

10. Conventional arms control and military confidence building

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I. Introduction

The renewed interest in and dialogue on conventional arms control and disarmament that began at the end of the 2000s continued in 2010. Relations improved between Russia and the United States, including in the area of controlling heavy conventional weapons in Europe. Although the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) remained in abeyance because of Russia's disagreement with its equity and adequacy, its states parties explored options to resolve the deadlock. In 2010 the military dimension of the informal 'Corfu process' dialogue on European security of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which aims to revitalize arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), made progress. Subregional arms control frameworks in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region continued to operate well and are being successively developed and adapted to meet the current needs of the parties or participants.

This chapter assesses these and other major developments in conventional arms control and military confidence building in 2010. The efforts to control conventional arms continue to centre on Europe; thus, the chapter's main emphasis is on relevant OSCE developments. Section II reviews developments related to the CFE Treaty. Section III addresses measures to strengthen confidence and security, with special emphasis on updating the Vienna Document regime in the area covered by the OSCE. Section IV examines issues related to the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies. Section V deals with the global dimension. Section VI presents the conclusions.

II. European arms control: the CFE regime

The CFE Treaty is the most elaborate conventional arms regime worldwide.¹ During the period 1992–2010 its implementation led to more than a 50 per cent decrease in the parties' aggregate holdings of the treaty-limited

¹ For a summary and other details of the CFE Treaty see annex A in this volume.

* The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Polish authorities.

equipment (TLE)—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery of at least 100-mm calibre, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.² The treaty is built on past efforts to balance major categories of TLE between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the now defunct Warsaw Treaty Organization in its Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone of application. The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty would better respond to the geopolitical shifts that have occurred and the current security situation, but it has not entered into force because NATO members and other parties have refused to ratify it until Russia complies with the commitments it made at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit.³ The 1990 CFE Treaty and its associated agreed documents and decisions remain valid for all parties but Russia, which has unilaterally suspended its implementation of the treaty.⁴ Another state party, Azerbaijan, has suggested reconsideration of the maximum national levels for holdings in order to allow a state party to ‘better meet’ current security conditions.⁵

Erosion of the CFE regime in certain subregions is a damaging trend. Azerbaijan does not comply with the treaty’s provisions, having exceeded the permitted maximum national levels of tanks by almost 60 per cent and of artillery by nearly 70 per cent.⁶ In the separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia TLE holdings are reportedly increasing, although such holdings are not included in the figures for CFE Treaty aggregate holdings.

A new impetus

The prospect for advances in European arms control seemed good at the beginning of 2010. The US Administration had started a thorough review of its conventional arms control agenda and structures in Europe and appointed a special envoy for conventional armed forces in Europe. In April 2010 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and US President Barack Obama signed the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and

² Lachowski, Z., ‘Conventional arms control’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2010*, p. 426.

³ Russia pledged to reduce its military equipment in Georgia, to withdraw all Russian troops and TLE from Moldova and to eliminate its stocks of ammunition and military equipment in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova. For a summary and other details of the agreement see annex A in this volume. For the text of the adapted CFE Treaty as amended by the Agreement on Adaptation see ‘Documents on conventional arms control’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2000*, pp. 627–42.

⁴ On Russia’s objections to the CFE Treaty see the chapters on conventional arms control in previous editions of the *SIPRI Yearbook*.

⁵ Lachowski, Z., ‘Conventional arms control’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2008*, p. 482.

⁶ A US report points to other, minor cases of non-compliance by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. US Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments* (Department of State: Washington, DC, July 2010).

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), another step towards surmounting obstacles on the European security agenda.⁷

In late January US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated that the CFE Treaty ‘needs our attention’ to prevent its further erosion and to meet the concerns of the Central and East European states.⁸ She called for a modern security framework that would take into account developments since 1990, limit military deployments and consolidate select tenets of European security: territorial integrity, no first use of force and the consent of a host state to the stationing of armed troops on its territory. A few days later in the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), which deals with questions related to compliance with the provisions of the CFE Treaty, Belarus unsuccessfully attempted to restart dialogue among the states parties by repeating its 2008 proposals for ‘structured’ dialogue on the provisional application of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the accession of new states to the treaty.⁹ Other delegations expressed no interest in the proposal because of Russia’s continued refusal to permit inspections and its failure to provide the data requested under the treaty and its associated documents.

Meanwhile, the parties explored various options. Brookings Institution experts prepared a detailed analysis of the state of the CFE Treaty regime and its future for the US Department of State.¹⁰ In March Russia reportedly sent a letter to the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, summarizing its position on the treaty regime. Linking conventional and nuclear disarmament with a diminished reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe was also mentioned.¹¹ In May US Vice President Joseph R. Biden hinted at an ‘exploration’ of reciprocal limitations on conventional weapons.¹² Later that month Ellen Tauscher, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, pointed to five principles that underpin the US approach to enhancing Europe’s security: (a) reciprocal transparency on military forces; (b) reciprocal limitations on deployments and exercises; (c) increased attention on, and resources to address, threats emanating from outside Europe; (d) more effective crisis prevention,

⁷ For a summary and other details of New START see annex A in this volume. See also chapter 7, section II and III, and chapter 8, section II, in this volume.

⁸ US Department of State, ‘Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on the future of European security’, L’Ecole Militaire, Paris, 29 Jan. 2010, <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>>.

⁹ Lachowski, Z. and Post, S., ‘Conventional arms control’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*, p. 445.

¹⁰ Witkowsky, A., Garnett, S. and McCausland, J., *Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington*, Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 2 (Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, Mar. 2010).

¹¹ ‘Russia initiates resumption of CFE dialogue with NATO-source’, ITAR-TASS, 12 Mar. 2010; and Dempsey, J., ‘West to seek revival of arms treaty in Europe’, *New York Times*, 30 Apr. 2010.

¹² Although he referred to limitations on the size and location of conventional weapons in Europe, Biden did not name the CFE Treaty. Biden, J. R., Jr, ‘Advancing Europe’s security’, *New York Times*, 6 May 2010.

management and conflict resolution; and (e) affirmation of the principle of indivisible security, territorial integrity for all countries in Europe and the right of all states to choose their security alliances.¹³

The NATO states' framework proposal to guide new negotiations

On 14 June at an informal JCG meeting (outside the JCG framework) in Vienna the NATO states presented a 'confidential proposal' to 'develop a 21st century framework for strengthening conventional arms control and transparency in Europe'.¹⁴ The arms control regime in Europe risked collapse because of Russia's suspension; the ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation was at an impasse; and armed forces were being stationed on foreign territory without the consent of the host state. The NATO framework built on the adapted CFE Treaty and other legal and political commitments. It also proposed reciprocal transparency and verification, mutual limitations and restraints, and renewed commitment to the principle of host state consent. The intent was to approve the framework by November, so that the parties could return to implementation of their CFE Treaty obligations by the end of 2010; the framework was also meant to form the basis for work in 2011. The USA suggested the use of the 'at 36' format (i.e. with the participation of all NATO member states, including those that are not parties to the CFE Treaty, and of all treaty parties that do not belong to NATO).

Russia did not immediately reject the NATO proposal and promised to examine it carefully. The Medvedev–Obama summit meeting in late June 2010 committed Russia and the USA to work together with all partners to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe and to modernize it to meet 21st century needs. Several weeks later Russia welcomed the framework proposal as a way to end the standstill in the negotiating process. Russia also presented a position paper on modernization of the CFE regime that listed more than a dozen questions for further clarification and analysed elements of the proposal, including those that dealt with (a) the reciprocity of transparency, limitations and restraints; (b) the avoidance of excessive numbers of troops and TLE; (c) the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova; (d) the flank area issue—reciprocal limitations and restraints 'in geographically defined areas'; (e) the status of

¹³ 'Ellen Tauscher: we are committed to working on concrete ideas for missile defense cooperation with Russia', Interfax, 26 May 2010, <<http://www.interfax.com/interview.asp?id=167142>>. In Apr. Victoria Nuland, US special envoy on conventional arms control, gave her first briefing to NATO ambassadors on US intentions.

¹⁴ In response to requests from OSCE participants that are not NATO members, the JCG Chairperson informed them in general terms about developments in the CFE Treaty regime.

non-CFE Treaty parties; and (f) the proposal to create a list of pending issues within the agreed framework.¹⁵

During the second half of 2010 the issue of ratification of New START hampered efforts to achieve results in consultation with Russia. Many European countries wanted to become involved in the conventional arms control debate.¹⁶ In Vienna the view among diplomats was that progress on New START was a prerequisite for making headway on modernizing the CFE regime.¹⁷ A report from the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, urged that a new strategic concept should reaffirm the role of NATO and its members in conventional arms control policy and noted with concern that the CFE Treaty process had stalled and was now 'in danger of crumbling'.¹⁸ Accordingly, at the Lisbon Summit on 19–20 November, the NATO states repeated their commitment to conventional arms control on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host state consent.¹⁹

Earlier that month the US delegation to the JCG had proposed establishing a negotiating group 'at 36' on 'conventional arms control modernization in Europe', in which all participants would work on equal terms. Many states parties showed a flexible and positive attitude during meetings in November and December despite Russia's initial criticism, other delegations' legal and procedural doubts about the participation of Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, and the USA's desire that negotiations should be the province of the negotiating group, not the JCG.²⁰ The acronym 'CFE' was not used in the new talks—an apparent attempt to avoid holding a new agreement hostage to disputes over the old treaty

¹⁵ 'Statement by H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Anatoly Antonov, Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the informal meeting on conventional arms control and CFE regime', Vienna, 28 July 2010. The flank (or Article V) zone was an area of strategic importance (along with Central Europe) along the lines of confrontation between the two blocs. In the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union the significance and role of the flank zone was essentially changed compared with the circumstances in which it was negotiated and agreed.

¹⁶ Although the CFE Treaty is not part of the OSCE mechanism, many OSCE delegations claim that its status has repercussions for the organization's activities, and hope was expressed that the OSCE's Astana Summit in December (see below) would act as an impetus to the coming CFE negotiation. In recent years some non-CFE Treaty participants in the Corfu process, such as Albania, have expressed their readiness to join the adapted CFE Treaty regime.

¹⁷ This information was conveyed to the author by a diplomat close to the CFE talks in Vienna.

¹⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 'NATO 2020: assured security; dynamic engagement', Analysis and recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, 17 May 2010, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm#p2>. On work on the new strategic concept see also Bailes, A. J. K. and Cottey, A., 'Euro-Atlantic security and institutions: rebalancing in the midst of global change', *SIPRI Yearbook 2010*, pp. 159–61.

¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 'Active engagement, modern defence: strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation', 19 Nov. 2010, Lisbon, <<http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>>.

²⁰ Many states parties stressed that the JCG is the natural framework for future negotiations; otherwise, it was claimed, the purpose and outcome of the negotiations might be put in doubt.

regime. Both Russia and the USA presented draft framework agreements, and many Western delegations acknowledged that the Russian text was a constructive contribution.

The OSCE summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, in December 2010, the first since the 1999 Istanbul Summit, noted the CFE Treaty's 'contribution to the creation of a stable and predictable environment for all OSCE participating States'. While the participants noted that the CFE Treaty was not being implemented in full and its Agreement on Adaptation had not entered into force, they recognized the 'intensified efforts to overcome the impasse' and expressed support for the consultations to open the way for negotiations in 2011.²¹ A breakthrough was envisaged at the review conference of the CFE Treaty, which may be held in the autumn of 2011.

As a sign of its good faith, Russia provided to the other states parties aggregated, 'consolidated' information on its TLE, valid as of 1 January 2011. However, the information was incomplete and did not include, for example, the holdings in the critical southern part of Russia's flank area. The NATO states again submitted the required information, despite Russia's non-compliance, although they made clear that their willingness to do so was waning.

In early 2011 the issue of modernization of the CFE Treaty regime became linked to other matters, such as Russian-US disagreements over missile defence, thereby slowing momentum.

III. Consolidating military confidence in the OSCE area

In the post-cold war era, CSBMs became a means to manage the changes taking place in Europe and to enhance cooperative relations among states based on partnership, reassurance and transparency. The efforts to overcome the CFE Treaty crisis parallel those aimed at strengthening other OSCE politico-military tools, particularly CSBMs, both in related mechanisms and frameworks (the Forum for Security Co-operation, FSC, the security dialogue and review conferences) and within the Corfu process.²² The general level of CSBM implementation in 2010 remained satisfactory and similar to that of previous years. As in 2008–2009, the conventional arms control crisis and the related decrease in the flow of CFE arms control information from Russia to other states parties enhanced Russia's interest in conducting more Vienna Document-related inspections and evaluation

²¹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 'Astana Commemorative Declaration: towards a security community', 3 Dec. 2010, <<http://www.osce.org/mc/73962>>, para. 8.

²² The Corfu process refers to the informal, ongoing discussion in the OSCE that began in mid-2009 at an OSCE foreign ministers' meeting held in Corfu, where the 'role of the arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes in building trust in the evolving security environment' was considered. The process addresses a wide spectrum of security issues, threats and challenge, but it does not focus on the CFE Treaty debate.

visits to its OSCE partners. The trend towards an increase in voluntary verification missions continued, and Russia carried out 32 inspections and 22 evaluation visits of that type in 2010.²³

The politically binding Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures is the fundamental CSBM agreement. Efforts to develop and update it have at times been smoothly implemented and at other times have remained at a standstill.²⁴ In 2010 improved relations between Russia and the USA led to a more vigorous dialogue on the Vienna Document. Evidently, this debate and other factors, such as the reviews and decisions that occurred in 2009, shifted focus away from endeavours in other confidence-building and norm- and standard-setting areas.²⁵

Updating the Vienna Document

The OSCE participating states have recognized that comprehensive, indivisible and cooperative security requires functioning, transparent and verifiable arms control: a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing components.²⁶ In the run-up to the Astana Summit numerous delegations submitted proposals, working papers, drafts and other documents to elaborate the content of a new Vienna Document that would better respond to the changed security environment. During 2010 various meetings dealt with the Corfu process and reinforced and increased military transparency, including the 20th annual implementation assessment meeting (AIAM) on 2–3 March, the annual security review conference on 14–16 June, and the three-part review conference before the Astana Summit on 30 September–8 October (in Warsaw), 18–26 October (in Vienna) and 26–28 November (in Astana). The OSCE also appointed an FSC coordinator for the Vienna Document in October 2010.

Many participating states joined the two-track debate on the philosophy of the process of confidence building and strengthening security, and the specific changes to the Vienna Document that are required to meet current needs. Topics of discussion included tenets and norms; the direction of thinking on adaptation, sustainability and cost-efficiency measures; and the need to retain the past work on CSBMs. The aims were to ensure transparency and predictability as regards military capabilities, activities and cooperation; to improve conflict-prevention and -management efforts; to tackle subregional threats; to consider adequately the effect of changes

²³ In 2010 Russia requested and carried out the greatest numbers of verification visits: one-third of all inspections and almost half of the evaluation visits.

²⁴ For a summary and other details of the Vienna Document 1999 see annex A in this volume.

²⁵ On activities in 2009 related to the Vienna Document see Lachowski (note 2), pp. 438–39.

²⁶ OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Reconfirm-review-reinvigorate security and co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok', MC.DOC/01/09, 2 Dec. 2009; and OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Issues relevant to the Forum for Security and Co-operation', MC.DAC/16/09, 2 Dec. 2009.

such as the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the modernization of military capabilities; to address the militarization of internal security and other paramilitary forces; to deal with the issue of the stationing of forces on another state's territory; and to meet other challenges.

Denmark and the United Kingdom proposed a package approach to update the core of the Vienna Document—Chapter V on notification of certain military activities and Chapter IX on compliance and verification—and other delegations supported the idea. Austria presented a ‘food-for-thought’ paper on (a) introducing new CSBMs; (b) assisting the participating states to implement their commitments (via verification training, provision of technical expertise, implementation assistance mechanisms etc.); (c) using existing CSBMs to meet new threats and challenges through expert meetings, contacts and networks; and (d) employing the 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security, which promotes non-hierarchical relations among international organizations in the Euro-Atlantic region, to conduct a strategic dialogue among international organizations. Belarus tabled an initiative to change the Vienna Document provisions on inspection and evaluation visits in crisis situations in the zone of application.²⁷ In the spring of 2010 Russia proposed that action be taken immediately to update, reformulate and broaden the range of the Vienna Document.²⁸ In May the FSC made a symbolic gesture by agreeing to establish a procedure (called Vienna Document Plus) for incorporating relevant FSC decisions into the Vienna Document, which encouraged the OSCE delegations to suggest a broad range of chapters and items that should be updated.²⁹ The participating states also agreed to hold a special FSC meeting at least every five years, starting not later than in 2011. In the autumn of 2010 the crucial FSC decision to open negotiations on the Vienna Document 1999, focusing on chapters V and IX, emphasized the importance of a mechanism for regular updates.³⁰ During 2010 the FSC took five Vienna Document Plus decisions. It also informed the 56 participating states about several dozen proposals on notification of military activities, visits to airbases, demonstration of

²⁷ OSCE, FSC, ‘Food for thought paper and draft decision: Vienna Document 1999—a way forward’, FSC.DEL/13/10/Rev.1, 19 Feb. 2010; OSCE, Permanent Council, Delegation of Austria, ‘Strengthening and expanding the OSCE’s confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)’, PC.DEL/291/10, 22 Apr. 2010; and OSCE, FSC, ‘Proposals by the Republic of Belarus on the update of the Chapter IX of the Vienna Document 1999, IX. Compliance and verification’, FSC.DEL/75/10, 21 July 2010.

²⁸ Russia revised its proposal several times during 2010. OSCE, Permanent Council, ‘The OSCE programme for further actions in the field of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures’, PC.DEL/300/10, 27 Apr. 2010.

²⁹ OSCE, FSC, ‘Establishing a procedure for incorporating relevant FSC decisions into the Vienna Document’, Decision no. 1/10, FSC.DEC/1/10, 19 May 2010.

³⁰ OSCE, FSC, ‘Negotiations on the Vienna Document 1999’, Decision no. 7/10, FSC.DEC/7/10, 29 Sep. 2010.

new types of weapon and equipment, and inspection and evaluation visits.³¹ The two main actors, Russia and the USA, submitted their own proposals. Russia proposed to extend the CSBM regime to naval activities and to provide notification to the FSC of one major military activity, which is below the Vienna Document threshold limit, a prior large-scale military transit and the deployment of multinational rapid reaction forces.³² The USA focused on transparency and verification, inspection quotas, and expansion of the size and composition of inspection and evaluation teams.³³ France proposed lowering the thresholds for notification and observation.³⁴ Other delegations, including Belarus, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine, submitted proposals individually or with another delegation.

Despite considerable activity and progress, it was not possible to agree a Vienna Document 2010. However, the Astana Commemorative Declaration positively assessed the work of the FSC and reaffirmed that the arms control regime, including CSBMs, should be 'revitalized, updated and modernized'.³⁵ Updating the Vienna Document is not an easy task and is expected to take many months of negotiation. The progress that has been made will be presented at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, in December 2011.

³¹ For the Vienna Plus decisions see OSCE, FSC, 'Vienna Document Plus: taking national holidays into account when planning verification activities', Decision no. 10/10, FSC.DEC/10/10, 27 Oct. 2010; OSCE, FSC, 'Vienna Document Plus: timing of a demonstration of new types of major weapons and equipment systems', Decision no. 11/10, FSC.DEC/11/10, 10 Nov. 2010; OSCE, FSC, 'Vienna Document Plus: incorporating FSC Decision no. 1/10 into the Vienna Document Chapter XII', Decision no. 12/10, FSC.DEC/12/10, 10 Nov. 2010; OSCE, FSC, 'Vienna Document Plus: updating the listing of Partners for Co-operation mentioned in Chapter XII', Decision no. 13/10, FSC.DEC/13/10, 10 Nov. 2010; and OSCE, FSC, 'Vienna Document Plus: eligibility of air bases for hosting visits', Decision no. 15/10, FSC.DEC/15/10, 24 Nov. 2010. A synopsis of decisions and proposals is contained in the FSC restricted document 'Vienna Document 1999, VD PLUS FSC-Decisions on Chapters IV, IX and XII and specific proposals which pertain to Chapters I, IV, V, IX, and Annex I, as of 24 November 2010', FSC.DEL/137/10/Rev.1, 24 Nov. 2010.

³² OSCE, FSC, Delegation of the Russian Federation, 'Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on prior large-scale military transit', FSC.DEL/133/10/Corr.1, 16 Nov. 2010; OSCE, FSC, Delegation of the Russian Federation, 'Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus Decision on prior notification of major military activities', FSC.DEL/97/10, 24 Sep. 2010; OSCE, FSC, Delegation of the Russian Federation, 'Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on notification of the deployment of multinational rapid reaction forces', FSC.DEL/98/10/Rev.1, 21 Oct. 2010; and OSCE, FSC, Delegation of the Russian Federation, 'Proposal for a draft Vienna Document Plus decision on the exchange of information on naval forces', FSC.DEL/134/10, 21 Oct. 2010.

³³ OSCE, FSC, Delegation of the United States, 'Food-for-thought paper: Vienna Document priorities to enhance military transparency', FSC.DEL/89/10, 21 Sep. 2010; OSCE, FSC, Delegation of the United States, 'Proposal for a draft decision on team size for inspections and evaluation visits', FSC.DEL/90/10, 21 Sep. 2010; and OSCE, FSC, Delegation of the United States, 'Proposal for a draft decision on inspection quotas', FSC.DEL/92/10, 21 Sep. 2010.

³⁴ OSCE, FSC, Delegation of France, 'Lowering thresholds for prior notification of certain military activities—Vienna Document 1999', FSC.DEL/107/10/Rev.1/Corr.1, 2 Nov. 2010.

³⁵ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (note 21).

Subregional arms control for the Western Balkans and the Black Sea

The 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Florence Agreement) is the only fully functional ‘hard’ (armament limitation-related) arms control agreement in Europe.³⁶ The seventh conference to review its implementation, held on 7–8 July 2010, concluded that the parties to the Florence Agreement—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia—are in full compliance with it. Armaments limited by the agreement have been destroyed voluntarily since the end of the official reduction period in October 1997, and by August 2010 the parties had scrapped or converted a total of 9721 pieces of heavy weapons. In 2011 the states parties plan to move to phase II of the transfer of technical functions from the Office of the Personal Representative to the parties.³⁷

The eighth annual consultation meeting on implementation of the Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, held on 9 December 2010, pointed out its positive effects and implications. The meeting also selected the OSCE Communications Network to transmit messages related to the agreement.³⁸

The Code of Conduct, small arms, surplus ammunition and assistance projects

The annual implementation assessment meetings, which are organized by the FSC, discuss the OSCE stabilizing and norm- and standard-setting measures together with the Vienna Document CSBMs. However, the FSC tackles these issues more efficiently and gives them more time and attention in other forums. In recent years, selected subjects have been given special attention.³⁹

The 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (COC) is the norm-setting document on the cooperative behaviour and mutual responsibilities of states in the OSCE region and the democratic control of their armed forces. Like other confidence-building measures (CBMs), the COC faces new challenges created by the changing security environment, and the 2009 update of the COC’s annual questionnaire was a

³⁶ For a summary and other details of the Florence Agreement see annex A in this volume. The texts of the Florence Agreement and the Dayton Peace Agreement are available at <<http://www.racviac.org/documents/treaties-agreements.html>>.

³⁷ Periotto, C. (Brig. Gen.), ‘Report to the Permanent Council: implementation of the Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control (Article IV, Annex 1-B, Dayton Peace Accords)’, CIO.GAL/147/010, 8 Aug. 2010.

³⁸ OSCE, FSC, ‘Statement of the delegation of Romania’, FSC.JOUR/637, 15 Dec. 2010. For more on the 2002 naval CSBM agreement in the Black Sea region see Lachowski, Z., ‘Conventional arms control in Europe’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, pp. 709–10.

³⁹ See relevant chapters in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook.

major effort to meet these challenges.⁴⁰ However, there is more work to be done. In 2010 the OSCE participating states elaborated a comprehensive reference guide to the questionnaire that is intended to encourage higher common standards in implementation of the COC, but they were unable to agree on the text before the Astana Summit in December. Since the most recent COC follow-up conference took place in 2002, convening such a conference is increasingly advisable.

The OSCE adopted a Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in May 2010 to address uncontrolled proliferation and destabilizing accumulation of illicit weapons in OSCE states.⁴¹ The plan aims to improve the implementation of existing measures and to review possible new measures in the areas of export and brokering controls, stockpile management and security, destruction, and marking and tracing of surplus small arms and light weapons (SALW).

States tend to sell rather than destroy stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA). However, obsolete or expired ammunition that is exported to unstable countries or regions may cause or prolong crisis or conflict situations. In 2010 Denmark and Germany, which were later joined by other states, proposed that destruction be regarded as the preferred method for disposal of SCA.⁴² To this end, the OSCE participants adopted a relevant decision in March 2011.⁴³

Since 2003 the FSC has conducted assistance projects to deal with excess, unsecured or uncontrolled stockpiles of SALW and conventional ammunition in OSCE participating states.⁴⁴ More than 20 such projects have been carried out under FSC auspices, some with NATO assistance.⁴⁵ These projects have enabled the OSCE to develop considerable technical, managerial and legal capabilities to meet the complex risks and challenges posed by hazardous stockpiles. However, lack of funds continues to be a problem for the implementation of such assistance projects. Available extra-budgetary funding decreased substantially in 2009–10; ensuring full

⁴⁰ OSCE, FSC, 'Technical update of the questionnaire on the Code of Conduct', Decision no. 2/09, FSC/DEC/2/09, 1 Apr. 2009.

⁴¹ OSCE, FSC, 'OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons', Decision no. 2/10, FSC/DEC/2/10, 26 May 2010. In Nov. the OSCE participants adopted a decision to exchange information on their present regulations concerning brokering activities with regard to SALW, as a one-off exchange, by 30 June 2011.

⁴² OSCE, FSC, 'Food for thought on destruction of conventional ammunition', FSC.AIAM/10/10/Rev.1, 25 May 2010.

⁴³ OSCE, FSC, 'Destruction of conventional ammunition', Decision no. 3/11, FSC/DEC/3/11, 23 Mar. 2011.

⁴⁴ For overviews of OSCE assistance projects in recent years see the chapters on conventional arms control in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook.

⁴⁵ For the list of the assistance projects in 2010 see OSCE, Conflict Prevention Centre, 'Synopsis of status of SALW and conventional ammunition projects in the OSCE in 2010', Prepared by FSC coordinators for SALW and SCA projects and the CPC, Vienna, 10 Jan. 2011. On NATO-assisted destruction projects see Lachowski (note 2), pp. 441–42.

implementation of projects in 2011–12 will require an additional €20 million (\$29 million).⁴⁶

IV. The Treaty on Open Skies

Given the suspended state of the CFE Treaty and the frozen status of the Vienna Document 1999, the value of the Treaty on Open Skies in enhancing military transparency and other CSBMs has increased.⁴⁷ The first review conference of the treaty, in 2005, stressed the regime's relevance and pointed to several sensitive issues, such as the distribution of flight quotas, the modernization of sensors, extension of competence into the areas of environmental protection, crisis management and conflict prevention, and the perennial issue of Cyprus's accession to the treaty. The latter issue prevented the 2005 conference from adopting a final document by consensus.⁴⁸

A major compliance issue during an observation flight over Russian territory in May 2010 disturbed the otherwise smooth implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies. A planned Romanian–US overflight would have approached the Abkhazian–Georgian border at a point approximately 2.5 kilometres from it. Claiming that Abkhazia is an adjacent state and not a party to the treaty, Russia demanded a change under Article VI, Section II, of the treaty, which stipulates that the flight path of an observation aircraft shall not be closer than 10 km from the border with an adjacent state that is not a party to the treaty.⁴⁹ Georgia, Romania and the USA criticized Russia's claim as a violation of Georgia's territorial integrity that is inconsistent with Russia's obligations under the treaty.⁵⁰ Russia rejected the criticism.⁵¹

The second review conference on implementation of the treaty, held on 7–9 June 2010, welcomed the successful implementation and growing membership of the treaty and its contribution to the goals and objectives of the OSCE.⁵² More than 100 observation flights, many shared by states parties, are conducted annually, and nearly 700 flights have been carried out.⁵³ A prominent obstacle to implementation is the global financial and eco-

⁴⁶ Estimated on the basis of OSCE (note 45).

⁴⁷ For a summary and other details of the Treaty on Open Skies see annex A in this volume.

⁴⁸ Lachowski, Z., 'Conventional arms control', *SIPRI Yearbook 2006*, pp. 767–68.

⁴⁹ Russia is the only state party to the treaty that recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states. Open Skies Consultative Commission, 'Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation to the Open Skies Consultative Commission', OSCC52.JOUR/165, annex 3, 17 May 2010.

⁵⁰ Open Skies Consultative Commission, 'Statement by the delegation of Romania (also on behalf of the United States of America) to the Open Skies Consultative Commission', OSCC52.JOUR/165, annex 2, 17 May 2010.

⁵¹ This contrasted with other cooperative acts, including a joint Open Skies observation flight conducted by Georgia, Russia and the UK on 28 Sep. 2010.

⁵² Open Skies Consultative Commission, 'Final Document of the Second Review Conference on the implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies', OSCC.RC/39/10, 9 June 2010.

⁵³ Open Skies Consultative Commission, 'Open Skies Treaty observation flights since entry-into-force', OSCC.RC/15/10, 4 June 2010.

conomic crisis that began in the autumn of 2008 and the related financial constraints, both of which adversely affect the treaty's goals, including (a) the transition from film-based cameras to digitalized equipment in order to make observation faster, better and cheaper in coming years; (b) the replacement of the ageing Open Skies fleet with new aircraft; and (c) the decrease in the cost of maintenance for existing aircraft. The review conference stressed the need for strategic planning to achieve these goals and also discussed minimal technical standards for Open Skies airfields.⁵⁴

Sensors are the most critical element of the Open Skies regime, and the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) Informal Working Group on Sensors plays a key role in producing and updating related documents.⁵⁵ In 2010 the states parties adopted three related decisions for completing certification of the digital sensors; these decisions will allow states to acquire digital video sensors and prepare for certification.⁵⁶

The review conference used the phrase 'the next generation of the treaty implementation' for the problem of addressing emergencies and situations that fall outside the treaty's mandate to enhance confidence and security (e.g. natural disaster, climate and environmental change, conflict prevention and crisis management, and transnational security). It also recognized the issue as meriting further discussion in the OSCC. The Final Document made an oblique reference to Cyprus's application for accession.⁵⁷

The USA, as chair of the second review conference, suggested that future work should (a) address additional decisions necessary for the certification of digital sensors; (b) procure and certify digital sensors within the next three years; (c) determine the best approach for digital data and identify new and cost-effective procedures; (d) further address minimal technical standards for airfields; (e) develop conflict-prevention and crisis-management procedures for flights over the territory of a state party with its consent and on request from the OSCE and other relevant international bodies; (f) consider proposals to deal with environmental and trans-

⁵⁴ The technical solution proposed by the Czech delegation would cost in excess of \$1 million. Second Open Skies Review Conference, 'Minimum technical standards for Open Skies airfields', Paper submitted by Col. Gabriel Kovacs, OSCC.RC/12/10, 7–9 June 2010.

⁵⁵ Commercial satellites are becoming more precise but for the most part are still not as accurate as Open Skies imagery.

⁵⁶ Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), 'Revision one to decision fourteen to the Treaty on Open Skies on the methodology for calculating the minimum height above ground level at which each video camera with real time display installed on an observation aircraft may be operated during an observation flight', Decision no. 6/10, OSCC.DEC/6/2010, 17 May 2010; OSCC, 'Revision two to decision number seventeen to the Treaty on Open Skies: the format in which data is recorded and exchanged on recording media other than photographic film', Decision no. 8/10, OSCC.DEC/8/10, 12 July 2010; and OSCC, 'Digital imagery processing', Decision no. 9/10, OSCC.DEC/9/10, 12 July 2010.

⁵⁷ An 'interpretative statement' was made by all parties, except Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey, supporting Cyprus's application.

national security issues; and (g) share experience of aerial observation with other regions of the world.⁵⁸

V. The global dimension

Two major topics currently dominate the global agenda concerning conventional weapons: the arms trade treaty and the humanitarian impact of certain conventional weapons. International attention continues to focus on so-called inhumane weapons as their military utility is called into question and the humanitarian and economic harm that they cause is widely denounced. Restraining or banning these weapons has long been an international public and governmental concern. Several international agreements regulate or prohibit the use of anti-personnel mines (APMs), explosive remnants of war (ERW) and cluster munitions and seek to limit the effects of armed conflict on civilians.

The 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention restricts or prohibits the use of specific categories of weapons that are deemed to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately.⁵⁹ The Ottawa process to ban landmines, outside the CCW framework, resulted in the 1997 APM Convention, which seeks to eliminate all such weapons.⁶⁰ The 2003 Protocol V of the CCW Convention was until recently the only international legislation covering ERW, including cluster munitions.⁶¹ The Oslo process to stigmatize cluster munitions successfully led to the separate Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in December 2008 that entered into force in August 2010.⁶²

In 2010 the discussions in the CCW framework continued the work of the previous year but with no spectacular outcomes.

⁵⁸ Open Skies Consultative Commission, Delegation of the United States, 'Second Review Conference—moving forward', OSCC.DEL/8/10, 12 July 2010.

⁵⁹ For a summary and other details of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW, also known as the 'Inhumane Weapons' Convention) see annex A in this volume.

⁶⁰ For a summary and other details of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction see annex A in this volume. On the Ottawa process see Lachowski, Z., 'Conventional arms control', *SIPRI Yearbook 1997*, pp. 498–500; and Lachowski, Z., 'The ban on anti-personnel mines', *SIPRI Yearbook 1998*, pp. 545–58.

⁶¹ For a summary and other details of the CCW Convention's Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War see annex A in this volume. On the negotiations in the framework of the CCW Convention see Lachowski (note 5), pp. 489–90.

⁶² For a summary and other details of the CCM see annex A in this volume. See also Lachowski and Post (note 9), pp. 435–38. The 'Oslo process' is the generic name given to the diplomatic activities and public campaign that resulted in the convention. In Nov. 2010, the Cluster Munition Coalition published the first edition of the *Cluster Munition Monitor*, a sister publication to the *Landmine Monitor*.

The arms trade treaty and related developments

The recent history of an arms trade treaty (ATT) dates to 2003, when a group of Nobel Prize laureates put forward the idea.⁶³ At the outset it looked like a hopeless initiative: originally only three governments supported it. However, by 2006, 153 states supported a United Nations General Assembly resolution to create such a treaty.⁶⁴ In 2008 the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, established a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to examine the 'feasibility, scope and parameters' of a legally binding treaty.

In 2008 the UN member states endorsed a resolution to negotiate an arms trade treaty that would function as 'a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms'.⁶⁵ The treaty is to be negotiated in a series of preparatory bodies, culminating in a negotiating conference in 2012. In 2009 the process continued in an open-ended working group (OEWG) and preparatory committees. The decision, announced in October 2009 by US Secretary of State Clinton, that the USA would join the process was a critical breakthrough, although the USA added the condition that the treaty text must be agreed by consensus.⁶⁶ Despite concerns about the US position, many states continued to participate in the negotiations.

A 2009 General Assembly resolution determined that a month-long conference would be held in 2012 to negotiate the text of an ATT and established a clear negotiating mandate for the UN conference.⁶⁷ The remaining sessions of the OEWG in 2010 and 2011 will serve, in effect, as a preparatory committee to develop the treaty. The conference has agreed to take decisions by consensus.

Some states continued to question the necessity of an ATT. However, by 2010 many states shared an interest in a treaty to regulate the conventional arms trade, although it was less apparent how to pursue that goal. States could not reach consensus on the scope and other parameters of such a treaty, including the kind of arms to be covered (many countries favoured a 7+1+1 formula that would include the seven categories of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) plus SALW plus ammunition); the stand-

⁶³ Actually, the origin of the initiative dates to the period between world wars I and II; first attempts in the League of Nations include the 1919 Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition and the 1925 Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War, neither of which entered into force.

⁶⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 61/89, 18 Dec. 2006.

⁶⁵ UN General Assembly Resolution 63/240, 24 Dec. 2008.

⁶⁶ US Department of State, 'Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. support for the arms trade treaty', 14 Oct. 2009, <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130573.htm>>.

⁶⁷ UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48, 12 Jan. 2010.

ards to apply in making weapon import and export decisions; and the issues of how to share, monitor and verify information.⁶⁸

Observers perceived that the sole meeting of the preparatory committee in 2010, on 12–23 July in New York, had made progress, but numerous outstanding issues remain to be solved in 2011 and 2012. The summary report of a symposium on an ATT held in Boston, USA, in October pointed to three critical issues: the necessity for flexibility in adapting to the needs of various states while striving for universality; the need to use existing mechanisms at the global, regional and national levels in order to consolidate national practice with compliance and universality of the treaty; and the importance of terminology to improve clarity about regulations.⁶⁹

Two sessions of the preparatory committee were scheduled for 2011—on 28 February–4 March and on 11–15 July; in 2012 a brief procedural meeting will take place before the month-long UN conference to elaborate the treaty.

Anti-personnel mines

In April 2010 the 12th annual conference of the parties to the CCW Convention's Amended Protocol II, which prohibits mines, booby traps and other devices, discussed its universalization as not all parties to the CCW Convention are also parties to Amended Protocol II. The conference also addressed the legality of terminating the original Protocol II and the issue of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The parties plan to further consider IED-related incidents, their prevention, understanding of such incidents and their effects, and exchange of information.

In 2010 the parties highlighted the synergies between Amended Protocol II and the CCW's Protocol V on ERW. The parties to Amended Protocol II decided to synchronize the deadline for submission of their national annual reports under that protocol with the submission of similar reports under Protocol V, and that work on assistance to victims of IEDs and of ERW will also be coordinated.⁷⁰ These steps aim to strengthen both of these important regimes.

⁶⁸ 'Facilitator's summary for scope', Arms Trade Treaty legal blog, 22 July 2010, <http://armstradetry.blogspot.com/2010_07_01_archive.html>. See also Abramson, J., 'Progress made at arms trade treaty meeting', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 40, no. 7 (Sep. 2010). For broader discussion of the problem see Holtom, P. and Bromley, M., 'The international arms trade: difficult to define, measure and control', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 40, no. 6 (July/Aug. 2010).

⁶⁹ 'Boston symposium on the Arms Trade Treaty: summary report, Ambassador Marschik', Arms Trade Treaty legal blog, Oct. 2010, <http://www.armstradetry.blogspot.com/2010_10_01_archive.html>.

⁷⁰ UN Office at Geneva, News & Media, 'CCW Amended Protocol II on mines and explosive devices prohibition increases synergies with Protocol V on explosive remnants of war and continues to focus on improvised explosive devices', 3 Dec. 2010.

The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Convention prohibits its 156 states parties from using, producing, stockpiling or transferring APMs. Although some key producers and users of landmines—China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the USA—have not signed the convention, in many respects it is one of the most successful multilateral conventional arms control agreements of recent times.⁷¹ Over 45 million APMs have been destroyed under the convention by a total of 86 states parties that have completed the destruction of their stockpiles; only 5 parties have mine stocks left to destroy. While more than 12 million APMs remain to be destroyed by four parties to the convention—Belarus, Greece, Turkey and Ukraine—an estimated 160 million APMs are stockpiled by non-party states. Myanmar continued to use (lay) APMs in 2009–10, as did non-state armed groups in six countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and Yemen.⁷²

Some parties continue to encounter difficulties in complying with their obligations. Belarus, Greece, Turkey and Ukraine, all with large stockpiles of APMs, have missed their destruction deadlines and remain in serious violation of the convention. As of September 2010, 22 states parties had been granted or were seeking the extension of their 10-year mine clearance deadline.⁷³

The Certain Conventional Weapons Convention

Despite the international attractiveness of the CCM, many of the world's main users, producers and stockpilers of cluster munitions have opted for continued dialogue on a protocol within the less stringent CCW Convention framework.⁷⁴ Approximately 85 per cent of the world's unregulated stock of cluster munitions remains outside the CCM. Many states that are critically relevant to the cluster munitions debate, including China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the USA, favour the CCW framework for dealing with those weapons. The humanitarian impact of cluster munitions has been the central element of the agenda of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts since 2007. Despite much effort to draft a new CCW protocol on prohibitions and restrictions on the use of cluster munitions, considerable controversies remain (e.g. regarding the definition of cluster munitions and an immediate ban on the transfer of all cluster munitions).⁷⁵ The CCW Convention seeks to be universal, and three additional states, Antigua and

⁷¹ The most recent accession, that of Palau, took place in 2007.

⁷² International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor 2010* (Mines Action Canada: Ottawa, 2010).

⁷³ International Campaign to Ban Landmines (note 72).

⁷⁴ Abramson, J., 'Cluster negotiations again extended', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 41, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2011).

⁷⁵ Abramson (note 74).

Barbuda, Dominican Republic, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, joined the regime in 2010.

In September, after consultations among the GGE, the group's chairman presented a draft protocol on cluster munitions that could become a sixth protocol to the convention.⁷⁶ In the run-up to the Fourth CCW Review Conference in 2011 it remains the focus of preparations.

The CCW Convention's Protocol V on ERW recognizes the humanitarian problems caused by unexploded and abandoned ordnance and covers post-conflict remedial measures in order to minimize their occurrence, effects and the risk they pose. Ten more states joined the ERW regime in 2010: Belgium, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Gabon, Honduras, Italy, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saudi Arabia.⁷⁷ The universality of the protocol remains the focus of discussion, and the parties welcomed the steps taken in 2010 by Brazil and Poland to accede to Protocol V.

VI. Conclusions

The European arms control dialogue continues on two tracks: the CFE Treaty regime and that of the Vienna Document on CSBMs, both of which were last adapted in 1999. In 2010 the participants revitalized their efforts to update both. The NATO states and Russia vigorously sought to overcome the long-standing CFE Treaty crisis, while the OSCE's Corfu process continued its work to reinforce the Vienna Document regime. Adoption of a new version of the Vienna Document is expected in 2011 or soon thereafter. The second review conference of the Treaty on Open Skies reaffirmed its pertinence.

In short, the long-awaited 'reset' in the field of conventional arms control and confidence- and security building has occurred. The gradual erosion of conventional arms control in Europe, which Russia's 2007 decision to freeze relations with the NATO states over the obsolete CFE Treaty regime aggravated, has slowed. NATO's June 2010 proposal to develop a new framework to strengthen conventional arms control and transparency in Europe paved the way to constructive dialogue, with Russia recognizing that its security interests are being taken seriously. Observers believe that the next CFE Treaty review conference, to be held in the autumn of 2011 or later, will provide a mandate for negotiation and accelerate momentum towards agreement.

Likewise, CSBMs are regaining their value in military-security dialogue. The experience of recent years has forced the OSCE participating states to make a major effort to adapt this useful instrument of openness, trans-

⁷⁶ See CCW, Group of Governmental Experts, 'Draft protocol on cluster munitions', CCW/GGE/2010-II/WP.2, 6 Sep. 2010.

⁷⁷ For the list of parties to Protocol V see annex A in this volume.

parency and reassurance to meet the existing and emerging risks and challenges. The incremental method of tackling the Vienna CSBM Document appears workable. However, innovation is needed in order to add new elements and commitments that address qualitative threats, especially at the intrastate, regional and subregional levels. The OSCE community must look for more effective ways to meet its commitments and obligations and 'do more with less' as advances in weapons and technology gain speed. In 2010 the Open Skies Treaty regime began the transition to digital sensors, which should result in both cost-effective and technological improvements. There were also positive developments regarding military CBMs in South America: the ministers of defence of the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR) adopted procedures for confidence building, including specific implementation measures and guarantees, at a meeting of the South American Defence Council (Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, CDS) in May 2010.⁷⁸

In the past decade many observers tolled the death knell of arms control. Current developments suggest otherwise. The year 2010 saw numerous proposals regarding conventional arms control and confidence-building endeavours that will be part of the overall concept for future OSCE work in this area and that will persist well beyond 2010.

Erosion in the disarmament and arms control fields has apparently been arrested. Whether this trend will persist and the ongoing talks are on a steady course, moving the European community towards more cooperative, adequate and efficient means and ways of security building, remain to be seen. Arms control in Europe is not autonomous, and much depends on the strategic interests of the main actors on the Euro-Atlantic scene. The anodyne outcome of the December 2010 Astana Summit slowed the momentum towards attaining ambitious goals in this field. Other security policy factors, including those in the strategic armaments field related to such issues as missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons, affected the rate of progress in conventional arms control in the first months of 2011. Furthermore, in the CFE Treaty dialogue formidable issues such as 'substantial combat forces', the flank area problem and the related Caucasus conundrum require bold rethinking and perseverance as well as patient negotiations and lasting decisions.

⁷⁸ South American Defence Council, 'Declaration of Guayaquil', 6–7 May 2010, <http://www.cds.unasur.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=261>; and South American Defence Council, 'CDS developed an unprecedented procedure to apply confidence-building measures', 30 Nov. 2010, <<http://www.cdsunasur.org/en/press/news/459-cds-desarrollo-procedimiento-inedito-para-aplicar-medidas-de-confianza?layout=default&date=2011-03-01>>.