Peace operations in Africa

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II. Peace operations in Africa

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In 2013 the attention of peace operations moved away from Afghanistan and focused more sharply again on Africa. Not only was it the host for all eight new missions launched in the year, reinforcing Africa’s position as the location of more operations than any other region, but for the first time since 2008 Africa also hosted the most personnel.

As well as these quantitative developments, there were qualitative changes, with existing operations, in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), acting as testing grounds for new developments. The United Nations operation in the DRC was expanded with the addition of a significant new combat component and initiated the use of new technology, while the new UN operation in Mali received a more robust mandate than is usual. In an unprecedented step, the UN expanded its logistical support packages for the African Union (AU) operation in Somalia to the frontline units of the Somali National Army in their joint fight against the Islamist group al-Shabab. Alongside these innovations, in other parts of Africa, such as the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Sudan, and West Africa, there was general continuity in the conduct of peace operations. This section reviews the new missions and developments in 2013 in these locations.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The inability of UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to protect civilians had already become apparent on 20 November 2012, when forces of the 23 March Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars, M23) entered the city of Goma in eastern DRC. In March 2013, in response, the UN Security Council agreed to more drastic measures. It adapted a 2012 proposal by Rwanda and Uganda by establishing a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO. The brigade was given an initial mandate of one year to take stronger action against armed groups in eastern DRC such as M23, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, a Ugandan opposition group) and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda.

(FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). Its aim was to ‘carry out targeted offensive operations ... either unilaterally or jointly with the [Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the DRC)], in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner’. Headquartered in Goma and made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, the FIB was composed of three infantry battalions, one artillery company, and one special force and reconnaissance company, with around 3000 personnel. Despite this addition of personnel to MONUSCO, to reach a total of 19 815, the operation remained just under its previously authorized maximum troop level, which was not increased by the Security Council.

Emphasizing the special character of the brigade, the UN Security Council stressed that the decision to create it was made ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping’, including consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The aim of this more robust and forceful approach was ‘to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities’. Initially, the decision to authorize the FIB was criticized by some analysts, who suggested that it could jeopardize the credibility and impartiality of MONUSCO. Moreover, a heavier burden would be placed on the rest of MONUSCO, as the brigade would have to balance the protection of civilians against pursuing armed groups. Others argued that military intervention in the DRC has always had humanitarian repercussions.

When it established the FIB, the Council extended MONUSCO’s mandate until 31 March 2014. The operation’s future configuration was to be determined by the threat of armed groups, and by whether stability and state authority had been established in conflict-affected areas. The brigade’s exit strategy was to be the building-up by the Congolese Government (with the support of MONUSCO) of a rapid-reaction force that should take over the brigade’s responsibilities. In the provinces of the DRC that were less affected by conflict, MONUSCO and the UN Country Team for the DRC (which brings together the UN agencies, programmes and

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3 UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (note 2), para. 9.
4 UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (note 2), para. 12(b).
funds active in the DRC) were to look at which tasks could be handed over from the former to the latter. MONUSCO as a whole was requested to further focus on eastern DRC.\(^7\)

On 18 March, prior to the establishment of the FIB, hundreds of M23 combatants had already fled into Rwanda, and on 22 March General Bosco Ntaganda, one of the leaders of M23, surrendered to the International Criminal Court (ICC).\(^8\) Nevertheless, M23, the FDLR and other armed groups continued to launch attacks against both the FARDC and MONUSCO throughout the first half of the year. Simultaneously, FARDC units carried out mass rapes, mistreatment of M23 detainees and desecration of the corpses of M23 casualties, and MONUSCO was forced to review its support for the units responsible.\(^9\)

The deployment of the FIB started in May 2013. In July MONUSCO was accused by the Rwandan Government of collaborating with the FDLR, a claim that MONUSCO refuted.\(^10\) Later that month, after a FARDC offensive, the Rwandan Government sent a letter to MONUSCO protesting about the deliberate bombing of its territory, but MONUSCO again denied any responsibility. On 30 July MONUSCO declared Goma a security zone in which only FARDC and MONUSCO forces were allowed to bear arms.\(^11\) However, M23 attacks on Goma in August led the civilian population there to demonstrate against MONUSCO’s inactivity. Two Congolese civilians were reportedly killed by peacekeepers during the demonstration. As a result, the UN ordered an investigation into the reports.\(^12\)

However, as the deployment of the FIB got on track, it boosted the FARDC’s confidence, changed the population’s perception that MONUSCO was not engaging the armed groups and effectively pushed back M23.\(^13\) On 25 October, after peace talks broke down, the FARDC restarted its offensive against M23, quickly winning ground with support from the FIB, leading to M23’s defeat. On 5 November M23 announced an end to its rebellion, and

\(^7\) UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (note 2).
\(^8\) UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (note 2). For a brief description and other details of the ICC see annex B, section I, in this volume.
\(^12\) United Nations, S/2013/581 (note 11).
this led to a cessation of hostilities between the Congolese Government and M23.\(^\text{14}\)

Reactions to the FIB’s role in the defeat of M23 were mixed but overall cautiously optimistic. On the one hand, the brigade gained some ground in what has long been considered a failed effort on the part of the UN to stabilize eastern DRC.\(^\text{15}\) On the other hand, the situation in the DRC remained far from stable. For example, in 2013 UN experts accused Rwanda of continuing to provide military aid to M23.\(^\text{16}\) Nonetheless, with M23 apparently defeated, the UN Security Council called on the FARDC and MONUSCO and its FIB to deal with the threat of the FDLR and other armed groups, and to prevent these groups from taking advantage of the changed situation in eastern DRC.\(^\text{17}\) MONUSCO, along with UN operations in other countries in the region, also provided logistical support to the AU Regional Task Force in its struggle against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the CAR, South Sudan and the DRC.\(^\text{18}\)

On 3 December, in accordance with a decision by the UN Security Council in January 2013, and in support of the UN’s aerial monitoring of troop movements and the arms embargo against non-governmental forces in the DRC, MONUSCO launched the UN’s first ever unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone). By the beginning of 2014, MONUSCO was operating five UAVs within a 150-kilometre radius of Goma airport, and by mid-January the first UAV crash was reported.\(^\text{19}\)

**Mali**

Following the 2011 conflict in Libya, the Sahel region was increasingly affected by transnational organized crime (in the form of arms and drug trafficking), and by groups designated by the European Union (EU) and the UN as terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Mouvement pour le Tawhid et du Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), the Salafist group


Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) and other related organizations. At the same time, the conflict between the Malian Government and Tuareg rebels flared up once more. The number of armed groups grew and additional inter-ethnic conflicts were ignited.

In responding to the security situation in Mali, in 2013 the UN Security Council focused on three issues: the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel; the instability in northern Mali; and the presence of extremist elements and terrorist groups. The Security Council stated several times that it considered these challenges to be threats to international peace and security, and that it welcomed initiatives by the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the EU—for example, to build the capacities of governments in the Sahel, and security sector reform (SSR)—to counter them.

On 20 December 2012 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year. However, the force—which was to be a joint AU–ECOWAS operation—was only expected to reach full strength by September 2013. On 10 January 2013, when Islamist and Tuareg forces captured the strategic town of Konna in central Mali, putting at risk nearby Sévaré military airport, which was vital to any future intervention, France pushed the Security Council to reiterate the call for assistance to the Malian Government. Using this extra support from the Council and in order to accelerate international involvement and to allow the deployment of AFISMA, France deployed a military force of its own, Operation Serval. Subsequently, ECOWAS stated that it would speed up its deployments to AFISMA. However, according to the AU special representative to Mali, AFISMA’s deployment was initially delayed by logistical, capacity and coordination challenges. In particular, contributing countries lacked equipment and adequate transportation.

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Within three weeks of the start of Operation Serval, Malian and French forces had recaptured the three main cities in northern Mali (Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu), encountering little resistance. A number of European countries provided logistical assistance. At the end of January, Nigerien and Chadian forces joined the Malian and French forces. Following their loss of ground, the Tuareg and Islamist forces adopted guerrilla tactics. As the fighting continued, doubts remained as to whether the intervention would have a lasting impact after the departure of the French troops. While the African diplomatic community was largely positive about Operation Serval, there was also a sense of dissatisfaction at having to rely on external actors for urgent military assistance. Observers also criticized the EU, France and the United States for mobilizing logistical capacity to set up Operation Serval instead of using this capacity to help meet AFISMA’s logistical challenges.

By the beginning of February, 3000 troops from West African countries had been deployed to AFISMA. Nonetheless, France and the USA called on the UN Security Council to quickly replace AFISMA with a UN operation. On 7 March the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided to support the proposal on the conditions that (a) the UN mission would have a ‘robust’ peace-enforcement mandate; (b) the UN would consult with the AU, ECOWAS and Mali, and appoint the head of AFISMA, Pierre Buyoya, to lead the new mission; and (c) the UN would raise financial and logistical support for AFISMA and provide a ‘central role’ for the AU and ECOWAS. At the end of March the Malian Government and the president of the ECOWAS Commission also requested the transformation of AFISMA into a UN operation.

On 25 April, when the Malian Government, with the help of Operation Serval and AFISMA, had regained control over much of its territory, the UN Security Council mandated the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), comprised of 11 200 military
personnel (including a rapid-response battalion) and 1440 police personnel. The new operation incorporated troops from AFISMA. However, some of these troops did not meet UN standards—they were given a four-month grace period in which to receive extra training and equipment.

The new mission also incorporated the structures and responsibilities of the UN Office in Mali (UNOM), which had been established in December 2012. Authority was transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July. The phased deployment of MINUSMA was made dependent on the progress of the international forces in fighting groups designated by the Security Council as terrorist forces.

The UN Security Council resolution establishing MINUSMA mandated the ‘stabilization of key population centres and support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country’. This included deterring threats, actively preventing the return of armed elements and assisting the rebuilding of the Malian security sector. Support would also be provided for the implementation of the transitional road map adopted by the Malian National Assembly on 29 January, including assistance for the national political dialogue and the 2013 electoral processes. MINUSMA was also mandated to protect civilians and UN personnel; promote and protect human rights (including the deployment of human rights observers); support humanitarian assistance and the preservation and protection of cultural and historical sites; and assist in bringing to justice, either in Mali or through the ICC, those guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

While MINUSMA was allowed to use all necessary means to implement its mandate, the UN Security Council also reaffirmed, as in the case of the FIB in the DRC, the basic principles of peacekeeping, including impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. In addition, it stated that ‘the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned’. The Permanent Representative of France to the UN, Gérard Araud, stated that MINUSMA was ‘not going to chase the terrorists in their strongholds’ but was ‘there to stabilize the country’, although if peacekeepers were to uncover a terrorist cell in their deployment area they would dismantle it. The Council authorized French troops to intervene in support of

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36 UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (note 34).
37 UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (note 34), para. 16.
38 UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (note 34).
MINUSMA when under threat and when requested to do so by the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{40}

On the same day that the UN Security Council mandated MINUSMA, the AU expressed its ‘concern that Africa was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and consultation process’ leading to MINUSMA’s adoption and stressed that this was ‘not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years’.\textsuperscript{41} The disagreement between the AU and the UN stemmed primarily from the fact that the UN was unwilling to agree to the preconditions set out by the AU and ECOWAS, and that it therefore effectively sidelined both organizations.\textsuperscript{42}

African regional organizations and the UN also disagreed over MINUSMA’s robustness. In contrast to the AU’s conditions for supporting the transformation, which included reference to ‘a robust mandate’ and offensive operations against armed groups, several members of the UN Security Council—including Argentina, Guatemala, Pakistan and Russia—sought to limit the robustness of MINUSMA’s mandate.\textsuperscript{43} These countries had also pushed for the reaffirmation of the basic principles of peacekeeping in the mandate. Some observers argued that, by limiting the robustness of MINUSMA, these countries were seeking to restrict peace enforcement to exceptional circumstances rather than establishing another precedent—as was the case with the establishment of MONUSCO’s FIB.\textsuperscript{44}

Significantly, China contributed a guard unit to MINUSMA. While China has never deployed combat troops to a peace operations, this brought it one step closer to doing so.\textsuperscript{45}

The security situation remained relatively stable, although still somewhat fragile, until September 2013. In addition to the newly ignited inter-ethnic conflicts, the Tuareg and Islamist forces continued to fight, using guerrilla and terrorist tactics, particularly in towns in northern Mali. Despite the continuing insurgency, two peaceful rounds of presidential elections were organized in July and August, with legislative elections held in November and December. On 4 September the transitional authority was successfully
ended when Boubacar Keïta was sworn in as president.\textsuperscript{46} In October the security situation in northern Mali, particularly in Kidal, began to deteriorate, with more frequent attacks on MINUSMA and Operation Serval camps, checkpoints and vehicles. In addition, several violent demonstrations against MINUSMA occurred in Gao and Ménaka.\textsuperscript{47} In September, after a dispute over pay, at least four MINUSMA soldiers from Chad left their base and raped at least one woman in Gao.\textsuperscript{48} Previously, in June the UN had placed Chad under special scrutiny in order to ensure that it would not deploy child soldiers to MINUSMA.\textsuperscript{49}

In late October French and Malian forces, in cooperation with MINUSMA, started Operation Hydra, aiming ‘to put pressure on any terrorist movements to avoid their resurgence’.\textsuperscript{50} In early November, despite the unrest and insecurity, France decided not to delay the draw-down of its forces, reducing its total number of troops in Mali from 3200 to 1000.\textsuperscript{51}

**The Central African Republic**

At the beginning of 2013 the administration of CAR President François Bozizé had little authority outside the capital, Bangui. In the rest of the country, armed opposition groups and the LRA filled the security vacuum. On 11 January a ceasefire agreement was signed between the CAR Government and the Séléka rebel coalition in Libreville, Gabon, under the auspices of the Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC, Economic Community of the Central African States). In addition, a political agreement on the resolution of the crisis was signed by parties to the ceasefire and the democratic opposition under which a government of national unity was created.\textsuperscript{52} Under these Libreville Agreements, President Bozizé would stay in power until the end of his term in 2016, while the opposition would provide ministers in his government, and the CEEAC Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX) would continue its efforts to support the peace process.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{47} United Nations, S/2014/1 (note 46).
\textsuperscript{49} Charbonneau, L. and Nichols, M., ‘UN peacekeeping operations in Mali to begin on July 1’, Reuters, 25 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{51} Irish, J. and Diallo, T., ‘France won’t delay Mali troop withdrawal despite killings’, Reuters, 5 Nov. 2013.
\textsuperscript{52} UN Security Council Resolution 2088, 24 Jan. 2013.
However, on 24 March Séléka seized power, claiming that President Bozizé had failed to abide by the agreement. Bozizé fled the country and, in the aftermath of the coup, rule of law in the CAR broke down completely.\(^{54}\) The AU condemned Séléka’s ‘unilateral and unjustified decision’ to ‘flagrantly violate the Libreville Agreements’, and called for the international community, including the UN Security Council, to denounce the rebel coalition’s actions.\(^{55}\) Despite the April 2013 N’Djamena Summit road map and declaration—which were supposed to start a transition process culminating in elections—reports emerged of violations of international humanitarian law and widespread human rights violations by elements of Séléka. Séléka’s leader, Michel Djotodia, was recognized as transitional head of state, but he increasingly lost control over parts of his militia to the extent that he would dissolve Séléka in September.\(^{56}\) In particular, representatives of certain ethnic and non-Muslim groups were subjected to targeted violence by these rogue groups, increasing tensions between communities. UN staff were also targeted. As a result, the existing humanitarian crisis escalated, becoming what the Security Council would later describe as a ‘complex emergency’.\(^{57}\)

In response, on 19 July the AU’s PSC authorized the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA, also known as AFISM-CAR), which was to absorb MICOPAX.\(^{58}\) Although the AU officially launched the transition phase from MICOPAX to MISCA on 1 August 2013, there were several problems between the AU and CEEAC. Consequently, MICOPAX also remained deployed after 1 August and was in fact expanded various times due to the situation on the ground.\(^{59}\)

On 10 October the UN Security Council expanded the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA) to include supporting the Libreville and N’Djamena political process, including the implementation of the electoral process and the monitoring of human rights. The Security Council also announced that it would consider the transformation of BINUCA from a political and peacebuilding operation into a peacekeeping operation if the situation on the ground allowed.\(^{60}\) On 29 October the Security Council decided to deploy a guard unit the following month to

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\(^{57}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2121 (note 54).

\(^{58}\) African Union, Peace and Security Council, 385th meeting, Communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCLXXXV).


\(^{60}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2121 (note 54).
protect BINUCA—similar to the unit deployed in 2004 to protect the UN mission in Iraq. This unit had an initial size of 250 but was to grow to 560 to enable BINUCA deployment outside Bangui. 61

These measures did not prevent the situation from deteriorating further. On 13 November the PSC urged the UN Security Council to respond to its establishment of MISCA on 19 July and adopt a resolution endorsing this deployment. 62 On 20 November the CAR authorities also requested French forces to support MISCA. The transitional authorities had only made limited progress in implementing the Transitional Framework, which had been called for by the April 2013 N’Djamena declaration and which took effect on 18 August, and there was a total absence of rule of law. Increasingly, the widespread human rights violations by former, mostly Muslim, Séléka forces led to retaliation by the predominantly Christian ‘Anti-balaka’ militias. As such, the dynamics of religious and ethnic violence and retaliation spiralled into total chaos, and the police and justice authorities did not have the capacity to hold perpetrators responsible. 63

The UN Security Council deemed the situation in the CAR to be a threat to international security, as it would provide an environment conducive for transnational criminal activity and radical networks. On 5 December, more than 4 months after MISCA was established by the PSC, the Security Council authorized its deployment and also mandated French forces to support it. MISCA was mandated to protect civilians and restore security and public order; stabilize the country and restore state authority; create conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance; and contribute to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and SSR processes. The formal transfer of authority and the end of the transition period from MICOPAX to MISCA was to take place on 19 December. All newly deployed African forces were to be integrated in MISCA. In order to support MISCA, the UN Secretariat provided technical and expert advice, while a UN trust fund was established to ensure funding. However, the Security Council noted that regional organizations are responsible for supplying resources for their work, including finance. The UN Secretary-General continued to prepare for a potential transformation of MISCA into a UN operation.

In response to yet another Security Council resolution mandating a French deployment abroad, some commentators began to refer to a


‘Hollande doctrine’—named after French President François Hollande—of short and limited French humanitarian interventions, mandated by the UN Security Council in cooperation with forces deployed by a regional (in this case, African) organization, and on the invitation of the host state. During the night of 6 December, the French-led Operation Sangaris deployed a force which grew to about 1600 personnel, and which initially led to improved security and reduced fighting between Christian and Muslim militias.

Despite some successes there were also major problems for both Operation Sangaris and MISCA. Christians complained that Chadian forces within MISCA were acting in a partisan manner towards the former Séléka forces, to whom they were ethnically and religiously related, while Muslims accused the French of taking sides in the conflict. Moreover, in December violent fighting broke out between MISCA troops in the capital, after Chadian troops fired on Burundian forces during the process of disarming former Séléka members. MISCA’s force commander and French troops accused the Chadian troops of siding with the rogue Séléka elements the force was supposed to disarm.

**Somalia**

During the first half of 2013, military and police forces from the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) played a critical role in improving the security situation in southern Somalia—including in the capital, Mogadishu, and in Kismayo. The aim of the international approach was to re-establish local governance structures and security forces, particularly in the areas recovered from the Islamist group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahedín Youth Movement, or al-Shabab). After conducting separate strategic reviews, the UN and the AU decided to enhance their cooperation on the basis of comparative advantage and a clear division of labour. In November 2012 the UN Security Council had announced that it would review the progress made before the next renewal of AMISOM’s mandate.

By the end of February 2013 it appeared that the outcome was positive, as it

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64 See e.g. Tisdall, S., ‘France in the Central African Republic is the latest use of “Hollande doctrine”’, The Guardian, 5 Dec. 2013.


69 UN Security Council Resolution 2073, 7 Nov. 2012.
renewed AMISOM’s mandate for one year. In addition to its existing mandate, AMISOM was also mandated to extend state authority in the recovered areas through the expansion of its civilian presence.\textsuperscript{70} The AU had also requested the UN to authorize ‘an enhancement of the support package’ for AMISOM.\textsuperscript{71} However, the UN did not respond to that request, instead calling on the AU and other international donors to increase their contributions to AMISOM.\textsuperscript{72}

Following the UN’s strategic review, both the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council deemed the conditions not yet appropriate to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation to Somalia. However, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to set benchmarks for an appropriate time to make such a deployment.\textsuperscript{73} In addition, the Security Council decided to close the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) as it had fulfilled its mandate, and established a new expanded political mission, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). The new mission was established on 3 June, had its headquarters in Mogadishu and was to deploy throughout Somalia if security allowed.\textsuperscript{74} Both the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and the UN Country Team for Somalia were to be integrated in UNSOM on 1 January 2014. UNSOM was mandated to provide good offices in the peace and reconciliation process; advise the government on issues such as governance, the security sector, and the development of a federal constitution and preparations for the 2015 elections; coordinate international donor assistance; and prevent, monitor and report on human rights violations—in particular, those against women and children, including gender-based and sexual violence—through the deployment of human rights observers. AMISOM committed a guard force of 311 troops for the protection of UN staff.\textsuperscript{75} On 24 July the Security Council also requested AMISOM to assist the Somali Federal Government in taking the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal, the proceeds from which are often used to finance al-Shabab.\textsuperscript{76}

During the year the territorial gains made in the conflict against al-Shabab came under threat and the Somali National Army (SNA) and

\textsuperscript{70} UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (note 68).
\textsuperscript{72} African Union, Peace and Security Council (note 71); and UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (note 68).
\textsuperscript{73} UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (note 68).
\textsuperscript{74} UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (note 68); UN Security Council Resolution 2102, 2 May 2013; and United Nations, Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2013/7, 6 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{75} UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (note 68); UN Security Council Resolution 2102 (note 74); and United Nations, S/PRST/2013/7 (note 74).
\textsuperscript{76} UN Security Council Resolution 2111, 24 July 2013.
AMISOM were forced to take a defensive posture. In May, al-Shabab had shifted its strategy from conventional to asymmetrical warfare in the recovered areas, including Mogadishu, targeting government institutions and the international presence, including the UN. For example, on 19 June the UN common compound in Mogadishu was attacked. The subsequent restrictions on troop movements led to a slowdown in the establishment of UNSOM.\(^77\)

In response, the UN Security Council mandated an expansion in the number of AMISOM uniformed personnel from 17,731 to 22,126. This surge, for a period of up to two years, aimed to negate al-Shabab’s asymmetrical tactics and regain the momentum militarily. However, the Security Council also viewed the troop enlargement as part of an exit strategy in which the benchmarks established by a joint AU–UN assessment mission would eventually be met, leading to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. A new concept of operations was expected by 1 January 2014.\(^78\) The Security Council also decided to expand the logistical support package for AMISOM for the new enlargement. In addition, support was extended to the frontline units of the SNA in joint operations with AMISOM. In a show of good will, the PSC had called on AU member states to also contribute financially to AMISOM.\(^79\)

Due to the deterioration of the security situation, the Security Council also decided to mandate UNSOM to deploy a UN static guard unit to protect UN personnel, similar to the models used in the CAR and Iraq.\(^80\)

**South Sudan and Sudan**

In 2013 the UN continued to deploy three missions in South Sudan and Sudan: the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) on the border between the two countries. Almost one-third of all troops deployed on UN peace operation worldwide were deployed with these three missions (25,195 troops), and the UN Security Council continued to urge close coordination of their activities.\(^81\)

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\(^{79}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2124, 12 Nov. 2013.

\(^{80}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2124 (note 79).

\(^{81}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2113, 30 July 2013.
Darfur

No progress was made in the Darfur peace process in 2013. In fact, although still better than at the time UNAMID was deployed, the security situation in Darfur worsened throughout the year. Inter-tribal violence, banditry and criminality, as well as confrontations between armed groups and the Sudanese Government (including aerial bombardments by government forces) led to significant population displacements. UNAMID’s 2012 troop reinforcement and reconfiguration, which was intended to increase the mission’s focus on the protection of civilians and the protection of humanitarian assistance, was completed well within the planned time frame. However, the mission continued to be plagued by insufficient force enablers, including military air assets; government restrictions and bureaucracy, which restricted UNAMID movement and operations, including the refusal to give a licence for UNAMID’s own radio transmitter; and the absence of agreed levels of self-sustained capabilities among some military and police contingents.

As the conflict intensified, attacks on UNAMID also increased. In total, 44 peacekeepers were killed in Darfur in 2013—the worst figure for a UN mission that year. In addition, while UNAMID has traditionally been involved in mediation through the peace process, some observers suggested that, due to its capacity issues, the mission should distance itself from mediation activities and focus on the protection of civilians. Moreover, UNAMID’s mediation has at times damaged its perceived neutrality, putting peacekeepers in danger.

Abyei

As in 2012, in 2013 UNISFA had to deal with cross-border violence between Sudan and South Sudan, although the level of violence was less than in 2012. Tensions remained high, with sporadic threats by both countries to halt the flow of oil across the border. Some progress was made on resolving outstanding issues from the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The South Sudanese and Sudanese governments worked to enforce the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) and implemented the

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82 van der Lijn (note 1), p. 80.
Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). At the request of the two countries, the UN Security Council increased UNISFA’s authorized troop ceiling from 4200 to 5326 in order to enable it to fully engage in the verification and monitoring of the border. The first of these additional troops deployed during the second half of the year.

However, there was less progress on UNISFA’s other mandate area. By the end of 2013 the Abyei Area Administration, Council and police forces had still not been established, and the Sudanese Government had failed to withdraw its Oil Police, leading to a complete absence of rule of law. Moreover, communal violence between the Dinka Ngok and the Miseriya increased, particularly after the killing of a Dinka Ngok paramount chief by a Miseriya gunman. Therefore, on 7 May the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee—the joint South Sudanese–Sudanese committee where daily negotiations continue—reiterated the status of the area as a weapon-free zone and the UN Security Council asked UNISFA to continue its dialogue on effective implementation and oversight of the zone. At the end of October, tensions increased further when the Dinka Ngok, in the absence of the referendum on the status of Abyei agreed to in the CPA, decided to conduct a unilateral referendum. At the beginning of November, when an AU PSC delegation visited the region, Dinka Ngok demonstrators attempted to forcefully enter UNISFA’s headquarters in order to meet the delegation. Eventually it met with the protestors peacefully.

South Sudan

The security and human rights situation in South Sudan deteriorated during 2013, in particular in parts of Jonglei state, where UNMISS continued to struggle to protect civilians from the ongoing internal conflict and inter-communal violence. The UN Secretary-General stated that ‘the sheer scale of the task compared to the resources and capacity available to the Mission and to the Government presents ongoing challenges’. The humanitarian situation worsened further due to the conflict in neighbouring Sudan, the insecurity along the border with Sudan and the limited humanitarian access. Furthermore, despite the end of the oil transit fees dispute with Sudan and the restarting of South Sudanese oil production in April 2013, the South Sudanese Government was forced to continue to

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87 On the establishment of the SDBZ and the JBVMM in 2011 see Fanchini (note 20), pp. 95–99.
90 UN Security Council Resolution 2104 (note 88).
91 UN Security Council Resolution 2126 (note 89).
implement austerity measures and consequently had no funding for peacebuilding efforts.  

UNMISS continued to focus on the protection of civilians and was requested by the UN Security Council to coordinate international assistance for the 2015 elections. However, the mission struggled with numerous problems. It continued to experience force-generation problems—that is, in adequately staffing the operation—and lacked essential air- and river-transport capacities. Moreover, it faced continuing restrictions on movement and attacks on its personnel. Although previously reported, mistreatment of UNMISS personnel increased sharply, with 67 cases of ‘harassments, threats, physical assaults, arrests and detentions of UN personnel and seizures of UN vehicles’ reported between 7 May and 5 November. In response, the Security Council decided to summon the South Sudanese ambassador. In 2013 UNMISS also suffered 9 casualties due to malicious attacks, compared to none in 2012 and 2011, and as a result it became the second most violent UN mission, after UNAMID. In addition, the UN experienced internal tensions due to a lack of clarity on the division of tasks between UNMISS and the UN Country Team in South Sudan. A joint review on the comparative advantages of the peace operation and the Country Team was carried out in the hope that this would improve the relationship.  

At the same time, the environment in which UNMISS had to operate became increasingly difficult as political tensions increased in South Sudan during 2013. On 23 July President Salva Kiir dismissed the Vice-President, Riek Machar, and the entire cabinet. On 15 December, after an alleged coup attempt by Machar, the situation exploded. Machar managed to escape the capital, Juba, but the South Sudanese Government detained 11 senior political figures and former ministers. Subsequently, South Sudan was plunged into a security and humanitarian crisis in which increasingly heavy fighting occurred along Nuer–Dinka lines. Extrajudicial killing of civilians on the basis of their ethnicity quickly led to hundreds of deaths and thousands of internally displaced persons. Faced with massive human rights violations, UNMISS quickly expanded its human rights investigation capacity, with the help of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In addition, UNMISS welcomed tens of thousands of people
onto its premises to escape the fighting. On 19 December approximately 2000 young people from the Lou Nuer ethnic group attacked a UNMISS camp, in Akobo, killing two Indian peacekeepers. By 23 December, after a week of heavy fighting, 81 000 people had become internally displaced, with around 45 000 finding refuge in UNMISS compounds.

In response to the rapidly deteriorating situation the UN Secretary-General proposed to temporarily increase UNMISS's troop levels by 5500 to a total of 12 500 in order to protect civilians and provide humanitarian aid. In addition, the UNMISS civilian police component was to be expanded from 900 to 1323. On 24 December the UN Security Council quickly authorized this request. However, in order to reduce expenditure, the Security Council only allowed the transfer of forces from other missions—including UNISFA, UNAMID, MONUSCO, the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)—if agreed by the troop-contributing countries. A week later, at the end of the year, the number of internally displaced people had increased to 194 000, 40 000 had fled their country or were stuck at the border between South Sudan and Sudan, and 57 500 were sheltering at 10 UN bases. Some analysts have warned that these bases resemble the UN-protected safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, and that they run the risk of being overrun by combatants who believe the UN is sheltering ethnic or political opponents, as occurred in Srebenica.

**West Africa: Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau**

In 2013 Côte d'Ivoire progressed on its path towards stability and the majority of people displaced by conflict returned to their homes. On 21 April regional and municipal elections were organized, although opposition parties boycotted the polls. The reconciliation process remained slow,

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the SSR and DDR processes did not go according to plan and reports of human rights violations continued. In addition, UNOCI remained concerned about instability in the border region with Liberia, and therefore continued to coordinate with UNMIL and the UN country teams in both countries in order to assist both governments with monitoring their common border. UNOCI’s mandate was extended until 30 June 2014, by which time the number of military personnel was set to decrease to 7137, with the intention to draw down to 5437 one year later. The remaining forces directed their attention to the high-risk areas, with the protection of civilians as their priority. The police component remained at 1555. A transfer of responsibilities to the Country Team was also started. The authorization of the French forces that support UNOCI—Operation Licorne—was again extended.105

The situation in Liberia continued to improve. However, the UN Security Council noted the threat of transnational organized crime, in particular arms trafficking. The Security Council extended the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2014, while continuing its phased drawdown by reducing the military component by 1129 personnel. The police component remained at 1795 personnel.106 Some analysts were concerned that the drawdown of UNMIL’s military component might be premature, as Liberia’s police was still too weak, and civilians were complaining about corruption and harassment.107

In Sierra Leone, the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was extended for the last time, until 31 March 2014, after which its responsibilities were to be transferred to the Country Team.108 Throughout 2013 the drawdown went according to plan.109

After the April 2012 military coup d’etat in Guinea-Bissau, drug trafficking increased in the country.110 The Agreement of Principles for the return to constitutional normalcy signed on 30 April 2013 extended the transition period until 31 December, during which elections were to be held to form an all-inclusive transitional government. The international community—including the AU, the EU, ECOWAS, the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), the UN and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative—increased efforts to speak with one voice, as this had been a

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However, both military interference in civilian affairs and drug trafficking continued and the security situation deteriorated further, to the extent that the organization of free and fair elections was under threat. In fact, the transitional government postponed the elections until March 2014. Nonetheless, ECOWAS intended to strengthen ECOMIB in order to assist the transitional authorities in providing security for the elections.112

Conclusions

The new operations deployed in Africa in 2013 formed part of complex constellations of operations, organizations and actors. Authority was transferred from one mission to another and often from one organization to another. These constellations are not new but they increasingly bring to the forefront relational frictions between different organizations and divergent views on how to deal with particular conflicts. In Mali, the AU and ECOWAS felt that the UN had not sufficiently consulted with African stakeholders on the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA or on MINUSMA’s mandate. In the case of the transition from MICOPAX to MISCA in the Central African Republic, there were organizational frictions between CEEAC and the AU and between the AU and the UN.

In addition to the AU, ECOWAS and the UN, two UN Security Council-mandated operations by French forces—Operation Serval in Mali and Operation Sangaris in the CAR—were also part of these complex constellations. The French operations received mixed reactions. On the one hand, there was a sense that they filled an important gap and allowed other missions in their deployment areas to fulfil their mandates by providing additional security and protection. On the other hand, African critics in particular argued that it would have been more appropriate to provide additional capacity to existing operations such as AFISMA and MISCA. Moreover, by mandating the French forces with robust tasks, the UN Security Council was able to soften the mandate of MINUSMA and as such ensure consent from countries, such as Russia, that fear the increasing robustness of UN peace operations. However, involving French forces also raised questions among observers as to whether French national interests are the right basis for intervention in Mali and the CAR.

The UN continued to struggle with the protection of civilians but appeared much more determined to enforce the concept in 2013 than it had

in 2012. In the process MONUSCO became the testing grounds for new developments. The robustness of its Force Intervention Brigade is a step away from traditional peacekeeping, but it is too early to tell whether this will become a trend or if it is an exception. The deployment of UAVs in eastern DRC is a similar departure from traditional peacekeeping’s aversion to intelligence gathering. The FIB showed that the UN Security Council hopes disasters such as M23’s capture of Goma in 2012 will not be repeated. The subsequent defeat of M23 with the assistance of MONUSCO was perceived as a success for the UN. However, the violence at the end of the year in South Sudan placed the UN once again in a difficult position. With tens of thousands of people sheltering at UN bases, the comparison with the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina is obvious and the UN will have a difficult task preventing a new Srebrenica.

Finally, in a climate of financial austerity, the call from the UN Security Council for African organizations to step up their financial efforts to fund their own missions became stronger. The AU Peace and Security Council picked up on this call in the case of Somalia and this may become the seed of increasing African independence in responding to threats to security in Africa.