

## II. Multilateral embargoes on arms and dual-use goods

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In 2015, 38 multilateral arms embargoes were in force: 15 imposed by the United Nations, 22 by the European Union (EU) and 1 by the League of Arab States (see table 19.1).<sup>1</sup> Of the EU's 22 embargoes, 11 implemented UN decisions directly, 3 implemented UN embargoes with modified geographical scope or coverage in terms of the weapon types included, and 8 had no UN counterpart.<sup>2</sup> The single Arab League arms embargo on Syria had no UN counterpart. The majority of these embargoes only covered arms. However, the UN and EU embargoes on Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and the EU embargo on Russia also cover certain exports of dual-use goods.<sup>3</sup>

One major development in 2015 was the imposition of a UN arms embargo on non-governmental forces in Yemen. No UN arms embargo was imposed on South Sudan despite a continuation of discussions about the issue—started in 2014—in the UN Security Council. The EU and the Arab League did not impose or discuss new arms embargoes in 2015 which had no UN embargo counterpart.

Implementation of the UN embargoes was not without problems. In particular, violations of the embargo on arms supplies to Libya without permission from the UN Sanctions Committee were observed but did not lead to specific UN punitive actions.

Significant modifications were made to the UN and EU embargoes on Iran in connection with the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which regulates Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. There were also numerous reports that aspects of

<sup>1</sup> In addition, 1 voluntary multilateral embargo was in force in which the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) requests that all participating states impose an embargo on arms deliveries to Armenian and Azerbaijani forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Committee of Senior Officials, Statement, Annex 1 to Journal no. 2 of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee, Prague, 27–28 Feb. 1992.

<sup>2</sup> The 3 European Union (EU) embargoes that differed from equivalent United Nations embargoes were those on Iran and North Korea, which covered more weapon types than the UN embargo, and on Sudan, which covered the whole country whereas the UN embargo applied only to the Darfur region. The 8 with no UN counterpart were those on Belarus, China, Myanmar, Russia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe and the partial embargoes on Egypt and Syria. The EU embargoes on China and Egypt are a political commitment whereas the other 6 are legally binding. The 11 that implement UN embargoes are shown in table 19.1.

<sup>3</sup> The UN and EU embargoes on Iran and North Korea apply to dual-use goods on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) control lists. The EU embargo on Russia applies to transfers of all items on the EU's dual-use list to military end users.

the UN embargo—particularly the ban on exports of military equipment by Iran—were being repeatedly violated.<sup>4</sup>

### **The UN arms embargo against the Houthi–Saleh forces in Yemen**

The violent conflict between the recognized government of Yemen and an alliance between Houthi forces and forces loyal to the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullāh Saleh, commonly referred to as the Houthi–Saleh forces, increased dramatically in 2015. A range of other armed groups were also active in Yemen, most notably localized independent groups fighting the Houthi–Saleh forces, al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, its off-shoot Ansar al-Sharia and Islamic State (IS).<sup>5</sup> In response to the violence in Yemen, in March 2015 Saudi Arabia together with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states suggested elements for a resolution to the UN Security Council that would impose an arms embargo on the Houthi–Saleh forces. The GCC members reportedly stressed that an arms embargo should only block arms to the Houthi–Saleh forces and not to the Yemeni Government. The GCC reportedly wanted to avoid a similar situation to the case of Libya, where permission must be sought from a UN sanctions committee for exemptions to a UN arms embargo in order to supply the internationally recognized Libyan Government with weapons.<sup>6</sup> In early 2015 several GCC member states were already directly involved in military action against the Houthi–Saleh alliance and providing military aid to the Yemeni Government.<sup>7</sup>

In reaction to the increased fighting and the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo against the Houthi–Saleh forces on 14 April 2015.<sup>8</sup> The resolution demanded that they unconditionally end the violence, withdraw forces from areas they have seized, relinquish all arms, cease activities undermining the authority of the country's legitimate government, refrain from provocation against neighbouring states and end the recruitment of children.

Fourteen members of the Security Council voted in favour of the partial arms embargo. Russia abstained, insisting instead on a comprehensive arms embargo on all parties to the conflict in Yemen and the UN taking action to

<sup>4</sup> The issues concerning developments in and violations of the UN and EU embargoes on Iran are discussed in chapter 3 in this volume.

<sup>5</sup> For an overview of the violent conflict in Yemen, see United Nations, Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014), S/2016/73, 26 Jan. 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Anna, C., 'Gulf states ask UN Security Council for Yemen arms embargo', Associated Press, 26 Mar. 2015; and see below for more on problems with the implementation of the Libyan arms embargo.

<sup>7</sup> On Yemen, see chapter 15, section II, in this volume.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216, 14 Apr. 2015.

promote peace talks between the parties in order to find a political solution. The EU has often imposed arms embargoes on the whole of the territory of a country in reaction to violence in that country, as in South Sudan. However, it did not impose such an embargo on Yemen. Instead, it implemented the UN arms embargo on the Houthi–Saleh forces in 2015 without any additional provisions.<sup>9</sup>

### **Threats of multilateral arms embargoes against South Sudan**

In 2015 fighting continued between the Government of South Sudan—formed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)—and the SPLM/A in Opposition.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, arms embargoes on South Sudan were discussed and threatened in different multilateral organizations, in a continuation of the discussions that took place in 2014.<sup>11</sup>

After more than a year of violence, violations of human rights and humanitarian law, large-scale displacement of persons, a deepening humanitarian crisis and several failed international efforts to broker peace combined with threats of sanctions, in March 2015 the UN Security Council imposed a first set of sanctions aimed at the main actors in the crisis in South Sudan. This only involved a travel ban on a select group of South Sudanese government officials and rebel leaders. At the same time, the Security Council expressed its intention to review the situation in South Sudan regularly and to consider further sanctions, including an arms embargo.<sup>12</sup> China, Russia and the United States had reportedly opposed an arms embargo at that time, while European and other Security Council members were in favour.<sup>13</sup> In May 2015 the African Union requested that the Security Council urgently consider the immediate imposition of an arms embargo on the belligerents in South Sudan.<sup>14</sup> The UN Panel of Experts that had been tasked with monitoring the UN sanctions on South Sudanese individuals in early 2015, and also arms flows to the country, concluded that the supply of arms and ammunition to the belligerents had been instrumental in prolonging and escalating the war.

<sup>9</sup> Council Regulation (EU) no. 878/2015 of 8 June 2015 amending Regulation (EU) no. 1352/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Yemen, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L143, 1 June 2015.

<sup>10</sup> For an overview of the violent conflict in South Sudan, see United Nations, Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015), S/2015/656, 21 Aug. 2015.

<sup>11</sup> See Wezeman, P. D. and Kelly, N., ‘Multilateral arms embargoes’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2015*, pp. 621–23.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2206, 3 Mar. 2015.

<sup>13</sup> Nichols, M., ‘US proposes United Nations arms embargo on South Sudan’, Reuters, 19 Aug. 2015.

<sup>14</sup> African Union, Peace and Security Council, 510th meeting, Press statement, 22 May 2015, Swakopmund, Namibia.

It therefore recommended that the UN Security Council impose an arms embargo on South Sudan.<sup>15</sup>

In mid-August 2015 the South Sudanese Government was reluctant to sign a peace agreement to which other parties had already agreed. In response, the USA circulated a draft resolution among Security Council members proposing several sanctions to be imposed from 6 September if the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM/A in Opposition did not sign a peace agreement and implement a ceasefire before that date.<sup>16</sup> The proposed sanctions included an embargo on the supply of arms to all parties to the conflict in South Sudan.<sup>17</sup> The President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, signed the peace agreement on 26 August, following earlier signings by the other parties to the conflict.<sup>18</sup> As a result, the draft resolution was not put to the vote in the Security Council. In spite of the peace agreement, the UN Panel of Experts reported in November that fighting and atrocities were continuing and that both sides were actively acquiring arms. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council was still unable to unite behind an arms embargo.<sup>19</sup>

### The implementation of UN embargoes

Violations and other problems with the implementation of UN arms embargoes were again reported in 2015.<sup>20</sup> This section highlights the most important cases reported and some of the efforts made to mitigate them.

In 2005 the UN imposed a ban on arms transfers to any of the belligerents in the Darfur region. As in all the years from 2005, in 2015 the UN Panel of Experts concerning the Sudan found ample evidence that the Government of Sudan had 'routinely' violated the ban, including by moving combat aircraft and ammunition into Darfur.<sup>21</sup> In some cases it had disregarded agreements with the states from which it had acquired arms not to use those arms in Darfur.<sup>22</sup> The UN Security Council has explicitly warned states to be mindful of the risk that weapons supplied to Sudan could be used by Sudan in Darfur in violation of the arms embargo.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>15</sup> United Nations (note 10), pp. 19, 24–25.

<sup>16</sup> Nichols, M. (note 13).

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, 'US draft resolution on South Sudan: sanctions', [leaked draft], 20 Aug. 2015.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Presidential Statement S/PRST/2015/16, 28 Aug. 2015.

<sup>19</sup> Wanjohi, C., 'South Sudan: UN report casts doubts on formation of unity government', *Deutsche Welle*, 5 Nov. 2015; and Anna, C. and Lederer, C. M., 'UN report: South Sudan rival sides expanding arms stockpiles', Associated Press, 4 Nov. 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Panels of experts, the primary sources for the reporting on arms embargo violations, existed for all United Nations arms embargoes in 2015 except those relating to Iraq and Lebanon. Reports by panels of experts can be found on the website of the UN Security Council sanctions committees, <<https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/>>.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005), Annex to S/2015/802, 19 Jan. 2015, p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations (note 21), pp. 19–20.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2265, 10 Feb. 2016.

The UN arms embargoes on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia prohibit arms transfers to non-government forces. The UN also requires of the governments in these countries that they inform the relevant sanctions committee about their arms procurement. These notifications should facilitate efforts to prevent the weapons supplied to these countries being diverted to non-government forces.

In 2015 the armed forces of the DRC started a programme to register and mark all its weapons purchased with foreign aid to improve its stockpile management.<sup>24</sup> The UN Panel of Experts for the DRC called this a welcome initiative, but did not consider it comprehensive enough as it still allows weapons and ammunition to be transferred to armed groups.<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea observed tangible progress in the Federal Government of Somalia's efforts to implement the required notifications to the UN Sanctions Committee on arms procurements and its management of weapons stockpiles. However, it also noted that violations of the arms embargo continued in Somalia, through the illegal sale or unauthorized distribution of weapons from government stocks or through illegal imports.<sup>26</sup>

The UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported many serious problems with the implementation of the UN arms embargo that only allows arms supplies to the recognized authorities after approval from the UN Sanctions Committee.<sup>27</sup> The panel reported that it was investigating, among other things, suspected deliveries of arms, including combat aircraft and helicopters, from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the Libyan Government not authorized by the Sanctions Committee.<sup>28</sup> The panel was also investigating what appeared to be leaked emails between diplomats from the UAE which showed that the UAE had knowingly supplied or arranged the supply of arms to the Libyan Government in 2015 without prior permission from the Sanctions Committee, and had tried to hide these supplies from the UN Panel of Experts.<sup>29</sup> The emails are also alleged to show that a UAE company had tried to buy machine guns, rifles and rockets from North Korea. Such acquisitions would be in breach of the UN sanctions that prohibit importing

<sup>24</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annex to S/2015/797, 16 Oct. 2015, p. 22.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations (note 24), p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia, Annex to S/2015/801, 19 Oct. 2015, pp. 39, 41.

<sup>27</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 23 Feb. 2015 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2015/128, 23 Feb. 2015, pp. 28–36.

<sup>28</sup> United Nations, Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), Annex to S/2016/209, 9 Mar. 2016, pp. 36–45.

<sup>29</sup> United Nations (note 27), pp. 25–30; and Kirkpatrick, D., 'Leaked Emirati emails could threaten peace talks in Libya', *New York Times*, 12 Nov. 2015.

arms from North Korea.<sup>30</sup> The Security Council called on the Libya Sanctions Committee to consider expeditiously requests for the supply of arms to the Libyan Government to combat IS, al-Qaeda and related groups.<sup>31</sup> This could indicate that some of the alleged violations may have been related to frustration on the side of the supplying states about the time it takes to process requests for approval for arms supplies.

The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea reported several cases in which North Korea imported commercial products for military end uses, highlighting the challenges posed by embargo enforcement for goods that would not normally be subject to export controls. In early 2015 the panel reported on its analyses of debris recovered by South Korea after North Korea's launch of an Unha-3 rocket in December 2012, which was used to place a satellite in orbit.<sup>32</sup> A number of foreign-made components were used by North Korea in the manufacture of the Unha-3 rocket, among them commonly available commercial products such as direct current-to-direct current (DC/DC) converters and pressure transmitters.<sup>33</sup> In early 2016 the panel reported that North Korea had acquired components from a variety of countries for use in the manufacture of small reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Trucks imported from China have had artillery rocket launchers mounted on them, even though they were supplied under the condition that they would be used for civilian purposes. Japanese-made navigation radar systems for civilian use have also been seen in use on a North Korean Navy ship.<sup>34</sup>

State-level enforcement activities have also prevented several attempted violations of the North Korea embargo. In February 2015, the British Government informed the panel about an unsuccessful attempt by a China-based company to acquire military-grade components for UAVs on behalf of North Korea.<sup>35</sup> In July 2015 a North Korean national was arrested and charged in the USA with seeking to supply military-grade night-vision goggles to North Korea.<sup>36</sup> In December 2015 the Singapore-registered Chinpo Shipping Company was convicted for its role in facilitating the passage of a ship that was seized in Panama in 2013 while transporting arms from Cuba to North Korea.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Kirkpatrick (note 29).

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2214 (2015), 27 Mar. 2015.

<sup>32</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), Annex to S/2015/131, 23 Feb. 2015, p. 28.

<sup>33</sup> United Nations (note 32), p. 25.

<sup>34</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), 11 May 2012, Annex to S/2011/157, 16 Oct. 2015, pp. 32–39.

<sup>35</sup> United Nations (note 34), Annex 61.

<sup>36</sup> United Nations (note 34), p. 38.

<sup>37</sup> 'N Korean ship seized with Cuban weapons returns to Cuba', BBC News, 15 Feb. 2014; and Jaekyoung, K., 'Singapore plugs loophole in NK's arms trade', *Korea Times*, 15 Dec. 2015.

The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported several developments related to the Eritrean military under the heading ‘violations of the arms embargo on Eritrea’. It had information indicating that Eritrea had allowed the Saudi Arabia- and UAE-led Arab coalition fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen to use Eritrean land, airspace and territorial waters. In exchange, Eritrea reportedly received monetary compensation and fuel supplies, which would be in violation of UN sanctions on Eritrea. Further, the group reported having received credible information that Eritrean soldiers were embedded in the UAE forces fighting in Yemen. This would also be in violation of the UN sanctions on Eritrea.<sup>38</sup>

### EU sanctions

On 29 October 2015 the EU suspended some of its sanctions on specific persons and entities in Belarus for four months.<sup>39</sup> However, it maintained its arms embargo on the country. The EU embargo on the export of military items to Russia and dual-use goods to military end users in Russia remained in place throughout 2015. In October 2015 the embargo was modified to allow for the supply of certain pyrotechnics for use in space launches and satellite fuelling.<sup>40</sup> In December 2015 the EU voted to extend the embargoes until at least 31 July 2016.<sup>41</sup> EU member states have stated that the embargoes—together with the wider package of economic sanctions that the EU has imposed on Russia—will remain in place until Russia fully implements the Minsk agreements concerning the conflict in Ukraine.<sup>42</sup> In November 2015 the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, rejected speculation that the EU would ease its sanctions in exchange for Russia’s help in fighting the war in Syria, stating this ‘would not only be immoral but also ineffective’.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>38</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), 24 Oct. 2014, Annex to S/2015/802, 19 Oct. 2015, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) no. 1948/2015 of 29 Oct. 2015 amending Regulation (EC) no. 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L284, 29 Oct. 2015.

<sup>40</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1764/CFSP of 1 Oct. 2015 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L257, 1 Oct. 2015, pp. 42–43.

<sup>41</sup> Council of the European Union, ‘Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months’, Press release, 21 Dec. 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Council of the European Union (note 41).

<sup>43</sup> Guarascio, F., ‘EU’s Tusk says Russia does not abide by Minsk deal on Ukraine’, Reuters, 4 Nov. 2015.

**Table 19.1. Multilateral arms embargoes in force during 2015**

Target <sup>a</sup>	Date embargo first imposed	Principal instruments establishing or amending the embargo <sup>b</sup>	Key developments during 2015
<i>United Nations arms embargoes</i>			
CAR	5 Dec. 2013	SCR 2127	
DRC (NGF)	28 July 2003	SCRs 1493, 1596, 1807, 2078	Extended until 1 July 2016 by SCR 2198, 29 Jan. 2015
Côte d'Ivoire	15 Nov. 2004	SCRs 1572, 1946, 2045, 2101	Extended until 30 Apr. 2016 by SCR 2219, 28 Apr. 2015
Eritrea	23 Dec. 2009	SCR 1907	
Iran	23 Dec. 2006	SCRs 1737, 1747, 1929,	Amended by SCR 2231, 20 July 2015
Iraq (NGF)	6 Aug. 1990	SCRs 661, 1483, 1546	
ISIL, al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities	16 Jan. 2002	SCRs 1390, 1989, 2170	Amended by SCR 2253, 17 Dec. 2015
Korea, North	15 July 2006	SCRs 1695, 1718, 1874	
Lebanon (NGF)	11 Aug. 2006	SCR 1701	
Liberia (NGF)	22 Dec. 2003 <sup>c</sup>	SCRs 1521, 1683, 1903, 2128	Extended until 2 June 2016 by SCR 2237, 2 Sep. 2015
Libya (NGF)	26 Feb. 2011	SCRs 1970, 1973, 2009, 2095, 2174	
Somalia	23 Jan. 1992	SCRs 733, 1725, 2093, 2111	Extended until 15 Nov. 2016 by SCR 2244, 23 Oct. 2015
Sudan (Darfur)	30 July 2004	SCRs 1556, 1591, 1945	
Yemen (NGF)	14 Apr. 2015	SCR 2216	
Taliban	16 Jan. 2002	SCRs 1390, 1988	New embargo
<i>European Union arms embargoes</i>			
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities*	17 Dec. 1996	CPs 96/746/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP, 2002/402/CFSP	
Belarus	20 June 2011	CD 2011/357/CFSP, CD 2012/642/CFSP	Extended until 29 Feb. 2016 by CD 2015/1957/CFSP, 29 Oct. 2015
China	27 June 1989	European Council declaration	



Target <sup>d</sup>	Date embargo first imposed	Principal instruments establishing or amending the embargo <sup>b</sup>	Key developments during 2015
CAR*	23 Dec. 2013	CD 2013/798/CFSP	
DRC (NGF)*	7 Apr. 1993	Declaration, CPs 2003/680/CFSP, 2005/440/CFSP, 2008/369/CFSP	
Côte d'Ivoire*	13 Dec. 2004	CP 2004/852/CFSP, 2010/656/CFSP CD 2012/371/CFSP	
Egypt	21 Aug. 2013	Council conclusions on Egypt	
Eritrea*	1 Mar. 2010	CD 2010/127/CFSP	
Iran	27 Feb. 2007	CPs 2007/140/CFSP, 2007/246/CFSP CD 2012/168/CFSP	
Iraq (NGF)*	4 Aug. 1990	Declaration, CPs 2003/495/CFSP, 2004/553/CFSP	
Korea, North	20 Nov. 2006	CPs 2006/795/CFSP, 2009/573/CFSP	
Lebanon (NGF)*	15 Sep. 2006	CP 2006/625/CFSP	
Liberia (NGF)*	7 May 2001	CPs 2001/357/CFSP, 2004/137/CFSP, 2006/518/CFSP, 2010/129/CFSP	
Libya (NGF)*	28 Feb. 2011	CD 2011/137/CFSP, 2011/625/CFSP	
Myanmar	29 July 1991 <sup>d</sup>	GAC declaration, CPs 96/635/CFSP, 2003/297/CFSP, 2010/232/CFSP	Extended until 30 Apr. 2016 by CD 2015/666/CFSP, 28 Apr. 2015
Russia	31 July 2014	2014/512/CFSP, CR 833/2014	Extended until 31 July 2016 by CD 2015/2431/CFSP, 21 Dec. 2015
Somalia (NGF)*	10 Dec. 2002	CPs 2002/960/CFSP, 2009/138/CFSP, 2010/231/CFSP	
South Sudan	18 July 2011	CD 2011/423/CFSP	
Sudan	15 Mar. 1994	CPs 94/165/CFSP, 2004/31/CFSP, 2005/411/CFSP, CD 2011/423/CFSP	
Syria	9 May 2011	CD 2011/273/CFSP, CR 36/2012, CR 509/2012, CR 36/2012, CR 509/2012, CD 2012/420/CFSP, CD 2013/255/CFSP	
Yemen (NGF)	8 June 2015	CR 2015/878	New embargo

Target <sup>a</sup>	Date embargo first imposed	Principal instruments establishing or amending the embargo <sup>b</sup>	Key developments during 2015
Zimbabwe	18 Feb. 2002	CP 2002/145/CFSP	Extended until 20 Feb. 2016 by CD 2015/277/CFSP, 19 Feb. 2015

*League of Arab States arms embargo*

Syria 3 Dec. 2011 Council statement, Council Resolution 7446<sup>c</sup>

\* = EU embargo implementing a UN embargo; CAR = Central African Republic; CD = Council Decision; CP = Council Common Position; CR = Council Regulation; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; GAC = General Affairs Council; NGF = non-governmental forces; SCR = UN Security Council Resolution.

<sup>a</sup> The target may have changed since the first imposition of the embargo. The target stated here is as at the end of 2015.

<sup>b</sup> The earlier instruments may have been amended or repealed by subsequent instruments.

<sup>c</sup> Liberia has been the target of UN arms embargoes since 1992, with related but different objectives.

<sup>d</sup> The EU and its member states first imposed an arms embargo on Myanmar in 1990.

<sup>e</sup> Amended by Arab League Council Resolution 7446, 12 Feb. 2012. Resolution 7446 could be interpreted as permitting the provision of arms to the Syrian opposition.

Sources: United Nations, Security Council, 'UN Security Council sanctions committees', <<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/>>; and European Union External Action, 'Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force', from list updated on 30 Sep. 2015, <[http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm)>.