I. Responding to atrocities: the new geopolitics of intervention

GARETH EVANS

I. The challenge of civilian protection

Our age has confronted no greater ethical, political and institutional chal-
lenge than ensuring the protection of civilians, as victims of both war and
of mass atrocity crimes. In wartime, civilians have for long now been killed
and maimed in numbers far exceeding armed combatants. Whether in
peacetime or war, the murder, torture, rape, starvation or forced expulsion
of groups of men, women and children, for no other reason than their race,
ethnicity, religion, nationality, class or ideology, has been a recurring stain
on the world’s collective conscience.

Many fewer wars are fought today than just two decades ago, and there
are many fewer battle casualties, certainly across borders but within them
as well. Fewer instances, and fewer victims, of what is now called genocide
and other major crimes against humanity occur today but the civilian tolls
are still alarmingly high, and new threats continually arise. In Iraq
between 2003 and 2011, of the 162 000 deaths as a result of the US-led war,
128 000 were civilians. At the end of 2011 the civilian death toll from the
war in Afghanistan stood at 17 000 and still counting. The war in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) formally ended in 2003 but the
number of deaths from ongoing violence and war-generated malnutrition
and disease continues to rise, and sexual violence continues on a horren-
dous scale. In Sudan, the plight of 1.8 million displaced Darfuris is as acute

Shrinking Costs of War* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2011). This report draws on data from
the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The
New York, 2005) also contains much material that is still relevant. See also Pinker, S., *The Better
chapter 7, especially pp. 297–305.


count.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>.

4 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ‘Civilian casualties rise for fifth

5 See e.g. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Crisis in the Democratic
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), ‘Imminent risk: Democratic Republic of the
crisis’, ‘imminent risk’ and ‘serious concern’.
as ever, and in late 2011 the new border with South Sudan witnessed the aerial bombardment of civilian areas, extrajudicial killings and the forced displacement of local populations opposed to Sudanese rule. During the course of 2011, the international community had to respond to a merciless assault by the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya on its initially unarmed civilian opponents, with the overall civilian death toll at the end of the year amounting to many thousands. In the even more alarming situation in Syria, by early 2012 the death toll from 9 months of regime crackdown on initially unarmed protesters stood at well over 5000 and was increasing rapidly.

Not all the news is bad. Awareness of the problem of civilian protection is as great as it has ever been, not least as a result of the emergence and consolidation in the post-cold war years of an array of actors, including effective media organizations (e.g. most recently and to spectacular effect during the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera); highly professional non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch; and more official institutions like the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Joint Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to Protect. All this made it impossible for policymakers to pretend, as they could as recently as the Rwandan genocide in 1994, to be unaware of horrors that may be unfolding.

Consciousness of the problem has been accompanied by a much greater evident willingness—at least in principle—to do something about it. This chapter charts two big normative advances in this area: first, the dramatically upgraded attention given since 1999 to the law and practice relating to the protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict; and, second, the emergence in 2001, and far-reaching global embrace since 2005, of the new concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P). There is now more or less universal acceptance of the principles that state sovereignty is not a licence to kill, but entails a responsibility not to do or allow grievous harm to one’s own people (Pillar 1); a responsibility on the part of the wider international community to assist those states that need and want help in

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6 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (note 5), pp. 4–6.
7 No properly verified Libyan death toll figures exist. The best available evidence, according to an International Criminal Court (ICC) estimate, suggests that 500–700 civilians were killed in Feb. 2011, before the international intervention and outbreak of civil war. ‘Hague court seeks warrants for Libyan officials’, New York Times, 4 May 2011. However, estimates of the overall death toll from the fighting between Mar. and Oct. 2011 vary wildly, from 10 000 to 30 000 or more. Milne, S., ‘If the Libyan war was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure’, The Guardian, 26 Oct. 2011. The number of civilian deaths directly attributable to the NATO-led military action seems likely to have been fewer than 100. Chivers, C. J. and Schmitt, E., ‘In strikes on Libya by NATO, an unspoken civilian toll’, New York Times, 17 Dec. 2011.
meeting that obligation (Pillar 2); and—although this element has been harder to translate into consistent practice—a responsibility to take timely and decisive collective action in accordance with the UN Charter, including under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII, if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations from genocide and other mass atrocity crimes (Pillar 3).9

UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing military intervention in Libya to halt what was seen as an imminent massacre, was a resounding demonstration of these principles at work, and seemed to set a new benchmark against which all future arguments for such intervention might be measured.10 However, the subsequent implementation of that mandate led to the reappearance of significant geopolitical divisions. The Security Council’s paralysis over Syria during the course of 2011, culminating in the veto by Russia and China on 4 February 2012 of a very cautiously drafted condemnatory resolution, has raised the question, in relation to the sharp-end implementation of R2P, of whether Resolution 1973 would prove to be the high-water mark from which the tide will now retreat.

China and Russia have always been susceptible to the suggestion that if Western powers are given an inch they will take a mile, and their position had real resonance through the course of 2011 with the major new emerging power bloc of India, Brazil and South Africa (the IBSA countries), which also had seats on the Security Council at the time. This was a fascinating foretaste of what might be expected if the Security Council’s permanent membership can ever be configured to reflect contemporary power realities rather than those of the mid-20th century.

The crucial question to be explored is whether the new geopolitics of intervention that appeared to have emerged with Resolution 1973—with previously reluctant powers prepared not only to acknowledge in principle the imperative of civilian protection but also to accept strong practical action, and to do so squarely within the framework of the UN Charter—is in fact sustainable, or whether, as suggested by the subsequent response to the situation in Syria, a more familiar, and more cynical, geopolitics will in fact reassert itself. A no less important related question is whether powers such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States, which have been the strongest supporters of robust intervention in the past, will retain their appetite for strong action in an environment of acute financial constraint.

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10 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 Mar. 2011. The resolution was passed with several abstentions—Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia—but no opposition.
and uncertain domestic support for any foreign adventures that are not seen to be squarely related to identifiable national interests.

This chapter takes the optimistic view that the new normative commitment to civilian protection is alive and well, and that, in the aftermath of the intervention in Libya, the world has been witnessing not so much a major setback for a new cooperative approach as the inevitable teething troubles associated with the evolution of any major new international norm. Section II summarizes the related concepts of protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect, and outlines some of the challenges that may affect their future applicability and effectiveness. Section III focuses on the 2011 intervention in Libya and the implementation of Resolution 1973, and seeks to answer two specific questions. First, was the intervention a case of overreach? Second, given the shifts in the geopolitical environment since the intervention, is there potential for a new consensus? Section IV, finally, argues for a set of policy approaches that could make the path back to effective consensus significantly easier to tread, both in principle and in practice.

II. New paradigms for a new century: protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect

Protection of civilians in armed conflict

International action to protect civilians in time of war has a long history, with legal foundations in the body of international humanitarian law that has been developed since the 19th century in successive Hague and Geneva conventions, especially as now enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols of 1977 (the latter extending the relevant protections to non-international armed conflicts). International human rights law and refugee law, most of which originated in the years following World War II, also create obligations on states to protect civilians in multiple ways in both war and peacetime. Many international organizations have also long exercised significant civilian protection mandates, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the OHCHR, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

It is only since 1999, with the presentation of the first report by the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, that there has been systematic policy focus on this issue.

11 For brief summaries of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 protocols—which are the basis for international humanitarian law—see annex A in this volume.
at the highest international level.\textsuperscript{12} The report was a comprehensive overview, addressing the threats posed by attacks on and forced displacement of civilians; the mixing of combatants and civilians in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons; the denial of humanitarian assistance and access; the targeting of humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel; the specific problems faced by children and women; the destructive role played by small arms and anti-personnel mines; and the humanitarian impact of sanctions. It recommended a series of measures to strengthen both legal protection (including ratification and implementation of international instruments, and increasing accountability for war crimes) and physical protection (including more effective peace operations, stronger guarantees of humanitarian access and targeted sanctions).

Most of these recommendations were embraced, albeit in general terms, in a subsequent Security Council thematic resolution on POC and, in various permutations, have been the subject of regular annual debates and resolutions since.\textsuperscript{13} Ban Ki-moon’s reports and briefings since 2009, and the debates following them, have focused on the ‘five core challenges’ of enhancing compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, including Security Council measures to initiate commissions of inquiry and refer relevant matters to the International Criminal Court (ICC); engaging more effectively with non-state armed groups to enhance compliance; properly training and resourcing peace operations to enhance the protection of civilians; enhancing humanitarian access to affected populations; and generally enhancing accountability for violations of international law.\textsuperscript{14}

Building on these foundations, over the past decade the Security Council has frequently taken POC action in specific cases, including calling on parties to conflict to observe international humanitarian law; imposing sanctions on violators; creating special tribunals (notably for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) and making references to the ICC to hold individuals accountable; and using Chapter VII of the UN Charter to impose arms embargoes. Very importantly, the Security Council has also used Chapter VII to authorize peace operations to use force when providing physical protection to civilians under imminent threat of violence, with


\textsuperscript{13} UN Security Council Resolution 1265, 17 Sep. 1999.

14 missions being so mandated since 1999.\textsuperscript{15} An important further underpinning of these expanded peacekeeping mandates came with the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, which made absolutely clear that the principle of UN impartiality could not mean—as it had during the 1990s, much to the organization’s discredit—a reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.\textsuperscript{16}

Beyond the issue of peacekeeping mandates, the POC reports and debates have tended until recently to avoid the larger issue of coercive military intervention, although Kofi Annan opened up the issue in his initial 1999 report.\textsuperscript{17} In Resolution 1296 in 2000 the Security Council noted that the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, in this regard, reaffirms its readiness to consider such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{The responsibility to protect}

Important as this new emphasis on civilian protection was after 1999, some crucial ingredients were missing in the way the issue was being conceptualized. Nothing in the POC reports and resolutions addressed mass atrocity crimes occurring as one-sided violence—as had been the case for some of the worst atrocities of all, notably those in Cambodia in the 1970s and Rwanda in 1994—or other than in the context of full-blown war. Perhaps even more importantly, there was nothing directly politically responsive to the major debate on ‘humanitarian intervention’ that had been raging throughout the 1990s and deeply dividing the international community.

A fundamental conceptual gulf was evident throughout this decade between those, largely in the Global North, who rallied to the banner of humanitarian intervention or ‘the right to intervene’ (\textit{droit d’ingérence} in Bernard Kouchner’s influential formulation) and those, largely in the Global South, who defended the traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty, invoking the primacy of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and arguing

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} United Nations (note 12), para. 67.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} UN Security Council Resolution 1296, 19 Apr. 2000, para. 5.
\end{itemize}
that internal events were none of the rest of the world’s business.\textsuperscript{19} The outcome was that the international community reacted incompletely or not at all—as with the catastrophe of Rwandan genocide and the almost unbelievable default in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995—or unlawfully, as in Kosovo in 1999 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), anticipating a Russian veto, intervened without the Security Council’s authorization.

It was to find a way out of this political impasse that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ concept was born, in the 2001 report of that name by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).\textsuperscript{20} The Commission was established by the Canadian Government as an explicit response to the challenge issued by Kofi Annan in the UN General Assembly in 2000: ‘If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?’\textsuperscript{21}

The ICISS report sought to meet this challenge in three main ways. First, in terms of presentation, it turned abrasive ‘right to intervene’ language into the potentially much more acceptable ‘responsibility to protect’. Second, it broadened the range of actors in the frame: whereas humanitarian intervention focused just on the international response, the new formulation spread the responsibility, starting with the spotlight on the sovereign state itself and its responsibilities (the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ that had been earlier given prominence by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen), and only then shifting to the responsibility of the wider international community.\textsuperscript{22} Third, it dramatically broadened the range of possible responses: whereas humanitarian intervention focused one-dimensionally on military reaction, R2P involves multiple elements in the response continuum, including both long-term and short-term preventive action, reaction when prevention fails, with coercive military action only contemplated as an absolute last resort after multiple criteria are satisfied, and post-crisis rebuilding aimed at preventing recurrence.

\textsuperscript{19} Article 2(7) of the UN Charter (note 9) requires the UN not to ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. Droit d’ingérence came to prominence at the time of the US-led intervention in Somalia in 1992 and was first articulated in Bettati, M. and Kouchner, B. (eds), Le devoir d’ingérence: peut-on les laisser mourir? [The duty to interfere: can one let them die?] (Denoël: Paris, 1987), p. 300. See also Evans (note 16), pp. 32–33.

\textsuperscript{20} International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (International Development Research Centre: Ottawa, 2001). For a fuller account of the birth and evolution of the concept see Evans (note 16), pp. 31–54.


Articulated this way, the new concept gained remarkable international traction within a very short time, winning unanimous endorsement by the more than 150 heads of state and government meeting as the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit; and within another year it had been embraced in Security Council Resolution 1674.\textsuperscript{23} Since 2005 the task has been to ensure that this new normative development—spectacular as it might look on paper, with the historian Martin Gilbert, for example, describing it as ‘the most significant adjustment to sovereignty in 360 years’—actually translates into effective action in real-world situations that cry out for it.\textsuperscript{24} That has meant surmounting conceptual, institutional and political challenges.

As to the conceptual challenge, it is evident—writing in early 2012—that this has largely been met. Assisted by a series of well-received reports to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (written by his Special Adviser on R2P, Edward Luck), the debate about what constitutes an R2P situation is much less confused now than it was in the period shortly after 2005.\textsuperscript{25} As successive situations have arisen and been debated, it has come to be widely understood and accepted that R2P is not about human security, human rights violations or conflict situations in general; nor is it concerned with natural disasters or other humanitarian catastrophes. Rather, R2P is about responding to the ‘four crimes’ specified in the 2005 Outcome Document—namely, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity—and even here there has to be some scale and contemporaneity to the types of atrocity crime committed or feared if any kind of serious coercive response is to be justified.\textsuperscript{26}

The institutional challenge, similarly, is being met, although much more remains to be done to fully develop the necessary preparedness—diplomatic, civilian and military—to deal with future situations of mass atrocity crime. Within key national governments and international organizations, ‘focal points’ are being established with officials whose job it is to worry


\textsuperscript{26} On the emerging consensus about particular cases see Evans, G., ‘The raison d’etre, scope and limits of the responsibility to protect’, Address, Centre de Droit International, Université Paris Ouest, 14 Nov. 2011, <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech456.html>; and Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (note 5).
about early warning and response to new situations as they arise, and to energize the appropriate action throughout their respective systems. One of the strongest examples is the USA, with a special unit in the National Security Council, and an inter-agency Atrocities Prevention Board being created with the object of taking whole-of-government responses to these situations to a new level of effectiveness.

The ICC and a number of other ad hoc tribunals have been established, enabling not only trial and punishment for some of the worst mass atrocity crimes of the past, but also potentially providing an important new deterrent for the future. Although the establishment of effective military rapid reaction forces on even a standby basis remains more an aspiration than a reality, key militaries are now devoting serious time and attention to debating and putting in place new force configuration arrangements, doctrines, rules of engagement and training to run what are being increasingly described as mass atrocity response operations (MARO).27

The most troubling challenge, as always, is the political one: finding the will to translate clear understanding of need, and available institutional capacity, into effective action. While the paralysed Security Council response to the situation in Syria since mid-2011 has brought this problem once again to the fore, the available evidence points to unequivocal in-principle acceptance of all the core elements of the R2P norm by the overwhelming majority of states. The clearest proof lies in the outcomes of the series of debates in the UN General Assembly since 2005, especially those in response to the Secretary-General’s R2P reports in 2009, 2010 and 2011. For those who had never accepted the 2005 consensus, the 2009 debate was seen as a real opportunity to overturn it but it became apparent that, out of the whole UN membership, only four states—Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela—wanted to go that far.28 Since then, while lively debate continues about the pros and cons of particular responses to particular situations, general opposition to the R2P norm itself has been even more muted. That was so even in 2011 in the midst of concerns being widely voiced about the ‘overstretching’ of the Libya mandate.29

by the end of 2011 the Security Council itself had referred to R2P on three occasions since the Libya resolutions: in its resolutions on Sudan and Yemen, and in a presidential statement on prevention.\textsuperscript{30} As Ban Ki-moon put it in September 2011: ‘It is a sign of progress that our debates are now about how, not whether, to implement the Responsibility to Protect. No government questions the principle’\textsuperscript{31}

The relationship between protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect

The two new paradigms that have dominated international policy debate on civilian protection in the new century march comfortably alongside each other and there is no particular point, except as an intellectual exercise, in trying to disentangle them in the many real-world situations where they overlap.\textsuperscript{32} The preamble to UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya, for example, makes clear its reliance on both R2P and POC norms, in ‘Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians’.\textsuperscript{33}

The UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, briefing the Security Council in its open debate on the protection of civilians in 2006, made clear the common normative foundations of the two bodies of doctrine, stressing that the responsibility to protect was a ‘core principle of humanity’ which must ‘become a truly shared interest and translate into joint action by all members of this Council and our global Organisation’.\textsuperscript{34} The first endorsement of R2P by the Security Council came in its POC resolution of 2006.\textsuperscript{35} Both POC and R2P have the same legal

general debate opening the General Assembly, 2 of the most fascinating acknowledgements that R2P is here to stay came from ministerial contributions from 2 manifestly unlikely sources: Syria and Zimbabwe.


\textsuperscript{33} UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (note 10) (emphasis in original).

\textsuperscript{34} United Nations Security Council, 5577th meeting, S/PV.5577, 4 Dec. 2006.

\textsuperscript{35} UN Security Council Resolution 1674 (note 23).
underpinnings in international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law as far as the responsibility of individual states is concerned. In addition, neither body of doctrine is synonymous with military intervention: R2P is about a very wide range of preventive and reactive responses, and while POC is heavily focused, operationally, on peace operations mandates, its agenda is much broader than that.

The two norms differ in just two respects, neither of which is significant for present purposes. POC is broader than R2P to the extent that the rights and needs of populations caught up in armed conflict go well beyond protection from mass atrocities. However, in one major respect the scope of R2P goes well beyond POC, in that it is concerned with preventing and halting mass atrocity crimes regardless of whether they occur in times of armed conflict. Cambodia in the mid-1970s, Rwanda in 1994, Kenya in 2008 and Libya, at least at the time of Resolution 1973 in February 2011, are major examples of such non-war situations.

III. Libya and its aftermath: the limits of intervention?

Implementing Resolution 1973: a case of overreach?

Libya in 2011 was, at least initially, a textbook example of how R2P is supposed to work in the face of a rapidly unfolding mass atrocity situation during which early-stage prevention measures no longer have any relevance. In February, Gaddafi’s forces responded to the initial peaceful protests against the excesses of his regime, inspired by the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, by massacring at least several hundred of his own people. That led to UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which specifically invoked ‘the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population’, condemned its violence against civilians, demanded that this stop and sought to concentrate Gaddafi’s mind by applying targeted sanctions, an arms embargo and the threat of ICC prosecution for crimes against humanity.

Then, as it became apparent that Gaddafi was not only ignoring that resolution but planning a major assault on Benghazi in which ‘no mercy or pity’ would be shown to perceived opponents, armed or otherwise—his reference to ‘cockroaches’ having a special resonance for those who remembered how Tutsis were being described before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda—the Security Council followed up with Resolution 1973. This also invoked the R2P principle (and POC as well); reasserted a determination to ensure the protection of civilians; deplored the failure to

36 See note 7.
comply with the first resolution; called for an immediate ceasefire and a complete end to violent attacks against and abuses of civilians; and explicitly authorized military intervention by member states to achieve these objectives.

That coercive military action was allowed to take two forms: ‘all necessary measures’ to enforce a no-fly zone, and—in an important and far-reaching addition proposed by the USA at the last minute—‘all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’. Only ‘a foreign occupation force’ was expressly excluded: ground troops were just a bridge too far for the Arab League to contemplate, and the political support of this regional organization was absolutely crucial in ensuring both a majority on the Security Council and no exercise of the veto by China or Russia. (That regional support was also, politically, an absolute precondition for the UK and the USA to act without leaving themselves open to the allegation throughout the Arab-Islamic world of being up to their old Iraq-invading, crusading tricks.)

NATO action commenced immediately, and can certainly be credited with stopping a major catastrophe in Benghazi that would have cost a great many civilian lives. To this extent R2P again worked exactly as it was intended, and justified the exultation at the time of those who, like the present author, believed that a major page had been turned and that maybe, just maybe, after centuries of indifference or worse to mass atrocity crimes, the world could look forward to a future in which there would be no more Rwandas or horrors like it. But not everyone shared even that initial exultation. Right from the outset there were critics who argued that the likely Benghazi death toll, with no international intervention, would have been much less than claimed, and that negotiations could have succeeded given more time.\(^{39}\) It is impossible after the event to test such arguments, but these particular ones are unpersuasive. Whatever the distaste unquestionably felt for Gaddafi in both the West and the Arab League, it is inconceivable that the ‘all necessary measures’ resolution in the Security Council would have been pursued, let alone accepted, if there had not been at the time a widespread and quite genuine belief (shared by China, Russia and the others who did not oppose Resolution 1973) that Gaddafi’s regime had killed many civilian protesters and was on the verge of killing a great many more in Benghazi. Gaddafi’s behaviour over the three weeks since the preceding Security Council resolution had shown him to be determinedly resistant to any negotiated political settlement, certainly one that involved him relinquishing any significant power.

The criticisms of the intervention that have more traction, and continuing resonance, are those mounted not against the initial military response—destroying Libyan Air Force infrastructure, and attacking the ground forces advancing on Benghazi—but what came after, when it became rapidly apparent that the NATO-led forces would settle for nothing less than regime change and do whatever it took to achieve that. Such action included not only rejecting outright early ceasefire offers that may or may not have been serious, but also attacking from the air fleeing personnel who posed no immediate risk to civilians (including, in the October endgame, Gaddafi himself); striking locations that were not obviously militarily significant (such as the Tripoli compound in which Gaddafi’s son Khamis and three grandchildren were reportedly killed in April); and, more generally, comprehensively supporting the rebel side (even to the extent of breaching the Security Council arms embargo in the case of France and Qatar) in what rapidly became a full-scale civil war.40

All these actions were characterized, inevitably, by a number of critics as exceeding the mandate conferred by Resolution 1973, or at the very least stretching its letter to the limits and breaching its spirit. They generated negative reactions as a result from the Arab League, which originally strongly supported that resolution, and from many of the countries that initially did not oppose the resolution including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS countries). They were also used as justification, again by these states, for opposing any substantive Security Council resolution on Syria throughout 2011.41 On the other side, the argument was made that, while the intervention was always about civilian protection, the only way civilians could reliably be protected in areas, such as Tripoli, that were under Gaddafi’s control was by removing him from power. Some critics have been quick to ascribe darker commercial or other motives, or simply a congenital trigger-happiness on the part of the ‘war party’ of France, the UK and the USA but it seems fairer to describe the Western powers’ response as primarily a genuinely motivated reaction to a genuinely perceived humanitarian need.42

The question remains, nonetheless, whether that reaction was an overreaction. Could it in fact have been possible to respond militarily to the situation as it presented itself in Libya without taking sides and fighting an all-out war? The original 2001 ICISS report certainly approached the issue of R2P military interventions from a limited perspective of this kind:

40 On implementation of the arms embargo see chapter 10, section III, in this volume.
41 See e.g. the statements, of varying degrees of explicitness but with a clear common message, by the permanent representatives of Brazil (pp. 15–17), India (pp. 17–18), South Africa (pp. 21–23), Russia (pp. 23–24) and China (pp. 24–25) in United Nations, S/PV.6650 (note 14).
42 See e.g. Roberts (note 39); and, among many other critics of the relevance and utility of R2P in these situations, O’Connor, M., ‘How to lose a revolution’ and Hehir, A., ‘The illusion of progress: Libya and the future of R2P’, The Responsibility to Protect (e-International Relations: Nov. 2011).
Because the objective of military intervention is to protect populations and not to defeat or destroy an enemy militarily, it differs from traditional warfighting. While military intervention operations require the use of as much force as is necessary, which may on occasion be a great deal, to protect the population at risk, their basic objective is always to achieve quick success with as little cost as possible in civilian lives and inflicting as little damage as possible so as to enhance recovery prospects in the post-conflict phase.\(^43\)

The present author, concerned about the backlash that the Libyan intervention was generating, went on record suggesting that it would have been preferable for the NATO-led coalition to conduct the operation on a more restrained basis: maintaining a no-fly zone, and attacking any concentration of forces clearly about to put civilians at risk, and beyond that leaving the rebels to fight their own war.\(^44\)

This is, it must be acknowledged, a hard position to sustain. Conducting the operation in this way would certainly have led to a more protracted, messier war with the likelihood of larger civilian casualties as a result, and it may have given freer rein to Gaddafi to do his worst, without attackable concentrations of troops, in Tripoli and elsewhere.\(^45\) The domestic politics of an open-ended but limited brief would have been much more difficult to manage in Europe and the USA than a short, reasonably sharp war with the avowed aim of removing a universally abhorred dictator, successfully accomplished. Additionally, militaries are always going to be hard to dissuade from conducting the kind of operations with which they feel most comfortable: using all available resources to defeat a clearly defined enemy. It may be that the Libyan intervention could not practicably have been conducted any other way.

And yet. The trouble is that there is no broad-based international constituency for an approach to mass atrocity crimes that does not set very carefully defined limits on the most extreme response option, military coercion. If the necessity, in a rule-based international order, for Security Council endorsement for any coercive use of military force other than self-defence is accepted, then operations must be conducted within a framework that is capable of generating, and sustaining, consensus in that body. If some key states act in ways that are seen by others to be pushing that consensus beyond endurable limits, then not only will it be almost impossible in the future to win Security Council consensus on any further use of

\(^{43}\) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (note 20), para. 7.1, p. 57. See also Evans (note 16), p. 214.


\(^{45}\) The argument that the international intervention as conducted resulted in more civilian casualties than would otherwise have been the case cannot be proven. It seems reasonable to assume that without it there would still have been a bloody civil war, with atrocity crimes ending only with either Gaddafi’s overthrow or his crushing all dissent, and body counts either way impossible to guess. On this type of methodology see Seybolt, T. B., SIPRI, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007).
military force in atrocity crime situations, but it will be hugely difficult to get agreement on even lesser measures. This seems to be the lesson of Syria, at least while nerves remain raw about the Libyan experience.

**The geopolitical environment after Libya: potential for a new consensus?**

There are two basic directions in which the debate could now go. One is that mapped by David Rieff, who concludes that rather than trying to fashion a new, constrained concept of R2P military intervention—and indeed, rather than staying with the whole R2P project, with its multi-layered approach and focus on international consensus building across the whole spectrum of preventive and reactive atrocity crime responses—‘we could have simply stayed with the concept of just war’.46 Presumably, although he does not spell it out, this means relying on ad hoc interventions—outside the framework of the Security Council and depending on moral legitimacy rather than legal authority—of the kind that have occasionally occurred in the past (e.g. in the humanitarian interventions periodically mounted in the 19th century to protect Christians at risk in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, and most recently with NATO in Kosovo in 1999).47

The other approach is not to throw the R2P baby out with the bathwater in this way, but to go back to basics, build on the very substantial foundations that have already been laid, and work at refining and further developing the R2P norm in a way that is capable of generating consensus around even the hardest cases. Achieving this will involve the key states on both sides of the post-Libya intervention debate stepping back a little from the positions they have staked out. In the present geopolitical environment that may not be as hard as it first seems: if the positions of each of the major current players are reviewed, it is evident that in every case there are contradictory dynamics at work, which are far from pushing them into inexorably opposed camps.

While the three Western permanent members of the Security Council have been by far the most overtly committed to R2P in all its dimensions (and the most willing to argue for coercive military force to be applied in appropriate cases), the UK and France are incapable of going it alone, except in relatively small-scale operations like the UK’s Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 2000 or the France-led (although notionally an EU mis-

sion) Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003. As for the USA—the ‘indispensable nation’ as Madeleine Albright famously described it in the context of its unique capacity to project power just about anywhere in the world—it can be expected to be deeply cautious in the future about plunging into new military commitments except when national interests, narrowly defined, are very obviously threatened. The isolationist current always evident in US public and congressional sentiment is, if anything, strengthening. Some hard lessons have been learned in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past decade about the limits of military power; and the budgetary pressures imposed by the global financial crisis and its aftermath will bite hard on US military expenditure in the years ahead. Overall, there is much less cause for anxiety now than there may have been at the time of the Iraq war in 2003 about the major Western powers’ willingness to engage in cynical neo-imperialist adventurism.

The other two permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia, have been much more traditionally inclined to champion—cynically or otherwise, and some scepticism is permissible, particularly in the case of Russia—the principles of ‘non-interference in countries’ internal affairs and of respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of states’.

Notwithstanding this, China, contrary to many expectations, did not play any kind of spoiling role in the discussion leading up to the World Summit debate which embraced R2P in 2005 and has not been the strongest obstructive voice since. It did not oppose the initial Resolution 1973 on Libya, and has framed its subsequent objections not absolutely but in terms of the need to use ‘extreme caution’ in authorizing the use of force to protect civilians, and to ‘fully and strictly’ implement Security Council resolutions and not ‘wilfully misinterpret’ them. It is increasingly apparent that China is self-conscious about its need to be seen to be playing a constructive, responsible role in international affairs and should not be assumed to be instinctively unresponsive to the need for sometimes quite robust cooperative responses to mass atrocity crimes. Its veto early in 2012, against the wishes of the Arab League, of the condemnatory but not

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48 The EU, not least as a result of Germany’s continuing deep reluctance to contribute to any such missions (as evident in its abstention from UN Security Council Resolution 1973), remains unlikely for the foreseeable future to become a serious collective player in these enterprises.
51 E.g., again, Li Baodong, United Nations, S/PV.6650 (note 14), p. 25.
52 China’s potentially constructive multilateral role has started to generate some attention from commentators: ‘It starts out still relatively poor, is geographically insecure and is short of almost any natural resource you can think of. Its economy relies on western markets. It needs a stable, open international system. It’s an intriguing thought: how long before China emerges as the new champion of the multilateral order?’ Stephens, P., ‘How a self-sufficient America could go it alone’, Financial Times, 12 Jan. 2012.
otherwise interventionist proposed Security Council resolution on Syria was unexpected and may have reflected other factors—in particular anxiety about the USA putting increasing pressure on its Middle East energy sources—more than a determination to reassert a hard line on R2P as such.\(^{53}\)

Both in the lead up to 2005 and since, Russia has been a more obdurate opponent of robust action but in the event it did not oppose the World Summit Outcome Document, the 2011 Libya resolutions or other Security Council resolutions referring to R2P. In fact, Russia explicitly relied on R2P to justify its own military invasion of Georgia in 2008, not that the wider international community found this remotely persuasive.\(^{54}\) Its subsequent objections have been more directed to the way in which R2P was applied in Libya (‘double standards dictated by short term circumstances or the preferences of particular states’) than to its inherent normative content.\(^{55}\) Russia has been particularly supportive of the role of regional organizations in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and was clearly influenced, as were others, by the strong support of the Arab League for intervention in Libya. All that said, strong support by the Arab League—and 13 members of the Security Council—for the proposed resolution on Syria put to it on 4 February 2012, condemning the violence and backing an action plan for political transition but not threatening any coercive measures, was not enough to prevent Russia vetoing the resolution: the realpolitik of its close and long-standing economic and strategic relationship with Syria and the regime of President Bashar al-Assad prevailed.\(^{56}\) But it is not to be assumed that its intransigence will be as complete in other contexts in the future.

Of the remaining BRICS countries, India was the last significant state to be persuaded to join the 2005 consensus, and has remained a generally unenthusiastic supporter of R2P since (save in the context of the Sri Lankan conflict in 2009, when the Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, called on the Sri Lankan Government to exercise its responsibility to protect its own citizens). Certainly it has been among the strongest critics, both in the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, of the way the Libyan intervention mandate was implemented. It did support the initial interventionist measures against Libya in Resolution 1970, while not

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\(^{55}\) The Russian Permanent Representative, Vitaly Churkin, refrained from mentioning Russia’s invasion of Georgia in this context. United Nations, S/PV.6650 (note 14), p. 23.

opposing Resolution 1973; issued a condemnatory statement on Syria as president of the Security Council; and supported the proposed Syria resolution in February 2012.\(^\text{57}\) Further, India supported the use of UN forces to protect civilians in Côte d’Ivoire, has itself been a willing provider of peacekeeping forces with strong POC mandates and has generally focused not on opposing military force so much as on setting conditions for its exercise, including that it ‘be the measure of last resort and be used only when all diplomatic and political efforts fail’ and that Security Council mandates be closely monitored.\(^\text{58}\) India has wanted to be seen internationally as a champion of human rights and democracy, but at the same time to maintain its non-interventionist credentials with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a difficult balance to maintain (as is its position as simultaneously a global champion and national resister of nuclear disarmament).\(^\text{59}\) It seems reasonable to assume that as India looks more and more to assume a global leadership role, it will contribute to bridge building on these issues in a more active and systematically constructive way.

South Africa, in contrast, was an enthusiastic proponent of R2P at the 2005 World Summit, was a crucial player in mobilizing and articulating sub-Saharan African support for it, and has since been generally supportive and keen to maintain its post-apartheid human rights and democracy credentials. However, it has been pulled in a different direction by its other international personalities as an outspoken advocate for pan-African and South–South solidarity, and as a strong supporter of mediation and conflict resolution through dialogue. Above all, in the context of Libya, as a long-standing friend of the Gaddafi regime and the leader of the African Union mediation effort, South Africa has been an outspoken critic of the military intervention there, describing it as going ‘far beyond the letter and spirit of Resolution 1973’.\(^\text{60}\) If its explicit concerns about less than even-handed mandate implementation can be addressed, it seems reasonable to hope that it will again become a strong supporter of R2P in all its dimensions.

Brazil is another state visibly torn between its overall desire to maintain support from the Global South, and its increasing self-consciousness as a rapidly growing global player of real stature and willingness in that context to employ more human rights rhetoric in its foreign policy.\(^\text{61}\) Again, more like South Africa than India, it was one of the key Latin American countries


\(^{61}\) Piccone and Alinikoff (note 59), pp. 4–10.
embracing, in a historically significant way, limited-sovereignty principles in the lead-up to 2005 and has generally given quite strong support to the R2P norm. But as with all the BRICS countries, the bridge too far for Brazil was the perceived overreach by the NATO-led operation in Libya in implementing Security Council Resolution 1973. What has distinguished Brazil’s role, however, is its evident willingness now to search actively for a way to regenerate consensus around the issue of forcible intervention in hard cases, with its proposal to develop, in parallel to the present concept of R2P, an ‘agreed set of fundamental principles, parameters and procedures’ on the theme of ‘responsibility while protecting’.\footnote{See statement of de Auguiar Patriota, A., Brazilian Foreign Minister, presented by Ribeiro Viotti, M. L., Permanent Representative of Brazil, United Nations, S/PV.6650 (note 14), pp. 15–17.} As discussed in section IV, this does seem to have the potential to put back on track a multilateral, cooperative approach to civilian protection, including in the most difficult cases.

None of these three major emerging powers have taken as hard a negative line as China and Russia on the question of international engagement in Syria, and they seem more likely between them to play a more substantial and influential role than China or Russia in rebuilding international consensus about how to respond to mass atrocity crimes. Another extremely influential emerging power whose role will be important in the years ahead on this as on many other issues is Turkey, which has been a consistently strong supporter of the R2P principle, an increasingly active, forthright and respected player in its own region and beyond, and a particularly strong critic of the Syrian regime’s murderous response to its civilian opponents.

**IV. The future for civilian protection**

It will not be easy to rebuild the consensus on the implementation of the R2P, and more general POC, norms that were fleetingly achieved at the time of the Security Council resolutions on Libya and Côte d’Ivoire in March 2011, but the best chance of doing so will be for civilian protection policymakers and advocates—building on the general political support for R2P that clearly exists among UN member states (as described in section II)—to focus in the period ahead on making progress in the following five specific areas.

**Criteria for the authorization of military force**

First, and most importantly, some understanding will need to be reached on the kinds of condition, or criterion, which should have to be satisfied before coercive military force is authorized, and on a process to ensure that the
limits inherent in any mandate granted by the Security Council continue to be observed. These are the issues at the heart of the backlash that has accompanied the implementation of Resolution 1973, and the concerns of the BRICS countries in particular should be taken seriously by France, the UK and the USA. They are too serious to be simply dismissed as indicative of the kind of complaints, rationalizations or evasions of responsibility that are bound to arise whenever states have to make hard decisions that have the potential to offend international friends or domestic constituencies.

One way of approaching the criteria issue would be to return directly to the recommendations of the ICISS, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and Kofi Annan that the Security Council formally adopt the five following prudential guidelines for authorizing the use of force.63

1. **Seriousness of risk.** Is the threatened harm of such a kind and scale as to justify prima facie the use of force?

2. **The primary purpose of the proposed military action.** Is it to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other secondary motives might be in play for different states?

3. **Last resort.** Has every non-military option been fully explored and the judgement reasonably made that nothing less than military force could halt or avert the harm in question?

4. **Proportionality.** Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat?

5. **Balance of consequences.** Will those at risk ultimately be better or worse off, and the scale of suffering greater or less? This is usually the toughest legitimacy test.

Such criteria could clearly not guarantee consensus in any particular case, but requiring systematic attention to all the relevant issues—which simply does not happen at the moment—would hopefully make its achievement much more likely. One of the further virtues of this approach is that it would make it abundantly clear from the outset just how different coercive military action is to other response mechanisms, and how many hurdles should have to be jumped before ever authorizing it: that it is something that should not be contemplated as a routine escalation, but only in the most extreme and exceptional circumstances. If such criteria were able to be agreed, and applied with some rigour and consistency to new situations as they arise, it should be a lot easier to avoid the ‘slippery slide’ argument

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which has contributed to the Security Council paralysis on Syria, making some countries unwilling to even foreshadow non-military measures like targeted sanctions or ICC investigation because of their concern that military coercion would be the inevitable next step if lesser measures failed.

Until now, however, all such arguments have foundered in the face of strong arguments by most of the relevant states and UN insiders—even those who agree on the utility of having such criteria in place—that getting there would be a procedural nightmare, generating endless wrangling about abstractions and unproductively diverting attention away from real issues. What has given fascinating new life to the question is Brazil’s initiative in November 2011 in introducing the idea of ‘responsibility while protecting’ (RWP) to be pursued not as an alternative but a complement to R2P, evolving together with it. The concept paper distributed to generate discussion recommends that there be an ‘agreed set of fundamental principles, parameters and procedures’ that include at least three of the five criteria described above (last resort, proportionality and balance of consequences). Indications at the time of writing in early 2012 are that the Brazilian proposal has been well received, certainly by its fellow BRICS countries, and—with further development—is likely to feature centrally in the next General Assembly Interactive Dialogue on R2P in mid-2012, which will focus squarely on Pillar 3 enforcement issues.

It is clear that the Brazilian RWP proposal, in its initial formulation, is generating a positive response from other BRICS countries, not least because it also focuses specifically on the need for military action to ‘abide by the letter and the spirit of the mandate conferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly’, arguing that ‘Enhanced Security Council procedures are needed to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented to ensure responsibility while protecting’. While this part of the initiative will no doubt be particularly sensitive for the three Western permanent members of the Security Council, if it proves—as now seems very possible—to be the vehicle through which a new cooperative commitment to sharp-end implementation of R2P is capable of emerging, it would be irresponsible for France, the UK and the USA, and others who share their basic outlook, not to participate seriously in crafting workable procedures of the kind sought.

64 de Auguiar Patriota (note 62).
66 United Nations (note 65), para. 11(d), (h).
Measures falling short of coercive military intervention

The second major area to which more attention needs to be devoted by policymakers is the scope and limits of Pillar 3 measures that fall short of coercive military intervention, with Security Council members focusing on how they can better join up diplomatic initiatives, targeted sanctions, threats of reference to the ICC and other tools. A good example of the Security Council linking some of these tools reasonably effectively is Côte d’Ivoire, which became a threat to the UN’s credibility in early 2011, with both Russia and South Africa blocking more decisive action. UN sanctions primarily implemented by the EU helped contain the crisis while African diplomats tried to negotiate a peace deal. When that proved impossible, with other options manifestly exhausted, a unanimous Security Council resolution approving the use of force by French and UN troops was readily achievable by the end of March. That said, it is important that ‘exhaustion of other options’ not be seen as requiring non-military options to be physically worked through in circumstances where they are obviously likely to prove totally unproductive: where killing is occurring or imminent, the requirement is to be able to make a reasonable judgment, quickly, that no non-military action is likely to be productive.

Long-term preventive strategies

It will also be important to give, and for the key states to be seen to be giving, more systematic attention to longer-term preventive strategies. These should be relevant both to conflict generally and mass atrocity crimes in particular, not only before such events have ever occurred but—in many ways even more pertinently—after they have occurred, in the peace-building stage where the effort is to prevent recurrence. While the toolbox of relevant structural measures—across the whole spectrum of political and diplomatic, economic and social, constitutional and legal, and security strategies—is well known and regular lip service is paid to this need in the Security Council, including in regular thematic debates on conflict prevention, the record of effective action is not stellar. One theme strongly emphasized in commentary from the Global South, and in lessons-learned analyses from Afghanistan and Iraq, is the critical need for more sensitive attention to be paid by external interveners and assisters to local social dynamics and cultural realities, and to perceptions of their own require-

ments by local populations at all levels. The more that states in the Global North, in particular, are seen to be taking seriously and sensitively their Pillar 2 assistance responsibilities, the less prospect there is of them being criticized as intolerably preoccupied with punitive measures.

**Developing appropriate institutional response capacities**

A fourth major need is for rapid further development of appropriate institutional response capacity, both preventive and reactive, and both civilian and military, of the kind referred to in section II. The main challenges here are the establishment, in many more governments and intergovernmental organizations, of early warning and response ‘focal points’; and the organization and resourcing of civilian capability able to be used, as occasion arises, for diplomatic mediation, civilian policing and other critical administrative support for countries at risk of atrocity crimes occurring or recurring. Further, it will be important to create a culture of effective support—crucial at the national level in the absence of any international marshals service—for the ICC and the developing machinery of international criminal justice; and to have in place properly trained and capable military resources available both for rapid ‘fire-brigade’ deployment in Rwanda-type cases and for long-haul stabilization operations like those in the DRC and Sudan, not only in no-consent situations, but also where vulnerable governments request this kind of assistance. Again, a major, visible commitment by countries of the Global North to building this kind of capacity is not only very important in its own terms, but can also help to reduce scepticism about their good intentions when more sensitive policy responses have to be considered.

Here as elsewhere on global security issues in the future, regional organizations can be expected to play an ever more important role, exercising the full range of the responsibilities envisaged for them in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. So far, although both the African Union and the EU have shown occasional willingness to act collectively, and the Arab League demonstrated in 2011 a hitherto-lacking capacity for concerted political action in the contexts of both Libya and Syria, only the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has so far shown a consistent willingness to respond with a full range of diplomatic, political, economic and ultimately military strategies in response to civilian protection crises. Still there will, and should be, ever more pressure on regional and subregional organizations elsewhere in Africa, and in Asia and Latin America, to be front-line responders in these situations. It may be going too far to

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say that the engagement of regional organizations will over the next few years be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for any military intervention in mass atrocity cases—each situation will have its own dynamic—but their role will be ever more important.

**Rethinking the concept of ‘national interest’**

A fifth need worth mentioning relates to those many states that are sensitive to potential domestic resistance to morally worthy foreign entanglements (or which are perhaps oversensitive in perceiving such resistance: it is not unknown for publics to be more generously and internationally minded than their own governments). There is much to be said for rethinking the concept of ‘national interest’ as involving not just the two traditional dimensions of economic and security interests, but a third as well: every state’s interest in being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen. The argument is that, even when there may be no direct economic or strategic pay-off, actively helping to solve global public goods ‘values’ challenges—for example, climate change, drug trafficking, cross-border population flows, weapons of mass destruction and mass atrocity crimes—is not just the foreign policy equivalent of boy-scout good deeds. Selfless cooperation on these issues does actually work to a country’s advantage, in terms of both reputation and the generation of reciprocal support: my help in solving your drug trafficking issue today will increase the chances of you supporting my asylum-seeker problem tomorrow. A story couched in these realist terms is likely to be an easier sell to domestic constituencies than one pitched as disinterested altruism.

Nobody suggests that the geopolitics of ensuring effective civilian protection is ever going to be easy, especially in cases where early-stage prevention, if any, has manifestly failed. What has to be accepted, and treated as a challenge rather than cause for despair, is that there is always going to be tough debate about the really hard cases, where violations that are occurring are so extreme that the question of coercive military force comes into play as something which, prima facie at least, might have to be seriously contemplated as the only way to halt or avert the harm that is occurring or feared. The higher the stakes, the higher the emotion and the more that realpolitik will come into play.

When it comes to generating consensus on military action, some cases will always be easier than others, for example, where small, relatively friendless countries with weak military forces are involved, and where a military intervention is not particularly likely to have wider regional ramifications, as compared to cases where it almost certainly will, perhaps because of cross-over ethnic or sectarian loyalties. What is most important
in all of this is not to let the idea take hold that because—for any one of a number of reasons, good or bad or both—it will not be possible to intervene militarily everywhere that a mass atrocity crime situation arguably justifies this, then intervention should not take place anywhere. The bottom line is that, while the responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians generally face some real challenges after Libya, these challenges are not insuperable. The R2P principle is firmly and globally established and has demonstrably delivered major practical results but its completely effective implementation is going to be a work in progress for a long time yet.