III. Delivering as one: other multilateral mechanisms for sustaining peace

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Beyond the reviews of the Peacebuilding Architecture, progress has been made in several other fields relevant to sustaining peace. This section reviews advances in three areas: (a) preventing violent extremism; (b) the linking of humanitarian action to development, particularly through the World Humanitarian Summit; and (c) the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda.

Preventing violent extremism: the report of the Secretary-General

In 2016 there was growing international momentum towards a broad, developmental approach in ‘preventing violent extremism’ (PVE). Although the terminology used by actors varies, hard security approaches privileging intelligence, police and military means under counterterrorism tend to be referred to as ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE). In contrast, PVE approaches seek to address the structural or root causes and drivers of violent extremism, factors that have traditionally fallen under the category of development challenges. The emergence of PVE, specifically its intersection with aspects of human rights, peacebuilding and development agendas, has proven alarming to some actors within those communities, who perceive similar potential risks in PVE for manipulation, abuse and stigmatization as seen with counterterrorism.¹ While some development actors have embraced PVE through attention to development-related causes and solutions to radicalization, and the need for inclusive governance of diverse societies, others warn of the risk that development aid could become securitized.² Nevertheless, despite these concerns the international PVE agenda was further consolidated in 2016. The United States under the Obama Administration was at the forefront of advancing the preventative approach towards violent extremism and unveiled a joint Department of State–USAID Strategy on CVE in May 2016.³ With the CVE Strategy, the USA was perceived at the

¹ See e.g. American Civil Liberties Union, ‘What is wrong with the government’s “countering violent extremism” programs’, ACLU Briefing Paper, Apr. 2016. On the use of CVE/PVE against the Islamic State group see chapter 3, section II, in this volume.


time as moving closer to the UN’s approach and its emphasis on preventive measures.4

At the international level, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism was tabled in December 2015 and presented to the UN General Assembly in January 2016.5 The Plan of Action introduced an explicitly preventive approach for addressing violent extremism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 rests on four pillars: (a) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (b) preventing and combating terrorism; (c) building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the UN; and (d) ensuring human rights and the rule of law.6 Recognizing that both prevention and respect for human rights and the rule of law have been largely neglected in favour of militarized responses and counterterrorism capacity building, the Plan of Action seeks to reinvigorate those pillars, and thus contribute to a more balanced and comprehensive approach for addressing violent extremism and terrorism.7

The Plan of Action adopts a ‘practical’ approach to preventing violent extremism, setting out more than 70 recommendations for action. It sets out two categories of drivers of violent extremism: ‘push’ factors (conditions conducive to and structural context) and ‘pull’ factors (individual experiences and motivations that contribute to radicalization processes). Recognizing that there can be no one-size-fits-all solution, the Plan of Action calls for the development by each member state of a national action plan to prevent violent extremism, which identifies national priorities to address local drivers of violent extremism.8 Seven priority areas should be addressed: (a) dialogue and conflict prevention; (b) strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law; (c) engaging communities; (d) empowering youth; (e) gender equality and empowering women; (f) education, skills development and employment facilitation; and (g) strategic communications, the Internet and social media. Implementation of national action plans should occur through ‘all-of-society’ and ‘all-of-government’ approaches.

The Plan of Action calls for combined security, development, human rights and humanitarian action at national, regional and global levels. It calls for a comprehensive UN approach both at UN headquarters and in the field, encompassing the integration of PVE into UN peacekeeping missions and special political missions, as well as enhancing the capacities of UN agencies, funds and programmes to support member states in developing

7 United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/674 (note 5), para. 7.
8 United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/674 (note 5), para. 44.
their national plans of action. A High-Level PVE Action Group was created to spearhead and mainstream the implementation of the Plan of Action across the UN system, and a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Interagency Working Group on Preventing Violent Extremism was tasked with bringing relevant UN agencies together to begin deliberations on moving forward and presenting concrete recommendations to the High-Level PVE Action Group.9

Initial reception of the Plan of Action by the General Assembly was mixed with divergent views on: the need to address root causes more deeply; whether the Plan of Action interferes with domestic affairs and national sovereignty; and the need to acknowledge the role of foreign military interventions in fostering violent extremism.10

Numerous international civil society actors have criticized the Plan of Action for failing to define violent extremism.11 Leaving violent extremism to each member state to define was also seen as risking its conflation with different forms of political protest, insurrection, radicalism and terrorism.12 The Plan of Action was further critiqued as lacking a clear evidentiary basis for many of its causal claims.13 The normative influence of the Plan of Action further raised concern that it would ‘lead to a proliferation of PVE initiatives that do not contain sufficient safeguards to protect human rights’.14

The Plan of Action underwent further consideration during the Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism in April 2016, and during the fifth biennial review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which took place in New York in July 2016.15 The General Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 291 on the Fifth Review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which included the recommendation that member states imple-


11 United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/674 (note 5), paras 2, 5.

12 Atwood, R., ‘The dangers lurking in the UN’s new plan to prevent violent extremism’, Reuters, 8 Feb. 2016.


ment the relevant national-level recommendations contained in the Plan of Action.16

What remains to be seen is whether, or to what extent, the Plan of Action’s recommendations for preventing violent extremism will be linked to other efforts to prioritize prevention in the UN system. One such initiative is the newly appointed Internal Review Team’s review of the UN’s peace and security strategy, functioning and architecture.17 More broadly it is unclear how the Plan of Action will be interpreted and implemented by states and international actors, how effectively they will craft multidimensional, integrated and comprehensive approaches to the complex problem of violent extremism, and the extent to which they can allay the concerns of the development, peacebuilding and human rights communities.

**Humanitarian assistance: the World Humanitarian Summit 2016**

Since the 1990s the increase in internal wars dominated by non-state actors and the growing involvement of external actors, including transnational criminal groups, have rendered conflicts more complex and protracted as the negotiation of lasting peace agreements has become more difficult. Disasters have become more frequent and intense, as extreme weather events caused by climate change have interacted with other pressures such as political instability, rapid urbanization and growing inequality.18 As a result of these trends, the international community is ‘in a state of constant crisis management’.19 The international humanitarian system is under tremendous strain: at the beginning of 2016 some 130 million people—the highest number since the Second World War—required humanitarian assistance owing to conflict or disaster and the resulting increase in over 60 million forcibly displaced persons.20 Displacement is increasingly protracted, with the average length of conflict-induced displacement now at 17 years.21 This has driven the growing realization that internal displacement is not only a short-term humanitarian issue, but in countries with significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), fundamentally one of long-term development.22 While absolute amounts of humanitarian

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18 On disasters and climate change see chapter 8 in this volume.
assistance funding have increased each year and in 2015 reached a record $28 billion, the gap between humanitarian needs and available resources has also increased and currently stands at 45 per cent.\textsuperscript{23}

Further, the humanitarian space has eroded amid weakened respect for human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) in situations of armed conflict, as demonstrated by the deliberate targeting by combatants of civilians and humanitarian personnel and facilities such as hospitals, clinics and educational facilities.\textsuperscript{24} Humanitarian access is increasingly treated as a weapon of war, as vividly demonstrated in Syria where warring parties have withheld access to humanitarian aid as part of their military strategies and to advance political objectives, and in attacks on humanitarian aid workers in Juba, South Sudan in July 2016.\textsuperscript{25}

In 2016 the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, initiated the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) as a response to the dramatic increase in humanitarian funding requirements and the growing challenges of politicization of humanitarian aid and denial of access to those in need.\textsuperscript{26} The multi-stakeholder WHS, the first of its kind, was preceded by a year of consultations involving 23,000 people globally, including those on the frontlines providing and receiving assistance. Taking place in Istanbul on 23–24 May 2016, the WHS convened 9000 participants including state and government representatives, private sector actors, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). By mid-August 2016, the WHS resulted in 3140 individual and joint commitments across the five core areas outlined by the Secretary-General in the framework of the summit, which included political leadership to prevent and end conflict, upholding the norms that safeguard humanity (including through the International Criminal Court), ‘leaving no one behind’, changing people’s lives (from delivering aid to ending need) and investing in humanity.\textsuperscript{27}

Many initially viewed the summit as an opportunity to reform the severely strained humanitarian system, but controversy arose as its preparation took form. One of the key concerns voiced by certain humanitarian actors was the blurring of the distinction between humanitarian response and development assistance, created by making the Sustainable Development Goals


\textsuperscript{24} On IHL and armed conflict see also chapter 14, section I, in this volume.


\textsuperscript{26} United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/709 (note 19), para. 11.

(SDGs) the common overall objective and by the Secretary-General’s emphasis on using development goals as a crisis response. Critics maintained that long-term development goals, while worthy, are secondary to humanitarian goals, whose primary imperative must remain ‘addressing the immediate needs of people caught up in crisis, by delivering relief aid and delivering it in accordance to the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence’.

As development is or should be closely connected to national ownership, linking development to humanitarianism may well erode those fundamental humanitarian principles. The withdrawal of Médecins Sans Frontières from participating in the summit, which it branded ‘a fig-leaf of good intentions’, further reflected its concerns that the summit would fail to reinforce ‘the obligations of states to uphold and implement the humanitarian and refugee laws which they have signed up to’.

A main outcome of the WHS was the launch of a package of reforms entitled the ‘Grand Bargain’, which was endorsed by the core of 15 lead donors and 15 aid agencies and international NGOs that collectively dominate international humanitarian assistance. Drawing on findings from the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on Humanitarian Financing, the Grand Bargain identified ten areas in which humanitarian actors commit to working more efficiently and effectively together: (a) transparency; (b) localization; (c) cash-based programming; (d) periodic functional reviews; (e) joint and impartial needs assessments; (f) including aid recipients in decision-making; (g) multi-year planning and funding; (h) reduced earmarking of donor contributions; (i) harmonized and simplified reporting requirements; and (j) engagement between humanitarian and development actors.

A notable development was seen in the commitment to fund national and local actors (localization) in recognition of the principle that crisis response should build and rely on national and local capacities and providers, supplemented by international capacities only as needed. Currently, national and local actors receive few resources. In 2015, for example, local NGOs received only 0.4 per cent of international humanitarian assistance funding, while government authorities of affected states received just 1.2 per cent. Donors in the Grand Bargain agreed that by 2020 local and national actors would

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receive 25 per cent of the funding they provide for humanitarian action ‘as
directly as possible’.\footnote{The Grand Bargain: A Shared Commitment To Better Serve People In Need (note 30), p. 5.}

The initiative to better localize humanitarian response points to a fund-
damental problem in the international humanitarian system, which not
only lacks sufficient funds, but suffers from a crisis of legitimacy owing to
the dominance of an ‘oligopoly’ of major donors, UN agencies and large
international NGOs. These organizations are the main recipients of concen-
trated resource flows and function in practice like a cartel, dominating the
discourse, functioning as gatekeepers and shaping the rules of international
humanitarian response.\footnote{Collinson, S. and Elhawary, S., Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues, Humanitar-
ian Policy Group (HPG) Report no. 32 (Overseas Development Institute: London, 2012), pp. 19–20.} Critics maintain that the international NGO
members of this group are driven by competitive concerns of increasing
their own market share and funding, a dynamic that collectively discourages
diversification and systemic change, while the major donors direct attention
to issues that reflect their interests.\footnote{Bennett, C. and Foley, F., Time to Let Go: Remaking Humanitarian Action for the Modern Era,
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Report (Overseas Development Institute: London, 2016), pp. 57–59.} In this system, national, local and
community actors are ignored, excluded or instrumentalized to implement
internationally developed solutions. Public consultations leading up to the
WHS revealed that many recipients of humanitarian assistance not only
feel that this system fails to respond effectively to their priority needs, but
that the aid agencies delivering assistance are ‘partial, unaccountable and
potentially corrupt’.\footnote{Redvers, L., ‘What refugees really think of aid agencies’, IRIN, 5 Mar. 2015.}

While the WHS launched important initiatives to improve the manage-
ment and efficiency of the humanitarian system, transformational change
appears unlikely. Absent from the WHS were the leaders of the world’s
wealthiest and most powerful states, with only German Chancellor Angela
Merkel participating from among the Group of Seven (G7) countries and
no leaders representing the permanent members (P5) of the UN Security
Council.\footnote{Afanasieva, D. and Yackley, A. J., ‘UN, Turkey disappointed G7 leaders skipped humanitarian
conference’, Reuters, 24 May 2016.} This absence contributed to the failure of the summit to make any
progress on accountability for violations of IHL.

The status of the women, peace and security agenda

The Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World
Conference on Women in 1995 constitutes a platform of actions for what
could be described as positive peace. The Beijing Declaration addresses the
need to re-evaluate structures of society as well as the relationship between
men and women regarding justice and equality.\textsuperscript{37} The language in the WPS agenda is based on the Beijing Declaration, specifically section E on Women and Armed Conflict. The WPS agenda consists of eight resolutions that address a gender perspective in various peace and security forums. The resolutions emphasize women’s roles and the importance of women’s participation in peacebuilding and preventing armed conflict, as well as the importance of the protection of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict.\textsuperscript{38} UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the landmark resolution of the WPS agenda, has since its adoption in 2000 contributed to a better understanding of the relevance of a gender perspective for peace and security. However, progress on the implementation of the WPS agenda has been slow.

In 2015 the 15th anniversary of Resolution 1325 was marked with the High-Level Review of Women, Peace and Security, where UN member states renewed their commitments, and focused on key obstacles and how to improve the implementation of commitments that had yet to be realized. A record-breaking 110 statements were made and a new resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 2242—that addresses global challenges such as climate change, the increasing number of refugees and IDPs, and violent extremism, and urges greater consultation with women’s organizations—was unanimously adopted and added to the WPS agenda.\textsuperscript{39} The High-Level Review was followed by publication of the \textit{Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325}, which identified challenges as well as progress with the implementation of the WPS agenda.\textsuperscript{40}

On 25 October 2016 the Security Council convened its annual open debate on women, peace and security, to follow up on the previous year’s high-level review and to update the status on the implementation of Resolution 1325. The 2016 open debate and the annual report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security demonstrated growing support for the WPS agenda. In 2016 four new countries (Kenya, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Ukraine) adopted national action plans on Resolution 1325.\textsuperscript{41} To date, 63 countries have adopted national action plans in support of Resolution 1325, and several initiatives have been taken to support states in developing and implementing these plans.\textsuperscript{42} In July 2016 over 80 participants, including government representatives, civil society advocates, academics and experts from 17 countries, gathered in Bangkok at the Asia-Pacific regional sympo-

\textsuperscript{38} Höghammar, T. et al., ‘The development of the women, peace and security agenda’, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 2016}, p. 323.
sium on national action plans on women, peace and security. It was the first organized occasion for the Asian-Pacific countries to share their experiences and to develop strategies for developing effective national action plans.  

In addition, new initiatives on networks like the Nordic Women Mediators (NWM) were taken. The NWM was officially launched in November 2015 and its international launch was in March 2016 at the UN in New York. The NWM aims to increase the number of Nordic women in peacemaking efforts, strengthening the role of women mediators in conflict-affected regions as well as interacting with other similar women’s networks.  

Similar initiatives, such as the network of African Women Mediators, were also taken during 2016 to increase women’s participation in peacebuilding.

Despite the increasing support for the WPS agenda, there remains a gap between policy and practice. In the 2016 annual report on WPS, the Secretary-General presented five areas that require urgent action in order to fill the gaps in implementation: (a) increasing women’s participation; (b) protecting the human rights of women and girls during conflict; (c) gender-responsive planning and accountability for results; (d) strengthening gender architecture and technical expertise; and (e) increasing financial resources for the WPS agenda.  

Progress and gaps in these areas are discussed further below.

Despite some progress achieved in 2016 regarding the implementation of the WPS agenda, for example on high-level prosecutions of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, the protection of human rights of women and girls in conflict was still seriously lacking. The year was marked by reports of armed actors and terrorist organizations violating women’s human rights, sometimes as part of their political agendas.

The UN Secretary-General emphasized the urgent need to punish those responsible for human rights violations committed by non-state actors and urged member states to take action against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in countries hosting UN peace operations. Following the increased number of allegations of SEA from across the UN system and the reports on allegations of SEA by international peacekeepers in the Central

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44 Folke Bernadotte Academy ‘Nordic women mediators’, 20 June 2016.
African Republic (CAR), the Secretary-General emphasized the need for donors to extend support for mechanisms to assist the victims of these crimes that have devastated lives and damaged global perceptions of the UN.\(^{48}\) In his 2015 report on conflict-related sexual violence, the Secretary-General asserted commitments to policies of zero tolerance for SEA.\(^{49}\) In his 2016 report, he continued to inform measures for protection from SEA.\(^{50}\) As a consequence of the allegations of SEA in the CAR, three Congolese peacekeepers from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) were prosecuted.\(^{51}\) Both the head of UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR and the commander of the UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan were sacked over failure to protect civilians.\(^{52}\) A resolution addressing SEA by UN peacekeepers and non-UN forces, Resolution 2272, was adopted in March 2016 (building on Resolution 2242).\(^{53}\)

Some member states committed to take action against SEA during the open debate in 2016. For example, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uruguay committed to adopt the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy for SEA and to ensure the full accountability of perpetrators. Kazakhstan also agreed to promote the participation of female soldiers in peacekeeping operations, while the United Kingdom agreed to double the number of women participating in peacekeeping operations by 2020 and address all cases of SEA.\(^{54}\)

One of the most common thematic issues addressed at the 2016 open debate on WPS was women’s participation and, specifically, collaboration with women’s organizations and civil society organizations.\(^{55}\) As directed by Resolution 2242, the UK committed to having open country-specific briefings with civil society actors during its presidency of the Security Council in March 2017.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{51}\) For more details see Höghammar, T., ‘Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations’, SIPRI Yearbook 2016, pp. 305–15; and ‘UN peacekeepers go on trial for CAR sex abuse’, Aljazeera, 5 Apr. 2016. On SEA in the CAR see also chapter 5, section II, in this volume.


The Colombian peace agreement signed on 26 September 2016 is an example of women’s participation and active engagement in a peace process. Women constituted 30 per cent of the participants at the peace table in Havana, approximately half of the participants in the national and regional consultations were women, and women constituted over 60 per cent of the experts and victims visiting the peace table. In other areas, however, women’s participation and leadership in peace is stagnating or backsliding. The proportion of women in parliaments of conflict and post-conflict countries was 16.6 per cent in 2016, decreasing from 18 per cent in 2015. In addition, the Secretary-General cited concerns over the low levels and ranks of women’s representation in field missions, including peace operations and peacekeeping missions. At the same time, studies show that the direct inclusion of women does not necessarily ensure women’s influence in peace processes. It is important to look beyond the numbers in women’s participation and also focus on the qualitative aspects of women’s influence, since women may still be discriminated against and ignored.

Further, the protection pillar has often been the main focus overshadowing the other two pillars of the WPS agenda: women’s participation and prevention of conflict. The Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and recent critiques suggest that the implementation of the WPS agenda in many cases seems to have been invoked in order to make war safe for women, rather than to challenge gendered impacts of security policies and violent conflicts. The importance of conflict prevention in order to meet the global challenges on security and development was repeatedly recognized in 2015–16, but few states made specific commitments on conflict prevention during the open debate in 2016.

In 2009 the Secretary-General introduced a process to ensure that at least 15 per cent of UN-managed funds in support of peacebuilding were allocated...
to advance gender equality.\textsuperscript{65} The funding has increased from 5 per cent in 2011 and exceeded the goal for the first time in 2015 at 15.7 per cent.\textsuperscript{66} Despite a positive trend, the lack of allocated funding to gender equality and women’s empowerment continues to be one of the major obstacles to the implementation of Resolution 1325.\textsuperscript{67} In response to the financial gaps, the WPS Financing Discussion Group (FDG) was established in June 2014, composed of representatives from conflict-affected UN member states, donors, UN entities and civil society actors. The group aims to create synergies between different funding sources to better meet the needs of women in development and humanitarian divisions. In 2015, the WPS FDG initiated the Global Acceleration Instrument (GAI), a financing mechanism aiming to respond to obstacles in the implementation of the WPS agenda.\textsuperscript{68}