


# **SIPRI YEARBOOK 2013**

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

Patterns of organized violence, 2002–11

LOTTA THEMNÉR AND PETER WALLENSTEEN



## Patterns of organized violence, 2002–11

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### III. Patterns of organized violence, 2002–11

LOTTA THEMNER AND PETER WALLENSTEEN  
UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM

This section provides an overview of trends in the 10-year period 2002–11 in three categories of violent action used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in mapping organized violence around the world: state-based conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence. The overall number of incidents of organized violence resulting in the deaths of at least 25 people in a particular year (the threshold for counting by UCDP) was slightly lower in 2011, at 98, than in 2002, when it stood at 114. This was solely due to a decrease in incidents of one-sided violence; both state-based and non-state conflicts were more prevalent in 2011 than in 2002 (see figure 1.3).

Within the overall trend, each of the three types of violence has its own internal dynamics, while also being affected by the dynamics of the other types. The full picture is, of course, more complex, but there is no clear positive or negative correlation between the three types of violence.

#### **State-based conflicts**

State-based conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility between two parties—at least one of which is the government of a state—that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force by the parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year (see ‘Sources and methods’ below for more detail).<sup>1</sup> A state-based conflict that results in 1000 battle-related deaths in a year is classified as a ‘war’ in that year; other state-based conflicts are classified as ‘minor state-based conflicts’.<sup>2</sup> This definition extends from low-intensity conflicts that are active for just one or a few years to high-intensity, protracted conflicts.

In the 10-year period 2002–11 there were 73 active state-based conflicts, including 37 that were active in 2011 (see table 1.3).<sup>3</sup> Over the decade, the annual number increased, albeit unevenly, and at 37 in 2011 it reached a level only seen in one other year of the period: 2008 (see table 1.4).


There was also an overall increase in battle-related deaths in state-based conflicts over the decade, with over 22 500 people killed in battles in 2011 (see figure 1.4), compared to just over 17 000 in 2002.<sup>4</sup> Again, the increase was uneven, with the lowest number (c. 11 500) recorded in 2005 while the

<sup>1</sup> This category is called ‘armed conflict’ in other UCDP data sets.

<sup>2</sup> The category minor state-based conflict is called ‘minor armed conflict’ in other UCDP data sets.

<sup>3</sup> Note that the UCDP counts fighting between different sets of actor over the same type of incompatibility (government or territory) in the same country as a single conflict.

<sup>4</sup> For the full definition of battle-related deaths see below.



**Figure 1.3.** Numbers of state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts and incidents of one-sided violence, 2002–11

highest number (almost 31 000) was reached in 2009. This peak was largely due to the dramatic escalation of the conflict in Sri Lanka, which ended in that year with the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan also played a part. The conflict between the Afghan Government and the Taliban escalated in 2009 and a new, intense conflict erupted between the Pakistani Government and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taliban Movement of Pakistan).

UCDP data distinguishes between three types of state-based conflict: interstate, intrastate and internationalized intrastate. Interstate conflicts are fought between two or more governments of states. Intrastate conflicts are fought between a government of a state and one or more rebel groups. Internationalized intrastate conflicts are intrastate conflicts in which one or both sides receive troop support from an external state. Intrastate conflicts are by far the most common; in most years they account for more than 80 per cent of all conflicts, and never for less than 70 per cent. Interstate conflicts are the least common. In the 10-year period 2002–11 there were only four: between India and Pakistan (2001–2003), Iraq and the USA with its allies (2003), Djibouti and Eritrea (2008), and Cambodia and Thailand (2011). Although rare, interstate conflicts should not be neglected. Given the vast resources that can be mobilized by governments compared to rebel groups, conflicts between states may rapidly escalate and cause high numbers of fatalities.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. Lacina, B. and Gleditch, N. P., 'Monitoring trends in global combat: a new dataset of battle deaths', *European Journal of Population*, vol. 21, no. 2–3 (June 2005), pp. 145–66.

**Table 1.3.** State-based conflicts in 2011

For more detailed definitions of the terms used see 'Sources and methods' below.

Location <sup>d</sup>	Parties	Incompatibility	Start year <sup>b</sup>	Fatalities, 2011	Change from 2010 <sup>c</sup>
<i>Africa</i>					
Algeria (Algeria, Niger)	Government of Algeria, Niger vs al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Government	1998/1999	269	+
CAR	Government of CAR vs Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP, Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace)	Government	2009/2009	44	+ +
Côte d'Ivoire	Government of Côte d'Ivoire vs Forces de Défense et de Sécurité Impartiales de Côte d'Ivoire (FDSI-CI, Impartial Defence and Security Forces of Côte d'Ivoire)	Government	2011/2011	35	..
Ethiopia (Ethiopia, Kenya)	Government of Ethiopia vs Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	Territory (Ogaden)	1994/1994	25	--
	vs Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	Territory (Oromiya)	1974/1977	25	0
Libya	Government of Libya vs National Transitional Council (NTC)	Government	2011/2011	1 600	..
	vs Forces of Muammar Gaddafi	Government	2011/2011	328	..
Mauretania (Mali, Mauretania, Niger)	Government of Mauretania, Mali, Niger vs al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Government	2008/2010	30	0
Nigeria	Government of Nigeria vs Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	Government	2009/2009	324	..
Rwanda (DRC)	Government of Rwanda, DRC vs Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda)	Government	2001/2001	116	-
Senegal	Government of Senegal vs Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance the Democratic Forces of the Casamance)	Territory (Casamance)	1988/1990	25	..
Somalia (Kenya, Somalia)	Government of Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya vs Al-Shabab	Government	2008/2008	1 917	0
South Sudan	Government of South Sudan vs South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (SSDM/A)	Government	2011/2011	101	..
	vs South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A)	Government	2011/2011	111	..

Location <sup>d</sup>	Parties	Incompatibility	Start year <sup>b</sup>	Fatalities, 2011	Change from 2010 <sup>c</sup>
Sudan	Government of Sudan vs Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	Government	2003/2003	98	--
	vs Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	Government	2003/2003	130	-
	vs South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (SSDM/A)	Government	2010/2010	492	++
	vs South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A)	Government	2011/2011	312	..
	vs Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM/A-North)	Government	2011/2011	217	..
Sudan	Government of Sudan vs Government of South Sudan	Territory (Abyei)	2011/2011	149	..
Uganda (DRC)	Government of Uganda, DRC vs Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF)	Government	1996/1996	73	0
(CAR, DRC, S. Sudan, Sudan)	Government of Uganda, CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan vs Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Government	1988/1988	64	+
<i>Americas</i>					
Colombia	Government of Colombia vs Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)	Government	1964/1964	202	-
USA (Afghanistan, vs Pakistan)	Government of USA, France vs al-Qaeda	Government	2001/2001	190	-
<i>Asia and Oceania</i>					
Afghanistan (Afghanistan, vs Pakistan)	Government of Afghanistan, Multinational coalition <sup>d</sup> vs Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan)	Government	1980/1980	44	--
	vs Taliban	Government	1995/1995	7 184	+
Cambodia, Thailand	Government of Cambodia vs Government of Thailand	Territory (Common border)	1975/1977	28	..
India	Government of India vs Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	Government	2004/2005	287	-
	vs Kashmir insurgents	Territory (Kashmir)	1984/1989	140	--
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar vs Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)	Territory (Kachin)	1961/1961	209	..
	vs Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5 (DKBA 5)	Territory (Karen)	2010/2010	115	++
	vs Karen National Union (KNU)	Territory (Karen)	1966/1966	203	++
	vs Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS)	Territory (Shan)	1986/1996	44	+
	vs Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)	Territory (Shan)	2011/2011	141	..

Location <sup>a</sup>	Parties	Incompatibility	Start year <sup>b</sup>	Fatalities, 2011	Change from 2010 <sup>c</sup>
Pakistan (Afghanistan, Pakistan)	Government of Pakistan vs Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taliban Movement of Pakistan)	Government	2007/2008	2 599	-
	vs Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)	Territory (Balochistan)	2004/2004	42	..
Philippines	Government of the Philippines vs Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)	Government	1969/1969	205	0
	vs Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Territory (Mindanao)	1993/1933	80	0
	vs Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	Territory (Mindanao)	1990/1990	83	..
Tajikistan	Government of Tajikistan vs Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Government	2005/2010	28	--
Thailand	Government of Thailand vs Patani insurgents	Territory (Patani)	1965/2003	142	++
<i>Europe</i>					
Russia	Government of Russia vs Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	Territory ('Caucasus Emirate')	2007/2007	359	-
<i>Middle East</i>					
Iran (Iran, Iraq)	Government of Iran vs Partî Jiyani Azadî Kurdistan (PJAK, Free Life Party of Kurdistan)	Government	2005/2005	219	..
Iraq	Government of Iraq, USA vs Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam)	Government	2003/2004	27	..
	vs Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya (ISI, Islamic State of Iraq)	Government	2004/2004	834	-
Israel	Government of Israel vs Harakat al-Muqawarna al-Islamiyya ( Hamas, Islamic Resistance Movement)	Territory (Palestinian territories)	1989/1993	25	..
	vs Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin (PIJ, Palestinian Islamic Jihad)	Territory (Palestinian territories)	1987/1995	31	+
Syria	Government of Syria vs Free Syrian Army (FSA)	Government	2011/2011	842	..
Turkey (Iraq, Turkey)	Government of Turkey vs Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party)	Territory ('Kurdistan')	1983/1984	599	++
Yemen	Government of Yemen, USA vs al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Government	2009/2009	1 140	++

CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.

<sup>a</sup> Location refers to the state whose government is being challenged by an opposition organization. If fighting took place elsewhere, all countries where fighting took place are listed in brackets. The location name appears once for each conflict in the location. There can only be 1 conflict over government and 1 conflict over a specific territory in a given location.

<sup>b</sup> Start year refers to the onset of a given dyad (i.e. the fighting between a government and a rebel group or another government). The first year given is when the first recorded battle-related death in the dyad occurred and the second year is the year when fighting caused at least 25 battle-related deaths for the first time.

<sup>c</sup> 'Change from 2010' is measured as the increase or decrease in the number of battle-related deaths in 2011 compared to the number of battle-related deaths in 2010. The symbols represent the following changes: ++ = increase in battle-related deaths of >50%; + = increase in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; 0 = stable rate of battle-related deaths (-10 to +10%); - = decrease in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; -- = decrease in battle-related deaths of >50%; . = the conflict was not active in 2010.

<sup>d</sup> The following countries contributed troops to the coalition in 2011: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, South Korea, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, UK and USA.

Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset v. 1-2012 and UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset v. 5-2012b, <<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/>>.

Internationalized intrastate conflicts have become increasingly common. In both 2010 and 2011 there were nine such conflicts, the highest number in the period. This meant that in 2010, 29 per cent of active state-based conflicts had the involvement of an external actor. This is a very high proportion, not just for 2002–11 but also in comparison with a longer time period.<sup>6</sup> Since external involvement tends to prolong conflicts, this may not bode well for future peacemaking efforts.<sup>7</sup>

The internationalized intrastate conflicts active in 2002–11 can be divided into two broad (and sometimes overlapping) groups: (a) conflicts linked to the USA's 'global war on terrorism', such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the USA's conflict with al-Qaeda; and (b) cases of government intervention in internal conflicts in neighbouring countries, such as the conflict between Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), where the government in 2011 received support from the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.

Of the 73 state-based conflicts active in 2002–11, 29 (or 40 per cent) were fought in Africa, 27 (37 per cent) in Asia, 9 in the Middle East (12 per cent), 4 in Europe (5 per cent) and 4 in the Americas (5 per cent). While Africa started the decade with the highest number of conflicts, it was overtaken by

<sup>6</sup> See Themnér, L. and Wallensteen, P., 'Armed conflicts, 1946–2010', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 48, no. 4 (July 2011), pp. 525–36.

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Cunningham, D. E., 'Blocking resolution: how external states can prolong civil wars', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 47, no. 2 (Mar. 2012), pp. 115–27.



**Table 1.4.** State-based conflict, by intensity, type and region, 2002–11


	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>31<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>37</b>
<i>Intensity</i>										
Minor	26	25	25	27	28	31	32	30	27	31
War	6	5	7	5	5	4	5	6	4	6
<i>Type</i>										
Interstate	1	2	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
Intrastate	28	26	28	26	27	30	30	28	22	27
Internationalized intrastate	3	2	4	6	6	5	6	8	9	9
<i>Region</i>										
Africa	15	10	10	7	10	12	13	12	10	15
Americas	2	1	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2
Asia and Oceania	12	15	14	16	15	14	15	15	12	13
Europe	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1
Middle East	2	3	3	5	5	4	4	5	5	6

<sup>a</sup> One conflict has been added to the total for 2010 given in *SIPRI Yearbook 2011*, that between the Ethiopian Government and the Oromo Liberation Front, because newly available information indicates that it passed the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in that year.

Asia and Oceania between 2003 and 2010, due mainly to a large increase in the number of conflicts in Central and South Asia. During this period Asia saw the resumption of the conflicts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan's Balochistan province, and the escalation of low-intensity violence between the Thai Government and insurgents in southern Thailand, which first crossed the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2003. There were no state-based conflicts recorded in Oceania in 2002–11.

Simultaneously, a number of conflicts came to an end in Africa, although some only temporarily (CAR, Chad and Somalia) and others seemingly more permanently (Angola and the Republic of the Congo). This positive trend in Africa was sharply reversed in 2011. New conflicts erupted in Libya and Sudan as well as in the newly independent South Sudan at the same time as conflicts that had been dormant for many years once again turned violent (e.g. in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal).

Over the decade, the number of battle-related deaths in African conflicts decreased somewhat, going from over 7100 in 2002 to under 6500 in 2011, although the lowest figure was in 2005 (see figure 1.4). Asian conflicts turned markedly more deadly, however, increasing by roughly 4500 fatalities (63 per cent) from almost 7100 in 2002 to just less than 11 600 in 2011, and reaching a peak of 21 707 in 2009. The pattern was mainly driven by developments in Central and South Asia, particularly the high-intensity conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.



**Figure 1.4.** Battle-related deaths in state-based conflicts, by region, 2002–11

The number of battle-related deaths fell in both the Americas and Europe, despite similar numbers of conflicts in both regions at the start and end of the period. A peak of over 1000 battle-related deaths in Europe in 2004 was driven by an escalation of the conflict between the Russian Government and the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Another, in 2008, was driven by the outbreak of renewed fighting between the Government of Georgia and the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, supported by Russia. Both of these conflicts terminated during the period, influencing the decreasing trend in the number of fatalities. The decrease in the Americas was largely related to the de-escalation of the conflict in Colombia, between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and the conflict between the US Government and al-Qaeda.<sup>8</sup>

The number of battle-related deaths in the Middle East rose from fewer than 500 in 2002 to more than 3700 in 2011, a nearly 700-per cent increase. This reflected dramatic developments in the region. In 2002 the deadly conflicts in Iraq and Yemen had yet to begin and in 2011, six conflicts were active and the Arab Spring had triggered the outbreak of the conflict between the Syrian Government and the Free Syrian Army.

<sup>8</sup> While the fighting in the conflict between the USA and its allies and al-Qaeda started on US soil with a series of terrorist attacks on 11 Sep. 2001, it then moved to other parts of the world. In 2002–11 fighting in this conflict mainly took place in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

## Non-state conflicts

A non-state conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two organized groups—neither of which is the government of a state—that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Non-state conflicts are divided into three subcategories according to the groups' level of organization: (a) conflicts between formally organized groups such as rebel groups and militias; (b) conflicts between informally organized supporters and affiliates of political parties and candidates ('informally organized supporter groups'); and (c) conflicts between informally organized groups that share a common identification along ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal lines ('informally organized ethnic or religious groups').<sup>9</sup> Thus, non-state conflict relates to a broad spectrum of violence that tends to greatly affect the civilian population but often has fewer implications for international relations than state-based conflict. For example, the category includes conflicts between highly organized groups—such as the two factions of the separatist National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), NSCN–Isaac–Muviah and NSCN–Khaplang, which are fighting in the Nagaland region in north-eastern India—as well as conflicts between ethnic communities in the Horn of Africa such as that between the Toposa and Turkana in north-western Kenya.<sup>10</sup>

A total of 223 non-state conflicts were active worldwide in 2002–11, including 38 that were active in 2011 (see table 1.5). There was a slight increase in the number of active non-state conflicts over the decade, but as with state-based conflicts the rise was far from smooth (see table 1.6).

The increase in the number of conflicts was accompanied by a rise in the average number of fatalities (see figure 1.5). The 35 conflicts fought in 2002 caused a little over 5800 fatalities, making the average number of people killed per conflict 166; while the 38 conflicts in 2011 accounted for almost 6400 fatalities, with an average of 168 fatalities per conflict. However, trends in non-state conflict numbers and fatalities over the decade differ. This is most clearly illustrated by the change from 2008 to 2009, when the number of conflicts dropped by 9 but the number of fatalities increased by as much as 1700. This increase was mainly driven by the violent escalation

<sup>9</sup> There is a potential overlap between the types of non-state conflict. E.g. in many countries supporters of different political parties are almost by definition members of a specific ethnic group. During election years these groups are mobilized under a political banner, whereas they are mobilized as an ethnic group in conflicts occurring in other years. To be able to get a good overview and to follow a conflict even though it is reported in different ways in different years, UCDP has a coding rule that if there is a conflict between 2 ethnic groups in 1 year, and these ethnic groups are then involved in fighting mobilized along political lines (i.e. as supporters of a party) in another year, all conflict years are coded as part of the same ethnic conflict.

<sup>10</sup> See e.g. Baumann, J. et al., 'Organized violence in the Horn of Africa', *SIPRI Yearbook 2012*.

**Table 1.5.** Non-state conflicts in 2011

For more detailed definitions of the terms used see 'Sources and methods' below.

Location <sup>a</sup>	Side A	Side B	Organization level <sup>b</sup>	Start year <sup>c</sup>	Fatalities, 2011	Change from 2010 <sup>d</sup>
<i>Africa</i>						
CAR	CPJP	UFDR	1	2011	60	..
Côte d'Ivoire	Guéré	Malinké	3	2011	33	..
DRC	FDC	FDLR	1	2011	27	..
Guinea	Kpelle	Malinké	3	2011	25	..
Kenya	Borana	Turkana	3	2011	29	..
Kenya	Dassanetch	Turkana	3	1997	55	..
Kenya	Toposa	Turkana	3	1992	26	..
Nigeria	Biom	Fulani	3	2010	100	++
Nigeria	Christians (Nigeria)	Muslims (Nigeria)	3	1991	830	..
Nigeria	Ezilo	Ezza	3	2011	50	..
Nigeria	Fulani	Tiv	3	2011	124	..
Nigeria	Hausa	Sayawa	3	2011	38	..
Nigeria	Supporters of ACN	Supporters of PDP	2	2008	26	..
Somalia	Al-Shabab	Shabelle Valley Alliance (SVA)	1	2011	36	..
Somalia	Forces of Shayk Muhammad Said Atom	Puntland state of Somalia	1	2010	33	--
Somalia	Sa'ad subclan of Habar Gidir clan (Hawiye)	Suleiman subclan of Habar Gidir clan (Hawiye)	3	2004	40	..
Sudan	Atuot Dinka	Jur Beli	3	2011	43	..
Sudan	Bor Dinka	Murle	3	2007	44	..
Sudan	Dinka	Nuer	3	1997	133	-
Sudan	Gony Dinka	Thiyic Dinka	3	2011	95	..
Sudan	Lou Nuer	Murle	3	2006	1 415	..
Sudan	Misseria	Ngok Dinka	3	2011	212	..
<i>Americas</i>						
Mexico	CIDA	La Barredora	1	2011	105	..
Mexico	Gulf Cartel	Los Zetas	1	2010	345	-
Mexico	Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación)	La Resistancia	1	2011	33	..
Mexico	Jalisco Cartel New Generation	Los Zetas	1	2011	101	..
Mexico	Juarez Cartel	Sinaloa Cartel	1	2008	1 668	-
Mexico	La Familia Templarios (the Knights Templar)	Los Caballeros	1	2011	100	..
Mexico	Los Zetas	Sinaloa Cartel	1	2010	85	++
<i>Asia and Oceania</i>						
Afghanistan	Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Taliban	1	1994	25	--
India	NSCN-Isaac-Muivah faction	NSCN-Khaplang faction	1	2005	37	..
Pakistan	Lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam)	Lashkar (army) of Zakakhel tribe	1	2011	128	..

Location <sup>a</sup>	Side A	Side B	Organization level <sup>b</sup>	Start year <sup>c</sup>	Fatalities, 2011	Change from 2010 <sup>d</sup>
Pakistan	Lashkar-e-Islam	TTP-Tariq Afridi faction	1	2011	41	..
Pakistan	Lashkar of the Kukikhel clan	TTP	1	2011	60	..
Pakistan	Lashkar of the Masozai Qaumi tribe	TTP	1	2011	79	..
Philippines	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	1	2011	31	..
<i>Middle East</i>						
Egypt	Copts (Egypt)	Muslims (Egypt)	3	2011	31	..
Syria	Opponents of Bashar al-Assad	Supporters of Bashar al-Assad	2	2011	30	..

ACN = Action Congress of Nigeria; CIDA = *Cártel Independiente de Acapulco* (Independent Cartel of Acapulco); CPJP = *Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix* (Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace); FDC = *Forces de défense congolaise* (Congolesé Defence Force); FDLR = *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda); NSCN = National Socialist Council of Nagaland; PDP = People's Democratic Party; TTP = *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* (Taliban Movement of Pakistan); UFDR = *Union des Forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity).

<sup>a</sup> Location refers to the geographical location of the fighting.

<sup>b</sup> Organization level: 1 = formally organized groups; 2 = informally organized supporter groups; and 3 = informally organized ethnic or religious groups. See 'Sources and methods' for full details.

<sup>c</sup> Start year is the first year (since 1988) when conflict caused 25 fatalities.

<sup>d</sup> 'Change from 2010' is measured as the increase or decrease in the number of battle-related deaths in 2011 compared to the number of battle-related deaths in 2010. The symbols represent the following changes: +++ = increase in battle-related deaths of >50%; ++ = increase in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; 0 = stable rate of battle-related deaths (-10 to +10%); - = decrease in battle-related deaths of >10 to 50%; -- = decrease in battle-related deaths of >50%; .. = the conflict was not active in 2010.


Source: UCDP Non-state Conflict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011, <<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/>>.

of the conflict between the Lou Nuer and Murle ethnic groups in Southern Sudan and between Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca and al-Shabab in Somalia.

The most common type of non-state conflict in 2002-11 was conflict between informally organized ethnic or religious groups. Of the 223 non-state conflicts, 128 (57 per cent) were fought between such groups. Eighty-seven of the conflicts (39 per cent) were between formally organized groups. Conflicts between informally organized supporter groups were uncommon: only 8 (4 per cent) were recorded in the entire period. Non-state conflict involving informally organized supporter groups was the least common of the three subcategories in all years of the period.


**Table 1.6.** Non-state conflict, by subcategory and region, 2002–11

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>38</b>
<i>Subcategory</i>										
Formally organized groups	13	15	13	11	7	10	13	9	16	18
Informally organized supporter groups	1	3	1	–	1	–	2	1	–	2
Informally organized ethnic or religious groups	21	21	12	18	19	9	20	16	11	18
<i>Region</i>										
Africa	30	34	20	22	21	11	23	18	13	22
Americas	2	2	3	3	–	–	3	3	7	7
Asia and Oceania	2	2	2	4	5	5	8	5	6	7
Europe	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Middle East	1	1	1	–	1	3	1	–	1	2

**Figure 1.5.** Average number of battle-related deaths in non-state conflicts, 2002–11

The vast majority of non-state conflicts in 2002–11 were located in Africa. Most of them were clustered in a few countries. Of the 165 non-state conflicts in Africa over the decade, 125 (or almost 76 per cent) were fought in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan.

While most deaths in non-state conflicts occurred in Africa, the average 161 deaths per conflict there was well below the corresponding figure for the Americas, 524. This is to be expected, since most non-state conflicts in



**Figure 1.6.** Subcategories of non-state conflict, by region, 2002–11

Africa involved ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal groups (see figure 1.6), which cannot mobilize resources as effectively as formally organized rebel groups or militias, which accounted for the majority of non-state conflicts in other regions. The Americas, in contrast, is one of the regions with the highest proportion of non-state conflicts between formally organized groups. Over the period, most non-state conflicts in the Americas were fought between rebel groups and pro-government militias (e.g. FARC and the pro-government Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), rival criminal gangs (e.g. Comando Vermelho and Terceiro Comando in Brazil) or drug cartels (e.g. the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels in Mexico). In 2011 all non-state conflicts in the Americas were located in Mexico and were fought between drug cartels. Many of these conflicts continued into 2013.<sup>11</sup>

### One-sided violence

One-sided violence is defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against unorganized civilians that results in at least 25 deaths. A state or group that kills 25 or more unarmed civilians during a year is registered as carrying out one-sided violence in the UCDP data. This includes a wide variety of situations, from

<sup>11</sup> On security spending related to the drugs war in Central America see chapter 3, section IV, in this volume.

**Table 1.7.** One sided-violence in 2011

For more detailed definitions of the terms used see 'Sources and methods' below.

Location <sup>a</sup>	Actor	Start year <sup>b</sup>	Fatalities, 2011	Change from 2010 <sup>c</sup>
<i>Africa</i>				
CAR, DRC, Sudan	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	1989	145	--
Côte d'Ivoire	Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes pour le sursaut national (AJPSN, Alliance of Young Patriots for National Revival)	2011	52	..
Côte d'Ivoire	Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI, Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire)	2011	49	..
Côte d'Ivoire	Government of Côte d'Ivoire	2000	277	..
Libya	Government of Libya	1989	152	..
Nigeria	Government of Nigeria	1990	32	..
Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	2010	89	0
Somalia	Al-Shabab	2008	44	--
Somalia	Government of Somalia	1989	36	..
Sudan	Government of Sudan	1989	174	..
<i>Americas</i>				
Mexico, Guatemala	Los Zetas	2010	268	++
<i>Asia and Oceania</i>				
Afghanistan	Taliban	2004	60	--
India	Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	2005	184	-
Myanmar	Government of Myanmar	1992	107	++
Pakistan	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Taliban Movement of Pakistan)	2007	198	--
Pakistan, Afghanistan	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ, Army of Jhangvi)	1998	121	-
Thailand	Patani insurgents	2004	116	-
Viet Nam	Government of Viet Nam	2011	72	..
<i>Europe</i>				
Russia	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	2010	40	-
<i>Middle East</i>				
Bahrain	Government of Bahrain	2011	26	..
Iraq	Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya (ISI, Islamic State of Iraq)	2004	322	--
Syria	Government of Syria	2011	2 924	..
Yemen	Government of Yemen	2011	142	..

<sup>a</sup> Location refers to the geographical location of the one-sided violence.<sup>b</sup> Start year is the first year (since 1988) when one-sided violence caused 25 fatalities.<sup>c</sup> 'Change from 2010' is measured as the increase or decrease in the number of fatalities in 2011 compared to the number of fatalities in 2010. The symbols represent the following changes: ++ = increase in fatalities of >50%; + = increase in fatalities of >10 to 50%; 0 = stable rate of fatalities (-10 to +10%); - = decrease in fatalities of >10 to 50%; -- = decrease in fatalities of >50%; .. = the conflict was not active in 2010.Source: UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, v. 1.4-2012, 1989-2011, <<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/>>.



**Table 1.8.** One-sided violence, by actor and region, 2002–11


	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>
<i>Actor type</i>										
Non-state actors	34	30	33	22	19	18	20	15	18	13
State actors	13	11	10	10	11	9	7	4	1	10
<i>Region</i>										
Africa	26	23	18	12	10	15	14	8	7	10
Americas	2	1	3	4	1	–	2	1	2	1
Asia and Oceania	14	12	13	8	14	9	10	7	8	7
Europe	1	1	3	–	–	–	–	–	1	1
Middle East	4	4	6	8	5	3	1	3	1	4

largely small-scale, day-to-day attacks, such as those by the Ivorian militia Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes pour le sursaut national (AJPSN, Alliance of Young Patriots for National Revival, commonly called the Young Patriots)—which supports former president Laurent Gbagbo—to large-scale cases such as the Syrian Government’s attacks on civilians throughout 2011.

A total of 130 actors were recorded as carrying out one-sided violence in 2002–11, including 23 active in 2011 (see table 1.7). The annual number declined markedly in the period, starting at 47 in 2002 (see table 1.8).

This decline was matched by a drop in the number of fatalities in one-sided violence (see figure 1.7). Between 2002 and 2008 the number of fatalities decreased every year, falling by 43 per cent between 2004 and 2005, due in part to a decline in one-sided violence by the Sudanese Government and the Janjaweed militia in Darfur. There were widely oscillating figures in the last three years of the period: an increase by 63 per cent in 2009, as both the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) and the LRA stepped up their campaigns against civilians in Central Africa, was followed by a 49 per cent drop the following year, as the activities of these two actors de-escalated markedly. In 2011 the number of fatalities increased dramatically again, this time by 81 per cent. An increase of this magnitude has not been recorded previously in the data, and it was largely driven by the actions of the Syrian Government, which caused almost 3000 fatalities during the year.

As with non-state conflicts, the trend in fatality numbers from one-sided violence can differ from the trend in actor numbers. For example, as the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence increased from 41 to 43 between 2003 and 2004, the number of fatalities decreased from approximately 10 800 to fewer than 7900. This type of discrepancy is most often due to a change in the behaviour of single actors. In 2003–2004 the drop was to a large extent due to developments in Liberia, where the govern-



**Figure 1.7.** Fatalities in one-sided violence, by type of actor, 2002–11

ment carried out extensive one-sided violence in 2003, but none in 2004, when a peace deal had been reached between the warring parties. Furthermore, the Congolese rebel group *Forces nationalistes et integrationnistes* (FNI, Nationalist and Integrationist Forces) and the Janjaweed militia in Sudan de-escalated their activities markedly.

Non-state actors tend to be the most common perpetrators of one-sided violence, as they were in all years of the period 2002–2011, and over the period as a whole, 95 of the 130 actors (73 per cent) were rebel groups or militias. It is interesting to note, however, that in 2011 this pattern was at its weakest, with only three more non-state than state actors registered. This at least partly reflects the developments in North Africa and the Middle East, where governments targeted peaceful demonstrators during the Arab Spring. It was also in part due a significant decrease in the number of non-state actors carrying out one-sided violence, which fell by more than 60 per cent over the period as a whole. Although one-sided violence by individual government actors can be particularly lethal, as illustrated by the actions of the Liberian Government in 2003 and the Syrian Government in 2011, taken together, non-state actors killed more civilians in all years of the period apart from 2011. Nevertheless, the two actors that killed the most civilians during a given year in 2002–11 were both governments: the Syrian Government in 2011 and the Sudanese Government, whose attacks in Darfur in 2004 led to the deaths of more than 2500 civilians. The third highest number of deaths was caused by the Sunni Islamist opposition group *Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya* (Islamic State of Iraq, ISI), which killed almost 2000 civilians in 2007.

Nearly half of the 130 actors targeting civilians in 2002–11 were in Africa (63), followed by Asia and Oceania (38), the Middle East (17), the Americas (7) and Europe (5). Over the decade, Africa saw the highest number of one-sided actors in all but two years, when Asia and Oceania had more.

Africa was the region with the highest number of fatalities in all but four years of the decade. In 2006 and 2010 the highest number of fatalities was in Asia; in 2006 mainly due to a marked increase in the number of one-sided actors, and in 2010 due more to a dramatic decrease in fatalities in Africa. In 2007 and 2011 the highest number of fatalities was recorded for the Middle East, mainly due to attacks by ISI (in 2007) and the Syrian Government's targeting of unarmed civilians during the popular uprising that began in February 2011 and that escalated as the year passed.

## Conclusions

There was little change in the rate of organized violence over the 10-year period 2002–11, both in terms of the numbers of actors engaging in these types of activity and the number of fatalities. One-sided violence exhibited a clear downward trend during the period, but this was counterbalanced by increases in state-based and non-state conflict.

Looking at the incidence of organized violence, it is clear that the three categories show markedly different patterns over time. The annual number of non-state conflicts can rise and fall sharply, displaying no obvious trends. In contrast, major changes in the number of state-based conflicts tend to happen slowly; while the number of state-based conflicts hovers around a mean value of 33 throughout 2002–11, this is well below the peak year 1992, when 53 conflicts were active.<sup>12</sup> Developments in the incidence of one-sided violence fall somewhere between these two extremes.

Another interesting difference between non-state and state-based conflicts is that the former tend to be more sporadic and short-term. Once again, the pattern for one-sided violence falls between the two, with numerous examples of actors only recorded in the data for one or two years while some other actors target civilians over long periods.

All three categories of organized violence were most common in Africa. However, while non-state conflicts were clustered in some countries and regions, notably the Horn of Africa and Nigeria, many of the larger state-based conflicts in Africa were located elsewhere, for example in Liberia and North Africa. However, the average number of fatalities in African non-state conflicts was lower than, for example, in the drug-related non-state

<sup>12</sup> Themnér, L. and Wallensteen, P., 'Armed conflict, 1946–2011', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2012), pp. 565–75.

violence in South America, which in part reflects the level of organization of the actors involved.

The data for 2002–11 illustrate the difficulty of drawing direct links between patterns in the different categories of organized violence studied. There are some shared traits, but also many important differences. The different categories of violence can certainly influence each other (as shown in sections I and II above). However, the mechanisms are complex, and understanding them—let alone how to manage them—requires in-depth, case-based study.

## Sources and methods

### *Definition of state-based conflict*

The UCDP defines state-based conflict as a contested incompatibility concerning government or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. The separate elements are defined as follows.

1. *Incompatibility that concerns government or territory.* This refers to the stated generally incompatible positions of the parties to the conflict. An *incompatibility that concerns government* refers to incompatible positions regarding the state's type of political system or the composition of the government. It may also involve an aim to replace the current government. An *incompatibility that concerns territory* refers to incompatible positions regarding the status of a territory and may involve demands for secession or autonomy (intrastate conflict) or aims to change the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict).

2. *Use of armed force.* This refers to the use of armed force by the military forces of the parties to the conflict in order to promote the parties' general position in the conflict. Arms are defined as any material means of combat, including anything from manufactured weapons to sticks, stones, fire or water.

3. *Party.* This refers to the government of a state, any of its allies, an opposition organization or an alliance of opposition organizations. The *government of a state* is the party that is generally regarded as being in central control, even by those organizations seeking to seize power. If this criterion is not applicable, the party controlling the capital of the state is regarded as the government. An *opposition organization* is any non-governmental group that has announced a name for itself as well as its political goals and that has used armed force to achieve them. A state or a multinational organization that supports one of the primary parties with regular troops may also be included in the table. In order to be listed in the table, this secondary party must share the position of one of the warring parties. A traditional peacekeeping operation is not considered to be a party to the conflict but is rather seen as an impartial part of a consensual peace process.

4. *State.* A state is an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally non-recognized government controlling a specific territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by an internationally recognized sovereign state that previously controlled the territory in question.

5. *Battle-related deaths.* This refers to deaths directly related to combat between the warring parties and can include both deaths on the battlefield and civilians caught in cross-fire. UCDP defines a state-based conflict that has incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths during a calendar year as a minor state-based conflict and any with at least 1000 battle-related deaths during a calendar year as a war in that year.

*Definition of non-state conflict*

The UCDP defines non-state conflict as the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. The separate elements are defined as follows.

1. *Organized groups.* There are three levels of organization. *Formally organized groups (organizational level 1)* are rebel and other organized groups whose level of organization is high enough to include them in the state-based conflict category. These include rebel groups with an announced name, as well as military factions. *Informally organized supporter groups (organizational level 2)* are groups composed of supporters and affiliates of political parties and candidates. These are commonly not groups that are permanently organized for combat, but which at times use their organizational structures for such purposes. *Informally organized ethnic or religious groups (organizational level 3)* are groups that share a common identification along ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal lines. These are not groups that are permanently organized for combat, but which at times organize themselves to engage in fighting.

2. *Battle-related deaths.* The definition of battle-related death varies according to the level of organization of the fighting groups. For formally organized groups (organizational level 1) the recording of battle-related deaths follows the same criteria as for state-based conflict, that is, the warring groups must target representatives of the other formally organized group. Targeting of civilians, even if those civilians are of, for example, the same ethnicity as a group's rivals, is coded as one-sided violence. For informally organized groups (organizational levels 2 and 3), the definition of battle-related death is extended to include both civilian and armed victims as long as there is a pattern of violent (lethal) interaction between the groups, with both parties carrying out attacks.

*Definition of one-sided violence*

The UCDP defines one-sided violence as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians, which results in at least 25 deaths in a calendar year. Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded. The separate elements are defined as follows.

1. *Use of armed force.* This is the use of arms in order to exert violent force, resulting in death. Arms are defined as any material means of combat, including anything from manufactured weapons to sticks, stones, fire or water.

2. *Government.* See above.

3. *State.* See above.

4. *Formally organized group.* This can be any non-governmental group of people that has announced a name for the group and that uses armed force. This corresponds to 'opposition organization' as defined for the state-based conflict category and to 'formally organized group' as defined for the non-state conflict category.

5. *Extrajudicial killings in custody.* This is the killing by the government of a state of a person in its custody. In custody is defined as when a person is located in a prison or another type of government facility.

*Sources*

The data presented here is based on information taken from a wide selection of publicly available sources, both printed and electronic. The sources include news agencies, newspapers, academic journals, research reports, and documents from international and multinational organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In order to collect information on the aims and goals of the parties to the conflict, documents of the warring parties (governments, allies and opposition organizations) and, for example, the Internet sites of rebel groups are often consulted.

Independent news sources, carefully selected over a number of years, constitute the basis of the data collection. The Factiva news database is indispensable for the collection of general news reports. It contains more than 25 000 sources in 22 languages from 159 countries and provides sources from all three crucial levels of the news media: international (e.g. Agence France-Presse and Reuters), regional and local.

The UCDP regularly scrutinizes and revises the selection and combination of sources in order to maintain a high level of reliability and comparability between regions and countries. One important priority is to arrive at a balanced combination of sources of different origin with a view to avoiding bias. The reliability of the sources is judged using the expertise of the UCDP together with advice from a global network of experts (academics and policymakers). Both the independence of the source and the transparency of its origins are crucial. The latter is important because most sources are secondary, which means that the primary source also needs to be analysed in order to establish the reliability of a report. Each source is judged in relation to the context in which it is published. The potential interest of either the primary or secondary source in misrepresenting an event is taken into account, as are the general climate and extent of media censorship. Reports from NGOs and international organizations are particularly useful in this context, complementing media reporting and facilitating cross-checking. The criterion that a source should be independent does not, of course, apply to sources that are consulted precisely because they *are* biased, such as government documents or rebel groups' Internet sites. The UCDP is aware of the high level of scrutiny required and makes great efforts to ensure the authenticity of the material used.

#### *Methods*

The data on organized violence are compiled by calendar year. It includes data on conflict locations, type of incompatibility, onset of the conflict, warring parties, total number of battle-related deaths, number of battle-related deaths in a given year and change in battle-related deaths from the previous year. See also the notes for tables 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6.

The data on fatalities are given the most attention in coding for the UCDP database. Information on, for example, the date, news source, primary source, location and death toll is recorded for every event. Ideally, these individual events and figures are corroborated by two or more independent sources. The figures are then aggregated for the entire year of each conflict. The aggregated figures are compared to total figures given in official documents, in special reports and in the news media. Regional experts such as researchers, diplomats and journalists are often consulted during the data collection. Their role is mainly to clarify the contexts in which the events occur, thus facilitating proper interpretation of the published sources.

UCDP codes three different fatality estimates—low, best and high—based on the reliability of reports and the conflicting number of deaths that can be reported for any violent event. All of the data presented here are based on the best estimate, which consists of the aggregated most reliable numbers for all incidents of each category of violence during a year. If different sources provide different estimates, an examination is made as to what source is the most reliable. If no such distinction can be made, UCDP as a rule includes the lower figure in the best estimate. UCDP is generally conservative when estimating the number of fatalities. As more in-depth information on a case of organized violence becomes available, the conservative, event-based estimates often prove more correct than others widely cited in the news media. If no figures are available or if the numbers given are unreliable, the UCDP does not provide a figure. Figures are revised retroactively each year as new information becomes available.