Regional developments in peace operations

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III. Regional developments in peace operations

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Africa

In 2012, as in previous years, the largest concentration of peace operations was in Africa. Two of the three new operations during the year—the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) and the European Union (EU) Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger)—were located in Africa. There were 17 operations deployed in the region, 9 of them under United Nations command—a smaller proportion than in recent years (see table 2.1). Nonetheless, UN operations accounted for about 75,000 of the 94,000 personnel deployed in Africa. About 90,000 of the personnel deployed in the region were troops. Although the African Union (AU)/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) decreased its personnel size by more than 2,000, overall personnel deployments in the region increased due to the expansion of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and further deployments to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), both of which opened in 2011 and continued to expand in 2012.¹

Somalia

In 2012 the international community took a renewed interest in Somalia. The UN Political Office for Somalia and the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Augustine P. Mahiga, relocated to Mogadishu, after being based in Nairobi, Kenya, since 1995. Furthermore, the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council agreed in January on a new strategic concept for AMISOM that would both increase its force size and give it a more robust mandate. Following this concept, the Security Council mandated AMISOM to expand in four sectors in south-central Somalia, replacing Ethiopian forces and re-hatting Kenyan forces that had been fighting the Islamist group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahedín Youth Movement, or al-Shabab) in the area.²

Under the new concept, AMISOM is to use all necessary means to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance, and to reduce the threat posed by armed groups, especially al-Shabab. For this purpose the UN Security Council requested the AU to increase the force strength from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 troops and decided that the UN would also

increase its logistical support packages. The Security Council welcomed the support provided by the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) for the purpose of strengthening training and support to the Somali security forces.\(^3\) Military advances were made in the fight against al-Shabab and a new federal government was established following the end of the Transitional Federal Government’s mandate on 20 August. However, by this time al-Shabab was no longer the only concern: inter-clan competition and warlordism were increasing, and none of the groups involved wanted a strong central government.\(^4\) The next renewal of the AMISOM mandate was only for a four-month period, because the Security Council wanted to review the progress made before the next renewal.\(^5\)

**South Sudan and Sudan**

In 2012 the UN continued to deploy three missions in South Sudan and Sudan: UNAMID in the Darfur region of Sudan, UNMISS in South Sudan and UNISFA at the border between the two countries. By the end of 2012, almost one-third of all UN peace operation troops worldwide were deployed with these three missions.

Negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan made slow progress in 2012. Even when agreements were reached, implementation was often

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\(^3\) UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (note 2).


bogged down in discussions over their operationalization. Also, the charges Sudan imposes on South Sudan for transporting the latter’s oil to the terminal at Port Sudan remained contentious, leading South Sudan to stop oil production in January at enormous economic cost and causing domestic instability. Moreover, in 2012, incidents of cross-border violence continued, such as aerial bombardments, support to proxies and troop movements.6

After weeks of fighting on the border, in early April the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the national army of South Sudan, captured the Sudanese-controlled town of Heglig and the surrounding oilfields, which are in a contested border region. Retaliatory Sudanese air raids hit Bentiu in South Sudan. The fighting escalated to the brink of all-out war. However, on 20 April the SPLA left Heglig—although whether it withdrew voluntarily or was repulsed is disputed.7 During this period, the UN Security Council only reiterated that UNISFA was ready to support the implementation of any agreements reached.8 Pending the creation of two joint mechanisms agreed in 2011—the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and the Ad Hoc Committee of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism between Sudan and South Sudan—UNMISS was mandated to monitor the flow of weapons and personnel across the border.9

Eventually, although belatedly, South Sudan and Sudan lived up to the Security Council’s demands and largely withdrew their forces from the contested Abyei region in line with the 2011 Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area. On 27 September, in Addis Ababa, South Sudan and Sudan signed an agreement on security arrangements, which defined the ‘safe demilitarized border zone’ UNISFA has to monitor. Although neither country had provided full support to the mission by the end of 2012, in October Sudan and in November South Sudan signed a revised status-of-forces agreement.10 At the same time the situation in Abyei remained tense, with occasional demonstrations and riots. In one incident a UNISFA peacekeeper accidentally killed a local UN staff member participating in a demonstration.11

In South Sudan the security situation deteriorated due to spillover effects of the internal conflicts in Sudan’s South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and to intercommunal violence, especially in Jonglei state. The violence in Jonglei in 2011 and January 2012, and fierce criticism of UNMISS for its failure to protect civilians under imminent threat, prompted the mission to make protection of civilians (POC) the centrepiece of its operations and to develop an ambitious POC strategy, announced in June 2012.¹² The strategy was criticized by some for raising already unrealistic expectations among the civilian population of the protection they could expect from UNMISS. To moderate these expectations, UNMISS started an outreach programme to improve understanding of its role among the South Sudanese population.¹³

UNMISS also struggled with restrictions placed on its movements in certain areas and had difficulty reaching full deployment, with shortfalls of, in particular, ‘key enablers’, military helicopters and civilian specialists.¹⁴ Exacerbating the situation, several military helicopters were shot down. In January Russia threatened to withdraw all of its eight helicopters after losing one in the autumn of 2011. It then agreed to leave four with the mission until South Sudanese forces shot down another of its helicopters in December. In response, Russia stated that it would withdraw all of its helicopters in March 2013.¹⁵

The intensity of the conflict in Darfur decreased after the deployment of UNAMID in 2007. However, in 2012 violence and insecurity started to rise again in the area, and clashes between the government and rebel groups—including aerial bombardments, inter-tribal violence, banditry and criminality—continued. In addition, the Darfur Peace Process facilitated by the AU and the UN remained unproductive. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, signed by the Sudanese Government and the rebel Liberation and Justice Movement in 2011, was not implemented.¹⁶ Moreover, UNAMID patrols came under attack several times during the year, resulting in the injury or death of several peacekeepers.¹⁷ The Sudanese Government continued to hinder the mission by not respecting the status-of-forces agree-

¹³ Hemmer, J., ‘“We are laying the groundwork for our own failure”: the UN Mission in South Sudan and its civilian protection strategy—an early assessment’, Conflict Research Unit (CRU) Policy Brief no. 25, Netherlands Institute of International Relations and Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Jan. 2013.
¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 2057 (note 9).
¹⁵ ‘South Sudan’s army down UN helicopter in Jonglei, 4 Russians killed’, Sudan Tribune, 21 Dec. 2012.
ment, delaying the provision of the necessary visas, and obstructing the use of UNAMID’s aerial assets and its radio transmitter. Other parties to the conflict denied access to humanitarian workers.\(^{18}\)

During the annual review of UNAMID’s mandate in July, the Security Council decided to reconfigure the deployment over 12–18 months, to focus more on the areas in Darfur where the security threats are highest. For that purpose the mission’s authorized strength was increased to 16 200 military personnel, 2310 police and 17 formed police units of up to 140 personnel each. The Security Council noted, however, that the contingents deployed needed to be properly trained and equipped.\(^{19}\)

**Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) continued to struggle with issues of impartiality and with POC in 2012. In April a rebellion had been started by a group of former National Congress for People's Defence (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, CNDP) rebels who had been integrated into the national armed forces. The group, calling itself the 23 March Movement (M23, named for the date in 2009 when the CNDP and the government signed a peace agreement), received direct military support from the Rwandan and Ugandan governments.\(^{20}\)

In June UN Security Council Resolution 2053 extended MONUSCO’s mandate for another year and encouraged the mission to continue its partnership with the Congolese Government—something that has made it difficult to appear impartial in dealings with rebels in eastern DRC. Struggling with the lack of progress and increasing pressure to cut costs among a number of its members, the Security Council told MONUSCO to review its approach and establish a new strategy and timetable. Although POC was to remain MONUSCO’s priority, MONUSCO should make security sector reform its primary focus.\(^{21}\)

The M23 rebellion continued in the following months, as did M23’s attempts to establish a parallel administration and its attacks on the civilian population, peacekeepers and humanitarian actors. Consequently, by October 320 000 people had fled their homes in Nord-Kivu.\(^{22}\)

At a summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in July it was announced that the ICGLR and the AU were plan-

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\(^{18}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2063 (note 16).

\(^{19}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2063 (note 16).


\(^{21}\) UN Security Council Resolution 2053, 27 June 2012.

ning to deploy a ‘neutral international force’ in eastern DRC to ‘eradicate M23’ and other ‘negative forces’ and patrol and secure border zones.\textsuperscript{23} There were concerns in the UN Security Council about the aims and modalities of this force and its relationship with MONUSCO.\textsuperscript{24} Of particular concern was whether the force would involve troops from Rwanda and Uganda.\textsuperscript{25} The Security Council also requested the UN Secretary-General to report on options to enhance implementation of MONUSCO’s mandate, including POC.\textsuperscript{26}

On 20 November M23 forces entered the city of Goma. The Security Council demanded that they withdraw, disband and restore the authority of the government in Nord-Kivu.\textsuperscript{27} MONUSCO was widely accused of paying too little attention to its POC mandate during the episode despite outnumbering the rebels and being far better equipped. Troop-contributing countries were said to have been unwilling to put the lives of their forces at risk. The French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, called MONUSCO’s conduct ‘absurd’, and throughout eastern DRC angry mobs threw stones at MONUSCO personnel and facilities and burned down UN compounds.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{North and West Africa}

During a review of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in early 2012 it was decided to keep a ‘light footprint’ in the country because it was believed that a more intrusive mission would not be well received locally.\textsuperscript{29} The mandate of UNSMIL was modified to assist the Libyan Government in (a) managing the democratization process; (b) promoting the rule of law; (c) restoring public security; (d) countering illicit proliferation of arms; and (e) coordinating international assistance and building the capacity of the government.\textsuperscript{30}

With the inauguration on 25 April of the Ivoirian National Assembly, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire seemed to settle down after the electoral crisis of 2011. However, the already fragile situation, particularly in the border region with Liberia, deteriorated sharply when on 8 June a UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) patrol was attacked by armed elements and seven

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\textsuperscript{24} United Nations, S/PRST/2012/22 (note 22).
\textsuperscript{25} Kibangula, T., ‘A neutral force in eastern DR Congo is a false solution’, France 24, 19 Aug. 2012.
\textsuperscript{26} United Nations, S/PRST/2012/22 (note 22).
\textsuperscript{27} UN Security Council Resolution 2076, 20 Nov. 2012.
\end{flushright}
peacekeepers and a number of others were killed. In addition, numerous attacks on civilians, including internally displaced persons and returned refugees, forced UNOCI to revise its POC strategy.

Despite this, the UN Security Council deemed that the situation allowed for a reduction of the military component of UNOCI by one battalion, bringing the authorized strength down to 8837 personnel. However, cooperation between UNOCI and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was increased.\textsuperscript{31} From August to October the situation in the country deteriorated further. In particular, attacks on the Ivorian national security forces in and around Abidjan and in the border regions, reportedly executed by supporters of former president Laurent Gbagbo, were worrying. Intercommunal violence also remained a concern. In the light of these developments the planned troop reduction was deferred until 2013.\textsuperscript{32}

With regard to Liberia, the Security Council decided on a phased reduction of UNMIL’s authorized strength from seven to four infantry battalions, to eventually leave UNMIL with an authorized force of 3750 troops in July 2015. The first reduction, which is to take place between October 2012 and September 2013, consists of 1990 personnel. At the same time the number of UNMIL formed police units is to increase by three, totalling 420 personnel. The first new unit is to be deployed before February 2013.\textsuperscript{33}

In Sierra Leone, the successful completion of the electoral process allowed the Security Council to request a timeline for transition and a drawdown and exit strategy for the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL).\textsuperscript{34}

The Americas

Two operations were active in the Americas in 2012: the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA), led by the Organization of American States, and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). After a surge following the devastating January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, MINUSTAH—by far the bigger of the two operations—almost returned to its previous personnel levels. Given the relatively calm security situation, during its annual discussion on MINUSTAH’s mandate extension the UN Security Council reduced the total number of authorized military and police personnel to 6270.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31} UN Security Council Resolution 2062, 26 July 2012.
\textsuperscript{33} UN Security Council Resolution 2066, 17 Sep. 2012.
\textsuperscript{34} United Nations, Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2012/25, 30 Nov. 2012.
\textsuperscript{35} UN Security Council Resolution 2070, 12 Oct. 2012.
Under Haitian President Michel Martelly, who was elected in 2011, the debate over the withdrawal of MINUSTAH continued. The opposition stressed national pride and abuses committed by peacekeepers, as well as expressing anger over a cholera epidemic believed to have originated with MINUSTAH personnel. However, even the fiercest critics agreed that the Haitian police force could not guarantee security and therefore only called for MINUSTAH's phased withdrawal.\(^\text{36}\) In 2012 it was proposed that MINUSTAH's military component would gradually hand over responsibility for security to formed police units, and ultimately to the national police. The mission and the UN country team, in close consultation with the Haitian Government, finalized a new ‘integrated strategic framework’ for the period 2013–16, which identified UN priorities. Work started on developing a ‘reconfiguration and conditions-based consolidation plan’ for MINUSTAH, under which its tasks would be narrowed to a core set of tasks achievable within a ‘reasonable time frame’ (tentatively four to five years). Benchmarks and indicators were also to be developed collaboratively with the government and other stakeholders to measure progress made in the transition process.\(^\text{37}\)

Asia and Oceania

Eight peace operations were active in Asia and Oceania in 2012, with a total of about 103,892 personnel deployed (see table 2.1). The number of operations in 2012 remained the same as in 2011, but the total number of personnel decreased by 30,835. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan continued to account for the overwhelming majority of personnel deployed in the region. In 2012, transition-related developments and planned withdrawals continued for two operations: ISAF focused on withdrawing by the end of 2014 and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) closed at the end of 2012.

In May ISAF handed over security responsibilities to the Afghan national security forces in several districts, the third tranche of handovers in the transition process. By the end of 2012 the Afghan national security forces were in complete charge of security in 11 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. In December Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced the next 12 provinces for transition. Once this is complete, 87 per cent of the Afghan population will be living in transitioned areas. It is expected that the fifth and last phase will commence in mid-2013. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has repeatedly stated that after 2014 it will continue to


commit to Afghanistan through the deployment of a training, advisory and assistance mission.\textsuperscript{38} 

\textbf{Europe} 

There were 15 peace operations active in Europe in 2012, the same number as in 2011, while the total number of personnel deployed to missions in the region fell from 11,932 in 2011 to 9,784 in 2012 (see table 2.1). The decrease was largely due to the phased drawdown strategy of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which decreased its numbers by over 800, and the EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA), which reduced its force by almost 700. This shows a continuation of a downward trend of peacekeeping personnel deployed in Europe: deployments have roughly halved since 2009 and have declined more or less steadily for over a decade. At the height of the deployments in the former Yugoslavia, around 85,000 peacekeepers were deployed in Europe.

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), which provided capacity building and other support to strengthen the rule of law, closed on 30 June, and after the troop reduction EUFOR ALTHEA retained a residual force of only 600. The mission now focuses on training and capacity building of the Bosnian armed forces but maintains an out-of-country Intermediate Reserve Force that can be called on at short notice to reinforce Bosnian law enforcement agencies.\textsuperscript{39} 

\textbf{The Middle East} 

In addition to the deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS; see section II), the Syrian conflict also had a destabilizing effect on the operations of UNDOF on the Israeli–Syrian border. Armed members of the Syrian opposition hid in the Israeli–Syrian area of separation defined by the 1973 Agreement on Disengagement, provoking military operations by the Syrian armed forces. A number of incidents across the ceasefire line showed the potential for escalating tensions between Israel and Syria.\textsuperscript{40} 

\textsuperscript{39} UN Security Council Resolution 2074, 14 Nov. 2012. 
\textsuperscript{40} UN Security Council Resolution 2084, 19 Dec. 2012.
Conclusions

Budget considerations were important in many countries’ decisions to draw down their personnel contributions to ISAF, and in the speed of the drawdowns. Pressure to reduce spending on peace operations also meant that UN missions were subject to increased scrutiny; most notably, more benchmarks and indicators were established to evaluate and monitor operations in the DRC, Haiti and Sudan, among others. In addition, existing missions were increasingly told to focus on core sets of tasks achievable in a defined time frame. Inter-mission cooperation, such as that between UNMIL and UNOCI, was another strategy used to increase efficiency.

Despite the budgetary and other rigours, many politicians and civil society groups continued to place high demands on peace operations. Pressure continues to get even more value for money for peace operations. However, the UN struggled with POC in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and South Sudan. Unable to prevent inter-communal violence in Jonglei state in South Sudan and M23’s capturing of Goma in the DRC, the UN was once again criticized by advocacy groups and politicians for its ‘weakness’ and inability to act. Such criticisms often overlook the fact that the ability of UN missions to respond in cases like these is dependent on the UN member states being willing to contribute the essential capacities and to agree on sufficiently robust measures.

There were markedly fewer signs of division within the international community regarding existing operations than there were regarding new operations.