7. Coping with crises: forced displacement in fragile contexts

Overview

In 2016 forced displacement continued to be a major challenge to human security, most notably in the Middle East and Africa, which together currently host over two-thirds of the world’s displaced populations. In recent years the number of forcibly displaced persons has increased significantly—to over 60 million—when compared, for example, to population growth or general migration. This rise has been caused by new displacement crises such as in Yemen and South Sudan, coupled with protracted crises such as in Syria and Afghanistan, and low numbers of returnees. The clear majority of these displacement crises have been generated primarily by armed conflicts.

The challenges are particularly pronounced due to the concentration of forcefully displaced persons in small, confined geographical spaces—in a city, at a border, in a camp or along a narrow transit route—and overall across a small set of countries. Such concentration leads to coping issues, for example, overcrowding and associated problems including inadequate physical protection and healthcare, increasing constraints on resources, and loss of livelihoods and educational opportunities.

State-centric structures for addressing forced displacement and the lack of a commonly agreed international legal framework are serious obstacles to successfully addressing both short-term human security needs and long-term challenges such as the legal status of displaced persons in a host country and the consequences that has on livelihoods and other opportunities. While existing international law offers protection to those fleeing their home country and seeking protection in other states, most major refugee-hosting countries have not signed the United Nations Convention on Refugees. Furthermore, the UN Convention does not apply to internally displaced persons—the group that makes up the vast majority of those forcefully displaced.

This chapter argues that the most useful way of understanding current displacement dangers, and therefore addressing them in more adequate ways, is viewing them in their shared context of large-scale displacement in fragile, violent situations. While fragility refers to societies’ heightened exposure to risks combined with a low capacity to mitigate or absorb them, violent conflicts were also closely associated with all the major displacement crises in 2016. The chapter discusses and situates forced displacement in fragile, violent contexts
using examples of recent developments from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, South Sudan and Nigeria.

The depth and breadth of the ongoing displacements may have spillover effects on societies and countries beyond those that are considered to be sources of the crises. In order to address the humanitarian challenges of displacement and concerns of refugee-hosting and other states, regional and international processes have been initiated. In 2016 the UN General Assembly took the first step towards a political process for an international framework on safe migration, including more equitable burden sharing with regard to hosting and supporting refugees. Other examples of processes, in particular those presented by the European Union (EU), have on the other hand risked undermining the international legal framework that is currently protecting refugees. On at least two occasions in 2016, the EU sought to reach political solutions with major refugee-hosting states without any written or legal basis.

LINA GRIP
I. Introduction

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Since 2013, the world has been experiencing an upward trend in the number of displaced persons, including refugees. The global number of refugees under the United Nations mandate was estimated to be 21.3 million at the end of 2015—the largest recorded number of refugees in the past two decades and approximately 1.7 million more than the total reported 12 months earlier. In addition to the 21.3 million refugees, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported 40.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.2 million asylum seekers at the end of 2015.\(^1\) This upward trend is explained partly by new displacement and partly by protracted crises that have resulted in relatively few returnees.\(^2\) One of the key characteristics of the ongoing displacement crises, both new and protracted, is a causal relation between displacement and conflict, giving rise to large-scale displacement in fragile, violent contexts. Given these characteristics, it is necessary to understand and better address the issue of forced displacement in fragile contexts in order to prevent local and regional conflicts, increase security and build sustainable peace.

Large-scale, vulnerable mobility, as seen in both new displacement and protracted crises, is typically distinguished on the basis of the international legal status of the displaced (see box 7.1). A refugee has a special status in international law and is defined as a person who:

Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside

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\(^1\) The global number of refugees under United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate was estimated to be 16.1 million at the end of 2015. In addition, 5.2 million Palestinian refugees were registered by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). For various reasons, the figures for refugees and displaced populations are estimates. These include the inability of the UN and other international agencies to reach some conflict zones, the difficulties of assessing repeat population movements, as well as concerns that numbers may be over- or understated depending on political interests, and that national systems of data collection for entry and exit into neighbouring countries are not always reliable. However, reasonable estimates are possible using figures produced by UNHCR of the total number of individuals and families displaced by ongoing conflicts, which are based on the registration of individuals and families with the agency. However, these figures do not include unregistered individuals who may have entered a country through informal networks or those who do not need UNHCR support. Other figures used include those of national organizations managing asylum seekers. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 Sep. 2016, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, A/RES/71/1, 3 Oct. 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/A_RES_71_L_E.pdf>, p. 1.

A ‘refugee crisis’ is the forced displacement of people crossing at least one recognized international border, creating extraordinary pressures on local resources and exceeding the coping mechanisms of the hosting state. Due to the specific legal status of refugees and their protection under international law, it is important to maintain the distinction between refugees and other displaced persons. Under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, refugees are entitled to specific kinds of assistance by states other than their own, including the right to seek asylum and to find refuge within the territory of those states. For that reason, states may avoid classifying or refuse to classify people as refugees. Significantly, states not party to the convention and the protocol may refuse to acknowledge any definitions or obligations under the UN framework. Of the states most affected by displacement crises, only Turkey has ratified one of the agreements (see table 7.1). A refugee crisis can therefore also be understood in terms of an ‘asylum crisis’, or the failure by states to meet their obligations

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4 E.g. Iran has reported that it is hosting around 900 registered refugees and anywhere between 1.4 and 3 million undocumented Afghan migrants. Schmeidl, S., ‘Deconstructing Afghan displacement data: acknowledging the elephant in the dark’, Migration Policy Practice, vol. 6, no. 3 (2016), p. 12.
Forced displacement in fragile contexts

Towards refugees under international law, or the refusal to acknowledge that a refugee crisis exists. Finally, refugee crises could be seen to include failures to prevent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies causing mass displacement of civilians in the first place.

IDPs, on the other hand, can generate a humanitarian or displacement crisis without leaving their home state. Unlike refugees, IDPs are formally the responsibility of their national government. Protection of IDPs in conflict locations is at the discretion of the warring parties unless there is an external intervention force to create safe zones or provide protection. This makes IDPs caused by intrastate conflict particularly vulnerable, given that the government could be a cause of insecurity rather than a security provider.

From a peace research perspective, the gaps in the application of the international legal framework and current empirical evidence suggest that the challenges of displacement extend beyond refugee and asylum crises. Besides the growing scale of displacement, several new characteristics defined displacement crises in 2016. This chapter argues that central among these is the recurring and protracted forced displacement in fragile, violent contexts, in particular but not limited to states in the greater Middle East (in and around Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan) and the greater Horn of Africa (including Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen). Parts of these displacement crises have spilled over into comparatively wealthier states, and to a greater extent than seen previously. Armed violence and insecurity in countries generating refugees and IDPs, as well as political decisions by other states and a lack of options for the displaced, have resulted in an unequal distribu-
security and development, 2016

The concept of forced displacement in fragile contexts

In addition to displacement on a massive scale, a common feature of the displacement crises that unfolded in 2016 is forced displacement in fragile, and often violent, contexts. Fragility refers to societies’ heightened exposure to risks combined with a low capacity to mitigate or absorb them. The concept of ‘forced displacement in fragile contexts’ has become increasingly evident in recent years. Violent conflict and forced displacement are intimately connected. Whereas violent conflict is one reason behind forced displacement, forced displacement in fragile contexts can also increase tensions. Large influxes of people to a limited geographical area, such as a city, can impose humanitarian, economic, environmental and security stresses on both the displaced and the host community, and this is especially so in already fragile contexts.

To capture the relation or overlap between violent conflict and forced displacement, among other things, SIPRI uses the term ‘dangerous places’. The idea includes displacement, along with violent death, as core indicators of a dangerous place: that is, a place where violence is more likely to occur and

Table 7.2. Global spread of displaced persons by hosting region, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hosting region</th>
<th>Displaced persons (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


development is more likely to fall behind targets. Furthermore, a dangerous place is not locked into state categories but could refer to local, subnational or regional settings. In 2016 the 90 countries considered to encompass the most dangerous places constituted less than one-third of the world’s population yet accounted for 78 per cent of global violent deaths and were the source of 98 per cent of global refugees and displaced persons.\textsuperscript{7} The Global Peace Index (GPI) also lists displacement as an indicator that has a negative impact on peace, which is one reason why the index of the least peaceful countries overlaps with the countries experiencing major displacement crises. The countries ranked least peaceful in the 2016 GPI were Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen.\textsuperscript{8}

While displacement patterns and crises are dynamic and may include sudden-onset developments, they may also become protracted and last for many years. A crisis can continue to exist even if it appears to have become ‘normalized’, with outside acceptance of the dire situation, including of higher levels of humanitarian distress. In fact, ongoing forced displacement crises in fragile, violent contexts seem to be increasingly linked to previously ill-resolved displacement problems. The concept of ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ covers such long-term emergencies in that it typically refers to man-made, political (institutional) humanitarian crises, including conflict-generated emergencies, in need of a system-wide response:

By the often used concept complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) we mean here serious multidimensional crises (including the ‘black hole’ syndrome and ‘failed states’), which not only imply physical destruction but also social exclusion, depletion of ‘social capital’, erosion of civil society, decay of institutions and decline of civility. It is a destruction of the social and moral substance of society and the issue of coercive intervention from outside naturally arises, at least as an option.\textsuperscript{9}

Complex humanitarian emergencies are generating forced displacement in fragile contexts, for example, within and from Somalia. Such displacement dynamics, if sustained over time or continuously reoccurring, could also in themselves be defined as complex humanitarian emergencies in need of system-wide solutions, such as in Afghanistan.

In terms of policy-relevant concepts, the emergency definition of the UN-led Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is relevant although somewhat limited in scope. The IASC serves as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination relating to humanitarian assistance in response to complex and major emergencies, under the leadership of the UN Emer-

\textsuperscript{7} Milante, G., ‘Dangerous places revisited’, chapter 6 in this volume.
\textsuperscript{8} Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), \textit{Global Peace Index 2016} (IEP: June 2016), p. 11.
gency Relief Coordinator.¹⁰ It has agreed on a series of principles to recognize and address exceptional and major humanitarian crises triggered by natural disasters or conflict that require system-wide mobilization (Level 3 Emergencies). A Level 3 Emergency activates a broad response by UN and non-UN humanitarian providers to ensure a more effective response to the needs of affected populations. Activation of such a response is exceptional and based on five criteria: (a) scale, (b) complexity, (c) urgency, (d) capacity and (e) reputational risk.¹¹ These criteria are by necessity narrow in scope and not limited in application to displacement crises, but the outcome of their application does nonetheless overlap with the world’s large displacement crises: in 2016 Iraq, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen were all classified as Level 3 Emergencies.¹²

Although neither the concept of complex humanitarian emergencies nor the concept of Level 3 Emergencies is specific to forced displacement in fragile contexts, both may certainly include such scenarios. However, politicians, the media and the public seldom use either one of the two terms. Rather, they refer to such scenarios as refugee crises, which are distinct from displacement in fragile, violent contexts in both legal and political terms.

¹⁰See the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) website, <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/>.

¹¹Reputational risk refers to risks to the humanitarian system from e.g. donors, the public and national stakeholders. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Transformative agenda reference document, ‘Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Activation: definition and procedures’, PR/1204/4078/7, 13 Apr. 2012.

II. Displacement dangers

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Refugee crises can involve raised levels of distress and increased vulnerabilities—including inadequate protection and health provision (leading to increased mortality) and loss of educational opportunities—which threaten the immediate safety and well-being of refugees and the communities hosting them, and which can pose more long-term challenges as well. This can lead to risky livelihood coping strategies among displaced populations and host communities, such as undertaking dangerous sea crossings to a neighbouring country with an ongoing armed conflict (e.g., refugees fleeing between Somalia and Yemen in 2016). A 2016 survey from Kenya, for example, found that 24.6 per cent of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had experienced or witnessed cases of human trafficking.

Forced displacement in fragile contexts generates specific vulnerabilities for affected populations. A United Nations report on human rights abuses against displaced people in Libya published in December 2016 identified different forms of torture, including sexual slavery, forced labour and inhuman detention conditions. A global study in 2014 estimated that approximately one in five female refugees or displaced women had experienced sexual violence during their displacement caused by complex humanitarian emergencies (including violent conflict). The authors concluded that this was probably an underestimation of the true prevalence, given the multiple existing barriers to disclosure.

Displaced people who are smuggled or trafficked are particularly at risk of experiencing unsafe means of passage, infectious disease and debt bondage. The latter may result in slavery, forced labour, forced prostitution, forced

1 The author would like to thank Kate Sullivan for her valuable contribution to this section.
6 E.g. the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 3771 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea in 2015.
marriage and other types of labour and sexual exploitation undertaken as payment for the debt incurred by the migrant in exchange for their passage.\textsuperscript{7} Recent evidence suggests that traffickers in Eritrea have begun exploiting the local conflict by targeting refugees in transit, holding them hostage and subjecting them to rape and physical and psychological abuse.\textsuperscript{8} A number of studies have shown that refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers have higher rates of psychological disorders (i.e. post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression) than the general population, although this is in large part due to post-migration stresses such as racism and other forms of discrimination, housing insecurity, unemployment and the asylum process itself.\textsuperscript{9}

Beyond shared and specific vulnerabilities, the dynamics of forced displacement crises include aspects of geographical proximity, local coping abilities, violence, mobility-restricting policies and population density. Most forced displacement occurs within countries and then spreads outwards to neighbouring states, with relatively few people fleeing beyond their region of birth. Similarly, displacement in border areas tends more often to spill over national borders for reasons of proximity, resource constraints and identity or other connections. Given that fragile states and violent conflicts are often located close to or next to each other, former refugee-hosting countries frequently become unsafe and a source of forced displacement themselves. The Greater Horn of Africa (i.e. Somalia and Yemen) is one recent example. Syria in 2011, which prior to the outbreak of civil war hosted over 1 million Iraqi refugees, arguably without proper coping strategies or resources, is another.\textsuperscript{10}

Like the areas displaced people flee from, refugee-hosting areas themselves are often afflicted by conflict and instability.\textsuperscript{11} The displacement of people to already fragile contexts often further disrupts the social and economic fabric of communities, with negative effects on the means used to maintain


and sustain life, including food production. Refugees and IDPs in areas of violent conflict are subject to new forms of risk and aggravate existing vulnerabilities, making it more difficult to sustain livelihoods. Social groups that are politically or economically marginalized can find themselves doubly at risk when they are displaced. Displacement can also result in new forms of gender and age vulnerability. Women can experience discrimination in the allocation of economic and social resources. For men, displacement and the resulting loss of livelihood can increase their risk of military recruitment, including by armed non-state groups. Displaced children must often manage as heads of households while being at risk of forced labour, sexual abuse and abduction. Forced displacement in fragile contexts also has a severe impact on children’s access to education.

Host states’ and communities’ abilities to cope is central to the consequences of displacement. The ability to cope is mainly determined by structural factors such as the quality and resources of local institutions. Yet the strain put on resources, by for example the size of the affected population (comprising both displaced and the host communities), is also relevant and can in turn impact on the ability to cope. For example, states with high levels of urbanization (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan) risk generating rapid displacement on a massive scale if fighting is taken into a city, as was the case in Mosul in October 2016 (see section III). Although population density at the national level may be less relevant compared to local and subnational conditions, full-scale civil war tends to generate a larger displacement crisis in a country with a high population density, such as Syria, compared to a country with a low population density, such as Libya. According to the World Bank, population density in ‘fragile and conflict-affected situations’ was on average 33 people per square kilometre of land area in 2015. However, population density was significantly higher in the countries most affected by displacement crises in 2016—not only in the countries generating forced displacement but also in key hosting countries and locations receiving returnees (see table 7.3). The gap between identified ‘fragile situations’ and key locations of massive forced displacement suggests that general use of the concept of fragility does not fully incorporate displacement crises.

Some studies have also noted the urban settlement patterns of forced displacement in fragile contexts, for example, Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and IDPs in Nigeria (see section III). Forced urban

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12 Jacobsen (note 11), pp. 95–123.
13 Jacobsen (note 11), p. 98.
Table 7.3. Displacement and population density in selected states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of refugees created</th>
<th>No. of refugees hosted</th>
<th>No. of IDPs</th>
<th>Population density (people/km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Over 6 m.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.475 m.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Over 2 m.</td>
<td>250 000</td>
<td>3.1 m.</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2.726 m.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.95 m.</td>
<td>21 000</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>195 350</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2.152 m.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.56 m.</td>
<td>1.8 m.</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1.3 m.</td>
<td>260 000</td>
<td>1.8 m.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Over 5 m.</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>8.7 m.</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>3 m.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>182 011</td>
<td>278 670</td>
<td>2.10 m.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>665 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

. . = not applicable; IDP = internally displaced person; km² = kilometre squared; m. = million.

a Iraq hosts 250 000 Syrians.
b Since 2014.
c Comprises 726 000 UNHCR-registered refugees plus more than 2 million registered Palestinian refugees (of which nearly 370 000 live in refugee camps).
d Comprises 1.5 million Syrians and 450 000 Palestinians.
e Comprises 0.5 million Palestinians (Syria hosted millions of refugees prior to the conflict).


displacement within fragile states due to development, climate change or armed conflict is considered a distinct challenge in meeting the humanitarian needs of IDPs and refugees, but is often overlooked in research on refu-
The mapping of so-called self-settling in urban centres requires substantial resources, as displaced populations increasingly end up blending in with the urban poor, which partly explains the lack of data. Densely populated areas in fragile contexts, including cities, may be at particular risk of a displacement crisis due to the stress that forced displacement generates on local services and resources, including water and sanitation. For example, 93 per cent of Syrian refugees in urban areas in Jordan are reported to be living below the poverty line. A study by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on coping with returnees in Afghanistan in 2007 showed that districts that had received the largest influx of returnees relative to the local population were more likely to suffer higher insecurity.

Understanding and better addressing the issue of forced displacement in fragile contexts is necessary to prevent local and regional conflicts, increase security and build sustainable peace.

When data is collected on the numbers of refugees hosted by different states (see e.g. table 7.3), it typically refers to the UNHCR definition and categorization rather than to the legal status in the country to which the refugees have fled. The hosting country may or may not provide the displaced with the legal status of refugees (see section I). Furthermore, there are a number of common shortcomings in how the data is collected (e.g. double registration) and then updated after first registration. Refugees living outside of camps, for example in cities, may not be obliged to ‘check in’ with the authorities or prove that they are still in the country.

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III. Crises of forced displacement in fragile contexts: key developments in 2016

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This section looks more closely at the largest crises of forced displacement in fragile contexts, seen from their developments in 2016. It starts with the largest crisis, in Syria, and unfolds mainly by geographical proximity to Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, South Sudan and Nigeria.

Syria

The forced displacement and refugee flows within and out of Syria since the start of the conflict in 2011, and in particular since the escalation in forced displacement in 2012–13, constitute the largest refugee crisis since World War II. In 2015 approximately 1.3 million people were newly displaced in Syria. In 2016, five years into the country’s civil war, internal displacement still increased from the previous year. By August 2016, 900 000 Syrians had already been displaced that year. In 2012 Syria was estimated to have 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), but by 2016 the number had risen drastically to 8.7 million. Armed violence, including deliberate targeting of civilians, is the main cause for the massive displacement. Sieges, checkpoints and international border restrictions have prevented civilians in need of protection during the conflict from fleeing to safer areas, either within or outside the country.

Nevertheless, over 5 million Syrians have managed to escape to other countries. Five neighbouring countries—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey—together host 4.74 million Syrian refugees (see table 7.4). Refugees originating from Syria are typically granted temporary protection by neighbouring countries. However, their limited legal status may impact on opportunities for safe and secure livelihoods. Most of the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees who are working in Turkish garment factories, for example, have no legal right to work, and are therefore reportedly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.

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Within this chapter it is not possible to fully lay out the implications of the Syrian crisis, which has killed an estimated 400,000 people, including an estimated 50,000 children, left major cities such as Aleppo in ruin and destroyed vast tracks of agricultural land. Beyond the social and physical trauma that will inevitably affect Syria for decades to come, humanitarian agencies are now talking about ‘the lost generation’ of children growing up during the war. The implications for a child growing up in a war-torn society partly depend on the amount and type of exposure to war trauma that they have suffered, but include, for example, continuous post-traumatic stress disorder.

Currently, a total of 5.4 million Syrian children and youth (aged 5–17 years) inside Syria and 1.4 million Syrian refugee children and youth hosted in the five neighbouring countries need educational assistance.

One response to the crisis, which was first presented by Turkey, is the creation of so-called safe zones inside Syria. While potentially allowing safer options to remain in or return to Syria, safe zones could also arguably facilitate development assistance, including education schemes. However, the difficulty involved in enforcing safe zones in Syria presents a major challenge, especially as evidence for the successful application of safe zones in other conflicts is weak.

Table 7.4. Syrian refugees hosted by neighbouring states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,750,000a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,740,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* This figure is contested by some Turkish experts who argue that it does not account for all the recorded Syrians who have since left Turkey.


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Iraq

Iraq is experiencing a protracted displacement crisis with an upsurge in new displacement since 2014. In 2007 there were believed to be over 4 million displaced Iraqis around the world, including some 1.9 million within Iraq itself (of which 750 00 had been displaced in 2006), over 2 million in neighbouring Middle Eastern countries (of which 1.2 million were in Syria and 750 000 in Jordan), and about 200 000 further afield.\(^{12}\) Many of the refugees who have returned to Iraq from neighbouring countries, including Syria, have become internally displaced.\(^{13}\)

In 2014 conflict erupted in northern Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) expanded its control in large parts of the western provinces (Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Diyala). As a result, Iraq suffered the highest new internal displacement worldwide in 2014, of at least 2.2 million. In addition, it is estimated that 1.1 million Iraqis were still living in displacement in 2014 following the 2006–2008 sectarian conflict.\(^{14}\) Between January 2014 and December 2016, Iraq is estimated to have generated 3.1 million IDPs.\(^{15}\) In 2015, 222 000 Iraqis sought asylum in the region and 121 000 sought asylum in the European Union.\(^{16}\) As of 1 January 2017, Iraq was estimated to be hosting 233 224 Syrian refugees.\(^{17}\)

The ability of displaced people to access safe areas of refuge has been dramatically restricted by the fragmentation of society along sectarian lines and security threats linked to terrorism and counterinsurgency.\(^{18}\) On 17 October 2016 Iraqi Government forces resumed military operations along the Tigris Valley to retake the city of Mosul from the Islamic State (IS).\(^{19}\) When fighting intensified that month in Mosul, Ninewa's provincial capital and Iraq's second largest city (with a metropolitan area of some 1.5 million people), it resulted in thousands being newly displaced every day. At the same time, non-governmental organizations reported that the nearest camps to Mosul, those bordering northern Iraq near the Kurdish region of Syria: historical lessons', PolicyWatch 2590 (Washington Institute, 17 Mar. 2016).


\(^{14}\) Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), ‘Iraq: IDPs caught between a rock and a hard place as displacement crisis deepens’, 30 June 2015.


\(^{16}\) Newland and O’Donnell (note 13).


\(^{18}\) Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (note 14).

\(^{19}\) On the Islamic State see chapter 3, section II, in this volume.
Iraq, were close to full capacity and would not necessarily be able to handle a large influx of people.²⁰ As of December, 302,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced from the Mosul corridor in the two months since the intensified fighting began.²¹ According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), some 85 per cent of the displaced in Mosul are in camps and emergency sites, while the remainder are in host communities, sheltering in private settings or public buildings. Up to 1 million people in the city of Mosul are estimated to be largely inaccessible to humanitarian aid organizations, sheltering from the fighting or waiting for an opportune time to flee.²²

**Afghanistan**

In terms of forced displacement in a fragile context, Afghanistan represents one of the most protracted crises globally. Over 6 million people fled Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan during 1979 and 1990.²³ At the height of the refugee crisis, a staggering 8.3 million Afghans were estimated to be displaced: 6.3 million abroad (nearly half of the country’s population) and 2 million internally (15 per cent of the population).²⁴ Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan has experienced one of the world’s largest returns of forcefully displaced people. Between 2001 and 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assisted the return of 4.8 million Afghans, and many more returned without official assistance.²⁵ The majority have returned from Iran and Pakistan, including about half a million more refugees from Pakistan than were estimated to be staying there in the first place.²⁶ It is now believed that 20 per cent of the total population and 40 per cent of the urban population in Afghanistan are made up of returned refugees.²⁷ Between 2001 and 2006, the number of IDPs in Afghanistan also declined significantly—to about one-tenth of what it was in 2000.²⁸

²⁶ Schmeidl (note 24), p. 12.
Yet in spite of international assistance, Afghanistan was in a weak position to respond to such a large population movement. Furthermore, from 2006 it experienced a dramatic increase in Taliban-led insurgent activity, which reduced the rate of returnees and causing new displacement.

In 2014 the so-called triple transition, in which foreign aid sharply declined, the bulk of foreign troops left Afghanistan and the presidential election was poorly governed, slowed down the return of refugees, resulting in an upsurge of Afghans (especially young men) going to Europe (see section IV).29 Furthermore, Afghanistan’s severe economic crisis pushed an additional 1.3 million Afghans into poverty and triggered a threefold increase in unemployment between 2012 and 2014.30

Despite the high number of returnees over the past 15 years, many Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan have remained in those countries, often having lived there for decades. Pakistan is host to 1.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan, the world’s second-largest protracted refugee population in a single country under UNHCR mandate. In addition, according to Pakistani Government estimates, about 1 million undocumented Afghans are living in Pakistan. Most Afghans residing in Pakistan as refugees are living in the Peshawar district in northern Pakistan.31

On 16 December 2014 the Pakistani Taliban carried out a terrorist attack on a school in Peshawar that killed 145 people, including 132 children. The attack is considered to have had significant implications for Afghans in Pakistan.32 One of the measures taken by the Pakistani Government in its wake was a proposal to register and repatriate Afghans living in Pakistan. Human Rights Watch has reported that the Pakistani police further pursued an unofficial policy of punitive retribution against Afghans, including raids on Afghan settlements, detention, harassment, physical violence, extortion and the demolition of Afghan homes.33 A decision was later taken to repatriate many registered and unregistered Afghans in the Peshawar district. Those registered were given until March 2017 to leave Pakistan, while those unregistered were required to return to Afghanistan by 15 November 2016.34

As of 19 November 2016, according to UNHCR, 368,687 refugees had returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan during 2016. The vast majority were

30 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (note 25).
resettled from north-eastern Pakistan, with one-third going to the border province of Nangarhar in Afghanistan, where fighting has been extensive.\textsuperscript{35} In addition, according to the International Organization for Migration that is charged with helping unregistered refugees and deportees, in total 248,189 undocumented Afghans returned from Pakistan and 443,968 from Iran in 2016.\textsuperscript{36} This can be compared to the total of 61,400 returnees to Afghanistan in 2015 and the 16,957 Afghan refugees who repatriated, allegedly voluntarily, from Iran and Pakistan in 2014.\textsuperscript{37} A Human Rights Watch report on the 2016 repatriation calls it the ‘the world’s largest unlawful mass forced return of refugees in recent times’.\textsuperscript{38}

The distinctions between refugees, IDPs and returnees are not clear-cut (as is the case for all countries under consideration here). Back in Afghanistan, returnees frequently end up being internally displaced. The proportion of returnees who become internally displaced in Afghanistan has increased rapidly as the local absorption capacity has diminished. The frequency of internal displacement among returnees in 2013 was twice as high as among returnees in 2002, even though there were almost 50 times more returnees in 2002 than in 2013.\textsuperscript{39} OCHA estimates that over 600,000 people were newly displaced due to conflict in Afghanistan during 2016, more than half of whom were under 18 years old.\textsuperscript{40}

**Yemen**

The ongoing civil war in Yemen, mainly between Yemeni Government forces and the Houthi insurgency but with the involvement of al-Qaeda and IS as well as a regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia, has killed thousands of civilians since March 2015 and resulted in mass displacement. By March 2015 more than 3.1 million people had been displaced, of whom an estimated 2.18 million remain as IDPs in Yemen. Moreover, 182,011 people are registered as having fled to neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{35} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Update on Return of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan, Update No. 8: 13 November–19 November 2016*, 19 Nov. 2016.


\textsuperscript{39} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (note 25).

\textsuperscript{40} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Afghanistan: conflict induced displacements (as of 26 Dec. 2016)’.

Ground fighting and insecurity have constrained the movement of commodities and hindered food supplies, creating an emergency for food import-dependent Yemen. In addition, fuel shortages and high prices have hit agricultural production and increased the cost of food transportation and water pumping for irrigation. This has led to a sharp increase in food prices, which are 25–50 per cent higher than in the pre-crisis period.\(^{42}\)

The war has also had a hugely negative impact on livelihoods: malnutrition has increased by over 60 per cent since 2015 and 80 per cent of the population is currently in need of humanitarian assistance.\(^ {43}\) By October 2016 the World Food Programme was providing food to 6 million people in Yemen.\(^ {44}\) IDPs are reported to be more food insecure compared to non-displaced populations in the same country, while households headed by women tend to have a more fragile and unstable food security status than those headed by men.\(^ {45}\)

Despite the deteriorating security situation in Yemen, over 100 000 people fled to Yemen from Ethiopia and Somalia during 2016. Yemen is ill-equipped to receive and host new refugees and migrants or those seeking to transit.\(^ {46}\) In total, 278 670 are reported to have sought refuge in the country.\(^ {47}\) Somalia remains the most common country of origin for refugees in the region, with almost 900 000 Somali refugees residing in other countries in the region, of which the vast majority live in Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia. Furthermore, over 1 million Somalis are internally displaced. Most Somali refugees have lived in exile since the Somali displacement crisis in the early 1990s caused by the collapse of the state of Somalia in 1991, and in recent years the numbers of displaced persons have been relatively stable. However, Kenya’s decision in 2016 to close the Dadaab refugee camp (home to 262 000 refugees) has increased uncertainty for many Somali refugees for 2017 onwards.\(^ {48}\)

**South Sudan**

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011, following a civil war that lasted decades and claimed the lives of approximately 2 million people. In December 2013 a new war broke out between South

\(^{42}\) World Food Programme (WFP), *Yemen Market Watch Report*, no. 7 (Nov. 2016).


\(^{44}\) World Food Programme (WFP), ‘WFP alarmed at growing rates of hunger and malnutrition in war-torn Yemen’, 25 Oct. 2016.


\(^{46}\) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (note 43).

\(^{47}\) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (note 43).

Sudanese Government forces (the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Government, SPLM/A-IG) and opposition forces (the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition, SPLM/A-IO). President Salva Kiir and his former deputy and leader of the SPLM/A-IO, Riek Machar, signed a peace deal in August 2015 and formed a unity government in April 2016. However, fighting resumed in South Sudan in July 2016. Assessment missions by UNHCR in 2016 concluded, among other things, that there was widespread targeting of civilians for killings and rape in the ongoing armed conflict.

In just over five years since the creation of the state of South Sudan, as many as one-quarter of the total population is believed to have been forcibly displaced or made to flee to a neighbouring country. As of December 2016, South Sudan had 1.8 million IDPs. This forced displacement has had a particularly negative impact on the ability to sustain livelihoods. At the start of the war in 2013, up to 90 per cent of households in parts of South Sudan depended primarily on agriculture and livestock for their subsistence. In December 2016 the World Food Programme estimated that a third of the population was severely food insecure—3.7 million people.

Many IDPs have sought protection and refuge at existing UN bases in the country, so-called Protection of Civilians (POC) sites. Since the start of its mandate in July 2011, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has frequently provided refuge to civilians seeking temporary protection. For example, between October 2012 and November 2013 more than 12 000 civilians sought protection at UNMISS bases on 12 separate occasions. In June 2016 the estimated number of civilians seeking safety in six POC sites had increased to 169 418. The creation of POC sites on the scale seen in South Sudan is arguably unprecedented in UN history.

Of great concern is a recent UN survey which found that 70 per cent of women hosted in the POC

49 ‘UN: South Sudan on brink of ethnic civil war’, Al Jazeera, 14 Dec. 2016.
54 On the POC sites in South Sudan see also chapter 5, section III, in this volume.
57 Lilly (note 55).
sites had been raped since the conflict erupted, the vast majority by police or soldiers.\textsuperscript{58}

The resumed fighting in July 2016 also led to a sharp increase in refugees to neighbouring countries, especially to Uganda but also to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. Between July and November 2016 Uganda is estimated to have received over 300 000 refugees from South Sudan, compared to the 30 000 received in the first half of the year.\textsuperscript{59} As of December 2016, the total number of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan was estimated to be 1 291 294, almost half of whom had left the country in 2016 (560 000).\textsuperscript{60} South Sudan itself hosts 260 453 refugees from other countries.

It is estimated that about 350 000 South Sudanese have fled to Sudan since South Sudan’s independence and separation from Sudan. Sudan is also experiencing a long-term displacement crisis, with over 3 million people assumed to be internally displaced due to violence, food insecurity and seasonal drought. Although still a staggering number, this is a significant decrease compared to 2010 when there were an estimated 5 million IDPs in Sudan.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{Nigeria}

From the start of the conflict between the Nigerian Government and the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram in 2009, Nigeria has experienced an internal displacement crisis in the north-eastern part of the country. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that there were approximately 2 150 000 IDPs in Nigeria as of 31 December 2015, the vast majority having fled Boko Haram violence since 2014.\textsuperscript{62} According to OCHA, IDPs are taking shelter in the relative safety of urban centres. This is causing overcrowding in already inadequate living conditions and placing resources and basic services under severe strain. The greater area of Maiduguri city

\textsuperscript{58} Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (note 53).


has seen its population more than double with the influx of people displaced from other areas of the state—from 1 million to 2 million.\textsuperscript{63}

More than 78 per cent of IDPs are living in host communities. For the third year in a row, displaced farmers have been unable to return to the land for the planting season, adding to food insecurity. More than 4.8 million people are now in urgent need of food assistance and 5.1 million are predicted to be food insecure if not supported by the humanitarian community in 2017. An estimated 300,000 children in Borneo state alone will suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2017 and up to 450,000 people in total across the north-eastern provinces will likewise suffer if adequate assistance is not received. With the ongoing disruption to basic services such as healthcare, clean water and sanitation, susceptibility to disease also increases. Poor drainage and stagnant water are increasing the incidence of malaria and the likelihood of waterborne diseases.\textsuperscript{64}

Almost 200,000 Nigerians have sought shelter in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.\textsuperscript{65} Although UNHCR has also reported the return of Nigerians from these countries, including refugees, many of the returnees set military presence and patrols in their areas of origin as conditions for return.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 63).
\textsuperscript{65} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘UNHCR is shocked and greatly saddened by a deadly attack on a Malian “refugee hosting area” in the west of Niger yesterday, the 6th of October’, 7 Oct. 2016.
IV. United Nations and regional responses to displacement crises

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This section provides a brief overview of developments in 2016 as regards selected United Nations and regional responses to displacement crises.

United Nations responses

The case studies in section III of this chapter cover some of the work of UN programmes in ongoing displacement crises in the Middle East and Africa. They illustrate that without the work of the UN and its agencies (see box 7.2) displacement crises would undoubtedly be significantly worse. The invaluable work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the World Food Programme (WFP) and others, however, often falls short of its full potential due to underfunding. For example, OCHA and its partners requested almost $20 billion in 2015 to meet the humanitarian demands of over 80 million people in 37 countries; the total finances raised came to about half of that, and OCHA's budget was only $233 million.¹

Motivated by the worsening of displacement crises in 2016 and the underfunding of relevant UN agencies, the UN General Assembly raised the issue of large movements of refugees and migrants at the highest political level. On 19 September the General Assembly hosted a high-level summit with the aim of bringing countries together in a more humane and coordinated approach. It was the first time the General Assembly had called for a summit at the level of Heads of State and Government to look at large movements of refugees and migrants. In the outcome document, the ‘New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants’, member states agreed to start negotiations leading to an international conference and the adoption of a global agreement for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018; they further agreed to develop guidelines on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations and to seek more equitable burden sharing for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees.²

The UN Secretary-General also convened the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit on 23–24 May 2016, in Istanbul. In framing parts of the humanitarian agenda and key challenges in advance of the meeting, the Secretary-General was able to include some highly relevant commitments to preventing and coping with displacement crises. These included seeking political commitment to ending violent conflicts, protecting international humanitarian law and a call to ‘leave no one behind’, by reducing displacement and supporting refugees and migrants, among other things. However, the final summit outcome saw few actual commitments to the displaced.

### Middle Eastern responses

Since 2013, Middle Eastern responses to the Syrian and other regional refugee crises have been characterized by several key features. First, the large scale of the number of refugees hosted in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and for the latter two, especially in reference to their size and population density.

Second, the unequal balance in the wider region, with the Gulf states welcoming virtually no Syrians as refugees. For example, prior to 2016 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had not accepted any Syrian refugees on its territory. In 2016, however, it agreed to take 15,000 Syrians over the next five years.

Third, reluctance by states in the region to adopt a general binding legal framework under the UN, and instead a preference for a more specific

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3 For more information on the World Humanitarian Summit see chapter 6, section III, in this volume.
response plan. The protracted Palestinian issue is often cited as a reason for the continued refusal of many states in the Middle East to sign the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Many countries in the region are anxious to ensure that Palestinian refugees retain their special status and are not subjected to the UNHCR norm of resettlement, which would include admitting Palestinian refugees with permanent residence status and with rights similar to those enjoyed by nationals. First asylum countries (those that permit refugees to enter their territory for the purpose of temporary asylum) also fear that refugees from, for example, Iraq and Syria will settle permanently.

Fourth, the specific economic status of hosting states (a key aspect of the Middle Eastern regional response to the Syrian refugee crisis). Today, more than 80 per cent of refugees in middle-income countries are hosted in the Middle East or Turkey. This economic status has generated a targeted response towards refugee assistance in order to, for example, access funding from international financial institutions (see the Global Concessional Financing Facility below).

The Syria Response Plan and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)

From 2015 the UN has coordinated the Syria Response Plan and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) aimed at providing region-wide assistance for Syrian refugees and the communities hosting them through a coordinated response including service provision and resource mobilization.

The 3RP is comprised of country chapters developed under the leadership of national authorities, with support from the UN and non-governmental organizations in each country. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the Jordan Response Plan are chapters for their respective countries, and there are country chapters for Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. The 2015 Syria Response Plan and the 3RP were only half funded, with $3.86 billion secured.

A donor conference in London in February 2016, the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference, sought to close the funding gap and launch a programme for the next two years. The conference raised $11.22 billion in

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pledges for the Syrian crisis, the largest sum ever on a single day for a single crisis, and included multi-year funding for 2016–20 by 17 donors. The new 2017–18 3RP, which was adopted in 2016 and follows on from the 2015–16 plan, brings together more than 240 partners in a coordinated, region-wide response to assist 9.1 million people in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq (4.7 million Syrian refugees and over 4.4 million members of the communities hosting them).

The challenges are huge. For example, according to Amnesty International, refugees in Lebanon receive barely $0.70 a day in assistance. Early results of the 3RP in response to the Syrian crisis included the issuing of 11 500 work permits to Syrians in Jordan between April and mid-June 2016, while a pilot project has been agreed for 4000 Syrian refugees in the garment and agriculture sectors. In Turkey, a regulation from January 2016 allows Syrian refugees to work and be paid a minimum wage.

**The Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) for MENA**

At the 2016 Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London, the World Bank Group, the UN and the Islamic Development Bank Group announced a joint financing initiative to support refugee-hosting states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) for the MENA region. The motivation behind the new financial instrument is that middle-income countries did not previously have access to multilateral development financing at the same levels of concessionality as lower-income countries. The impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan and Lebanon—both middle-income countries—exposed this gap in the existing development assistance architecture. The new facility is designed to extend concessional financing arrangements to middle-income countries hosting large refugee populations, with an initial focus on helping Jordan and Lebanon address the impacts of Syrian refugees. By July 2016 the initiative had raised over $140 million in initial grant contributions with $1 billion pledged in loans, which will generate further grant contributions.

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12 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (note 10), p. 5.
15 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (note 10).
16 Concessionality is a measure of the ‘softness’ of a credit, reflecting the benefit to the borrower compared to a loan at market rate.
European Union responses

Although Europeans have often portrayed the Syrian refugee crisis as also being a ‘European refugee crisis’, especially during 2015, the approach taken in this chapter on ‘forced displacement in fragile contexts’ largely excludes the European Union (EU). EU member states in general are neither fragile nor experiencing massive forced displacement in terms of scale, resources or population density. Specific locations, however, such as the easterly Greek islands bordering Turkey, would possibly fall within that scope. Nonetheless, the EU was involved in two important bilateral political arrangements, with Turkey and Afghanistan, on refugee and asylum matters in 2016.

The EU–Turkey statement

During 2015 the EU experienced a large upswing in the number of refugees seeking asylum in its member states. The vast majority of refugees fleeing to the EU came via Turkey to Greece. The situation on some of the Greek islands was unsustainable and thousands of people were dying as they tried to escape to Europe. In the first three months of 2016 almost 170,000 people were estimated to have crossed the Mediterranean, with over 151,000 using the Eastern Mediterranean route. This was significantly higher than the 20,700 estimated to have made the journey in the first three months of 2015.

In March 2016 the EU and Turkey agreed on a common statement that included the right of the Greek authorities to send refugees and other migrants arriving in Greece after 20 March back to Turkey, obliging them to apply for asylum in Turkey as the ‘first country of asylum’. Further, it was agreed that Turkey would take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for ‘irregular migration’ opening from Turkey to the EU. In return—aside from a multibillion-euro aid package and the promise of visa liberalization—EU member states agreed to resettle Syrian refugees directly from Turkey and accept one Syrian from Turkey for every Syrian received by Turkey from Greece. As of 15 June 2016, only 511 Syrian refugees had been resettled from Turkey to the EU. This effectively means that asylum seekers are being stopped and kept in Turkey and prevented from travelling to the EU, rather than actually being returned.

According to the EU, the number of migrants crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to the Greek islands dropped by 95 per cent between March

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and May 2016. In total, UNHCR estimates that just under 362,000 people crossed the Mediterranean to Europe during 2016, which is about one-third of the number for the previous year. However, even though the number of people attempting to cross was less, the death toll in 2016 increased to 5022—a new high and a significant increase compared to 3771 in 2015. This upsurge in drownings is believed to be a direct consequence of the closure of the Eastern Mediterranean route and of refugees and migrants turning to the more dangerous Central Mediterranean route.

The EU–Afghanistan settlement

Following the EU–Turkey statement, the EU reached a political settlement with the Afghan Government on returning asylum seekers to Afghanistan. In 2015 Afghanistan was the second-largest country of origin of first-time asylum requests in EU member states—with 178,000 requests. This was significantly more than the 38,000 requests filed by Afghans in the EU during 2014. Many Afghans have moved to Europe from either Pakistan or Iran and nearly 20 per cent of those arriving at the Greek islands in January 2016 had never lived in Afghanistan. In an attempt to reduce the number of Afghan asylum requests in the EU—and possibly fearing the consequences of Pakistan’s new policy towards remaining Afghans (and a likely increase in internal displacement, insecurity and violence)—the EU pushed the Afghan Government to agree to allow EU member states to deport an unlimited number of Afghan asylum seekers, obliging Afghanistan to receive them. An earlier version of the agreement, which was leaked in March 2016, included a proposed limit of 80,000 asylum seekers. The final agreement signed on 2 October, however, included no such limit. Subsequently, half of all asylum requests by Afghans to EU member states were rejected in the third quarter of 2016, compared to 63 per cent recognition rates on average for all requests in the same period and 70 per cent recognition rates
for Afghan asylum applications to the EU in the third quarter of 2015.\textsuperscript{30} In addition, many Afghans were deported from several EU member states during 2016.\textsuperscript{31} These included homosexual Afghan men who were deported to Afghanistan, where homosexuality is illegal, allegedly with instructions to hide their sexual identity from the authorities and from insurgents.\textsuperscript{32}

The EU and the Government of Afghanistan also co-hosted a conference on Afghanistan in Brussels in October 2016, where the participants endorsed a reform agenda presented by the Afghan Government.\textsuperscript{33} A similar conference had been hosted in London in January 2010.\textsuperscript{34} The 2010 conference communiqué outlined, among other things, a commitment to the return and reintegration of Afghan refugees, including increasing national absorption capacity to better plan and manage sustainable reintegration.\textsuperscript{35} This alludes to the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the long-held awareness among decision makers of what the challenges and risks of return are, and, on the other hand, insufficient subsequent political action.


\textsuperscript{34} Noormal, A. N., ‘Conflict analysis: Afghanistan since 2001’, Beyond Intractability, Sep. 2015.

V. Conclusions

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The world’s largest displacement crises continue to be characterized by forced displacement in fragile contexts experiencing armed violence. Several renewed displacements took place in 2016 as a result of armed conflict, including non-state armed groups and/or government forces attacking civilians. Displacement crises have led to increased insecurity, tensions and vulnerabilities in the affected communities. Some of the worst effects appear to be larger exposure to existing risks, such as severe food insecurity and sexual abuse. Based on the experiences of the ongoing displacement crises discussed in this chapter, the long-term challenges of sustaining livelihoods and resettling and reintegrating large displaced populations will continue to be a struggle. Displacement crises are more likely to be recycled, larger and more difficult to resolve going forward.

In terms of policy, a two-track approach is likely to continue: (a) the vital humanitarian, emergency response (as illustrated by the engagement of United Nations agencies); and (b) a more long-term approach aimed at supporting economic and possibly other forms of liberal development (e.g. the engagement of development banks in the Middle East and North Africa).

A relatively new trend is the role of middle-income countries (e.g. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) as key agents in shaping the political responses to crises, due to their position as major refugee-hosting states, particularly with regards to the Syrian crisis. These countries also hold the keys to Europe’s gateways due to their geographical proximity. It appears that this partial burden shift from lower-income to middle-income countries may have contributed to bringing the issues of refugees and displacement to the political arena, as the dedicated UN summit and new financial instrument for MENA suggest.

Evidently, the current two-track policy response is falling short of incorporating the actual prevention or resolution of mass displacement in fragile, violent contexts. In order to develop in such a way, there would need to be a better understanding of the relations between displacement, fragility and violent conflict, as well as a mobilization of the necessary political will and resources to develop comprehensive, and sometimes system-wide, solutions. A poor understanding of such relations may instead lead to various lockout or pushback policies, such as closing borders or forced repatriation, which are more likely to intensify fragility and/or displacement, potentially with dangerous outcomes. Another approach, which risks undermining the international legal frameworks currently protecting refugees, is to find political solutions that lack written or legal bases, such as the statements between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, and the EU and Afghanistan in 2016.