

I. Development in dangerous places

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Human development is a generational endeavour of accumulation of human and physical capital that ought to lead to better standards of living, increased opportunities, expanded freedoms and livelihoods with dignity. There are many places in the world where development works—people are able to live fulfilling and rewarding lives, free from fear and want, and can invest in improved prospects for their children.¹ In many places where development does not work, however, violence and the fear of violence affect how people develop, often because they must cope with the uncertainty and instability that development practitioners call fragility. The study of security and development is the study of what works—or often what does not work—in these dangerous places and fragile situations. It is relevant to the security audience because peace is necessary for development—development is a dividend of security.

2015 was a particularly important year for security and development. A new development agenda was enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and a number of review processes took stock of what is and is not working in the field of international development. In adopting the sustainable development agenda, the world has committed to a core principle of ‘leaving no one behind’ in the next 15 years. Yet challenges remain. The evolving concept of development has been expanded in the SDGs and is now far more ambitious. The prospects for delivering this agenda are most demanding in places affected by violence, referred to below as dangerous places. The status quo that left many behind in the era of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is unlikely to lead to development progress in dangerous places. Nonetheless, these are not hopeless cases. Progress has been made in a number of previously fragile situations and the new development agenda opens the door for doing things differently in the next 15 years.

Introduction to the Sustainable Development Goals

In September 2015 a United Nations Special Summit on Sustainable Development in New York officially adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.² The 17 Global Goals for Sustainable Development succeed the in many cases unfinished work of the eight MDGs as the world’s agenda for development. In the years leading up to 2015, the UN convened perhaps

¹ Sen, A., *Development as Freedom* (Random House: New York, 2000).

² United Nations, General Assembly, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, 25 Sep. 2015.

Box 9.1. Descriptions of the 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

1. **No Poverty** End poverty in all its forms everywhere (5 targets plus 2 implementing targets).
2. **Zero Hunger** End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture (5 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
3. **Good Health and Well-Being** Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages (9 targets plus 4 implementing targets).
4. **Quality Education** Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all (7 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
5. **Gender Equality** Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (6 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
6. **Clean Water and Sanitation** Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all (6 targets plus 2 implementing targets).
7. **Affordable and Clean Energy** Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all (3 targets plus 2 implementing targets).
8. **Decent Work and Economic Growth** Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all (10 targets plus 2 implementing targets).
9. **Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure** Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (5 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
10. **Reduced Inequalities** Reduce inequality within and among countries (7 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
11. **Sustainable Cities and Communities** Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (7 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
12. **Responsible Consumption and Production** Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (8 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
13. **Climate Action** Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts* (3 targets plus 2 implementing targets).
14. **Life below Water** Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development (7 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
15. **Life on Land** Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss (9 targets plus 3 implementing targets).
16. **Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (10 targets plus 2 implementing targets).
17. **Partnerships for the Goals** Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development (19 implementing targets).

*Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

Source: United Nations, General Assembly, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1, 25 Sep. 2015.




Figure 9.1. The 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Sources: On the SDGs, see United Nations, General Assembly, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1, 25 Sep. 2015. On the MDGs, see United Nations, *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015* (United Nations: New York, 2015).

the largest consultation ever undertaken in the ‘World We Want’ process, which included regional and online consultations involving millions of people around the world.³

Together, box 9.1 and figure 9.1 demonstrate that the SDG agenda is an ambitious one that expands the concept of development well past that of the MDG agenda. The core areas of development, such as reducing poverty and malnutrition, enshrined in MDG 1, have been expanded to include eliminating extreme poverty (SDG 1) and ending hunger (SDG 2). Similarly, MDG 7 on ensuring environmental sustainability, including access to water and

³ See the website of the ‘World We Want’ process, <<https://www.worldwewant2030.org>>.

Box 9.2. The links between SDG 5 (gender) and SDG 16 (peace and justice)

SDG 5 'Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls' and SDG 16 'Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels' complement each other and overlap at several points. Both goals have targets on eliminating violence, enforcing non-discriminatory laws and inclusive representation. SDG 16 addresses these issues more generally while SDG 5 addresses them with specific reference to eliminating all forms of violence against women and girls, and ending 'all forms of discrimination against all women and girls and ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life'. Gender equality has a positive impact on development and economic growth, and societies with high levels of gender inequality have more intra-state armed conflict.

If inclusiveness in SDG 16 inherently addresses aspects of gender equality, is it necessary to have specific targets on gender equality and women's rights? Gender, racial, religious and ethnic inequalities are different aspects of structural violence, which describes systems of institutionalized discrimination where resources are unevenly distributed. Issues related to women are often ignored as a result of structural violence. While target 16.1 refers to 'reducing all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere', target 5.2 explicitly states 'eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation'. Domestic violence or sexual violence within marriage were long seen, and still are in many countries, as private issues that should not be raised outside of the family. SDG 5 explicitly ensures that these forms of violence are included in wider discussion of 'all forms of violence'.

Sources: Kabeer, N. and Natali, L., 'Gender equality and economic growth: is there a win-win?', Institute for Development Studies Working Paper, no. 417 (Feb. 2013), pp. 34–35; Bjarnegård, E. and Melander, E., 'Disentangling democratization, gender, and peace: The negative effects of militarized masculinity', *Journal of Gender Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2 (2011), pp. 139–154; and Galtung, J., 'Violence, peace, and peace research', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 3 (1969), pp. 167–91.

sanitation, has been expanded into at least six goals (SDGs 6 and 7 on water, sanitation and energy and SDGs 12, 13, 14 and 15 on environmentally sustainable development) as well as targets in other goals, such as SDG 11 on sustainable cities and communities, and education for sustainable development in SDG 4.

With regard to health, where dramatic gains have been realized, a number of goals have been collected into a single goal, SDG 3 on good health and well-being. SDG 3 is not the only 'health-related' goal—there are elements of health in other SDGs, such as: the SDG 5 targets on harmful practices including female genital mutilation (target 5.3) and access to sexual and reproductive health (target 5.6); SDG 11, on resilience to natural disasters (target 11.5); and SDG 16 on reducing violence, among others.

In other cases, unfinished agendas have been updated. MDG 2 on promoting universal primary education has been expanded in SDG 4 to the concept of a quality education, which includes universal secondary completion (target 4.1), equal access to 'affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university' (target 4.3), and the knowl-

edge and skills necessary to promote sustainable development (target 4.7). Similarly, MDG 8 on global partnership for development has been updated to SDG 17, 'Partnership for the goals' and expanded to include a number of 'implementing targets' included for each SDG. 'Promote gender equality and empower women' in MDG 3 has been updated to 'Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls' in SDG 5, a strong revision based on the limited global progress on gender equality. For example, while 90 per cent of countries increased the proportion of women in parliament between 1995 and 2015, only one in five parliamentarians were women in 2015.⁴ Furthermore, interlinkages have been built between the goals, such as between gender and peace (see box 9.2).

Figure 9.1 shows that a number of new elements have been added to the SDGs that reflect an expansion of the development paradigm beyond that previously seen in the MDGs, including goals related to the private sector (SDG 9 on industry, innovation and infrastructure) and livelihoods (SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth). There was very little about the private sector or access to decent jobs in the MDGs, apart from a few targets in MDG 8 about access to markets. SDG 10 addresses increasing global inequality, both within and between countries, and addresses the mechanisms for promoting more equal economic growth, including promoting growth of the income share of the bottom 40 per cent of the population (target 10.1), fiscal, wage and social protection policies (target 10.4), economic and political inclusion (target 10.2), stability of financial markets (target 10.5) and representation and voice for developing countries in global decision making (target 10.6). Inequality was only mentioned in the MDGs in the third indicator of target 1 of MDG 1 (share of poorest quintile in consumption), and was not an explicit goal or target. The introduction of SDG 11 applies the new development paradigm specifically to the development challenges of cities, reflecting current trends in global urbanization and the importance of cities as the engines of global economic growth.

The most notable innovation in the SDGs related to security and development is the inclusion of SDG 16 on peace, justice and institutions, which represents a monumental shift in how development practitioners understand development. The goal reads, 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels' and reflects the evolving conceptualization of security and peacebuilding as a key component of development.⁵ This is significant because, while the Millennium Declaration had

⁴ United Nations, *The Millennium Development Goals Report, 2015* (United Nations: New York, 2015).

⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators*, Note by the Secretary-General, 17 Dec. 2015.

Box 9.3. Measurement: indicators for the SDGs

Since the endorsement of the new agenda, the world's attention has shifted from goals and targets to indicators and data collection. The UN Secretary-General, in his synthesis report on the post-2015 agenda, *The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet*, called for a comprehensive programme of action on data to be established. In response, on the 6 March 2015, the United Nations Statistical Commission created an Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) to develop an indicator framework for monitoring the goals and targets at the global level, and support its implementation.

On 26–28 October 2015, members of the IAEG-SDGs met in Bangkok to review and discuss the indicators that would be used to monitor progress with the SDGs. After extensive consultation, the IAEG-SDGs produced a draft list comprised of 229 indicators for the 17 SDGs and associated targets. Of these, 80 indicators were marked with an asterisk, 'indicating that at the time of the submission of this report further work was required to better understand the existing proposals and reach consensus' (para. 25). Many of these asterisked indicators are related to peace, justice and institutions. Consultations are scheduled to continue until the indicator list is finalized in March 2016. Finalization of indicators, including those for which a methodology is not yet universally accepted, may continue until 2017.

Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators, E/CN.3/2016/2, 17 Dec. 2015.

emphasized peace and security as prerequisites for poverty reduction, peace and security were not included in the MDGs and were often overlooked as part of the broader development agenda in the period 2000–15.⁶

Clearly, the ambition and scope of the global development agenda has been scaled up with the SDGs, but the sheer size of the agenda has also increased. The MDGs comprised 8 goals with 18 targets and used 48 indicators to monitor progress towards those targets. The SDGs have 17 goals, with a total of 169 targets. Of these 169 targets, 62 are implementing targets, which will be used to assess global commitment and delivery on the processes and inputs necessary to meet the goals. Even without the implementing targets, however, the SDGs still have 104 targets (more than double the MDGs). While the indicators for the SDGs have not been formalized yet (see box 9.3), 229 indicators are currently proposed. Since the targets in the SDGs are global, but are intended to be set and monitored by each nation, this scaling up represents a significant challenge to developing countries, particularly those with limited capacity that had fallen behind with the MDGs. If a country is already struggling to implement or even monitor progress towards the 8 goals and 18 targets of the MDGs, it is unlikely to be able to deliver on the 17 goals and 104 targets of the SDGs.

While the MDGs served to focus global attention on a number of development issues, it remains an open question whether they had any impact on

⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/res/55.L.2, 8 Sep. 2000.

accelerating development. Those countries that reached their development goals and contributed to global success, such as China, would probably have done so without the MDGs. At the same time, many other countries lag behind and will not reach several of the MDGs for many years. For this reason, a recurrent theme in the design of the SDGs has been to 'leave no one behind'. This principle of the new agenda reflects the reality that lagging development in some of the most fragile and dangerous places threatens to create even greater inequality between states (SDG 10) and that the violent reversals and setbacks in a few countries can have negative impacts on the rest of the world.

Six pivotal reviews and events in development policy, 2015

As the MDG era came to a close in 2015 it was also an opportunity for the international community to reflect on development practice. In the light of the mixed success with the MDGs, the year saw a number of reflective reviews on the practices of global development, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Six were pivotal:

1. *The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015–30*, adopted at the Third UN World Conference in Sendai, Japan, on 18 March 2015, is the successor instrument to the Hyogo Framework for Action, 2000–15, a 10-year plan to reduce disaster losses. The Framework puts government at the centre of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and recognizes that DRR is essential to achieving sustainable development.⁷

2. *The High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (HIPPO) released its report on 17 June.⁸ The HIPPO report calls for four essential changes to ensure that UN peace operations are able to play their role in building and sustaining peace: recognizing the primacy of politics; a full spectrum of UN peace operations; stronger global-regional partnerships; and field-focused and people-centred approaches.

3. *The Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, designated by the UN Secretary-General, submitted its report on 29 June.⁹ It represents the first part of a two-stage review of the role and position of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), as well as the UN's operational entities active in

⁷ United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–30*, (UNISDR: Geneva, 2015).

⁸ United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, A/70.95, S/2015/446, 17 June 2015. See also the discussion on HIPPO in chapter 7, section III, of this volume.

⁹ United Nations, *The Challenges of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, 29 June 2015.

peacebuilding. The report consists of four parts: part I introduces the concept of ‘sustaining peace’; part II outlines the changing global context for conflict and peacebuilding; part III presents an assessment of what the UN has done well and what it has done poorly; and part IV presents concrete proposals to build coherence in delivering sustainable peace. The report made six key recommendations: (a) promote intergovernmental coherence; (b) improve peacebuilding capacity in the UN system; (c) build peacebuilding partnerships outside the UN; (d) more predictable financing for peacebuilding; (e) increase the early or catalytic role of the PBF in risk-taking investments; and (f) promote leadership and broader inclusion in national peacebuilding processes.

4. *The Third International Conference on Financing for Development* was held in Addis Ababa on 13–16 July 2015.¹⁰ Heads of State and Government, and High Representatives agreed a global framework for financing development. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which was adopted as a result of the conference, focused on: (a) strengthening public policies, regulatory frameworks and finance at all levels; (b) unlocking the transformative potential of people and the private sector; and (c) incentivizing changes in financing as well as consumption and production patterns to support sustainable development.

5. *The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* (IDPS) is the first forum for political dialogue to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners and civil society.¹¹ The International Dialogue is composed of members of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the G7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states and member organizations of the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). Throughout 2015, the IDPS has hosted a number of events to reflect on how global development dialogue, including the SDGs and financing for development, will be implemented in countries affected by conflict and fragility. Its fifth global meeting will take place in Stockholm on 5 April 2016.

6. *The 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC, COP 21 or 2015 Paris Climate Conference) took place on 30 November to 12 December 2015.¹² The UNFCCC is one of the three Rio conventions adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 as an international political response to climate change, biodiversity loss and

¹⁰ Third International Conference, Financing for Development, <<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd3/>>.

¹¹ The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, <<http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/>>.

¹² The 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Climate Conference, <<http://www.cop21paris.org/>>. See also the discussion on climate and security in chapter 12 of this volume.

desertification. The main outcome of the Paris Conference was an international agreement on reducing carbon emissions and keeping global warming below 2°C compared to preindustrial levels. Whereas the Kyoto Protocol set targets only for industrialized countries, the Paris agreement applies to all parties. A number of the SDGs are oriented to reducing climate change and its effects. Because the COP 21 and SDG processes are interlinked, it is expected that the agreements in Paris will contribute to achieving sustainable development and ending poverty, as well as building stronger economies, and safer, healthier and more resilient societies.

Fragility: why development lags in dangerous places

While peace is necessary for development, it is not sufficient. There are many places where an absence of violence exists, but development does not follow. This can be because of an implicit threat of violence or other structural conditions that preclude development. These conditions are considered ‘fragile’ by development practitioners. Fragility refers to situations in which institutions—both state and non-state—have insufficient capacity to resolve disputes, absorb and respond to shocks and stresses, and otherwise create a resilient environment for development. Most of the lagging development from the MDGs is concentrated in fragile situations.¹³

During the MDG period, \$1.7 trillion was spent on development.¹⁴ There were a number of successes, but the circumstances for millions of people living in dire conditions have either remained largely unimproved or deteriorated. If the world is to truly leave no one behind in the SDG age, it will have to make unprecedented progress in fragile situations.

Fragility more than just fragile states

The term ‘fragile state’ is often used to describe a country that cannot manage economic, environmental or political shocks and stresses through institutional processes. As others have noted, this assessment is a subjective process, often undertaken at the expert level.¹⁵ Lists of fragile states are produced annually by a number of international authorities, including the World Bank through its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) process.¹⁶ The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index compiles 12 clusters of indicators using sophisticated modelling software. Each of the 12 clusters

¹³ United Nations (note 4).

¹⁴ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, Official Development Assistance, 2000–14, Charts, tables and databases, <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data.htm>>. (Based on 2013 US\$ prices and exchange rates).

¹⁵ For a critique of the term fragile state, see Milante, G. and Jang, S., ‘Security and development: a primer’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2015*, pp. 297–333.

¹⁶ The World Bank, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, <<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/CPIA>>.

Table 9.1. Descriptive statistics: dangerous places, China, India and the rest of the world, 2015

	No. of countries	Total population (b.)	Average rate of violent deaths (per 100 000 population)	Refugees (per 100 000 population)	Displaced persons (per 100 000 population)
Dangerous places	100	2.582	14.2	562	1829
China	1	1.364	1.1	15.4	–
India	1	1.295	3.0	0.8	93
Rest of the world	110	1.996	2.5	4.8	7

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the World Bank, UNHCR and GBAVD, *The Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015).

is comprised of a number of sub-indicators, many of which are national or internationally available (and replicable) statistics, but it also includes expert assessment through human analysis and qualitative indicators.¹⁷ In the past, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has constructed a 'fragile states list' based on the World Bank and the Fund for Peace lists.¹⁸ At the time of writing, however, it is unclear whether the OECD and the World Bank will continue to publish fragile states lists in the future.

Because of the diversity of fragility-related challenges, it is not clear what the value of fragile states lists is to policymakers. The label itself can be a source of contention, especially when used to 'name and shame' a country with weak institutions. Moreover, because the underlying indicators are often slow-moving and backward looking the lists often do not reflect current realities or are not useful in anticipating future shocks. In addition, the state-level focus (derived from using mainly national statistics), may omit regional variations of fragility within a state.¹⁹ While debate continues on the use of the term, the concept of 'fragility' is useful as it refers to places, systems and situations where caution should be applied to strategic planning and special care taken in programme and project design.

Towards the concept of dangerous places

Without a fragile state list, analyses at the cross-country level can still be useful for assessing progress on development, including aggregating groups

¹⁷ The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, <<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>>.

¹⁸ For the 2015 list of fragile states and economies used to prepare the 2015 OECD report on States of Fragility, see <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/List%20of%20fragile%20states.pdf>>.

¹⁹ Bengtsson, S., 'Fragile states, fragile concepts: a critical reflection on the terminology of fragility in the field of education in emergencies', ed. J. Paulson, *Education, Conflict & Development: Oxford Studies in Comparative Education* (Symposium Press: Oxford, 2011); Brinkerhoff, D. W., 'State fragility and failure as wicked problems: beyond naming and taming', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 2 (Dec. 2014), pp. 333–44; and Call, C. T., 'The fallacy of the "failed states"', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 8 (Dec. 2008), pp. 1491–1507.

of countries and comparing their qualities for the purpose of monitoring progress towards goals such as the SDGs. Because fragility can transcend income levels—as demonstrated by experiences in the Arab Spring, Pakistan and Colombia, for example—income levels are insufficient for identifying fragility. Rather than using fragile states lists for the reasons described above, the analysis below examines development in dangerous places.²⁰ Dangerous places are defined as countries with high rates of violent death, and major sources of refugees and/or internally displaced persons (IDPs).²¹

For the purposes of this analysis, countries are categorized as dangerous places if their rate of violent deaths puts them among the top 25 per cent of countries (46 countries) or they are in the top 40 per cent of countries that are sources of refugees or IDPs per capita (78 countries, 24 of which have high levels of violent deaths).²² This yields a list of 100 dangerous places. Some basic descriptive and comparative statistics for these countries are shown in table 9.1, which also shows the stark difference between dangerous places, and China, India and the rest of the world. While the 100 countries considered dangerous places constitute roughly one-third of the world's population, their average rate of violent death, refugees and displacement are significantly higher than the rest of the world combined.

For further comparison, figure 9.2 shows the dangerous places based on the above criteria, overlaid with the 2015 OECD Fragile States List and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) List of Humanitarian Emergencies in 2015 (see section II,

²⁰ While it is acknowledged that the term 'dangerous places' is also a negative classification, it may be preferable or at least tolerable to policymakers, since it is defined by objective and replicable criteria.

²¹ Annual violent deaths are as reported in the 2015 Global Burden of Armed Violence (GBAV), which includes intentional homicides and best estimates of conflict-related deaths, see Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, *The Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015); Refugees are as reported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency) in its statistical yearbook and mid-year report, see UNHCR: *Mid-Year Trends, 2015* (UNHCR: Geneva, Dec. 2015). The term 'refugees' is used to denote refugees and persons in refugee-like situations excluding Palestinian refugees under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate (see notes 2 and 3, page 20 of the UNHCR report for details on the distinction); and global figures for internal displacement are regularly reported through best estimates by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), see IDMC, 'Global figures', <<http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>>.

²² Specifically, they are included if the violent death rate per 100 000 population is greater than 10.84—the top quartile of global violent deaths for all countries with data in the GBAVD 2015 (note 21). A country is also considered a dangerous place if the number of refugees/persons in refugee-like situations and IDPs is greater than 63.55 per 100 000 population—the upper two quintiles (highest 40%) for this statistic. Due to their scale, China and India are considered separately. These thresholds are artificial, but they are convenient for a number of reasons: (a) much of the literature on homicide has invoked 10 per 100 000 as a 'high' level of violence in the past, and the highest quartile conveniently delivers a similar cut-off; (b) the highest two quintiles for displacement is a convenient cut-off for policy discussions; (c) based on 2015 data, these two cut-offs yield a convenient list of 100 countries; and (d) these cut-offs capture most of what is regarded as 'fragile' in the OECD list (see figure 9.2).




Figure 9.2. Comparing the 100 dangerous places, the OECD Fragile States List and the UNOCHA Humanitarian Emergencies List

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UNOCHA = United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Sources: Authors' calculations based on the OECD Fragile States List 2015; UNOCHA, 'Emergencies', [n.d.], <<http://www.unocha.org/where-we-work/emergencies>>; Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, *The Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015); UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 'UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2015', UNHCR, Geneva, Dec. 2015; and World Bank Databank, 'Population, total', <<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>>.

box 9.4).²³ There is clearly a significant overlap of countries where the four lists intersect—Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. In these countries there is little doubt about the presence of violence or the threat of violence and the concomitant fragility of their systems. What is more striking about figure 9.2 is the fact that more than 80 per cent of the OECD Fragile States List and the UNOCHA emergency list are captured by the dangerous places designation. The only OECD list countries not captured by the dangerous places list are Egypt, Kosovo, Madagascar and the Solomon Islands, as well as four small states (Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Tuvalu) and North Korea, for which there is no data. Meanwhile, the countries with UNOCHA emergencies not captured by the OECD Fragile States List but captured by the dangerous places designation are Guatemala, Honduras, Senegal and Ukraine. Burkina Faso was the only country in 2015 to experience a humanitarian emergency (heavy rains, flooding and heavy winds in August 2015) but not qualify as a dangerous place or be included on the 2015 OECD list.

In addition, the dangerous places designation picks up a number of countries for which violence or the threat of violence are clearly affecting development, either directly through conflict (e.g. Colombia) or interpersonal violence (e.g. South Africa, Mexico and Venezuela), or through the displacement of those fleeing dangerous places (e.g. Cambodia, El Salvador, Russia and Turkey) to escape persecution or seek greater freedom. A number of countries on the list do not regularly appear in discussions of fragility (e.g. Armenia, Ghana, Iran and Macedonia), but their inclusion should raise questions about why the number of refugees and IDPs from these countries exceeds 60 per 100 000 population.

The designation of dangerous places has the advantage of not being state-centric. While the statistics presented here are aggregated at the national level, most of the fragile situations, including the emergencies discussed below, are regional, subnational, provincial, rural or urban, suggesting that most of the dangerous places are in fact localities or subnational phenomena rather than state level concerns. Refugees and displacement are generally from affected areas and violent death rates can vary widely within countries. For example, murder rates in Guatemala in 2012 ranged by province from 4 to 89 per 100 000 population, while the national rate was 34.²⁴ Similarly, development and health outcomes can vary widely across countries, particularly for those affected by humanitarian emergencies.²⁵ With

²³ Small states with populations under 500 000 are not listed individually in figure 9.2 but included in the analysis in this section.

²⁴ See Pachico, E., 'Mapping Guatemala's murder hotspots', *Insight Crime*, 31 Jan. 2013.

²⁵ Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), *People Affected by Conflict: Humanitarian Needs in Numbers, 2013* (CRED: Brussels, 2013).

commitments in the SDGs to collect increasingly disaggregated data, more nuanced analyses could identify dangerous places at the local, subnational and regional levels of fragile systems and inform better targeted responses.

The alternative designation of dangerous places proposed here uses publicly available and objective data that is simple to use and easy to replicate, and it can be easily disaggregated at the subnational, provincial or city levels. Figure 9.2 shows that it also captures nearly all of the OECD Fragile States List and the UNOCHA list, and certainly captures the core of the ‘most fragile’ of the situations in these lists, by any definition. While the debate on the usefulness of designating countries as fragile through a fragile states list will continue, the remainder of the analysis in this section uses the designation dangerous places to assess who is most vulnerable to being left behind in the new age of the SDGs.

People living in dangerous places: the most vulnerable to being left behind in the age of the SDGs

The 2.6 billion people living in dangerous places face a number of barriers to attaining the ambitious vision of development outlined in the SDGs. Because of lagging development and unmet MDGs in countries affected by violence, the people and their governments have further to go to meet absolute goals such as eradicating poverty and ending hunger.²⁶ Because of legacies of violence and the persistence of conflict, they will have to build peace, resolve conflicts and build trust while attempting to deliver development over the next 15 years. Even if these societies have ended their conflicts, they are likely to have lost a generation of education and human capital formation and will continue to bear the costs associated with disability and the mortality of breadwinners.²⁷ Levels of migration mean they have less of the human and social capital necessary to build peace and development. These populations are often highly vulnerable and are at risk of being left behind in the next 15 years of development.

There are many ways that people can be left behind, four of which are considered in this section: excess deaths due to weak health systems, as represented by infant mortality; deaths due to violence; refugees and displacement; and poverty/lack of education. These measures are not exhaustive, but representative of the scope of the challenge in ensuring that no one is left behind in dangerous places in the development era (see table 9.2).

²⁶ United Nations (note 4).

²⁷ See Justino, P., ‘Violent conflict and human capital accumulation’ *MICROCON Research Working Paper* 54 (Oct. 2011); and Blattman, C., ‘Post-conflict recovery in Africa: The micro level’, eds. S. Devarajan et al., *Oxford Companion to the Economics of Africa* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010).

Poverty, education and health

Of the 2.6 billion people living in dangerous places (a third of the world's population), 458 million live on less than \$1.90 a day.²⁸ This is a poverty rate of 16 per cent, but some of these countries have extremely high rates of poverty (Burundi 79 per cent, CAR 76 per cent, DRC 72 per cent, Guinea-Bissau 63 per cent, Liberia 59 per cent and Rwanda 49 per cent). Poverty rates above 45 per cent are notable because only a quarter of developing countries have managed to reduce poverty at a rate greater than 2 per cent a year for a period of longer than three years, only 10 per cent of countries have managed to reduce poverty at a rate greater than 3 per cent a year and no country in the world has documented poverty reduction of 3 per cent a year sustained over 15 years.²⁹ Of the 100 dangerous places, 13 have poverty rates above 45 per cent. Based on past performance it is therefore highly unlikely that poverty will be eradicated by 2030.

The challenge of eradicating poverty is largely concentrated in dangerous places. While dangerous places represent 36 per cent of the world's population, they are home to 61 per cent of the world's poor. China currently has approximately 41 million people living on less than \$1.90 a day, India 155 million and the rest of the world 99 million. So, while 458 million poor people live in dangerous places, the total number of people living in poverty elsewhere is 345 million. The population elsewhere, however, is 4.7 billion people—nearly twice that of the population of dangerous places. Thus, the poverty rate in dangerous places is more than twice that of the rest of humanity. Only five countries in the rest of the world have poverty rates above 45 per cent: Benin, Madagascar, Micronesia, Mozambique and Zambia.

Like poverty, the education goal in the SDGs is universal. Target 4.1 reads, 'By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education...'. Current rates of secondary school enrolment paint a stark picture of the challenge and the prospects of achieving universal secondary education. Applying today's secondary enrolment rates to the total youth population (aged 0–14) in dangerous places yields 396 million youths who are not expected to complete secondary school and are at risk of being left behind in the next 15 years of development. Although poverty and missing education are correlated, they are unique phenomena, so it is unknown how many of the poor are at risk of being uneducated. In the rest of the world, including China and India, 198 million children are likely to be left behind by education, which means that 67 per cent of today's

²⁸ \$1.90 a day is the new global poverty line, based on 2011 US dollars and current estimates of purchasing power parity. Data updated by Chandy, L., Noe, L. and Zhang, C., 'The global poverty gap is falling: billionaires could help close it', *Up Front*, 20 Jan. 2016.

²⁹ See Milante, G., 'A thousand paths to poverty reduction', eds. L. Chandy, H. Kato and H. Kharas, *The Last Mile in Ending Extreme Poverty* (Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 2015).

youth who are likely to be under educated by 2030 live in dangerous places. These large, vulnerable populations also represent tremendous potential for accelerating development in dangerous places.

Health and the provision of public health, like most development topics, are broad, and this section cannot do justice to the scope of the nine targets described in SDG 3: Good health and well-being. One indicator of the quality of health systems that is widely available, including in low capacity developing countries, is infant mortality—used here as an indicative measure for all of the health targets.³⁰ Target 3.2 specifically calls for an end to preventable deaths of new-borns by reducing infant mortality rates to below 12 per 1000 live births. Using this as a cut-off, it is possible to count expected excess deaths of infants based on current infant mortality rates. Obviously, any infant death is a tragedy but annually there are an estimated 2 million preventable deaths of infants in dangerous places above the target rate of 12 per 100 000. China has a rate of infant deaths below 12 (9.4), and thus has no ‘excess deaths’. India and the rest of the world have 1.1 million preventable deaths, but a population of 700 million more people than the population of dangerous places. Since infant mortality is just one component of the health system, 2 million deaths a year in dangerous places is a highly conservative estimate—many more are lost every year due to weak health systems.

Violence, refugees and displacement

Like excess deaths due to a poor health system, every violent death represents someone who will be left behind in the next 15 years, especially in the light of SDG 16, target 1: ‘Significantly reduce violence and violence-related deaths’. Unlike preventable deaths in health systems, which are limited by medical advancements, there are few ‘acceptable’ levels of violent death—every violent death is conceivably preventable. When all violent deaths are counted, dangerous places account for 365 000 violent deaths a year, compared with 14 000 in China, 39 000 in India and 51 000 in the rest of the world.³¹ Dangerous places have 36 per cent of the world’s population, but 78 per cent of the world’s violent deaths. The violent death rate for this group of countries is quite high, at 14.6 (New York, formerly considered a dangerous city, has not seen an intentional homicide rate like this since the mid-1990s, currently it is around 4 per 100 000).³² With more than triple the violent deaths and only half the population of the rest of the world, including China and India, the challenge of reducing violence and related deaths is clearly concentrated

³⁰ Reidpath, D. and Allotey, P., ‘Infant mortality rate as an indicator of population health’, *Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health*, no. 57 (2003), pp. 344–46.

³¹ Global Burden of Armed Violence (note 21).

³² Authors’ calculations based on New York Police Department’s Crime Statistics, CompStat, <http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/crime_prevention/crime_statistics.shtml>; and US Census Bureau, <<http://www.census.gov/>>.

in dangerous places. The scale of the challenge associated with violence is conservative as it measures only violent deaths and does not include injuries or disability caused by political, social or interpersonal violence, including gender-based violence. The 365 000 lives lost every year do not include all of the years lost for those who survive violence and must recover from debilitation, or risk being left behind on other SDGs (resultant poverty, missed education, other health effects etc.).

Vulnerable people living in fragile situations were largely left behind by the MDGs. At the end of 2014, nearly 60 million individuals around the world had been displaced by violence and conflict, including 14.8 million refugees and persons in refugee-like situations.³³ There were also over 38 million IDPs.³⁴ If these people constituted a country, it would be the 25th largest in the world, roughly the population of South Africa or South Korea.³⁵ They are probably not included in most of the official statistics for the countries listed in table 9.1, and therefore represent an additional challenge for meeting the SDGs in table 9.2.

The baseline for peace is being set quite low by the SDGs in 2015, with more than 15 million refugees, more than 40 million displaced and 5 million Palestinians in refugee-like situations. However, until durable solutions for the 60 million refugees, IDPs and persons in refugee-like situations are found, there is a risk that many of the world's poorest and most vulnerable will be left behind by the next round of development. Nearly all refugees come from dangerous places, which account for 36 per cent of the world's population, but are the source of 98 per cent of the world's refugees and 97 per cent of IDPs. The prevalence of the internally displaced in dangerous places is a reminder that the challenge is not at the state level—many people find refuge within their country of nationality. In these situations, it would be more accurate to identify dangerous places at the subnational level, such as Darfur, Abyei, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

However, it should be noted that not all (or even most) refugees leave dangerous places and find refuge in the rest of the world. While Syria, Somalia, the CAR, Afghanistan, Eritrea and South Sudan are the major sources of refugees, perhaps surprisingly, they also host a high number of refugees per capita. Not all dangerous places are a source of refugees. Lesotho and Brazil, for example, are the source of less than 1 per 100 000 population refugees. Meanwhile, Jordan and Lebanon bear the brunt of global refugee hosting

³³ On the definition of refugees see note 21, and also the discussions in chapter 2, section III, and chapter 11, section III, in this volume.

³⁴ 2015 mid-year estimates by IDMC put the number of displaced (including newly displaced) closer to 42 million. See note 21.

³⁵ Population data is from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables* (UN: New York, 2015).



Figure 9.3. People at risk of being left behind

per capita. Lebanon is hosting 25 785 refugees per 100 000 population—a ratio of less than 4 nationals to 1 refugee; while Jordan is hosting 10 051 per 100 000 population. For the sake of international comparison, Sweden hosts 1467, Malta hosts 1426 and Norway hosts 915 per 100 000 population.³⁶

³⁶ UNHCR (note 21); and World Bank population data, <<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>>.

Conclusions

The SDGs reflect an expanded conceptualization of development that is significantly more ambitious than the MDGs. Though dangerous places are home to 36 per cent of the world's population, they account for 508 to 951 million people (61 to 64 per cent) of the global number at risk of being left behind (table 9.2).³⁷ Countries that lagged behind on delivery of the MDGs face a more ambitious agenda in the SDGs, with both a broader definition of development and higher targets. In addition, they often start from further back. With the adoption of the SDGs, 2015 was a year of reflection on disaster response, financing for development, climate change policy, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, intended to retool the global architecture for delivering the SDGs.

Those working on issues related to fragility have moved past the 'post-conflict' lens to a richer understanding of how fragility, in all its manifestations, affects development. Globally, the language has moved away from 'failed and weak states' to fragility, complexity and resilience—terms that provide traction for more honest conversations about peacebuilding and statebuilding. The challenges for reaching the SDGs need not employ the artificial distinction between fragile and non-fragile states. Instead, the analysis shows that people living in dangerous places have the furthest to go in delivering development and peace. They also bear the brunt of the challenges to peace measured by violent deaths and refugee numbers.

³⁷ Because many of the poor are likely to be under-/uneducated, the estimates for poor and uneducated cannot simply be added together. The lower bound estimate for the range 508 to 951 million (and other ranges in table 9.2) are calculated by adding poor to violent deaths, infant deaths and refugees, while the upper bound estimate includes those unlikely to complete secondary school and the internally displaced.