

II. Regional trends and developments

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There were no significant shifts in 2016 in the distribution of peace operations across the different geographical regions of the world. Of the 62 peace operations that were active during the year, 26 were located in Africa, 18 in Europe, 8 in the Middle East, 7 in Asia and Oceania, and 3 in the Americas (see table 5.1). Africa and Europe hosted the majority of all global peace operations throughout the entire 2007–16 period (see figure 5.6). That said, there is a big difference between the types of operation conducted in the two regions. Most of the peace operations in Europe are relatively small, civilian missions.

The concentration of many large peace operations on the African continent is reflected in comparisons of the number of personnel deployed in peace operations in each region. In 2016, 72 per cent of all personnel in peace operations (and 82 per cent of all personnel in United Nations peace operations) were deployed in countries in Africa. However, the long-term trend of ever-increasing personnel deployments in Africa—arguably the most noticeable and significant trend in peace operations—was reversed in 2016 (see figure 5.7). There were already some signs of having reached saturation point in 2015, and the number of personnel in peace operations in Africa fell by 7.5 per cent during 2016. This was the first substantial year-on-year decrease (in both absolute and relative terms) in personnel deployments to Africa since 2000. Notwithstanding this trend-break, the gap between the number of personnel deployed in peace operations in Africa and elsewhere remains very large (see figure 5.7).

Africa

The 26 peace operations located in Africa in 2016 (2 fewer than in 2015) deployed 110 957 personnel. This is a significant decrease of 8988 compared to 2015 and a major break with developments in preceding years.

Since the publication of the report of the UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (the HIPPO report), the African Union and the UN have continued to strengthen their partnership.¹ For example, the UN Security Council stressed the role of the African Union in post-conflict peacebuilding in its resolution on the Advisory Group of Experts' Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture. More concretely, in a presidential statement

¹ United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, 'Identical letters dated 17 June 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council', A/70/95-S/2015/446, 17 June 2015.

Table 5.1. Number of peace operations and personnel deployed, by region and type of organization, 2016

| Conducting organization | Africa | Americas | Asia and Oceania | Europe | Middle East | World |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|
| Operations | 26 | 3 | 7 | 18 | 8 | 62 |
| United Nations ^a | 12 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 22 |
| Regional organization or alliance | 12 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 31 |
| Ad hoc coalition | 2 | – | 3 | 2 | 2 | 9 |
| Personnel | 110 957 | 5 409 | 13 939 | 8 835 | 13 916 | 153 056 |
| United Nations ^a | 86 987 | 5 386 | 354 | 1 096 | 12 411 | 106 234 |
| Regional organization or alliance | 23 537 | 23 | 13 435 | 6 589 | 62 | 43 646 |
| Ad hoc coalition | 433 | – | 150 | 1 150 | 1 443 | 3 176 |

^a United Nations figures include peace operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

the UN Security Council welcomed the UN–AU partnership and recognized that the success of peace operations increasingly depends on strong collaboration between both organizations. In a resolution on the UN–AU partnership specifically, the UN Security Council stressed the need for predictable, sustainable and flexible financing of the AU-led peace support operations it has authorized. However, it also reiterated that in the end it is the AU that is responsible for securing all the necessary resources. In an important step, the Security Council welcomed the decision of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government to increase AU funding for all AU peace support operations to 25 per cent by 2020. In order to do so, the AU Assembly has instituted a 0.2 per cent import tax on ‘eligible’ imports into the continent. This measure is part of the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) roadmap for 2016–20, which maps out the steps required by the AU Commission and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms to make APSA fully operational.²

West Africa

In West Africa the general trend in peace operations is for relatively successful missions to be moving towards exit strategies and mission closure. On

² United Nations Security Council Resolution 2282, 27 Apr. 2016; United Nations, Security Council, Presidential Statement 8, 24 May 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2320, 18 Nov. 2016; AU Assembly, Decision on the outcome of the retreat of the Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec. 605 (XXVII), 27th ordinary session, Kigali, 27–28 July 2016; and AU Commission, African Peace and Security Architecture, APSA road map 2016–20, Dec. 2015.




Figure 5.6. Number of multilateral peace operations, by region, 2007–16

20 January 2016, following successful presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire in 2015, and in line with the UN Secretary-General's recommendations, the UN Security Council decreased the authorized ceiling for the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) military component from 5437 to 4000 military personnel. Three months later the Security Council renewed UNOCI's mandate for a final period until 30 June 2017. For the remaining period the operation will follow the Secretary-General's phased withdrawal plan and focus on the most crucial tasks to consolidate its efforts since 2004: protection of civilians; political support; support to security institutions and on border-related challenges; support for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law; and support for humanitarian assistance. The military component will continue to focus on high-risk areas, especially in the west of the country. For the final two months of the mission a minimum number of personnel will remain to finalize the process of transition to the UN Country Team.³

The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) also continued its drawdown. Following the successful completion of the transfer of security responsibilities to the government of Liberia on 30 June 2016, the Security Council reduced UNMIL's authorized troops ceiling by the end of February 2017 from 1240 to 434 military personnel and its police component from 606 to 310 police personnel. UNMIL's mandate was adjusted in line with the presidential and

³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2260, 20 Jan. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2284, 28 Apr. 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, S/2016/297, 31 Mar. 2016.




Figure 5.7. Number of personnel in multilateral peace operations, by region, 2007–16

legislative elections scheduled for October 2017 and the expected transfer of power in 2018. Its mandate now includes: the protection of civilians; reform of justice and security institutions; human rights promotion and protection; and, when requested and within its capabilities, logistical assistance with the electoral process. Its mandate will end on 30 March 2018 and all personnel not required for mission liquidation will be withdrawn one month later. Its human rights, rule of law, national reconciliation and security sector reform tasks will be transferred to the UN Country Team.⁴

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) maintained its Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB), despite initial uncertainty about whether it would be able to continue its deployment. The leaders of ECOWAS had signalled that the organization and its members would not be able to extend the mandate of ECOMIB beyond mid-2016 for financial reasons. Following a last-minute financial injection by the European Union (EU), the ECOWAS member states decided to extend the mission for another year, until 30 June 2017. In December 2016 they confirmed that this would be ECOMIB's last extension and authorized ECOWAS to commence a gradual withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau in the first quarter of 2017.⁵

⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2333, 23 Dec. 2016.

⁵ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Final Communique of the 50th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Government, 17 Dec. 2016.

The Sahel region

The Sahel region is one of the hot spots where a variety of international organizations have different peace operations deployed. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is the main UN operation in the Sahel region. As the main UN operations in West Africa are closing, in the context of inter-mission coordination, the UN Security Council has transferred UNOCI's quick reaction forces, as well as the aviation unit that supports it, to MINUSMA in order to support both MINUSMA and UNMIL after UNOCI's closure. However, the continuing lack of key capabilities remains a serious challenge for MINUSMA, particularly as it is operating in a complex security environment and facing asymmetric threats. As a result of increased inter-communal violence and terrorist attacks in central Mali, MINUSMA's mandate was expanded from northern Mali to include the centre of the country. The Security Council increased MINUSMA's authorized force levels from 11 240 to 13 289 military personnel and from 1440 to 1920 police personnel. In order to reach full operational capability, the Council requested the UN Secretary-General to speed up force generation, while troop and police contributing countries were asked to speed up the procurement and deployment to Mali of the required equipment, as well as the personnel trained to use it.⁶

MINUSMA's strategic focus remains implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, between the government and the two coalitions of non-state armed groups (the Coordination of Azawad Movements and the Platform), and in particular the restoration and expansion of state authority.⁷ In order to address the limited support among the local population, the Council strengthened MINUSMA's mandate to include developing an effective communication strategy and setting up MINUSMA Radio in the hope that this would increase awareness and understanding of its mandate and activities. However, the main shift in MINUSMA's renewed mandate was the additional attention paid to countering asymmetric threats to the safety and security of its personnel. The Security Council requested MINUSMA to move to a more proactive and robust posture. It also asked the Secretary-General and the UN member states to improve MINUSMA's intelligence capacity, training and equipment to counter explosive devices, military capabilities to protect its logistical supply lines, casualty and medical evacuation capabilities, and safety and security facilities and arrangements.⁸

⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2295, 29 June 2016.

⁷ On the peace agreement in Mali see Sköns, E. and Nyirabikali, G., 'The implementation of the peace process in Mali: a complex case of peacebuilding', *SIPRI Yearbook 2016*, pp. 159–188.

⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2295, 29 June 2016.

After the renewal of MINUSMA's mandate the situation in northern Mali remained fragile. The Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali continued to be frequently violated by the Coordination of Azawad Movements and the Platform. The interim administration in the north of Mali was delayed, terrorist and criminal activities expanded into central and southern Mali and inter-communal violence intensified in central Mali. In response to the continuing instability, the AU Peace and Security Council considered sending an AU intervention force to fight jihadist groups as part of MINUSMA, comparable to the Force Intervention Brigade in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).⁹

At the same time the three EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in the Sahel (EUCAP Niger, EUCAP Mali and EUTM Mali) were seeking ways to further regionalize their approach, coordinated from Bamako in Mali, with the placement of liaisons in the capitals of the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) as a starting point.¹⁰ EUTM Mali's mandate was amended to move its training activities further north, to include Gao and Timbuktu and an added focus on working with the G5 Sahel partners to reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups.¹¹ In 2016 EUCAP Sahel Niger increasingly focused on assisting 'the Nigerien central and local authorities and security forces in developing policies, techniques and procedures to better control and fight irregular migration'.¹² In this context, the mission collects migration and trafficking data and informs, shelters and trains irregular migrants, while also facilitating their voluntary return to their countries of origin. The regional multi-purpose centre in Agadez, set up for this purpose, is seen as a pilot project.¹³

The Maghreb region

The conflicts in the Maghreb region do not yet appear to be ripe for resolution, which limits the potential role of the peace operations deployed.

Libya remained unstable in 2016.¹⁴ The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), signed at Skhirat, Morocco on 17 December 2015, formed the basis for the creation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the return of the

⁹ United Nations, Security Council, Presidential Statement 16, 3 Nov. 2016; and Institute for Security Studies, 'A new African force for Mali', Peace and Security Council Report, 5 Sep. 2016.

¹⁰ EU official 1, Interview with author, 23 Nov. 2016; and EU official 2, Interview with author, 23 Nov. 2016.

¹¹ Council Decision 2016/446/CFSP of 23 March 2016 amending and extending Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L78/74, 24 Mar. 2016.

¹² Council Decision 2016/1172/CFSP of 18 July 2016 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L193/106, 19 July 2016.

¹³ EU official 1, Interview with author, 23 Nov. 2016; and EU official 2, Interview with author, 23 Nov. 2016.

¹⁴ On the conflict in Libya see chapter 3, section I, in this volume.

UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to facilitate the peace process at the end of March 2016. The UN Security Council encouraged UNSMIL to establish a permanent presence and implement a mandate that included human rights monitoring, assistance with securing uncontrolled arms, support for key Libyan institutions and supporting the provision of essential services and humanitarian assistance. However, the relationship between the GNA and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives broke down again and the humanitarian situation deteriorated later in the year. On 13 December 2016 the Security Council extended UNSMIL's mandate until 15 September 2017 and expanded its tasks to include good offices and mediation to support the implementation of the LPA, as well as consolidation of the GNA and the subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process.¹⁵

In February 2016, the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) was transformed into a planning mission. As of August 2016 it was planning for a possible future EU mission to provide advice and capacity building for the Libyan Government on police and criminal justice, including counterterrorism and border management.¹⁶

During a visit by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to Western Sahara, the Government of Morocco took offence at the Secretary-General's use of the term 'occupation' to describe Morocco's presence there. In response, it took measures that included the expulsion of most of the civilian component of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which affected its ability to fully implement its mandate. The UN Secretary-General wanted the Security Council to take a stance but in an attempt to avoid controversy, the Council chose the lowest level of response, merely expressing its 'concern'. It also extended MINURSO's mandate until 30 April 2017. Some of the civilian personnel were allowed to return and more have reportedly followed. Tensions between Moroccan forces and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, POLISARIO) continued throughout the rest of the year.¹⁷

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2291, 13 June 2016; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2323, 13 Dec. 2016.

¹⁶ EU, EEAS, Common Security and Defence Policy: EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), updated Nov. 2016; Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Libya, 18 Apr. 2016, Press release 193/16, 18 Apr. 2016; Council Decision 2016/207/CFSP of 15 February 2016 amending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L39/45, 16 Feb. 2016; and EU Member state official 2, Written interview with author, 13 Jan. 2017.

¹⁷ United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, S/2016/355, 19 Apr. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2285, 29 Apr. 2016; France24, 'UN Council wants Western Sahara mission fully restored', 23 Mar. 2016; What's in Blue, 'Council discussions on Western Sahara', 26 Mar. 2016; What's in Blue, 'Western Sahara: Arria-formula meeting, consultations and MINURSO adoption', 26 Apr. 2016; What's in Blue, 'Western Sahara consultations and update on return of civilian staff to the mission', 25 July 2016; and What's in Blue, 'Western Sahara consultations', 9 Sep 2016.

Somalia

Somalia is still an extremely challenging mission environment. A new nadir was an attack by the Islamist group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahedin Youth Movement, or al-Shabab) on an AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base outside the southern Somali town of el-Ade. Al-Shabab claimed to have killed more than 100 Kenyan soldiers in the attack. This was the third time in seven months that an AU forward operating base had been overrun.¹⁸

In this difficult and often perilous context, AMISOM continued to lack some of the equipment and a number of the specialized units it required, most notably an appropriate aviation component. At the same time, the EU reduced the allowances of AMISOM's uniformed personnel by 20 per cent and the troop contributing countries became worried about AMISOM's funding. A number even threatened to withdraw forces from the operation over what they considered insufficient international support.¹⁹

In its long-term strategy, the AU Commission expressed its intention to prioritize territorial recovery and consolidation by AMISOM and Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) until October 2018, and subsequently to transfer security responsibilities to the SNSF and withdraw by December 2020.²⁰

South Sudan and Sudan

South Sudan and Sudan were also troubled mission areas, a situation exacerbated by difficult relationships with the host governments.

The war in South Sudan erupted once again following intense fighting in Juba on 8–11 July 2016, when civilians and UN personnel and premises also came under attack, including the Protection of Civilians (POC) sites (see section III). In the midst of this chaos, UNMISS removed its non-critical staff. Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom also evacuated their police personnel without consultation with the mission, which led to criticism from UN officials.²¹ Following the July events, assaults on civilians became more frequent and UN personnel were increasingly the target of attacks,

¹⁸ BBC News, 'Al-Shabab seizes African Union base in Somalia', 15 Jan. 2016; and Williams, P., 'Three things we learned from last week's al-Shabaab attack in Somalia', *Washington Post*, 19 Jan. 2016.

¹⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2297, 7 July 2016; What's in Blue, 'Somalia: briefing and possible press statement', 27 Jan. 2016; What's in Blue, 'Somalia: adoption of resolution extending UN assistance mission', 23 Mar. 2016; and Williams, P. D., 'Paying for AMISOM: are politics and bureaucracy undermining the AU's largest peace operation?', IPI Global Observatory, 11 Jan. 2017.

²⁰ African Union, Peace and Security Council, 608th Meeting, Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (DCVIII), 29 June 2016.

²¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2304, 12 Aug. 2016; Nichols, M., 'United Nations to move non-critical staff out of South Sudan', Reuters, 14 July 2016; and Agence France-Presse, 'UN angry over European pullout of police from South Sudan', *The Guardian*, 21 July 2016.

detention and kidnappings, and even of killings. The Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan (TGONU) also continued to obstruct UNMISS.²²

In response to the deteriorating situation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development plus heads of state and government (IGAD Plus) issued a protocol on the deployment of a regional protection force (RPF) within the framework of UNMISS. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government endorsed this decision to reinforce UNMISS and the TGONU gave its consent in principle. In the following days, however, Juba sent out mixed messages, at times claiming that its sovereignty was being threatened.²³

On 12 August 2016 the UN Security Council decided to increase the force level of UNMISS by 4000 personnel intended for an RPF, up to a ceiling of 17 000 military personnel. In order to contribute to the safety and security of the people of South Sudan, and create an enabling environment for the implementation of the peace agreement, the RPF was mandated, under the UNMISS command and control structure, to use all necessary means to: (a) facilitate safe and free movement into, out of and around Juba; (b) protect the airport and key facilities in Juba essential to the well-being of the population; and (c) engage any actor preparing attacks or engaged in attacks against civilians or the UN. Although in principle based in Juba, if required the RPF would be allowed to operate outside the capital. At the same time, the Security Council increased pressure on the TGONU to cooperate with the RPF by threatening measures, including an arms embargo, in case of any impediments. The TGONU softened its tone but in spite of a joint communiqué in which it accepted the RPF, it continued to throw up obstacles and caveats, such as objections to troops from neighbouring states.²⁴

In early November, following the dismissal of the Kenyan UNMISS Force Commander over the mission's inability to protect civilians during the July events (see section III), Kenya decided to withdraw most of its troops. This decision hit UNMISS hard, particularly as Kenya was one of the neighbouring countries willing to contribute to the RPF. The Secretary-General claimed that UNMISS would be in no position to deal with the 'very real risk of mass atrocities' in South Sudan. The AU and the UN considered

²² United Nations Security Council Resolution 2327, 16 Dec. 2016.

²³ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Communiqué of the heads of state and government of the IGAD Plus on the situation in the Republic of South Sudan, Kigali, 16 July 2016; AU Assembly, Decision on the situation in South Sudan, Assembly/AU/Dec. 613 (XXVII), 27th ordinary session, 27–28 July 2016, Kigali; IGAD, Communiqué of the Second IGAD Plus extraordinary summit on the situation in the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, 5 Aug. 2016; and Lynch, J., 'South Sudan rejects UN proposal to send more peacekeepers', Associated Press, 10 Aug. 2016.

²⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2304, 12 Aug. 2016; Dumo, D., 'South Sudan's president says will consider UN troops', Reuters, 15 Aug. 2016; Joint Communiqué by Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan and United Nations Security Council Members, Press release SC/12505-AFR/3445, 4 Sep. 2016; and What's in Blue, 'South Sudan consultations', 15 Oct. 2016.

an over-the-horizon force based outside the country that would be able to deploy quickly to the theatre when required. The TGONU eventually decided to accept the RPF without conditions in November 2016 following threats of additional sanctions. While this seemed to end the deadlock over the RPF's mandate, there were few signs of any progress with the actual deployment of the RPF by the end of the year.²⁵

As part of the UN Security Council's mid-December annual mandate renewal, the authorized police personnel level for UNMISS was increased by 100 to 2101. The mandate remained largely the same, but additional attention was given to deterring and preventing sexual and gender-based violence in areas of deployment as well as monitoring, investigating and reporting hate speech. The Security Council stressed that the UN Secretary-General must prioritize the complete deployment of UNMISS up to its authorized troop and police levels, including tactical military helicopters, unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles and the required enablers for the RPF.²⁶

Meanwhile, in Sudan, despite the persistent lack of cooperation from the Sudanese Government, and the UN Security Council's continued emphasis on the need for an exit strategy, UNAMID's mandate was renewed without any major changes.²⁷

Democratic Republic of the Congo

This situation in the DRC remained precarious in 2016. There were reports of increased violations of international humanitarian law and human rights by the Armed Forces of the DRC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC). The security situation in eastern DRC appeared to deteriorate due to increased activity by armed groups. At the same time, political tensions increased and escalated in mid-September in the run up to the presidential and legislative elections. These elections had been scheduled for November 2016 but in the end were postponed until 2018. This meant that President Joseph Kabila remained in power after his constitutionally mandated term expired on 19 December. MONUSCO also struggled to find a solution for some 750 Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) fighters, who had fled into the DRC and were perceived by the DRC Government as a risk to stability in the Kivu provinces.²⁸

²⁵ Reuters, 'Kenya withdraws first batch of troops from UN South Sudan mission', 9 Nov 2016; *The Guardian*, "'Very real risk" of South Sudan atrocities, UN secretary general warns', Agence France-Press, 16 Nov. 2016; Lynch, J., 'South Sudan accepts more UN peacekeepers with no conditions', Associated Press, 26 Nov. 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 16 December 2016 to 1 March 2017)', S/2017/224, 16 Mar. 2017.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2327, 16 Dec. 2016.

²⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2296, 29 June 2016.

²⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2277, 30 Mar. 2016; What's in Blue, 'Renewal of UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', 29 Mar. 2016; *The Guardian*, 'DRC elections put

In early 2016, the collaboration resumed between the FARDC and MONUSCO against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, FDLR) and other armed groups. Cooperation had been suspended in February 2015 after two DRC generals suspected of human rights violations were appointed to lead the operations.²⁹

The Government of the DRC pushed for an exit strategy and a halving of MONUSCO's force strength at the end of 2015. Given the situation in the country, however, and because some Security Council members cautioned against setting a possible precedent by allowing host states to dictate the terms of peace operations, the UN Security Council rejected the government's views on MONUSCO's March mandate renewal. In spite of the Secretary-General's recommendation that the force should be reduced by 1700 troops, the authorized strength remained at 19 815 military personnel. An earlier troop reduction of 2000 may become permanent, however, through a revised authorized troop ceiling, but this is dependent on a further improvement in the situation.³⁰

The EU concluded its last remaining operation in the DRC, the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), in June 2016. The EU has deployed multiple operations in the DRC since 2003, but had scaled down its presence in the country significantly in recent years to just 10 international staff. EUSEC RD Congo had been deployed since 2005.³¹ The closure of EUSEC RD Congo did not receive any formal attention from the EU's public relations channels, despite the fact that it had been one of the lengthiest missions it had conducted and constituted the end of a long period of active EU support for the reform of the DRC's security sector. This quiet exit is illustrative of the EU's shifting geographic focus in Africa, which in recent years has been primarily concentrated in the Sahel, the CAR and the Southern Mediterranean region.

Central African Republic

The humanitarian and security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) remains dire. There was an improvement at the beginning of 2016, but it deteriorated in the autumn and remained fragile due to the presence of armed groups and rebels and the weakness of the national security forces.

back to 2018, as opposition calls strike in protest', Reuters, 16 Oct. 2016; and Reuters, 'UN chief seeks Security Council help with South Sudan rebels in Congo', 27 Oct. 2016.

²⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2277, 30 Mar. 2016; and United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement 18, 5 Dec. 2016.

³⁰ United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 16 December 2015 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2015/983, 16 Dec. 2015; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2277, 30 Mar. 2016; and What's in Blue, 'Renewal of UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', 29 Mar. 2016.

³¹ European External Action Service, 'EU military staff', *Impetus*, no. 21 (Apr. 2016).

The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) continued to be the target of attacks. In spite of the existence of a strategic review of MINUSCA, the UN Security Council did not change its authorized strength and composition in 2016, except for an additional 68 corrections officers to support the CAR prison system agreed before the review. Some members of the UN Security Council wanted MINUSCA's intelligence capacity to be increased. Resistance from at least one member of the Council, however, led to the language 'timely, reliable and actionable information on threats to civilians and the analytical tools to use it' being adopted instead. The number of deployed MINUSCA personnel increased in 2016, but the police component, including specialized police teams, in particular was still not at full capacity and not yet fully deployed throughout the country by the end of the year. However, the troop and police contributing countries that were already deployed in the International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) increasingly met UN standards.³²

Two other peace operations that were active in the CAR in 2016 terminated before the end of the year. The EU concluded the EU Military Advisory Mission to the CAR (EUMAM RCA) in July, but continued its efforts to build the capacity of the CAR Armed Forces through a newly established follow-up operation. The EU Training Mission in the CAR (EUTM RCA) is larger than its predecessor. It is mandated to provide operational training to the CAR Armed Forces, in a similar way to the EU military training missions working in Somalia and Mali since 2010 and 2013, respectively.³³ Later in 2016, France formally concluded its military operation, Operation Sangaris, which had been active in the CAR since the start of armed conflict in December 2013.³⁴

The peace operations in the CAR, both UN and non-UN, continued to be plagued by allegations and reports of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). In January, less than one month after the Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the CAR had been highly critical of the way the UN had dealt with reports of SEA by non-UN peace operations personnel in MISCA and Operation Sangaris, MINUSCA announced that it was investigating new accusations of SEA by its own personnel. A few days later the DRC contingent, which had allegedly been involved in SEA in 2015, was repatriated because it did not meet UN standards 'in terms of equipment, vetting and preparedness'. The mission

³² United Nations Security Council Resolution 2264, 9 Feb. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2281, 26 Apr. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2301, 26 July 2016; What's in Blue, 'Meeting on the Policy Framework on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping Operations', 26 July 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, Presidential statement 17, 16 Nov. 2016.

³³ Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 of 19 Apr. 2016 on a European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L104/21, 20 Apr. 2016.

³⁴ BBC News, 'France ends Sangaris military operation in CAR', 31 Oct. 2016.

continued to be plagued throughout the year by allegations of SEA by perpetrators from a variety of troop contributing countries. MINUSCA was also specifically mentioned in the UN Security Council resolution on SEA. MINUSCA concluded, however, that some of the allegations had been fabricated by people seeking financial compensation.³⁵

Burundi

When in 2015 the AU Peace and Security Council decided to establish a 5000-strong force—the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU)—to prevent further escalation of the crisis there and to protect civilians, it recommended that in the absence of Burundian Government approval, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government should invoke article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act. This provision allows the AU to intervene in member states without their prior consent in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Burundi remained firmly opposed, however, and the AU Assembly decided instead to shelve the plans.³⁶

The Burundian Government did accept an increase in the number of AU human rights observers and military experts from 100 to 200. However, the deployment of this AU Observer Mission to Burundi has yet to be formalized and a memorandum of understanding between the AU and Burundi remained unsigned in 2016. In spite of this, and despite the financial and logistical constraints, some personnel were deployed and by the end of 2016 the mission consisted of 56 personnel. The UN supported the AU in a number of ways, including financial support for the human rights monitors from the UN Peacebuilding Fund.³⁷

³⁵ Deschamps, M., Jallow, B. H. and Sooka, Y., *Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers*, Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic (United Nations, DPKO: New York, 15 Dec. 2015); Charbonneau, L., 'Fresh sex abuse charges against UN forces in Central Africa', Reuters, 5 Jan. 2016; United Nations, 'New allegations of sexual abuse emerge against UN peacekeepers in Central African Republic', Press release, 4 Feb. 2016; Agence France-Presse, 'UN pulls DR Congo troops from C. Africa mission', 8 Jan. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2272, 11 Mar. 2016; and Reuters, 'UN memo casts doubt on some Central African sex abuse accusations', 11 Oct. 2016. See also chapter 6, section III, in this volume.

³⁶ African Union, Peace and Security Council, 565th Meeting, Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (DLXV), 17 Dec. 2015; Nkundikije, F., 'AU summit decision on Burundi peacekeepers pleases govt, not opposition', Voice of America, 1 Feb. 2016; McCormick, T., 'The Burundi intervention that wasn't', *Foreign Policy*, 2 Feb. 2016; and Williams, P., 'Special Report, Part 2: The AU's less coercive diplomacy on Burundi', IPI Global Observatory, 16 Feb. 2016.

³⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2279, 1 Apr. 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 19 September 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2016/799, 20 Sep. 2016. Given that the AU human rights monitors and military advisers have been deployed even in the absence of agreement on the memorandum of understanding, and that by 31 December 2015 the mission had deployed 10 personnel, SIPRI considers it retroactively to have been a mission since 2015.

The UN Security Council, concerned over the limited progress in deploying the AU human rights monitors and military experts and in the absence of MAPROBU, decided to add to the diplomatic pressure on the Burundi Government by asking the UN Secretary-General to investigate deploying a UN police contribution to the country. The UN Secretary-General developed three options: (a) a UN police protection and monitoring presence of about 3000 personnel; (b) a UN police monitoring presence of 228 personnel; and (c) a UN police assessment presence of 20 to 50 personnel. The Government of Burundi consented to the deployment of 50 UN police officers. The Burundian opposition, however, was disappointed as it had hoped for peacekeepers. On 29 July the UN Security Council requested that the UN Secretary-General establish the UN police component in Burundi, with an authorized ceiling of 228 police officers, to be deployed throughout Burundi for an initial period of one year. The component was mandated to monitor the security situation and support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in monitoring human rights. The Burundian Government subsequently rejected the deployment of the mission.³⁸

The Americas

There were three peace operations in the Americas in 2016 (one more than in 2015). Together, they deployed 5409 personnel. The number of personnel deployed in peace operations in the region increased by 232 during the year due to the establishment of the UN Mission in Colombia. The other two operations that were active in the region—the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—maintained approximately their existing personnel strength. MAPP/OEA is a small civilian mission led by the OAS that has been active in Colombia since 2004.

In spite of the progress made, the Haitian National Police remain operationally dependent on MINUSTAH. Moreover, MINUSTAH required extra capacity during the postponed presidential election in November 2016 and its aftermath. The UN Security Council therefore extended the mission's mandate for another year in October, but with unchanged authorized personnel levels, delaying the further drawdown. The most notable development regarding MINUSTAH, however, was the UN's admission that the mission had been involved in the initial outbreak of the cholera epidemic

³⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2279, 1 Apr. 2016; Reuters, 'Burundi says "fine" with request for UN police deployment', 2 Apr. 2016; United Nations, Security Council, 'Letter dated 15 April 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council', S/2016/352, 19 Apr. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2303, 29 July 2016; and United Nations (note 37).

in 2010, which killed thousands of Haitians. A report to the UN stated that the epidemic ‘would not have broken out but for the actions of the United Nations’.³⁹ The UN Secretary-General apologized to the Haitian population for not having done enough, but stopped short of saying that the UN caused the epidemic and maintained the legal position that the UN is immune from any legal action. Nonetheless, the UN has intensified its activities to control and eliminate the epidemic.⁴⁰

Following the progress made in the Colombian peace process between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP), the Colombian Government asked the UN to establish a special political mission as the international component of the tripartite mechanism for monitoring and verification of the peace agreement and the cessation of hostilities.⁴¹ It requested that the observers come from member countries of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. The UN Security Council responded promptly to establish within one week the UN Mission in Colombia, which consists of unarmed observers who will monitor the Final Peace Agreement for an initial 12-month period. The mission is mandated to consist of about 450 observers and a number of civilians. After the peace agreement was rejected in a referendum, the mission continued to monitor the ceasefire until and beyond ratification of the renegotiated peace agreement at the end of November.⁴²

Asia and Oceania

The seven peace operations located in Asia and Oceania in 2016 (the same number as in 2015) deployed 13 939 personnel—a slight increase on the 13 658 personnel deployed in 2015. Afghanistan hosted three peace operations in 2016. The other peace operations in the region were located in Kashmir, South Korea (on the southern part of the Demilitarized Zone with North Korea), the Philippines (on the island of Mindanao) and the Solomon Islands. These four operations—the United Nations Military Observer Group in

³⁹ Katz, J., ‘UN admits role in cholera epidemic in Haiti’, *New York Times*, 17 Aug. 2016.

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2313, 13 Oct. 2016; Katz (note 39); Pilkington, E. and Quinn, B., ‘UN admits for first time that peacekeepers brought cholera to Haiti’, *The Guardian*, 1 Dec. 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2016/753, 31 Aug. 2016.

⁴¹ On the peace agreement in Colombia see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.

⁴² United Nations, Security Council, ‘Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council’, S/2016/53, 22 Jan. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2261, 25 Jan. 2016; United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the United Nations Mission in Colombia, S/2016/729, 18 Aug. 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2307, 23 Sep. 2016; and United Nations, Security Council, Press statement on Colombia’s Peace Agreement, Press release SC/12606, 1 Dec. 2016.

India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)—are all relatively small and have all been operational for more than 10 years (IMT and RAMSI), or even several decades (UNMOGIP and the NNSC). RAMSI is scheduled to terminate in 2017.

The three operations in Afghanistan were the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), EUPOL Afghanistan and the RSM. EUPOL Afghanistan, which had been active in the country since 2007, completed its final mandate on 31 December 2016 and terminated as planned. The mission aimed to contribute to the development of Afghan civilian policing capacity and institutional reform of Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior. Although the EU made modest claims about the 'concrete progress' achieved in these areas, EUPOL Afghanistan faced many challenges in delivering its mandate, including low levels of literacy among Afghan police and the pervasive corruption in Afghan institutions. Moreover, since the Afghan Government assumed full responsibility for the country's security in 2015, the Afghan National Police force has been increasingly involved in fighting insurgents rather than civilian policing.⁴³

The NATO-led RSM remained the largest operation in the region by a large margin, with 13 332 personnel. It maintained its original force strength and composition, in spite of initial indications that NATO would reduce its footprint towards the end of the year and uncertainty about its role in Afghanistan beyond 2016. The formal decision to extend the RSM into 2017 was made at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016.⁴⁴ Ahead of the meeting, the then-US president, Barack Obama, announced that instead of reducing the number of US troops in Afghanistan from 9800 to 5500 by the end of 2016, as initially planned, the USA would maintain about 8400 troops in Afghanistan in 2017.⁴⁵ Under the revised plan the USA would continue to contribute approximately 7000 troops to the RSM, while the remainder would be deployed in Afghanistan within the framework of the USA's parallel counterterrorism operation.⁴⁶

⁴³ Wellmann, P. W., 'EU police mission in Afghanistan to end: police more involved in fighting than policing', *Stars and Stripes*, 29 Dec. 2016.

⁴⁴ NATO, Warsaw Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, 9 July 2016.

⁴⁵ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Afghanistan, 6 July 2016.

⁴⁶ United States Department of Defense (DOD), *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress (US DOD: Washington, DC, Dec. 2016).

Europe

The 18 peace operations active in Europe in 2016—the same number as in 2015—deployed 8835 personnel. Personnel deployments in Europe decreased by 8.4 per cent compared to the previous year, when the same operations deployed 9644 personnel. Except for the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), all the other peace operations in Europe were active in the countries of the former-Yugoslavia or the former-Soviet Union. Apart from the three operations established following the outbreak of armed conflict in Ukraine in 2014, all the operations in Europe have been active for a relatively long period.

The decrease in personnel deployments in operations in Europe resulted primarily from further personnel reductions in the operations in Kosovo. The number of personnel deployed in the NATO-led KFOR decreased by 320, but at 4289 personnel KFOR remained the largest operation in the region. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), once the largest civilian peace operation in Europe, further decreased its number of personnel from 731 to 411.

As part of the positive momentum in the peace process in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders decided to establish two new crossing points. While civilian use of the buffer zone grew, this also meant that criminal activities flourished. Consequently, the burden of monitoring the buffer zone and the new crossings, as well as supporting the negotiations and assisting with confidence-building measures, increased for UNFICYP. Given this new operational context, the UN Security Council authorized an increase in UNFICYP's force level from 860 troops to 888.⁴⁷

In Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) SMM and the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) both added some staff to their missions (41 and 32, respectively). With 779 personnel, the OSCE SMM remained the largest operation in Ukraine, the largest OSCE mission and the largest civilian mission in Europe. Amid increasing numbers of reported ceasefire violations in eastern Ukraine, the civilian and unarmed OSCE monitors continued to be subject to harassment, intimidation and obstructions to their freedom of movement by eastern Ukrainian separatist combatants, and were even directly fired at.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the Government of Ukraine continued to call for enhancements to existing peace operations or the establishment of new peace operations in the country. In October,

⁴⁷ United Nations, Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, S/2016/11, 6 Jan. 2016; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2263, 28 Jan. 2016.

⁴⁸ E.g. OSCE, 'Chief of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine concerned by increased violence, calls for a sustained ceasefire', 7 Apr. 2016; and OSCE, Secretary General Lamberto Zannier, Report to the Ministerial Council, MC.GAL/9/16, 8 Dec. 2016.

the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko claimed that the members of the Normandy Format (representatives of the French, German, Russian and Ukrainian governments) had agreed to deploy an armed OSCE police mission to eastern Ukraine. However, neither the OSCE nor any of the other members of the Normandy Format have confirmed that this is the case. Given Russian resistance to the establishment of a more robust operation in Ukraine, as well as the civilian nature of OSCE field missions and its lack of experience in deploying large numbers of armed police personnel, any agreement to this end seems unlikely.⁴⁹

The Middle East

The eight peace operations located in the Middle East in 2016 (the same number as in 2015) deployed 13 916 personnel. This was a slight decrease compared to the previous year, when the same operations deployed 14 279 personnel. This decrease was the result of a reconfiguration of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which has been active in the Sinai Peninsula since 1982. As a result of the reconfiguration process, which commenced in mid-2016, the force strength of the MFO decreased by 387 to 1383 personnel.

Despite continued fighting in the area of separation between Israel and Syria, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) returned incrementally to previously vacated positions, starting with Camp Faouar on the eastern border of the buffer zone (the bravo side). Since the closure for security reasons of the Quneitra crossing in 2014, temporary alternatives have been needed to allow UNDOF personnel passage between the western (alpha) and bravo sides until the crossing is reopened. Temporary procedures and a crossing to be used *in extremis* were established in the second half of 2016.⁵⁰

In 2016, at the request of the UN Security Council, UN plans for a potential role in monitoring, verification and reporting on any ceasefire agreement in Syria became more concrete.⁵¹ The UN Secretary-General envisaged physical monitoring and verification at the local and national levels, and possibly also at the provincial level. All levels would require a dispute resolution mechanism for managing ceasefire violations. Independent information resources, such as satellite imagery, could complement on-the-ground monitoring. Given the currently highly volatile and violent operating environment, deployment of UN monitors in the field was considered extremely

⁴⁹ Voice of America, 'Agreement to send armed European police force to eastern Ukraine', 19 Oct. 2016. On the conflict and crisis management in Ukraine see chapter 4, sections I and II, in this volume.

⁵⁰ United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 30 Aug. to 17 Nov. 2016, S/201/6930, 7 Dec. 2016.

⁵¹ On the conflict in Syria see chapter 3, sections I and II, in this volume.

difficult. The UN Secretary-General presented a spectrum of options: (a) monitoring by local Syrian parties (the government, non-state armed opposition groups and civil society); (b) physical monitoring by local parties with indirect or remote international assistance; (c) direct physical monitoring by international parties, such as member states, organizations or groups; and (d) direct physical monitoring by the United Nations. Depending on the security and political situation, these options could be applied together or in sequence.⁵²

In 2016, in spite of a number of temporary truces, no UN observer role followed. As the battle over rebel-held eastern Aleppo escalated, France and Spain circulated a draft resolution in the UN Security Council that included a request to the UN Secretary-General to provide options for monitoring a ceasefire. However, Russia objected to any such monitoring mechanism. Nonetheless, although not a peace operation, the Security Council mandated the UN and other relevant institutions to carry out adequate, neutral monitoring and direct observation of the evacuations from eastern Aleppo to other districts of the city.⁵³

⁵² United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, 18 Dec. 2015; and United Nations, Security Council, 'Letter dated 17 February 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council', S/2016/152, 17 Feb. 2016.

⁵³ What's in Blue, 'Syria: vote on a resolution demanding an end to military flights over Aleppo', 7 Oct. 2016; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2328, 19 Dec. 2016.