III. Patterns of organized violence, 2004-13

MARGARETA SOLLENBERG AND PETER WALLENSTEEN UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM

This section provides a 10-year overview of three categories of organized violence used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): state-based conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence. The number of incidents of violent action that resulted in the deaths of at least 25 people in a particular year (the threshold for inclusion in the UCDP) was exactly the same in 2013 as in 2004, at 106. The number of state-based conflicts in 2013 was also the same as in 2004. Over the decade, however, the emphasis has shifted from one-sided violence, which was the largest category in 2004, to non-state conflict, which was the largest category in 2013. The number of campaigns of one-sided violence has declined steadily over the decade to almost half the number recorded in 2004, whereas the number of non-state conflicts increased dramatically. The number of state-based conflicts shows less of a clear trend, fluctuating between 31 and 37 over the period (see figure 4.4). Looking at the overall trend in the number of fatalities from organized violence, a more distinct-and troubling-trend emerges. Largely due to developments in state-based conflict, and particularly due to the Syrian conflict, 1 the number of deaths from organized violence increased from about 30 000 in 2004 to nearly 56 000 in 2013 (see figure 4.5).²

Within the overall trend, each of the three types of violence has its own internal dynamics and is also affected by the dynamics of the other types. The full picture of this relationship is, of course, more complex and there is no obvious positive or negative correlation between the three types of violence.

¹ Information on all types of organized violence in Syria in 2012 and 2013 is highly uncertain and imprecise, which affects the possibility of reliable coding of violence. This concerns the identification of different types of violence, and the actors involved in that violence, as well as estimating the number of deaths by violence. Fatalities are likely to have been underestimated, and there may also be many more non-state conflicts and actors involved in one-sided violence than the UCDP has been able to identify. The fatalities incurred by such actors are unknown. In the state-based conflict, it has not been possible to identify all the separate organizations fighting the Syrian Government, and these organizations are therefore grouped together as 'Syrian insurgents'. Thus, all the information on Syria included in the tables and figures, as well as the number of non-state conflicts and actors carrying out one-sided violence, should be treated with caution. See Themnér, L. and Wallensteen, P., 'Armed conflicts, 1946–2013', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 51, no. 4 (July 2014), pp. 541–54. See also chapter 2 in this volume for a discussion of the armed conflict in Syria.

² See section II of this chapter for a discussion on gender aspects of organized violence and the differential effects of violence on fatality rates among men and women. However, as is noted in that section, the sources used to compile fatalities data in the UCDP do not allow gender distinctions to be made.




Figure 4.4. Number of state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts, and campaigns of one-sided violence, 2004–13

State-based conflicts

State-based conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility between two parties—at least one of which is the government of a state—that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force by the parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year (see 'Sources and methods' below for more detail).³ A state-based conflict that results in 1000 battle-related deaths in a year is classified as a 'war' in that year; other state-based conflicts are classified as 'minor state-based conflicts'.⁴ This definition extends from low-intensity conflicts that are active for just one or a few years—such as the territorial conflict in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya State, India, between the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) and the Government of India, active in 2012—to high-intensity, protracted conflicts that persist for a long period—such as the conflict over governmental power in Afghanistan which has involved a variety of rebel groups, as well as the military forces of other states, since 1978.

In the 10-year period 2004–13 there were 74 active state-based conflicts, including 33 that were active in 2013 (see table 4.3).⁵ While the number of active conflicts in the first and last year of the period was the same, the

³ This category is called 'armed conflict' in other UCDP data sets.

⁴ The category 'minor state-based conflict' is called 'minor armed conflict' in other UCDP data sets.

⁵ Note that the UCDP counts fighting between different sets of actors over the same type of incompatibility (government or territory) in the same country as a single conflict.




Figure 4.5. Fatalities due to state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts and onesided violence, 2004–13

years in between saw two separate peaks, one in 2008–2009 and one in 2011 (see table 4.4).

The trend in the number of battle-related deaths over the decade was more dramatic. Starting at about 18 200 fatalities in 2004, the number increased to 44 100 in 2013 (see figure 4.5).6 This increase was uneven, and there were significant drops in the death toll in 2005 and 2010. The number passed 30 000 for the first time in the 10-year period in 2009, largely due to the dramatic escalation of the conflict in Sri Lanka. That conflict ended that same year with the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan also contributed to the peak. The conflict between the Afghan Government and the Taliban escalated and a new, intense conflict erupted between the Pakistani Government and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taleban Movement of Pakistan). The high number recorded for 2012 is by and large attributable to the conflict in Syria, which erupted in 2011. In 2013 organized violence in Syria involved all three categories of violence and a large number of actors as the situation became increasingly complex. Although impossible to verify, some sources point to the existence of as many as 1200 different organizations.7 The complexity of the situation and the intensity of the conflict have led to a situation in which the UCDP has found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to estimate reliable figures on fatalities. The vio-

⁶ For the full definition of battle-related deaths, see 'Sources and methods' below.

⁷ See e.g. Lund, A., 'The non-state militant landscape in Syria', *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 6, no. 8 (Aug. 2013), pp. 23–28.

lence is on such a scale that reporting on Syria no longer allows the establishment with any degree of certainty of which type of violence is occurring, which actors are involved or the resulting number of deaths. As an illustration of the magnitude of the problem, even the United Nations suspended updating its death tolls in July 2013. The reason given was the difficulty verifying and cross-checking information.⁸ Therefore, the number of battle-related deaths in Syria included for 2012 and 2013 in figure 4.5 should be treated with great caution and as representing an uncertain minimum number of estimated deaths.

UCDP data distinguishes between three types of state-based conflict: interstate, intrastate and internationalized intrastate. Interstate conflicts are fought between two or more governments of states. Intrastate conflicts are fought between a government of a state and one or more rebel groups. Internationalized intrastate conflicts are intrastate conflicts in which one or both sides receive troop support from an external state. Intrastate conflicts are by far the most common; in most years they account for more than 80 per cent of all conflicts, and never for less than 70 per cent. Interstate conflicts are the least common. In the 10-year period 2004–13 there were only three: between Djibouti and Eritrea (2008), Cambodia and Thailand (2011), and Sudan and South Sudan (2012). No interstate conflicts were active in 2013. Although rare, interstate conflicts should not be disregarded. Given the vast resources that can be mobilized by governments compared to rebel groups, conflicts between states can rapidly escalate causing high levels of fatalities.⁹

Internationalized intrastate conflicts have become increasingly common (see table 4.4).¹⁰ Both 2012 and 2013 saw nine such conflicts, the highest number in the period. This means that 27–28 per cent of the active statebased conflicts in these years had the involvement of one or more external actors. This is a very high share, compared to the long-term trend.¹¹ Since external involvement tends to prolong conflicts, the fact that more than a quarter of all current conflicts are internationalized does not bode well for future peacemaking efforts.¹²

⁸ Pizzi, M., 'UN abandons death count in Syria, citing inability to verify toll', Al Jazeera America, 7 Jan. 2014, <<u>http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/7/un-abandons-deathcountinsyria.html</u>>; and Cumming-Bruce, N., 'Death toll in Syria estimated at 191 000', *New York Times*, 22 Aug. 2014.

⁹ See e.g. Lacina, B. and Gleditch, N. P., 'Monitoring trends in global combat: a new dataset of battle deaths', *European Journal of Population*, vol. 21, nos 2–3 (June 2005), pp. 145–66.

¹⁰ For state-based conflicts in 2013 (table 4.3), state actors listed on either side of the conflict, in addition to the primary state actor, indicate that the conflict is internationalized.

¹¹ On the longer time period see Themnér, L. and Wallensteen, P., 'Armed conflicts, 1946–2010', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 48, no. 4 (July 2011), pp. 525–36.

¹² See e.g. Cunningham, D. E., 'Blocking resolution: how external states can prolong civil wars', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 47, no. 2 (Mar. 2012), pp. 115–27; and Aydin, A. and Regan, P. M., 'Networks of third-party interveners and civil war duration', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 18, no. 3 (Sep. 2012), pp. 573–97.

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Table 4.3. State-based conflicts in 2013

For more detailed definitions of the terms used see 'Sources and methods' below.

Location ^a	Parties	Incompatibility	Start year ^b	Fatalities, 2013	Change from 2012 ^c
Africa					
Algeria	Government of Algeria vs al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Government	1998/ 1999	147	-
CAR	Government of CAR, South Africa vs Séléka (Alliance)	Government	2012	104	+ +
DRC	Government of DRC vs Mouvement du 23 mars (M23, March 23 Movement), Rwanda	Government	2012	1 151	+ +
	vs Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS, Alliance of the People for a Free and Sovereign Congo)	Government	2012/ 2013	135	
	vs Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila	Government	2013	92	
DRC	Government of DRC vs Kata Katanga	Territory (Katanga)	2011/ 2013	94	
Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia vs Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	Territory (Ogaden)	1994	48	+ +
Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia vs Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	Territory (Oromiya)	1974/ 1977	25	0
Mali (Mali,	Government of Mali, Multinational coalition ^d				
Niger)	vs Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa)	Government	2013	328	
	vs Signed-in-blood-Battalion (al-Mouwakoune Bi-Dima)	Government	2013	68	
Mali	vs Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith)	Government	2012	60	
	vs al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Government	2009	305	
Mozambique	e Government of Mozambique vs Resistência nacional moçambicana (Renamo, Mozambican National Res	Government sistance)	1977	28	
Nigeria	Government of Nigeria, Chad, Niger vs Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachi and Jihad, or Boko Haram)		2009	1 614	+ +

Location ^a	Parties	Incompatibility	Start year ^b	Fatalities, 2013	Change from 2012 ^c
Somalia (Somalia, Kenya)	Government of Somalia, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Niger Sierra Leone, Uganda	ia,			
Kellya)	vs al-Shabab	Government	2008	926	
South Sudan	Government of South Sudan vs Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition)	Government	2013	1 195	
	vs South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army–Cobra Faction (SSDM/A–Cobra Faction)	Government	2011/ 2013	74	
Sudan	Government of Sudan vs Sudanese Revolutionary Army (SRF)	Government	2011	576	
Uganda	Government of Uganda, DRC vs Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	Government	1996	53	
(CAR, DRC)	Government of CAR, DRC, Uganda, South Sudan				
	vs Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Government	1988	47	
Americas					
Colombia	Government of Colombia vs Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias colombianas (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)	Government	1964	113	-
	vs Ejército de la liberación nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army)	Government	1965/ 1966	27	
USA (Afghanistan	Government of USA, Afghanistan,				
Pakistan, Somalia)	vs al-Qaeda	Government	2001/ 2001	38	
Asia and Oce	eania				
0	Government of Afghanistan, , Multinational coalition ^e				
Pakistan)	vs Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan)	Government	1980	35	
	vs Taliban	Government	1995	8 013	0
India	Government of India vs Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI–Maoist)	Government	2004/ 2005	222	0
India	Government of India vs Kashmir Insurgents	Territory (Kashmir)	1984/ 1989	145	0
India	Government of India vs National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit (NDFB-S)	Territory (Bodoland)	2013	28	

Location ^a	Parties	Incompatibility	Start year ^b	Fatalities, 2013	Change from 2012 ^c
Malaysia	Government of Malaysia vs Sultanate of Sulu	Territory (Sabah)	2013	70	
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar vs Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5 (DKBA 5)	Government	2010	41	
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar vs Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)	Territory (Kachin)	1961	125	
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar vs Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS)	Territory (Shan)	1996	32	

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		, ,			
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar vs Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5 (DKBA 5)	Government	2010	41	
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar vs Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)	Territory (Kachin)	1961	125	
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar vs Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS)	Territory (Shan)	1996	32	
	vs Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)	Territory (Shan)	2006/ 2011	51	
Pakistan	Government of Pakistan vs Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taleban Movement of Pakistan)	Government	2007	1 630	-
	vs Lashkar-e-Islam	Government	2008/ 2009	99	
Pakistan	Government of Pakistan vs Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)	Territory (Baluchistan)	2004	45	+
Philippines	Government of the Philippines vs Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)	Government	1969	165	0
Philippines	Government of the Philippines vs Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Territory (Mindanao)	1993	48	-
	vs Moro National Liberation Front –Nur Misuari faction (MNLF–NM)	Territory (Mindanao)	2001	239	
	vs Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	Territory (Mindanao)	2012	62	+ +
Thailand	Government of Thailand vs Patani insurgents	Territory (Patani)	1965/ 2003	189	+
Europe					
Russia	Government of Russia vs Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	Territory ('Caucasus Emir	2007 ate')	316	-
Middle East					
Iraq	Government of Iraq vs al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (ISIS, Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham)	Government	2004	1 870	+ +
Syria	Government of Syria vs Syrian insurgents f	Government	2011 2	2 752 ^g	^g

Location ^a	Parties	Incompatibility	Start year ^b	Fatalities, 2013	Change from 2012 ^c
Turkey (Turkey, Iraq)	Government of Turkey vs Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party)	Territory ('Kurdistan')	1983/ 1984	30	
Yemen	Government of Yemen, USA vs al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Government	2009	582	

CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo

^{*a*} Location refers to the state whose government is being challenged by an opposition organization. If fighting took place elsewhere, all countries where fighting took place are listed in brackets. The location name appears once for each conflict in the location. There can only be 1 conflict over government and 1 conflict over a specific territory in a given location.

^b Start year refers to the onset of a given dyad (i.e. the fighting between a government and a rebel group or another government). The first year given is when the first recorded battle-related death in the dyad occurred and the second year is the year when fighting caused at least 25 battle-related deaths for the first time.

^c 'Change from 2012' is measured as the increase or decrease in the number of battle-related deaths in 2013 compared to the number of battle-related deaths in 2012. The symbols represent the following changes: + + = increase in battle-related deaths of >50%; + = increase in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; 0 = stable rate of battle-related deaths (-10 to +10%); - = decrease in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; - = decrease in battle-related deaths of >50%; ... = the conflict was not active in 2012.

^d The following countries contributed troops to the coalition in 2013: Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, China, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Côte d'Ivoire, Jordan, Liberia, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Tajikistan, Togo, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yemen.

^e The following countries contributed troops to the coalition in 2013: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the UK and the USA.

^fA large number of groups have been active. Some of the larger groups in 2013 were Ahrar al-Sham, Farouq Brigades, ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, Liwa al-Maqq, Liwa al-Tawhid and Suqour al-Sham.

^{*g*} The number for battle-related deaths in Syria in 2013 is a low estimate and is thus not comparable to other fatality numbers in the table, which are best estimates. Since this is the case, we refrain from making comparisons with 2012. For further information on the coding of Syria in 2013 see footnote 1 in this section of this chapter.

Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset, v. 1-2014, 1946–2013 and UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.5-2014, 1989–2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/.

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total	33 ^a	32 ^{<i>a</i>}	34	35	37 ^a	37 ^a	31	37	32	33
Intensity										
Minor	26	27	29	31	32	31	26	31	26	26
War	7	5	5	4	5	6	5	6	6	7
Туре										
Interstate	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-
Intrastate	29	27	29	31	30	30	23	29	22	24
Internationalized intrastate	4	5	5	4	6	7	8	7	9	9
Region										
Africa	10	7	10	12	13	13	10	15	13	13
Americas	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2
Asia and Oceania	15	16	16	14	15	15	12	13	10	13
Europe	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
Middle East	3	5	5	4	4	5	5	6	5	4

Table 4.4. State-based	conflict, b	y intensity,	type and	region, 20	004-13

^{*a*} Newly available information means that state-based conflicts have been added to the total for 2004 and 2009 given in *SIPRI Yearbook 2014*: the conflict between the Government of Myanmar and Karen National Union (KNU) in 2004 and the conflict between the Government of Mali and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2009. The following state-based conflicts have been removed from the total for 2005 and 2008 given in *SIPRI Yearbook 2014*: the conflict between the Government of Pakistan and Baloch Ittehad in 2005 and the conflict between the Government of India and Dima Halam Daogah–Black Widow faction (DHD–BW) in 2008.

The internationalized intrastate conflicts active in 2004–13 can be divided into two broad and sometimes overlapping groups: (*a*) conflicts linked to the USA's 'global war on terrorism', such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the USA's conflict with al-Qaeda; and (*b*) cases of government intervention in internal conflicts in neighbouring countries, such as the conflict between Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), where the government in 2013 received support from the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.

Of the 74 state-based conflicts active in 2004–13, 29 (or 39 per cent) were fought in Africa, 29 (39 per cent) in Asia, 8 in the Middle East (11 per cent), 4 in Europe (5.5 per cent) and 4 in the Americas (5.5 per cent).

Asia and Oceania had the highest number of active state-based conflicts in the first seven years of the period, with the annual number of conflicts ranging between 12 and 16. The number dropped to 10 in 2012, but increased again to 13 in 2013. This was still slightly lower than the years 2004–2009. The increase in 2013 was due to conflicts over territory in India and Myanmar, which resurfaced after a temporary lull, as well as the eruption of a brief conflict in Sabah State, Malaysia, over the self-proclaimed Sultanate of Sulu, whose claims to Sabah originate in the 17th century. Conflict began in February 2013 and ended about a month later when the insurgents were militarily defeated by the Malaysian Armed Forces.

While the number of conflicts in Asia and Oceania saw a slight decrease during the period, the number of battle-related deaths more than doubled from just over 5200 in 2004 to approximately 11 200 in 2013. The peak year was 2009 (over 22 000 deaths, see figure 4.6). The Asian conflicts became distinctly more deadly during the period, mainly due to developments in a few conflicts, most notably in Sri Lanka (until 2009), Afghanistan and Pakistan. The latter two were the most deadly state-based conflicts in Asia in 2013.

The number of conflicts in Africa increased from 10 in 2004 to 13 in 2013.13 Africa had slightly fewer conflicts than Asia and Oceania in 2004-10. After 2011, however, Africa became the region with the highest number of conflicts in the world. In 2013 the same number of state-based conflicts was recorded for Africa as for Asia and Oceania: 13. Among the 13 active conflicts in Africa in 2013 were some that had been temporarily inactive or seemingly resolved. In 2013 the Government of Uganda again became embroiled in fighting with both the Lord's Resistance Army and the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) after this conflict had been inactive in 2012. The conflict in Mozambique between the Government of Mozambique and Resistência nacional moçambicana (Renamo, Mozambican National Resistance), which had been settled by the 1992 General Peace Agreement, erupted once again in April 2013 and low-scale skirmishing continued throughout the year. A new conflict was recorded in the DRC, where the secessionist Kata Katanga fought for the territory of Katanga, which was last contested in the 1960s.

Battle-related deaths in Africa increased in the period 2004–13. There were just over 7100 battle-related deaths in 2013, which is slightly higher than the first year in the period, when there were 6000 deaths. There was a sharp fall in 2005 to 1600, after which the number of deaths climbed fairly consistently to the levels of 2012 and 2013 (see figure 4.6).

The number of conflicts in both the Americas and Europe remained fairly constant during the period 2004–13. There were two or three conflicts each year in the Americas and one or two conflicts active in Europe in any given year. The number of battle-related deaths declined overall in the Americas from 1800 in 2004 to fewer than 200 in 2013, although a slight break in the downward trend was recorded for 2009–10. The overall decrease was due to increasingly positive developments in the longrunning conflict in Colombia, linked to the ongoing negotiations between

¹³ For more information on conflict trends in Africa see section II of this chapter.




Figure 4.6. Battle-related deaths in state-based conflicts, by region, 2004-13

the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), as well as reduced activity in the conflict between the US Government and al-Qaeda.¹⁴ In Europe, the death toll dropped to around 300 deaths in 2013 compared to almost 1200 in 2004. Two peaks are visible in figure 4.6. The first is for 2004, driven by an escalation of the conflict in Chechnya. The second, for 2008, is a result of fighting in the internationalized conflict in Georgia between South Ossetia, supported by Russia, and the Government of Georgia.

In contrast to these regions, the Middle East has seen a sharp increase in the number of battle-related deaths, despite relatively little fluctuation in the number of conflicts during the period 2004–13. The number of battlerelated deaths in the Middle East increased from 4000 in 2004 to about 25 200 in 2012, a more than six-fold increase. This reflects the dramatic developments in the region over the decade. The deadly conflicts in Yemen and Syria had not begun in 2004. Although the death toll in the conflicts in Yemen and Turkey decreased in 2013 compared to 2012, these developments were overshadowed by the continuing deterioration in the conflict in Syria, as well as the escalation of the conflict in Iraq involving the al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (ISIS, Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham).

¹⁴ While the fighting in the conflict between the USA and its allies and al-Qaeda started on US soil with a series of terrorist attacks on 11 Sep. 2001, it then moved to other parts of the world. In 2004–13 fighting in this conflict mainly took place in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Non-state conflicts

A non-state conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two organized groups—neither of which is the government of a state—that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Non-state conflicts are divided into three subcategories according to the groups' level of organization: (a) conflicts between formally organized groups such as rebel groups; (b) conflicts between informally organized supporters and affiliates of political parties and candidates ('informally organized supporter groups'); and (c) conflicts between informally organized groups that share a common identification along ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal lines ('informally organized ethnic or religious groups').¹⁵ Thus, non-state conflict relates to a broad spectrum of violence that tends to greatly affect the civilian population but often has fewer implications for international relations than state-based conflict. For example, the category includes conflicts between highly organized groups, such as the two factions of the separatist National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), NSCN-Isaac-Muviah and NSCN-Khaplang, which are fighting in the Nagaland region in north-eastern India, as well as conflicts between ethnic communities in the Horn of Africa, such as that between the Pokot and Turkana in north-western Kenva.

A total of 238 non-state conflicts were active worldwide during the 10-year period 2004–13, including 48 that were active in 2013, which is the highest number of non-state conflicts in any single year (see table 4.5). The number of active non-state conflicts fluctuated with no clear pattern until 2010, after which a steep and continuous increase was recorded (see table 4.6).

The increase in the number of conflicts was accompanied by a rise in the number of fatalities. The 29 conflicts fought in 2004 accounted for a little over 3800 fatalities, while the 48 conflicts fought in 2013 caused almost 4200 fatalities. However the average number of people killed per conflict dropped dramatically from 133 in 2004 to 87 in 2013 (see figure 4.7). This decrease in the average number of deaths indicates that although there were more conflicts in 2013 than in any other year in the period, these conflicts were generally limited in scope and intensity. However, over the 10-year period, the trend in the number of non-state conflicts and the

¹⁵ There is a potential overlap between the latter 2 types of non-state conflict. In many countries, supporters of different political parties are almost by definition members of a specific ethnic group. During election years these groups are mobilized under a political banner, whereas they are mobilized as an ethnic group in conflict that occurs in other years. To get a good overview and be able to follow a conflict even though it is reported in different ways in different years, the UCDP has a coding rule that if there is a conflict involving 2 ethnic groups in 1 year, and these ethnic groups are then involved in fighting mobilized along political lines (i.e. as supporters of a party) in another year, all conflict years are coded as part of the same ethnic conflict.




Figure 4.7. Average number of fatalities in non-state conflicts, 2004-13

number of fatalities often diverged. This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the change from 2008 to 2009, when the number of conflicts dropped by five, while fatalities increased by more than 1500; whereas the number of conflicts increased by three from 2011 to 2012 but fatalities decreased by 2100. The change between 2012 and 2013 was mainly driven by the deescalation of three conflicts: those between the Lou Nuer and Murle ethnic groups in South Sudar; between the Juarez Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico; and between Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel, also in Mexico.

Although still active, the death tolls decreased to levels close to the average number of deaths for all non-state conflicts in 2013. The uneven development in the number and magnitude of non-state conflicts from one year to the next is characteristic of this type of conflict. Non-state conflicts rarely last for more than a year, but if they do the level of violence fluctuates greatly between years. Moreover, changes in individual countries, such as Mexico, Nigeria and Sudan, can have a major impact on conflict numbers and the number of fatalities as these countries account for a large proportion of all non-state conflicts.

The most common type of non-state conflict in 2004–13 was conflict between informally organized ethnic or religious groups. Of the 238 nonstate conflicts, 125 (53 per cent) were fought between such groups, while 107 (45 per cent) were between formally organized groups, such as rebel organizations. Conflicts between supporters and affiliates of political parties and candidates were uncommon: only 6 (3 per cent) were recorded in the entire period. This was the least common of the three subcategories of non-state conflict in all years of the period.




Figure 4.8. Subcategories of non-state conflict, by region, 2004-13

The vast majority of non-state conflicts in 2004–13 were located in Africa. Most of these were clustered in a few countries. Of the 154 non-state conflicts in Africa over the decade, 124 (80 per cent) were fought in six countries: the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan.¹⁶

There are distinct differences in the types of non-state conflict fought in each region. Africa was the only region where a majority of the conflicts involved ethnic or religious communities (see figure 4.8). In all other regions, a majority of the conflicts were between formally organized groups. This is particularly obvious in the Americas, where all the nonstate conflicts involved formally organized groups. The majority of these were drug cartels (e.g. in Mexico), but rebel groups and militias were also represented.

While the majority of deaths in non-state conflicts occurred in Africa, the average of 109 deaths per conflict there was well below the corresponding figure for the Americas: 237. The relatively limited intensity of non-state conflicts in Africa is in part due to the fact that most of these conflicts involve ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal groups, which cannot mobilize resources as effectively as formally organized rebel groups. In the Americas, by contrast, all the non-state conflicts in the Americas in 2013 involved Mexican drug cartels (see table 4.5).

¹⁶ On organized violence in the Horn of Africa see Baumann, J. et al., 'Organized violence in the Horn of Africa', SIPRI Yearbook 2012, pp. 57–64.

Table 4.5. Non-state conflicts in 2013

For more detailed definitions of the terms used see 'Sources and methods' below.

Location ^a	Side A	Side B	Organ- ization level ^b	Start year ^c	Battle-related deaths, 2013	Change from 2012 ^d
Africa						
Algeria	Arab Brabich	Tuareg Indinan	3	2013	27	
CAR	anti-Balaka	ex- Séléka	1	2013	69	
DRC	APCLS	NDC	1	2013	29	
DRC	M23	M23-R	ī	2013	29	
Ethiopia,	Borana	Burji, Gabra	3	2013	39	
Kenya Guinea	Konianke	Kpelle	3	2013	98	
Kenva	Pokot	Turkana	3	1995	28	••
Kenya	Degodia	Garre	3	2000	57	 + +
Mali	MAA	MNLA	1	2000	28	
Nigeria	Black Axe	Evie	1	2013	39	••
Nigeria	Boko Haram	Yan Gora	1	2011	92	••
Nigeria	Atakar	Fulani	3	2013	92 77	••
Nigeria	Agatu	Tiv	3	2013	42	••
Nigeria	Agatu	Fulani	3	2013	102	••
Nigeria	Fulani	Tarok	3	2013	102	
Nigeria	Birom	Fulani	3	2004	58	••
Nigeria	Fulani	Tiv	3	2002	164	- + +
Nigeria	Hausa	Jukun	3	2011	70	
Nigeria	Alago	Eggon	3	2013	35	••
South Sudan		Murle	3	2012	118	
	Amothnhon Dinka	Panyon Dinka	3	2008	25	
South Sudan		Nuer	3	1997	25 38	••
South Sudan Sudan			*			••
Sudan Sudan	Ma'aliyah Beni Hussein	Rizeigat Baggara		2002	229	••
Sudan	Awlad Heiban	Rizeigat Baggara	3	2013	311	••
Sudan	(Misseriya)	Awlad Metanin (Misseriya), Awla	ad	2013	80	
Sudan	Beni Halba	Serur (Misseriya) Gimir	3	2013	164	
a 1	Baggara	G.1	2	2012	407	
Sudan	Misseriyah	Salamat Baggara		2013	427	••
Sudan Americas	Ma'aliyah	Hamar	3	2013	38	••
Mexico	Gulf Cartel	Los Zetas	1	2010	339	_
Mexico	Jalisco Cartel	Los Caballeros	1	2010	127	-++
Mexico	New Generation (Cártel de Jalisco	Templarios (the Knights Templar	-	2012	127	+ +
	Nueva Generación)	о I				
Mexico	Autodefensas	Los Caballeros	1	2013	38	
	Unidas de Michoacán	Templarios (the Knights Templar)			
Mexico	Juarez Cartel	Sinaloa Cartel	1	2008	127	
Mexico	Gulf Cartel-	Gulf Cartel-	1	2003	35	
WEARO	Ramirez Treviño faction	Villareal faction	1	2013	55	
Mexico	Los Zetas	Sinaloa Cartel	1	2010	54	
Mexico	Los Zetas La Mochomera	Sinaloa Cartel	1	2010	27	
			-	2010	_,	
Asia						
Bangladesh	Supporters of	Supporters of	2	2013	31	••
India	Awami League Hindus	Jamaat-e-Islami Muslims	3	1989	68	
	(India)	(India)				
Myanmar	Buddhists (Myanmar)	Muslims (Myanmar)	3	2001	50	

Location ^a	Side A	Side B	Organ- ization level ^b	Start year ^c	Battle-related deaths, 2013	Change from 2012 ^d
Pakistan	Ansar ul-Islam (Supporters of Islam)	TTP (Pakistan)	1	2013	211	
Middle East						
Egypt	Opponents of Mohamed Morsi	Supporters of Mohamed Morsi	3	2013	119	
Lebanon	Alawite (Lebanon)	Sunni (Lebanon)	3	2012	67	+
Lebanon	Brigades of Aisha	Hezbollah (Party of God)	1	2013	26	
Syria	Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham (The Support Front for the People of Syria)	PYD	1	2013	56	
Syria	ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham		1	2013	37	
Syria	FSA, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham Mishʿal-at-Tammu Brigade	PYD	1	2013	41	
Syria	FSĂ	ISIS	1	2013	40	
Syria Syria	FSA FSA, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham	PYD Jabhat al-Akrad (Kurdish Front)	1 1	2013 2013	34 34	

APCLS = Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo); Boko Haram = Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings); CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; NDC = Ndumba Defence of Congo; M23 = Mouvement du 23-Mars (March 23 Movement); M23-R = Mouvement du 23-Mars-Runiga faction (March 23 Movement-Runiga faction); MAA = Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad (Arab Movement of Azawad); MNLA = Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad); TTP = Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Taleban Movement of Pakistan); PYD = Partiya Yektîya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party); ISIS = Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham); FSA = Free Syrian Army.

^{*a*} Location refers to the geographical location of the fighting.

^b Organization level: 1 = formally organized groups; 2 = informally organized supporter groups; and 3 = informally organized ethnic or religious groups.

^c Start year is the first year (since 1988) when conflict caused 25 fatalities.

^{*d*} 'Change from 2012' is measured as the increase or decrease in the number of battle-related deaths in 2013 compared to the number of battle-related deaths in 2012. The symbols represent the following changes: + + = increase in battle-related deaths of >50%; + = increase in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; 0 = stable rate of battle-related deaths (-10 to +10%); - = decrease in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; - = decrease in battle-related deaths of >50%; ... = the conflict was not active in 2012.

Source: UCDP Non-state Conflict Dataset, v. 2.5-2014, 1989–2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/ research/ucdp/datasets/>.

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total	29 ^a	29 ^a	27 ^a	21 ^{<i>a</i>}	35 ^a	30 ^a	28 ^a	41 ^{<i>a</i>}	44 ^a	48
Subcategory										
Formally organized groups	14	12	8	11	13	11	16	21	22	21
Informally organized supporter groups	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	1
Informally organized ethnic or religious groups	14	17	19	10	21	18	12	18	21	26
Region										
Africa	21	23	22	12	23	18	14	24	25	28
Americas	4	3	-	-	3	4	7	8	7	7
Asia and Oceania	2	3	4	6	8	8	6	7	8	4
Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Middle East	2	-	1	3	1	-	1	2	4	9

Table 4.6. Non-state conflict, by subcategory and region, 2004-13

^a Newly available information means that non-state conflicts have been added to the total for 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 given in SIPRI Yearbook 2014: the 4 conflicts between the Al-Maraziq and Al-Saida in Yemen, between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, between Burkinabé and Guéré in Côte d'Ivoire, and between Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) and Comando Vermelho (Red Command) in Brazil in 2004; the conflict between Mangal and Turi in Pakistan in 2007; the conflict between Afisare, Anaguta and Birom, on the one side, and Fulani and Hausa, on the other, in Nigeria in 2008; the 3 conflicts between Han Chinese and Uighur in China, between Lashkar of Mohmand tribe and TTP in Pakistan, and between Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) and Comando Vermelho (Red Command) in Brazil in 2009; the 2 conflicts between Birom, on the one side, and Fulani and Hausa, on the other, in Nigeria, and between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria in 2010; the 2 conflicts between Black Axe and Eyie in Nigeria, and between Comando Vermelho (Red Command) and Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Third Command) in Brazil in 2011; and, the 2 conflicts between Ikpanaya and Ntan Obu-Ukpe in Nigeria, and between Lashkar-e-Islam and Tehriki-Taliban Pakistan-Tariq Afridi faction (TTP-TA, Taleban Movement of Pakistan-Tariq Afridi faction) in Pakistan in 2012. The following non-state conflicts have been removed from the total for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 given in SIPRI Yearbook 2014: the conflict between Bachama, on the one side, and Fulani and Hausa, on the other, in Nigeria in 2004; the conflict between Dimasa and Karbi in India in 2005; the conflict between Supporters of Awami League and Supporters of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Bangladesh in 2006; the conflict between Supporters of All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) and Supporters of People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria in 2008; the conflict between Afisare, Anaguta and Birom, on the one side, and Fulani and Hausa, on the other, in Nigeria in 2010; and the three conflicts between Shia and Sunni in Pakistan, between Ansaar ul-Islam (Supporters of Islam) and Lashkar-e Islam (Army of Islam) in Pakistan, and between Lashkar-e-Islam and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taleban Movement of Pakistan) in Pakistan in 2012.

One-sided violence

One-sided violence is defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against unorganized civilians. A state or group that kills 25 or more unarmed civilians during a year is registered as carrying out one-sided violence in the UCDP data. This includes a wide variety of situations, ranging from largely small-scale, day-to-day attacks, such as those carried out in 2013 by Patani insurgents in southern Thailand, to large-scale cases such as the attacks on civilians by ISIS in Iraq and Syria as well as by the Government of the Central African Republic in the CAR.

In 2004–13, 116 actors were recorded as carrying out one-sided violence, including 25 that were active in 2013 (see table 4.7). The annual number declined markedly over the period, from 44 in 2004 (see table 4.8). The number of actors carrying out one-sided violence reached an all-time low in 2010, when 20 such actors were recorded.

This decline was matched by a drop in the number of fatalities as a result of one-sided violence at the beginning of the 10-year period, in 2004-2008, when the number of fatalities decreased every year, falling by 42 per cent between 2004 and 2005 (see figure 4.5). This was partly due to a decline in one-sided violence by both the Sudanese Government and the Janjaweed militia in Darfur. The end of the period saw widely fluctuating figures. There was an increase of 56 per cent in 2009-as both the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) and the LRA stepped up their campaigns against civilians in Central Africa. This was followed by a 47 per cent fall in the following year, when the activities of these actors de-escalated markedly. The number of fatalities increased dramatically again in 2011, this time by 72 per cent to almost 5600. The actions of the Syrian Government, which caused almost 3000 fatalities during the year, accounted for most of the increase. The largest change in the period 2004-13 came in 2013, when fatalities rose by 130 per cent to around 7700. Most of this increase was due to escalating one-sided violence in Syria as well as the occurrence of largescale violence in the CAR, in both cases involving state and non-state actors. As is noted above, the data on one-sided violence in Syria is extremely uncertain and incomplete, in terms of both actors and the number of fatalities. Conclusions on trends beyond 2011 cannot therefore be drawn with any degree of certainty.

As with non-state conflicts, the trend in the number of fatalities from one-sided violence can differ from the trend in the number of actors. For example, as the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence decreased from 29 to 21 between 2008 and 2009, the number of fatalities increased from approximately 4000 to almost 6200. Changes in the behaviour

Table 4.7. One-sided violence in 2013

For more detailed definitions of the terms used see 'Sources and methods' below.

Location ^a	Actor	Start year ^b	Fatalities, 2013	Change from 2012 ^c
Africa				
Algeria	Signed-in-blood-Battalion	2013	26	
CAR, DRC,	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1989	65	0
Sudan				
CAR	Government of CAR	2001	1 188	
CAR	ex-Séléka	2013	85	
CAR	anti-Balaka	2013	608	
DRC	Government of DRC	1989	30	
DRC	Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	1997	83	
DRC	Mouvement du 23-mars (M23, March 23 Movement)	2013	29	••
DRC	Ndumba Defense of Congo (NDC)	2013	69	••
DRC	Nyatura	2013	34	••
DRC	Kata Katanga	2013	173	••
Nigeria,	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People	2010	839	+ +
Cameroon	Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachir and Jihad, or Boko Haram)	ıg		
Somalia, Kenva	Al-Shabab	2008	185	+ +
South Sudan	Government of South Sudan	2012	74	+
Sudan	Government of Sudan	1989	27	-
Asia and Oced	ania			
Afghanistan	Taliban	2004	64	_
India	Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI–Maoist)	2005	124	+
Pakistan	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ, Army of Jhangvi)	1998	311	
Pakistan	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taleban Movement of Pakistan)	2007	496	+ +
Thailand	Patani insurgents	2004	60	_
Europe				
Russia	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	2010	40	
Middle East				
Iraq, Syria	al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (ISIS, Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham)	2004	2 078	+ +
Lebanon	al-Hizb al-Arabi al-Dimuqrati (ADP, Arab Democratic Party)	2013	47	
Syria	Government of Syria	2011	601	+ +
Syria	Syrian insurgents	2013	352	

CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo

^{*a*} Location refers to the geographical location of the one-sided violence.

^b Start year is the first year (since 1988) when one-sided violence caused 25 fatalities.

^c 'Change from 2012' is measured as the increase or decrease in the number of fatalities in 2013 compared to the number of fatalities in 2012. The symbols represent the following changes: + + = increase in fatalities of >50%; + = increase in fatalities of >10 to 50%; 0 = stable rate of fatalities (-10 to +10%); - = decrease in fatalities of >10 to 50%; - = decrease in fatalities of >50%; . . = the conflict was not active in 2012.

Source: UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.4-2014, 1989–2013, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/re search/ucdp/datasets/>.

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total	44 ^a	34 ^{<i>a</i>}	30 ^a	27 ^a	29 ^a	21	20	23 ^a	22 ^a	25
Actor type										
Non-state actors	34	24	20	19	21	17	19	14	15	20
State actors	10	10	10	8	8	4	1	9	7	5
Region										
Africa	18	12	10	15	14	8	7	10	12	15
Americas	3	4	1	-	2	1	2	1	-	-
Asia and Oceania	14	9	14	9	12	9	9	7	8	5
Europe	3	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1
Middle East	6	8	5	3	1	3	1	4	2	4

Table 4.8. One-sided violence, by actor and region, 2004-13

^{*a*} Newly available information means that actors carrying out one-sided violence have been added to the total for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012 given in *SIPRI Yearbook* 2014: the Government of Myanmar (Burma) in 2004; al-Qaeda in the United Kingdom and Indian Mujahideen in India in 2005; Indian Mujahideen in India in 2006; Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of Taiba) in India in 2007; the Government of Myanmar (Burma) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of Taiba) in India in 2008; Indian Mujahideen in India in 2011; and Mayi Mayi Kifuafua together with Raia Mutomboki in DRC, and the Government of Ethiopia in 2012. The following actor carrying out one-sided violence has been removed from the total for the years 2004, 2006 and 2007 given in *SIPRI Yearbook 2014*: Government of India.

of single actors are often responsible for such discrepancies. The increase in fatalities in 2009 was to a large extent due to the extensive violence committed by the LRA and the FDLR against civilians in the DRC.

Non-state actors were the most common perpetrators of one-sided violence in every year of the 10-year period 2004–13 (see table 4.8). Over the period as a whole, 86 of the 116 actors (74 per cent) were rebel groups or militias. This pattern was at its strongest in 2010, when all the actors except the Government of Myanmar were non-state actors. In 2011, however, there were nine state actors registered along with 14 non-state actors. This change in part reflected developments in North Africa and the Middle East, where governments targeted peaceful demonstrators during the Arab Spring.¹⁷

Non-state actors killed more civilians than state actors in every year of the 10-year period apart from 2011 (see figure 4.9). Nonetheless, one-sided violence by individual state actors can be particularly lethal. The two actors that killed the most civilians in a single year in 2004–13 were both governments: the Syrian Government in 2011, which caused over 2900 civilian deaths; and the Sudanese Government, which organized attacks in Darfur

¹⁷ See e.g. Allansson, M. et al., 'The first year of the Arab Spring', SIPRI Yearbook 2012, pp. 45–56; and Allansson, M., Sollenberg M. and Themnér, L., 'Armed conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring', SIPRI Yearbook 2013, pp. 19–27.




Figure 4.9. Fatalities in one-sided violence, by type of actor, 2004-13

in 2004 that led to the deaths of more than 2500 civilians. The third highest number of deaths was caused by ISIS, a non-state actor which killed approximately 2000 civilians in both 2007 and 2013.

Nearly half of all the 116 actors that targeted civilians in 2004–13 were in Africa (54), followed by Asia and Oceania (33), the Middle East (18), the Americas (7) and Europe (5). Over the decade, Africa saw the highest number of actors carrying out one-sided violence in all but three years—Asia and Oceania had more in 2006, 2009 and 2010 (see table 4.8).

Africa was the region with the highest number of fatalities in all but three years: 2007, 2010 and 2011. In 2010 the highest number of fatalities was in Asia, mainly due to a decrease in deaths from one-sided violence in Africa. In 2007 and 2011 the highest number of fatalities was in the Middle East, mainly due to attacks by ISIS in 2007, and to the large-scale targeting of unarmed civilians by the Syrian Government, which began during the popular uprising initiated in February 2011.

Conclusions

Developments in organized violence over the 10-year period 2004–13 demonstrate a bifurcated world. Some areas, such as Western Europe, North America, East Asia and Oceania, witnessed little or no violence in the form discussed in this section, while the Middle East, many parts of Africa and South Asia encountered all three types of recorded violence. Particularly worrying was the increased brutality of state-based violence, even to the point where it became difficult to record. Developments in Syria defy

any close counting for the time being: figures from different sources suggest up to 200 000 battle-related deaths in 2011–14.¹⁸ This suggests a level of annual fatalities that would be double the amount given in figure 4.5. The internal war in Syria, which began with the repression of a popular uprising, had by the end of 2013 developed into a humanitarian disaster as well as a highly complex situation involving many countries and subnational groups with a stake in the outcome.

In terms of fatalities, it is notable that the vast majority are attributable to the state-based conflicts. The other categories of organized violence discussed in this overview generate more sporadic killing, often in significantly lower numbers. Throughout this period, wars have tended to be a greater threat to the safety of inhabitants than communal conflicts, terrorism and other one-sided violence. Nonetheless, these forms of hostility constitute threats to particular regions and in particular contexts.

At the regional level, Africa and Asia continue to suffer the highest levels of bloodshed. However, events in Syria as well as the serious situation in Iraq and in Yemen show how a small number of conflicts can generate high levels of casualties. The situation for refugees and internally displaced persons demonstrated that the Middle East had become an exceptionally fragile environment by the end of 2013. Nonetheless, although it had risen to the top of the peacemakers' agenda, real achievements were absent. In 2014 Ukraine was added to this list of unresolved violent conflicts.

Sources and methods

Definition of state-based conflict

The UCDP defines state-based conflict as a contested incompatibility concerning government or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. The separate elements are defined as follows.

1. Incompatibility that concerns government or territory. This refers to the stated generally incompatible positions of the parties to the conflict. An *incompatibility that concerns government* refers to incompatible positions regarding the state's type of political system or the composition of the government. It may also involve an aim to replace the current government. An *incompatibility that concerns territory* refers to incompatible positions regarding the states of a territory and may involve demands for secession or autonomy (intrastate conflict) or aims to change the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict).

2. Use of armed force. This refers to the use of armed force by the military forces of the parties to the conflict in order to promote the parties' general position in the conflict. Arms are defined as any material means of combat, including anything from manufactured weapons to sticks, stones, fire or water.

3. *Party*. This refers to the government of a state, any of its allies, an opposition organization or an alliance of opposition organizations. The *government of a state* is the party that is generally regarded as being in central control, even by those organizations seeking to seize power. If this criterion is not applicable, the party controlling the capital of the state is regarded as the government. An *opposition organization* is any non-governmental group that has announced a name for itself as well as its political goals and that has used armed force to achieve them. A state or a multinational organization that supports one of the primary parties with regular troops may also be included in the table. In order to be listed in the table, this secondary party must share the position of one of the warring parties. A traditional peacekeeping operation is not considered to be a party to the conflict but is rather seen as an impartial part of a consensual peace process.

4. *State*. A state is an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally non-recognized government controlling a specific territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by an internationally recognized sovereign state that previously controlled the territory in question.

5. *Battle-related deaths*. This refers to deaths directly related to combat between the warring parties and can include both deaths on the battlefield and civilians caught in crossfire. The UCDP defines a state-based conflict that has incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths during a calendar year as a minor state-based conflict and any with at least 1000 battle-related deaths during a calendar year as a war in that year.

Definition of non-state conflict

The UCDP defines non-state conflict as the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. The separate elements are defined as follows.

1. Organized groups. There are three levels of organization. Formally organized groups (organizational level 1) are rebel and other organized groups whose level of organization is high enough to include them in the state-based conflict category. These include rebel groups with an announced name, as well as military factions. Informally organized supporter groups (organizational level 2) are groups composed of supporters and affiliates of political parties and candidates. These are commonly not groups that are permanently organized for combat, but which at times use their organizational structures for such purposes. Informally organized ethnic or religious groups (organizational level 3) are groups that share a common identification

along ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal lines. These are not groups that are permanently organized for combat, but which at times organize themselves to engage in fighting.

2. *Battle-related deaths.* The definition of battle-related death varies according to the level of organization of the fighting groups. For formally organized groups (organizational level 1) the recording of battle-related deaths follows the same criteria as for state-based conflict, that is, the warring groups must target representatives of the other formally organized group. Targeting of civilians, even if those civilians are of, for example, the same ethnicity as a group's rivals, is coded as one-sided violence. For informally organized groups (organizational levels 2 and 3), the definition of battle-related death is extended to include both civilian and armed victims as long as there is a pattern of violent (lethal) interaction between the groups, with both parties carrying out attacks.

Definition of one-sided violence

The UCDP defines one-sided violence as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians, which results in at least 25 deaths in a calendar year. Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded. The separate elements are defined as follows.

1. Use of armed force. This is the use of arms in order to exert violent force, resulting in death. Arms are defined as any material means of combat, including anything from manufactured weapons to sticks, stones, fire or water.

- 2. Government. See above.
- 3. State. See above.

4. Formally organized group. This can be any non-governmental group of people that has announced a name for the group and that uses armed force. This corresponds to 'opposition organization' as defined for the state-based conflict category and to 'formally organized group' as defined for the non-state conflict category.

5. *Extrajudicial killings in custody*. This is the killing by the government of a state of a person in its custody. In custody is defined as when a person is located in a prison or another type of government facility.

Sources

The data presented here is based on information taken from a wide selection of publicly available sources, both printed and electronic. The sources include news agencies, newspapers, academic journals, research reports, and documents from international and multinational organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In order to collect information on the aims and goals of the parties to the conflict, documents of the warring parties (governments, allies and opposition organizations) and, for example, the Internet sites of rebel groups are often consulted.

Independent news sources, carefully selected over a number of years, constitute the basis of the data collection. The Factiva news database is indispensable for the collection of general news reports. It contains more than 25 000 sources in 22 languages from 159 countries and provides sources from all three crucial levels of the news media: international (e.g. Agence France-Presse and Reuters), regional and local.

The UCDP regularly scrutinizes and revises the selection and combination of sources in order to maintain a high level of reliability and comparability between regions and countries. One important priority is to arrive at a balanced combination of sources of different origin with a view to avoiding bias. The reliability of the sources is judged using the expertise of the UCDP together with advice from a global network of experts (academics and policymakers). Both the independence of the source and the transparency of its origins are crucial. The latter is important because most sources are secondary, which means that the primary source also needs to be analysed in order to establish the reliability of a report. Each source is judged in relation to the context in which it is published. The potential interest of either the primary or

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the secondary source in misrepresenting an event is taken into account, as are the general climate and extent of media censorship. Reports from NGOs and international organizations are particularly useful in this context, complementing media reporting and facilitating crosschecking. The criterion that a source should be independent does not, of course, apply to sources that are consulted precisely because they *are* biased, such as government documents or rebel groups' Internet sites. The UCDP is aware of the high level of scrutiny required and makes great efforts to ensure the authenticity of the material used.

Methods

The data on organized violence is compiled by calendar year. It includes data on conflict locations, type of incompatibility, onset of the conflict, warring parties, total number of battle-related deaths, number of battle-related deaths in a given year and change in battle-related deaths from the previous year. See also the notes for tables 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7.

The data on fatalities is given the most attention in coding for the UCDP database. Information on, for example, the date, news source, primary source, location and death toll is recorded for every event. Ideally, these individual events and figures are corroborated by two or more independent sources. The figures are then aggregated for the entire year of each conflict. The aggregated figures are compared to total figures given in official documents, in special reports and in the news media. Regional experts such as researchers, diplomats and journalists are often consulted during the data collection. Their role is mainly to clarify the contexts in which the events occur, thus facilitating proper interpretation of the published sources.

The UCDP codes three different fatality estimates—low, best and high—based on the reliability of reports and the conflicting number of deaths that can be reported for any violent event. Unless explicitly noted in the text and tables, all the data presented above is based on the best estimate, which consists of the aggregated most reliable numbers for all incidents in each category of violence during a year. If different sources provide different estimates, an examination is made of which source is the most reliable. If no such distinction can be made, the UCDP as a rule includes the lower figure in the best estimate. The UCDP is generally conservative when estimating the number of fatalities. As more in-depth information on a case of organized violence becomes available, the conservative, event-based estimates often prove more correct than other estimates widely cited in the news media. If no figures are available or if the numbers given are unreliable, the UCDP does not provide a figure. Figures are revised retroactively each year as new information becomes available.