1. Introduction: international security, armaments and disarmament

IAN ANTHONY

I. The erosion of state legitimacy

States are the building blocks of the international system, but in many parts of the world in 2014 their role as pre-eminent security providers was being challenged. Although the specific nature of these challenges differed widely, depending on the context, a common thread was an underlying concern about the capacity of states to manage a mounting set of often interconnected problems of concern to citizens.

The wider risks posed by the loss of authority, the collapse of institutions and the emergence of ungoverned spaces in certain locations—such as Somalia—have been in focus for more than two decades. In 1995 the supplement to the *Agenda for Peace* launched by then United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali underlined that the collapse of state institutions created different kinds of problems when compared with interstate conflicts. The report stated that the loss of state functions provided by the police and judiciary opened the way for banditry, which could lead to the looting or destruction of national assets and the loss of important human capacity—through emigration or displacement. Recent events, many of which are documented in *SIPRI Yearbook 2015*, have heightened a number of these concerns.

One concern is that the cases of state collapse in Iraq, Libya and Syria may indicate an emerging trend in the Middle East. State failure in a significant number of large and powerful states in a region heightens insecurity and also creates spillover effects that may exacerbate existing risks and create new problems in neighbouring states and the region as a whole.

A second concern, in light of the networked activities of the Salafi movement and other violent extremist groups, is that some forms of state collapse may have a corrosive effect on states that are not near neighbours and may even be located in a different region. The evidence in 2014 suggests various types and degrees of connection between acts carried out by armed non-state groups within a space that includes territories in parts of North and West Africa, Central and South Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

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A third concern, given the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), is that groups and populations who lose confidence in the capacity of states may develop other affiliations—religious, national or ethnic—in the hope that their needs can be met more effectively. Order of a kind might be restored in ungoverned spaces, but by forces that do not conform to the general rules that states are expected to abide by (see chapter 2).

In sum, the underlying narrative regarding states appears to have changed over the past decade. The World Summit Outcome Document in 2005, which was adopted by consensus, accepted the principle that if a government is unable to meet its obligations, it might forfeit its legitimate authority in the eyes of the international community. This perspective on sovereignty, a key element in statehood, seems to be undergoing a reinterpretation in the current environment. It is debatable whether international action to strip authority from governments would be seen as a constructive approach today, even in cases where behaviour falls far short of the standards considered acceptable internationally.

The relationship between what can be called in shorthand the state-building paradigm and the peacebuilding paradigm is likely to be the focus of attention for the international community. When it was assumed that states were moving towards a common destination—albeit at different speeds and via different routes—there was no conceptual inconsistency between ideas based on human security and the promotion of a global civil society on the one hand and efforts to create order in a state through direct action by outside powers on the other. However, when external actors are reluctant to assume responsibility for the internal security of other states, or are uncertain about which kinds of intervention can play a constructive role, a reassessment is called for.

One manifestation of the need to reassess state performance has been an intensified discussion of state resilience, fragility, weakness and failure—including revisiting the meaning of these terms, and how they are used (see chapter 8). For well over a decade, identifying weak or fragile states has been an essential element in understanding where future threats lie and preparing appropriate kinds of intervention. Conversely, identifying the elements that make states resilient could be an important contribution to reducing the risk of state failure.

The analysis presented in this Yearbook suggests the need for a more graduated approach, however, as opposed to a binary determination that a state either is, or is not, fragile. A systemic approach is proposed, identifying the factors and processes that cause fragility—which may or may not be within the capacity of a state to control. The systemic approach recognizes that states have limited capacities to address the complex problems that

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could undermine their security. The idea that state performance should be monitored, and that there might be different degrees of statehood, depending on the outcome, can be seen as a challenge to the principle of sovereign equality, and equal rights and responsibilities of states. However, applying the graduated approach can also be seen as a pragmatic recognition of reality, since states with the same status \textit{de jure} have very different capacities \textit{de facto}.

Despite their legitimacy not being in question, many states clearly have serious deficits in one or more areas where a state is expected to perform to a certain standard (e.g. economic, judicial, military, political or social aspects). Moreover, the performance of a state is not static over time, and there have been efforts to measure both the decay of state institutions and also the strengthening of their capacity.\footnote{Ezrow, N. and Frantz, E., ‘Revisiting the concept of the Failed State: bringing the state back in’, \textit{Third World Quarterly}, vol. 34, no. 8, (2013), pp. 1323–38.}

In Europe, where 2014 saw a serious breakdown in security both regionally and within several states, the role of the state as a security provider is also being reassessed from different perspectives. It is too soon to make a definitive judgement on the future course of events, but whether Europe is returning, step-by-step, to a concept of security based on traditional forms of power politics has become a legitimate and widely asked question.

Despite the dense web of legal conventions, political agreements, institutions of different kinds and other instruments in place to build regional security systems, political crisis escalated into major conflict in Ukraine in the space of only a few months (see chapter 3). The incorporation of Crimea into Russia against the wishes of Ukraine triggered widespread fears that the consensus around the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states on which European security has been based is illusory (see chapter 6). However, the crisis that preceded the conflict also demonstrated that Ukraine had not succeeded in building a resilient and successful state that could meet the needs of all its citizens in the 25 years since becoming a sovereign entity.

A number of observers highlighted the domestic dimension influencing Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. A key factor identified in this analysis is the need to solidify support for the current Russian regime in the aftermath of massive domestic protests in 2011–12, and reduce any risk that developments in Ukraine might spread to Russia.\footnote{Makarychev, A. and Yatsyk, A., \textit{A New Russian Conservatism: Domestic Roots and Repercussions for Europe}, Notes Internacionals no. 93 (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB): Barcelona, June 2014).}

A second factor is a Russian formulation of the idea of a graduated approach to sovereignty noted above. According to this view, while the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states remains...
fundamental, the mechanisms for interpreting the principle and ensuring that it is respected are in need of review and revision. Ukraine (and other states that can be seen as having limited sovereignty because of their shortfalls in delivering results expected of states, including in the field of security of their citizens) would need the support and oversight of outside guarantors in order to preserve stability, with this support being provided in the framework of what Russian leaders have called in the past ‘equal security’. This would entail a European security system in which the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is recognized as the primary authority, and a reduced role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—where (seen from a Russian perspective) some states ensure their own security at the expense of others. While Russia has consistently advocated versions of this proposal in different forms since 2008, such a proposal has been rejected equally consistently by other states, which stress the right of states to choose their forms of association freely, including the right to be a party to treaties of alliance or a right to neutrality. These principles are specific elements of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (the entity which eventually became the OSCE) 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

The Helsinki Final Act also underlines that frontiers can be changed ‘in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement’. After the end of the cold war state boundaries in Europe have been modified peacefully more than once. The consolidation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic into one state, and the division of Czechoslovakia into two separate states were accomplished peacefully. In 2014 a referendum was held in Scotland under a process agreed by all relevant key parties in the United Kingdom. The majority of voters in Scotland decided to remain as part of the UK. In Spain, however, procedures that would have allowed voters in Catalonia to express a view on whether or not to establish an independent state could not be agreed (see chapter 6).

II. Security governance

The introduction to SIPRI Yearbook 2014 noted the progressive weakening of efforts to coordinate relations among states on the basis of what former

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6 Zagorski (note 5).


UN Special Representative on business and human rights, John Ruggie, described as ‘principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions’. The question of whether multilateralism as an approach to security governance is in decline, or whether it is in an inevitable process of adaptation in changing conditions, continued to be a subject for reflection in 2014.

According to some metrics, the UN Security Council was more active in 2014 than it has ever been, with the highest number of meetings ever convened by the council since 2006, and the highest number of public meetings ever recorded. Moreover, in addition to public meetings, in which the wider UN membership was invited to participate in the discussion prior to a Security Council vote, the council also organized numerous informal meetings that included non-governmental participation.

By using its convening power to promote discussion and debate, the Security Council could be seen as evolving and adapting into a more open system in which new kinds of partnerships and opinion-shaping could be promoted—for example, between state and non-state actors, between states and regional or sub-regional organizations, or between national and sub-national authorities (such as municipal authorities who play an increasingly key role in light of the strong tendencies towards urbanization).

While it is helpful that the Security Council is acting as a convenor, it was originally envisaged as an executive body, responding in a timely way to threats to international peace and security. From that perspective, the impact of Security Council deliberations in 2014 was mixed.

The Security Council now regularly addresses issues that are not tied to a specific location—such as the need to combat terrorism or prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In these, and several other functional issue areas, the Security Council was able to agree on necessary measures. However, the performance of the Security Council was weaker in country-specific situations.

In a number of cases permanent members of the Security Council—in particular China, Russia and the United States—made use of their veto to protect the position of governments that they support, effectively paralysing action under the auspices of the Security Council in some of the most pressing conflict locations.

Compared with 2013, the Security Council spent significantly more time discussing issues in Europe against the background of the escalating crisis

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and subsequent conflict in Ukraine. The Security Council received regular briefings from different parts of the UN system on political developments, and in relation to human rights and emergency assistance. However, in March 2014 a draft resolution on Ukraine was vetoed by Russia and during 2014 there was no agreement on substantive action to be taken with regard to resolving the Ukraine conflict (see chapter 3).11

In May 2014 a draft resolution presented to the Security Council calling for the referral of cases involving gross human rights violations in Syria to the International Criminal Court was vetoed by China and Russia.12 Following the collapse of peace talks between Israel and Palestinian representatives, and subsequent escalation in fighting between Israel and the forces of Hamas, the Security Council was unable to adopt a draft resolution in December 2014 calling for the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. While four of the five permanent members of the Security Council supported the content of the draft, the USA made it clear that it would veto the text should it be tabled.13

As noted above, the Security Council now regularly addresses transnational and functional security issues, and in 2014 there was a positive record of achievement with agreed responses for several issues identified as threats to international peace and security. For example, the Security Council reached a consensus that the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa was a threat to international peace and security.14 It did so not only on medical grounds, but also because of the risk that the political, socio-economic and humanitarian impact of the disease outbreak could threaten the still fragile recovery from conflicts in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.15

In 2001 the Security Council discussed the risks posed by the spread of HIV/AIDS as part of a wider debate on challenges to peace and security in Africa. However, the 2014 debate on the EVD outbreak and subsequent resolution were the first time the council has declared that an infectious disease could itself be a threat to international peace and security. Nonetheless, the response to the EVD outbreak highlighted shortcomings in

national and international preparedness for managing emerging infectious disease threats (see chapter 13). The response also illustrated the important role non-governmental actors play as security providers, as bodies such as Medécins Sans Frontières were the first to mount a systematic response to some of the local challenges posed by the EVD outbreak.

In September the UN Security Council, under US Chairmanship, convened a summit of heads of state and government to discuss the wider impact of the recruitment of foreign fighters by IS and other groups fighting in Iraq, Syria and parts of Africa. In particular, the meeting addressed the role of the UN in addressing the impact of what the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (ASSMT) of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee estimated to be around 15,000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 80 countries fighting with designated terrorist groups or their affiliates.\(^\text{16}\)

The Security Council debate highlighted a number of challenges—in particular, border security, effective criminal action against individuals who seek to join terrorist organizations and the need to counter violent extremism—as well as the requirements to determine best practices and the most efficient use of resources.

The need for international cooperation to strengthen criminal laws targeting groups that use terrorist methods, impose sanctions on them, and ensure that laws and restrictive measures can be implemented and enforced was a strong emphasis in the Security Council decisions during the year. UN Security Council Resolution 2178, for example, introduced a set of measures intended to address the foreign terrorist fighter threat and assist in countering violent extremism. The resolution requires states to ‘prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities’.\(^\text{17}\) The Security Council also highlighted the evidence of a nexus between terrorism and organized crime.\(^\text{18}\)

In the wake of Security Council Resolution 2083 issued in 2012, the ASSMT outlined recommendations to make more effective use of existing counterterrorism sanctions; to build on the existing sanctions regime with


\(^{17}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2178, 24 Sep. 2014.

new measures; and to take non-sanctions-related measures.\textsuperscript{19} However, the 
ASSMT recommended that the Security Council also look beyond law 
enforcement measures, and promote more concerted multilateral and 
national action to address ‘the toxic ideas and imagery that ISIL [Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant, now known as IS], ANF [al-Nusra Front], 
along with other groups within the Al-Qaida movement, promote. This 
includes developing national and multilateral counter-extremism 
communications strategies\textsuperscript{20}.

In 2014 the Security Council also continued to emphasize the imperative 
to protect civilians in conflict locations, and determined that the humani-
tarian situation in Syria was a separate threat to international peace in and 
of itself. However, Valerie Amos, the UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs (who is also the Emergency Relief Coordinator), 
reported that warring parties disregarded Security Council resolutions on 
this topic with impunity.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition to examining the output of the United Nations in 2014, this 
edition of the Yearbook focuses on the efficiency of current regional secur-
ity organizations and initiatives in security governance in Asia and Europe, 
and the potential for developing additional measures. Chapter 7 describes 
and analyses new security initiatives focused on East Asia proposed and led 
by China. These efforts include a more proactive and assertive Chinese 
diplomacy aimed at building new political, economic and financial insti-
tutions in which Asian countries play the leading role in governance and 
decision making. The chapter also assesses the steps taken to reinforce and 
strengthen military cooperation between the USA and its allies in East Asia.

In Europe, the OSCE was one focal point for efforts to reduce the inten-
sity of fighting in Ukraine and to mediate between the warring parties. 
Furthermore, actions undertaken by the OSCE in the field underlined its 
unique position. As an organization in which all states have equal status, 
and all decisions are taken on the basis of consensus, the efficiency of the 
OSCE has often been questioned. It can be very difficult to agree measures 
that impact directly on contested interests since it is possible for any 
participating state to block any decision. Nevertheless, at short notice the 
OSCE was able to put in place a Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 
and an Observer Mission at two specific checkpoints on the border 
between Ukraine and Russia—actions that no single state or group of states

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; report 
and recommendations submitted pursuant to resolution 2170 (2014), S/2014/815, 14 Nov. 2014.

\textsuperscript{20} United Nations S/2014/815 (note 19).

\textsuperscript{21} Amos, V., Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 
Coordinator, United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Security Council 
202014%20USG%20SecCo%20statement%20on%20Syria.pdf>. See also chapter 2 in this volume.
acting in a loose coalition would have been able to take (see chapters 3 and 5).

The escalating conflict in Ukraine was a catalyst for decisions taken by NATO to accelerate plans to put in place measures to reassure allies that collective defence commitments could be met effectively. NATO also decided on additional measures to adapt force structures to the new security environment. The new measures include the creation of a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (the so-called Spearhead Force) available for deployment at very short notice, and modifications to the NATO Response Force to provide the follow-on forces that would subsequently support the Spearhead Force (see chapter 6). As part of the process of adaptation, NATO has subsequently established a multinational command and control presence in six countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania), which will be tasked with force integration—with the aim of ensuring that the Spearhead Force and follow-on forces are able to work efficiently alongside the national armed forces of states at NATO’s eastern perimeter.

In 2014 the European Union (EU) undertook a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Created in 2003, the ENP is the primary instrument through which the EU meets the obligation in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) to develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries.\(^2^2\) The ultimate objective of the ENP is to create ‘an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’.\(^2^3\) While routine in one respect (the last review was in 2011, and the policy would have been evaluated towards the end of a five-year cycle), the need for a review took on a new significance in light of two developments.

First, the events in the immediate neighbourhood suggest that the objectives laid out in the TEU are moving further away, rather than coming closer. The neighbourhood is not becoming more peaceful, and the countries in the neighbourhood cannot all credibly be said to share the values of the EU. Second, in 2014 the EU went through a complete change of senior management: new presidents took office in both the European Commission and the Council; Federica Mogherini became the new High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission; and a new (and more political) European Commission was created containing many individuals who previously held high office in their home countries.

Dismantling barriers to the point where people, money and goods circulate freely within a large, common space has been a key EU internal object-

\(^2^3\) Treaty on European Union (note 22), Article 8.
ive. Moreover, openness has been an important element in EU external action—including increasing the mobility of non-EU citizens into and out of the EU on a temporary basis for employment.

On this basis, the 26 countries that are part of the Schengen system have modified their approach to sovereignty by giving recognition and full legal effect within their national jurisdiction to decisions taken in a partner country. Moreover, the Schengen partners include four that are not members of the EU—Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

The 1985 inter-governmental Schengen agreement, along with its 1990 implementing convention, abolished border checks and guaranteed the free movement of people between participating states. Removing internal controls was supplemented with arrangements to create a common area of security and justice based on a single external border. A harmonized visa regime set the conditions for entry and short stays by non-EU citizens in the Schengen area; a common procedure was developed to determine where asylum applications would be submitted; and measures were put in place to strengthen cooperation in policing and judicial matters. In 1999 the Schengen arrangements were incorporated into EU law.

However, while EU member states have insisted on retaining national control over immigration policy, implementing a national policy within an open, common space has been increasingly challenging. Although further integration and openness could be seen as being beneficial to the populations of member states, concern about the potential risks this approach might pose has had an impact on the discourse inside the EU. Parties and groups that advocate reducing openness, reversing integration and re-imposing national controls of different kinds have gained political support.

III. Dynamics of peace and conflict

Although it is still too soon to be certain, the data presented in this Yearbook tends to reinforce the tentative conclusion presented in the introduction to the 2014 volume—that the positive trend towards less violence and more effective conflict management witnessed over the past decade has ended. In 2014 the priority has been containing, rather than resolving, conflicts in different parts of the world. Containment has a geographical dimension—to prevent the spread of fighting to new locations and mitigate the spillover effects, including the displacement of people, and the breakdown of health systems and other necessary services—and is also a basis for reducing the levels of violence, most often through ceasefire arrangements. In recent years conflicts have been resolved (to a greater or lesser extent) as a result of outcomes on the battlefield rather than using tools of mediation, and no conflict has ended by way of a peace settlement since 2009 (see chapter 4).
The trends in military spending also tend to reinforce the tentative findings in recent Yearbooks. The overall downward trend in global military spending continued in 2014, but at the regional level the pattern was similar to that recorded for 2013: spending increased rapidly in Africa, Asia and Oceania, and the Middle East (see chapter 9).

In Asia, the rise is largely accounted for by a growth in China’s military spending. This Yearbook maps trends in East Asian security, and suggests that there has been a recent change in the nature of the discourse about the implications of Chinese policies and programmes (see chapter 7). The analysis indicates that China’s policies may be becoming increasingly proactive in seeking to shape the security environment, rather than responsive to impulses initiated elsewhere.

In Europe, the pattern of spending by states has differed in accordance with their proximity to Russia. In the eastern part of Europe the rapid rises recorded in recent years continued, while the aggregated spending in the western and central parts of Europe declined for the sixth consecutive year.

Military spending by the USA has reduced by 20 per cent in real terms over the past five years. However, if the overall military predominance of the USA is diminishing, the process is occurring very slowly. Despite significant reductions in its spending in recent years, the USA still accounts for roughly one-third of global military expenditure. Moreover, if the spending of US allies is combined, the amount represents roughly 60 per cent of the world total.

The demand for external assistance of different kinds in conflict management continues to increase, with seven operations launched in 2014—four in Africa and three in Europe (all of the latter in Ukraine) (see chapter 5). However, peace operations remain limited in scope and complexity, and in general they can only have a meaningful impact on conflict where they are one element in a wider and more comprehensive response.

The experience of implementing effective arms control and confidence-and security-building measures in conflict locations was mixed in 2014. In Europe—where the most fully developed arms control regime has been created—the use of confidence and security-building measures in Ukraine was challenged by Russia, which claimed that the instruments were being misused to produce a one-sided picture of events, rather than being used to increase transparency and understanding of events on the ground.

In Syria, by contrast, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had some success. It continued to verify the completeness of Syria’s declaration regarding chemical weapons; remove and destroy identified stockpiles of chemical weapons (CW) and their precursors; and dismantle the infrastructure of the Syrian CW programme (see chapter 13).