**sipri**

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Armed conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring

MARIE ALLANSSON, MARGARETA SOLLENBERG AND LOTTA THEMNÉR

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Contents

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I. Armed conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring

MARIE ALLANSSON, MARGARETA SOLLENBERG AND LOTTA THEMNÉR
UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM

The Arab Spring of 2011 represented a major upheaval in a region that had previously seen few open, mass-based challenges to its regimes. It brought radical political change in a number of countries, notably Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Libya.[1] In some countries, processes for regime change continued into 2012—in the case of Syria as a full-fledged civil war, whereas in other countries, such as Bahrain and Jordan, protests remained largely non-violent. In some countries where regimes did change in 2011, political instability continued, largely because of the unsettled nature of the political landscape. For example, in Egypt protests continued against the new military-led government, at times violently, and then also against the newly elected president, Mohamed Morsy; in Libya there were incidents of violence between the new regime and supporters of former leader Muammar Gaddafi.

The Arab Spring and subsequent developments in 2012 illustrate different ways in which political instability and violence can spread. The revolts initiated in 2011 can be described as contagious uprisings, through which protests and challenges against regimes spread through demonstration effects.[2] This type of contagion did not continue in 2012; no new mass revolts erupted. However, ripple effects of the Arab Spring were visible across a wider region in 2012.

This section focuses on the three state-based conflicts active in 2012 that were either a continuation of the Arab Spring (Syria) or exhibited direct links to those revolts (Yemen and Mali).[3] These cases illustrate some of the ways in which conflict in one country can contribute to instability and conflict in others through the diffusion of fighters, weapons, ideas and tactics. They also illustrate two patterns of escalation influenced by the events in the region in 2011: the intensification of fighting and the fragmentation of the opposition, with an increasing number of armed groups active.

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[1] For an overview of events in the region in 2011 see Allansson, M. et al., 'The first year of the Arab Spring', *SIPRI Yearbook 2012*.

[2] See e.g. Bellin, E., 'Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: lessons from the Arab Spring', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Jan. 2012), pp. 127–49. 'Demonstration effect' is a process whereby political action by 1 group influences political action by other groups in pursuit of their own causes. See e.g. Kuran, T., 'Ethnic dissimilation and its international diffusion', eds D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1998).

[3] See 'Sources and methods' in section III for a definition of state-based conflict.

Syria

Processes of both diffusion and escalation were evident in the Syrian conflict in 2012. There was a dramatic increase in the intensity of the fighting as well as in the number of opposition groups. Developments since the beginning of the uprising also included the diffusion of fighters, ideas and tactics into Syria from groups involved in other conflicts in the region and further afield.

The Arab Spring uprising in Syria began in March 2011 with a series of largely peaceful demonstrations. These were soon met with increasing brutality on the part of the Syrian state, leading in turn to a rising number of army defections. Many of the defectors joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was formed in late July 2011.[4] The fighting in the initial stages was primarily between the government and the various militia groups fighting under the banner of the loosely organized FSA. The opposition then became increasingly fragmented as new armed groups formed and gained strength.[5] The common denominator for these groups was the goal of ousting the Baathist government of President Bashar al-Assad.

The second year of the uprising also saw the emergence of radical Sunni Islamist groups calling not only for the overthrow of the Assad government but also for the establishment of an Islamist regime.[6] Assad had claimed since the start of the uprising that the armed opposition consisted of criminal gangs and foreign-backed terrorists. The opposition rejected the claims and also downplayed the role of jihadist movements.[7] However, during 2012 it became increasingly clear that groups like the radical Islamist and jihadist Jabhat al-Nusra and Kata'ib Ahrar al-Sham, formed in January 2012, were growing in both strength and number.[8] There were also several reports of foreign fighters, for example from Jordan, participating in the Syrian conflict.[9]

What role these jihadist groups and foreign fighters played in the conflict in 2012 has been debated; analysts have argued that while they only made up a fraction of the armed fighters in the country, they had a significant impact on the conflict dynamics by introducing the use of, for example, sui-

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[4] Flood, D. H., 'An overview of Syria's armed revolution', *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Apr. 2012), p. 1; and the entry for Syria in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database/>.

[5] Starr, S., 'A fight for the spoils: the future role of Syria's armed groups', *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 5, no. 8 (23 Aug. 2012), p. 2; and International Crisis Group (ICG), *Syria's Phase of Radicalisation*, Middle East Briefing no. 33 (ICG: Damascus/Brussels, 10 Apr. 2012), pp. 1–4.

[6] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition*, Middle East Report no. 131 (ICG: Damascus/Brussels, 12 Oct. 2012), pp. 10–11.

[7] Flood (note 4), p. 4; and International Crisis Group (note 6), p. 1.

[8] International Crisis Group (note 6), pp. 10–19.

[9] See e.g. Al-Shishani, M. B., 'Syria emerges as a new battlefield for Jordan's jihadists', *Terrorism Monitor*, 10 Jan. 2013, pp. 4–5.

cide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[10] The Syrian groups seem to have been influenced by other groups in the region. For example, Jabhat al-Nusra confirmed that it had gained bomb-making skills from jihadists who had fought in Iraq.[11]

One of the government's strategies to counter the growing armed resistance has been the use of local militia groups, commonly known as the shabiha (ghosts).[12] These militias have been blamed for brutal repression of civilians in opposition areas, including by massacres and torture.[13]

Both the shabiha and the fragmented opposition shared a common feature in 2012: the lack of a clear leadership structure. The FSA's official leaders, for example, resided in Turkey and it was argued that they had limited control over the different FSA factions.[14] This lack of cohesion and leadership is highly likely to affect a future peace process, and the risk of spoilers from both sides is high. Should the common goal of ousting Assad be achieved, divisions in the already factionalized armed opposition are likely to grow. In addition, it is unclear whether the shabiha would disarm and demobilize, should the regime fall.[15]

The involvement of external actors such as Turkey and the Lebanon-based non-state group Hezbollah further complicates the situation. Tensions along the Turkish–Syrian border ran high in 2012 and there was a massive influx of Syrian refugees to the country.[16] As for Hezbollah, it is unclear to what extent the group is active in Syria, but it continues to be a strong supporter of the Assad regime.[17] Given this context, where many countries and subnational groups have a stake in the outcome of the conflict, there is a potential risk of the Syrian conflict exacerbating tensions, and even sparking conflict, in other parts of the region.

Yemen

The case of Yemen in 2011–12 clearly illustrates escalation processes and how rebel groups on the periphery can benefit from a temporary power

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[10] See e.g. Starr, S., 'Shabiha militias and the destruction of Syria', *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 5, no. 12 (28 Nov. 2012), p. 12.

[11] International Crisis Group (note 6), pp. 11, 15; Abouzeid, R., 'Meet the Islamist militants fighting alongside Syria's rebels', *Time*, 26 July 2012; and Abdul-Ahad, G., 'Al-Qaida turns tide for rebels in battle for eastern Syria', *The Guardian*, 30 July 2012.

[12] Starr (note 10).

[13] Starr (note 10).

[14] International Crisis Group (note 6), pp. 6, 22.

[15] Starr (note 10), p. 14; and Starr (note 5), pp. 2–3.

[16] 'Nato deploying Patriot missiles to Turkey–Syria border', BBC News, 4 Jan. 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20911919>.

[17] Zambelis, C., 'Hizb Allah's role in the Syrian uprising', *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 5, no. 12 (28 Nov. 2012), pp. 14–17.

vacuum at the centre, in this case political turmoil following widespread anti-government demonstrations.

The demonstrations, which began in January 2011, were soon met with lethal violence from government forces. A rising death toll and a continuously weakening power base eventually forced Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign in late November. Vice-President Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi was subsequently sworn in as interim president for a two-year period in February 2012. Although their number subsequently decreased, demonstrations continued throughout the year.[18]

Overshadowed by these developments, the conflict between the government and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which began in 2009, escalated dramatically.[19] Benefitting substantially from the weakening of the Yemeni Government, which focused largely on retaining power and suppressing public unrest, AQAP launched a large-scale offensive mainly in the southern governorate of Abyan in March 2011.[20] The group captured seven towns and cities, including the capital of Abyan, Zinjibar. AQAP subsequently proclaimed the seven captured areas as 'Islamic emirates' and imposed a strict interpretation of Islamic (sharia) law.[21] Fighting in Abyan continued throughout 2011 and into 2012.[22] The large-scale capture of territory by a local al-Qaeda branch is unprecedented in Yemen. Up until 2011 the group had only been involved in relatively minor clashes with the government. Thus, the events in 2011 and 2012 marked a drastic escalation of the conflict as well as change in AQAP's tactics.

The Yemeni Army eventually managed to regain control of Abyan through a large-scale offensive during the spring and summer of 2012, with decisive help from local tribes in the form of so-called popular resistance committees. In both 2011 and 2012 government forces were also supported by the United States through attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones).[23] As AQAP was pushed back it seemed to shift its stra-

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[18] Allansson et al. (note 1); Raghavan, S., 'Yemen protests continue six months after Saleh's fall', *The Guardian*, 12 Aug. 2012; and Dawood, A., 'Efforts continue to seek justice for journalists who died in 2011', *Yemen Times*, 26 Nov. 2012.

[19] AQAP was formed in early 2009 through the merger of the local al-Qaeda branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In 2011 the formation of an offshoot, Ansar al-Sharia, was announced. According to AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia was formed to gain popular support for the group in the southern region in which it operates. UCDP views AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia as 1 group. See the entry for Yemen in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (note 4).

[20] 'Yemen militia besieges tribal leader: son', Agence France-Presse, 6 Nov. 2012; and International Crisis Group (ICG), *Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition*, Middle East Report no. 125 (ICG: Brussels, 3 July 2012), pp. 10–11.

[21] Coombs, C. L., 'Hot issue: the Ansar al-Shari'a insurgency in Southern Yemen: the view from the ground', Jamestown Foundation, 9 May 2012, <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39348>.

[22] Yemen entry in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (note 4).

[23] Carlino, L., 'Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula sets assassins loose in strategic shift', *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 10, no. 19 (18 Oct. 2012), pp. 7–8; and Agence France-Presse, '8 Qaeda suspects dead in Yemen air strike: local official', *Lahore Times*, 25 Aug. 2011.

tegy from controlling strategically important areas to targeted assassin-ations and suicide attacks, even in the Yemeni capital, Sana'a.[24]

While AQAP was on the defensive during the latter half of 2012, there are concerns for the future. The initiation of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), intended to revise the constitution prior to the 2014 elections, was repeatedly postponed.[25] Originally scheduled for mid-November 2012, the conference eventually opened on 18 March 2013.[26] There are fears that a failed process and potential power struggles will afford AQAP renewed space to operate in the country, leading to further conflict escalation.[27]

Mali

The case of Mali vividly illustrates how conflict in one place can be ignited by the diffusion of fighters and arms from a conflict elsewhere—specifically the 2011 intrastate conflict in Libya. The flow of resources from Libya was facilitated by the lack of government control in northern Mali as well as the porous borders in the region. The emergence and increased influence of Islamists groups that characterized the developing conflict in Mali in 2012 reflects a general trend in the Sahel that was also seen in Syria and Yemen.

When the Gaddafi regime began to crumble in 2011, a large number of Malian Tuareg fighters who had been involved in the Libyan civil war returned to northern Mali.[28] Carrying with them heavy and small arms taken from Libyan stockpiles, most of them withdrew to the hills of Tin-Assalak, north of the Malian town of Kidal and close to the Algerian border.[29] A few months later this flow of fighters and arms contributed to a sudden and dramatic flare-up of long-standing Tuareg resentment against the central government, setting off a chain of events that surprised analysts.

The returnees from Libya were a mixed group. Most had fought on Gaddafi's side in the 2011 conflict. While many had been in Libya for years, others had only been recruited during 2011. There was a long history of

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[24] Shahbaz, A., 'Strategic and tactical shift keeps al-Qaeda insurgency alive in southern Yemen', *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 10, no. 21 (15 Nov. 2012), pp. 4–5.
[25] 'Failure of national dialogue likely to help Al-Qa'idah expand in Yemen', BBC Monitoring Middle East, 27 Nov. 2012
[26] 'Yemen national dialogue conference begins', BBC News, 18 Mar. 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21828527>.
[27] 'Failure of national dialogue likely to help Al-Qa'idah expand in Yemen' (note 25)
[28] There is no consensus on how many they were; estimates vary between hundreds and thousands. E.g. 'Mali: returning Touaregs—jihad or peace?', *Africa Research Bulletin*, vol. 49, no. 10 (Dec. 2011), p. 19 099; and 'Mali's Tuaregs demand self-rule for northern region, threaten military action', Text of 5 Nov. 2011 article by K. Mahmud on Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online, BBC Monitoring Africa, 6 Nov. 2011.
[29] Weapons ranged from rifles to small-calibre anti-aircraft cannons mounted on pick-up trucks. On the types of weapon leaving Libya see United Nations, Security Council, Consolidated working document on the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2017 (2011) 16 Mar. 2012, annex to S/2012/178, 26 Mar. 2012.

cooperation between Gaddafi and the Tuaregs of both Mali and Niger. Already in the 1970s large numbers of young Tuaregs migrated to Libya due to severe droughts in their home countries. Many received military training, as Gaddafi incorporated some into his regular military forces and others into a Libyan-sponsored 'Islamic legion', which was dispatched to fight in places such as Afghanistan, Chad, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.[30] In the late 1980s economic conditions deteriorated and only those Tuaregs who had obtained Libyan citizenship were able to stay in Libya.[31] Others who returned to Mali launched a separatist rebellion there in 1990.[32] A few years later, some fighters, rejecting a 1992 peace accord, returned to Libya and became senior officers in the Libyan Army.[33]

When these well-armed and battle-hardened Tuaregs returned to Mali in 2011–12, they entered an already volatile situation. Northern Mali on the eve of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion was economically underdeveloped, with a limited presence of administrative structures and a general dissatisfaction with the central government; many of the same grievances that had bred earlier Tuareg uprisings persisted. Furthermore, northern Mali was highly insecure, serving as a haven for smugglers, traffickers and the transnational militant Islamist group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré ruled the north through a network of alliances with competing and opportunist elites.[34]

The returning fighters quickly went on to form alliances with other groupings in the region. On 16 October, the Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) was formed, under the banner of leaders such as Mohammed Ag Najem, a former professional officer in the Libyan Army.[35] The new organization was a merger of the Libyan returnees, a Tuareg political organization called Mouvement national de l'Azawad (MNA, National Movement of

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[30] See e.g. Keita, K., 'Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: the Tuareg insurgency in Mali' *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* vol. 9, no. 3 (1998), p. 111; and Schultz, R. H., 'Can democratic governments use force in the war against terrorism? The US confrontation with Libya', *World Affairs*, vol. 148, no. 4 (spring 1986), p. 208.

[31] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya*, Middle East/North Africa Report no. 107 (ICG: Brussels, 6 June 2011), p. 23.

[32] For more information on the conflicts in northern Mali in the 1990s and 2000s see Lecocq, B., *Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalism and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali* (Brill: Leiden, 2010); and the entry for Mali in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (note 4).

[33] Pacte national conclu entre le gouvernement de la République du Mali et les Mouvements et Fronts Unifies de l'Azawad consacrant le statut particulier du nord du Mali [National pact concluded between the Government of the Republic of Mali and the unified movements and fronts of Azawad giving the special status of northern Mali], signed 11 Apr. 1992, Bamako. See Morgan, A., 'The causes of the uprising in Northern Mali', Think Africa Press, 6 Feb. 2012, <http://thinkafricapress.com/mali/causes-uprising-northern-mali-tuareg>.

[34] International Crisis Group (ICG), *Mali: Avoiding Escalation*, Africa Report no. 189 (ICG: Brussels, 18 July 2012), pp. 1–8; and Amnesty International (AI), *Mali: Five Months of Crisis: Armed Rebellion and Military Coup* (AI: London, 2012), pp. 5-6.

[35] Azawad is Tuareg separatists' name for the area of northern Mali to which they lay claim.

Azawad) and the remnants of the group fighting the 2007–2009 rebellion, Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement (ATNMC, North Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change).[36]

Also formed at the end of 2011 and comprising large numbers of Tuareg returnees from Libya was the Salafist group Ansar Dine (sometimes referred to as Ansar Al-Din or Ansar Eddin). It was established by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a veteran of the Tuareg uprisings of the 1990s, who had grown increasingly devout and who attempted to join the MNLA leadership, only to be rebuffed.[37] While little was known of this group in the first months of 2012, they came to play an increasingly important role in the conflict.

On 17 January 2012 the MNLA launched an offensive and, with the Malian Army in a state of disarray, quickly made large territorial gains. Between January and mid-March the group, backed by an increasingly strong Ansar Dine, was able to capture nearly a third of the country's territory. These developments bred widespread protests in the capital, Bamako, culminating in a coup on 22 March, with a group of junior officers under Amadou Sanogo ousting President Touré. After this, the army became even weaker and the main northern towns fell to the rebels one by one in late March. On 6 April the MNLA declared an independent state of Azawad, comprising the three northern regions Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.

As the MNLA, and to some extent Ansar Dine, carried out their lightning offensive across the north, reports of involvement in the fighting by AQIM and the Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), an AQIM splinter group, started to emerge. By early April these groups had become stronger than the MNLA. Pressing south, the rebels entered territory where the population was more favourable to the message of Ansar Dine—the imposition of sharia across a united Mali—than to the MNLA's separatist agenda, a fact that Ansar Dine used to its advantage. Furthermore, Ansar Dine started to receive reinforcement, both personnel and weapons, from AQIM.[38] AQIM, for its part, seems also to have come out stronger after the Arab Spring, gaining from the spillover of weapons and fighters from Libya.[39]

During April and May it became clear that the Islamists had created an alliance against the MNLA and the latter was pushed out of all the main towns that had been captured. In late June, the Islamists forcibly evicted the separatists from Gao, where they had set up their provisional govern-

[36] International Crisis Group (note 34), pp. 10–11.
[37] 'Mali: returning Touaregs—jihad or peace' (note 28); and International Crisis Group (note 34).
[38] 'Al-Qa'idah chief adopts Afghan Taleban model in Mali: paper', Text of Echourouk El Youmi website, 8 Aug. 12, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 9 Aug. 2012; and International Crisis Group (note 34), pp. 16–17.
[39] 'Al-Qa'idah's affiliate getting stronger in north Mali: US general', Transcription from Al-Jazeera TV, 21:30 GMT, 27 July 2012, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 28 July 2012.

ment. As the MNLA withdrew into the desert, the Islamists set about creating a de facto Islamic state in the captured territories, enforcing its strict interpretation of sharia.

Between the end of June 2012 and January 2013 positions were more or less deadlocked in Mali. The Islamists controlled the vast northern region; the MNLA, weakened and regrouping, attempted to launch an attack against MUJAO in November with little success; political wrangling continued in the south; and negotiations on an external military intervention, mandated by the UN Security Council and initially to be led by Africans, proceeded fitfully, without any impact on the ground.

All of this changed in early January 2013, when the Islamists launched a new offensive southwards, seizing the town of Konna and raising fears that they would push south all the way to the capital. In response, on 11 January France deployed troops to the country, opening a new phase of the conflict.

Conclusions

Syria, Yemen and Mali were ravaged in 2012 by armed conflicts related in one way or another to the Arab Spring. All three cases point to the importance of understanding the Arab Spring and its repercussions in order to fully grasp regional conflict developments. They are all to some extent defined and influenced by the major political upheavals in 2011. However, depending on the domestic contexts, the chain of events set in motion by the Arab Spring was different in each country.

In Syria, the conflict escalated and became increasingly complex. A growing number of groups became active, some of which were influenced by radical Islamist ideas and joined by foreign fighters who brought with them new technologies and tactics. In Yemen, the protests that took place in 2011 largely died out, whereas the armed conflict between the Yemeni Government and AQAP escalated dramatically. The group gained considerable momentum as the government was preoccupied with the ongoing demonstrations in 2011, but was pushed back in 2012 by the new government. Finally, in Mali the diffusion of fighters and arms from Libya ignited existing grievances in the northern part of the country. What started as a separatist rebellion was soon overtaken by groups with a different agenda, reflecting the spread of radical Islamist ideas in this part of the world.

While differing in many respects, Syria, Yemen and Mali also illustrate general phenomena central to peace and conflict research: conflict diffusion and conflict escalation.

Conflict diffusion is most clearly displayed in the case of Mali. The likelihood of conflict in a country is heavily influenced by the presence of armed

conflict in a neighbouring state.[40] The means of diffusion vary, including the spread of arms and fighters (as witnessed in Mali) and ideas (which was also seen in Syria). Notable in all three cases is the spread of radical Islamist ideas. The presence of extremist agendas has been found to make compromise more difficult, which complicates the resolution of conflict.[41]

Conflict escalation is a widely researched field. Escalation commonly refers to an intensification of the fighting, which was seen in all three cases. It can also be understood in terms of an increase in the number of armed groups.[42] Witnessed in both Syria and Mali, escalation has been shown to have negative implications for the prospects for conflict resolution.[43]

There is a clear risk that conflict may spread and escalate further in this region. However, just as the present conflicts were difficult to foresee at the outset of the Arab Spring, the future paths of conflict are equally difficult to predict. In Mali, it is not yet clear where the events set in motion in January 2012 will lead, particularly after the French intervention.[44] As for Syria, the potential for conflict diffusion continues to increase in a region where many countries and subnational groups have a stake in the outcome. In Yemen, the strengthening of the local al-Qaeda branch in recent years made the country a key centre for radical Islamists. If the government fails to curb their activities, there is a risk that the groups' activities will spread beyond national borders.

[40] See e.g. Forsberg, E., *Neighbors at Risk: A Quantitative Study of Civil War Contagion* (Uppsala University: Uppsala, 2009); Salehyan, I., *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 2009); and Hegre, H. and Sambanis, N., 'Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on Civil war onset', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 50, no. 4 (Aug. 2006), pp. 508–35

[41] Zartman I. W. and Faure, G. O. (eds), *Engaging Extremists: Trade-offs, Timing and Diplomacy* (United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, DC, June 2011).

[42] Pruitt, D. G. and Kim, S. H., *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, 3rd edn (McGraw-Hill: New York, 2004), pp. 88–91.

[43] See e.g. Nilsson, D., 'Partial peace: rebel groups inside and outside of civil war settlements', *Journal of Peace and Conflict Research*, vol. 45, no 4 (July 2008), pp. 479–95; and Cunningham, D. E., 'Veto players and civil war duration', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 50, no. 4 (Oct. 2006), pp. 875–92.

[44] On the discussions in 2012 regarding possible international deployments to Mali see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.