

## II. Multilateral embargoes on arms and dual-use items

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In 2016, 38 multilateral arms embargoes were in force: 15 imposed by the United Nations, 22 by the European Union (EU) and 1 by the League of Arab States (see table 15.2).<sup>1</sup> Of the EU's 22 embargoes, 11 implemented UN arms embargoes directly, 3 implemented UN embargoes with modified geographical scope or coverage in terms of the weapon types included and 8 had no UN counterpart.<sup>2</sup> The single Arab League arms embargo on Syria had no UN counterpart. Most of these embargoes only cover conventional arms and military goods and services. However, the UN and EU embargoes on Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and the EU embargo on Russia also cover certain exports of dual-use items—goods, software and technologies that can be used for both civilian purposes and in connection with conventional, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems.<sup>3</sup>

No new UN arms embargoes were imposed in 2016. A US proposal for a UN arms embargo on South Sudan and a British and French proposal for a UN arms embargo on Syria failed to gain enough votes in the UN Security Council. The Chinese and Russian reactions to these proposals showed their continuing aversion to arms embargoes and sanctions in general. The UN arms embargo on Iran was relaxed in 2016 and the UN arms embargo on North Korea, along with its associated monitoring mechanisms, was tightened (see below). Several investigations in 2016 showed once again that the implementation of these and other UN embargoes was not unproblematic. In an attempt to help post-conflict states strengthen their security forces without contributing to diversion, several UN arms embargoes allow governments in the target state to import arms provided certain conditions are met. The remaining notification requirements for Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia were lifted in 2016, whereas those on Somalia, the Central African Republic

<sup>1</sup> In addition, 1 voluntary multilateral embargo was in force in which the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) requests that all participating states impose an embargo on arms deliveries to Armenian and Azerbaijani forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Committee of Senior Officials, Statement, annex 1 to Journal no. 2 of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee, Prague, 27–28 Feb. 1992.

<sup>2</sup> The 3 that differed from equivalent UN embargoes were those on Iran and North Korea, which covered more weapon types than the UN embargo, and on Sudan, which covered the whole country, whereas the UN embargo applied only to the Darfur region. The 8 with no UN counterpart were those on Belarus, China, Myanmar, Russia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe and the partial embargoes on Egypt and Syria. The EU embargoes on China and Egypt are a political commitment whereas the rest are legally binding. The 11 that implement UN embargoes are indicated in table 15.2.

<sup>3</sup> The UN and EU embargoes on Iran and North Korea apply to dual-use goods on the NSG and MTCR control lists. The EU embargo on Russia applies to transfers of all items on the EU's dual-use list to military end-users.

(CAR) and Libya remained in place, despite the often vocal protests of their national governments (see below).

A call by the European Parliament for an EU arms embargo on Saudi Arabia, in response to alleged violations of international law in the latter's military campaign in Yemen, did not lead to action by the European Council (see below). Unlike UN arms embargoes, there are no systematic mechanisms in place for monitoring compliance with EU and Arab League arms embargoes.

### **Threats to impose UN arms embargoes**

#### *South Sudan*

The war in South Sudan between the Government of South Sudan—formed by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)—and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) that began in 2013, continued in 2016. As part of international efforts to end the war the UN Security Council imposed a travel ban on a select group of South Sudanese Government officials and opposition leaders in March 2015.<sup>4</sup> The option of an arms embargo on South Sudan had been discussed and threatened in different multilateral organizations, including the Security Council, since the outbreak of the war.<sup>5</sup>

The UN Panel of Experts appointed to monitor the situation in South Sudan warned in November 2016 that the parties to the conflict were preparing for a further escalation, and noted in this context that arms continued to be supplied to both sides.<sup>6</sup> In the light of the deteriorating situation in South Sudan, including the risk of genocide, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called repeatedly for the imposition of an arms embargo in 2016.<sup>7</sup> However, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a group of countries in East Africa that sought to mediate in the conflict, stated that an arms embargo or sanctions on South Sudan would not provide a solution and argued instead for dialogue and reconciliation.<sup>8</sup>

Having lost confidence in attempts to negotiate peace, the United States in December 2016 tabled a draft resolution in the UN Security Council, calling

<sup>4</sup> See Bromley, M., Kelly, N. and Wezeman, P. D., 'Multilateral embargoes on arms and dual-use goods', *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, pp. 750–51.

<sup>5</sup> For a full analysis of discussions prior to 2016 see Bromley, Kelly and Wezeman (note 4), pp. 748–54.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015)', S/2016/963, 15 Nov. 2015, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> UN Security Council, 7846th Meeting, S/PV.7846, 19 Dec. 2016.

<sup>8</sup> IGAD, 'Communiqué of the 29th Extra-ordinary Summit of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government', Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9 Dec. 2016.

mainly for an arms embargo on all the parties to the conflict.<sup>9</sup> The proposal was defeated by a vote of seven in favour, none against and eight abstentions. The USA and other countries that favoured sanctions argued that the embargo would have stemmed the flow of arms to the belligerents and contributed to efforts to prevent the conflict from worsening and potentially developing into a genocide.<sup>10</sup> The states that abstained argued that they saw value in IGAD continuing its efforts to mediate between the parties and the efforts by the South Sudanese Government to engage in a national dialogue. In addition, China and Russia expressed general concerns about the use of sanctions by the UN Security Council, arguing—as in previous years—that they are dubious tools used by developed Western countries to exert pressure on developing countries.<sup>11</sup> Russia called the proposed sanctions ‘typical of the sort of geopolitical engineering that the Western countries have been using against South Sudan and other countries’ and argued that such measures had failed to have a positive effect in similar situations.<sup>12</sup> It also specifically mentioned the lack of regional support for the sanctions—referring to the position of IGAD—as well as the reservations voiced by countries providing troops to the UN Mission in South Sudan.<sup>13</sup>

### *Syria*

In October 2016 a report by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism concluded that Syrian Government forces had used helicopters to drop barrel bombs containing chlorine gas.<sup>14</sup> In response, the United Kingdom and France drafted a resolution in December 2016 to be tabled at the United Nations Security Council. The draft included, among other things, a ban on the transfer of arms and related materiel used to deliver chemicals as weapons. It specifically included a ban on the supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government and targeted sanctions on Syrian entities involved in the development and production of chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, Security Council, ‘United States of America: draft resolution’, S/2016/1085, 23 Dec. 2016.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 7850th Meeting, S/PV.7850, 23 Dec. 2016, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> UN Security Council, S/PV.7850 (note 10), p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> UN Security Council, S/PV.7850 (note 10).

<sup>13</sup> UN Security Council, S/PV.7850 (note 10).

<sup>14</sup> UN Security Council, ‘Fourth report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism’, S/2016/888, 21 Oct. 2016.

<sup>15</sup> Nichols, M., ‘Britain, France push UN Syria helicopter ban, sanctions over gas attacks’, Reuters, 21 Dec. 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, ‘Draft resolution on chemical weapons’, S/2017/172, 28 Feb. 2017.

## Alleged violations of UN arms embargoes

### *Iran*

The UN arms embargo on Iran, which was substantially modified in January 2016, as discussed further below, requires prior approval from the Security Council for any transfers to Iran of arms covered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms and their associated parts and components, transfers of certain dual-use items to Iran, and all transfers of arms from Iran. There were no reported violations of the restrictions on transfers of dual-use items to Iran during 2016.<sup>16</sup>

However, as in 2015, there was a series of allegations that Iran was violating the embargo on transfers of arms from Iran. During 2016, the Australian, French and US navies each intercepted ships carrying small arms and light weapons (SALW). They concluded that the weapons originated from Iran and that they were intended for delivery to non-state armed groups in either Yemen or Somalia.<sup>17</sup> If the allegations are correct, the transfers represent violations of both the arms embargo on Iran and the arms embargoes on Yemen or Somalia. Arms transfers to Hezbollah by Iran have been the subject of numerous reports in recent years.<sup>18</sup> In June 2016 the Secretary-General of Hezbollah stated that the organization's budget, including for salaries, expenses, weapons and missiles, all came from Iran.<sup>19</sup>

### *North Korea*

The UN arms embargo on North Korea prohibits the transfer of arms and certain dual-use items to and from the country. In March 2016 the UN Security Council responded to North Korea's nuclear test in January 2016 by amending its sanctions.<sup>20</sup> This involved expanding the existing UN arms embargo to include imports of SALW. It also called on states to expel any North Korean nationals, including diplomats and government representatives, found to be assisting with embargo violations and to inspect all cargo passing through their ports, airports and free trade zones that is en route to or from North Korea. The arms embargo had previously called on states to inspect all cargo en route to or from North Korea if states had 'reasonable

<sup>16</sup> Nichols, M., 'UN chief concerned Iran may have violated arms embargo: report', Reuters, 8 Jan. 2017.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)', S/2016/589, 12 July 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, 'Second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)', S/2016/1136, 30 Dec. 2016.

<sup>18</sup> See Bromley, M. and Wezeman, P. D., 'Conventional arms and dual-use items', *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, pp. 105–106.

<sup>19</sup> Nichols (note 16).

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270, 2 Mar. 2016.

grounds to believe' it contained prohibited goods.<sup>21</sup> The expanded arms embargo enforcement mechanisms—particularly those relating to cargo inspections—are among the most rigid that have ever been imposed by the UN, and their adoption was widely interpreted as a sign of China's increased willingness to put pressure on the North Korean Government.<sup>22</sup>

Despite the increased monitoring mechanisms, violations of the UN embargo on North Korea continued during 2016. The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea stated that its evasion techniques were increasing 'in scale, scope and sophistication'. As with Iran, most of the alleged violations involving transfers of conventional arms or dual-use items concerned exports from North Korea. The panel investigated reports concerning shipments of ballistic missile spare parts to Egypt, portable surface-to-air missiles to Mozambique, guided missiles to Sudan and small arms to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Some of the small arms that went to the DRC allegedly went to Congolese police units that were later deployed with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).<sup>23</sup> However, several attempted shipments were interdicted in 2016, including 30 000 rocket-propelled grenades en route to a private company in Egypt and 45 boxes of military radio communications equipment en route to Eritrea.<sup>24</sup>

The panel also investigated reports that Angola and Uganda were receiving military training from North Korean personnel.<sup>25</sup> The panel underlined that the restrictions put in place by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 prohibit 'States from engaging in the hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training'.<sup>26</sup> In December 2016 Uganda—where North Korean military instructors have previously trained paramilitary forces—announced that it was cutting all military ties with Pyongyang.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, 12 June 2009.

<sup>22</sup> Sengupta, S. and Sang-Hun, C., 'UN toughens sanctions on North Korea in response to its nuclear program', *New York Times*, 2 Mar. 2016. For a more detailed analysis of the effect of the restrictive measures on North Korea and recent developments in its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes see chapter 11, section IX, in this volume.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)', S/2017/150, 27 Feb. 2017, paras 88–89, 101–102, 106 and 104–105.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations, Security Council (note 23), paras 61–71 and 72–80.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations, Security Council (note 23), paras 120–22. On reports of past cases of North Korea providing military training to states in Africa see DuPre, A., Kasprzyk, N. and Stott, N., 'Cooperation between African states and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea', Institute for Security Studies- Africa, 30 Nov. 2016.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270, 2 Mar. 2016.

<sup>27</sup> Park, J. and Munroe, T., 'Uganda to halt military, security ties with North Korea: South Korea', Reuters, 29 May 2016.

*Other alleged violations*

The UN arms embargo on Sudan prohibits arms transfers to any of the belligerents in the armed conflict in the Darfur region. Since the imposition of the embargo in 2005, the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan has found ample evidence that the Government of Sudan has violated the ban, including by moving combat aircraft and ammunition into Darfur.<sup>28</sup> However, in 2016 the panel's investigations aimed at establishing whether such violations were continuing were hindered by the fact that the Sudanese Government did not provide them with a visa to enter Darfur.<sup>29</sup>

The UN arms embargo on the Taliban prohibits the transfer of arms to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In 2016 the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for the Taliban embargo highlighted the ease with which the Taliban had been able to acquire from abroad 'detonators, detonating cord and remote control triggers, as well as precursors for homemade explosives' for use in improvised explosive devices (IEDs).<sup>30</sup> The embargo calls on all states to restrict supplies of 'components that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices or unconventional weapons'.<sup>31</sup> However, many of the items concerned are not subject to either arms or dual-use export controls, which makes enforcement at the national level challenging. The UN Secretary-General and others have called for the further development and promotion of industry guidelines as a means for preventing the supply of IED precursors.<sup>32</sup> The Monitoring Team also noted the difficulty of tracking the sources of the Taliban's arms—given the large number of weapons in circulation in the wider region—but noted that it appeared to have enhanced its ability to source 'specialized, modern equipment such as sniper rifles, laser sights and night-vision goggles'.<sup>33</sup>

The UN arms embargo on Yemen prohibits arms transfers to non-state groups in Yemen. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen investigated allegations from Saudi Arabia and several other Arab countries that Iran was supplying weapons to Houthi and Saleh forces in Yemen.<sup>34</sup> It concluded that it had not seen sufficient evidence to confirm any direct large-scale supply of arms from Iran, although it did find evidence that weapons seized on

<sup>28</sup> See Bromley, Kelly and Wezeman (note 4), p. 751.

<sup>29</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)', Annex to S/2017/22, 9 Jan. 2017, pp. 8–9.

<sup>30</sup> UN Security Council, 'Seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to peace, stability and security of Afghanistan', Annex to S/2016/842, 5 Oct. 2016, p. 16.

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2255, 22 Dec. 2015.

<sup>32</sup> UN Security Council (note 30), p. 17.

<sup>33</sup> UN Security Council (note 30), p. 19.

<sup>34</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen', Annex to S/2017/81, pp. 26–30.

ships in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden on four occasions in 2015 and 2016 were likely to have originated from Iran and were possibly intended for armed groups in Yemen.

### **‘Partial’ UN arms embargoes**

In recent years it has become increasingly common for the UN Security Council to impose ‘partial’ UN arms embargoes, which allow transfers of arms to the target state provided that certain conditions have been met. These conditions usually involve the supplier or recipient state requesting permission from, or notifying, the relevant Sanctions Committee. Partial UN arms embargoes represent a middle ground between a full embargo and a complete withdrawal of all restrictions. They have been used, among other things, to help provide some level of international oversight over arms transfers to a particular state and to encourage the adoption of improved standards of stockpile management and security sector governance. Of the 15 UN arms embargoes in force in 2016, 7 were partial arms embargoes. Despite the widespread use of this tool, rates of compliance with the relevant notification systems are often poor—by both supplier and recipient state—and the target state often presses for the restrictions to be completely lifted.

#### *The lifting of UN restrictions on Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia*

The remaining UN-imposed restrictions on arms transfers to Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, which had been in place with varying levels of restrictiveness since 2004 and 1992 respectively, were lifted in 2016. Until its termination in April 2016 the UN arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire required either the supplier states or Côte d’Ivoire to notify the relevant Sanctions Committee in advance of any arms transfers and to provide information about the intended end-use and location of the weapons.<sup>35</sup> The notification system for Côte d’Ivoire appears to have been poorly adhered to throughout its existence. In April 2016 the Panel of Experts reported that it was investigating a number of deliveries that had taken place without prior notification, including transfers of night vision goggles and military trucks to the Côte d’Ivoire security forces.<sup>36</sup>

Until its termination in May 2016 the UN arms embargo on Liberia required Liberia to notify the relevant Sanctions Committee in advance of any arms imports, to mark the imported weapons and maintain a registry of

<sup>35</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2153, 29 Apr. 2014; and UN Security Council Resolution 2283, 27 Apr. 2016.

<sup>36</sup> United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 27 of Security Council resolution 2219 (2015)’, S/2016/254, paras 98–105.

them, and to notify the Committee that these steps had been taken.<sup>37</sup> Since 2009 several arms transfers to Liberia have occurred without prior notification.<sup>38</sup> However, Liberia's commitment to improving marking and stockpile management practices—if not its capacity to do so—has been widely noted. That said, Liberia's willingness to allow external supervision of its national practices in stockpile management appeared to wane in the final months of the UN arms embargo.<sup>39</sup>

*Other 'partial UN embargoes'*

The UN arms embargo on Somalia requires the Government of Somalia to report to the relevant Sanctions Committee in advance on all deliveries, to provide information on its force structure and to take steps to secure its arms stockpiles. The government has repeatedly called for the reporting conditions to be fully lifted. However, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea noted that this call ignores the fact that the embargo allows the supply of arms to the government and that it had received a significant amount of weaponry since the current system was put in place in 2013.<sup>40</sup> In 2016, the Monitoring Group noted that the government had improved some aspects of its compliance with the reporting obligations and that the remaining issues were a result more of capacity issues than of a lack of political will.<sup>41</sup> However, it also noted that the government still lacks the capacity to manage its weapons stockpiles effectively.<sup>42</sup>

The UN arms embargo on the Central African Republic permits transfers of arms to the CAR security forces, provided that they have been approved in advance by the relevant UN Sanctions Committee. In 2016 the CAR Government, parliament and opposition parties, with increasing support from civil society, called for the embargo to be lifted, arguing that it is an injustice imposed on the CAR. The UN Panel of Experts on the CAR concluded that these calls by some CAR officials sought to mobilize nationalist sentiment and place responsibility for the intensified violence entirely on the UN.<sup>43</sup>

The UN arms embargo on Libya permits transfers of arms to the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), provided that they have been approved in advance by the relevant UN Sanctions Commit-

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1903, 17 Dec. 2009; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2288, 25 May 2016.

<sup>38</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Security Council resolution 2237 (2015)', S/2016/348, para. 31.

<sup>39</sup> United Nations, Security Council (note 38), para. 38–39.

<sup>40</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia', S/2016/919, 31 Oct. 2016, p. 37.

<sup>41</sup> United Nations, Security Council (note 40), p. 36.

<sup>42</sup> United Nations, Security Council (note 40), p. 37.

<sup>43</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016)', S/2016/1032, 5 Dec. 2016, p. 18.



tee.<sup>44</sup> To help prevent weapons from being smuggled into and out of Libya, in June 2016 the Security Council authorized states to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that are believed to be carrying prohibited items.<sup>45</sup> The GNA has asked for the arms embargo to be fully lifted, arguing that it restricts its ability to obtain the necessary means to fight terrorism.<sup>46</sup> However, this has not resulted in any amendments to the restrictions.<sup>47</sup>

The UN arms embargo on Iran was substantially modified in January 2016, following the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015.<sup>48</sup> Transfers are now permitted of all arms and dual-use items to and from Iran, provided that they have been approved in advance by the UN Security Council.<sup>49</sup> The way the system of approvals and notifications works in practice—in particular the extent to which supplier states comply with the provisions, which transfers are approved or denied, and how supplier states respond in cases where a denial is issued—will contribute to the success or failure of the JCPOA. Five requests to approve transfers to Iran of items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group control list and one request to approve arms transfers to Iran were submitted in 2016.<sup>50</sup>

## EU embargoes

The EU arms embargo on Iran prohibits transfers of arms to and from Iran and transfers of dual-use items to Iran. Although many of the EU's economic sanctions on Iran were lifted under the terms of the JCPOA, the arms embargo will remain in place until 2023.<sup>51</sup> The EU arms embargo was imposed in response to the UN's nuclear-related sanctions on Iran but is broader in scope, covering all items on the EU military list. The EU also has a range of restrictions in place on the supply of items to Iran that might be used for 'internal repression', including vehicles designed for riot control or prisoner transfers, razor barbed wire and equipment, and technology or

<sup>44</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)', S/2015/128, 23 Feb. 2015, pp. 28–36.

<sup>45</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2292, 14 June 2016.

<sup>46</sup> Prentis, J., 'Serraj calls for lifting of arms embargo at AU mini-summit on Libya', *Libya Herald*, 27 Jan. 2017.

<sup>47</sup> Prentis (note 46).

<sup>48</sup> For a full analysis of the JCPOA and the schedule for lifting the UN arms embargo on Iran see Anthony, I., Bromley, M. and Wezeman P. D., 'The role and impact of international sanctions on Iran', *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, pp. 87–114; and Rauf, T., 'Resolving concerns about Iran's nuclear programme', *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, pp. 673–88.

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, 20 July 2015.

<sup>50</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 'Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)', S/2017/49, 18 Jan. 2017, paras 19, 22. Three of the NSG control list requests were approved. The other two control list requests and the arms request were still under consideration as of Jan. 2017.

<sup>51</sup> European External Action Service, 'Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)', Brussels, 23 Jan. 2016.

software for the monitoring or interception of Internet or telephone communications.<sup>52</sup> All of these restrictions are unaffected by the JCPOA.

In 2013 the EU member states issued a political agreement stating that they would suspend exports to Egypt of equipment that might be used for internal repression, re-evaluate export licences for military equipment and review their security assistance to Egypt. These measures remained in place in 2016.<sup>53</sup> However, since 2013 several EU member states have exported significant quantities of conventional arms to Egypt and issued licences for additional exports.<sup>54</sup> The items include small arms and armoured vehicles that have the potential to play a role in internal repression. During 2016 it was argued that the original agreement remains in place largely because certain member states are concerned that pursuing discussions about officially ending the agreement in the EU Foreign Affairs Council could potentially lead to the imposition of a more restrictive agreement.<sup>55</sup>

The Saudi military operations in Yemen that began in 2015 have drawn widespread criticism owing to strong evidence that many of the air attacks have caused civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects, and could be considered to be in violation of international humanitarian law. This has resulted in calls for an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia from civil society and politicians in many EU member states.<sup>56</sup> In February 2016 the European Parliament adopted by a large majority a non-binding resolution asked the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to launch an initiative aimed at imposing an EU arms embargo on Saudi Arabia.<sup>57</sup> There was no ensuing action by the European Council and Saudi Arabia continues to be an important arms export market for several EU member states.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Council of the European Union, 'Council Decision 2012/168/CFSP of 23 Mar. 2012 amending Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran', *Official Journal of the European Union*, 24 Mar. 2012, p. 85.

<sup>53</sup> European External Action Service, Communication with authors, 26 Jan. 2017.

<sup>54</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers database; and Amnesty International, 'EU: halt arms transfers to Egypt to stop fuelling killings and torture', 25 May 2016.

<sup>55</sup> Jacqmin, D., 'Égypte: "embargo" et armes de repression interne' [Egypt: 'embargo' and arms for internal repression], Note d'analyse, GRIP, 26 Oct. 2016.

<sup>56</sup> Wezeman, P. D., 'Arms transfers to the Middle East and North Africa, and the military intervention in Yemen', *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, pp. 587–94.

<sup>57</sup> European Parliament, Resolution of 25 Feb. 2016 on the humanitarian situation in Yemen, 2016/2515(RSP).

<sup>58</sup> For more on arms exports to Saudi Arabia see chapter 3, section III, and chapter 10 in this volume.

**Table 15.2.** Multilateral arms embargoes in force during 2016

Target <sup>d</sup>	Date embargo first imposed	Principal instruments establishing or amending the embargo <sup>b</sup>	Key developments during 2016
<i>United Nations arms embargoes</i>			
CAR (NGF)	5 Dec. 2013	SCR 2127	Extended until 31 Jan. 2017 by SCR 2262, 27 Jan. 2016
DRC (NGF)	28 July 2003	SCRs 1493, 1596, 1807, 2078	Extended until 1 July 2017 by SCR 2293, 23 June 2016
Côte d'Ivoire (NGF)	15 Nov. 2004	SCRs 1572, 1946, 2045	Lifted by SCR 2283, 28 Apr. 2016
Eritrea	23 Dec. 2009	SCR 1907	
Iran	23 Dec. 2006	SCRs 1737, 1747, 1929, 2231	
Iraq (NGF)	6 Aug. 1990	SCRs 661, 1483, 1546	
ISIL, al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities	16 Jan. 2002	SCRs 1390, 1989, 2170, 2253	
Korea, North	15 July 2006	SCRs 1695, 1718, 1874	Amended by SCR 2270, 2 Mar. 2016
Lebanon (NGF)	11 Aug. 2006	SCR 1701	
Liberia (NGF)	22 Dec. 2003 <sup>c</sup>	SCRs 1521, 1683, 1903, 2128	Lifted by SCR 2288, 25 May 2016
Libya (NGF)	26 Feb. 2011	SCRs 1970, 1973, 2009, 2095, 2174	
Somalia (NGF)	23 Jan. 1992	SCRs 733, 1725, 2093, 2111	Extended until 15 Nov. 2017 by SCR 2317, 10 Nov. 2016
Sudan (Darfur)	30 July 2004	SCRs 1556, 1591, 1945	
Yemen (NGF)	14 Apr. 2015	SCR 2216	
Taliban	16 Jan. 2002	SCRs 1390, 1988	
<i>European Union arms embargoes</i>			
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities*	17 Dec. 1996	CPs 96/746/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP, 2002/402/CFSP	
Belarus	20 June 2011	CD 2011/357/CFSP, CD 2012/642/CFSP	Extended until 28 Feb. 2017 by CD 2016/280/CFSP, 25 Feb. 2016
China	27 June 1989	European Council declaration	
CAR (NGF)*	23 Dec. 2013	CD 2013/798/CFSP	
Congo, Democratic Republic of the (NGF)*	7 Apr. 1993	Declaration, CPs 2003/680/CFSP, 2005/440/CFSP, 2008/369/CFSP, 2010/788/CFSP	Amended by CD 2016/1173/CFSP, 18 July 2016
Côte d'Ivoire (NGF)*	13 Dec. 2004	CP 2004/852/CFSP, 2010/656/CFSP, CD 2012/371/CFSP	Lifted by CD 2016/917/CFSP, 9 June 2016

Egypt	21 Aug. 2013	Council conclusions on Egypt	
Eritrea*	1 Mar. 2010	CD 2010/127/CFSP	
Iran	27 Feb. 2007	CPs 2007/140/CFSP, 2007/246/CFSP, CD 2012/168/CFSP	
Iraq (NGF)*	4 Aug. 1990	Declaration, CPs 2003/495/CFSP, 2004/553/CFSP	
Korea, North	20 Nov. 2006	CPs 2006/795/CFSP, 2009/573/CFSP	
Lebanon (NGF)*	15 Sep. 2006	CP 2006/625/CFSP	
Liberia (NGF)*	7 May 2001	CPs 2001/357/CFSP, 2004/137/CFSP, 2006/518/CFSP, 2010/129/CFSP	
Libya (NGF)*	28 Feb. 2011	CD 2011/137/CFSP, 2011/625/CFSP	
Myanmar	29 July 1991 <sup>d</sup>	GAC declaration, CPs 96/635/CFSP, 2003/297/CFSP, 2010/232/CFSP	Extended until 30 Apr. 2017 by CD 2016/627/CFSP, 21 Apr. 2016
Russia	31 July 2014	2014/512/CFSP, CR 833/2014	Extended until 31 July 2017 by CD 2016/2315/CFSP, 19 Dec. 2016
Somalia (NGF)*	10 Dec. 2002	CPs 2002/960/CFSP, 2009/138/CFSP, 2010/231/CFSP	
South Sudan	18 July 2011	CD 2011/423/CFSP	
Sudan	15 Mar. 1994	CPs 94/165/CFSP, 2004/31/CFSP, 2005/411/CFSP, CD 2011/423/CFSP	
Syria	9 May 2011	CD 2011/273/CFSP, CR 36/2012, CR 509/2012, CR 36/2012, CR 509/2012, CD 2012/420/CFSP, CD 2013/255/CFSP	
Yemen (NGF)	8 June 2015	CR 2015/878	
Zimbabwe	18 Feb. 2002	CP 2002/145/CFSP	Extended until 20 Feb. 2017 by CD 2016/220/CFSP, 15 Feb. 2016
<i>League of Arab States arms embargo</i>			
Syria	3 Dec. 2011	Council statement Council Resolution 744 <sup>e</sup>	

\* = EU embargo implementing a UN embargo; CAR = Central African Republic; CD = Council Decision; CP = Council Common Position; CR = Council Regulation; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; GAC = General Affairs Council; NGF = non-governmental forces; SCR = Security Council Resolution. The target may have changed since the first imposition of the embargo. The target stated here is as of the end of 2016.

<sup>b</sup> The earlier instruments may have been amended or repealed by subsequent instruments.

<sup>c</sup> Liberia has been the target of UN arms embargoes since 1992, with related but different objectives.

<sup>d</sup> The EU and its member states first imposed an arms embargo on Myanmar in 1990.

<sup>e</sup> Amended by Arab League Council Resolution 7446, 12 Feb. 2012. Resolution 7446 could be interpreted as permitting the provision of arms to the Syrian opposition.

Sources: United Nations, Security Council, 'UN Security Council sanctions committees'; and European External Action Service, 'Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force', from list updated 11 Oct. 2016.