VI. International cooperation on non-proliferation, arms control and nuclear security

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UN Security Council Resolution 1977

On 20 April 2011 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1977, which extended by 10 years the mandate of the committee established to monitor and facilitate states’ compliance with Resolution 1540. Since its adoption in 2004, Resolution 1540 has gained legitimacy as the legal basis for a range of national and multilateral non-proliferation and counter-terrorism activities, including export and trans-shipment controls to prevent trafficking in items related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The 10-year extension of the 1540 Committee was reportedly a compromise between Security Council members seeking to permanently institutionalize the body and those preferring a more limited extension. Under Resolution 1977, the 1540 Committee will conduct a comprehensive review of its operations after five years and another prior to the renewal of its mandate in 2021. In its reports on these reviews, the committee can make recommendations to the Security Council for ‘adjustments’ to its mandate.

Resolution 1977 affirmed that the 1540 Committee should prioritize efforts to enhance the capacities of states to implement Resolution 1540, rather than highlight compliance shortcomings. The committee could do this by providing resources, training and technical support to states that encountered difficulties in drafting or implementing legal and regulatory measures aimed at preventing proliferation of WMD. The new resolution also requested the committee to ‘identify effective practices, templates and guidance’ in the areas covered by Resolution 1540, as well as to produce a technical reference guide, in order to assist states in their implementation efforts. To facilitate these activities, the committee was authorized to establish a working group on technical issues consisting of up to eight experts. It was also encouraged to engage with relevant international and regional organizations and to urge such organizations to appoint a coordinator or point of contact.

4 UN Security Council Resolution 1977 (note 1), para. 3.
Extension of the Group of Eight’s Global Partnership programme

Concern about the risk of nuclear material falling into the hands of non-state actors who could use it for terrorist purposes has impelled leading industrialized countries to invest resources in strengthening selected countries’ national measures for protecting nuclear materials and facilities. This concern was evident in the decision taken at the 2002 Group of Eight (G8) summit, held in Kananaskis, Canada, to create the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.6 The Global Partnership was established to support cooperative projects aimed at addressing non-proliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear safety issues. The partner countries pledged to provide up to $20 billion for such efforts over 10 years.

On 27 May 2011, at a summit meeting held in Deauville, France, the heads of state and government of the G8 countries announced that they had agreed to extend the Global Partnership for an unspecified period beyond its 2012 expiration and would encourage additional countries to participate in its activities.7 The extended programme would continue to focus on the threat-reduction priorities adopted at the 2008 G8 summit.8 These concentrated on activities for enhancing nuclear and radiological security, ensuring biosecurity and facilitating national implementation of export controls under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.9 At the same time, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to completing priority projects in Russia.10

The G8 leaders did not pledge a specified amount of money to support the extended Global Partnership. Instead, the 23 states currently participating in the initiative would discuss assistance needs and additional threat-reduction projects, and the partners would later ‘decide on funding of such projects on a national, joint, or multilateral basis’.11

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10 Global Partnership project activities initially focused on 5 priority activities, primarily in Russia: (a) constructing chemical weapon destruction facilities; (b) dismantling decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines; (c) redirecting employment of scientists formerly working on WMD-related activities to peaceful civilian endeavours; (d) disposing of weapon-usable fissile material; and (e) improving the physical protection of facilities and enhancing the custodial security of nuclear material.
The P5 states’ discussion of multilateral arms control

From 30 June to 1 July 2011, officials from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5 states: China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA), which are also the legally recognized nuclear weapon states under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), met in Paris, France, to consider how to follow through with the commitments they made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to discuss cooperative approaches to nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs). The P5 states had convened a similar ‘Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation’ in London in 2009. The representatives issued a joint statement reaffirming their states’ determination to take concrete steps to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in the world and to increase the transparency of their stockpiles, pursuant to their commitments under the action plan agreed in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

In addition, the representatives pledged to establish a regular multinational dialogue among the P5 states on nuclear transparency, verification and CBMs. As an initial step, they exchanged information on nuclear doctrine and capabilities and approved the creation of a working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. They also discussed technical challenges associated with verifying nuclear disarmament and agreed to hold additional expert-level consultations on this subject. They decided to hold a third P5 conference on nuclear transparency and CBMs in the context of the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in April–May 2012.

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