I. Global and regional trends in peace operations

JAĪR VAN DER LIJN AND TIMO SMIT

Global trends

Number of peace operations

A total of 62 multilateral peace operations were conducted across five continents in 2014, 3 more than in 2013. The total number of operations increased for the third year in a row following a downward trend in 2007–11. Except for 2007, there were more peace operations in 2014 than any other year in the decade spanning 2005–14 (see figure 5.1).

In 2014 there were seven new operations: four in Africa and three in Europe. Two new missions were launched in the Central African Republic (CAR). The European Union (EU) Military Operation in the CAR (EUFOR RCA) complemented the existing international stabilization efforts, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) replaced both the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA, also known as AFISM-CAR) and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA). In South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) deployed the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM). In Mali, the African Union (AU) Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) became formally responsible for the implementation of the AU’s new regional strategy for the Sahel region, from which point onwards it also qualified as a peace operation according to SIPRI standards (see section IV).

The 3 new missions in Europe were all established in response to the conflict in Ukraine. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established two separate monitoring missions: the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine and the OSCE Observer Mission (OM) at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk. The EU launched its Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine

---

1 The quantitative analysis presented here draws on data collected by SIPRI to examine trends in peace operations in the 10-year period 2005–14. It is limited to missions that meet the SIPRI definition of a peace operation (see section IV below). The data presented provides a snapshot of peace operations that were active in 2014 and is meant to serve as a reference point to enable comparative analysis between 2014 and previous years. Aggregate personnel figures are calculated based on deployments in missions as of 31 Dec. 2014 or, in the case of operations that were terminated in 2014, the date of closure. They do not represent maximum or average numbers deployed, or the total number of personnel deployed during the year. Personnel figures exclude locally recruited national staff, UN volunteers and civilian (contracted) staff in NATO-led operations. The data in SIPRI’s database on multilateral peace operations is reviewed and adjusted if more accurate information becomes available. Therefore, the statistics included in this analysis may not always fully correspond with statistics used in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook or the content of the database accessed after publication of the Yearbook.
(EUAM Ukraine) to support the new Ukrainian Government in reforming its security sector.

Six peace operations terminated during 2014, most notably the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The other missions that closed were all deployed in Africa. France’s Operation Serval was concluded and replaced by a larger regional counterterrorism presence across the Sahel (Operation Barkhane), which falls outside the scope of peace operations. In the CAR, MISCA and BINUCA were absorbed into MINUSCA. The mandates of the EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (EUPOL RD Congo) and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) were not renewed.

### Number of personnel deployed

Altogether, the operations that were active during 2014 deployed 162 052 personnel—20 per cent less than at the end of 2013. Total deployments decreased for the fourth consecutive year and were the lowest since 2005 (see figure 5.2).\(^2\) Excluding ISAF, however, the total personnel deployed in operations in 2014 increased for the third consecutive year, by 4 per cent to 148 716—a new record high.\(^3\)

\(^2\) This steady decline is largely the result of the drawdown and eventual conclusion of ISAF, which at its height in 2011 deployed more than 130 000 troops.

\(^3\) To avoid double counting, MISCA and BINUCA personnel are excluded from personnel aggregates at the time of their closure, since they were integrated into MINUSCA. The Multinational

---

**Figure 5.1.** Number of multilateral peace operations, by type of conducting organization, 2005–14

![Figure 5.1](image_url)
The seven new operations accounted for a total of 10,303 personnel. Other missions with significant personnel expansion during 2014 included the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The total number of personnel deployed in these three missions increased by 10,552.

In total, 12 operations deployed more than 5000 personnel and 7 operations deployed more than 10,000 personnel in 2014. With 21,925 personnel, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) was the largest peace operation in 2014; with only slightly less personnel (21,279), AMISOM was the second largest and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was the third (16,836). Despite its gradual withdrawal during 2014, ISAF was still the largest peace operation during large parts of the year.

Over the course of 2014, NATO and its partner countries in ISAF withdrew 44,793 troops from Afghanistan. Five ongoing operations also significantly reduced their personnel. UNAMID shrank by 3668, the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) by 2384, the UN Mission in Liberia

---

Figure 5.2. Number of personnel deployed to multilateral peace operations, 2005–14

ISAF = International Security Assistance Force; MNF-I = Multinational Force in Iraq.

---


4 This figure includes MISCA personnel that were re-hatted and incorporated into MINUSCA.
(UNMIL) by 1663 and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) by 1435. The relatively small UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights reduced its personnel by 306—a reduction of approximately 25 per cent. Finally, at its conclusion at the end of July 2014, Operation Serval comprised 900 fewer troops than at the end of 2013 (c. 2400 less than at its height in the first half of 2013).

Conducting organizations

The UN remained the main conductor of peace operations in 2014. Including UNAMID, it was responsible for 22 of the 62 peace operations (see figure 5.1). In its operations the UN deployed 110,288 personnel, more than two-thirds of the total personnel in peace operations in 2014. Nine UN operations comprised more than 5000 personnel, including five with more than 10,000 personnel (including UNAMID).

The number of OSCE missions increased from seven to nine. With 423 personnel, the SMM in Ukraine was by far the largest of these, comprising more personnel than all the other ongoing OSCE missions combined. The EU launched 2 new missions in 2014, EUFOR RCA and EUAM Ukraine, which brought the total number of peace operations in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to 13—the second largest number after the UN. Nevertheless, the EU’s contribution to peace operations in terms of personnel remained minor as it continued to focus on relatively small training and capacity-building missions. It deployed

---

5 UN figures include peace operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and UNAMID.
3579 personnel, whereas France alone deployed 4000 in its three military operations in the CAR, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.

The AU surpassed NATO in terms of personnel and was—for the first time—the second largest contributor to peace operations, with 27 368 personnel deployed in AMISOM, MISAHEL and MISCA. The two operations led by NATO (ISAF and the Kosovo Force, KFOR) deployed 17 982 personnel by the end of 2014. The AU and NATO each led an operation with more than 10 000 personnel (AMISOM and ISAF respectively) and AU-led MISCA had more than 5000 personnel when it was replaced by MINUSCA (see table 5.2 in section IV).

**Troop contributions**

The drawdown of ISAF also had a noticeable effect on the ranking of contributors of troops (see figure 5.3). Since 2006 the United States had consistently been the largest troop contributor to peace operations, because of its large contribution to ISAF. However, by the end of 2014, the USA had reduced its troops in ISAF to 5500, which made it only the fifth largest contributor of troops to peace operations. Ethiopia—the fourth largest contributor of troops in 2013—was the largest in 2014. The number of Ethiopian military personnel deployed in peace operations nearly doubled from 6493 in 2013 to 12 042 in 2014, largely due to the integration of more than 4000 Ethiopian troops into the ranks of AMISOM. With the exception of the USA, the 10 largest contributors of troops to peace operations (including ISAF) were from Africa and South Asia; France and the United Kingdom dropped out of the top 10 due to the conclusion of Operation Serval and the withdrawal of British troops from ISAF. Excluding ISAF, the USA is not among the top 20 countries in terms of personnel contributions, but France is in the top 10 as the only European country. As was the case in 2013, the 10 largest troop contributors together provided almost half of all the troops deployed in UN operations.

With regard to contributors of civilian police, Jordan surpassed Bangladesh as the largest contributor in 2014 but little else changed. The 10 largest contributors of civilian police to peace operations were also from Africa and South Asia, along with two Middle Eastern countries (see figure 5.4).

---

6 For much of 2014 the USA was still the largest troop contributor (incl. ISAF), e.g. in Oct. 2014 it still had c. 25 000 troops in ISAF.

In 2014, as in previous years, peace operations were primarily concentrated in Africa. Almost half of all missions (44 per cent) were deployed in Africa: 27 in 2014 compared to 25 in 2013 (see figure 5.5). Overall personnel deployments in Africa also increased, from 108,965 in 2013 to 116,723 in 2014, of which approximately 100,000 were troops (see figure 5.6).\footnote{The EU CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) was established on 15 Apr. 2014, but it did not start carrying out its mandate until it was officially launched on 15 Jan. 2015. As such, the mission is not included in the figures for 2014.}

This increase in personnel is part of a longer-term trend of steadily rising personnel numbers in operations in Africa. While Africa already overtook Asia and Oceania in 2013 as the region hosting the most personnel in peace operations, the closure of ISAF further widened the gap with other regions. At the end of 2014, personnel deployed in Africa exceeded the number of personnel operating in all other regions. Nearly 75 per cent of all personnel deployed in peace operations in 2014 were deployed in Africa. Given these margins, and in light of current trends, it is likely that Africa will remain the principal theatre for peace operations in the foreseeable future.

As in previous years, the UN was the predominant security actor in Africa. It was responsible for approximately half of all operations and 75 per cent of their combined personnel (see table 5.1). Despite the surge in
troops from AMISOM, personnel deployments in missions led by African regional organizations decreased slightly from 29,231 in 2013 to 28,313 in 2014. France conducted three operations in Africa unilaterally.

The total for 2013 includes personnel in the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), which was replaced by MINUSMA on 1 July 2013. It does not include personnel in the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX), since its personnel remained deployed in another regional follow-up mission: the AU-led MISCA. The total for 2014 includes MISCA, which was replaced by the UN mission MINUSCA on 15 Sep. 2014.
However, with the conclusion of Operation Serval on 1 August 2014 and Operation Licorne in January 2015, and their subsequent integration into Operation Barkhane, France’s military involvement in West Africa shifted even further towards counterterrorism in the Sahel region.\textsuperscript{10}

Developments in 2014 with regard to four operations in Africa are particularly noteworthy. First, the drawdown of UNMIL was affected by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and a number of planned processes that UNMIL was mandated to support were postponed. Instead, the mission was required to support the Liberian Government in its efforts to stop the spread of Ebola through facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance, including providing the necessary security conditions. However, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stressed that the mission ‘has not, and will not, enforce the Government-imposed isolation of affected areas’.\textsuperscript{11} UNMIL’s policy towards Ebola was primarily ‘limited engagement’.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} Following the conclusion of Operation Serval, French forces in Mali remained authorized to intervene in support of MINUSMA, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2164 (25 June 2014).


main UN response to the epidemic was the UN Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER) established by the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{13} However, countries contributing personnel to UNMIL were concerned about health risks and required measures to protect the mission’s personnel. The Philippines even decided to withdraw its forces.\textsuperscript{14} By the end of 2014, four UNMIL personnel had contracted Ebola, two of whom died.\textsuperscript{15} The UN Security Council also recognized that the Ebola outbreak had slowed down the peacebuilding process and decided to suspend the further drawdown of the mission.\textsuperscript{16}

Second, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of MONUSCO continued to play an active role in the DRC. It assisted in the defeat of the rebel forces of the M23 movement and the weakening of the Islamist Allied Democratic Forces–National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF–NALU). Following these successes, the UN Security Council reaffirmed that the neutralization of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) would remain a top priority in the DRC.\textsuperscript{17} In August, MONUSCO finalized a planned reconfiguration to focus on eastern DRC, while handing over substantial responsibilities to the UN Country Team in western DRC.\textsuperscript{18} MONUSCO had already increased its presence in the southern province of Katanga earlier in the year in response to the deteriorating security situation in that region.\textsuperscript{19} The FIB, with its focus on offensive actions, is a clear departure from the traditional principle of neutrality in peacekeeping operations. It remained, therefore, the subject of much debate throughout 2014. Among other things, a number of troop-contributing countries feared that the FIB’s offensive actions might endanger the other contingents in MONUSCO, which continued to engage in regular peacekeeping operations and were only equipped for such purposes.\textsuperscript{20} At the same time, the

\textsuperscript{13} UN General Assembly Resolution 69/1, 23 Sep. 2014.
general perception of the local population in eastern DRC was that MONUSCO was not doing enough to protect civilians from rebel groups operating in the area. A series of violent demonstrations against contingents of MONUSCO in October and November resulted in the deaths of at least two civilian protestors. The UN has launched investigations into the causes of these deaths.

Third, on 22 January, AMISOM increased its authorized troop ceiling from 17,731 to 22,126, largely by integrating more than 4,000 Ethiopian troops already deployed in Somalia. AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) successfully recovered towns and large areas in central and south Somalia from the Islamist group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Youth Movement, or al–Shabab). However, the Federal Government of Somalia was less successful in stabilizing these areas and delivering public services. Other issues faced by AMISOM included the cancellation of the deployment of a new Sierra Leonean contingent due to fears of spreading Ebola, as well as reports of human rights violations by AMISOM troops.

Fourth, UNAMID was unable to improve the security situation in Darfur as it deteriorated further and led to hundreds of thousands of newly displaced persons. Given the unwillingness of a number of UN Security Council members to increase UNAMID’s budget, the Secretariat instead proposed to increase its efficiency, bolster its force posture and refocus its tasks on protecting civilians and mediation. UNAMID faced growing criticism in the media over its failure to take action against human rights violations. At the same time, UNAMID’s relationship with the Sudanese Government deteriorated to the extent that the latter requested UNAMID
to make preparations to leave Darfur. At the end of 2014 it was reported that UNAMID had put in place plans to downsize.

Other developments in African peace operations include the Ethiopian Government, the main troop-contributing country to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), stating that it would have to reconsider its contribution to the mission if Sudan and South Sudan—both affected by civil war—did not make any further progress in resolving their dispute. In Libya, the security situation deteriorated to the extent that all internationally recruited personnel of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) were evacuated in July. Despite appeals by the UN Secretary-General and human rights organizations, the renewed mandate for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) did not include human rights monitoring. The UN Security Council also ignored the Secretary-General’s call to slow the drawdown of UNOCI during the sensitive electoral period in Côte d’Ivoire, and lowered the authorized troop size as planned. However, it did approve the establishment of a quick reaction force within UNOCI, which, within the context of inter-mission cooperation, is also mandated to temporarily reinforce UNMIL without a Security Council resolution. Lastly, in response to discussions in the media about a future role for the UN in the fight against the militant group Boko Haram, the UN made it clear that it would not be sending a rescue mission to liberate a group of around 300 schoolgirls abducted by Boko Haram from the town of Chibok in Nigeria.

For developments with regard to the four new operations in the CAR, Mali and South Sudan, as well as the missions already deployed in those areas, see section II.

**The Americas**

The long-standing operations in the Americas—the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA), led by the Organization of

---


American States (OAS), and MINUSTAH—continued in 2014. Together, they accounted for 7552 personnel, 16 per cent less than in 2013. This decrease was caused by a decline in personnel deployed in MINUSTAH, which has been drawing down since its post-earthquake surge in 2010. In 2014 the UN Security Council decided that the security situation in Haiti allowed for an accelerated reduction of MINUSTAH’s authorized force levels, from 7621 to 4971 uniformed personnel.\(^\text{35}\) However, a number of South American countries were concerned by this reduction, viewing it as purely based on the need to reduce expenditure so as to divert additional funds to operations in Africa.\(^\text{36}\) As MINUSTAH still comprised 7532 personnel by the end of 2014, it is likely that total deployments in the Americas will continue to decline through 2015. The MINUSTAH operation was at the centre of a controversy in 2014 when UN peacekeepers fired on protestors during large anti-government demonstrations in Port-au-Prince on 12 December. MINUSTAH later announced that it would investigate the ‘alleged excessive use of force’.\(^\text{37}\)

Asia and Oceania

Seven peace operations were active in Asia and Oceania during 2014, compared to eight in 2013. In total, these operations deployed 14 189 personnel, 44 850 fewer than in 2013.

This decrease can be fully attributed to the drawdown of ISAF, which terminated on 31 December after 13 years of deployment in Afghanistan (see section III). Over the course of 2014, ISAF reduced its military footprint from 58 129 in January to 13 336 in December. The December total is the approximate number of troops NATO and its partner countries will keep in Afghanistan throughout 2015 as part of the follow-up Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

The other missions operating in this region have been relatively stable in terms of mandates and personnel. The most notable developments were in the Philippines, and India and Pakistan. The International Monitoring Team (IMT), which monitors the ceasefire between Philippine government forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, completed its ninth rotation on 12 March 2014. It will continue its monitoring mission following the implementation

---


on 27 March 2014 of a comprehensive peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the MILF, albeit in a slightly smaller formation. Amid renewed skirmishes between India and Pakistan, the latter requested a strengthening of the role of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). India, however, was opposed to such a strong international role in what it considered to be a strictly bilateral issue.38

Europe

In 2014 there were 18 peace operations active in Europe, 3 more than in 2013. The total number of personnel deployed in Europe decreased by 106 to 9361. As noted above, the three new missions were all established in response to the conflict in Ukraine.39 By the end of 2014 these missions comprised 494 civilian personnel. All other missions in Europe maintained relatively stable personnel levels throughout 2014, with the exception of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), which reduced its personnel from 1109 in 2013 to 688 in 2014. This reduction reflects a decision by the EU to phase out the mission between June 2014 and June 2016, after which it will cease its advisory role to the Kosovar police and customs services. EULEX Kosovo’s team of international prosecutors, which have the authority to initiate and prosecute serious criminal cases in Kosovo, have subsequently stopped investigating new cases. Initial proposals by the European External Action Service (EEAS) called for a far-reaching reduction in size and scope of the mission. The Kosovar Government also pushed for a quick end to the operation. However, EU member states instead chose to implement a more phased reduction.40 Despite its significant downsizing, EULEX Kosovo remained in 2014 the largest civilian CSDP mission by far.

Another noteworthy development in 2014 was the appointment of the Norwegian Major General, Kristin Lund, as the new Force Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Lund is the first woman to assume the position of Force Commander in a UN peace operation, and UNFICYP—which also has a female Head of Mission—is the first UN peace operation with dual female leadership.41


39 On the conflict in Ukraine, see also section II below and chapter 3 in this volume.


Finally, in 2014 a European troop-contributing country to a UN peace operation was held liable for the deaths of civilians for the first time. Relatives of the victims of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated the case with the district court of The Hague in the Netherlands. The court’s verdict in July 2014 was that Dutch peacekeepers in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) could have done more to prevent the killing of at least 300 civilians that had sought shelter at UNPROFOR’s compound. The Dutch state was ordered to pay compensation to the families of these victims, who were among the 7000 men and boys killed in Srebrenica.42

The Middle East

Nine operations were active in the Middle East during 2014, one less than during 2013. The total number of personnel deployed in the region decreased by 551 to 14,227. This was mainly the result of reductions in personnel in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights.

UNDOF suffered numerous setbacks in 2014. At the end of August, the al-Nusra Front detained 44 Fijian peacekeepers and surrounded an additional 73 Philippine peacekeepers at a border crossing located between Israeli- and Syrian-controlled parts of the Golan Heights. UNDOF’s quick reaction force extracted a number of Philippine personnel. Following instructions from Manila, the remaining Philippine peacekeepers disobeyed orders from UNDOF’s Force Commander and refused to surrender. They held their position against al-Nusra Front attacks for several hours before withdrawing to safety.43 In exchange for the Fijian soldiers, the al-Nusra Front demanded, among other things, compensation for the killing of three of its members by UN soldiers and that the group be removed from the UN terrorism list.44 UNDOF completely withdrew its presence from Syria, to the Israeli side of the border, and within two weeks the Fijian soldiers were released.45 However, these events—following on from earlier incidents of abduction of UNDOF and UN Truce Supervision Organization

(UNTSO) personnel—meant that a decreasing number of countries were willing to contribute to UNDOF.\textsuperscript{46} The Philippines also withdrew its contingent, reducing UNDOF’s force level by roughly 25 per cent (to 306 personnel).

In 2014 Israel launched a new offensive against the Hamas-controlled area of Gaza, leading to a significant upturn in violence. The EU offered to support international efforts to resolve the conflict by reactivating, and possibly extending, the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)—which suspended activities following the Hamas takeover of the area in 2007—and the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). However, this offer of support did not lead to further action.\textsuperscript{47} Earlier in the year, President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority issued a proposal suggesting that a US-led NATO operation could patrol a future Palestinian state for an indefinite period. In his view, the NATO mission would offer reassurance to the Israelis and protection for people living in the area.\textsuperscript{48}

Meanwhile, in Syria, the Syrian opposition called for a UN peace operation to observe a future ceasefire in the conflict. A document released by the opposition stated that a transitional governing body would “prepare and oversee a total ceasefire by taking immediate measures to stop military violence, protect civilians and stabilize the country in the presence of UN observers”.\textsuperscript{49}

The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

On 11 June 2014 the UN Security Council met to discuss new trends in UN peacekeeping. The UN Secretary-General in his opening remarks emphasized the evolving nature of the peacekeeping environment and the complex challenges that many operations face. UN peace operations are increasingly mandated to operate in complex and volatile theatres where (a) ‘there is no peace to keep’ or political process to support; (b) it can be unclear who the parties to the conflict are; and (c) peacekeepers face asymmetric and unconventional threats.\textsuperscript{50}

In light of this, the Secretary-General told the Security Council that he would initiate a review of UN peacekeeping—nearly 15 years after a similar effort produced the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Oper-


\textsuperscript{50} United Nations, Security Council, 7196th meeting, S/PV.7196, 11 June 2014.
Among the issues needing to be addressed, the Secretary-General stated the following: increased capabilities (including unarmed drones), rapid deployment, command and control, and cooperation with regional organizations. On 31 October 2014 the Secretary-General announced the establishment of a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations under the chairmanship of José Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former President of Timor-Leste. The panel is tasked with assessing the current state and future needs of UN peacekeeping, and examining issues such as the changing nature of conflict, mandates, partnerships, human rights and the protection of civilians, and uniformed capabilities. It will make recommendations to the Secretary-General, which will be placed on the agenda for discussion at the UN General Assembly’s general debate in September 2015.

---

52 Security Council (note 50).