I. Peace and development

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Introduction

The United Nations officially launched the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development on 1 January 2016, defining sustainable development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as socio-economic and human development that 'meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'.¹ This is perhaps the broadest official interpretation of development that has ever been adopted: it includes economic growth, but also social inclusion, peace, justice and good governance, job opportunities and social and environmental protection, as well as an implicit valuation of the future in terms of development, investment and consumption decisions taken today.

The SDGs reflect a global set of goals for all countries—low-, middle- and high-income—to meet over the next 15 years (by 2030). The time frame for the SDGs is consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which preceded the SDGs with goals set for 2015 at the turn of the millennium. This reflects the fact that development is a continuous, gradual process that is never truly completed and often requires at least a generation to yield results.² Because development, particularly sustainable development, requires years of planning, consultation and adaptive delivery, it can be difficult to reconcile with the pressing needs of today. As a result, the time necessary for development and the time frame of the development practitioner is fundamentally different from that of the diplomat or the soldier.³

Generational planning is particularly difficult to reconcile with the day-today demands of complex environments confronted by insecurity, instability and uncertainty—what are referred to as 'dangerous places' (see section II). It is difficult for the policy makers of today to invest in an uncertain future.

¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 'Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development', A/RES/70/1, 21 Oct. 2015. For an in-depth discussion of the SDGs and the challenges of development in countries affected by conflict see Milante, G. et al., 'The challenges of relief and development in dangerous places', *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, pp. 343–88.

² Because development is a continuous process on a spectrum of human conditions, this chapter eschews the terms 'developed country', which would be no countries, and 'developing country', which would be all countries, and refers rather to 'more developed countries' and 'less developed countries'. Development is a continuous process, so while the text here may refer to 'successful development', this does not suggest that development is 'complete', but that a particular milestone has been reached or a period of progress was observed.

³ For many years, economic development was synonymous with development, and many development concepts remain linked to economic concepts. Where applicable, these terms are described in footnotes in the text that follows. Similarly, the shorthand term 'leader' is used for senior national policymakers (presidents and ministers), and 'diplomats' and 'soldiers' are used generally in this chapter to refer to those who work in the diplomacy and defence/security domains. Those working in dangerous places (planners, leaders, diplomats and soldiers) have to navigate the day-to-day challenges of creating security and building peace, as well as stay on course to bring about sustainable development in the future.

Thus, peace and development are about time: reconciling the demands and priorities of today with the goals of tomorrow. This section introduces a violence–peace spectrum and the concepts of positive and negative peace, to inform analysis that follows in the remainder of the chapter. Some achievements of 2016 are contributing to sustaining peace and sustainable development, while others appear as setbacks for these ambitious agendas (see section II).

The violence-peace spectrum

Violence is well understood and documented.⁴ Peace is not simply the absence of violence: in 2016 there were a variety of types of peace in the world, reflecting a broader spectrum of the quality of peace. A ceasefire can create peace even if it is temporary, as happened with the Syrian ceasefire in December 2016.⁵ A peace agreement can create a different sort of peace, something more inclusive and with pathways to reconciliation, as represented by the Colombian Government agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in November 2016.⁶ Peace can follow victory by one side, or the purge or silencing of opponents, as in Turkey following the failed coup attempt of July 2016.⁷ Meanwhile, there is a sort of peace in Ferguson in the United States, as local officials attempt to meet US Justice Department demands for police reforms following the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in 2014.⁸ Iceland, in contrast, has a different form of peace, with homicide rates of 0.3 per 100 000 people (far less than the global average of 6 per 100 000).⁹

Johan Galtung, founder of the *Journal of Peace Research* and influential peace researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) differentiated between two forms of peace outcome: 'positive peace' and 'negative peace'.¹⁰ Negative peace, simply put, is the absence of violence (negative refers to the

⁵ On the conflict in Syria see chapter 3, section I, in this volume.

 $^{^4}$ See e.g. chapter 2 in this volume and the various conflict chapters in other volumes of the SIPRI Yearbook.

⁶ On the peace agreement in Colombia see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.

⁷ Pierini, M., 'Turkey's gift from God', Carnegie Europe, 30 Jan. 2017. On the coup in Turkey see also chapter 4, section III, in this volume.

⁸ Salter, J. and Tucker, E., 'Ferguson missed deadlines in deal with Justice Department', Associated Press, 27 Jan. 2017.

⁹ Calculated using data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Criminal Justice/Homicide Counts and Rates, https://data.unodc.org, updated 18 May 2016.

¹⁰ Galtung, J., 'An Editorial', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1, no. 1 (1964), pp. 1–4.

quality of the peace). People living in periods of instability during a contested election or a constitutional crisis, under oppressive if non-violent authoritarian rule, in fear, and even in the shadow of ceasefires enforced by foreign peacekeepers are living in a negative peace. In a negative peace, the 'shadow of the future' looms large, time horizons are short as people live from day to day and vicious cycles of disillusion and distrust fuel instability. Actors may also be less likely to collaborate and more likely to defect from cooperation.

Positive peace is a thriving peace, one that is collaborative, complex and inclusive, and allows, in Galtung's words, 'the integration of human society'.¹¹ A positive peace is self-sustaining; it creates virtuous cycles where actors are willing to work towards a common future, because they expect to share in the outcome. This is, again, where the quality of the peace has a temporal element: when people trust in each other and the government, they have longer time horizons and are willing to invest in the future—they invest in a positive peace.¹² A positive peace has all of the elements reflected in the concept of human security, including freedom from fear and want.¹³ Perhaps a positive peace is idealistic or unattainable.¹⁴ Even people living in some of the most developed and peaceful countries, who live under the fear of nuclear war, do not enjoy a fully positive peace as long as they are hostages to mutually assured destruction. Perhaps no one enjoys a truly positive peace but it nevertheless remains an aspiration.

Violence, negative peace and positive peace can manifest in several ways, often dependent on the conditions, context, legacy of conflict, access to resources for conflict including weapons, institutions that can be used to resolve conflict, and many other factors that are studied in peace research.¹⁵ This constitutes a spectrum, from political violence—including wars, genocides, mass killings, terrorism and other violent manifestations of conflict—through manifestations that represent a negative peace, often unstable or fragile, to those manifestations more representative of a positive and sustainable peace (see figure 6.1).

¹¹ Grewal, B. S. and Galtung, J., 'Positive and negative peace', *School of Social Science: Auckland University of Technology*, vol. 30 (Aug. 2003), pp. 23–26.

¹³ Human security goes beyond the definition of security at the state level to address the broader concept of security in terms of the welfare of ordinary people. For a thoughtful critique of the term see Paris, R., 'Human Security: Paradigm shift or hot air?', *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87–102.

¹⁴ Grewal and Galtung (note 11).

¹⁵ For more on the complex and diverse drivers of conflict see World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2011).

¹² For economists, a long time horizon means a low discount rate. Knowing that their persons and investments are physically secure and will not be threatened by others or the state leads people to value the future more and discount it less. The shadow of the future is the effect that future planning and time horizons have on decisions today, and can be positive or negative depending on expectations about the future.



Figure 6.1. A violence–peace spectrum and manifestations of violence and peace

The violence–peace spectrum and the examples shown in figure 6.1 are illustrative and are not meant to be cardinal or ordinal (this list is neither complete, nor is it meant to suggest that e.g. terrorism is always more violent than drone attacks, gang violence or domestic violence). Rather, the manifestations shown are themselves outcomes and indicative of the quality of the peace: they are warning flags of underlying negative peace or structural violence. For example, capital flight and increased levels of migration (possibly forced) during a political crisis can be indications of a negative peace.¹⁶

¹⁶ Capital flight is the movement of capital (currency, investment) out of a national economy. This is often related to dissaving (negative saving), as during conflict or instability, actors often respond

While there may not be violence, such a peace is less resilient than a positive peace with investment, trust in government and social cohesion. These manifestations signal where a path to a positive peace is closed or closing.

It should be noted that a negative peace is not necessarily a bad thing. Where violence is rampant, a negative peace in the form of elite pacts and bargains may be necessary. The peace deal agreed by the Afghan Government with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his militant group Hezb-i-Islami in September 2016, for example, resulted in the lifting of sanctions against the warlord.¹⁷ It remains an open question as to which elements of positive peace (social cohesion, trust, reconciliation) may emerge from this arrangement.¹⁸

Negative peace, positive peace and time

The definitions of positive peace and negative peace above demonstrate the temporal elements of the concepts: the quality of the current peace is embedded in the expectations that actors have of its sustainability and how they see themselves contributing to and benefiting from this peace in the future. In other words, the quality of the peace today (positive or negative) is often a present realization of the shadow of the future.¹⁹ Not all actors may share the same expectations about the future peace and this can itself be a source of conflict, violent or otherwise. Furthermore, just as many security and development actors work with different time frames, not all peace actors (planners, diplomats or soldiers) necessarily work towards the same peace. The violence and negative peace outcomes of today can affect what peace outcomes are possible in the future. Hence, these possible futures are 'path dependent' on the present.²⁰

As a result of path dependence, there can be sustainable and positive peace outcomes in the future that are precluded by the choice of a nega-

by liquidating assets. Forced migration, similarly, reflects the movement of people in response to threats. In situations of instability, dissaving, forced migration and elite capture can be accompanied by currency crisis as many actors attempt to exchange local currencies for 'hard currencies' or other assets that can be easily moved (e.g. gold), creating a glut of domestic currency. This is another way that the future is tied to the peace of today: the value that people place on national currency is directly tied to their belief in the currency's future value and their faith and trust in the government that issues the currency.

¹⁷ Nordland, R., 'Afghanistan signs draft peace deal with faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar', New York Times, 22 Sep. 2016.

¹⁸ On legitimacy and dealing with armed non-state actors see Blair, R. and Kalmanovitz, P., 'On the rights of warlords: legitimate authority and basic protection in war-torn societies', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 110, no. 3 (Aug. 2016), pp. 428–40.

¹⁹ For a mathematical treatment of the shadow of the future on the quality of current peace, and the willingness of actors to invest in that peace, see McBride, M., Milante, G. and Skaperdas, S., 'Peace and war with endogenous state capacity', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 55, no. 3 (June 2011), pp. 446–68.

 $^{20}\mbox{Path}$ dependence is the quality of outcomes today conditional on knowledge and decisions in the past.

tive peace today. Some general examples of these types of negative peace include: hurting stalemates (where neither side is willing to make peace, but both sides, and usually others, suffer from prolonged fighting or threats of fighting); elite capture (corruption) and the plundering of a state such that the institutional capacity is hollowed out and is no longer viable; ceasefires that are only negotiated to rearm fighting forces; the unjust imprisonment of enemies; and forced displacement. While no violence is observed in these cases, these examples of a negative peace may still hinder progress towards a future positive peace and several were prevalent in 2016. For example, more countries showed regression rather than improvement on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index from 2015 to 2016.²¹ This is reflected perhaps most significantly in the release of the Panama Papers, which have led to at least 150 investigations in 79 countries, including of high-profile politicians and celebrities.²²

Not all negative peace is internal to the developing state. Many events in 2016 were global or transnational, but can contribute to negative peace in the form of uncertainty or global instability for less-developed countries. For example, the impact of growing populism, nationalism and attendant isolationism on international donors could lead to reduced global aid budgets in the future and limited engagement with developing countries at risk of conflict (see section II). Meanwhile, there has been an increase in regional powers acting unilaterally to intervene in local conflicts (e.g. Saudi Arabia in Yemen) as civil wars have become more internationalized over the last decade.²³ This can (but may not always) have the unintended consequence of perpetuating or intensifying conflicts and result in longer periods of conflict and recovery, impacting pathways to positive peace.

Another external threat to future positive peace is the global effort to accommodate the movement of people, particularly forced migration. Forced migration especially taxes the limited resources, opportunities and services available in less-developed countries, including nearly 10 million refugees (1 in 6 of global refugees) hosted in just 10 countries: Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad.²⁴ These are all middle- or low-income countries and many are considered fragile, lacking the systems to accommodate the stresses associated with large inflows of displaced people. Where these stresses overwhelm fragile systems, they can cause lasting damage to the

²¹ Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2016', 25 Jan. 2017.

²² Fitzgibbon, W. and Diaz-Struck, E., 'Panama Papers have had historic global effects, and the impacts keep coming', Center for Public Integrity, 1 Dec. 2016.

²³ Gleditsch, N. P., Melander, E. and Urdal, H., 'Introduction: patterns of armed conflict since 1945', eds D. Mason and S. McLaughlin Mitchell, *What Do We Know About Civil Wars?* (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD, 2016), pp. 15–32. On interventions in the Middle East and North Africa see chapter 3, section I, in this volume.

²⁴ See chapter 7 on forced displacement in this volume.

prospects of sustainable peace. However, where systems are reinforced and risks mitigated (e.g. in Jordan), they can contribute to the building of systems and a government more resilient to future shocks.²⁵

Development action requires a continuous investment, whether in education, the environment, infrastructure, or institutions and governance. Indeed, while it has been claimed that there can be 'no development without security and no security without development', this tells only half the story.²⁶ Security (peace) is necessary, but not sufficient for development, as the quality of the security (peace) itself can affect whether development succeeds and if it is sustainable. The prospects for a future peace discussed in the remainder of the chapter are often linked to the current manifestations of negative peace. An increase in levels of violence and displacement in countries with existing high levels of violence and displacement suggests a concentration of violence, structural, political and otherwise, in the world's most dangerous places.

It is vital to get peace right: a typical civil war lasts 7 years and requires 14 years to recover from economically, chances of relapse are high and it can take 25 years to rebuild lost state systems and institutions to the level of 'good enough' governance.²⁷ Only in the last ten years have Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam started to take off economically after decades of conflict and then decades of recovery. This suggests that the ongoing conflicts and dissolution of the state in Libya, South Sudan and Yemen will, on average, engender another 15 to 25 years of lost development. Global commitments like the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda and the positive peace that they represent will be nearly irrelevant in these contexts for many years to come.²⁸

²⁵ See the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, http://www.jrpsc.org/>.

²⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security And Human Rights For All, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 26 May 2005.

²⁷ World Bank (note 15).

²⁸ The Paris Agreement, adopted by consensus on 12 Dec, 2015, entered into effect on 4 Nov. 2016, builds on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and commits all nations to undertake efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.