to settle their international conflicts and disputes by peaceful means. In particular, this means desisting from any violent interference with the rightful activity of an automatic or manned space object of another country by demolishing or damaging such an object, capturing it or displacing it from orbit.

In conditions of tough confrontation between the USSR and the USA a positive step was taken with the conclusion of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the US and the USSR (Nuclear Accident Agreement of 1971), the subsequent Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973, as well as the Agreement on Measures to Improve the US–USSR Direct Communications Link (“Hot Line” Modernisation Agreement of 1971).

Russia as a successor to the former Soviet Union strictly complies with these agreements. The 1973 Agreement requires the parties to notify each other immediately of any signs of interference with their early warning systems or related communication facilities, including those in outer space, if such interference could create a risk of nuclear war; as well as of cases of unauthorised or inadvertent incidents connected with a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; of detection of unidentified objects by their early warning systems; of missiles launched from the territory of one state in the direction of another.

Two items – “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” and “International co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space” – were included on the agenda of the 55th session of the UNGA (2000). One may regard these items as two sides of the same coin. The problems connected with them are annually debated in detail: the first in the ad hoc PAROS Committee of the CD, the second – in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Both committees submit reports on their work to the UNGA. These reports are discussed and on each of them the UNGA adopts a resolution.

A vivid example of successful international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space is the signing of the agreement on co-operation in the building of an international civilian space station in 1998.
by 15 states, including Russia and the USA. The joint venture successfully started. In October 2000 the station was manned by two Russian and one American astronauts. In March 2001 a new team consisting of two American astronauts and one Russian replaced them. In 2006, when the construction of the station will be finally completed, it will be manned by an international crew of 7 persons. Thus, the fortieth anniversary of Yu. Gagarin’s space flight coincides with the functioning of the manned international space station in orbit.

Lately, the attention of the international community has been attracted to the problem of co-operation in the adoption of necessary measures for preventing a probable collision of the Earth with asteroids and comets.

The proposal of the Russian President to convene under UN auspices an international conference on the prevention of the militarisation of outer space seems both important and well timed. The existing regime of the demilitarisation of outer space should be reviewed and concrete measures on the consolidation and strengthening of this regime elaborated. These could include:

1. The extension of the bilateral ABM Treaty and the bilateral moratorium on ASAT systems to other counties.

2. Strengthening the regime of inviolability or immunity of satellites by turning appropriate bilateral agreements between the RF and the USA into multilateral treaties. This “immunity” would cover all space objects, irrespective of their military or civil purposes. Such an approach is quite justified taking into consideration that military satellites enhance international peace and security and provide considerable benefits, such as the monitoring of treaty compliance, the global positioning system, and counter-terrorism and sanctions enforcement. Many examples in recent years show that a tendency has emerged of using military satellites commercial space services.

3. The strengthening of confidence between states when carrying out space activity by enhancing of the degree of transparency at the pre-launch stage, including satellite inspection before ignition.

4. Other measures of international control of space objects.

5. Institutional arrangements, including the creation of an International Monitoring Agency or Centre of Space Objects Flight Path Tracking.

6. The elaboration of draft documents concerning the complete or partial neutralisation of outer space as part of the implementation of the principle of non-use of force or threat of force – a fundamental principle of modern international law. This implies the application of the principles of international law through a treaty on space activity including actions,
directed from space against targets on the Earth as well as from the Earth against objects moving in space.

The efforts of the international community should be focused on the prohibition of ASAT, as well as on the problem of arriving at a multilateral arrangement on the prohibition of space-based ABM systems. Accordingly, the problem of an efficient international control of the prohibition on placing the above mentioned weapons in outer space should be addressed.

The measures on the demilitarisation of outer space would have a beneficial effect on the process of conducting further negotiations on arms control, for example through establishing an international verification system in space of the proliferation of missiles, capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The implementation of these measures would help to meet security challenges posed by the new millennium.
I. Legislative acts of the Russian Federation


**Law of the Russian Federation on Civil Defence**

The law defines the tasks in the field of civil defence and the legal basis for their implementation, powers of state authorities, executive authorities of the subjects of the RF, local self-government structures, as well as civil defence forces and means.

Passed by the SD on 26 December 1997, approved by the FC on 28 January 1998, signed by the President on 12 February 1998.

**Law of the Russian Federation on the 1998 Federal Budget**

The bill introduced into the State Duma by the Government touched upon the interests of every sector of the Russian State’s vital activities including national defence (chapter “National Defence”). On October 9 1997 the bill was turned down by the SD on the first reading and addressed for further consideration to the Trilateral Commission consisting of the representatives of the SD, the Federation Council and the Government.

After numerous co-ordinating efforts were taken and a number of mutually acceptable compromises were reached, the bill was passed by the SD on 4 March 1998, approved by the FC on 12 March 1998 and signed by the President on 26 March 1998.

**Law of the Russian Federation on Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law on Budget Classification of the Russian Federation aimed at the detailed elaboration and unification of the federal budget expenditure items related to defence,**

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security and law-enforcement activities of the state

The law is aimed at further increasing the number of target budget items and types of expenditure in the “National Defence” chapter of the federal budget, to make the defence budget even more transparent.

The bill was passed by the SD on 4 March 1998, approved by the FC on 12 March 1998 and signed by the President on 26 March 1998.

Law of the Russian Federation on Duty of Service and Military Service

The law is aimed at improving the legal regulatory system in the field of duty of service and military service for the purpose of ensuring implementation by RF citizens of their constitutional duty and the obligation to defend their Motherland. The President of the RF introduced the bill. After it had been passed by the SD on the third reading on 10 September 1997 and approved by the FC, it was submitted to the President for signature. However, the President turned down the submitted bill because it contained provisions different from the text of the law passed by the SD. After its consideration by the Conciliation Commission it was passed by the SD for the second time on 6 March 1998, approved by the FC on 12 March 1998 and signed by the President on 28 March 1998.


Passed by the SD on 20 February 1998, approved by the FC and signed by the President on 28 March 1998.


Passed by the SD on 20 February 1998, approved by the FC on 13 March 1998 and signed by the President on 28 March 1998.


Passed by the SD on 20 February 1998, approved by the FC on 13 March 1998 and signed by the President on 28 March 1998.


Passed by the SD on 20 February 1998, approved by the FC on 13 March 1998 and signed by the President on 28 March 1998.


The law is aimed at facilitating the conversion of the defence industry on the basis of the most effective use of the productive capacity, scientific and technical potential and labour resources of the converted organisations and to ensure social protection for employees of the enterprises subject to conversion.

Passed by the SD on 20 March 1998, approved by the FC on 1 April 1998,
signed by the President on 13 April 1998.

**Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of Servicemen**

The law defines the rights, freedoms, obligations and responsibility of servicemen, as well as the foundations of the state policy in the field of legal and social protection of servicemen, persons retired from the military service and members of their families.

The bill was passed by the SD on 6 March 1998 and approved by the FC on 12 March 1998. However, the President regarded certain provisions of the document as controversial and applied the veto. The veto was overcome. The President signed the law on 27 May 1998.


The bill was passed by the SD on 3 July 1998, approved by the FC on 9 July 1998, signed by the President on 19 July 1998.

The Law establishes the principles of state policy in the field of military technical co-operation of the RF with foreign states, the legal and organisational basis for the activities of the state authorities of the RF, methods of government control and principal funding in the field of military technical co-operation.


Passed by the SD on 2 October 1998, approved by the FC on 14 October 1998, signed by the President on 29 October 1998.


Passed by the State Duma on 23 December 1998, approved by the FC on 27 January 1999, signed by the President on 9 February 1999.

The Agreement aims to preserve the closed radar field in the Missile Attack Warning System throughout the territory of the former USSR and to provide the military-political leadership of the country with reliable warning information, which is crucial for making decisions with regard to retaliatory actions by the RF Armed Forces. The Agreement also facilitates better interaction between the Armed Forces of the RF and Ukraine on issues of anti-missile and anti-space defence.

**Law of the Russian Federation on the 1999 Federal Budget**

On 1 March 1999 the President signed the Law of the Russian Federation on the 1999 Federal Budget, which had been passed by the SD and approved by the FC.

The Draft Federal Law on the 1999 Federal Budget was submitted to the SD by the Government in violation of the Federal Law on the Budget Classification of the Russian Federation. In the open part of the budget, the “National Defence” chapter carried only three lines: “Armed Forces Development and Maintenance”, “The Military Program of Minatom” and “Provision of Mobilisation Training and Military Training for Civilians”. There should have been at least 180 lines, however, in accordance with the Federal Law on the Budget Classification of the Russian Federation. Thus, the 1999 Federal Budget brings back the legal matrix, which existed in the past. Apart from the above-mentioned three lines in the “National Defence” chapter, all target items of expenditure and the types of expenditure are classified.
It should be mentioned that expenditure envisaged by the target Art. “Armed Force Maintenance” was declassified under pressure of the SD Committee on Defence.

At the urgent request of the SD Committee on Defence, an amendment was passed which envisaged, in case of additional federal budget receipts due to increased inflation, the transfer of part of these receipts for financial coverage of housing certificates.

In the course of discussion of the 1999 federal budget, expenditure envisaged in the “National Defence” chapter was increased by 1.5 billion roubles. The SD adopted an amendment proposed by the SD Committee on Defence. It envisage that the Draft Federal Law on the Federal Budget should include a new article saying that the receipts drawn from the right of the RF to the results of military-, special- and dual-purpose research and development and technological work, are fully registered as the receipts beyond the federal budget and allocated for measures related to the military reform and federal target programs, above the amounts approved by Article 21 of the Federal Law. The procedures for the formation and distribution of these funds are defined by the Government. According to preliminary calculations, this could add a sum of approximately $200–300 million to the federal budget, which can be used, for financing R&D in the interests of national defence.

In the 1999 federal budget, the sub-chapter “utilisation and destruction of weapons and military equipment apart from international treaties” is missing. This implies that about 100 nuclear-powered submarines awaiting dismantling of nuclear-power reactors will remain moored at piers, thus contributing to the growing environmental threat.

At the same time, it’s worth noting that only 20% of the planned amount is allocated for the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which leads to a four-year delay in implementing the Program for the destruction of chemical weapons in the RF. Expenditure envisaged for this section can be increased only in case of budget returns increase resulting from the possible growth of the inflation rate, as compared to the planned budget figures, and the further devaluation of roubles against dollars.


The bill entered into force on 1 June 1999 (it was passed by the SD on 16 April 1999 and approved by the FC on 18 May 1999). The Law deals with pensions paid to parents of draftees who were killed (died) during their military service or died from the wounds inflicted by the war after being released from the armed forces.


Passed by the SD on 18 June 1999, approved by the FC on 25 June 1999, signed by the President of the RF on 3 July 1999 (The Agreement between the RF and Ukraine on the Division of the Black Sea Fleet signed in Kiev on 28 May 1997).


Passed by the SD on 18 June, Approved by the FC on 25 June 1999 signed by
the President of the RF on 3 July 1999. The Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Port Installations on the Territory of Ukraine was signed in Kiev on 28 May 1997.

Passed by the SD on 18 June, approved by the FC on 25 June 1999, signed by the President of the RF on 3 July 1999. The Agreement on the Settlement of Debts Related to the Division of the Black Sea Fleet and the Location of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine was signed in Kiev on 28 May 1997.

Federal Law on the Ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), no. 153-FZ, 8 July 1999
Passed by the SD on 18 June 1999, approved by the FC on 25 June 1999, signed by the President of the RF on 8 July 1999. The Additional Protocol to the above-mentioned Convention was adopted at the Review Conference in Vienna on 13 October 1995.

Federal Law on the Ratification of the Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the People’s Republic of China on Mutual Reduction of the Armed Forces in the Border Area, no. 180-FZ, 17 July 1999
Passed by the SD on 25 June 1999, approved by the FC on 2 July 1999, signed by the President on 17 July 1999.
The Agreement was signed in Moscow on 24 April 1997.

Law of the Russian Federation on the Funding of the State Defence Order for the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation
The SD passed the bill on 23 June 1999. The bill was approved by the FC on 2 July 1999 and signed by the President on 17 July 1999. The bill was elaborated by a group of deputies – members of the SD Committee on Defence. The combat potential of the SNF is a key factor ensuring containment of an aggression against the RF.
The relatively low cost of measures aimed at maintaining combat and support facilities of the SNF at a combat readiness level and the program of their development (construction), as well as the utmost importance of the SNF for ensuring national security of the RF, dictate the need for the target and guaranteed financing of the SNF within at least the minimum necessary volumes. The Law aims at ensuring stable and sufficient level of the SNF development for the period till 2010, taking into account the need to properly implement the international treaties designed to reduce the nuclear confrontation. The SNF shall be funded in accordance with the Federal Law On the Budget Classification of the Russian Federation, as well as with due regard for the Federal Law On Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law on Budget Classification of the Russian Federation.

Federal Law on Export Control, no. 183-FZ, 18 July 1999
Passed by the SD on 22 June 1999, approved by the FC on 2 July 1999, signed by the President on 18 July 1999.
The law establishes the principles of state policy, the legal basis for the activities of state authorities of the RF the field of export control, and defines the rights, obligations and responsibilities of foreign economic market participants.

The SD passed the bill on 24 September 1999 and the FC approved it on 13 October 1999.

Passed by the SD on 5 November 1999, approved by the FC on 11 November 1999. In accordance with this Law, the Protocol on the Extension of the Collective Security Treaty of 15 May 1992, which was been signed in Moscow on 2 April 1999, was ratified.

The bill was passed by the SD on 1 December 1999, signed by the President on 30 December 1999.

The Government submitted the draft to the SD on 25 August 1999.

The Protocol was signed in Moscow on 12 January 1999.

The bill was passed by the SD on 7 April 2000, approved by the FC on 19 April 2000, signed by the President on 4 May 2000.

The bill was passed by the SD on 14 April 2000, approved by the FC on 19 April 2000. For the full text of the Treaty see Appendix 11A.

The bill was passed by the SD on 29 March 2000, approved by the FC on 19 April 2000. The Agreement was signed in New York on 17 November 1993.

States of America on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972, no. 67-FZ, 4 May 2000

The bill was passed by the SD on 14 April 2000, approved by the FC on 19 April 2000. This Federal Law enacts the ratification of: the Memorandum of Understanding with Regard to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of ABM systems of 26 May 1972, the First Agreed Statement with Regard to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of ABM systems of 26 May 1972, the Second Agreed Statement with Regard to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of ABM systems of 26 May 1972, and the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures with Regard to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed in the city of New York on 26 September 1997.


The bill was passed by the SD on 14 April 2000. The Law establishes administrative responsibility of a legal entity for the violation of laws in the use of atomic energy. It aims at increasing the effectiveness of the state control of the safety of the use of atomic energy, and strengthening mechanisms of protection of people's health and lives and environmental protection.


The bill was passed by the SD on 27 April 2000, approved by the FC on 17 May 2000. For the text of the Law, see Appendix 12A


Passed by the SD on 7 July 2000, approved by the FC on 26 July 2000. This Federal Law enacts the ratification of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1997 signed in the name of the Russian Federation in the city of Budapest on 7 May 1999, with the following statement: the Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that the provisions of Article 5 and paragraph 2, Article 8 of the Convention should be implemented in a pattern that would ensure the inevitability of liability for crimes covered by the Convention, without prejudice to international co-operation on issues of extradition and legal assistance.


On 20 October 2000 the SD passed the bill on the second reading. Expenditure for national defence was increased by 12.6 billion roubles, as compared to the version submitted by the Government.

II. Draft legislation

Draft Federal Law on Alternative Military Service

One of the most controversial bills which ignited a sharp political debate not only in the SD, but in society as a whole. It aims to regulate the relations resulting from the exercise of citizens’ right to replace military service with alternative civilian service, and establishes procedures for the alternative civilian service.

In December 1994 the bill was passed on the first reading. However, while it
was being revised and prepared for the second reading, many amendments were introduced which transformed the very concept of the first bill. Currently the bill is being further revised in the two main committees of the SD – the Committee on Defence and the Committee on Social and Religious Organisations.

**Draft Federal Law on Civil Control and Management of the Military Organisations and Activities in the Russian Federation**

The bill is being worked out by the Working group under the auspices of the SD Committee on Defence. It defines the goal, contents, organisational pattern and principles of exercising civil management and control over the Armed Forces and its activities, as well as over other services, military units and military agencies in the RF.


It was prepared for the first reading by the SD Committee on geopolitics. The bill defines the legal foundation for the state policy in the field of the development and use of military and dual-purpose space vehicles in the interest of defence and security of the RF as one of the priority directions of strengthening the defence capability and enhancing the security of the RF.

**Draft Federal Law on Amendments to Article 26 of the Federal Law on Defence**

The bill was prepared by a group of the SD deputies. It was proposed to supplement the Federal Law on Defence with the provision that drafts of federal budget should include information about the numerical strength of the Armed Forces and other law-enforcing institutions (staff and roll) for the beginning and the end of the planned year. The bill was passed by the SD and turned down by the FC.

**Draft Federal Law on the Military Reform in the Russian Federation**

On 2 December 1998 the SD passed the bill in the third reading and referred it to the FC. The FC turned down the bill.

Given the fact that there is virtually no legal basis for a military reform in the RF, the proposed bill aims to fill the legal gap in this area. The bill indicates the way in which the military reform should be implemented, defines its goals and principles as well as the powers of state authorities in this regard. The bill defines the goal and contents of the military reform (Art. 2) and the main principles of force development in the period of the military reform implementation (Art. 3). The bill emphasises that the military reform is implemented under the direct guidance of the President (Art. 5). It defines the powers of the President, the FA and the Government related to the implementation of the military reform (Art. 8).

**Draft Federal Law on Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law on the Budget Classification of the Russian Federation**

On 23 April 1999 at its plenary meeting, the SD considered this bill, which aims at reducing the number of target items and expenditure types in the budget classification in the “National Defence” chapter, from 155 to 33. The adoption of this proposal would lead to greater secrecy in defence budget.

The bill was not passed on the first reading, and only 164 deputies voted for it (a majority of 226 votes is needed to pass a bill).
Draft of the Federal Constitutional Law on the State of Emergency

The SD passed the bill on the first reading on 29 June 2000. The bill is designed to replace the existing Law of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic on the State of Emergency, which, in many respects, does not correspond to the RF Constitution. The bill regulates the main aspects of the state of emergency in a more detailed fashion, including conditions, mechanisms and reasons for the introduction of such a regime, as well as forces, means and measures used in the state of emergency. The bill defines the reasons and mechanism of imposing the state of emergency, the list of measures and responsibilities of citizens and officials under these circumstances.

The bill envisages a qualitatively new mechanism for creating special administrative bodies for the period of the state of emergency throughout the territory of the RF or in some of its regions. This mechanism is aimed at facilitating the prompt fulfilment of tasks dictated by the state of emergency and to shorten the period when human rights and freedoms of the citizens on the given territory are restricted.

The measures stipulated by the bill are fully compatible with the obligations of the RF under existing international legal acts in the field of human rights. The draft law envisages the guarantees against political, racial, national, sex, language, religious or social discrimination of certain individuals and population groups.

Draft Federal Law on State Control of Activities Related to Restructuring the Defence Industrial Complex of the Russian Federation

The SD passed the bill on the first reading on 17 September 1999.

The bill establishes the legal, organisational and economic basis for state control of activities directed at restructuring and supporting of the defence industrial complex of the RF, as well as mechanisms, patterns and conditions for providing state support to defence-industry enterprises during their restructuring and conversion.


The bill was first passed by the SD on 15 July 1998, but turned down by the FC on 4 September 1998. To resolve differences, a Conciliation commission was established. The bill was passed by the SD on 20 May 1999 and approved by the FC on 9 June 1999, but was not signed by the President due to the fact that one of the requirements stipulated by Section 3, Art. 104 of the RF Constitution was not met, when the bill was tabled in the SD. In accordance with Section 3, Art. 104 of the RF Constitution, bills providing for any federal budget expenditure can be introduced into the SD only after the Government gives its approval. However, this federal law was passed by the SD without the approval on the part of the Government.

On 28 September 1999 the SD Council submitted the draft law to the Government of the RF, to obtain the latter’s approval.

Draft Federal Law on the Characteristic Features of Defence Industry Enterprises’ Bankruptcy

The original version of the bill was passed by the SD on 25 June 1999, but turned down by the FC on 2 July 1999. After the Conciliation commission completed its work, the bill was passed by the SD again, on 17 November 1999 and approved by the FC on 22 December 1999. After the President turned down the bill, a special commission was formed by the SD for further elaboration of the bill. In its resolution of 29 March 2000, the SD suggested that the FC members and the President’s representatives should take part in the work of this commission.

In its resolution of 19 April 2000, the Federation Council agreed to participate in
the commission.

**Draft Federal Law on the Establishment and Activities of Citizens’ Consultation Commissions on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons**

On 1 June 1999 the bill was placed on the agenda by the SD Council. The bill defines mechanisms aimed to ensure citizens’ control of work related to the destruction of chemical weapons stored on the territory of the Udmurt Republic, the Bryansk, Kirov, Kurgan, Penza and Saratov regions.


On 18 October 1999 this bill was withdrawn from the agenda, with the introduction of a new revised version of the draft law submitted by the Voronezh Regional Duma (in accordance with Art. 104 of the Constitution which grants the legislative right, *inter alia*, to legislative bodies of the subjects of the RF). The revised version of the bill was placed on the agenda by the SD Council.

**Draft Federal Law on the Addition to Article 2 of the Law on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons**

On 1 June 2000 the draft law was placed on the agenda by the SD Council. It envisages certain changes in the procedures related to the destruction of chemical weapons including the possible destruction of chemical weapons in places other than the chemical weapons storage sites.

**Draft Federal Law on Additional Sources of Funding for Military Construction Measures for the Period till 2005**

On 27 June 2000 the SD Council placed the bill on the agenda. The bill lays the foundations for the establishment of normative legislation base aimed at finding additional sources of funding for the military construction activities for the period till the year of 2005.

### III. Normative acts of the Executive authorities. Presidential decrees and orders


**Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on measures to implement international treaties in space**, no. 848, 8 August 1997


The Agreement was signed in Kiev on February 28, 1997.

**Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on measures of**
implementation by the Russian Federation of UN Security Council Resolutions regarding the establishment of an international regime for permanent monitoring and control of exports to Iraq, no. 972, 2 September 1997

The Decree sanctions the List of dual-purpose goods and technologies and other items submitted by the RF Government, the export of which is subject to control and notification, or prohibited under UN Security Council resolutions. The Decree specifies that pending the UN Security Council’s decision on modification or cancellation of the restrictive measures again Iraq, export from the RF to Iraq of goods, technologies and other items mentioned in the List from paragraph 1 of this Decree, except the materials, equipment and technologies prohibited from export to Iraq under the List, can be allowed only with the permission of the Committee which was established in accordance with the UN Security Council’s Resolution no. 661 of 6 August 1990. The Decree obliges the RF Government to adopt a statute on monitoring the export to Iraq of dual-purpose goods and technologies and other items covered by the Permanent Monitoring and Control Mechanism and to ensure its entry into force together with this Decree.


The Ordinance of the Government approved the draft of this Agreement submitted by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, agreed with the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the RF Defence Ministry and negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the US side.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Regulations for organising the system of state control over radioactive agents and radioactive waste, no. 1298, 11 October 1997

In accordance with Art. 22 of the Federal Law on the Use of Atomic Energy, the Ordinance approved the Regulations for registration of, and control of radioactive agents and radioactive waste. The text of the Regulation is attached.

The Ordinance obliges the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy to work out, negotiate with the federal executive bodies and federal authorities of the RF subjects concerned, and approve the Regulations on state control of radioactive agents and radioactive waste in the second quarter of 1998. All bodies, agencies and organisations on the federal, regional and departmental levels which, within their respective areas of jurisdiction, conduct activities related to the use of atomic energy, are obliged to take measures to ensure the establishment, before January 1, 2001, and proper operation of a system of state control over radioactive agents and radioactive waste, in accordance with the Regulations approved by this ordinance.


Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on control of exports to Iraq of dual-purpose goods and technologies and other items covered by the International Mechanism of Permanent Monitoring and Control, no. 1403, 7 November 1997

In accordance with Presidential Decree no. 972, 2 September 1997 (see above),
by adopting this Ordinance the RF Government approved the attached Regulations on
Control Over Export to Iraq of Dual-Purpose Goods and Technologies and Other Items
Covered by the International Mechanism of Permanent Monitoring and Control, and
obliged the respective federal ministries, bodies and agencies of the Russian Federation to
ensure control of exports to Iraq of the above-mentioned dual-purpose goods and
technologies and to bring their respective legal regulations in conformity with the present
Decision.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on concluding the
Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government
of the Kingdom of Norway on Co-Operation in the Field of Environmental Protection
with regard to the Utilisation of Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarines Withdrawn
from Active Service in the Northern Region, and the Enhancement of Nuclear and
Radiation Safety, no. 1448, 18 November 1997

The Government of the Russian Federation approved the draft of this Agreement
submitted by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, agreed with the RF Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the RF Ministry of Defence and the State Committee of the RF on
Environmental Protection, the Federal Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety
(Gosatomnadzor) and other federal executive authorities concerned, negotiated on a
preliminary basis with the Norwegian side, and assigned the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy, with the participation of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the task of
conducting final negotiations with the Norwegian side, and, upon reaching an agreement,
of signing the Agreement in the name of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the demarcation
of the western sector of the Russian-Chinese border, no. 1464, 22 November 1997

This Ordinance defines the range of organisational measures aimed at
implementing the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on introducing
amendments in certain normative legal acts of the Government of the Russian
Federation regulating export control issues, no. 1548, 11 December 1997

The Ordinance lists certain normative legal acts of the RF Government
regulating export control issues, and amendments to them.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on approving the
Statute of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation on the
interaction with NATO and implementation of the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Co-operation and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the composition of the Interdepartmental
Commission, no. 516-rp, 17 December 1997

The Directive of the RF President approves the attached Statute and the
composition of the Interdepartmental Commission. The text of the Statute is attached. It is
emphasised that the Interdepartmental Commission is a working body which supports the
activities aimed at developing interaction with NATO and NATO member states, and
implementing the Founding Act signed in Paris on May 27 1997. The Statute defines the
tasks of the Commission related to the co-ordination of the federal executive authorities’
activities aimed at the development of co-operation with NATO for the purpose of
defending the national interests of the RF, and ensuring the implementation of the
Founding Act, and the ways to carry them out. Its main tasks include: developing the concept of the RF policy towards NATO, assessing its effectiveness, preparing recommendations on issues related to co-operation with NATO, co-ordinating activities aimed at the development of interaction between the RF and NATO, working out proposals for the formulation of the negotiation position of the RF on issues related to interaction with NATO and the implementation of the Founding Act.

**Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on further measures to implement the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1011 of 16 August, 1995, no. 524-rp, 17 December 1997**

Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution of the UN Security Council, the Directive obliges all state authorities, industrial, commercial, financial, transport and other enterprises, firms, banks and organisations and private individuals under the RF jurisdiction, to take into account in their activities that: a) the restrictions imposed in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution no. 918 (1994) and envisaged by the Directive of the President of the RF no. 395-rp of 21 July 1994 with regard to the sale or supply of all types of arms and military materials to the Government of Rwanda are lifted; b) the prohibition on the sale or supply of all types of arms and military materials to Rwanda or persons in the states neighboring on Rwanda is fully valid if such a sale or supply is designed for use other than by the Rwanda Government, as envisaged by subpoint “g” of paragraph 1 of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation no. 168-rp, 9 April 1996, as well as provisions of subpoints “b” and “c” of paragraph 1 of the above mentioned Order.


The Directive approved the proposal submitted by the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the RF and agreed with the Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Defence of the RF, on signing the amendment to the Agreement between the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the RF and the US Department of Defence of 30 July 1992 with regard to secure, safe and pollution-free destruction of chemical weapons which envisaged allocation by the United States of free aid of USD 2.2 million. aimed at covering the cost of materials and services rendered for the purpose of dismantling and destroying specialised equipment and special elements of buildings at the former chemical weapons production site of the Volgograd Khimprom public joint-stock company as part of the implementation of the pilot project aimed at the creation of a civilian production site there.

**Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the Federal State Unitary Enterprises, the State Company Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport, no. 1658, 31 December 1997**

For the purpose of strengthening state control of external economic activities in the field of military and technical co-operation, the Ordinance adopted the attached charters of the federal state enterprises: the State Company Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport.

**Ordinance of the Government of the RF on the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of Ukraine on Co-operation in the field of Nuclear Materials Transportation Between**
The ordinance is adopted for the purpose of regulating the nuclear materials shipping operations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Bulgaria.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the addition to the Statute on controlling the exports from the Russian Federation of dual-purpose equipment and materials and the related technologies used for nuclear purposes and covered by the export control regulations, no. 24, 8 January 1998

For the purpose of ensuring Russia’s implementation of international obligations in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, the Government of the RF decided that the above mentioned Appendix should be supplemented by paragraph 5 stating the following: “5. Oscillographs and transition registers as well as devices designed specially for them including changeable blocks, external amplifiers, driver amplifiers designed for signal registration, cathode-ray tubes for analogue oscillographs specified in paragraphs. 7.1.1-7.1.4 of the List as well as technology for their development, production and use”.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on signing the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, no. 4-rp, 11 January 1998

In accordance with the Directive, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was entrusted with the task of signing the above-mentioned Convention, with the following statement: “The Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that provisions of Article 12 of the Convention should be applied in the way which would ensure the inevitability of amenability for the crimes regulated by the Convention, without prejudice to the effective international co-operation on issues of extradition and legal assistance.”


The Ordinance is adopted for the purpose of further improving the mechanism of control of dual-purpose exports. It obliges the Russian partners participating in foreign economic activities, regardless of the property types, to abstain from export transactions involving any dual-purpose goods and services that are not covered by the export control regulations of the RF in case they are aware of the fact that they will be used in the process of the development or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or their missile delivery vehicles (development, production, testing, etc.) and notify the RF Governmental commission on export control accordingly. In case the Russian parties have grounds to believe that these goods and services can be used for the above-mentioned purposes, they forward an appropriate enquire to the Governmental commission on export control.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the establishment of a Training Centre for specialists of chemical weapons destruction sites in the Russian Federation under the Ministry of Defence, no. 171, 10 February 1998

The Ordinance approves the proposal of the Ministry of Defence on the establishment, on the basis of the training centre of Military unit 25260 of the RF Defence Ministry (the town of Chapayevsk, Samara region), of a Training Centre for specialists of chemical weapons destruction sites in the Russian Federation under the Ministry of Defence. The decision also obliges the Ministry of Defence to submit a draft statute on the
Training Centre approved by the federal executive authorities and organisations concerned, to the Government in the first quarter of 1998.


The Government approved the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement submitted by the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy.


The plan of major measures aimed at the implementation of the above-mentioned federal laws is attached to the Ordinance, which contains (in tables) the names of enterprises, those responsible for the implementation, and time of performance.


In accordance with the Agreement between the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the RF and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FRG on co-operation in the process of safe destruction of chemical weapons, with observation of measures aimed at prevention of environmental pollution, of 22 October, 1993, the Ordinance approves the text of the above-mentioned note.


The Ordinance deals with issues related to providing state aid to the Russian organisations during the construction of the Lyanyungan atomic power station.


To facilitate the implementation of the state policy in the field of defence industry restructuring, the Government of the RF decided to adopt the above-mentioned Federal Program and the corresponding government customers of the Program and the subprograms: the Ministry of the Economy of the RF – the government customer of the Program; the Ministry of Atomic Energy – the government customer of the subprogram named “The Restructuring and conversion of atomic industry enterprises (nuclear military complex) for 1998–2000”; the Russian Space Agency – the government customer with regard to projects of restructuring and conversion of enterprises under its jurisdiction. The Ministry of the Economy of the RF and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF are recommended to make provisions, on an annual basis, for the allocation of appropriate
funds for the implementation of the Program in the forecast of the RF social and economic development and in the draft of the federal budget. The executive authorities of the subjects of the RF are recommended to render assistance to government customers of the Program in the process of its implementation.


The Ordinance gave approval to the proposal of the RF Ministry of Defence and the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on changing the maximum levels of combat aircraft and attack helicopters by transferring part of the Russian Federation’s attack helicopter quota (15 helicopter) to the Republic of Slovakia, and receiving part of the Republic of Slovakia’s combat aircraft quota (15 aircraft).


In accordance with the Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation, the following amendments related to timeframes are introduced in the plan of major measures approved by the Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 334, 24 March 1998:

- submission to the Government of the RF of the draft ordinance on organising preparations and ensuring international control at military and industrial sites – September 1998;
- submission to the Government of the RF of the draft decree of the President of the RF on the division of responsibilities among federal executive authorities in the process of implementation of the above-mentioned Convention – September 1998;
- elaboration and submission to the Government of the RF of proposals on the usage of utilisation products and reusable waste products obtained in the process of chemical weapons destruction – September 1998
- submission to the Government of the RF of the draft statute on protection measures zone – October 1998.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on making amendments and additions to the Regulations on acceptance by Russian enterprises of spent nuclear fuel from foreign countries’ atomic power stations for further reprocessing and the return of radioactive waste and materials produced during the reprocessing operations, no. 745, 10 July 1998

It contains the full text of amendments and additions made to the Regulations on acceptance by Russian enterprises of spent nuclear fuel from foreign countries’ atomic power stations for further reprocessing and the return of radioactive waste and materials produced during the reprocessing operations, which had been approved by the Ordinance of the Government of the RF, no. 773, 29 July 1995.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on Approving the Regulations on the system of state registration and control of nuclear materials, no. 746, 10 July 1998

The Ordinance outlines the assignment given to the Ministry of Atomic Energy
of the RF, to elaborate, in co-operation with other federal executive authorities concerned, executive authorities of the subjects of the RF, the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian scientific Centre “Kurchatov Institute”, the draft Statute on state registration and control of nuclear materials and take measures ensuring the establishment, before 1 January 2001, and proper functioning of a system of state registration and control, in accordance with the approved Regulations.

The full text of the Regulations and the list of nuclear and special-purpose non-nuclear materials subject to registration and control in the RF are attached.


The Ordinance approved the draft of the above-stated Agreement, which has been submitted earlier.


To ensure proper conditions for the safe and steady development of national nuclear power engineering, the Government ruled: 1) to approve the attached Program of the development of nuclear power engineering of the RF for the years of 1998–2005 and till the year of 2010: 2) to appoint the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF as the government customer of the Program; 3) to entrust the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Science and Technologies of the RF with the task of funding the Program from federal budget funds allocated for the implementation of the federal target program “Fuel and Energy” for 1996–2000 which was approved by the Ordinance of the Government, no. 263, 6 March 1996. The Ordinance says that the Russian side assumes obligations related to supplies of capital equipment for the atomic power stations “Kudankulam” (India), “Bushehr” (Iran) and the Lyanyungan atomic power station (China) equipped with VVER-1000 reactors, in accordance with the existing inter-governmental agreements and contracts for co-operation in atomic power station construction.


The Ordinance approved the proposal submitted by the Ministry of Health of the RF, to extend the time of implementation of the above-mentioned federal target program approved by the Ordinance of the Government of the RF, no. 191, 22 February 1997, until the end of 2002.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Procedures for considering requests of foreign customers and the inter-ministerial co-ordination of decisions on foreign economic operations involving military-purpose goods, no. 833, 24 July 1998
Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on establishing the unitary military trade system, no. 873, 31 July 1998

The Ordinance envisages the creation of the unitary trade system of the Armed Forces of the RF, other armed formations, military units and agencies including state unitary enterprises specialising in military trade which are created on an operational management basis.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the public body authorised to conclude contracts for transfer of state-owned nuclear materials to legal entities for use, no. 1117, 15 September 1998

The Government ruled to appoint the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF as a federal executive body given the special authority to conclude contracts for the transfer of state-owned nuclear materials to legal entities for use, and defined the functions of this body.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the renewal of international agreements in the safe storage and transportation of nuclear weapons in the RF because of its reduction, no. 1129, 26 September 1998


The Ministry of Defence of the RF was assigned the task to conduct negotiations with the US side and, upon reaching an agreement, to sign the above-mentioned documents and allow making minor amendments and additions to the attached drafts.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation no. 1483-r, 15 October 1998

The Directive allows the acceptance, for the purpose of reprocessing, of a limited amount of spent nuclear fuel from the Republic of Hungary in accordance with the procedures defined by the decision of Minatom of Russia, the State Ecology Committee of Russia and Gasatomnadzor of Russia related to the acceptance of a limited amount of spent nuclear fuel from the “Paksh” atomic power station built with the technical assistance of the USSR, of 16 July 1997.


The Ordinance approved the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on customs and border control in the period of joint exercises and other events in the framework of
United Air Defence System of the member states of the CIS, no. 1485, 11 December 1998

The Ordinance approved the proposal of the Ministry of Defence of the RF on customs and border control in the period of joint exercises (training) and training and methodical assemblies of Air Defence Forces (Air Defence and Air Forces) of the state parties to the Agreement on the Establishment of the United Air Defence System of the CIS Member States, of 10 February 1995, on training grounds of the Ministry of Defence of the RF and the planned replacement of arms and military equipment of the Russian military bases under the Agreement. Also, the Decision defines the functions and tasks of the Ministry of Defence and the State Customs Committee of the RF related to the achievement of the above-mentioned purposes.


This Directive approved the proposal of the Government to sign the above-mentioned United Convention worked out with participation of the Russian side and adopted by the diplomatic Conference in Vienna on 5 September 1997.


The Directive approved the proposal of Minatom of Russia on renewing the Agreement between the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF and the US Department of Defence on the Provision of Materials, Training and Services with Regard to the Construction of a Safe, Secure and Pollution-Free Storage Site for Fissile Materials Produced in the Process of Nuclear Weapons Destruction, of 2 September 1993 (amended on 20 June 1995, 6 September 1996 and 9 April 1997) and on providing assistance by the USA with regard to the construction of the fissile materials storage site amounting to $412.6 billion.


The Directive deals with issues related to signing the Agreement between the Government of the RF and the Government of the USA on Co-operation in the Registration, Control and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 6, 4 January 1999, on introducing amendments and additions to the List of Dual-Purpose Goods and Technologies Subject to Export Control Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on control of export of dual-purpose goods and technologies from the Russian Federation, no. 1268, 26 August 1996

The Decree obliged to introduce amendments and additions to the List of Dual-Purpose Goods and Technologies Subject to Export Control, in accordance with the Attachment. The text of the amendments and additions is attached.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 7, 4 January 1999, on introducing on making amendments and additions to the List of Equipment, Materials and Technologies Used in the Development of Missiles and Subject to Export Control approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on control of export of equipment, materials and technologies used in the development of missiles and subject to export control, from the Russian Federation,
no. 1194, 16 August 1996
The Decree approved amendments and additions to the above-mentioned List as proposed by the Government. The text of amendments and additions is attached.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the rates of expenditure for receiving and servicing of foreign inspectors, observers and crew member of foreign aircraft arriving on the territory of the Russian Federation for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as attendants and interpreters, no. 30, 9 January 1999
In accordance with this Ordinance, the above-mentioned expenditure is regulated by the rates defined in paragraph 1 of the Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation, no. 1155, 5 October 1998, and is covered by the funds allocated to the Committee on the Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the RF for the utilisation and destruction of weapons including the implementation of international treaties.

The Directive gives instructions to adopt the proposal of the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the RF that negotiations should be conducted on signing an amendment to the Agreement between the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the RF and the US Department of Defence Regarding Safe, Secure and Pollution-Free Destruction of Chemical Weapons, of 30 July 1992.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 25-r, 31 January 1999
The directive gives instructions to adopt the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to sign the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism of 27 January 1997.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on providing assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina in mine-cleaning of its territories, no. 26-rp, 31 January 1999
The Directive gives instructions to send a group of instructors from the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Ministry of Defence of the RF (up to 20 people) to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of up to four months, to assist in mine-clearing of its territories in accordance with the terms of the request for Russia’s participation in humanitarian mine-clearing in this region submitted by the World Bank.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on procedures for visiting chemical weapons storage sites and chemical weapons destruction sites, no. 143, 8 February 1999
This Ordinance approved the attached Statute on visiting chemical weapons storage sites and chemical weapons destruction sites, and the list of officials who have access to the above-mentioned sites. The Ministry of Defence was assigned the task of guarding state secrets during visits to such sites.
Directive of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 38-rp, 18 February 1999

The Directives gives instructions to approve the proposals of the RF Government to include the “Glonass” global navigation satellite system in the category of dual-purpose space-system equipment which is used for scientific, social and economic purposes, in the interests of the national defence and security of the Russian Federation as well as for the attraction of foreign investments to finance work related to the “Glonass” system.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Regulations on the protective measures zone created around chemical weapons storage sites and chemical weapons destruction sites, no. 208, 24 February 1999

To implement the Federal Law on the chemical weapons destruction, the Government of the RF decided to approve the attached Regulations on the protective measures for zones created around the above-mentioned sites. The Regulations contain the following main sections: I. General provisions; II. Calculation of the area of the protective measure zone; III. Procedures of setting the area of the protective measure zone; IV. Special complex of protective measures carried out in the protective measure zones.


The Ordinance approved the draft of the above-stated Agreement submitted by Minatom of Russia.


The Government of the RF decided to approve the draft Treaty on Co-operation of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Struggle against Terrorism submitted by the Federal Security Service of the RF.


The Government of the Russian Federation decided to approve the proposal of the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy on signing the Agreement between the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF and the US Department of Energy with Regard to the Transfer of the Source Material to the RF and the Administration Agreement between these two ministries. The Ministry of Atomic Energy of the RF is assigned the task of concluding, through AO “Tekhsnabexport”, a long-term contract with the companies Cameco
(Canada), Cozhema (France) and Hukem (Germany) for the sale of source material in the year of 1999 and in subsequent years, taking into account that all the material which is not sold in accordance with the above-mentioned contract is subject to transfer to the RF for storage, for use during the reprocessing of low-enriched uranium under the Agreement of 18 February 1993, as well as for possible additional supplies to the USA or third countries in the form of natural or low-enriched uranium.


The Directive gives instruction to approve the proposal of Gosatomnadzor of Russia with regard to negotiating an Agreement between the Federal Supervisory Authority (Nadzor) of Russia on Nuclear and Radiation Safety and the US Nuclear Regulation Commission on Technical Co-operation and Information Exchange, to exercise more effective supervision of activities related to the conversion of core circuits of nuclear reactors.


In accordance with this Ordinance, the Commission of the RF Government on Military-Industrial Issues is established. It defines the goals, tasks and priority areas of activities of the Commission in the field of strengthening defence and state security as well as its rights, composition and operational procedures.


The Ordinance approves the draft Protocol to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the USA with Regard to the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation submitted by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


**Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on using military formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the international presence aimed at security enforcement in Kosovo, the Union Republic of Yugoslavia, no. 822, 25 June 1999**

In accordance with this Decree, it is resolved: 1) to dispatch military formations of the Armed Forces of the RF of up to 3616 servicemen equipped with authorised armaments, military materiel and other equipment for use, before 10 June 2000, in the international presence aimed at security enforcement in Kosovo, the Union Republic of Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia; 2) to assign the Russian military contingent dispatched for use in the international security enforcement presence in Kosovo, the tasks in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244 of 10 June 1999; to entrust the RF General Staff the task of responsive control; 4) to assign the RF Government the task of ensuring, in accordance with existing procedures, the coverage of expenses related to the use of the Russian military contingent in the international security enforcement presence in Kosovo, providing for the material support of servicemen from the Russian military contingent and the payment of their money allowances including additional guarantees and compensations for them and their families, in accordance with federal legislation.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 206-rp, 25 June 1999

The Directive approves the proposal of the Government of to dispatch 210 employees of the RF internal affairs institutions to serve as part of international police personnel in Kosovo till 10 June 2000.


The Ordinance approves the above-mentioned target program. The attached Passport to the Program outlines its goals, main tasks, duration and stages of implementation, the list of key measures, key executors, the volume and sources of funding (Attachments 1, 2, 3, 4), the expected implementation results, the system of implementation control.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on the Dispatch of Russian Servicemen and Officers of Internal Affairs Institutions of the Russian Federation for Participation on the UN Mission in East Timor, no. 236-rp, 5 July 1999


The Government resolved to approve and submit for ratification to the SD of the RF the above-mentioned Agreement signed in Moscow on 26 January 1999.


The Ordinance approved the drafts of the above-mentioned protocol-descriptions submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF, the Federal Border Service of the RF, agreed with the other interested federal executive authorities and
negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the Chinese side. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned the task of conducting negotiations with the Chinese side and, upon reaching an agreement, to sign the above-mentioned protocol-descriptions and the attached maps of the eastern and western parts of the Russian-Chinese State border.


In accordance with this ordinance, the Russian Conventional Arms Agency is designated as a federal executive institution ensuring the implementation of the state policy in the field of the conventional arms industry and performing the functions previously assigned to the Ministry of the Economy. The Ordinance lists the main functions of the Agency. The Ordinance has two attachments. Attachment 1 contains the list of state enterprises and organisations under its jurisdiction, and Attachment 11 includes the list of joint-stock companies covered by the Agency's unified state policy in the field of the development, production, repair and utilisation of military- and civilian-purpose products.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Approving the Statute on the Security Council, no. 949, 2 August 1999

The Decree approved the Statute on the Security Council of the RF. It outlines the main tasks of this institution, its functions, composition and the procedures for its formation, powers of the Secretary, the inter-departmental commission and the issues related to the SC maintenance.


The Ordinance approved the Russian Munitions Agency as a federal executive body ensuring the implementation of state policy in the field of the munitions industry, special chemistry and chemical disarmament and performing the functions previously assigned to the Ministry of the Economy of the RF and the dissolved Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the RF. The Ordinance lists the functions of the Munitions Agency. The Ordinance has two attachments. Attachment 1 contains the list of state enterprises and organisations under its jurisdiction, Attachment 11 lists joint-stock companies covered by the Agency's unified state policy in the field of the development, production, repair and utilisation of military- and civilian-purpose products.


The Directive approved the proposal submitted by the Ministry of Defence and agreed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on signing the above-mentioned Protocol; the draft protocol was approved.

Federation in 1999, no. 938, 25 August 1999

The Ordinance approves the attached text of the above-mentioned note, in accordance with the Agreement between the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the President of the Russian Federation and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany on co-operation in the process of safe destruction of chemical weapons, with observation of measures aimed at prevention of environmental pollution, of 22 October 1993.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on the changes made by the Russian Federation in the maximum levels of conventional arms and equipment limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, no. 1081, 22 September 1999

The Government of the RF has ruled: 1) to approve the proposal submitted by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the RF Ministry of Defence and agreed with the Ministry of Justice, on changing the maximum levels for combat tanks, combat armoured vehicles, artillery systems with 100-mm calibre and more, combat aircraft and attack helicopters through transferring part of the RF quota to the Republic of Kazakhstan, comprising 50 tanks, 200 combat armoured vehicles, 100 artillery systems of a calibre of 100-mm and more, 15 combat aircraft and 20 attack helicopters; 2) to assign to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF the task of implementing, in co-operation with the Ministry of Defence of the RF, the procedures defined by the CFE Treaty of 19 November 1990 and the Agreement on Principles and Procedures of the CFE Implementation of 15 May 1992, with regard to the changes made by the RF in the maximum levels of conventional arms and equipment limited by the CFE Treaty, through transferring part of the RF quota to the Republic of Kazakhstan.


The Ordinance approved the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement submitted by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, agreed with other federal executive authorities concerned, and negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the US side.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Statute on the provision by the federal executive authorities of military and technical support and control of the development, production and supplies of military-purpose items, no. 1109, 2 October 1999

The Ordinance approved the above-mentioned Statute in order to improve the military and technical co-operation of the RF with foreign states and to prevent any detrimental consequences for the RF defence capabilities.


The Ordinance approves the draft of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the USSR and IAEA on the Application of IAEA Safeguards in the USSR of 21 February 1985, submitted by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy negotiated on a preliminary basis with the IAEA.

The Ordinance approves the proposal submitted by the Ministry of Atomic Energy and agreed with other federal executive authorities concerned, on concluding the above-mentioned Agreement through an exchange of notes; approves the draft letter of the Russian side; entrusts the Ministry of Atomic Energy with the task of conducting negotiations with the Chinese side and, upon reaching an agreement, of implementing, in the name of the RF Government, the exchange of notes constituting the above-mentioned Agreement.


The RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs is assigned the task of signing the above-mentioned Protocol in the name of the RF, after an agreement is reached with the US side.


The Ordinance approved the above-mentioned Agreement signed in Yalta on 8 October 1999.


The Ordinance approved the draft of the above-mentioned Protocol.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on signing the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, no. 442-rp, 17 November 1999

The Directive gives instructions: 1) to approve the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia to sign the above-mentioned Agreement; 2) to approved the attached basic provisions of the draft of the Treaty; 3) to find acceptable the signing of the Agreement at the summit of the OSCE member states on 18–19 November 1999.
23 December 1999

In accordance with the Directive, the Russian Ministry of Defence is allowed to use military- and dual-purpose space equipment and Russian Armed Forces personnel, including staff members of the Ministry of Defence, for the provision of services related to: 1) the implementation of the Federal Space Program of Russia and the international treaties of the RF in the field of space activities; 2) the implementation, in compliance with the Russian legislation, of measures aimed at preparing space vehicles for launches, in accordance with the attached List of space vehicles covered by the launch contracts with foreign partners.

Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation, no. 2128-r,
25 December 1999


The Directive gives instructions to accept the proposal submitted by the RF Ministry of Defence and to approve the draft of the above-mentioned Protocol negotiated on a preliminary basis with the US side.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, no. 24, 10 January 2000

In accordance with the Decree: 1) amendments and additions to the RF National Security Concept are made; 2) its new version is approved and outlined. It contains four sections: 1. Russia in the World Community; II. National Interests of Russia; III. Threats to National Security of Russia; IV. Ensuring National Security of Russia (the full text of the new version is attached to the Decree).


The Ordinance approved the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the area of the protection measure zone around the complex of chemical weapons storage and destruction sites in Gorny, Saratov region, no. 52, 21 January 2000

The Government of the RF approved the area of 77.23 square km as the protection measure zone around the complex of chemical weapons storage and destruction
sites in Gorny, Saratov region, and the list of inhabited localities (within administrative borders) included in the protection measures zone around the complex of Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction Sites in Gorny.


The Ordinance approves the proposal submitted by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and agreed with other federal executive authorities and the Government of the Udmurt Republic, on signing the above-mentioned Agreement, and the draft of this Agreement negotiated on a preliminary basis with the Italian side.


The Ordinance approved the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement submitted by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the US side. Rosaviakosmos and the RF Ministry of Defence must ensure the implementation of this Agreement, in co-operation with the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other federal executive authorities concerned. The implementation measures carried out at Plesetsk and Svobodniy space vehicles launching sites and the testing site Kapustin Yar are to be financed through non-budget funds.


The Ordinance approved the above-mentioned Statute. It outlined the goals, main tasks and functions of the Russian Conventional Arms Agency (the full text of the Statute is attached).


The Directive approved the proposal submitted by the State Customs Committee of Russia and agreed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, to conduct negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding between the RF State Customs Committee and the US Department of Energy on Co-operation in the Field of Prevention of Illegal Turnover of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials and Other Hazardous Agents.

**Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Statute on the Provision of Information Regarding Environmental Conditions, Environment Pollution and Technology-Related Emergency Situations Which Have Produced, Produce or May Produce Harmful Effect on the Environment, no. 128, 14 February 2000**

The text of the Statute is attached.

**Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Statute on the Establishment of Prohibited Areas and Prohibited Districts Near**
Arsenals, Bases and Storehouses of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Forces, Military Formations and Bodies, no. 135, 17 February 2000

The Ordinance approves the above-mentioned Statute (its full text is attached). In 2000 the RF Ministry of Defence and other federal executive authorities covered by the obligatory military service legislation must take measures aimed at establishing borders of the prohibited zones and prohibited districts near arsenals, bases and storehouses, in accordance with the above-mentioned Statute.


To ensure a complex solution of the nuclear and radiation safety problem, the Government of the RF approved the above-mentioned Federal Target Program (its full text is attached). It outlines: the essence of the problem, the reasons for solving it through complex methods, the goals and tasks, duration and main stages of implementation, the expected implementation results, provision of resources, implementation control as well as the social and economic effectiveness of the Program.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Amendments and Additions to the List of dual-purpose items and technologies covered by export control regulations approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the control over export of dual-purpose items and technologies from the Russian Federation, no. 447, 29 February 2000

The list of amendments and additions made to the List of dual-purpose items and technologies covered by export control regulations, is reproduced in the Attachment to the Decree.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Statute on the state accreditation of organisations launching their internal export control programs, no. 176, 29 February 2000

In accordance with the Federal Law on Export Control, the RF Government enacted that the above-mentioned Statute should be approved (its full text is attached). It defines the procedures for state accreditation of organisations, regardless of property forms, which created their internal export control programs. The state accreditation is aimed to confirm the willingness of these organisations to ensure compliance with the RF export control regulations while conducting foreign economic activities with regard to goods, information, works, services and results of intellectual activities which can be used for the development of WMD, the related delivery vehicles, other types of arms and military weaponry.


The Ordinance approves the draft of the Protocol on the renewal of the above-mentioned Agreement negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the US side.

by Military Units and AD Units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, no. 200, 7 March 2000


Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on signing the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Funding, no. 89-rp, 24 March 2000

The Directive approves the proposal submitted by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and agreed with other federal executive authorities concerned, on signing the above-mentioned Convention adopted in Hague on 9 December 1999.


Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on Additions to the List of enterprises and organisations possessing production facilities and sites which represent serious radiation and nuclear hazards and deal with the development, production, operation, storage, transportation, utilisation of nuclear weapons, materials and goods representing radiation risks, no. 302, 4 April 2000

The Ordinance covers state unitary enterprises included, in accordance with this Ordinance, in the Section “Enterprises and Organisations of Minatom of Russia” of the List approved by the Ordinance of the Government no. 238, 7 March 1995.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Statute on the transit of arms, military equipment and military materiel through the territory of the Russian Federation, no. 306, 8 April 2000

The Ordinance approves the above-mentioned Statute, which defines the procedures required for the transit of arms, military equipment and military materiel through the territory of the Russian Federation. The RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs is assigned the task of notifying governments of foreign states of the transit procedures established by this Ordinance.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the area of the protection measures zone around the chemical weapons storage site in Kisner (Udmurt Republic), no. 329, 12 April 2000

In accordance with the Federal Law on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons, the Government of the RF decided to approve an area of 510 square km as the protective measure zone around the chemical weapons storage site in Kisner (Udmurt Republic) and the list of inhabited localities (within administrative borders) included in the protection measures zone around the above-mentioned site in Kisner (Udmurt Republic).

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the
area of the protection measures zone around the chemical weapons storage site in Kambarka (Udmurt Republic), no. 330, 12 April 2000

In accordance with the Federal Law on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons, the Government of the RF decided to approve an area of 87 square km as the protective measure zone around the chemical weapons storage site in Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) and the list of inhabited localities (within administrative borders) included in the protection measures zone around the above-mentioned site in Kambarka (Udmurt Republic).

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on approving the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, no. 706, 21 April 2000

The Decree approved the Military Doctrine of the RF. The Decree on Principal Guidelines of the Military Doctrine of the RF, no. 1833, 2 November 1993, is declared null and void. The military doctrine is outlined in three main sections: 1. Military and Political Guidelines (military and political situation, main threats to the military security, ensuring military security, the military organisation of the state; management of the state’s military organisation); 2. Military and Strategic Guidelines (character of wars and armed conflicts; guidelines for the use of the Armed Forces of the RF and other forces); 3. Military and Economic Guidelines (ensuring military security from military and economic viewpoints; international military (military-political and military-technical) co-operation.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the reorganisation of the federal state unitary enterprise “Promexport” through the incorporation of the federal unitary enterprise “Rossiyskiye Tekhnologii” (“Russian Technologies”), no. 750, 27 April 2000


The Directive approved the proposal submitted by the Russian Minatom and agreed with other federal executive authorities concerned, on negotiating the contract between the public company “TWEL” and the Institute of Nuclear Energy (Hungary) incorporated in the Centre Physical Research Institute, for the production and supplies of enriched nuclear fuel (35 per cent of U-235 isotope) for the Budapest research reactor for the period of 2000–2015.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on measures to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999, no. 786, 5 May 2000

In accordance with the above-mentioned resolution, the Decree enacted that, starting from 14 November 1999 and pending further instruction, all state institutions, industrial, commercial, financial, transport and other enterprises, firms, banks, organisations and other legal entities and individuals under the RF jurisdiction: a) are prohibited to give any flying vehicle a take-off or landing permit from/on the RF territory if it belongs to the Taliban movement, is leased or used by Taliban or in its name (except for the cases sanctioned by the UN Security Council Committee for humanitarian reasons); b) all funds and other financial resources received and drawn from the assets possessed or directly/indirectly controlled by the Taliban movement are blocked. The Decree obliges all federal executive authorities concerned to ensure, within their respective areas of jurisdiction, the implementation of all the above-mentioned measures, taking into account that exceptions are allowed only with the approval of the Committee of the UN Security Council.
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on amendments and additions to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the control of exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies from the Russian Federation of 27 March 1992, no. 822, 6 May 2000

The Decree obliges the RF Government to bring its legislative normative acts in conformity with the amendments and additions introduced by the Decree.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Protocol on the Prohibition or Restrictions of the Use of Mines, Trap Mines and Other Devices with the Amendments Made on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II with the amendments made on 3 May 1996) attached to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, no. 388, 6 May 2000

The Government enacted that the above-mentioned Protocol should be approved and submitted to the SD for ratification, in accordance with the existing procedures.


The Directive approved the proposal submitted by the Russian Ministry of Defence and agreed with other federal executive authorities concerned, to conduct negotiations on the Agreement between the RF Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Finland on the Supply by Finland, on a Non-Refundable Basis, of the System of Technical Control of the Safety of Lewisite at the Chemical Weapons Storage Site in Kambarka (Udmurt Republic).


The Directive approves the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement submitted by the RF Ministry of Defence and agreed with the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Property Relations.


The Government assigned the Ministry of Defence the task of conducting negotiations with the Uzbek side and, upon reaching an agreement, to sign the above-mentioned document in the name of the Government of the RF.

Directive of the President of the Russian Federation on signing the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Establishment of the Joint Centre for Early Warning and Missile Attack Warning Systems Data Exchange, no. 192-rp, 3 June 2000

The Directive approved the draft of the above-mentioned Memorandum submitted by the RF Ministry of Defence and the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
prepared in co-operation with the US side, which defines the goals and tasks of the future joint centre, terms of the sponsorship of its establishment and operation shared by the Russian and US sides.


The Government assigned the Ministry of Defence the task of conducting negotiations with the Kazakh side and, upon reaching an agreement, to sign.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the Statute on licensing activities related to the use of radioactive materials during works aimed at the use of atomic energy for defence purposes, no. 471, 20 June 2000

The Ordinance approved the above-mentioned Statute. Its full text is attached.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on amendments and additions to Section 2, “Equipment and Non-Nuclear Materials”, of the List of nuclear materials, equipment, special non-nuclear materials and related technologies covered by the export control regulations approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 202, 14 February 1996, no. 1151, 21 June 2000

The list of amendments and additions to the above-mentioned List is attached.

The Decree obliges to introduce the amendments and additions specified in the List. It obliges the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send a note to the IAEA Director General, confirming the acceptance by the Russian side of the amendments to the Initial List of the Zangger Committee adopted in Vienna on 9 July 1999, and the amendments to the Initial List of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) adopted in accordance with the latter’s inter-session meeting in Vienna on 20 October 1999.


The Directive approves the proposal of the RF Government on signing this Agreement. The Chairman of the RF Government is assigned the task of signing it in the name of the RF, after an agreement is reached.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on dispatching a military formation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for participation in the UN peace-keeping operation in Sierra Leone, no. 1156, 22 June 2000

In accordance with this Decree, Russia dispatches a military formation of up to 115 servicemen (equipped with four Mi-24 helicopters with authorised armament, munitions, military equipment and other means required) for participation in the above-mentioned UN operation for the period till 7 August 2000, and is assigns to it the task of ensuring the safety of the UN personnel by accompanying ground convoys, carrying out search & rescue flights, supporting aeromobile operations, patrol and monitoring flights.
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation

Approved by the President on 28 June 2000.

The contents of the Concept is outlined in five sections: I. General Provisions; II. Modern World and the Foreign Policy of the RF; III. Priorities of the RF in the Solution of Global Problems; IV. Regional Priorities; V. Formulation and Implementation of the Foreign Policy of the RF.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving and submitting for the approval of the President of the Russian Federation amendments and additions made to the List of dual-purpose goods and technologies covered by the export control regulations, no. 496, 6 July 2000

The Government approved and decided to submit for the approval of the President of the RF the attached amendments and additions introduced in the above-mentioned List approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on controlling the exports from the Russian Federation of dual-purpose goods and technologies, no. 1268, 26 August 1996.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on approving the area of the protection measures zone around the chemical weapons storage site in Shchuchye (Kurgan region), no. 523, 14 July 2000

The Government decided to approve an area of 445 square km as the protective measure zone around the chemical weapons storage site in Shchuchye (Kurgan region), and the attached list of inhabited localities (within administrative borders) included in the protection measures zone around the above-mentioned chemical weapons storage site.


The Ordinance approves the draft of the above-mentioned documents; the signing of these documents by the Chairman of the RF Government is recognised as acceptable. The Ordinance lists the measures, which should be taken by Minatom, upon reaching an agreement with other federal executive authorities concerned, with regard to the implementation of the above-mentioned Agreement and the elaboration of the procedure, which would allow the authorised US bodies to exercise control of the forms and locations of the above-mentioned Russian plutonium and the procedure, which would allow the RF bodies to exercise control of the respective US materials.


The Ordinance approved the text of the above-mentioned note.

The Ordinance approved the drafts of the above-mentioned protocol-description submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF, agreed with the other interested federal executive authorities and negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the Chinese side. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is assigned the task of conducting negotiations with the Chinese side and, upon reaching an agreement, to sign the above-mentioned Additional Protocol-Description.


The Ordinance approves the draft of above-mentioned Protocol. The Minatom is assigned the task of conducting negotiations with the Italian side and, upon reaching an agreement, to sign it in the name of the RF Government.


The Directive approves the proposal submitted by the RF Federal Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) and agreed with the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minatom of Russia, to conduct negotiations on the Agreement between the RF Federal Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) and the Agency for Nuclear Devices Safety of the French Republic on Exchange of Information and Co-operation in the Field of Safety Regulations in the Civilian Use of Atomic Energy.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on measures to ensure the participation of the Russian Federation in international programs, projects and operation on humanitarian mine clearance, no. 582, 5 August 2000

The Ordinance outlines the tasks and main lines of activities of the federal executive authorities concerned, related to the development and implementation of measures to ensure the participation of the RF in international programs, projects and operations on humanitarian mine clearance.


The Directive approved the proposal submitted by Minatom of Russia and agreed with the Russian Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Economy, the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service, on co-operation with state and private organisations of Japan in the fields specified in the Attachment (namely, production of mixed uranium/plutonium-MOX fuel for BOR-60 and BN-600 fast neutron reactors; thermal reactors with the use of plutonium withdrawn from nuclear military programs and designated as no longer required for military purposes; irradiation of fuel elements; reprocessing, on the territory of the RF, of MOX fuel through pyroelectrochemical method with the consequent production of “fresh” fuel, the use of this fuel in reactors as well as calculation research of vibro-concentrated MOX fuel, etc.). It is emphasised that the co-operation should be in strict compliance with the Russian export control legislation and international obligations of the RF in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Minatom of Russia should exercise control over the co-operation with
Japanese organisations. The list of main areas of activities is attached.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on amendments and additions to the List of dual-purpose goods and technologies covered by export control regulations approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 1268, of 26 August 1996, no. 1477, 9 August 2000
The Decree obliges to introduce amendments and additions in accordance with the Attachment to the Decree.

Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation on amendments and additions to the Statute on the submission by the Russian Federation of information on conventional arms supplies in accordance with the Wassenaar Arrangement, no. 595, 12 August 2000
The Ordinance approves the attached amendments and additions to be introduced in the above-mentioned Statute. Also, it emphasises that the information on the conventional arms supplies for the first half of 2000 is submitted by the RF with due regard to the amendments and additions introduced by the present Ordinance.

To provide assistance to the Republic of India in ensuring the safety of the “Tarapur” nuclear-power station, the Government approved the proposal submitted by Minatom of Russia and agreed with other federal executive authorities concerned, on supplying the Republic of India with up to 58 tons of nuclear fuel tablets for the manufacture of heat-producing units designed for use in the “Tarapur” station reactors. The Directive obliges 1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to notify the NSG member states of Russia’s intention to supply nuclear fuel tablets manufactured in Russia to the Republic of India; 2. the Ministry of Defence to ensure control over the preparation of the contract and its implementation in accordance with the Statute on the procedures for export and import of nuclear materials, equipment, special non-nuclear materials and the related technologies approved by the Ordinance of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 574, 8 May 1996.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on measures to implement the UN Security Resolution no. 1298 of 17 May 2000, no. 1582, 28 August 2000
Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution of the UN Security Council, the Decree enacts that, starting from 17 May 2000 till 17 May 2001, all state agencies, industrial, commercial, financial, transport and other enterprises, firms, banks, organisations, other legal entities and private individuals under the RF jurisdiction a) are prohibited from selling and supplying military-purpose products, civil and official weapons and the related material means of all types including arms and munitions, military transport means and equipment, semi-military equipment and spare parts for all the above-mentioned items to Eritrea and Ethiopia, as well as from using sea and military ships for these purposes; 2) are prohibited from providing to Eritrea and Ethiopia any technical assistance or services in the field of personnel training related to the transfer, production, maintenance or operation of means listed in paragraph a). These measures do not apply to the supplies of military equipment or assets designed exclusively for humanitarian purposes which are subject to the approval of the Committee of the UN Security Council established in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1298 of 17 May 2000. The Decree obliges all federal executive authorities concerned...
to ensure, within their respective areas of jurisdiction, the implementation of the above-mentioned measures, taking into account that exceptions from these measures can be made only with the Committee’s sanction.

**Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation, no. 1271-r, 8 September 2000**

The Directive approves the draft of the Memorandum on Co-operation between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Japan with Regard to Facilitation of the Development, Non-Proliferation and Utilisation of Nuclear Arms Subject to Reduction in the RF, submitted by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreed with other federal executive authorities concerned and negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the Japanese side. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minatom of Russia are assigned the task of signing the above-mentioned Memorandum in the name of the RF Government, upon reaching an agreement with the Japanese side.


The Directive approves the draft of the above-mentioned Agreement negotiated, on a preliminary basis, with the Armenian side. Upon completion of negotiations, Ministry of Defence is authorised to sign the Agreement in the name of the RF.
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Electronic version created by Boris I. Klimenko
This volume presents the results of research on topical issues of Russian national security, defence and arms control policy conducted at IMEMO and published in 1997–2000 as Special supplements to the Russian editions of the SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

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