

II. Multilateral arms embargoes

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There were several substantial developments in multilateral arms embargoes in 2013. In particular, the issue of restricting arms to the warring parties in Syria continued to cause international disagreement. Several notable violations of United Nations embargoes were again reported in 2013, highlighting the difficulty of implementing arms embargoes.

During 2013 a total of 36 multilateral arms embargoes were in force: 14 imposed by the UN, 21 by the European Union (EU) and 1 by the League of Arab States (see table 10.1).¹ Of the EU's 21 embargoes, 10 implemented UN decisions directly, 3 implemented UN embargoes with modified scope or coverage, and 8 had no UN counterpart.² The Arab League embargo (on Syria) had no UN counterpart.

In 2013 one new arms embargo was imposed by the UN Security Council, in response to the violence in the Central African Republic (CAR). The EU imposed two new embargoes: on the CAR, implementing the UN embargo, and on Egypt, following the military coup d'état there. As in 2012, the Security Council could not agree on sanctions against Syria despite the intensity of the conflict and the use of chemical weapons. Within the EU a dispute over the question of whether or not to supply arms to Syrian rebel forces resulted in the lifting in 2013 of most elements of the EU arms embargo imposed on Syria in 2011.

Syria³

No draft resolution threatening or imposing a UN arms embargoes against Syria was presented to the UN Security Council in 2012 or 2013, after such efforts in 2011 had failed. In particular, the UN Security Council resolution

¹ In addition, 1 voluntary multilateral embargo was still in force in 2013: in 1992 the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) requested that all participating states impose an embargo on arms deliveries to Armenian and Azerbaijani forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area. The request has never been repealed but a number of OSCE participating states have supplied arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1992. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Committee of Senior Officials, Statement, annex 1 to Journal no. 2 of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee, Prague, 27–28 Feb. 1992. See also Holtom, P., 'Arms transfers to Armenia and Azerbaijan, 2007–11', *SIPRI Yearbook 2012*, pp. 286–92.

² The 3 that differed from equivalent UN embargoes were those on Iran and North Korea, which covered more weapon types than the UN embargo, and on Sudan, which covered the whole country whereas the UN embargo applied only to the Darfur region. The 8 with no UN counterpart were those on Belarus, China, Guinea, Myanmar, South Sudan, Syria and Zimbabwe and a partial embargo on Egypt. The EU embargoes on China and Egypt are political commitments whereas the other 6 are legally binding. The 10 that implement UN embargoes are indicated in table 10.1.

³ On the arguments presented for and against various forms of arms embargo on Syria see chapter 1, section II, in this volume.

of 27 September 2013 responding to the use of chemical weapons in Syria did not include explicit threats to impose an arms embargo.⁴

In February 2013 the EU decided to renew its arms embargo against Syria established in May 2011 for a further three months, amending it to allow the provision of greater non-lethal support and technical assistance for the protection of civilians. France and the UK argued that the EU arms embargo should be further amended to provide the option of supplying arms to opposition forces. However, a majority of EU states opposed such a move.⁵ As France and the UK were not willing to maintain an embargo that banned the supply of arms to the Syrian rebels under all circumstances, the existing arms embargo on Syria was left to expire in June 2013, instead of again being renewed.⁶ The EU sanctions against Syria continued to include an embargo on the supply of equipment and software for use in monitoring of communications by the Syrian Government and on the supply of certain equipment that might be used for internal repression.

The Council stressed that EU member states remained committed to basing their decisions on exports of arms to Syria on the EU Common Position on arms exports.⁷ No specific conditions were put on the supply of arms to Syria. However, a preceding Council declaration had noted a commitment by EU states that weapons supplied to Syria would be supplied to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Syrian National Coalition, SNC) for the purpose of protecting civilians, and that member states would not immediately start delivering such supplies. The Council announced that it would review its position before 1 August 2013.⁸ However, this review had not taken place by the end of the year.

Egypt

Political violence in Egypt escalated in mid-2013. In the second week of August hundreds of people were killed, many during operations by the Egyptian security forces.⁹ On 21 August 2013 the EU's Foreign Affairs Coun-

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2118, 27 Sep. 2013. On the use of chemical weapons in Syria see chapter 8, section I, in this volume.

⁵ For a description of the British and French arguments and the ensuing discussion within the EU see chapter 1, section II, in this volume.

⁶ Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L147, 1 June 2013.

⁷ Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 Dec. 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L335, 8 Dec. 2008.

⁸ Council of the European Union, Council declaration on Syria, 3241st Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 27 May 2013, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137315.pdf>.

⁹ Human Rights Watch, 'Egypt: security forces used excessive lethal force', 19 Aug. 2013, <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force>>.

cil, declaring that the actions of the Egyptian security forces were disproportionate, announced that EU member states had agreed (a) to suspend licences for export to Egypt of any equipment that might be used for internal repression and (b) to reassess export licences for military equipment and review their security assistance to Egypt.¹⁰

In contrast to most other EU agreements on restricting arms export to specific states, the Council did not issue a decision or a regulation on this occasion. The partial arms embargo was therefore not legally binding but instead a political commitment, somewhat similar to the EU arms embargo on China.¹¹

The Council did not impose time limits on the restrictions, nor did it clarify the definition of ‘suspension’ or ‘equipment, which might be used for internal repression’. The latter can be assumed to include certain types of arms and military equipment, such as small arms and armoured vehicles of the types used by the Egyptian security forces during the deadly violence in August 2013. However, it could also include other items that are not covered by the EU definition of ‘arms and military equipment’ as described in the EU Common Military List, such as vehicles with water cannons, vehicles designed for the transport of prisoners and razor barbed wire.¹²

Central African Republic

In November 2013, in response to the breakdown of law and order, increasing violence and widespread human rights abuses in the CAR, France proposed a UN Security Council resolution which was adopted unanimously on 5 December.

The resolution imposed several measures, including an embargo of initially one year on the supply of arms, military equipment and related assistance to non-state actors in the CAR. It also allowed the supply of arms to the CAR security forces if approved in advance by the UN Sanctions Committee established by the resolution.¹³

¹⁰ Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Egypt, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 21 Aug. 2013, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138599.pdf>.

¹¹ SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/>>.

¹² Council of the European Union, General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and security Policy’, 11205/12, 15 June 2012, pp. 28–29 and Annex II.

¹³ Thomas, L. and Penney, J., ‘France to boost Central African force with UN backing’, Reuters, 26 Nov. 2013; and UN Security Council Resolution 2127, 5 Dec. 2013.

Somalia

In March 2013 the UN Security Council amended the restrictions and procedures related to arms supplies to the Somali Government, while maintaining the full embargo on arms supplies to non-state actors in the country.¹⁴ The text of the resolution was ambiguous in certain parts and was further clarified in July 2013. Together the resolutions stipulated that for a one-year period ‘the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, military equipment, assistance or training intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and to provide security for the Somali people’.¹⁵

Both the Somali Government and the African Union had called for the complete lifting of the restrictions on military supplies to the Somali Government. However, under the 2013 resolutions the UN Sanctions Committee on Somalia continued to have the power to stop arms supplies.¹⁶

The UN Security Council introduced a list of several categories of military equipment, the supply of which to the Somali Government would always require advance approval from the Sanctions Committee on a case-by-case basis.¹⁷ The listed items are surface-to-air missiles (SAM); guns, howitzers and cannons with a calibre greater than 12.7 millimetres and their ammunition and components; mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm; anti-tank guided weapons; charges and devices intended for military use containing energetic materials; and weapons sights with a night vision capability.¹⁸ The resolution does not indicate why these items were selected and why others were not. For example, while the list includes guns, howitzers and cannons, it omits rocket launchers, which are similar in role and destructive effect. Supplies of unlisted weapons or military equipment intended solely for helping to develop Somali security sector institutions were allowed in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee.

The two resolutions differed from previous UN Security Council resolutions in that the Somali Government—as opposed to the supplier—was made responsible for ensuring that the Sanctions Committee is notified at least five days in advance of deliveries of weapons, military equipment, assistance and training to the Somali security forces.

The resolutions forbade the Somali Government from transferring weapons to any entity or individual not in the service of its security forces. The resolutions did not clarify the definition of ‘in service of its security

¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2093, 6 Mar. 2013

¹⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 2111, 24 July 2013.

¹⁶ Wezeman, P. D. and Buchhold, C., ‘Multilateral arms embargoes’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2013*, p. 435.

¹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 2111 (note 15), annex.

¹⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 2111 (note 15), annex.

forces', which is problematic because of the informal relations between the government and armed militias. However, the resolutions did oblige the Somali Government to report to the UN Security Council on the structure of its security forces and the infrastructure and procedures for securing its arms stockpiles.

Other European Union embargoes

In October 2013 the EU extended its embargo on Guinea for another year without public explanation, even though the political situation had improved considerably since the embargo was imposed in 2009 and the country had returned to civilian rule in 2010.¹⁹

In April 2013 the EU lifted all sanctions against Myanmar apart from the arms embargo, which was extended for one year, also without further explanation.²⁰

Violations of United Nations embargoes

In 2013, as in previous years, violations of UN arms embargoes and other concerns regarding the implementation of the embargoes were reported, primarily by the UN panels of experts tasked with monitoring the embargoes.²¹ The most notable cases were those related to the embargoes on supplies to or from the Darfur region of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), Libya, Somalia and Eritrea.

In previous years, assessing trends in violations of arms embargoes had been hindered by efforts of UN Security Council members to prevent or delay the publication of reports by UN panels of experts.²² However, in 2013 all new reports were released to the public.

Darfur

The UN Panel of Experts on Sudan reported that the Sudanese Government had continued to move arms and military equipment, including combat aircraft, bombs and ammunition, that had been recently legally

¹⁹ Council Decision 2013/515/CFSP of 21 October 2013 amending Decision 2010/638/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L280, 22 Oct. 2013.

²⁰ Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP of 22 April 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L111, 23 Apr. 2013.

²¹ In 2013 panels of experts existed for all UN arms embargoes except those on non-governmental forces in Iraq and Lebanon. Reports by panels of experts can be found on the website of the UN Security Council sanctions committees, <<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/>>.

²² On efforts to change or block reports in 2010–13 see Wezeman, P. D. and Kelly, N., 'Multilateral arms embargoes, 2010', *SIPRI Yearbook 2011*, pp. 449–51; and Wezeman and Buchhold (note 16), pp. 437–38.

imported into Sudan into the Darfur region.²³ These movements violated the UN embargo and contradicted assurances given by the Sudanese Government to the suppliers of the equipment.

Iran

The UN Panel of Experts on Iran found evidence that Iran maintains a wide procurement network to circumvent UN embargoes on export of arms or dual-use items. The panel concluded that Iran remained reliant on foreign suppliers for technology, some components and raw materials for its ballistic missile programme.²⁴ Iran is also in violation of the UN embargo on its arms exports, and in 2013 even updated the information on the marketing website of the Iranian Defence Industries Organization (DIO).²⁵

The panel investigated a concrete case of alleged Iranian arms exports in which weapons suspected to have originated from Iran—including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), 122-mm rockets, grenade launchers and explosives—were found on board a ship intercepted by the Yemeni Coastguard and the US Navy in Yemeni territorial waters.²⁶ The panel was divided on the case, with five panel members concluding that it constituted a violation of the embargo on Iranian arms exports, and three concluding that it was a probable violation.²⁷ Yemeni authorities suspected that the weapons had been intended for delivery to Huthi rebels in northern Yemen.²⁸

In 2013 the panel investigated but could not confirm allegations that Iran had exported weapons to Côte d'Ivoire, the Gaza Strip in Palestine, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Syria.²⁹ All these cases illustrate the difficulties in establishing the facts relating to Iranian arms exports in violation of UN sanctions.

²³ United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 22 January 2013 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, S/2013/79, 12 Feb. 2013, p. 3; and United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 7 February 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, S/2014/87, 11 Feb. 2014, pp. 12–45.

²⁴ United Nations, Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010), 3 June 2013, annex to S/2013/331, 5 June 2013, p. 23.

²⁵ Defense Industries Organization, <<http://www.diomil.ir/>>.

²⁶ United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, annex to S/2013/413, 12 July 2013, pp. 28, 313–14.

²⁷ United Nations, S/2013/331 (note 24), pp. 14–15.

²⁸ United Nations, S/2013/413 (note 26), pp. 278–85, 292.

²⁹ United Nations, S/2013/331 (note 24), pp. 24–25.

North Korea

The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea has reported on a series of cases of North Korean arms supplies in violation of the UN arms embargo in the period 2008–13.³⁰

The fact that violations continued was once again confirmed in July 2013 during a search of a North Korean ship in Panama, when authorities found a variety of military equipment—including 2 MiG-21 combat aircraft, 15 engines for MiG-21s, components for SAM systems and ammunition—hidden underneath a cargo of sugar.³¹ The source of the weapons was traced to Cuba, which announced within days of the discovery that the ‘obsolete defensive weapons’ found on the ship had been sent to North Korea ‘to be repaired and returned to Cuba’.³² Doubts about the Cuban statement remained and it was suspected that North Korea had acquired the equipment for its own use.³³ In either case, the UN arms embargo was violated as it prohibits both the supply to North Korea of all major arms and the export from North Korea of all arms and related maintenance or services.³⁴ Cuba was not publicly reprimanded or sanctioned for violating the arms embargo on North Korea. If the weapons were intended for North Korea, the fact that they were approximately 40 years old suggests that the arms embargo has made it difficult for North Korea to provide its armed forces with modern equipment.

Libya

The UN Panel of Experts on Libya noted that most of Libya’s arms stockpiles were not under state control and that the Libyan authorities were still rebuilding border controls. As a result, weapons could spread from Libya and fuel conflict elsewhere. The panel investigated alleged and documented arms smuggling from Libya to non-state actors in Algeria, Chad, Egypt, the Gaza Strip in Palestine, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria and Tunisia.³⁵

³⁰ United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 7 June 2013 from the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the president of the Security Council, annex to S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, p. 4.

³¹ United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 3 March 2014 from the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council, annex to S/2014/147, 6 Mar. 2014, pp. 26–31.

³² Cuban Foreign Ministry, Statement about the North Korean ship Chang Chon Gang seized in Panama Canal, 16 July 2013, <<http://www.cubaminrex.cu/en/statement-ministry-foreign-affairs-6>>.

³³ Johnson, T., ‘Cuban weapons aboard N. Korean ship part of “major deal”, Panama says’, McClatchyDC, 10 Oct. 2013, <<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/10/10/205036/cuban-weapons-aboard-n-korean.html>>.

³⁴ United Nations, S/2014/147 (note 31), p. 29.

³⁵ United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 15 February 2013 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2013/99, 9 Mar. 2013, pp. 24–38.

The panel highlighted the difficulties in establishing the facts surrounding breaches of the UN arms embargo during 2011, although it was able to document how in several cases weapons had reached Libya in contravention of the UN arms embargo. In particular, it concluded that, while Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had supplied weapons to forces opposing the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, they had never informed the UN Sanctions Committee and had therefore violated the 2011 UN arms embargo on Libya.³⁶

Somalia and Eritrea

The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea concluded that arms smuggling to Somali non-state actors, in particular al-Shabab, continued in 2013. While the monitoring group was able to document in detail several cases that occurred between mid-2012 and mid-2013, it was not able to establish the volumes involved.

Yemen was considered the primary source for arms and ammunition smuggled into Somalia. The largest intercepted shipment to Somalia of arms in this period included 220 rocket-propelled grenades and 137 kilograms of the explosive TNT.³⁷ The group reported that the Somali Government had not notified the sanctions committee of any weapons received, despite the fact that there had been credible reports that such deliveries had occurred in the first half of 2013.³⁸

The group also established that Eritrea had continued to receive some assistance from abroad in maintaining military equipment and had imported several civilian aircraft for use by its armed forces.³⁹

³⁶ United Nations, S/2013/99 (note 35), pp. 15–23.

³⁷ United Nations, S/2013/413 (note 26), pp. 278–85.

³⁸ United Nations, S/2013/413 (note 26), p. 30.

³⁹ United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Eritrea, annex to S/2013/440, 25 July 2013, pp. 25–26.

Table 10.1. Multilateral arms embargoes in force during 2013

Target ^a	Date embargo first imposed	Principal instruments establishing or amending the embargo ^b	Key developments during 2013
<i>United Nations arms embargoes</i>			
Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities	16 Jan. 2002	SCRs 1390, 1989	
CAR (NGF)	5 Dec. 2013	SCR 2127	New embargo
Congo, Democratic Republic of the (NGF)	28 July 2003	SCRs 1493, 1596, 1807, 2078	
Côte d'Ivoire (NGF)	15 Nov. 2004	SCRs 1572, 1946, 2045	Extended until 30 Apr. 2014 by SCR 2101, 25 Apr. 2013
Eritrea	23 Dec. 2009	SCR 1907	
Iraq (NGF)	23 Dec. 2006	SCRs 1737, 1747, 1929	
Korea, North	6 Aug. 1990	SCRs 661, 1483, 1546	
Lebanon (NGF)	15 July 2006	SCRs 1695, 1718, 1874	
Liberia (NGF)	11 Aug. 2006	SCR 1701	
Libya (NGF)	22 Dec. 2003 ^c	SCRs 1521, 1683, 1903, 2079	Extended until 10 Dec. 2014 by SCR 2128, 10 Dec. 2013
Somalia (NGF)	26 Feb. 2011	SCRs 1970, 1973, 2009	Amended by SCR 2095, 14 Mar. 2013 ^d
Sudan (Darfur)	23 Jan. 1992	SCRs 733, 1725	Amended by SCR 2093, 6 Mar. 2013, and SCR 2111, 24 July 2013 ^e
Taliban	30 July 2004	SCRs 1556, 1591, 1945	
	16 Jan. 2002	SCRs 1390, 1988	
<i>European Union arms embargoes</i>			
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities*	17 Dec. 1996	CPs 96/746/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP, 2002/402/CFSP	
Belarus	20 June 2011	CD 2011/357/CFSP, CD 2012/642/CFSP	Extended until 31 Oct. 2014 by CD 2012/534/CFSP, 29 Oct. 2013
China	27 June 1989	European Council declaration	
CAR (NGF)*	23 Dec. 2013	CD 2013/798/CFSP	New embargo
Congo, Democratic Republic of the (NGF)*	7 Apr. 1993	Declaration, CPs 2003/680/CFSP, 2005/440/CFSP, 2008/369/CFSP	

Target ^d	Date embargo first imposed	Principal instruments establishing or amending the embargo ^b	Key developments during 2013
Côte d'Ivoire (NGF)*	13 Dec. 2004	CP 2004/852/CFSP, 2010/656/CFSP, CD 2012/371/CFSP	
Egypt	21 Aug. 2013	Council conclusions	New embargo
Eritrea*	1 Mar. 2010	CD 2010/127/CFSP	
Guinea	27 Oct. 2009	CPs 2009/788/CFSP, 2009/1003/CFSP	Extended until 27 Oct. 2014 by CD 2013/515/CFSP, 21 Oct. 2013
Iran	27 Feb. 2007	CPs 2007/140/CFSP, 2007/246/CFSP, CD 2012/168/CFSP	
Iraq (NGF)*	4 Aug. 1990	Declaration, CPs 2003/495/CFSP, 2004/553/CFSP	
Korea, North	20 Nov. 2006	CPs 2006/795/CFSP, 2009/573/CFSP	
Lebanon (NGF)*	15 Sep. 2006	CP 2006/625/CFSP	
Liberia (NGF)*	7 May 2001	CPs 2001/357/CFSP, 2004/137/CFSP, 2006/518/CFSP, 2010/129/CFSP	
Libya (NGF)*	28 Feb. 2011	CDs 2011/137/CFSP, 2011/625/CFSP	
Myanmar	29 July 1991 ^f	GAC declaration, CPs 96/635/CFSP, 2003/297/CFSP, 2010/232/CFSP	Extended until 30 Apr. 2014 by CD 2013/184/CFSP, 22 Apr. 2013
Somalia (NGF)*	10 Dec. 2002	CPs 2002/960/CFSP, 2009/138/CFSP, 2010/231/CFSP	
South Sudan	18 July 2011	CD 2011/423/CFSP	
Sudan	15 Mar. 1994	CPs 94/165/CFSP, 2004/31/CFSP, 2005/411/CFSP, CD 2011/423/CFSP	
Syria	9 May 2011	CD 2011/273/CFSP, CR 36/2012, CR 509/2012, CR 36/2012, CR 509/2012, CD 2012/420/CFSP, CD 2012/739/CFSP	Lifted by CD 2013/255/CFSP, 31 May 2013
Zimbabwe	18 Feb. 2002	CP 2002/145/CFSP	Extended until 20 Feb. 2014 by CD 2013/89/CFSP, 18 Feb. 2013
<i>League of Arab States arms embargo</i>			
Syria ^g	3 Dec. 2011	Council statement, Council Resolution 7446	

* = EU embargo implementing a UN embargo; CAR = Central African Republic; CD = Council Decision; CP = Council Common Position; CR = Council Regulation; GAC = General Affairs Council; NGF = non-governmental forces; SCR = UN Security Council Resolution.

^a The target may have changed since the first imposition of the embargo. The target stated here is as at the end of 2013.

^b The earlier instruments may have been amended or repealed by subsequent instruments.

^c Liberia has been the target of UN arms embargoes since 1992, with related but different objectives.

^d UN Security Council Resolution 2095 of 14 Mar. 2013 lifted the requirement of notification to the Sanctions Committee in the case of supplies of non-lethal military equipment for humanitarian protective and the supply of non-lethal military equipment and the provision of technical and financial assistance and training to the Libyan Government.

^e UN Security Council Resolution 2093 of 6 Mar. 2013 amended the restrictions and procedures related to arms supplies to the Somali Government. UN Security Council Resolution 2111 of 24 July 2013 further clarified the decisions of Resolution 2093. For a one-year period (until 6 Mar. 2014) under the resolutions, the arms embargo on Somalia continued to allow arms supplies to the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia. However, an exception was introduced for several categories of military equipment, which can only be supplied to the Somali Government with advance approval from the Sanctions Committee.

^f The EU and its member states first imposed an arms embargo on Myanmar in 1990.

^g Resolution 7446 of 12 Feb. 2012 could be interpreted as permitting the provision of arms to the Syrian opposition.

Sources: United Nations, Security Council, 'UN Security Council sanctions committees', <<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/>>; and European External Action Service, 'Sanctions or restrictive measures', 29 Jan. 2014, <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm>.