6. Sustaining peace and sustainable development in dangerous places

Overview

Peace and development are continuous processes that require constant cultivation and may necessitate decades of effort before their benefits are realized. This chapter introduces current conceptualizations of peace and development, and how they relate to the new United Nations framework of ‘sustaining peace’. Relevant key events of 2016 and their implications for sustaining peace are considered in four sections.

Section I introduces the concepts of negative peace and positive peace and locates them on a spectrum ranging from violence to peace. It describes economic development concepts related to path dependency and expectations about the future to explain how security and peace objectives of the present may not always align with development objectives of the future.

Section II traces the development of the UN’s sustaining peace framework over 2016. After a brief introduction to the concept, the context for sustaining peace is described: pockets of violence concentrated in the world’s dangerous places; ongoing complex humanitarian emergencies; and limited capacities for preventing, responding to, managing and recovering from conflict. Sustaining peace is further linked to the sustainable development agenda and the principles of national ownership and inclusivity.

Section III examines several important mechanisms and events of 2016 in the fields of preventing violent extremism, humanitarian action, and the women, peace and security agenda. These fields reveal some of the mechanisms through which the concept of sustaining peace is being integrated into global peace and development practice.

The chapter concludes in section IV with discussion of the concept of conflict prevention. While prevention remains mostly aspirational, several developments in 2016 can be interpreted as investments in sustaining peace and possible paths for a positive peace, addressing the increasingly complex, interdependent and unprecedented challenges of sustainable development today.

MARINA CAPARINI AND GARY MILANTE
I. Peace and development

GARY MILANTE

Introduction

The United Nations officially launched the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development on 1 January 2016, defining sustainable development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as socio-economic and human development that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.¹ This is perhaps the broadest official interpretation of development that has ever been adopted: it includes economic growth, but also social inclusion, peace, justice and good governance, job opportunities and social and environmental protection, as well as an implicit valuation of the future in terms of development, investment and consumption decisions taken today.

The SDGs reflect a global set of goals for all countries—low-, middle- and high-income—to meet over the next 15 years (by 2030). The time frame for the SDGs is consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which preceded the SDGs with goals set for 2015 at the turn of the millennium. This reflects the fact that development is a continuous, gradual process that is never truly completed and often requires at least a generation to yield results.² Because development, particularly sustainable development, requires years of planning, consultation and adaptive delivery, it can be difficult to reconcile with the pressing needs of today. As a result, the time necessary for development and the time frame of the development practitioner is fundamentally different from that of the diplomat or the soldier.³

Generational planning is particularly difficult to reconcile with the day-to-day demands of complex environments confronted by insecurity, instability and uncertainty—what are referred to as ‘dangerous places’ (see section II). It is difficult for the policy makers of today to invest in an uncertain future.


² Because development is a continuous process on a spectrum of human conditions, this chapter eschews the terms ‘developed country’, which would be no countries, and ‘developing country’, which would be all countries, and refers rather to ‘more developed countries’ and ‘less developed countries’. Development is a continuous process, so while the text here may refer to ‘successful development’, this does not suggest that development is ‘complete’, but that a particular milestone has been reached or a period of progress was observed.

³ For many years, economic development was synonymous with development, and many development concepts remain linked to economic concepts. Where applicable, these terms are described in footnotes in the text that follows. Similarly, the shorthand term ‘leader’ is used for senior national policymakers (presidents and ministers), and ‘diplomats’ and ‘soldiers’ are used generally in this chapter to refer to those who work in the diplomacy and defence/security domains.
Those working in dangerous places (planners, leaders, diplomats and soldiers) have to navigate the day-to-day challenges of creating security and building peace, as well as stay on course to bring about sustainable development in the future.

Thus, peace and development are about time: reconciling the demands and priorities of today with the goals of tomorrow. This section introduces a violence–peace spectrum and the concepts of positive and negative peace, to inform analysis that follows in the remainder of the chapter. Some achievements of 2016 are contributing to sustaining peace and sustainable development, while others appear as setbacks for these ambitious agendas (see section II).

The violence–peace spectrum

Violence is well understood and documented. Peace is not simply the absence of violence: in 2016 there were a variety of types of peace in the world, reflecting a broader spectrum of the quality of peace. A ceasefire can create peace even if it is temporary, as happened with the Syrian ceasefire in December 2016. A peace agreement can create a different sort of peace, something more inclusive and with pathways to reconciliation, as represented by the Colombian Government agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in November 2016. Peace can follow victory by one side, or the purge or silencing of opponents, as in Turkey following the failed coup attempt of July 2016. Meanwhile, there is a sort of peace in Ferguson in the United States, as local officials attempt to meet US Justice Department demands for police reforms following the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in 2014. Iceland, in contrast, has a different form of peace, with homicide rates of 0.3 per 100 000 people (far less than the global average of 6 per 100 000).

Johan Galtung, founder of the Journal of Peace Research and influential peace researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) differentiated between two forms of peace outcome: ‘positive peace’ and ‘negative peace’. Negative peace, simply put, is the absence of violence (negative refers to the

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4 See e.g. chapter 2 in this volume and the various conflict chapters in other volumes of the SIPRI Yearbook.
5 On the conflict in Syria see chapter 3, section I, in this volume.
6 On the peace agreement in Colombia see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.
quality of the peace). People living in periods of instability during a contested election or a constitutional crisis, under oppressive if non-violent authoritarian rule, in fear, and even in the shadow of ceasefires enforced by foreign peacekeepers are living in a negative peace. In a negative peace, the ‘shadow of the future’ looms large, time horizons are short as people live from day to day and vicious cycles of disillusion and distrust fuel instability. Actors may also be less likely to collaborate and more likely to defect from cooperation.

Positive peace is a thriving peace, one that is collaborative, complex and inclusive, and allows, in Galtung’s words, ‘the integration of human society’. A positive peace is self-sustaining; it creates virtuous cycles where actors are willing to work towards a common future, because they expect to share in the outcome. This is, again, where the quality of the peace has a temporal element: when people trust in each other and the government, they have longer time horizons and are willing to invest in the future—they invest in a positive peace. A positive peace has all of the elements reflected in the concept of human security, including freedom from fear and want. Perhaps a positive peace is idealistic or unattainable. Even people living in some of the most developed and peaceful countries, who live under the fear of nuclear war, do not enjoy a fully positive peace as long as they are hostages to mutually assured destruction. Perhaps no one enjoys a truly positive peace but it nevertheless remains an aspiration.

Violence, negative peace and positive peace can manifest in several ways, often dependent on the conditions, context, legacy of conflict, access to resources for conflict including weapons, institutions that can be used to resolve conflict, and many other factors that are studied in peace research. This constitutes a spectrum, from political violence—including wars, genocides, mass killings, terrorism and other violent manifestations of conflict—through manifestations that represent a negative peace, often unstable or fragile, to those manifestations more representative of a positive and sustainable peace (see figure 6.1).

12 For economists, a long time horizon means a low discount rate. Knowing that their persons and investments are physically secure and will not be threatened by others or the state leads people to value the future more and discount it less. The shadow of the future is the effect that future planning and time horizons have on decisions today, and can be positive or negative depending on expectations about the future.
13 Human security goes beyond the definition of security at the state level to address the broader concept of security in terms of the welfare of ordinary people. For a thoughtful critique of the term see Paris, R., ‘Human Security: Paradigm shift or hot air?’, International Security, vol. 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87–102.
14 Grewal and Galtung (note 11).
The violence–peace spectrum and the examples shown in figure 6.1 are illustrative and are not meant to be cardinal or ordinal (this list is neither complete, nor is it meant to suggest that e.g. terrorism is always more violent than drone attacks, gang violence or domestic violence). Rather, the manifestations shown are themselves outcomes and indicative of the quality of the peace: they are warning flags of underlying negative peace or structural violence. For example, capital flight and increased levels of migration (possibly forced) during a political crisis can be indications of a negative peace.\footnote{Capital flight is the movement of capital (currency, investment) out of a national economy. This is often related to dissaving (negative saving), as during conflict or instability, actors often respond...}

\textbf{Figure 6.1.} A violence–peace spectrum and manifestations of violence and peace
While there may not be violence, such a peace is less resilient than a positive peace with investment, trust in government and social cohesion. These manifestations signal where a path to a positive peace is closed or closing.

It should be noted that a negative peace is not necessarily a bad thing. Where violence is rampant, a negative peace in the form of elite pacts and bargains may be necessary. The peace deal agreed by the Afghan Government with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his militant group Hezb-i-Islami in September 2016, for example, resulted in the lifting of sanctions against the warlord. It remains an open question as to which elements of positive peace (social cohesion, trust, reconciliation) may emerge from this arrangement.

**Negative peace, positive peace and time**

The definitions of positive peace and negative peace above demonstrate the temporal elements of the concepts: the quality of the current peace is embedded in the expectations that actors have of its sustainability and how they see themselves contributing to and benefiting from this peace in the future. In other words, the quality of the peace today (positive or negative) is often a present realization of the shadow of the future. Not all actors may share the same expectations about the future peace and this can itself be a source of conflict, violent or otherwise. Furthermore, just as many security and development actors work with different time frames, not all peace actors (planners, diplomats or soldiers) necessarily work towards the same peace. The violence and negative peace outcomes of today can affect what peace outcomes are possible in the future. Hence, these possible futures are ‘path dependent’ on the present.

As a result of path dependence, there can be sustainable and positive peace outcomes in the future that are precluded by the choice of a nega-
tive peace today. Some general examples of these types of negative peace include: hurting stalemates (where neither side is willing to make peace, but both sides, and usually others, suffer from prolonged fighting or threats of fighting); elite capture (corruption) and the plundering of a state such that the institutional capacity is hollowed out and is no longer viable; ceasefires that are only negotiated to rearm fighting forces; the unjust imprisonment of enemies; and forced displacement. While no violence is observed in these cases, these examples of a negative peace may still hinder progress towards a future positive peace and several were prevalent in 2016. For example, more countries showed regression rather than improvement on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index from 2015 to 2016.\textsuperscript{21} This is reflected perhaps most significantly in the release of the Panama Papers, which have led to at least 150 investigations in 79 countries, including of high-profile politicians and celebrities.\textsuperscript{22}

Not all negative peace is internal to the developing state. Many events in 2016 were global or transnational, but can contribute to negative peace in the form of uncertainty or global instability for less-developed countries. For example, the impact of growing populism, nationalism and attendant isolationism on international donors could lead to reduced global aid budgets in the future and limited engagement with developing countries at risk of conflict (see section II). Meanwhile, there has been an increase in regional powers acting unilaterally to intervene in local conflicts (e.g. Saudi Arabia in Yemen) as civil wars have become more internationalized over the last decade.\textsuperscript{23} This can (but may not always) have the unintended consequence of perpetuating or intensifying conflicts and result in longer periods of conflict and recovery, impacting pathways to positive peace.

Another external threat to future positive peace is the global effort to accommodate the movement of people, particularly forced migration. Forced migration especially taxes the limited resources, opportunities and services available in less-developed countries, including nearly 10 million refugees (1 in 6 of global refugees) hosted in just 10 countries: Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad.\textsuperscript{24} These are all middle- or low-income countries and many are considered fragile, lacking the systems to accommodate the stresses associated with large inflows of displaced people. Where these stresses overwhelm fragile systems, they can cause lasting damage to the

\textsuperscript{22} Fitzgibbon, W. and Diaz-Struck, E., ‘Panama Papers have had historic global effects, and the impacts keep coming’, Center for Public Integrity, 1 Dec. 2016.
\textsuperscript{24} See chapter 7 on forced displacement in this volume.
prospects of sustainable peace. However, where systems are reinforced and risks mitigated (e.g. in Jordan), they can contribute to the building of systems and a government more resilient to future shocks.\footnote{See the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, <http://www.jrpsc.org/>.
}

Development action requires a continuous investment, whether in education, the environment, infrastructure, or institutions and governance. Indeed, while it has been claimed that there can be ‘no development without security and no security without development’, this tells only half the story.\footnote{United Nations, General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security And Human Rights For All, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 26 May 2005.\footnote{World Bank (note 15).\footnote{The Paris Agreement, adopted by consensus on 12 Dec, 2015, entered into effect on 4 Nov. 2016, builds on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and commits all nations to undertake efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, <http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php>.}} Security (peace) is necessary, but not sufficient for development, as the quality of the security (peace) itself can affect whether development succeeds and if it is sustainable. The prospects for a future peace discussed in the remainder of the chapter are often linked to the current manifestations of negative peace. An increase in levels of violence and displacement in countries with existing high levels of violence and displacement suggests a concentration of violence, structural, political and otherwise, in the world’s most dangerous places.

It is vital to get peace right: a typical civil war lasts 7 years and requires 14 years to recover from economically, chances of relapse are high and it can take 25 years to rebuild lost state systems and institutions to the level of ‘good enough’ governance.\footnote{Only in the last ten years have Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam started to take off economically after decades of conflict and then decades of recovery. This suggests that the ongoing conflicts and dissolution of the state in Libya, South Sudan and Yemen will, on average, engender another 15 to 25 years of lost development. Global commitments like the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda and the positive peace that they represent will be nearly irrelevant in these contexts for many years to come.}\footnote{The Paris Agreement, adopted by consensus on 12 Dec, 2015, entered into effect on 4 Nov. 2016, builds on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and commits all nations to undertake efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, <http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php>.
}
II. Sustaining peace: the new overarching United Nations framework

MARINA CAPARINI AND GARY MILANTE

An introduction to the concept of sustaining peace

This section examines the concept of ‘sustaining peace’, which was promoted in two influential reviews of United Nations activities concluding in 2015: the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (AGE Report); and the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO Report). The concept was then confirmed in 2016 as the UN’s overarching conceptual framework for building peace, through identical resolutions issued by the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. According to the resolutions, sustaining peace is both ‘a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account’ in ‘activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development’.

The concept of sustaining peace calls for better linkages between the UN’s three foundational pillars of peace and security, development, and human rights, in addition to humanitarian action. It replaces what until now has been a sequential approach to conflict that often resulted in silos—notably silos of prevention, humanitarian action, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development—and calls for better linkages and sharing of instruments across these different sets of responses.

In sustaining peace, the imperative for a long-term vision of building a common, inclusive vision of society should be considered at all points within the conflict cycle—not only in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, but also and no less importantly in early prevention efforts of addressing the ‘root causes of conflict’ as well as in ‘prevention of the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict’.


3 The authors would like to thank Gizem Sucuoglu for this insight.

4 United Nations, General Assembly (note 2); and United Nations, Security Council (note 2), Preamble.
encompasses an array of interventions, including strengthening the rule of law, promoting sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development and national reconciliation. Some of the means and principles by which these interventions are pursued are inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institutions, respect for human rights and gender equality.\(^5\) Built on principles of human security, integrating an understanding of the root causes of conflict, and the protection of human rights, sustaining peace is inextricably linked with sustainable development.\(^6\) The recognition that sustaining peace is ‘the primary responsibility of national governments and authorities in identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies and activities’ and an emphasis on ‘inclusivity in national peacebuilding processes and objectives’ are reinforced by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which stresses the key role of national ownership in achieving sustainable development, and which aspires to ‘peaceful, just and inclusive societies’.\(^7\) The process by which sustaining peace emerged as the key UN framework is examined in further detail below, as are its links to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the central principle of inclusivity.

The emergence of sustaining peace as a key framework for the UN is also consistent with the concept of positive peace.\(^8\) On the peace–violence spectrum (see section I), sustaining peace is the action that enables ‘positive peace’. In other words, positive peace is the objective of sustaining peace, while negative peace is a useful, occasionally necessary, intermediary outcome. Ceasefires, instability, the threat of violence without the realization of violence and the ‘post-conflict’ period are all examples of a negative peace, marked by the absence of violence between actors. Meanwhile, positive peace is a self-sustaining condition, complex and multilayered, involving the constructive interaction of people and non-violent management of conflict. Sustaining peace involves restoring social relationships and building systems that respond to the needs of the population, including justice, equality and freedom from fear and want (language which was later integrated

\(^5\) United Nations, General Assembly (note 2); and United Nations, Security Council (note 2), Preamble.


A positive peace is a self-sustaining equilibrium for all stakeholders where violence, structural violence and the threat of violence are not necessary. Weapon systems and peacekeepers can be used to enforce or maintain a negative peace, but they are not necessary in conditions of a truly (and perhaps unattainable or idealistic) positive peace.

Sustaining peace seeks to shift actors away from structural violence and towards collaborative solutions and development, and thus towards positive peace outcomes. Sustaining peace demands more effective coordinated responses among the key pillars of the UN—peace and security, development, and human rights, as well as humanitarian action— and overcoming institutional and sectoral silos to develop collaborative and complementary solutions across the conflict cycle. This is reinforced by the 2030 Agenda, particularly SDG 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, access to justice for all, and effective and accountable institutions at all levels, which underscores its location at the nexus of security and development.

While the move towards sustaining peace marks an emerging multilateral consensus around the value of building a positive peace to avoid future conflict, the terminology is not without cost. The rebranding of various existing activities under the new nomenclature of sustaining peace risks contributing to conceptual muddle and confusion. Indeed, it is not clear in common usage how sustaining peace differs from the previous concept of peacebuilding. With the reviews and dual resolutions discussed further below, sustaining peace has become the preferred term that UN actors will henceforth use to refer to what the rest of the world has called (and likely will continue to call) peacebuilding. Although it does not replace peacebuilding, sustaining peace is an umbrella framework that subsumes and incorporates a refined and expanded definition of peacebuilding.

According to some UN observers, peacebuilding has been lifted out of the largely technical, post-conflict project-focused frame that came to enclose it. The AGE Report and the sustaining peace resolutions have endowed peacebuilding with an explicitly preventive focus, and appear to support elevating peacebuilding to the strategic level should the Peacebuilding Commission come to play a key role in coordinating the sustaining peace agenda across the entire UN system. Furthermore, some UN member states find

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the language around sustaining peace less onerous, as it suggests a peace to be maintained, rather than one that needs to be built. The emphasis that sustaining peace places on linking prevention to national ownership also proved reassuring to countries that have been sensitive to potential intervention in domestic affairs under the label of peacebuilding. Nevertheless, a major challenge will be harmonizing and achieving coherence in the use of the term by global actors working to promote peace, security and development in dangerous places and beyond. The high-level meeting ‘Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace’ to be convened by the General Assembly in September 2017, and a preceding report by the Secretary-General on the same topic, will provide important opportunities to clarify the meaning and implications of the UN’s new sustaining peace agenda.

**A fragile world: dangerous places**

The concept of ‘dangerous places’ was introduced in *SIPRI Yearbook 2016* as an alternative designation to ‘fragile states’.\(^{11}\) Countries were categorized as dangerous places if their rates of violent death put them in the top 25 per cent of countries (46 countries) or if their numbers per capita as sources of refugees and/or internally displaced persons (IDPs) put them in the top 40 per cent of countries (78 countries, 24 of which had high levels of violent death), yielding a list of 100 dangerous places.\(^{12}\) Due to their size, China and India are typically considered independently for this analysis. This volume similarly defines dangerous places as countries with high rates of violent death or which are major sources of refugees and/or IDPs, using the same criteria. The advantage of using these criteria to classify countries is that the data is nearly universally available and not the result of a subjective assessment (unlike many other fragile states criteria), so the designation of dangerous places is objective and based on replicable data.\(^{13}\) This section reproduces the list of countries for 2016 with updated data.


\(^{12}\) Specifically for the list in *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, countries were included if the violent death rate per 100,000 people was greater than 10.84—the top quartile of global violent deaths for all countries with data in the Global Burden of Armed Violence Database (GBAVD) for 2015. A country was also considered a dangerous place if the number of refugees/persons in refugee-like situations and IDPs was greater than 63.55 per 100,000 people—the upper two quintiles (highest 40 per cent) for this statistic. Annual violent deaths are derived using homicide data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and battle deaths data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Refugees by origin are reported in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Population Statistics Database (accessed Jan. 2017). Global figures for internal displacement are regularly reported through best estimates by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). See Melander, E., Pettersson, T. and Themnér, L., ‘Organized violence, 1989–2015’, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 53, no. 5 (2016); and IDMC, ‘Global figures’, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/>.

\(^{13}\) Milante et al. (note 11).
Applying the same cut-offs from 2016 (homicide rates greater than 10.84 per 100 000 people; displaced rates greater than 63.5 per 100 000 people) yields a new list of 90 countries that would qualify as dangerous places (see table 6.1). This reflects an improvement from the list of 100 countries in *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*: a net of 10 countries experienced improvements that reduced violent deaths and displacement. Notably, the number of displaced persons and refugees originating from Bangladesh, Cyprus, Kenya, Nepal, Peru, Timor-Leste and Turkmenistan improved. Meanwhile, rates of violent death below 10 per 100 000 people improved in Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Turkmenistan. Russia improved on both the levels of violent death and displacement. Among the improvers, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Paraguay experienced the highest reductions in absolute numbers of violent deaths.

Not all countries improved when measuring violent death and displacement. Increases in refugees and displacement from Ghana and Moldova and violent deaths in Costa Rica resulted in these countries being added to this year’s dangerous places list. In Afghanistan, Brazil, El Salvador, Venezuela and Yemen there were increases in violent deaths.

The reduction in the number of dangerous places to 90 countries represents a shift from 2.6 billion to 2.1 billion people living in dangerous places,

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**Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics: dangerous places, China, India and the rest of the world, 2015–16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of countries</th>
<th>Total population, (b.)</th>
<th>Violent deaths (per 100 000 people)</th>
<th>Refugees (th.)</th>
<th>Displaced persons (th.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous places&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>90 (−10)</td>
<td>2.108 (−18)</td>
<td>18.6 (+31)</td>
<td>15 402</td>
<td>32 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.582</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14 511</td>
<td>47 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.364</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.311</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>120 (+9)</td>
<td>2.532 (+26)</td>
<td>2.8 (+16)</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1.996</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. = billion; th. = thousand.

<sup>a</sup> Bracketed figures show the change (%) in 2016 compared to 2015.

Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Bank, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). The most recent available data is used: 2014 data for the 2015 list; 2015 data for the 2016 list.

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14 Three small states were also added to the list (population less than 500 000).
a reduction of 18 per cent. Increasingly, violent deaths are concentrated in the world’s dangerous places. While the 90 countries considered dangerous places now constitute less than a third of the world’s population, they account for 78 per cent of global violent deaths and are the source of 98 per cent of global refugees and displaced persons. The average violent death rate in the 90 dangerous places in the 2016 list was 18.6 per 100,000 people, versus an average violent death rate of 14.2 in 100 dangerous places in the 2015 list. The violent death rate for China and India and the average for the 120 countries in the rest of the world increased as well. However, because violent death rates were concentrated in a few very high violence countries (Afghanistan, Brazil, Nigeria, Syria and Venezuela alone account for nearly 40 per cent of global violent deaths), the global violent death rate (total global violent deaths over global population) actually improved from 6.96 to 6.52.

**Sustaining peace: the origins of the new UN framework**

*The AGE Report process*

To mark the tenth anniversary of the 2005 establishment of the three institutions that collectively constitute the ‘UN Peacebuilding Architecture’—the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund—the Security Council and the General Assembly initiated a comprehensive two-stage review process. A group of seven international experts (the Advisory Group of Experts, AGE) was mandated to engage in consultations and discussions with key stakeholders, including the parallel panels conducting the reviews on peace operations and Resolution 1325, to conduct a review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. The resulting report was completed in June 2015.

From January until March 2016 the findings and recommendations of the AGE Report were examined in an intense intergovernmental process aimed at transforming the report’s recommendations into identical resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The intergovernmental process involved consultations and negotiations with states, and engagement by the co-facilitators with various Peacebuilding Committee caucuses such as the European Union (EU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the African Group and others, as well as with groups such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to ensure that the process was inclusive. Negotiations on a draft

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15 The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was appointed in Oct. 2014 and presented its report to the Secretary-General on 16 June 2015. See United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, A/70/95-S/2015/446 (note 1); and chapter 5 in this volume.


resolution mostly took place in the General Assembly. A Security Council expert-level meeting subsequently met to endorse the finalized text of the General Assembly version and transform it into a Security Council resolution. On 27 April 2016 the General Assembly and the Security Council acted in a rare concurrent action to adopt by consensus their highly detailed and substantively identical resolutions, which constituted ‘the most comprehensive UN peacebuilding resolutions to date’.

The main recommendations of the AGE Report

The experts involved in producing the AGE Report stated that they interpreted their mandate as much broader than simply reviewing the roles of the Peacebuilding Commission, the PBSO and the Peacebuilding Fund, in addition to other UN actors involved in peacebuilding. In their view, peacebuilding is a shared responsibility of the entire UN system, and systemic factors—including a ‘generalized misunderstanding of the nature of peacebuilding’ in which it functioned largely as a post-conflict afterthought, and the fragmentation of the UN into separate ‘silos’—were essential to understanding the shortcomings in the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. Therefore, the group of experts sought to take ‘a fresh look not only at the specialized architecture itself, but at the whole approach to peacebuilding taken by the United Nations at large’. The more coherent and effective approach to peacebuilding that they identify as a shared responsibility of the UN system is ‘sustaining peace’, which ‘looks to shift peace and security responses from linear and sequential activities to a more comprehensive and strategic approach aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict’. The overarching finding of the AGE Report was that ‘the key Charter task of sustaining peace remains critically under-recognized, under-prioritized and under-resourced globally and within the United Nations system’. The AGE Report argued that violent conflict has become more complex, and international responses have tended to be militarized and short term, addressing symptoms rather than root causes. The report suggested that activities before, during and after conflict collectively contribute to a sus-

19 Martins and Bird (note 17).
22 Martins and Bird (note 17).
24 Militarized, short-term, non-sustainable responses that address symptoms while ignoring root causes can lead to violence or negative peace outcomes.
sustainable peace (a positive peace, though that language was not used in the AGE Report). According to the Security Council resolution adopting the AGE Report, ‘sustaining peace should be broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development’. Accordingly, sustaining peace should be approached in a comprehensive manner that combines actions across the entire UN system, including diplomatic, political, peacekeeping and security, human rights, economic, social and security areas, with a focus on addressing root causes, and at the intergovernmental level, within the Security Council, General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Recognizing that sustaining peace is ‘in essence, about individuals and different groups learning to live together without resorting to violence to resolve conflicts or disputes’, the AGE Report emphasized that sustaining peace must be ‘people-centred and inclusive in approach, and provide a vision of a common future to domestic stakeholders, public and private’; to this end, the UN’s approach ‘must be underpinned by a deep commitment to broadening inclusion and ownership on the part of all stakeholders across the societies where it works’. This emphasis on inclusion and national ownership connected the AGE Report strongly with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The parallel resolutions reflected these concerns, endorsing a comprehensive approach to the concept of sustaining peace that was put forward in the AGE Report as ‘a goal and a process to build a common vision of society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account’ and that should include ‘activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict’. Some member states, especially the UN’s largest financial contributors, disagreed with the AGE Report’s recommendation that 1 per cent of UN peace operation budgets or $100 million, whichever is greater, be provided from assessed contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund; instead, the resolutions called for ‘predictable

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25 United Nations, Security Council (note 2).
28 United Nations, General Assembly (note 2); and United Nations, Security Council (note 2), Preamble.
and sustained financing’.29 The assessed contribution suggestion was not entirely rejected but was postponed to a later stage, specifically after the Secretary-General presents a report on sustaining peace to the General Assembly in 2017–18 that would include options, such as using assessed and voluntary contributions ‘to increase, restructure and better prioritize funding to United Nations peacebuilding’.30

The twin resolutions strengthen the role of the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body and call for it to enhance its efficiency and flexibility in support of sustaining peace. This includes by (a) providing advice about mission mandates and transitions, (b) playing a bridging role to facilitate strategic and operational partnerships between the UN and regional groups and donors, and (c) developing closer collaboration with the World Bank in conflict-affected contexts.31 Further, the Peacebuilding Commission is to play a stronger convening role in bringing input from all relevant stakeholders, particularly from the field, to New York level discussions.32

The then Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, described the parallel resolutions as a ‘shift’ in the UN’s ‘strategy and mindset’ in sustaining peace, including a greater emphasis on prevention and working in partnerships with regional and subregional organizations and international financial institutions.33

**Links to the SDGs: sustaining peace and sustainable development**

The sustaining peace resolutions and the 2030 Agenda are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and together are shaping a common global vision of a sustainable peaceful future, including the values of national ownership, inclusivity, people-centred and transformative approaches, and long-term perspectives.34 Both the sustaining peace resolutions and the SDGs represent

30 Martins and Bird (note 17).
31 United Nations, General Assembly (note 2); and United Nations, Security Council (note 2), paras 5, 9, 18–20.
system-wide frameworks that recalibrate towards long-term approaches that focus on root causes and building societal resilience.

The 2030 Agenda, fundamentally a framework for development, differed from its predecessor the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in its universality and explicit recognition of peace as a necessary goal and condition for development. Conversely, the sustaining peace resolutions for the first time put greater emphasis on conflict prevention than the traditional focus on responding to conflict.

Nevertheless, with 17 goals, 169 targets and more than 200 indicators (some still to be finalized), the SDG agenda is a catalogue of ambitious and, perhaps for some, unattainable goals. Many fragile and conflict-affected countries did not succeed in meeting the MDGs. Within the goals, SDG 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and effective institutions represents the most obvious step towards integrating peace and security into the global development agenda. However, some 24 targets from 7 other SDGs also reflect aspirations for peaceful, just and inclusive societies. It should be noted, however, that many countries are lagging in taking the first step towards delivering on the SDGs—setting national targets based on baseline data: only 48 per cent of developing countries even have a statistical plan developed for monitoring progress against the SDGs.

Inclusivity: moving beyond national ownership

A key principle of international assistance is that governments and populations in fragile, conflict-affected states should be the primary actors in developing and implementing initiatives to build and maintain peace and development in those societies. Referred to variously as ‘local’, ‘national’ or ‘country’ ownership, this principle emerged from the problematic development and imposition of assistance programmes by external actors who often have imported foreign models without adequate consultation or understanding of recipients’ needs and context. However, the introduction of the concept of sustaining peace does little to reconcile conceptual ambiguity in practice, especially in resolving disagreements over which local actors should be the main drivers of sustaining peace reforms and initiatives: elected and government representatives or a broader group involving civil society and community groups. Moreover, regardless of the terminology,

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35 On the Sustainable Development Goals see Milante et al. (note 11).
38 See e.g. Principles 6 and 7 on promoting inclusive societies and aligning with local priorities in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations’, Apr. 2007.
while the principle of local ownership became routinely invoked in designing interventions to build peace and sustainable development, its implementation has remained less evident in practice.\textsuperscript{39}

The principle of national ownership was further strengthened by the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, launched in 2011 as the first set of principles to guide peacebuilding and state-building that was explicitly set out by fragile and conflict-affected states themselves.\textsuperscript{40} Asserting that externally imposed solutions do not work, the New Deal rests on the mutual commitment of national and international partners to ‘country-owned and country-led’ exits from fragility, and effective use of resources to build local capacities and institutions.\textsuperscript{41} While external actors such as donors, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide critical support, funding, expertise or facilitation, it is national governments that remain in the driver’s seat according to the New Deal principles.

More recently, an even broader norm of inclusivity has emerged, based on growing acknowledgement that a broad array of local perspectives must be taken into account in efforts to facilitate peace, security and development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The concept of inclusivity reflects a refining of the understanding of the requirements of local, country or national ownership; as noted by the recent review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, international support has focused almost exclusively on supporting government ownership, while neglecting the wider societal context of stakeholders.\textsuperscript{42} Inclusive national ownership in post-conflict contexts must be shared across government and all key social strata, and across a spectrum of political opinion and domestic actors, including minorities.\textsuperscript{43} Even deliberate efforts to integrate local actors into sustaining peace and sustainable development design may introduce only limited local perspectives because the local actors may be those whose language and education are accessible to stakeholders or who hold elite status, and they may be too few in number to represent the array of needs and preferences in that society. Indeed, in contexts with low local capacities, a small number of local civil society institutions may evolve to play dominant roles and become exclusionary in practice.\textsuperscript{44} Consequently, there has emerged a belief that

\textsuperscript{40} Note that, in line with a year of reflection on the previous decade of UN action, the G7+ embarked on a similar reflective exercise. See Hearn, S., Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (Center on International Cooperation, New York University: New York, 2016), p. 19.
\textsuperscript{43} United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, A/69/968–S/2015/490 (note 1), para. 44.
\textsuperscript{44} McCann (note 39), p. 22.
both state and societal actors must be engaged in sustaining peace, and that only ‘multi-layered, broad-based participation’ is likely to provide a deeply rooted, collective understanding of the nature of its challenges and objectives.45

The SDGs further sought to institutionalize the norm of inclusivity in sustaining peace and development, with the preamble declaring under the specific heading of peace: ‘We are determined to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies’. This is also directly expressed through SDG 16, which seeks to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels’.46 Additionally, the 2030 Agenda resolution pledges no fewer than five times to ‘leave no one behind’ in development processes.47

There remains, however, a significant lack of empirical evidence of the long-term impacts of engagement by local actors and institutions, such as whether peace outcomes are more sustainable than those led or initiated by external actors.48 More systematic monitoring and evaluation of participatory processes in sustaining peace are needed to contribute an evidence base to the normative claims underpinning the shift towards greater inclusivity. Questions remain on how inclusive sustaining peace must be to succeed, who should be involved and what is inclusive enough.49

In addition, while the commitments to sustaining peace are laudable in their language, realities on the ground have reflected global ambivalence to the peacebuilding agenda. First, the challenges of prevention are evident in countries that had all the warning signs of a high risk of conflict but little international appetite to engage in prevention (i.e. Syria, South Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen), but are even more complicated in cases where conflict risks and the value of prevention are less clear (i.e. Turkey, Myanmar and Mexico).50 Second, the parallel resolutions have so far failed to secure fixed financing for sustaining peace. Financing options are being examined by a working group, and will be outlined in the Secretary-General’s report to the 72nd session of the General Assembly. However, signals throughout 2016 were mixed. At the September 2016 pledging conference, the UN Peacebuilding Fund (a small multi-donor trust fund) requested $300 million in commitments, and received only $151 million. On the other hand, replenish-

45 McCann (note 39), p. 17.
47 United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/70/1 (note 7).
ment by donors of resources of the International Development Association in 2016 (referred to as ‘IDA 18’) resulted in increased total commitments for the IDA 18 term to $75 billion over three years, with the World Bank committing to doubling resources to address fragility, conflict and violence to $14 billion. The AGE Report recommended making assessed budget money available for programmatic purposes, and this was implemented. Moreover, a major, ongoing joint UN–World Bank study on the role of development in the prevention of conflict is considering how these two bodies can work better together to prevent conflict, and how the World Bank can channel funds more effectively, including how IDA 18 funds can be best spent. However, bilateral donors lack clear commitments. The UK Department for International Development (DFID), for example, recently pledged to commit 50 per cent of resources to fragile states, but has not clearly defined what a fragile state is or where additional resources, if necessary, would come from. It is unclear what the implications of the Trump Administration in the United States will be for US Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance to conflict-affected countries.

Beyond the reviews of the Peacebuilding Architecture, progress has been made in several other fields relevant to sustaining peace. This section reviews advances in three areas: (a) preventing violent extremism; (b) the linking of humanitarian action to development, particularly through the World Humanitarian Summit; and (c) the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda.

**Preventing violent extremism: the report of the Secretary-General**

In 2016 there was growing international momentum towards a broad, developmental approach in ‘preventing violent extremism’ (PVE). Although the terminology used by actors varies, hard security approaches privileging intelligence, police and military means under counterterrorism tend to be referred to as ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE). In contrast, PVE approaches seek to address the structural or root causes and drivers of violent extremism, factors that have traditionally fallen under the category of development challenges. The emergence of PVE, specifically its intersection with aspects of human rights, peacebuilding and development agendas, has proven alarming to some actors within those communities, who perceive similar potential risks in PVE for manipulation, abuse and stigmatization as seen with counterterrorism.\(^1\) While some development actors have embraced PVE through attention to development-related causes and solutions to radicalization, and the need for inclusive governance of diverse societies, others warn of the risk that development aid could become securitized.\(^2\) Nevertheless, despite these concerns the international PVE agenda was further consolidated in 2016. The United States under the Obama Administration was at the forefront of advancing the preventative approach towards violent extremism and unveiled a joint Department of State–USAID Strategy on CVE in May 2016.\(^3\) With the CVE Strategy, the USA was perceived at the

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\(^1\) See e.g. American Civil Liberties Union, ‘What is wrong with the government’s “countering violent extremism” programs’, ACLU Briefing Paper, Apr. 2016. On the use of CVE/PVE against the Islamic State group see chapter 3, section II, in this volume.


time as moving closer to the UN’s approach and its emphasis on preventive measures.\textsuperscript{4}

At the international level, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism was tabled in December 2015 and presented to the UN General Assembly in January 2016.\textsuperscript{5} The Plan of Action introduced an explicitly preventive approach for addressing violent extremism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 rests on four pillars: (a) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (b) preventing and combating terrorism; (c) building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the UN; and (d) ensuring human rights and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{6} Recognizing that both prevention and respect for human rights and the rule of law have been largely neglected in favour of militarized responses and counterterrorism capacity building, the Plan of Action seeks to reinvigorate those pillars, and thus contribute to a more balanced and comprehensive approach for addressing violent extremism and terrorism.\textsuperscript{7}

The Plan of Action adopts a ‘practical’ approach to preventing violent extremism, setting out more than 70 recommendations for action. It sets out two categories of drivers of violent extremism: ‘push’ factors (conditions conducive to and structural context) and ‘pull’ factors (individual experiences and motivations that contribute to radicalization processes). Recognizing that there can be no one-size-fits-all solution, the Plan of Action calls for the development by each member state of a national action plan to prevent violent extremism, which identifies national priorities to address local drivers of violent extremism.\textsuperscript{8} Seven priority areas should be addressed: (a) dialogue and conflict prevention; (b) strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law; (c) engaging communities; (d) empowering youth; (e) gender equality and empowering women; (f) education, skills development and employment facilitation; and (g) strategic communications, the Internet and social media. Implementation of national action plans should occur through ‘all-of-society’ and ‘all-of-government’ approaches.

The Plan of Action calls for combined security, development, human rights and humanitarian action at national, regional and global levels. It calls for a comprehensive UN approach both at UN headquarters and in the field, encompassing the integration of PVE into UN peacekeeping missions and special political missions, as well as enhancing the capacities of UN agencies, funds and programmes to support member states in developing

\textsuperscript{7}United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/674 (note 5), para. 7.
\textsuperscript{8}United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/674 (note 5), para. 44.
their national plans of action. A High-Level PVE Action Group was created to spearhead and mainstream the implementation of the Plan of Action across the UN system, and a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Interagency Working Group on Preventing Violent Extremism was tasked with bringing relevant UN agencies together to begin deliberations on moving forward and presenting concrete recommendations to the High-Level PVE Action Group.9

Initial reception of the Plan of Action by the General Assembly was mixed with divergent views on: the need to address root causes more deeply; whether the Plan of Action interferes with domestic affairs and national sovereignty; and the need to acknowledge the role of foreign military interventions in fostering violent extremism.10

Numerous international civil society actors have criticized the Plan of Action for failing to define violent extremism.11 Leaving violent extremism to each member state to define was also seen as risking its conflation with different forms of political protest, insurrection, radicalism and terrorism.12 The Plan of Action was further critiqued as lacking a clear evidentiary basis for many of its causal claims.13 The normative influence of the Plan of Action further raised concern that it would ‘lead to a proliferation of PVE initiatives that do not contain sufficient safeguards to protect human rights’.14

The Plan of Action underwent further consideration during the Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism in April 2016, and during the fifth biennial review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which took place in New York in July 2016.15 The General Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 291 on the Fifth Review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which included the recommendation that member states imple-

11 United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/674 (note 5), paras 2, 5.
12 Atwood, R., ‘The dangers lurking in the UN’s new plan to prevent violent extremism’, Reuters, 8 Feb. 2016.
ment the relevant national-level recommendations contained in the Plan of Action.¹⁶

What remains to be seen is whether, or to what extent, the Plan of Action’s recommendations for preventing violent extremism will be linked to other efforts to prioritize prevention in the UN system. One such initiative is the newly appointed Internal Review Team’s review of the UN’s peace and security strategy, functioning and architecture.¹⁷ More broadly it is unclear how the Plan of Action will be interpreted and implemented by states and international actors, how effectively they will craft multidimensional, integrated and comprehensive approaches to the complex problem of violent extremism, and the extent to which they can allay the concerns of the development, peacebuilding and human rights communities.

**Humanitarian assistance: the World Humanitarian Summit 2016**

Since the 1990s the increase in internal wars dominated by non-state actors and the growing involvement of external actors, including transnational criminal groups, have rendered conflicts more complex and protracted as the negotiation of lasting peace agreements has become more difficult. Disasters have become more frequent and intense, as extreme weather events caused by climate change have interacted with other pressures such as political instability, rapid urbanization and growing inequality.¹⁸ As a result of these trends, the international community is ‘in a state of constant crisis management’.¹⁹ The international humanitarian system is under tremendous strain: at the beginning of 2016 some 130 million people—the highest number since the Second World War—required humanitarian assistance owing to conflict or disaster and the resulting increase in over 60 million forcibly displaced persons.²⁰ Displacement is increasingly protracted, with the average length of conflict-induced displacement now at 17 years.²¹ This has driven the growing realization that internal displacement is not only a short-term humanitarian issue, but in countries with significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), fundamentally one of long-term development.²² While absolute amounts of humanitarian

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¹⁸ On disasters and climate change see chapter 8 in this volume.
assistance funding have increased each year and in 2015 reached a record $28 billion, the gap between humanitarian needs and available resources has also increased and currently stands at 45 per cent.23

Further, the humanitarian space has eroded amid weakened respect for human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) in situations of armed conflict, as demonstrated by the deliberate targeting by combatants of civilians and humanitarian personnel and facilities such as hospitals, clinics and educational facilities.24 Humanitarian access is increasingly treated as a weapon of war, as vividly demonstrated in Syria where warring parties have withheld access to humanitarian aid as part of their military strategies and to advance political objectives, and in attacks on humanitarian aid workers in Juba, South Sudan in July 2016.25

In 2016 the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, initiated the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) as a response to the dramatic increase in humanitarian funding requirements and the growing challenges of politicization of humanitarian aid and denial of access to those in need.26 The multi-stakeholder WHS, the first of its kind, was preceded by a year of consultations involving 23,000 people globally, including those on the frontlines providing and receiving assistance. Taking place in Istanbul on 23–24 May 2016, the WHS convened 9000 participants including state and government representatives, private sector actors, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). By mid-August 2016, the WHS resulted in 3140 individual and joint commitments across the five core areas outlined by the Secretary-General in the framework of the summit, which included political leadership to prevent and end conflict, upholding the norms that safeguard humanity (including through the International Criminal Court), ‘leaving no one behind’, changing people’s lives (from delivering aid to ending need) and investing in humanity.27

Many initially viewed the summit as an opportunity to reform the severely strained humanitarian system, but controversy arose as its preparation took form. One of the key concerns voiced by certain humanitarian actors was the blurring of the distinction between humanitarian response and development assistance, created by making the Sustainable Development Goals


24 On IHL and armed conflict see also chapter 14, section I, in this volume.


26 United Nations, General Assembly, A/70/709 (note 19), para. 11.

(SDGs) the common overall objective and by the Secretary-General’s emphasis on using development goals as a crisis response. Critics maintained that long-term development goals, while worthy, are secondary to humanitarian goals, whose primary imperative must remain ‘addressing the immediate needs of people caught up in crisis, by delivering relief aid and delivering it in accordance to the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence’.

As development is or should be closely connected to national ownership, linking development to humanitarianism may well erode those fundamental humanitarian principles. The withdrawal of Médecins Sans Frontières from participating in the summit, which it branded ‘a fig-leaf of good intentions’, further reflected its concerns that the summit would fail to reinforce ‘the obligations of states to uphold and implement the humanitarian and refugee laws which they have signed up to’.

A main outcome of the WHS was the launch of a package of reforms entitled the ‘Grand Bargain’, which was endorsed by the core of 15 lead donors and 15 aid agencies and international NGOs that collectively dominate international humanitarian assistance. Drawing on findings from the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on Humanitarian Financing, the Grand Bargain identified ten areas in which humanitarian actors commit to working more efficiently and effectively together: (a) transparency; (b) localization; (c) cash-based programming; (d) periodic functional reviews; (e) joint and impartial needs assessments; (f) including aid recipients in decision-making; (g) multi-year planning and funding; (h) reduced earmarking of donor contributions; (i) harmonized and simplified reporting requirements; and (j) engagement between humanitarian and development actors.

A notable development was seen in the commitment to fund national and local actors (localization) in recognition of the principle that crisis response should build and rely on national and local capacities and providers, supplemented by international capacities only as needed. Currently, national and local actors receive few resources. In 2015, for example, local NGOs received only 0.4 per cent of international humanitarian assistance funding, while government authorities of affected states received just 1.2 per cent.

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receive 25 per cent of the funding they provide for humanitarian action ‘as directly as possible’.  

The initiative to better localize humanitarian response points to a fundamental problem in the international humanitarian system, which not only lacks sufficient funds, but suffers from a crisis of legitimacy owing to the dominance of an ‘oligopoly’ of major donors, UN agencies and large international NGOs. These organizations are the main recipients of concentrated resource flows and function in practice like a cartel, dominating the discourse, functioning as gatekeepers and shaping the rules of international humanitarian response. Critics maintain that the international NGO members of this group are driven by competitive concerns of increasing their own market share and funding, a dynamic that collectively discourages diversification and systemic change, while the major donors direct attention to issues that reflect their interests. In this system, national, local and community actors are ignored, excluded or instrumentalized to implement internationally developed solutions. Public consultations leading up to the WHS revealed that many recipients of humanitarian assistance not only feel that this system fails to respond effectively to their priority needs, but that the aid agencies delivering assistance are ‘partial, unaccountable and potentially corrupt’.  

While the WHS launched important initiatives to improve the management and efficiency of the humanitarian system, transformational change appears unlikely. Absent from the WHS were the leaders of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful states, with only German Chancellor Angela Merkel participating from among the Group of Seven (G7) countries and no leaders representing the permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council. This absence contributed to the failure of the summit to make any progress on accountability for violations of IHL.

The status of the women, peace and security agenda

The Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 constitutes a platform of actions for what could be described as positive peace. The Beijing Declaration addresses the need to re-evaluate structures of society as well as the relationship between

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men and women regarding justice and equality.\textsuperscript{37} The language in the WPS agenda is based on the Beijing Declaration, specifically section E on Women and Armed Conflict. The WPS agenda consists of eight resolutions that address a gender perspective in various peace and security forums. The resolutions emphasize women’s roles and the importance of women’s participation in peacebuilding and preventing armed conflict, as well as the importance of the protection of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict.\textsuperscript{38} UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the landmark resolution of the WPS agenda, has since its adoption in 2000 contributed to a better understanding of the relevance of a gender perspective for peace and security. However, progress on the implementation of the WPS agenda has been slow.

In 2015 the 15th anniversary of Resolution 1325 was marked with the High-Level Review of Women, Peace and Security, where UN member states renewed their commitments, and focused on key obstacles and how to improve the implementation of commitments that had yet to be realized. A record-breaking 110 statements were made and a new resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 2242—that addresses global challenges such as climate change, the increasing number of refugees and IDPs, and violent extremism, and urges greater consultation with women’s organizations—was unanimously adopted and added to the WPS agenda.\textsuperscript{39} The High-Level Review was followed by publication of the \textit{Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325}, which identified challenges as well as progress with the implementation of the WPS agenda.\textsuperscript{40}

On 25 October 2016 the Security Council convened its annual open debate on women, peace and security, to follow up on the previous year’s high-level review and to update the status on the implementation of Resolution 1325. The 2016 open debate and the annual report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security demonstrated growing support for the WPS agenda. In 2016 four new countries (Kenya, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Ukraine) adopted national action plans on Resolution 1325.\textsuperscript{41} To date, 63 countries have adopted national action plans in support of Resolution 1325, and several initiatives have been taken to support states in developing and implementing these plans.\textsuperscript{42} In July 2016 over 80 participants, including government representatives, civil society advocates, academics and experts from 17 countries, gathered in Bangkok at the Asia-Pacific regional sympo-

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{37} United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, 27 Oct. 1995.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Höghammar, T. et al., ‘The development of the women, peace and security agenda’, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 2016}, p. 323.
\item \textsuperscript{39} United Nations Security Council Resolution 2242, 13 Oct. 2015.
\end{itemize}
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sium on national action plans on women, peace and security. It was the first organized occasion for the Asian-Pacific countries to share their experiences and to develop strategies for developing effective national action plans.\(^{43}\)

In addition, new initiatives on networks like the Nordic Women Mediators (NWM) were taken. The NWM was officially launched in November 2015 and its international launch was in March 2016 at the UN in New York. The NWM aims to increase the number of Nordic women in peacemaking efforts, strengthening the role of women mediators in conflict-affected regions as well as interacting with other similar women’s networks.\(^{44}\) Similar initiatives, such as the network of African Women Mediators, were also taken during 2016 to increase women’s participation in peacebuilding.\(^{45}\)

Despite the increasing support for the WPS agenda, there remains a gap between policy and practice. In the 2016 annual report on WPS, the Secretary-General presented five areas that require urgent action in order to fill the gaps in implementation: (a) increasing women’s participation; (b) protecting the human rights of women and girls during conflict; (c) gender-responsive planning and accountability for results; (d) strengthening gender architecture and technical expertise; and (e) increasing financial resources for the WPS agenda.\(^{46}\) Progress and gaps in these areas are discussed further below.

Despite some progress achieved in 2016 regarding the implementation of the WPS agenda, for example on high-level prosecutions of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, the protection of human rights of women and girls in conflict was still seriously lacking. The year was marked by reports of armed actors and terrorist organizations violating women’s human rights, sometimes as part of their political agendas.\(^{47}\)

The UN Secretary-General emphasized the urgent need to punish those responsible for human rights violations committed by non-state actors and urged member states to take action against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in countries hosting UN peace operations. Following the increased number of allegations of SEA from across the UN system and the reports on allegations of SEA by international peacekeepers in the Central

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\(^{44}\)Folke Bernadotte Academy ‘Nordic women mediators’, 20 June 2016.


African Republic (CAR), the Secretary-General emphasized the need for donors to extend support for mechanisms to assist the victims of these crimes that have devastated lives and damaged global perceptions of the UN. In his 2015 report on conflict-related sexual violence, the Secretary-General asserted commitments to policies of zero tolerance for SEA. In his 2016 report, he continued to inform measures for protection from SEA. As a consequence of the allegations of SEA in the CAR, three Congolese peacekeepers from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) were prosecuted. Both the head of UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR and the commander of the UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan were sacked over failure to protect civilians. A resolution addressing SEA by UN peacekeepers and non-UN forces, Resolution 2272, was adopted in March 2016 (building on Resolution 2242).

Some member states committed to take action against SEA during the open debate in 2016. For example, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uruguay committed to adopt the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy for SEA and to ensure the full accountability of perpetrators. Kazakhstan also agreed to promote the participation of female soldiers in peacekeeping operations, while the United Kingdom agreed to double the number of women participating in peacekeeping operations by 2020 and address all cases of SEA.

One of the most common thematic issues addressed at the 2016 open debate on WPS was women’s participation and, specifically, collaboration with women’s organizations and civil society organizations. As directed by Resolution 2242, the UK committed to having open country-specific briefings with civil society actors during its presidency of the Security Council in March 2017.

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51 For more details see Höghammar, T., ‘Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations’, SIPRI Yearbook 2016, pp. 305–15; and ‘UN peacekeepers go on trial for CAR sex abuse’, Al Jazeera, 5 Apr. 2016. On SEA in the CAR see also chapter 5, section II, in this volume.
The Colombian peace agreement signed on 26 September 2016 is an example of women’s participation and active engagement in a peace process. Women constituted 30 per cent of the participants at the peace table in Havana, approximately half of the participants in the national and regional consultations were women, and women constituted over 60 per cent of the experts and victims visiting the peace table. In other areas, however, women’s participation and leadership in peace is stagnating or backsliding. The proportion of women in parliaments of conflict and post-conflict countries was 16.6 per cent in 2016, decreasing from 18 per cent in 2015. In addition, the Secretary-General cited concerns over the low levels and ranks of women’s representation in field missions, including peace operations and peacekeeping missions. At the same time, studies show that the direct inclusion of women does not necessarily ensure women’s influence in peace processes. It is important to look beyond the numbers in women’s participation and also focus on the qualitative aspects of women’s influence, since women may still be discriminated against and ignored.

Further, the protection pillar has often been the main focus overshadowing the other two pillars of the WPS agenda: women’s participation and prevention of conflict. The Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and recent critiques suggest that the implementation of the WPS agenda in many cases seems to have been invoked in order to make war safe for women, rather than to challenge gendered impacts of security policies and violent conflicts. The importance of conflict prevention in order to meet the global challenges on security and development was repeatedly recognized in 2015–16, but few states made specific commitments on conflict prevention during the open debate in 2016.

In 2009 the Secretary-General introduced a process to ensure that at least 15 per cent of UN-managed funds in support of peacebuilding were allocated

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57 On the Colombian peace process see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.
to advance gender equality.\textsuperscript{65} The funding has increased from 5 per cent in 2011 and exceeded the goal for the first time in 2015 at 15.7 per cent.\textsuperscript{66} Despite a positive trend, the lack of allocated funding to gender equality and women’s empowerment continues to be one of the major obstacles to the implementation of Resolution 1325.\textsuperscript{67} In response to the financial gaps, the WPS Financing Discussion Group (FDG) was established in June 2014, composed of representatives from conflict-affected UN member states, donors, UN entities and civil society actors. The group aims to create synergies between different funding sources to better meet the needs of women in development and humanitarian divisions. In 2015, the WPS FDG initiated the Global Acceleration Instrument (GAI), a financing mechanism aiming to respond to obstacles in the implementation of the WPS agenda.\textsuperscript{68}


IV. The peace being sustained: operationalizing prevention

MARINA CAPARINI AND GARY MILANTE

The call for a greater focus on preventing conflict has resonated across international forums over the past year (see section II). Former United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, acknowledged that ‘preventing and ending conflicts are recognized in the Charter of the United Nations as our first and foremost responsibility to humanity. Yet, that effort is not where our political leadership or resources are currently focused’. The three major reviews of 2015 on peacebuilding, peace operations and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 each called for greater prevention efforts, and for increasing strategic capacities for prevention at the highest levels of the UN, within peace operations, and through resident coordinators and country teams. First, the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture held that peacebuilding occurs not only in post-conflict situations, but also before, during and after conflict, and that more attention needs to be paid to conflict prevention: a wider understanding of peacebuilding that was termed ‘sustaining peace’ (see section II). Second, the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) called for conflict prevention and mediation to be ‘brought back to the fore’, with more attention on root causes of conflict and through inclusive and equitable development work. It specifically recommended investing in and building the UN’s own capacities for conflict prevention, developing a more integrated UN approach to conflict prevention, the creation of a broad-based, high-level international forum on prevention, and the creation of new regional offices that could engage in preventive diplomacy in fragile regions. Third, the Global Study on women, peace and security emphasized that ‘prevention of conflict must be the priority, not the use of force’ and the need to implement both short-term, operational strategies and long-term strategies addressing root causes and structural drivers of violence.

The preamble of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development explicitly links peace and development, declaring: ‘We are determined to foster peace-
ful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.\textsuperscript{5} As part of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, it further sets out to ‘strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime’.\textsuperscript{6}

The emphasis on engaging more with conflict prevention continued throughout 2016. In his report for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), Ban Ki-moon identified global leadership to prevent and end conflict as the first and foremost of five core responsibilities to humanity.\textsuperscript{7} Further, recognizing that conflicts are linked to 80 per cent of all humanitarian needs, the first core priority identified in the WHS was the need for global leadership to prevent and end conflict.\textsuperscript{8} However, humanitarian action also responds to suffering resulting from disaster and, as with prevention of conflict, there is a growing emphasis on disaster preparedness and risk mitigation. The World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Sendai, Japan, resulted in a global framework for the coming 15 years to prepare for future natural and climate-related disasters.\textsuperscript{9} It identified seven global targets, including the substantial reduction in global disaster mortality, in numbers of people affected, and in economic losses relative to global gross domestic product, but stopped short of agreeing on concrete financial commitments.\textsuperscript{10} Other initiatives include the new Global Partnership for Preparedness (GPP), led by the Vulnerable 20 (V20) Group of Ministers of Finance of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, which will strengthen preparedness capacities for future disaster risks in 20 high-risk developing countries by 2020.\textsuperscript{11} The Global Alliance for Urban Crisis was also launched at the WHS, and is conceived as a framework for global urban preparedness, response and recovery, targeting municipalities and affected communities.\textsuperscript{12} The New Urban Agenda that was adopted at HABITAT III in Quito, Ecuador, in October 2016, as a guide for how cities should be planned and managed to achieve sustainable urbanization, seeks to create a mutually reinforcing relationship between

\textsuperscript{6} United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/70/1 (note 5), para. 16.a.
\textsuperscript{7} United Nations, General Assembly, 70/709 (note 1).
\textsuperscript{8} United Nations, General Assembly, 70/709 (note 1).
\textsuperscript{10} United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (note 9), para. 18.
urbanization and development, and also has a strong, cross-cutting emphasis on prevention.\textsuperscript{13}

**Shifting towards prevention in practice: avoiding the conflict trap**

The concept of ‘sustaining peace’ emphasizes the critical importance of conflict prevention, which has from the beginning been one of the UN’s primary goals, but has consistently failed to deliver, including through the restrictions imposed on the Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005 to work exclusively in post-conflict settings.\textsuperscript{14} As mentioned above, the necessity of focusing on conflict prevention was a core finding in each of the three UN reviews on peace and security that were delivered in 2015.

As the new consensus for the need for a renewed UN focus was developing, a deeper understanding of the link between security and development was also emerging. A landmark study published by the World Bank in 2004 clarified the impact that conflict has on development, establishing that a state’s experience of civil war—the most common type of conflict today—not only damages the economy during the conflict, but reverses and profoundly retards future development, creating a so-called ‘conflict trap’.\textsuperscript{15} Conflict further exacerbates and worsens those conditions that initially resulted in conflict (e.g. poverty, inequality, poor governance, ethnic tensions and marginalization from the global economic system), making those countries that have experienced civil war more likely to relapse into conflict. In about half of post-conflict countries there is a resumption of conflict, while a third manage to remain in peace but in a marginalized state characterized by low incomes, slow growth, and a higher risk of recurrence of internal conflict.\textsuperscript{16}

Civil war may also have a spillover effect into neighbouring countries through population displacement, the mobilization of diaspora communities and effects on domestic politics, excessive military spending by neighbouring states that may engender a regional arms race, or the spurring of external intervention by regional and in some cases major powers.\textsuperscript{17} The spillover risks of civil war are amply demonstrated by Syria, which has created 4.9 million refugees and 6.6 million internally displaced people.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[18] On the conflict in Syria see chapter 3 in this volume.
\end{footnotes}
war has caused the spread of conflict to Iraq and has prompted external intervention by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah in support of the Bashar al-Assad regime, while Turkey, the Gulf states and the United States have intervened in support of the opposition.

Moreover, it is the 2.1 billion people living in the 90 countries constituting the world’s dangerous places (see section II) that are particularly susceptible to experiencing civil war, because of the conditions that exist in those countries. According to one study, the risk of recurrence of civil war in post-conflict countries more than doubles for 40 years following the end of the conflict, with low-income countries at even greater risk of civil war—both of entering into civil conflict, and once experiencing it then sliding back into civil conflict in the future—and of posing a spillover risk to neighbouring states.¹⁹

These findings on the conflict trap highlight the value of conflict prevention: avoiding internal armed conflict in the first place, given its comprehensively destructive social, economic and material effects, and its lingering impact, and propensity to result in a resumption of conflict, with ripple effects in the region.

However, international efforts to engage states at risk of conflict remain limited. As noted by the HIPPO Report, a culture of prevention has still not materialized in the UN or among its member states, and conflict prevention remains ‘seriously under-resourced’.²⁰ Post-conflict interventions have included international peacekeeping missions, stabilization (maintaining a negative peace), and the painstakingly slow processes of supporting state-building, including democratization, institution-building and capacity building. This type of approach can be effective. Despite media and popular attention frequently focusing on failures (to prevent genocide in Rwanda, and more recent failures to protect civilians in Darfur and South Sudan), empirical evidence over the past 15 years has confirmed that, on average, the presence of a large multidimensional peacekeeping mission in a country emerging from conflict generally succeeds in maintaining peace in that country.²¹

Institutional development in countries emerging from conflict has become a primary focus of peacekeeping operations once the context is stabilized. Some empirical studies have suggested that democratic political institutions

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(i.e. constitutions, democratic elections and power-sharing agreements) have weak to no impact on whether conflict will resume and should be promoted on their own merits, not linked to conflict prevention or used as a benchmark for exit of a multidimensional peace operation.\textsuperscript{22} Rather, those researchers argue that it is the presence of military peacekeepers to maintain stability combined with long-term economic development that appear most effective in preventing the recurrence of internal conflict. Recent research has further refined understanding of precursors of the recurrence of war, identifying the perceived subjective quality of established legal institutions and the rule of law in post-conflict states as significant factors in reducing the risk of a return to civil war.\textsuperscript{23} In other words, what is important is not whether a legal institution such as an independent judiciary formally exists, but whether the legal institutions are considered strong, effective and impartial. The inclusiveness, effectiveness and accountability of state institutions, especially in the justice and security domains, are the essence of SDG 16. It is also in keeping with a key finding of the World Development Report 2011, according to which ‘institutional legitimacy is the key to stability. When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion—the likelihood of violent conflict increases’, and thus, ‘investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs is essential to reducing violence’.\textsuperscript{24}

Far from being nebulous aspirations, the concept of positive peace is increasingly being defined, refined and even measured.\textsuperscript{25} Peaceful societies are inclusive, accountable and equitable, and are characterized by a well-functioning government, an equitable distribution of resources, low levels of corruption, a free flow of information, an acceptance of others’ rights, good relations with neighbours, high levels of human capital, and a sound business environment.\textsuperscript{26} These factors are multidimensional and interact in complex ways, representing systems of peace, societal development and resilience. Thus, instead of the traditional conflict prevention focus on violence and conflict-prone societies—what might be considered the pathologies of human interaction—the positive peace approach studies the drivers of peaceful, inclusive and equitable societies.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} Institute for Economics and Peace (note 25).
\textsuperscript{27} Institute for Economics and Peace (note 25), p. 3.
Common wisdom has held that every dollar spent preparing for disaster saves seven dollars in economic losses. A recent study by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) has sharpened understanding of the costs of violence containment spending on national and global economies. Based on a new methodology working with ten indicators in its Global Peace Index plus three expenditure indicators, the study found that the global economic impact of violence containment in 2012 was valued at $9.46 trillion, or 11 per cent of gross world product. It found that a reduction of world expenditure on violence by 15 per cent would have provided enough money to pay for the European Stability Fund, repay Greece’s debt, and achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals.

**Possible pathways to positive peace**

Even in the face of current uncertainty, there are reasons to be optimistic about the future. All of the examples discussed in this chapter—the Grand Bargain, the Sendai Framework, the Global Partnership for Preparedness and the Global Alliance for Urban Crisis—are indications of positive peace: efforts to invest in institutions today that will improve resilience in the face of crisis in the future. There are many paths to positive peace and some recent developments described below indicate areas where further progress can be made.

The UN’s new sustaining peace agenda coupled with the energy of a new Secretary-General could create an opening for multilateral progress on conflict prevention, mediation, support for peace processes and conflict resolution. A new architecture for sustaining peace with an eye towards delivering the 2030 Agenda could support societal reconciliation, institutional reform, and a revitalized commitment to promoting respect for human rights, inclusion and gender equality. This could be more effective if leaders make a global recommitment to principled multilateralism—one suitable to address 21st century challenges.

Where multilateralism falters or fails, regional actors and local leaders are increasingly taking up the mantle of promoting peace with positive

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effect. ‘Groups of friends’ (less formal coalitions of interested parties, typically regional) and similar structures have played instrumental roles in resolving certain conflicts during the post-cold war period. Collectively, however, their effectiveness has been mixed. Among the key determinants of the effectiveness of a group of friends are the regional environment of the conflict, the group’s composition, the demands and behaviour of the conflict parties, the group’s internal leadership and relationship with the chief mediator, the timing of the group’s engagement, and the phase of the conflict and/or peace process. In successful cases, groups of friends have provided a way for external actors to give support to the mediator, conflict parties and UN bodies by leveraging a different set of resources (funds, knowledge, influence and relationships) and strengthening the legitimacy of the peace process. One example is the Group of Friends on Sustaining Peace, established by Mexico in 2016; an effort by UN member states to prioritize conflict prevention and other recommendations outlined in the sustaining peace resolutions and recent UN reviews. Nevertheless, the potential impact is contingent on the evolving geopolitical landscape and interests of the major powers—namely the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The New Deal for development in fragile situations, agreed in Busan in 2011, built a mutual commitment of national and international partners to ‘country-owned and country-led’ exits from fragility, and effective use of resources to build local capacities and institutions. The Stockholm Declaration of the International Dialogue in April 2016 reaffirmed the commitment of the membership of the International Dialogue to building on the experience gained and lessons learned from the New Deal, and to build a more ‘robust network of countries, organizations, and forums committed to finding new and better ways of building peace and preventing conflict’.

Conclusions

Peace and development is a temporal study of what is possible today, given the prospects and expectations people have of the future. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, policy makers must somehow chart a course for progress in five years or a decade, while facing the very real challenges of today. Development can take at least a generation to achieve, and for some

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32 Whitfield (note 31).
33 In the Peace Operations Review, the Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the review of the implementation of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; see also Whitfield (note 31).
people living in dangerous places this can amount to a lifetime. While it is important to monitor conflict trends, security capabilities and diplomacy, these often reflect only the negative peace part of the peace–violence spectrum. To understand positive and sustainable peace, and therefore the prospects for sustainable development—where it is possible and where progress is being made—it is necessary to monitor changes to the nature of peace in developing countries and the global, multilateral system, which may contribute to violence, negative peace or positive peace.