I. Conflict or peace in Europe? Increasing uncertainties, rising insecurities

IAN ANTHONY

Are sovereign states capable of working together in a sustainable way through positive cooperation, or is cooperation only possible when discipline and solidarity are based on mutual fear? At the end of the cold war, Europe embarked on an ambitious experiment in cooperative governance based on promoting agreed principles and embedding joint activities in international institutions. The approach balanced military, political and economic dimensions in an interlocking web that has been characterized as common, cooperative, indivisible security.¹

The institutional framework for European security included organizations created during the cold war but adapted to the new conditions (see figure 4.1). The Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were founded in 1949 but underwent extensive changes in their membership and mandates after the end of the cold war, and created new tools and instruments to pursue their objectives. New organizations were also created, building on existing processes. The European Union (EU) was created in 1993, developed on the platform of the European Communities. In 1994 the process of institutionalizing the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) entered a new stage with the decision to transform it into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

In recent years the European security framework performed less well than hoped when faced with a series of shocks: a financial crisis; a return of major conflict inside Europe and escalating conflicts at its periphery; a growing number of mass-impact terrorist attacks; and the sudden and uncontrolled mass movement of people into Europe, in part as a spillover from conflict outside of Europe.

A rising sense of insecurity is reflected in the European discourse on politico-military affairs. Speaking at the OSCE Ministerial Council in December 2015, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, observed that Europe has not established a model of conflict-free partnership but instead is moving towards deeper distrust and instability, and is accumulating a

dangerous number of crisis-related uncertainties. In June 2016 the global strategy published by the EU External Action Service contained a somewhat similar message: ‘peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given’. At the OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg in December 2016, participating states agreed to a structured dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area, taking account of the wider politico-military context. The European approach to governance was conceived as an integrated set of political, economic and military measures, and all three dimensions, as well as the relationships between them, may be part of a reinvigorated discussion on security.

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2 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council, Belgrade, December 3, 2015’.
In 2016 two events highlighted uncertainty about the prevailing approach to governance in large parts of the Euro-Atlantic area: the referendum on British membership of the EU on 23 June and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in November. In the British referendum a narrow majority voted to leave the EU, and after many years of EU enlargement the United Kingdom will be the first country to leave. This decision brings into sharp focus the issue of whether international institutions can adapt to manage problems in ways that citizens find convincing. Similarly, in his electoral campaign, Trump questioned elements of international governance that the Republican Party he was representing has traditionally supported, including the value to the USA of multilateral free trade agreements and military alliances. These two political outcomes were blows to the trends of political and economic integration and globalization that have been considered the hallmarks of a Euro-Atlantic approach to governance. Moreover, they were delivered from within, by citizens exercising their democratic rights.6

Cooperation or confrontation?

At the close of the cold war, proposals by President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union for joint initiatives to build what he called ‘our common European home’ were the catalysts for major change. The initiatives were not a concession to external powers; they reflected his conclusion that serious problems were hindering the development of the Soviet Union, and it was in the Soviet interest to promote cooperation to address them.7

The first priority was to eliminate the risk of a catastrophic military confrontation. The military dimensions of European security quickly moved to centre stage and important instruments to regulate conventional and nuclear arsenals in Europe were elaborated in the late 1980s and early 1990s.8 The agreements were created to ensure sufficient defence while respecting the principles framed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act: the obligation of states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and the commitment not to use force in

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6 In the British referendum, the margin of victory was 52 per cent to 48 per cent. In the US presidential election, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the Electoral College with 306 representatives, as opposed to 232 for his opponent, Hillary Clinton. However, Hillary Clinton won 48 per cent of the popular vote, as opposed to 46 per cent for the new president.

7 Gorbachev, M., The Road We Traveled, the Challenges We Face (Izdatelstvo Ves Mir: Moscow, 2006).

8 Those instruments were principally the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty), the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. However, other arms control agreements from the time were of great significance to Europe, including the 1991 Treaty between the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions (START I), and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. None of the instruments has been cancelled, although they are under considerable strain.\(^9\)

Other priorities included modernizing the Soviet technology base by forging links between industrialists and technologists from the East and West, and managing the environmental legacy of the Soviet economic and industrial model in partnership with its immediate neighbours. Mutual interest has shielded some collaboration, such as space science projects, from the impact of deteriorating political relations.\(^10\) Projects addressing the water and marine environment, nature conservation, the safe management of nuclear waste, environmental protection and environmental education continue to operate in northern Europe.\(^11\)

While President Gorbachev had no intention of abolishing the Soviet Union (and with it his own position), the Soviet leadership did not block Europe-wide discussion of fundamental political reforms, and did not stand in the way of leaders in state socialist countries who wanted to test new forms of governance.\(^12\)

In 1990 the Soviet Government subscribed to key documents such as the document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE; known as the Copenhagen Document) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.\(^13\) In the Copenhagen Document, states agreed that ‘full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and cooperation that they seek to establish in Europe’. The Charter of Paris set out a comprehensive framework for peaceful cooperation in the areas of human rights, democratic governance, peaceful relations among states, military

\(^9\) See chapter 14 on conventional arms control and chapter 12 on nuclear arms control in this volume.

\(^10\) The International Space Station, described as the most complex space cooperation project ever organized, has engaged the space agencies of Canada, the EU, Japan, Russia and the USA in a multitude of international research and technology projects.

\(^11\) The projects of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership are described at <http://ndep.org/>.

\(^12\) Following the suppression of the uprising in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made a speech in which he laid down that no deviation would be permitted from ‘the common laws governing socialist construction’; this became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. In 1985 Mr Gorbachev informed leaders in Central Europe that there would be no repeat of the measures employed in 1968. In October 1989, Gennady Gerasimov, Soviet spokesman, confirmed in public that the Soviet Union now believed ‘political structures must be decided by the people who live there’. ‘“Sinatra Doctrine” at work in Warsaw Pact, Soviet says’, Los Angeles Times, 25 Oct. 1989.

security, economy and the environment. At the 1992 Helsinki Conference of CSCE the new Russian Government supported the document ‘The Challenges of Change’, which codified additional measures needed to implement and give expression to the detailed principles.14

Do states still support the European security system?

As noted above, in constructing the framework in which cooperation would be organized, European states carefully balanced politico-military, political, human security, economic and environmental issues. Without this balance, agreement on a cooperative way forward could not have been achieved, and the ‘rules-based order’ in Europe means paying proper attention to all the different elements. The legal and normative basis for the European security system has not been altered, but many states appear to no longer have a shared understanding of how to interpret their commitments.

The upsurge in violence in the Balkans that accompanied the end of the cold war was largely met with a unity of purpose and coordinated effort by multiple actors (states, institutions and others). The current major conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the surges in violence there and elsewhere (in other parts of the post-Soviet space; see section II), indicate the potential for conflicts to begin in Europe and to escalate further. However, the response has been more limited and fragmented than was the case in the 1990s.

Major changes in the strategic geography of Europe have been brought about as a result of the formation of new states and through the enlargement of the EU and NATO. In addition, technologies that were known about in the early 1990s have now matured and become an important part of military capability—in particular, the so-called network-centric capability made possible by digital technology that can link better intelligence and situational awareness with weapons of greater accuracy and range.15 There have also been new and fast-paced developments in other technological areas, including cyberspace, which has emerged as a domain that some states see as justifying the creation of a separate (offensive and defensive) doctrine, implemented by dedicated military commands.16

Europe has created forums and frameworks to share information, conduct analysis and enhance the understanding of technological developments and their politico-military impact. However, at present these forums are not being used effectively. For example, the NATO–Russia Council met three times in 2016, providing what the NATO Secretary General described as ‘an

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16 Breene, K., ‘Who are the cyberwar superpowers?’, World Economic Forum, 14 May 2016.
important opportunity to clarify our positions to each other’ but without any expectation that differences in perspective would be narrowed.\textsuperscript{17} Within the OSCE, states disagreed on how to implement politico-military commitments, with reciprocal complaints that confidence- and security-building measures are not being respected.\textsuperscript{18} As the framework for dialogue corrodes, military technology development may feed perceptions of insecurity in future.

The political dimension of the European security system was based on a definition of democratic governance that went beyond holding regular, free and fair elections. States agreed that democracy required, among other things, independent courts and legal systems with independent law enforcement agencies to support them; impartial and effective public services free from corruption; a free and independent media in which journalists apply professional standards; transparency and access to information for citizens; freedom of association and freedom to develop political parties; and active efforts to promote and teach democratic values, institutions and practices through education and outreach to civil society. Some of these political elements of the European security system are also under strain, especially in Hungary, Poland and Russia.

In his 2005 speech on the State of the Nation, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that ‘democratic procedures should not develop at the expense of law and order, or stability which has been so hard to achieve’ and that, for Russia, ‘the democratic road we have chosen is independent in nature, a road along which we move ahead, all the while taking into account our own specific internal circumstances’.\textsuperscript{19} Putin began to put in place a system that was labelled ‘managed democracy’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ and which was explained as a way of creating stability to enable domestic progress, in contrast with the chaotic conditions prevailing under his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.\textsuperscript{20} The approach included blocking what was seen as the negative impact on Russia of external interference in its internal affairs.\textsuperscript{21}

In July 2014 the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, used the term ‘illiberal democracy’ to describe his objective of creating a governance system for Hungary that ‘does not deny the foundational values of liberalism such as freedom, etc. . . . but it does not make this ideology a central element

\textsuperscript{17} North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘NATO Secretary General welcomes frank and open discussions in NATO–Russia Council’, 13 July 2016.  
\textsuperscript{18} See chapter 14, section III, in this volume.  
of state organization’. In his speech Orbán said that Hungary should look to Singapore, China, India, Turkey and Russia for more effective ways of harmonizing the interests of individuals, the community and the nation.

In 2014 the EU established the Rule of Law Framework to assess member state compliance with their obligation to respect shared values, including a three-step process to address potential threats to the rule of law of a systemic nature, and in July 2016 the European Commission took a second step in the process when it identified a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland and set out the reasons for that finding. The finding reflected concerns over political interference in the judicial review of national legislation. If the Commission’s concerns are not addressed, the next step is referral to the member states for a decision that could, if a qualified majority agree that a serious and persistent breach of the rule of law continues, lead to sanctions on Poland.

The terms ‘managed democracy’, ‘sovereign democracy’ and ‘illiberal democracy’ suppose that different forms of democratic governance are equally legitimate. However, none respects the understandings of the early 1990s of what democracy means.

Economic cooperation was also a necessary part of the European security discourse of the early 1990s because if transition measured undermined social cohesion, or if transition led to extended economic downturn or collapse, then there could be an impact on political development and an increased risk of intra- or inter-state tension and conflict. In 1992 the CSCE established its Economic Forum, but after 1993 the EU became the primary framework for managing economic transition. Eleven states in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe that had command economies during the cold war moved through pre-accession processes and joined the EU as full members. An additional 15 European states have association agreements of some kind with the EU, the most recent agreements being with Georgia, Kosovo and Ukraine.

In the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, significant doubts have been expressed over the effectiveness of the EU response, including criticism by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).25

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22 For the full text, see ‘Full text of Viktor Orbán’s speech at Băile Tușnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014’, Budapest Beacon, 29 July 2014.
25 After the IMF recommended to Greek officials that a larger budget surplus than it said was already achievable was unnecessary, the Greek Government agreed to further reductions in public spending with European institutions as part of the loan agreement with the European Stability Mechanism—the so-called eurozone bailout fund. Obstfeld, M. and Thomsen, P. M., ‘The IMF is not asking Greece for more austerity’, IMF Blog, 12 Dec. 2016.
The following subsections examine how four key institutions (NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE) that are central to governance in Europe have tried to adapt their policies and practices in 2016 against this background of growing uncertainty.

**NATO after the 2016 Warsaw Summit**

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a turning point in relations between NATO and Russia. At the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, leaders identified Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine as a serious breach of international law and ‘a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security’ that ‘fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace’. Russian actions in Ukraine were put in the context of ‘a pattern of disregard for international law, including the UN Charter’ that ‘threatens the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security’.26

In the relatively benign post-cold war European security environment there was no reason to make the investments needed to sustain armed forces of the size and kind designed for forward defence at national borders. At the same time, many European countries participated in military actions outside Europe that increased the demand for mobility. As a result, bases and infrastructure associated with large standing forces were closed, and force postures were modified to generate and deploy forces for ‘out of area’ operations.

Reactions to Russian actions in Ukraine triggered closer scrutiny of the possible implications for its neighbours—but also the wider Euro-Atlantic community—of Russia’s military capabilities created after 2008 as part of its so-called New Look military reforms.27 The first focus of this enhanced attention to defence matters that NATO leaders called for in 2014 was better preparedness of national armed forces to conduct territorial defence at short notice—including by increasing the resources allocated to defence to pay for additional units at full readiness, larger reserve forces that can be mobilized quickly and the necessary equipment for a larger total force. At the same time, planning was also initiated to provide a more sustained collective military presence in locations that consider themselves in need of assurance about their territorial defence.

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27 At a meeting with the heads of international news agencies based in Russia on 17 June 2016, President Vladimir Putin answered a question about Russia’s military modernization by saying: ‘Trust me, Russia has moved a long way on this path. I will not read out the entire list, but I can tell you that we have modernized our weapons and are creating new-generation systems’. Transcript from Johnson’s Russia List, 20 June 2016.
In June 2014 the USA announced important changes to its military posture in Europe as part of a European Reassurance Initiative and, at the NATO Warsaw Summit on 8–9 July 2016, NATO leaders took additional steps to enhance their military preparedness.28

**Decisions taken at the 2016 Warsaw Summit**

The conclusions reached by NATO leaders in Warsaw built on the planning carried out to implement measures that were agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. First, these included a decision to make a Defence Investment Pledge: promising to move towards a defence spending benchmark of 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), of which 20 per cent should be on major equipment research, development and procurement. In Warsaw, for the first time since 2009, member states reported a collective increase in year-on-year defence expenditure: five members now spend a minimum of 2 per cent of GDP on defence; and ten members spend more than 20 per cent of their defence budgets on major equipment.29

Second, NATO decided to establish a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance: an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (and a tailored forward presence in the south-east, with Romania as a focal point).30 Scheduled to be in place from 2017, this enhanced forward presence will consist of four multinational, battalion-sized battle groups configured to work with the national forces of the host country. Canada (working with Latvia), Germany (working with Lithuania), the UK (working with Estonia) and the USA (working with Poland) volunteered to act as framework nations with primary responsibility for providing forces themselves and coordinating the forces of other contributing member states to ensure that the battle groups operate on a sustainable, rotational basis.

Russia has complained that the decision by NATO to establish a forward presence is a violation of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act, in which ‘NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces’.31 The language of the Founding Act reiterates a unilateral NATO decision. Russian attempts to codify legal limits for the size and location of NATO forces after enlargement were rejected by the Alliance, and had

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29 See chapter 9 on military expenditure in this volume.
Russia insisted on negotiating such limits it would not have been possible to conclude a NATO–Russia Founding Act at all.\footnote{Alberque, W., "‘Substantial combat forces’ in the context of NATO–Russia relations’, NATO Defense College, Research Division, Research Paper no. 131 (NATO Defense College: Rome, June 2016).} The Russian commitment in the Founding Act to ‘exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe’ is also a unilateral statement left undefined.

In addition to placing NATO military units in closer proximity to potentially vulnerable borders, the summit agreed to undertake larger, and more frequent, military exercises using scenarios based on defending national territory (as opposed to scenarios based on responding to natural disasters or humanitarian rescue).\footnote{According to the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, around 300 exercises were carried out in 2015, including NATO exercises and national exercises by member states, one of which was the largest and most complex exercise in over a decade: Exercise Trident Juncture. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), \textit{The Secretary General’s Annual Report, 2015} (NATO: Brussels, 28 Jan. 2016), p. 6.}

While these two summarized decisions were largely explained in relation to concerns about Russian actions in the eastern part of the Alliance, other decisions reflected the need for what was called a ‘full spectrum, 360-degree approach’ to defence and deterrence.

Third, NATO agreed to develop a tailored forward presence in the south-eastern part of the Alliance, with a focus on the Black Sea region, and including a multinational framework brigade as a land element. Romania has agreed to facilitate a Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative to promote joint operations involving NATO member states. It was also agreed that options for a strengthened NATO air and maritime presence in the south-eastern part of the Alliance would be assessed in detail. From 2006 onwards the USA has enhanced its military cooperation with Bulgaria and Romania under the terms of bilateral defence cooperation agreements. However, the decisions taken at the 2014 and 2016 NATO summits will promote multilateral engagement with participation from a wider spectrum of member states.

NATO Force Integration Units, which were established in Bulgaria and Romania, have become a focal point for strengthened consultations on military cooperation, and, as an example of expanding cooperation, in 2016 the regular US–Romanian bilateral air exercise, Thracian Star, was expanded to include air forces from Bulgaria and Greece.\footnote{NATO Allied Air Command, Ramstein, Germany, ‘Bulgaria hosts flying training for US, Romanian and Greek units’, 20 July 2016.}

Fourth, NATO announced that its collective ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability, which began development in 2010, had reached initial operational capability. This was due to the completion of the Aegis Ashore missile interceptor site in Romania and the transfer of command and control...
tasks to the Ballistic Missile Defence Operations Cell (BMDOC), which is part of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD). The operational control of an early warning radar at Kürecik in Turkey is also part of this integrated system, and in 2018 a second missile interceptor site at Redzikowo in Poland is expected to be added. Four Aegis warships hosted at the Rota naval base in Spain are integrated into the NATO BMD system, and additional Danish and Dutch warships will be integrated as they complete necessary equipment upgrades.\textsuperscript{35}

Fifth, the Warsaw Summit also considered how to respond to the deteriorating security environment in NATO’s southern part. NATO has no direct role in the operations of the Global Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria (in which all member states participate; see below), but at the summit it was agreed in principle to provide support in the form of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft. Although the idea was discussed in advance, there is no indication from the summit documents that detailed planning for potential military operations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region under NATO command was authorized—although there is reference to a decision to improve capabilities for expeditionary operations.

Decisions mainly focus on promoting a better understanding of strategic conditions in the region, and enhancing regional partnerships and capacity-building efforts. A programme to support Tunisian special forces and assist with the creation of an intelligence Fusion Centre in Tunisia was agreed, and training programmes for Iraqi security forces currently being carried out outside Iraq will be moved ‘in country’.\textsuperscript{36}

Sixth, NATO leaders agreed to launch Operation Sea Guardian, a new maritime security operation in the Mediterranean Sea, to be implemented in close cooperation with the EU Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED, Operation Sophia)—which was itself expanded in 2016 to include two new elements: (a) training the Libyan Coast Guard, and (b) implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya after the Security Council authorized the inspection of ships suspected of embargo violations on the high seas.\textsuperscript{37}

The initiatives noted above suggest an effort to take a more integrated approach to security building, as they emphasize working across institutional boundaries to promote more than one common objective: the military dimension of counterterrorism, and combating trafficking and organized criminal activity.

\textsuperscript{36} North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘NATO steps up efforts to project stability and strengthen partners’, 9 July 2016.
More generally, and following the same line of thinking, the EU and NATO have emphasized the need for closer cooperation on security matters based on the respective functional expertise of the organizations, including expertise in countering so-called hybrid threats. NATO defines this type of threat as a combination of overt and covert military, paramilitary and civilian measures used to disrupt, confuse, damage or coerce an adversary (see below).

One significant issue remained unchanged after the Warsaw Summit: the leaders did not authorize a follow-on to the defence and deterrence posture review carried out after the 2010 Lisbon Summit. However, the political guidance for defence planning agreed by defence ministers in mid-2015 (which sets parameters for the military advice on capability requirements) mandated a comprehensive, long-term adaptation of NATO to new strategic conditions.

*Changes in the force posture of the USA*

The USA is making important changes to its military engagement in Europe. During the cold war the US European Command (EUCOM) was probably the most important warfighting command. However, it has increasingly played a supporting role for other geographic commands responsible for major operations in Iraq (in 1991 and again after 2003), in Afghanistan (after 2001) and in Africa (after 2007).³⁸ In June 2014 the USA announced the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI).³⁹ Originally described as a temporary measure, this initiative has become part of the process of repositioning EUCOM as a major combat command.

On implementation, ERI will mean that by the end of 2017 three fully equipped US Army brigade combat teams will be permanently stationed in Europe, with sufficient equipment pre-positioned to support the rapid deployment of an additional armoured brigade combat team.⁴⁰ The focus of these combat teams is NATO’s eastern border, where infrastructure and logistics are being prepared to shorten the unit response time in a crisis and a division-level command has been recreated to allow the brigades to work more effectively together.⁴¹

Since 2014 the USA has participated in joint exercises with six countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) to promote

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³⁸ Prior to the formation of Africa Command in 2007, EUCOM had operational responsibility for Africa.


efficient cooperation with the recently deployed units. Under the name Atlantic Resolve, this activity has been described as a ‘continuous series of exercises from Estonia to Bulgaria’.42

New complexities in the NATO threat environment

The call by NATO leaders in their Warsaw Summit Communiqué to meet ‘challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction’ emphasized the increasingly complex threat environment faced by member states. For most of the post-cold war period NATO member states were accustomed to enjoying superiority, if not supremacy, when carrying out military operations. The degree of dominance over an adversary allowed operations to be carried out without prohibitive interference, and in some cases the degree of superiority was so great that the adversary was incapable of any effective response.43 However, recent military developments suggest that, for the first time in two decades, NATO might face a potential adversary that could restrict the freedom of movement of its forces and complicate the reinforcement of member states should they come under threat.

Russian operations in Syria since 2015, for example, show that Russia has, through recent military modernization, achieved a certain capability for area denial.44 Senior NATO officials have drawn attention to Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities being created in Murmansk, the Kola Peninsula, Kaliningrad in the Black Sea region, and the eastern Mediterranean.45 In addition, Russia has combined different conventional weapons in an integrated way in operations in Syria, including the use of long-range stand-off weapons launched from both surface warships and submarines in the Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Mediterranean Sea.

While NATO has not played a major role in counterterrorism, security challenges are increasingly intertwined and difficult to classify. All NATO member states participate, for example, in the Global Coalition against Daesh, and a number play a prominent role in combat operations in Iraq and Syria.46 Moreover, non-NATO members that are active in combat operations include several that are very close partners of the Alliance (e.g. Iraq, Jordan,

43 E.g. faced with what has been described as a hollow and marginalized Libyan air defence capability, NATO air forces operated with impunity during Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector in 2011. Mueller, K. F. (ed.), Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 2015).
44 On Russia’s role in Syria see chapter 3, sections I and II, in this volume.
46 On the role of the US-led Global Coalition against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, see chapter 3, section II, in this volume.
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), and these countries are the focal point
for recent NATO defence capability initiatives.

The coalition operations to degrade Islamic State (IS) capabilities cannot
be fully separated from recent mass-impact terrorist attacks in European
cities.\footnote{On Islamic State attacks in Europe in 2016, see chapter 3, section II, in this volume.} It will be increasingly difficult for NATO to stand aside from more active engagement in counterterrorism if the number of attacks on allies continues to increase.\footnote{In Aug. 2016 President Barack Obama observed that ‘the decline of ISIL in Syria and Iraq appears to be causing it to shift to tactics that we’ve seen before—an even greater emphasis on encouraging high-profile terrorist attacks.’ Garamone, J., ‘ISIL knows it will lose, already shifting strategy, Obama says at Pentagon’, US Department of Defense, 4 Aug. 2016.} The issue of terrorism now pervades most NATO summit meetings, even if it is not a formal agenda item. Moreover, there is no legal barrier to bringing together representatives of North American and European military and civilian intelligence agencies under NATO auspices (this is not the case for the EU).\footnote{However, how to integrate the domestic law enforcement authorities that are mainly leading counterterrorism efforts is an unsolved problem, as NATO has no connection with these agencies.}

**The European Union: reinforcing security and defence**

In 2015, following the coordinated mass-impact terrorist attacks in Paris, EU leaders promised to work to strengthen their common arrangements for security and defence. The effort to reinforce the EU’s security and defence policy has been described by Federica Mogherini (who acts in the triple capacity of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice President of the European Commission and Head of the European Defence Agency) as having three pillars: (a) implementation of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS); (b) implementation of the EU Defence Action Plan; and (c) strengthening cooperation with NATO (see below).\footnote{European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘Remarks by Federica Mogherini at the joint press conference following the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting’, Brussels, 6 Dec. 2016.} In presenting the overall approach being taken to security and defence, Mogherini clarified that the effort ‘is not about a European army. It is not about creating a new European Union SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe)-style headquarters. It is not about the European Union doing territorial defence, for this NATO is there for those that are Allies, and others have their own national defence competences’.\footnote{European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘Remarks by High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council’, Brussels, 14 Nov. 2016.}

*Implementing the EU Global Strategy*

In June 2016 the EU published a global foreign and security policy strategy (EU Global Strategy, EUGS) in which five priority areas for external action
were identified. The security of the EU was listed as the first priority, and the strategy made a commitment to enhancing EU efforts on certain identified aspects of security: defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications. Implementing the EUGS rests on actions taken by the EU using its own resources, but the need to work closely with partners was also emphasized, ‘beginning with NATO’.52

In November 2016 Federica Mogherini sent EU member states a proposal for an implementation plan for the security and defence dimensions of the EUGS.53 The plan was based on three objectives: (a) to create an EU response to external conflicts and crises; (b) to build the capacity of partners to manage their own security problems without external assistance; and (c) to support initiatives that promote the safety of EU citizens by forging stronger connections between external action and the work of EU Freedom, Security and Justice actors to strengthen internal security—in particular in the fields of counterterrorism and combating organized crime. The plan included specific actions to be taken, starting in 2017, to give substance to each of the objectives, and established a procedure for reporting back to member states on progress with each, the first report being due in June 2017.54

Implementing the EU Defence Action Plan

In December 2013 the European Council endorsed the ideas of strengthening an internal market for defence and defence-related products, and of a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB).55 Subsequently, a preparatory action for defence-related research was established, to be managed by the European Defence Agency but financed by the European Commission. Under the preparatory action, three specific projects will be financed: (a) the development of an unmanned heterogeneous swarm of sensor platforms; (b) a method for awareness and navigation inside buildings for use in urban warfare; and (c) a standardization of detect-and-avoid systems for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A consortium of European defence companies will implement each project.56

The preparatory action provides a basis on which EU member states can consider using common funding for defence-related research—something that was previously excluded—and in November 2016 the European Commission proposed the creation of a European Defence Fund (EDF) to support

collaborative defence research projects and the joint development of specific capabilities with community financing. The Commission has proposed that the next Multiannual Financial Framework (beginning after 2020) allocate €500 million each year to support defence research, and €5 billion each year to support joint capabilities. According to the proposal, a programme committee composed of representatives of member states would identify and select the projects.  

**Strengthening EU–NATO cooperation**

In December 2015, NATO foreign ministers agreed on the text of a strategy for NATO’s role in countering hybrid warfare, and in April 2016 the EU agreed on its own joint framework for countering hybrid threats. The EU and NATO have increasingly emphasized the need for closer cooperation on security matters based on the respective functional expertise of the organizations, including countering so-called hybrid threats.

At the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, signed a joint declaration that emphasized the need for strengthened cooperation and tasked officials with developing a programme for specific actions.  

In February 2016 the EU and NATO concluded the Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence to facilitate information exchange between emergency response teams, and at the Warsaw Summit it was agreed that cybersecurity was another functional area for strengthened cooperation.  

In December 2016 the EU and NATO published their agreement on how the joint declaration would be implemented. The agreement listed seven areas for strengthened cooperation: (a) countering hybrid threats; (b) operational cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea area; (c) cybersecurity and cyberdefence; (d) defence capability development; (e) defence research; (f) defence and security capacity building in third countries; and (g) the organization of joint exercises of various kinds.

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The impact of EU decisions on security and defence

The decisions taken in 2016 can be considered modest but with potentially important implications. Measures to implement the EUGS could be viewed as repackaging existing initiatives, such as the EU comprehensive approach to external crisis and conflict, and the proposals for more effective capacity building.\(^{61}\) However, incorporation of these initiatives into the strategy may have raised both their political salience and the probability of implementation.

By opening the pathway for common funding of defence capability projects for the first time, the EDF might represent a significant departure from past practice. However, the impact depends on decisions yet to be taken about the content and size of the post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework and will not deliver any new military capability for many years. Finally, the programme to give substance to a closer EU–NATO partnership is also a new development with significant potential impact.

The Council of Europe: building a legal framework to promote human rights and the rule of law

The Council of Europe is the custodian of more than 200 legal conventions that are binding on its 47 member states and that deal with a wide range of issues relating to protecting the rights of all people under its jurisdiction, including both its citizens and the citizens of other countries. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is one element within the structure of the Council of Europe. The ECHR considers allegations of violations of civil and political rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights that are brought before it. The members of the Council of Europe have accepted that rulings by the court are binding on them, and over time the court has developed a huge body of case law based on its past judgements.

Over time, the volume of cases brought before the ECHR has grown, and at the end of 2016 approximately 80 000 cases were pending.\(^{62}\) The ECHR has received applications on many issues that are directly relevant to sustaining and developing the European security system as described in this section. However, some recent developments are particularly noteworthy.

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Since 2014 the ECHR has examined a number of cases that have focused on how rules of asylum have been applied in Europe. In particular, the court has been asked to examine whether the EU’s so-called Dublin system has been applied in ways that are inconsistent with the standards established in relevant Council of Europe conventions. The Dublin system is the method used by EU member states to decide who is responsible for examining an asylum application by a third-country national, in order to avoid asylum seekers being sent from one country to another and to prevent abuse of the system by the submission of several applications for asylum by one person. After the most recent revision of the Dublin system in 2013, the ECHR began receiving applications from individuals who alleged that it was being implemented unfairly.\textsuperscript{63} In several cases the court found that the Dublin system was applied in ways that denied individuals the protection they were entitled to under one or more of the conventions of which the Council of Europe is the custodian.\textsuperscript{64}

The ECHR has received more than 4000 individual complaints related to the conflict in Ukraine since 2014, and is also considering five complaints brought by Ukraine against Russia.\textsuperscript{65} In 2016 Turkey sought derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights, citing the state of emergency declared in response to the attempted coup d’état in July. However, the ECHR saw a surge in individual cases brought by Turkish citizens.\textsuperscript{66}

Finally, the binding nature of ECHR jurisdiction means that states should comply with its decisions. In 2016 Russia refused to comply with a 2014 judgement awarding €1.9 billion in damages to shareholders of the Yukos company, which was bankrupted in 2007 by a combination of claims for unpaid taxes and punitive fines imposed by the Russian authorities. In 2015 the Russian Parliament passed legislation that would allow Russia to overturn decisions by the ECHR and, based on that legislation, Russia’s Constitutional Court ruled in January 2017 that Russia was not obliged to pay the compensation awarded to Yukos. The Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe responded to the Russian decision to give a national court supremacy over the ECHR by saying that it ‘bears far-reaching consequences for human rights protection in Russia and elsewhere in Europe’.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{63} Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless person, Official Journal of the European Union, L180/31, 26 June 2013.

\textsuperscript{64} An overview of selected case law is contained in European Court of Human Rights, ‘Dublin cases’, Fact sheet, June 2016.


\textsuperscript{66} Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights (note 62), p. 5.

The OSCE: challenges to the mechanism of cooperative security

Conflict and crisis management in Ukraine

On taking up the position of Chairperson-in-Office for 2016, Germany outlined the priorities for the OSCE. In keeping with its mandate, emphasis was placed on conflict resolution and crisis management, with a particular focus on Ukraine (see section II). The programme laid out by German representatives included a structured dialogue on key topics across the entire conflict cycle with a view to promoting the use of the OSCE as a platform for dialogue.68

Following the conclusion of the Helsinki+40 Process in 2015, which failed to produce any results, Germany sought new ways to promote an informal dialogue on pan-European security issues. In December 2016, OSCE foreign ministers agreed to launch a structured dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area.69 Another German priority in the area of politico-military security was continued talks on strengthening the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Vienna Document. In 2011, when the current version of the Vienna Document was issued, it was agreed that a new version should be issued incorporating any agreed changes not later than 2016.70 In the event, it was not possible to reissue the Vienna Document, which would require consensus among OSCE-participating states, because of objections by Russia.71

The OSCE has initiated innovative measures to create more transparency in conflict-affected territories, including the deployment of unarmed civilian observers—the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)—in Ukraine.72 The efforts to end the fighting in eastern Ukraine have included local agreements to separate warring parties and withdraw weapons from the combat zone. The most recent is the 21 September 2016 Framework Agreement on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware signed by the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE as a mediator).73 Under this, the warring parties are required to provide baseline information on the locations of

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armed forces/ formations and hardware in the area to the SMM prior to disengagement, and inform on the destination of forces and hardware within 24 hours of completing disengagement. Most of the SMM personnel have been deployed in, or close to, the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine. Their work has reportedly been made more difficult by repeated attempts to block access to places they would like to visit.74 Proposals by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to protect the SMM (e.g. through an armed police escort under OSCE auspices) would require a change in its mandate.75 This has been rejected by Russia, which is only willing to consider using local law enforcement officers from the Donbas region.76

After October 2014 the SMM began using UAVs to supplement the work of monitors on the ground. The UAVs were used in areas where the security situation made the deployment of monitors too dangerous, and in order to react quickly to reported incidents.77 While the OSCE directed their activities, the UAVs were provided, flown and maintained by an Austrian company under contract. Because they were regularly shot at or jammed, the rate of attrition made their operation financially unsustainable and in 2016 they were suspended, mainly on cost grounds.78

Human rights and fundamental freedoms

A second main pillar of German priorities focused on human rights and fundamental freedoms, and concentrated on topics that Germany considered closely linked to the main current problems in the European security order. These included assuring freedom of expression, the role of the media and journalists, and the situation of minorities in times of crisis. The stated ambition was to visibly strengthen the OSCE institutions most associated with these issues: the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM). By the end of 2016, however, the OSCE had accumulated a backlog of important decisions about the instruments governing these issue areas.

In 2016 the term in office of both the RFOM and the HCNM expired and OSCE-participating states were unable to agree on their respective successors. In each case, Russian objections were the main cause of the failure to agree.79 In March 2016 the OSCE decided to extend the tenure of Dunja Mijatović as the RFOM by one year, having decided not to grant her a third

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79 UAWire (note 76) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (note 77).
term in her position and being unable to agree on a successor.\textsuperscript{80} Nine OSCE member states put forward candidates to replace Mijatović, but all were rejected by Russia without explanation.\textsuperscript{81} By the end of 2016, a decision had still not been reached on a successor. The Russian objection to the reappointment of Astrid Thors as the HCNM was based on a 2014 report that she submitted on the risks posed to local Ukrainians and Crimean Tartars after the annexation of Crimea by Russia.\textsuperscript{82}

The different subsidiary bodies of the OSCE operate with considerable independence, and Russian decisions can be interpreted as being broadly in line with a long-standing Russian objective of bringing them under closer control of the participating states.\textsuperscript{83}

In addition to activities at its Vienna headquarters, the OSCE has various kinds of field presence in certain conflict-affected locations. In 2016 Azerbaijan blocked the extension of the mandate for the OSCE office in Yerevan on the basis that some of the projects being implemented might strengthen the military capacity of Armenia. In response, Armenia blocked the renewal of mandates for the OSCE project coordinator in Uzbekistan, the OSCE centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian–Ukrainian border.\textsuperscript{84} Armenia has also blocked the adoption of a unified budget for the OSCE. In addition, the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry has sought to change the status of the OSCE centre in Bishkek, downgrading it to a programme office.

Such failures to agree are indicative of divisions within the OSCE membership over important aspects of European security and perhaps, in particular, of the return of the military factor in European relations and the unsolved problem of how to stop the progressive corrosion of agreements intended to promote politico-military security. However, the agreement to organize a structured dialogue on current threats and challenges, through an informal working group but within the framework of the OSCE (see above), might provide an opportunity to re-establish the OSCE as an important framework for cooperation.


\textsuperscript{82} YLE Daily News, ‘Russia blocks reappointment of Finn as OSCE Minorities High Commissioner’, 30 Aug. 2016.

\textsuperscript{83} Bond, I., ‘Russia in international organizations: the shift from defence to offence’, eds D. Cadier and M. Light, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2015).