Introduction
International security, armaments and disarmament

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I. Assessing the past year

The past year saw new and old uncertainties and instabilities around the globe, even as pressures built for further cutbacks, especially in the United States and among its closest allies, to already-dwindling military budgets. Economic austerity measures took hold in many states, including significant economic and military powers in the developed world, further constraining their financial wherewithal, political willingness and military capacity to respond to complex challenges. The balancing of security needs with economic realities received further serious debate in many countries, including a growing realization that narrowly constructed military solutions are likely to be less and less relevant to addressing the actual security challenges of the future. Indeed, in 2011 the argument gained ground in Western capitals that it is not traditionally defined security threats but financial irresponsibility and profligacy—including the long-term costs of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—that pose some of the greatest long-term challenges to the prosperity and security of the developed world, and to the current international security institutions more broadly.

The 2011 uprisings and regime changes in the Arab world drew international attention. Hundreds of civilians and soldiers were killed in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. International responses included the United Nations-mandated and NATO-led intervention in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, which facilitated the downfall of the Libyan regime. In Syria, despite escalating sanctions and other punitive measures throughout the year on the part of the UN, the Arab League, Turkey, the USA, the European Union (EU) and others, violence continued unabated with well over 5000 people, mostly civilians, reportedly killed in 2011. Thousands more lives were lost to armed violence in other parts of the world in 2011 as well. In Côte d’Ivoire more than 1000 people were killed as a result of heavy fighting between rival political groups and inter-ethnic conflict. High-profile and deadly extremist attacks occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia, as well as in Norway, Russia’s North Caucasus, western China and elsewhere around the world. While the overall incidence of organized armed violence appears to have been in decline over the decade 2001–10, in 2010 there were 30 armed conflicts (involving
at least one state), 26 non-state conflicts, and at least 18 armed actors carrying out one-sided violence against unorganized civilians. To help bring peace to unstable parts of the world, more than 262,000 peacekeepers in 52 operations were deployed around the world in 2011.

In June 2011 US President Barack Obama announced that, having largely met its aims in Afghanistan, the USA would withdraw 10,000 troops from the country by the end of the year, with a further withdrawal of 20,000 troops anticipated by mid-2012. In December 2011, after nine years of war in Iraq, the US military presence there came to a formal end, with the last US combat soldiers leaving the country on 18 December. But prospects in Afghanistan and Iraq are clouded at best. Both countries will continue to grapple with the internal challenges of factional conflict, and foreign powers will for the indefinite future intervene in various ways to influence developments. Controversial leaders Osama bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi and Kim Jong-il all died in 2011, but left legacies that will continue to have an impact on regional and global security for years to come.

World military expenditure was $1738 billion in 2011, making it the first year since 1998 that spending did not increase. This results from the fact that 10 of the world’s top 15 military spenders—among them the USA and some of its major allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region—saw flat or reduced military budgets in 2011. However, while global military spending may have peaked for now, there was continued growth in the volume of conventional arms transfers and in the arms sales of the 100 largest arms-producing and military services companies. In addition, while total world military spending did not increase between 2010 and 2011, 5 of the world’s top 15 military spenders—China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Turkey—increased their defence budgets. Of the top 15 military spenders, the greatest increases in military budgets in the period 2002–11 occurred in China (whose spending increased by 170 per cent), Saudi Arabia (90 per cent), Russia (79 per cent) and India (66 per cent). Meanwhile, the world’s nuclear-armed states continued to modernize and in some cases expand their arsenals; as of the end of 2011, eight states had a total of approximately 19,000 nuclear weapons, with nearly 2000 kept on high operational alert. Concerns about the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes continued, while a three-year investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that a facility in Syria destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 2007 was ‘very likely’ a nuclear reactor which the Syrian Government had failed to report, in contravention of its international obligations.

A number of encouraging developments in 2011 arose in certain parts of the world, although many uncertainties linger in all of these cases. Expectations in early 2011 that the January referendum vote in favour of South Sudan’s independence would lead to an all-out bloodbath did not come to
pass, and the country entered the United Nations as its 193rd member in July. However, by early 2012, violence across the new South Sudan–Sudan border had begun to escalate toward war. The Basque separatist movement in Spain, Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Liberty), declared a permanent ceasefire in January 2011 that still holds. In May a ceasefire was also agreed between Cambodia and Thailand over their border dispute, and the International Court of Justice ruled that a provisional demilitarized zone be established in the contested area. Despite this, a proposed agreement between the two countries to have Indonesian observers deployed to the disputed area had not been put in place by the end of the year.

With respect to arms control, in a February 2011 ceremony in Munich, Russia and the USA exchanged instruments of ratification for the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). In addition, in June the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—came together to establish a regular exchange on nuclear transparency, verification and confidence-building measures, a potential first step toward multilateral disarmament discussions at some point in the future. In November, in a step forward for regional confidence-building, the South American Defence Council, made up of the region's defence ministers, reached agreement on the transparent exchange of military spending information.

II. SIPRI Yearbook 2012: overview, themes and key findings

Overview

In examining the above-noted developments and more, this 43rd edition of the SIPRI Yearbook includes contributions from 39 experts from 17 countries. These experts chronicle and analyse important trends and developments in international security, armaments and disarmament in 2011, including those in armed conflict and violence, multilateral peace operations, military expenditure, arms production, international transfers of conventional arms, non-proliferation, arms control, and confidence- and security-building measures.

This year the featured opening chapter is by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Drawing from his extensive international experience, his chapter explores the new geopolitics of intervention and in particular the advances seen over the past decade in relation to the protection of civilians (POC) in conflict and the responsibility to protect (R2P) concept. Evans was himself deeply involved in the development and global acceptance of POC and R2P norms and practice, and his chapter highlights
the strength of the international community’s emerging commitment to these two principles. The chapter is also particularly timely, as it speaks directly to the intervention in Libya in 2011 and the mounting concern in 2011 and early 2012 over the violence and bloodshed in Syria, and provides readers with a structured analysis of practical steps for further strengthening an effective consensus for protecting civilians in armed conflict.

The remainder of SIPRI Yearbook 2012 is built around three principal parts: part I examines developments in relation to armed conflict and conflict management; part II documents and analyses important global, regional and national trends in armaments, including military expenditure, arms production, arms transfers and nuclear arsenals; and part III elaborates important recent developments in disarmament, including assessments of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, chemical- and biological-related threats, and efforts to control conventional arms. The chapters are supported by extensive tabular data and by annexes giving details of international arms control and non-proliferation agreements, multilateral security institutions, and a chronology of major events in 2011. In addition, SIPRI Yearbook 2012 provides a platform for publishing the work of three important partner organizations: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s extensive data on organized violence; the Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Peace Index, produced in collaboration with the Economist Intelligence Unit; and the International Panel on Fissile Materials’ tables of global stocks and production capabilities of enriched uranium and plutonium.

Key trends and findings

Taken together, the contributions to SIPRI Yearbook 2012 offer the single-most comprehensive and in-depth annual assessment of developments in international security, armaments and disarmament. The current and recent editions of the SIPRI Yearbook point to persistent contemporary trends that define and shape developments in global and regional security, armaments and disarmament. These trends underpin a more dynamic and complex global security order where established powers will face constraints, new power centres will emerge, and traditional norms and institutions will struggle to cope with current and future security challenges.

Constraints on established powers

Established powers in the world system—especially the USA and its major transatlantic allies—will face continued constraints on their economic, political and military capacities to address global and regional security challenges. This seems to be particularly true in relation to military-centred responses but also applies across the spectrum of developmental
INTRODUCTION

and diplomatic responses. These constraints are primarily imposed by budget austerity measures in the wake of the crisis in public finances experienced throughout most of the developed world.

Some of the findings and data in this volume underscore this trend towards austerity. Perhaps it is most evident in relation to military spending. As detailed in chapter 4, for example, over the period 2002–11, with the exception of the UK, the military spending of most of the USA’s major allies in Europe fell. Taken as a whole, in real terms the military budgets of European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have now fallen back to 2002 levels and are expected to decline further for the next several years. Japan’s military spending also shrank over this period, by 2.5 per cent. Chapter 4 discusses in detail some of the implications of austerity for US and European military budgets. These figures do not take into account the effects of the ‘war fatigue’ that is found in the USA—whose continued involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan makes this its longest war—and among its allies, which will place intangible but nonetheless politically real constraints on their military action for the years ahead.

It is true that the USA and its allies still dominate indicative tables of military power. As described throughout part II of this volume, the USA is far and away the world’s largest military spender—indeed, it spends more on its military than the next 14 countries combined—and is likely to remain so for many years to come, despite the budgetary cutbacks. A number of the USA’s allies—including the UK, France, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Australia and Turkey—are also likely to retain some of the world’s highest military budgets. Investments by these countries, and particularly the USA, in new weapons and technologies will also help them to retain military advantages for the foreseeable future. Further, as some of the world’s principal exporters of major conventional weapons, countries such as the USA, the UK, France, and Germany will continue to exercise diplomatic and military influence through that trade. Nevertheless, the relative strengths of established powers will be constrained in comparison with the recent past as they struggle through a period of financial austerity and aim to ‘do more with less’ or, more likely, ‘less with less’. The initial political and operational difficulties encountered in mobilizing and deploying the coalition for the NATO-led intervention in Libya are likely portents of the future. In the event, the coalition was made up of barely half of NATO’s 28 members—with Germany taking a clear decision not to participate—plus Sweden, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Continuing emergence of new powers and non-state actors

As noted in recent editions of the SIPRI Yearbook and discussed in the current volume, numerous states around the world outside the traditional US alliance system continue to build greater economic, diplomatic and
military capacity to affect regional and, in some cases, global security developments. The remarkable growth in China’s, Russia’s, India’s and Saudi Arabia’s military spending noted above is only part of the story. Other countries that are not among the top military spenders are nevertheless rapidly expanding their military investments as a result of rapid economic growth or resource wealth. Algeria increased its military spending by 44 per cent between 2010 and 2011. Indonesia and Viet Nam have both increased their military budgets by over 80 per cent since the early 2000s and, as outlined in chapter 6, the top five importers of major conventional weapons in the period 2006–11—India, South Korea, Pakistan, China and Singapore—accounted for 30 per cent of arms imports over that period and were all located in Asia. Giving some focus to the Indian case, chapter 5 on arms production and military services notes that India expects to spend approximately $150 billion on equipment to modernize its military in the coming years.

As chapter 3 details, 32 of the 52 peace operations active in 2011 were conducted by regional organizations, alliances or ad hoc coalitions. While most of these were led by North Atlantic institutions—including the EU, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—regional organizations outside the transatlantic space have also become more politically and even militarily active. As discussed in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 10, such organizations as the African Union, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council took a higher profile in calling on the UN and the international community to take measures to quell the violence erupting in such places as Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria. Significantly, the Arab League formed and deployed its first peace operation, an observer mission, at the close of 2011, in an effort to resolve the Syrian uprising and bring the escalating violence against civilians to an end. These and other regional organizations still lack sufficient political and military capacity to act entirely independently, but it is a sign of the times that the international community, and in particular established powers, will look to such regional groupings to take on more responsibilities in defining and addressing security challenges which affect them.

States and state-based regional organizations are not alone in gaining in relative influence and impact. The research in the current and recent editions of the SIPRI Yearbook clearly underscores the continuing role played by non-state actors in defining regional and even global security developments. The impact of non-state actors is most clearly seen in the findings of chapters 2 and 3, which follow trends in armed conflict and conflict management, respectively. In-depth tracking of armed violence around the world reveals the destabilizing role of non-state actors in prosecuting conflicts and engaging in violence against civilians. The research presented in chapter 2 examines violence by state and non-state actors alike, whether
directed against other states, non-state groups or civilian populations. The work in chapter 3 also details the critically important impact of non-state actors across all forms of organized violence, and the often central role they play in conflict areas including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Thailand. The research and findings in this and previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook on both conventional arms transfers and conventional arms control point out that non-state groups continue to access a range of military equipment and weapons—mainly small arms and light weapons but also, occasionally, major weapon systems such as anti-ship missiles.

Other types of non-state actor also raise new and potentially more troubling concerns. Technologically sophisticated security threats in the form of cyberattacks and cybertheft, often emanating from non-state and quasi-state actors, pose a continuing concern in many circles. This in part explains the increase in major arms-producing companies’ strategically significant and financially noteworthy acquisitions of cybersecurity firms, as discussed in chapter 5. Meanwhile, chapter 9, which focuses on biological and chemical threats, points out that we are effectively already living in a ‘post-proliferation’ world: the concern is less with the spread of weapon systems and more with the increased access to and capacity for work with materials and technologies that can be employed for malign purposes. A 2011 case involving a decision as to whether and how to publish research results on the transmissibility of avian influenza led a US Government-mandated advisory body on biosecurity to request that Dutch and US research groups withhold parts of their research methodology from publication. This underscores the potential security challenges posed by the increasing ability of scientists to create and manipulate pathogens with novel or predetermined (including more lethal) characteristics. Finally, SIPRI research increasingly draws attention to the role of non-state and quasi-state middlemen in the supply chain—brokers, shippers, banks and other financial institutions, scientists, and others—who may knowingly or otherwise play a part in the proliferation of materials, technology and know-how related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, particularly with respect to so-called intangible transfers of technology.

Struggling norms and institutions

The established powers’ diminished capacity to shape the terms of discussion and implement preferred responses, combined with the diffusion of power to other players in the international system, contributes to a third important trend that is identified and illuminated in this and recent editions of the SIPRI Yearbook: struggling norms and institutions. Multilateral organizations tasked with promoting and enforcing norms for stability and
security continue to face difficulties in generating the political will and financial resources needed to meet their mandates, and gaps remain which require new or more effective mechanisms.

The opening chapter by Gareth Evans argues that the norms that bolster policy and action for protecting civilians from the ravages of war and mass atrocities have steadily strengthened over the past decade, with the Libyan and Côte d’Ivoire interventions in 2011 being cases in point. However, Evans acknowledges that the lack of effective international responsiveness to the even more horrendous plight of civilians in Syria throughout most of 2011 and into 2012 may signal that the consensus around these norms is not as strong as it could be and may well have reached a ‘high-water mark from which the tide will now retreat’. He lays out the difficult consensus-building steps that must be taken by the world’s powers. Even if the process is ultimately successful, such a consensus will not be easy to achieve, especially in the wake of the Libyan intervention, and is likely to remain a work in progress for a long time to come.

The widespread support for and expansion of traditional peace operations over the past decade is also facing difficult obstacles in the years ahead. As described in chapter 3, these include expanded mandates and ‘mission creep’; overstretched yet understaffed missions; and a lack of necessary equipment. Moreover, the world’s major donors to global peace operations—predominantly the advanced economies most badly affected by the global financial crisis and economic recession—are largely looking to cut back support to multilateral institutions and to focus instead on smaller and quicker missions. A case in point is the forthcoming major cut of around $1 billion to UN peacekeeping support, which will force blue helmet missions to do more with less, a reality which has already begun to affect the scale and timing of current operations.

The chapters in this volume examining armaments and disarmament also confirm the difficulties that norms and institutions are facing regarding arms control, non-proliferation, and confidence- and security-building measures. The capacities of major international non-proliferation and arms control regimes such as the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, see chapter 8), the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC, see chapter 9), and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, also discussed in chapter 9) did not see significant improvements in 2011. At the same time, new concerns surfaced about the existence of military nuclear programmes in Iran, North Korea and Syria; possible chemical and biological weapons in Syria; and the existence of previously undeclared chemical weapon sites in Libya. The UN Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks reported in 2011 that institutions with a mandate for dealing with chemical and biological threats were too diffuse in their organization and hampered by separate
INTRODUCTION

and partial mandates when it came to addressing such remedial measures as prevention, preparedness and response.

Similar normative and institutional difficulties are evident in the conventional weapons realm. As discussed in chapter 4, for example, the past decade has seen an overall decline in the number of UN member states publicly reporting their military spending via the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. In 2011 the number of reporting countries dropped to 51—that is, fewer than one-third of UN member states—from a high of 81 in 2002. The UN Security Council was able to agree to an arms embargo on Libya in 2011 but was unable to agree to one on Syria (although the EU and the Arab League did so unilaterally). As in previous years, in 2011 there were significant violations of various arms embargoes imposed by the UN against countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Iran, North Korea and the Darfur region of Sudan (see chapter 10). The most elaborate conventional arms control and confidence-building regime—the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)—held in September 2011 what was probably its last review conference. Russia unilaterally suspended its participation in the regime in 2007, and all NATO member states that are party to the CFE Treaty, as well as Georgia and Moldova, decided at the end of 2011 to stop exchanging treaty-relevant data with Russia. It is not clear what new mechanism, if any, will replace the CFE regime in the future. Regarding the banning of cluster munitions, developments in 2011 underscored the division within the international community between the states that negotiated the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and are obligated to ban such weapons and those states that would prefer less categorical restrictions to be negotiated in the framework of the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention but in the meantime face few restraints on their use of cluster munitions.

III. Looking ahead

The convergence of increased constraints on established powers, the emergence of influential states and non-states with diffuse objectives and capabilities, and the continuing struggle to stabilize norms and institutions leaves the world in a more precarious position in the short-to-medium term. The old constellation of power balances and institutional capacities, rooted in the second half of the 20th century, looks increasingly incapable of effective policy and action to address and manage the challenges of the current era. Major global or regional interstate wars appear unlikely in the near term, but the international system is nevertheless vulnerable to disruptive shocks arising from localized and intensive warfare and interruptions to the flows of people, capital, commodities, technologies and information that help sustain modernizing and stable societies. Many of these
disruptions—such as cyberattacks and cybercrime, well-organized criminal networks, resource scarcity, violent displacement of peoples, pandemics, piracy and extremism, as well as destabilizing trafficking in weapons, sensitive technologies, narcotics, money and persons—will not necessarily arise from the deliberate strategic choices of states but will often come from non-state or sub-state sources. Unfortunately, the global community has yet to fully grapple with the ongoing structural changes that define today’s dynamic, complex and transnationalized security landscape—changes that often outpace the ability of established institutions and mechanisms to cope with them.

It will certainly take time for established and newly emergent powers to reach an effective consensus on the most important requirements for international order, stability and peace, and on how to realize and defend them. It will also take time for states, still the dominant actors in the international system, to come to grips with and effectively respond to the increasingly critical role of non-state players. This needs to include more effective and genuine partnerships with those non-state actors that can make positive contributions—including businesses, philanthropists, religious and ethnic leaders and groups, and other civil society representatives. It also means working with other states and with constructive non-state actors to defuse and counter the threats to global, regional, and societal stability and security that malign non-state actors will increasingly pose.

At the level of high politics, institutions must continue bold reforms that more fully take into account the emerging power relationships among states at the global and regional levels. The reinvigoration of the Group of 20 (G20) in recent years has helped to ensure that more of the world’s emerging powers can have an influence commensurate with their growing interests and capacities. However, given the indivisibility of economics and security in today’s world, the G20 will also need to include security questions on its agenda. Expansion and reform of the UN Security Council would be a welcome move towards better reflecting the emergent realities of hard and soft power in the world today, but such measures seem unlikely given the understandable reluctance on the part of the current five permanent members to dilute their influence. Instead, it appears that members of the Security Council will look to regional organizations for political buy-in and, increasingly, material support for action. However, such ‘outsourcing’ would be more effective if regional organizations—such as the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and others—significantly reformed their decision-making structures and improved their capacities for cooperative action in such areas as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, countering crime, border surveillance, disaster relief, disease surveillance and developmental assistance.
In much of this work, established and newly emergent states and their multilateral institutions will need to devote far more resources than in the past to engaging with non-state actors, particularly at the intersection of security and development. Such partnerships are needed both in immediate post-crisis responses and, more importantly, in long-term recovery phases that, to be successful, must engage and empower local society actors to build up sustained capacity in such areas as health care, education and technical training, and judicial and police systems. The increased focus across the international community on developing the peacebuilding capacities of civilian actors should facilitate the development of effective partnerships between states, state-based institutions and non-state civil society actors.

It is also clear that a far greater focus will need to be placed on less militarized solutions to the security challenges ahead. This is both a political and a practical necessity. The general public in the developed world, especially in North America and Europe, will be wary about new military interventions, and national governments are under growing pressure to cut costs and produce more credible strategies for managing and reducing their long-term debts. Moreover, the diffusing constellations of state and institutional power today can constrain the will and capacity for effective military action, whether under a UN mandate or by an ad hoc coalition. Perhaps most crucially, many of the most important security challenges in the years ahead will not readily lend themselves to traditional military solutions. Instead, what will be needed is an innovative integration of preventive diplomacy, pre-emptive and early-warning technologies, and cooperative transnational partnerships. This is not to say that military capacities are not needed—they will be. In some cases, they can be put to work as part of domestic law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts, for example through the use of overhead imagery, robots and information system protection. But, to put it simply, the balance between military and less- or non-militarized solutions should continue to tip in favour of the latter.

As important as these steps are to take, it will certainly not be easy to create a new framework for relations among the world’s powers, reform institutions, respond to the influence of non-state players, and rebalance military and non-military resources. Nevertheless, the rapidly transforming global and regional scene will not wait. As a result, the world is likely to continue to face a lengthy period of uncertainty and a diffuse range of unmet and potentially destabilizing risks and challenges for security, armaments and disarmament. As an authoritative and respected resource for the international community for more than four decades, the SIPRI Yearbook will continue to monitor these complex developments and put forward well-informed perspectives on how to address them.