

III. Regional developments in peace operations

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Africa

As in preceding years, the largest concentration of peace operations in 2011 was in Africa: there were 16 operations in the region, most under the command of the United Nations, with a total of approximately 87 000 personnel, of which 83 000 were troops and civilian police and the remaining 4000 were civilian staff (see table 3.1). The number of operations deployed in Africa was unchanged from 2010. While three operations closed in 2011, three of the four new operations—the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)—are located in Africa. The deployment of UNISFA and UNMISS, which have significant military components, did not lead to a significant increase in personnel numbers as the two new operations in Sudan and South Sudan were mostly composed of personnel transferred from the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) after its closure in July 2011.

The rise in personnel numbers in the region was linked to the expansion of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)—which had been authorized in 2010 but did not take effect until 2011—and the temporary reinforcement of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Developments related to these two operations in 2011 are outlined below.

The AU Mission in Somalia

In December 2010, as the civil war in Somalia led to further deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation, the UN Security Council endorsed the AU's proposal to increase AMISOM's force strength from 8000 to 12 000 troops.¹ However, by December 2011 the AU had only generated an additional 2000 troops, to reach a force strength of 9800 troops. The gap between the authorized strength and the actual number of troops deployed is partly due to the technical and financial incapacities of AU member states but also points to contributing countries' reluctance to expose their soldiers to the constant attacks of Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahedin Youth Movement, or al-Shabab).² In 2011 AMISOM suffered 94 fatalities, making it the operation with the

¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1964, 22 Dec. 2010. On the conflicts in Somalia and their links to conflicts across the Horn of Africa see chapter 2, section II, in this volume.

² United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 18 July 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2011/433, 18 July 2011.

second highest number of fatalities, for the third consecutive year, after the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Despite the fact that AMISOM had not reached its authorized strength in 2011, the AU proposed raising the authorized level to 17 000 troops as it considered the mission too small in size to fulfil its mandate.³ It also requested that the UN increase its financial support from UN assessed contributions. One reason for the AU's proposal to increase the authorized strength may have been the presence of Kenyan troops in southern Somalia. In October, with the agreement of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, Kenya launched a unilateral operation against al-Shabab. There are indications that the Kenyan troops may be incorporated into AMISOM in 2012.⁴

The first tangible results of the EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM), which was launched in 2010, were seen in 2011 with the deployment of the first batch of Somali troops under AMISOM command. However, despite this short-term achievement at the operational level, questions were raised as to the appropriateness and strategic value of the mission given the fragility of the TFG's legitimacy and the lack of a functioning government in Somalia.⁵ Notwithstanding these concerns, in July 2011 the Council of the European Union approved a 12-month extension of EUTM's mandate, to December 2012.⁶

The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

The political stand-off between the incumbent Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo, and Alassane Ouattara, a former prime minister and the declared winner of the November 2010 presidential election, erupted into violent clashes between their supporters and continued into 2011. Deeply concerned over the ongoing violence and human rights violations in the country, including against UN peacekeeping personnel, the UN Security Council agreed on 19 January 2011 to deploy an additional 2000 military personnel to UNOCI until 30 June 2011.⁷

However, the security situation continued to deteriorate, with clashes taking place in both Abidjan and the rest of the country, especially in the west. This intense fighting escalated the use, by both sides, of heavy weapons—including mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and heavy

³ African Union, Peace and Security Council, 306th meeting, Communiqué on the situation in Somalia, 6 Jan. 2012.

⁴ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia*, Crisis Group Africa Report no. 184 (ICG: Nairobi, 15 Feb. 2012).

⁵ Oksamytna, K., *The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: Lessons Learnt for EU Security Sector Reform*, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Working Papers 1116 (IAI: Rome, June 2011).

⁶ Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011 amending and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L198, 30 July 2011.

⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1967, 19 Jan. 2011.

Table 3.1. Number of peace operations and personnel deployed, by region and type of organization, 2011

Conducting organization	Africa	Americas	Asia and Oceania	Europe	Middle East	World
United Nations ^d	10	1	3	2	4	20
Regional organization or alliance	5	1	2	13	5	26
Ad hoc coalition	1	–	3	–	2	6
Total operations	16	2	8	15	11	52
Total personnel	86 642	12 201	134 727^b	11 932	16 627	262 129^b

^a United Nations figures include peace operations led by the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

^b These figures include the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which had 131 386 troops in 2011.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

machine guns—against the civilian population, and also resulted in intensified attacks on UNOCI. On 30 March 2011 the UN Security Council called for UNOCI to ‘use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.⁸ Thus, in early April, with the support of French troops from Operation Licorne, UNOCI attacked military camps of pro-Gbagbo forces and the presidential palace.

Following the arrest of Gbagbo on 11 April 2011 and the installation of Ouattara as president, UNOCI was tasked with assisting the new Ivorian Government in disarming and demobilizing illegal armed groups.⁹ Although the security situation had improved, the UN Security Council decided to prolong the deployment of UNOCI and Operation Licorne until 30 July 2012 and to maintain UNOCI at the authorized strength of 9800 troops and observers and 1350 civilian police, while reducing Operation Licorne’s size by half, to 450 troops.¹⁰

The Americas

The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—the biggest of the two operations deployed in the Americas—operated at a reinforced authorized strength of 12 500 personnel (including an additional 1900 troops and 1600 police) for most of 2011, in part to complete post-earthquake recon-

⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1975, 30 Mar. 2011.

⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1980, 28 Apr. 2011.

¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 2000, 27 July 2011.

struction activities but also to support the electoral process.¹¹ However, given the relatively calm security situation, the UN Security Council, during its annual discussion on MINUSTAH's mandate extension, decided to reduce the total number of military and police personnel to 10 600.¹² MINUSTAH's mandate renewal became a subject of serious debate and protest within the Haitian community as allegations (and video clips) of Uruguayan soldiers involved in the sexual abuse of a young Haitian surfaced on the Internet and as Nepalese peacekeepers were accused of being the cause of a cholera outbreak in the country.¹³ The legitimacy of the operation, dependent partly on its moral authority, had been undermined to an extent by the conduct of its personnel.¹⁴

Asia and Oceania

Eight peace operations were active in Asia and Oceania in 2011, with a total of 135 000 personnel deployed (see table 3.1). This represented one fewer operation than in 2010 and a slight decrease in the total number of personnel. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan continued to account for the overwhelming majority of personnel deployed in the region and made Asia the region with the most peacekeeping personnel. In line with the overall global trend of consolidation, 2011 was marked by crucial transition-related developments and planned withdrawals for two operations in Asia: the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and ISAF.

In the case of Timor-Leste, a first step towards the long-planned withdrawal of peacekeepers was the transfer of executive responsibility for the conduct, command and control of all police operations from UNMIT to the East Timorese National Police in March 2011. In September 2011 the East Timorese Government and UNMIT signed the Joint Transition Plan for UNMIT's closure in December 2012. The plan envisages the early transfer of some UNMIT equipment to national authorities, allowing them to familiarize themselves with its use and maintenance while the mission is still in place and able to provide assistance. UNMIT will continue to provide a high level of support in the first half of 2012, around and during the presidential and parliamentary elections, after which the UNMIT police component and military liaison officers will begin to gradually

¹¹ These figures are as of 31 Oct. 2011.

¹² UN Security Council Resolution 2012, 14 Oct. 2011. Accordingly, and as recommended by the UN Secretary-General, military troops will be reduced from 8940 to 7340 and police from 4391 to 3241. United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2011/540, 25 Aug. 2011.

¹³ 'Haiti: UN troops must go, say Haitians after rape scandal', GlobalVoices, 9 Sep. 2011, <<http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/09/09/haiti-un-troops-must-go-say-haitians-after-rape-scandal/>>.

¹⁴ See also Wiharta, S., 'The legitimacy of peace operations', *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*.

downsize.¹⁵ The plan also sets out different models for a post-UNMIT UN presence and engagement in Timor-Leste.¹⁶

Europe

There were 15 peace operations in Europe in 2011, the same as in 2010, while the total number of personnel deployed to the region fell from 15 000 in 2010 to 12 000 in 2011 (see table 3.1) owing to the phased drawdown strategy of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

KFOR's strategy envisaged that the operation would reach the third phase of troop reduction to a level of 5000 personnel by its 12th year, 2011, with the eventual goal of a minimal 'deterrent' presence if the political and security conditions allowed. However, some countries found the downsizing plan to be overly cautious and drawn-out, and there were indications of mission fatigue as early as 2009 as these countries declared end dates for their withdrawals.¹⁷ Nevertheless, although the third phase was achieved in March 2011, clashes between Serbs and Kosovan police forces at the end of 2011 resulted in KFOR having to raise its troop level to 6700, perhaps reaffirming NATO's argument for a cautious transition strategy for KFOR.¹⁸

The Middle East

The Arab League's deployment of an observer mission to Syria, albeit briefly, was perhaps one of the most significant developments for peace-keeping in 2011 (see section II). This was the first time in the Arab League's history that it had conducted a peace operation.

Another significant development was that, after nine years of operation, the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I) ended its mission on 18 December 2011.¹⁹ MNF-I had a total budget of \$6.8 billion dollars and, at its peak, comprised over 183 000 military personnel from approximately 30 countries.²⁰ MNF-I is a prime example of how peace operations evolve over the course of their mandate and how the lines between a robust peace operation and a combat operation have been blurred as a result of the USA's

¹⁵ United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 20 September 2011 to 6 January 2012), S/2012/43, 18 Jan. 2012.

¹⁶ United Nations (note 15).

¹⁷ US Mission to NATO, 'NAC stresses that KFOR drawdown must remain conditions-based', Cable to US State Department, no. 09USNATO409, 25 Sep. 2009, <<http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/09/09USNATO409.html>>.

¹⁸ Nativi, A., 'NATO updates plans for Kosovo draw down', *Aviation Week*, 10 Feb. 2012.

¹⁹ The Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1511 in 2003. On 1 Jan. 2010, MNF-I transformed into USF-I on the basis of a bilateral security framework agreement between the USA and Iraq. See also note 21 below.

²⁰ On the total cost of the war in Iraq see chapter 4, section II, in this volume.

'global war on terrorism'.²¹ MNF-I, ISAF and, more recently, Operation Unified Protector in Libya have undoubtedly affected host populations' perceptions of peacekeeping. More importantly, they have influenced the way in which peacekeeping is carried out; for example, while there is now arguably a greater disposition to use force, strategies for 'winning the hearts and minds' are being introduced to gain local acceptance and legitimacy through the use of quick impact projects or provincial reconstruction teams.²² The deployment of MNF-I and ISAF has also taken a toll on peacekeeping resources, as Western countries have diverted both military and financial resources to these missions. The full impact of MNF-I will probably not be known for several years.

²¹ In some previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook, MNF-I was classified as a peace operation (although its activities included counterinsurgency) and it appeared in the tables of multilateral peace operations for 2003–2006. MNF-I was excluded from the table from 2006 onwards, after a review, because its focus had largely shifted from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency and it thus no longer met SIPRI's definition of a peace operation.

²² Wiharta, S., 'Peacekeeping: keeping pace with changes in conflict', *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, pp. 107–28.