I. Global trends in peace operations

TIMO SMIT

Multilateral peace operations in 2016

Various multilateral actors—the United Nations, regional organizations and alliances, and ad hoc coalitions of states—conducted 62 multilateral peace operations in 2016. There were two new missions but the total number of operations decreased by one compared to 2015 due to the closure of three missions in 2015. Following a peak in missions at 64 in 2014, 2016 was the second year in a row that the total number of peace operations decreased (see figure 5.1).

The two new peace operations in 2016 were the UN Mission in Colombia and the European Union (EU) Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) (EUTM RCA). Four peace operations terminated during 2016: the EU Military Advisory Mission in the CAR (EUMAM RCA); France’s Operation Sangaris, also in the CAR; the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo); and the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan. The two new operations in 2016 did not result in any new mission areas. Prior to the deployment of the UN mission, Colombia was already hosting a small mission of the Organization of American States (OAS). The CAR was host to five different peace operations in 2016 (see section IV).

The 62 missions that were active in 2016 together deployed 153,056 personnel. This is a 6 per cent decrease compared to the 162,703 personnel deployed in total in 2015. Personnel deployments decreased in both UN and non-UN peace operations, by 7426 and 2221 respectively (see below). Like 2015, eight operations deployed more than 10,000 personnel in 2016 (see figure 5.2). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) retained its...
position as the world’s largest peace operation (see section IV). Compared to 2015, the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan surpassed the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) to become the fifth largest operation. There were no other changes in the number of operations with more than 10,000 personnel, or in their ranking in terms of personnel strength. Taken together, the eight largest operations accounted for 80 per cent of all personnel deployed in peace operations in 2016.

**Trends in personnel deployments**

Some of the notable existing trends in aggregate personnel deployments were confirmed in 2016, whereas other were reversed. The decreases in the number of personnel deployed in all peace operations (UN and non-UN) and in non-UN peace operations were continuations of downward trends that began in 2012 (see figure 5.3). The steady decline in personnel deployments globally appeared to have come to a halt in 2015, but resumed its downward trend in 2016. Personnel deployments in non-UN operations decreased for the sixth year in a row; and the number of personnel deployed in each category reached its lowest level since 2005.

It should be noted, however, that the annual totals described here include the forces that were part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its follow-up RSM in Afghanistan. In terms of personnel volumes, ISAF was a clear outlier between 2006 and 2014, and almost entirely responsible for the significant year-to-year differences in aggregate
personnel deployments reported in this period. This obscured an important underlying trend: that the number of personnel deployed in all peace operations except ISAF and the RSM had been increasing quite significantly since 2012—the year ISAF commenced its gradual withdrawal. This was clearly not the case in 2016. While the number of personnel in the RSM remained stable, the combined number of personnel in all other operations decreased by a little over 10,000.

The decrease in the number of personnel in UN peace operations in 2016 constitutes another significant break with the recent past. Prior to 2016, personnel deployments in UN operations had increased for three consecutive years and reached an all-time high in 2015. By 2016, however, most of the UN operations that had been gradually building up their numbers were at approximately their authorized strength, while the phased withdrawal of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in particular, resulted in a significant decrease in the overall level of deployment by the UN.
The UN remained the dominant actor in multilateral peace operations in 2016. As in previous years, it conducted the most peace operations and deployed far more personnel than any other organization or coalition (see figure 5.1). The UN led 22 peace operations in 2016—one more than in 2015. The new operation is the UN Mission in Colombia, which received and began to implement its first mandate in 2016. The UN conducted more than one-third of all the active peace operations in 2016. Together, the 22 UN operations fielded 106,234 personnel. Although the number of personnel in UN peace operations decreased by 7,426 compared to 2015, it still accounted for almost 70 per cent (69.4 per cent) of all personnel in peace operations.  

Meanwhile the process of reforming UN peace operations continued, based on the recommendations of the 2015 report by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (the HIPPO report). Although the UN did not formally report on the status of the implementation of the recommendations that were adopted, initial steps were taken to address most of the strategic and operational issues flagged by the report, such as, among other things, the need for deeper cooperation with the African Union (AU), phased and sequenced mandates for peacekeeping operations and strict

---

3 UN figures include UNAMID.
measures to prevent and punish sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN personnel (see below).\textsuperscript{4}

\textit{Regional organizations and alliances}

Thirty-one of the peace operations active in 2016 were conducted under the authority of regional organizations or alliances, most notably the AU, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (see figure 5.1).

The AU conducted four peace operations in 2016.\textsuperscript{5} It did not initiate or terminate any operations during the year. There were 22,004 personnel deployed in these four operations, nearly all in AMISOM. This made the AU the second largest contributor of personnel to peace operations after the UN for the third year in a row. Besides AMISOM, which has been active in Somalia since 2007, the AU maintained its political missions in Mali and the CAR, as well as its Observer Mission (consisting of military experts and human rights observers) in Burundi.

NATO led two operations in 2016 classified as multilateral peace operations, maintaining its longstanding presence in Kosovo and Afghanistan. By the end of the year these two operations—the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the RSM—consisted of 17,621 personnel. The extent to which NATO will continue to contribute to peace operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere is uncertain. Expeditionary crisis management operations were an import aspect of its strategic agenda after the end of the cold war, but in recent years instability on the borders of Europe and deteriorating relations with Russia have shifted NATO’s attention back to collective defence and deterrence.\textsuperscript{6}

The EU conducted 14 operations classified as multilateral peace operations in 2016, just as in 2015. The EU deployed 2,435 personnel, 796 fewer than in 2015. Three EU operations terminated during the year: EUSEC RD Congo ended in June, EUMAM RCA ended in July and EUPOL Afghanistan concluded its final mandate in December. Whereas EUMAM RCA only lasted for 16 months, EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL Afghanistan had been active since 2005 and 2007, respectively, making them one of the lengthiest missions that the EU has conducted in the framework of its Common Secu-


\textsuperscript{5} African Union figures do not include UNAMID. The AU Observer Mission in Burundi was not included as a new peace operation in 2015 in \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 2016} because of the absence of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the AU and Burundi regarding the legal status of the mission, and because it remained unclear whether the few observers that had deployed to Burundi had begun to implement the mandate. Although an MOU had still not been signed as of the end of 2016, the mission was operational during the year. Given the difficulty in assessing an exact start date of this mission, it is retroactively included as a peace operation since the deployment of the first AU human rights observers to Burundi in 2015.

\textsuperscript{6} On NATO see chapter 4, section I, in this volume.
Armed conflicts and conflict management, 2016

The EU launched one new peace operation in 2016, EUTM RCA, which succeeded EUMAM RCA. The new operation is modelled on similar EU military training missions in Somalia and Mali.

Like NATO, recent developments within the EU and in its extended neighbourhood have compelled it to rethink the strategic purpose of its external action, including its CSDP. In the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), published in June 2016, the EU reconfirmed its ambition to serve as an international security provider. Among its strategic priorities, the document states that the EU will take an ‘integrated approach to conflicts and crises’. This integrated approach is an expansion of the ‘comprehensive approach’ that the EU has previously applied to its crisis management and peacebuilding approaches, and involves, among other things, EU engagement at all stages of the conflict cycle. At the same time, however, the document narrows down the geographical scope of these efforts to Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa and the Sahel.

The OSCE conducted nine missions in 2016 that qualified as peace operations, the same number as in the previous year. The total number of personnel deployed in these missions, 1020, was also comparable to 2015. More than three-quarters (76.4 per cent) were deployed as part of the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the OAS conducted one peace operation each in 2016. ECOWAS maintained its

---

Figure 5.4. The top 10 contributors of military personnel and police to multilateral peace operations, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of military and police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>12000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

8 On security developments in the EU see chapter 4, section I, in this volume.
Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), which it deployed in 2012. The OAS continued its Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA).

Ad hoc coalitions of states

Finally, nine of the peace operations that were active in 2016 were led by various ad hoc coalitions of states. These operations were not conducted under the formal auspices of the UN or a regional organization or alliance, although the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has an important role in the Ceasefire and Transitional Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan. Together these nine operations consisted of 3176 personnel in 2016. This is a substantial decrease from the 4488 personnel deployed in operations led by ad hoc coalitions in 2015. This decrease resulted from the downscaling and subsequent closures, in 2015 and 2016, of the French operations Licorne and Sangaris, and from a reconfiguration of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula during 2016.

Troop and police contributions

Ethiopia maintained its position as the largest contributor of uniformed personnel to peace operations in 2016—by a large margin (see figure 5.4). Ethiopia deployed 12,618 military and police personnel: 4323 in AMISOM and 8295 in UN peacekeeping operations. Only 62 were police officers. The rest were military personnel. The fact that Ethiopia has become such a major troop contributor is clearly linked to its proximity to the countries where some of the largest peace operations are located. Indeed, in 2016 Ethiopia deployed nearly all of its personnel (99.9 per cent) to operations in neighbouring countries: the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and AMISOM.

The USA was the second largest contributor of uniformed personnel to peace operations in 2016 and the only Western country among the 10 largest contributors to multilateral peace operations. It deployed 8142 military and police personnel. Given its leadership role in NATO, it is not surprising that the USA was responsible for the largest troop contingents in the RSM and KFOR. It also remained the largest contributor to the MFO. The USA is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council among the top 10 contributors of military personnel and police to multilateral peace operations.

9 These numbers do not include the Ethiopian troops deployed on Somalian territory in support of AMISOM, but that were not part of the AU mission and did not operate under its command.
it is only a minor contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, however, contributing only 72 military personnel and police in 2016.\textsuperscript{10}

India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have a long tradition of being major contributors of troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations. While India contributed approximately the same number of uniformed personnel to peace operations in 2016 as it did in 2015, both Pakistan and Bangladesh decreased their military and police contributions during the year. As a result, Bangladesh dropped three positions in the ranking in 2016.

Uganda, Burundi and Kenya were major contributors to AMISOM, whereas Rwanda made all of its contributions to UN missions. Nepal contributed military and police personnel to 16 UN peace operations, most notably the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), UNMISS and the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

**Defining multilateral peace operations**

The global peace operations landscape has evolved over time to become more diverse. In particular, the range of tasks assigned to these operations has broadened and in an increasing number of cases includes activities beyond the objectives normally entrusted to peace operations—ranging from counterterrorism to assistance with border management to addressing irregular migration. Operations are therefore increasingly finding themselves in the ‘grey zone’ of what falls inside and outside the SIPRI definition of multilateral peace operations.

The SIPRI definition is relatively broad and inclusive in order to capture as many of these efforts as reasonably possible. The tasks performed by peace operations under this definition have included: (a) monitoring and observing ceasefire agreements; (b) serving as part of confidence-building measures; (c) protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (d) assisting with demobilization and reintegration processes; (e) strengthening institutional capacities in areas such as the judiciary, the rule of law and penal institutions; (f) policing and human rights; (g) electoral support; and (h) economic and social development.

In recent years, multilateral actors or ad hoc coalitions have deployed a number of, at times sizeable, operations that are clearly outside the scope of what constitutes a peace operation, according to the definition applied by SIPRI. The EU naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Sophia (1160 personnel in 2016), is a primary example of this, as it is not linked to

\textsuperscript{10} China was the largest contributor of uniformed personnel to UN peace operations among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in 2016, contributing 2630 military personnel and police. It was the 12th largest contributor of uniformed personnel to the UN and the 17th largest contributor to peace operations in general.
any peace process or peacebuilding effort, but aims to disrupt human trafficking across the Mediterranean Sea and prevent further loss of life. In other cases, however, it is more ambiguous whether an operation falls just within or outside the definition. The main examples of operations in this grey zone are those that are actively involved in combat. Due to the way in which they have been framed by the UN Security Council, and because they have been part of a larger stabilization effort on behalf of the international community, AMISOM and the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan are considered peace operations even though they have been actively involved in military counterinsurgency. On the other hand, the AU-authorized Regional Task Force (RTF) against the Lord’s Resistance Army (2489 personnel) and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram (10,619 personnel) are not regarded as peace operations. The decisive factor here is that they are counterinsurgency operations that are not clearly part of a UN Security Council framework that includes a peace process. There are similar considerations regarding the non-inclusion of military training efforts in Iraq within the framework of Operation Inherent Resolve (the US-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIS).

Fatalities among peace operations personnel

Several of the peace operations active in 2016 were operating in complex and volatile environments characterized by armed conflict and militant insurgency. In some countries, peace operations were directly targeted by armed non-state actors on multiple occasions. This has led to a notion in the media and among policymakers that peace operations have become more dangerous. Such arguments are often supported by statistics on the number of deaths among personnel in UN peacekeeping operations, especially those resulting from malicious acts—actions perpetrated against UN personnel with the intention to hurt or kill. However, such data—which is often the best available—may not be the best indicator of the level or intensity of the danger to which peace operations personnel are exposed. The number of violent attacks against peacekeepers or injuries suffered would be better indicators, but the UN only publishes detailed data that is consistent over time and across operations on fatalities among its personnel in all of its field operations.

According to the UN, there were 99 fatalities among personnel (including local staff) in UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions in

---

11 For details of all the peace operations that met SIPRI’s criteria in 2016, see section IV.
2016, 33 of which were the result of malicious acts. The number of fatalities was 20 per cent lower than in 2015 and the lowest since 2007. However, the number of fatalities due to malicious acts was only slightly lower than in the preceding three years and relatively high compared to most other years. As in the two previous years, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) suffered the most fatalities of all UN operations in 2016: 38, of which 27 were due to malicious acts.\footnote{UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Fatalities by year, mission and incident type (up to 31 Jan. 2017)’, accessed 10 Mar. 2017.}

Assessing the risk-level in the operational environments of peace operations over time based on fatality numbers is misleading because the number of deployed personnel tends to fluctuate. In other words, if the UN deploys more personnel, other things being equal, the number of fatalities can also be expected to increase. A better indicator is the number of fatalities per 1000 personnel, or the fatality ratio.\footnote{Van der Lijn and Smit (note 12).} Looking at the fatality ratios for all uniformed personnel in UN peace operations for the period 1990–2016, three things become evident. First, the fatality ratio has been decreasing for most of this period. Second, the ratio of fatalities due to malicious acts was higher in 2013–16 than in most years in 2000–2009, but lower than during most of the 1990s. Third, MINUSMA has been a notable outlier in terms of fatalities compared to other concurrent UN operations. Leaving MINUSMA out of the equation, in 2016 the fatality ratio for uniformed personnel in UN

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fatality-ratios.png}
\caption{Fatality ratios for uniformed personnel in UN peace operations, 1990–2016}
\end{figure}
peace operations in general, and for fatalities caused by malicious acts, was the lowest for the entire period 1990–2016 (see figure 5.5).

**Sexual exploitation and abuse**

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2272 in March 2016 to specifically address the topic of SEA in UN peace operations. The resolution emphasized the undermining effect of SEA on the credibility and effectiveness of UN peace operations, and endorsed the decision of the UN Secretary-General to repatriate entire units where credible evidence exists of widespread SEA by their members. This was done with a Congolese battalion of MINUSCA in January 2016 (see section II). The Security Council also requested that the Secretary-General should henceforth replace all military or police units in a particular operation from countries where their national authorities have failed to properly investigate allegations of SEA or hold perpetrators accountable. In addition, the Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s expanded vetting of all UN peacekeeping personnel to ensure that they do not have a history of SEA in service with the UN. The Security Council called on all non-UN forces to take similar steps as appropriate.¹⁵

There were 103 allegations of SEA recorded in UN peacekeeping and specialized political missions in 2016, compared to 69 in 2015. Of those allegations, 73 involved military personnel, 23 civilian personnel and 7 police. The increase is directly linked to the rise in the number of allegations against MINUSCA. There were 35 more allegations recorded in MINUSCA than in 2015. Half of all the allegations (52) in 2016 originated from this mission.¹⁶

---
