3. Peace operations: the fragile consensus

THIERRY TARDY

I. Introduction

Peace operations have evolved since the end of the cold war on the basis of a broad consensus among states and international institutions as to their purpose and methods.[1] According to this consensus, peace operations are established to help stabilize societies emerging from conflict through a mix of security, political and economic activities that are carried out in support of a sovereign host state. Their ultimate goal is a positive peace that is supposed to emanate from structural changes and local adherence to the principles of democracy and economic liberalism.

While the consensus still forms the foundation of contemporary peace operations, there are signs that it is being undermined by two sets of trends. First, questions are increasingly being asked about what peace operations can and should try to achieve, and in accordance with what principles. Contemporary peace operations have tested the limits of the three traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality, consent of the host state and non-resort to force except in self-defence, and this has created a mix of conceptual, operational and political tensions that undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of operations. Second, there has been a shift in the typology of states that contribute to the peacekeeping and peacebuilding enterprise, which has had an impact on the politics of peace operations. Not only do states of the Global South provide the great majority of personnel deployed to United Nations peace operations, but some key regional and global powers have also significantly increased their presence over the past few years, raising the issue of a possible looming clash between these so-called emerging powers and Northern states over the norms and aims of peace operations.

Section II of this chapter provides some background information about the current state of strategic uncertainty affecting UN peacekeeping. Section III addresses the weakening of the consensus on peace operations by examining current debates relating to the purpose, underlying principles and meaning of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, particularly in the context of a Global North–Global South divide. Section IV looks specifically at the changing roles of four emerging powers—Brazil, China, India and

---

[1] In this chapter 'peace operations' refers to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, including multidimensional operations combining elements of both.

South Africa—in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the implications for the international peacekeeping consensus. Section V presents conclusions. Appendix 3A presents the latest SIPRI data on multilateral peace operations.

II. Background

Strategic uncertainty

Since the early 1990s there have been dramatic developments in the conceptual basis of peace operations, the types of actor running them, the nature of their mandates and the states that staff them. Although these changes have in many ways contributed to the rationalization and effectiveness of peacekeeping and peacebuilding practice, they have also introduced new difficulties and dilemmas.

Ten years after the release of the Brahimi Report, which reasserted the underlying principles of peacekeeping, the very meaning of peace operations is increasingly blurred.[2] Growing ambiguities come from both the wide interpretation of the three key peacekeeping principles and from the amalgamation of peace operations with other types of military mission, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As the main actor in peace operations, the UN is particularly concerned by these challenges. With 124 770 personnel in 20 operations in December 2010, combined with a field presence—through UN agencies—that goes far beyond the peacekeeping spectrum, the UN is involved in a wide range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities worldwide. In the meantime, the UN is going through a period of 'strategic uncertainty'.[3] A prolonged surge in UN peace operation deployments appears to have ended and the focus is now on consolidation.[4] Once again, peace operations are under review. The New Horizon initiative, launched in 2009, aimed to 'assess the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping today and over the coming years; and reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with stakeholders on possible solutions to better calibrate UN peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements'.[5] Its main outputs to date have been a 'non-paper' and a pro-

---

[2] United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000.

[3] See Jones, B. et al., *Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty*, Report submitted to the UN departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support for the New Horizons Project (Center on International Cooperation: New York, Apr. 2009).

[4] See Statement by A. Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, Security Council, 6370th meeting, S/PV.6370, 6 Aug. 2010, p. 3; and United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report no. 1* (United Nations: New York, Oct. 2010), pp. 7–8.

[5] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'The "New Horizon" process', <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newhorizon.shtml>.

gress report.[6] Simultaneous efforts have been pursued with the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and with the Review of International Civilian Capacities.[7] Nevertheless, needs remain high, while the operations are increasingly contested by the host countries—Chad, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) being the most recent examples—and challenged in their effectiveness by a combination of over-stretch and weak political support.

Decision makers versus implementers

Simultaneously, the typology of countries that participate in the design, financing and running of peace operations has evolved in a way that has an impact on both the politics and the implementation of peace operations. Since the mid-1990s the broad picture that has emerged is of UN peace operations run by Southern countries but, to a large extent, still designed and financed by Northern countries. In the meantime, the Northern countries have opted to deploy their personnel—particularly troops and civilian police—overwhelmingly to operations run by the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Against this backdrop, the increasing presence in peace operations of states such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa—historically states of the Global South but with growing geopolitical weight—has become a key evolution of UN conflict management policy. These four countries accounted for 15.4 per cent of uniformed UN peace operation personnel (15 184 out of 98 638 civilian police and military personnel) in December 2010, compared with 7.9 per cent (7766) for all 34 EU and NATO member states combined.[8] With the exception of India, which has long been an important troop contributor, emerging powers' presence and role have significantly expanded over the course of the past decade (see appendix 3A). China is the leading troop contributor among the permanent members of the UN Security Council and ranks seventh worldwide in terms of financial contributions. Brazil has combined regional and global

---

[6] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, 'non-paper' (United Nations: New York, July 2009); and United Nations (note 4).

[7] United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, 'Review of the United Nations peace-building architecture', A/64/868–S/2010/393, 21 July 2010; and United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, 'Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict', Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747–S/2011/85, 22 Feb. 2011. The Review of International Civilian Capabilities aims to determine how to 'broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict'. United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881–S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, p. 20.

[8] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Ranking of military and police contributions to UN operations', 31 Dec. 2010, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/>.

aspirations by providing the largest personnel contribution to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and asserting itself as a political actor in various UN bodies. Although more focused on Africa, South Africa has adopted an equally proactive stance in both peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. Meanwhile, these four emerging powers all contest—to a degree and in their own ways—the established international security governance mechanisms and policies. Their unprecedented role at the UN, and in peace operations in particular, reflects a more general changing posture on the international scene, but also potentially challenges the peacekeeping consensus.

III. In search of a shared understanding

'Conceptual overstretch'

Definitional debate regarding peace operations is not new. Several operations in the early 1990s—notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia—revealed the difficulty of situating peace operations on the crisis management spectrum and highlighted the need to bring coherence to the distinction between peace operations and war-fighting. The Brahimi Report reasserted the three traditional principles that have been seen as distinguishing characteristics of peace operations, although it broadened both the meaning of consent and the criteria for the use of force.[9] Despite this—and another attempt at codification in the 2008 Principles and Guidelines[10]—the principles are once again being stretched. Broad and contentious interpretations of the principles manifested in the mandates and activities of some operations have also met strong resistance. This has undermined the integrity of the operations as well as the support of local actors and even called into question the very meaning of 'peace operation'.

Impartiality applied to interventions in third countries has always been an aspiration rather than a reality. As operations have evolved towards multidimensionality they have by nature become increasingly intrusive, political and sometimes coercive in ways that are inherently partial. Operations that are explicitly mandated to support governmental institutions, such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), or even the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)—as well as those that implicitly become obstacles to government policy, such as the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

---

[9] United Nations (note 2), pp. 9–10.
[10] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (United Nations: New York, 2008), pp. 31–35. The so-called Capstone Doctrine sought to 'define the nature, scope and core business' of peace operations.

(UNAMID)[11]—inevitably run the risk of being perceived as partial by local parties. There is also a distinction between principled impartiality in the mandate and the reality of implementation on the ground.[12] In the DRC, MONUSCO has a mandate that includes civilian protection as its highest priority task. Its military support to the national army, which is recognized to be one of the main perpetrators of human rights violations, has thus become increasingly difficult to reconcile with the idea that an operation 'must implement [its] mandate without favour or prejudice to any party' and 'must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality'.[13]

The principle of consent has equally been tested. A corollary of state sovereignty is that peace operations cannot be deployed without the formal consent of the host state and should not stay if this consent is withdrawn. After the host governments pressured UN forces to withdraw from Burundi in 2005–2006 and Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2007–2008, the governments of Chad, the DRC and Sudan tried in 2010 to assert their sovereignty by either removing their consent to the UN presence on their territories or by obstructing its work such that the value of consent was significantly weakened.[14] For all actors involved, precarious consent raises the issues of both the legitimacy and the nature of the operation—given that consent is not only a primary source of legitimacy for third-party interventions but also marks a key distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.[15] As a consequence, in ever more ambitious and intrusive Chapter VII-mandated multidimensional peace operations, securing and managing consent has become a growing concern.[16]

Another issue is whose consent is needed and for what. Although the consent of the host state is still widely considered to be of primary importance, the Brahimi Report and the Principles and Guidelines broaden the principle to include the consent of the main conflict parties.[17] This refers not only to their acceptance of the operation but also to a 'commitment to a

[11] UNAMID is mandated, among other things, to prevent attacks on civilians, which are generally carried out by government-aligned militia. For the mandates of this and other current peace operations see appendix 3A, table 3A.2.

[12] Boulden, J., 'Mandates matter: an exploration of impartiality in UN operations', *Global Governance*, vol. 11, no. 2 (Apr.–June 2005), pp. 153–54.

[13] United Nations (note 10), p. 33.

[14] On developments in Chad and the DRC in 2010 see appendix 3A.

[15] See Wiharta, S., 'The legitimacy of peace operations', *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*, pp. 95–116.

[16] See Johnstone, I., 'Managing consent: the new variable?', eds C. H. de Coning, A. Ø. Stensland and T. Tardy, *Beyond the 'New Horizon': Proceedings from the UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar, 23–24 June 2010* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Oslo, 2010), pp. 25–39. Peace operations mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are authorized to impose certain aspects of the mandate on the parties but are distinct from peace enforcement, where the consent of the host state is not necessary. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>, Chapter VII.

[17] United Nations (note 2), p. 9; and United Nations (note 10), pp. 31–32.

political process'. Requiring consent from multiple local parties not only complicates the task of maintaining it but also increases the risk that consent will be uncertain.

Finally, the principle of the use of force only in self-defence is directly challenged by two sets of developments relating to the concept of 'robust peacekeeping' and the operational implications of civilian protection.[18]

Most current peace operations have been created under Chapter VII or have part of their mandates falling within that chapter, most often to allow the operations to use all necessary means within their capability—including military force—to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, even when the operation's personnel are not threatened. The issue of robust peacekeeping is also explicitly linked to the use of force—even if the New Horizon non-paper stresses the political dimension of robustness.[19] The Brahimi Report called for 'bigger forces, better equipped . . . able to be a credible deterrent' and 'sufficiently robust' rules of engagement to enable UN peacekeepers not to 'cede the initiative to their attackers'.[20] However, the politicization of the debate and the reluctance of most of the major troop contributors to UN operations to embrace the logic of robustness have undermined its political and operational pertinence.[21] Furthermore, operations where robust peacekeeping has been implemented, in the DRC and Haiti in particular, have shown the ambiguities and limitations of the concept, for example with the risk of slipping into peace enforcement in the name of civilian protection.[22]

Weak strategic thinking

It is a characteristic of UN peace operations that both the states that make decisions about them and the states that participate in them have a relatively low level of commitment. In most cases, peace operations are responses to conflicts that do not directly threaten either group, which naturally limits the involvement of the 'international community'. This fact largely explains the tendency for weak strategic thinking in the conceptualization and planning of peace operations, both in the Security Council and at the operational level. The need for better strategic thinking is attested by

[18] Holt, V. and Taylor, G., *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges* (United Nations: New York, 2009); and Tardy, T., 'The UN and the use of force: a marriage against nature', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 38, no. 1 (Mar. 2007).

[19] United Nations (note 6), p. 21.

[20] United Nations (note 2), pp. 10–11.

[21] Tardy, T., 'A critique of robust peacekeeping in contemporary peace operations', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Apr. 2011).

[22] Tull, D., 'Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: waging peace and fighting war', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 16, no. 2 (Apr. 2009); and Berdal, M., *Building Peace after War*, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper no. 407 (Routledge: London, 2009), pp. 100–21.

recent debates about operations' strategic oversight, transition and exit strategies, and the definition of benchmarks for these; about the peace-keeping–peacebuilding nexus; and about the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).[23] However, the political—rather than technical or organizational—nature of the problem militates against any significant pro-gress being made towards, for example, the better integration of peace operations into larger political processes.

The Principles and Guidelines speak of the 'full backing of a united Security Council' as a requirement for the success of a peace operation.[24] Yet such backing is most often neither very strong nor lasting. While the permanent members of the Security Council and major regional powers were relatively united in their support for peace operations in the 1990s, fragmentation characterizes the emerging geopolitical landscape. This has seriously weakened the international consensus needed to find political solutions to crises. As a consequence, operations are deployed not only without a clear peace agreement, and therefore a 'peace to keep', but also 'without the necessary leverage in hand to overcome political dead-lock during the implementation phase'.[25]

The North–South divide

Fragmentation is also manifested in a North–South divide in many matters related to peace operations. While Northern states provide much of the financing for UN operations and make key decisions about them in the Security Council, they tend to keep their personnel out of them and instead favour what they see as more effective institutions, particularly the EU and NATO. In contrast, the most important troop contributors to UN oper-ations are mainly Southern countries that remain marginalized in the decision-making and policy-development processes.

This divide not only affects the effectiveness and legitimacy of UN peace operations but also shapes the debates related to UN conflict management, including those on the blurring of definitions or on the contested peace-building model. In particular, it sheds light on the tensions between the necessary reforms of peace operations and the inherent constraints that the operations face. No matter how relevant some reform proposals are, they may be difficult to square with the reality that they would have to be imple-

---

[23] See e.g. United Nations (note 4); United Nations (note 6); Wiharta, S., 'Planning and deploying peace operations', *SIPRI Yearbook 2008*, pp. 100–103; Wiharta (note 15); and Wiharta, S. and Blair, S., 'Civilian roles in peace operations', *SIPRI Yearbook 2010*, pp. 87–106.

[24] United Nations (note 10), pp. 50–51.

[25] Brahimi, L. and Ahmed, S., *In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation* (New York University, Center on International Cooperation: New York, 2008), pp. 3–4. See also Gowan, R., 'The strategic context: peacekeeping in crisis, 2006–2008', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 15, no. 4 (Aug. 2008).

mented by states that in most cases lack the capacity, let alone the will to do so. Furthermore, those troop contributors that have little influence in shaping debates about peacekeeping norms are concerned by developments that would run counter to their conceptions of peace operations or would go beyond their own capabilities, knowing that they risk being blamed for any resulting difficulties and failures. What is at stake is a shared understanding among all stakeholders not only of the 'objectives of UN peacekeeping and the role that each plays in their realization'—as the New Horizon non-paper states[26]—but also of what a peace operation can realistically achieve.

The 2010 session of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (also known as the C-34) provided good examples of North–South divisions. While the EU group of countries pushed for the concept of robust peacekeeping, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) group, which includes nearly all the major personnel contributors to UN operations, expressed huge resistance, invoking the lack of resources to implement robust mandates—particularly the failure of well-equipped Northern states to contribute—and arguing that such mandates jeopardized the integrity of the peacekeeping principles.[27] Beyond the suspicion of a neo-colonialist agenda behind increasingly intrusive peace operations, the argumentation put forward by the NAM group reflected genuine concerns about unrealistic developments in peacekeeping.

This leads to the related tension between what is desirable and what is possible in peace operations, which is illustrated by the issue of civilian protection. There is undoubtedly a moral justification for the inclusion of the protection of civilians in almost all peace operations' mandates, making it difficult to resist. However, both operational considerations (such as the capabilities required and the size of the territory to be covered) and political ones (such as the degree of support in the Security Council for possible coercive measures and the willingness of contributing countries to engage with 'spoilers' or to accept the risk of an escalation of violence) call into question the feasibility of civilian protection by peacekeepers.[28]

More broadly, while all policy documents insist on the need for realistic mandates, the nature of contemporary peace operations makes it hard to confine mandates to what is realistic. The New Horizon non-paper warns

[26] United Nations (note 6), p. iii.

[27] See United Nations, 'Peacekeeping chief tells of Secretary-General's "ambitious agenda" for post-conflict rebuilding, as Special Committee opens session proceedings of the C-34 debates', Press Release GA/PK/203, 22 Feb. 2010, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gapk203.doc.htm>; and United Nations, 'Special Committee members commend performance of United Nations peacekeepers faced with complex mandates, lacking key capabilities', Press Release GA/PK/204, 23 Feb. 2010, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gapk204.doc.htm>. For a list of members of the NAM see annex B in this volume.

[28] Spoilers are parties that seek to stall or derail transition or peacebuilding processes, including through violence.

against the proliferation of tasks in peacekeeping mandates—citing 45 tasks included in the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC)—arguing that 'multiple, detailed tasks can obscure the overall objectives that the Council expects peacekeepers to achieve'.[29] In the end, peace operations create expectations both in the international community and among local actors that are known to be impossible to fulfil and that therefore inevitably undermine the credibility of the operations.

Critiques of liberal peacebuilding

Finally, the type of consensus that peace operations enjoy is undermined by the very nature of the model that peacebuilding actors promote. The political, economic and philosophical principles that currently underpin peacebuilding constitute what is frequently referred to as the 'liberal peace' model, which is understood as a combination of democratization and marketization.[30] In recent years, the effectiveness and legitimacy of liberal peacebuilding have been much questioned.[31] Critics argue that counterproductive aspects—such as intrusiveness and lack of local ownership, the risk of exacerbating political and socio-economic tensions due to inappropriately rapid liberalization, and weak focus on the strengthening of institutions (state building)—undermine its overall effectiveness and sustainability. Liberal peacebuilding would also attempt to replicate a Northern model whose viability and legitimacy in non-Northern states is problematic.

This issue is distinct from but linked to the North–South debate. The two are related in the sense that they both raise the question of how far the international community can go in trying to establish and sustain peace, and also in the fact that they suggest that less ambitious mandates are the way forward. In both cases, the problem is that of the fundamental nature of peace operations, the strategies that they are supposed to pursue and their degree of acceptability to recipient countries. The mounting criticism of liberal peacebuilding furthermore calls into question the durability of the peacekeeping consensus and the norms it is supposed to promote. Together with the interpretation of the peacekeeping principles, the founding pillars of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding are being slowly undermined.

---

[29] United Nations (note 6), p. 10.
[30] Paris, R., *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004), pp. 5–6.
[31] See e.g. Paris (note 30); Pugh, M., 'The political economy of peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective', *International Journal of Peace Studies,* vol. 10, no. 2 (autumn/winter 2005), pp. 23–42; Richmond, O., 'The problem of peace: understanding the "liberal peace"', *Conflict, Security and Development,* vol. 6, no. 3 (Oct. 2006); and Paris, R. and Sisk, T. D. (eds), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (Routledge: London, 2009).

IV. Emerging powers and the peacekeeping consensus

There has been much debate about how the rise of so-called emerging powers will affect the evolution of the international system, the global balance of power, and the norms and mechanisms of security governance. An interesting aspect of these debates is the extent to which emerging powers will challenge the existing principles and practices and what impact this may have on the structure of the system—multipolarity, interdependence and so on—as well as on the primacy of the United States and the position of the EU.[32] In the past few years, countries such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa have resisted or opposed the positions taken by the EU or by other Northern states or groupings in various UN bodies, from the General Assembly to the Security Council and the Human Rights Council. They have also called into question the legitimacy of the current international security architecture.[33] This raises the question of what impact these countries will have on the practice, and the underlying philosophy, of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as they become real stakeholders in what has so far been a North-dominated realm.

This section assesses the potential impacts on multilateral peacekeeping and peacebuilding of Brazil, China, India and South Africa. Each is the largest economy in its region. Traditionally considered part of the Global South, they are seeking to establish higher international profiles and, particularly in the cases of Brazil, India and South Africa, regional political leadership. In this context, the question is whether and how these states will try to alter peacekeeping and peacebuilding norms. Will they be 'norm-followers', buying into the existing rules and practices; will they be 'norm-setters', seeking to significantly shape them through the traditional decision-making channels; or will they be 'norm-breakers', contesting the current norms? More precisely, if normative divergences increasingly characterize the relationship between the North and emerging powers, how will this affect the conflict management field and the peacekeeping consensus?

---

[32] See Hurrell, A., 'Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?', *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1 (Jan. 2006); Ikenberry, J. G., 'The rise of China and the future of the West: can the liberal system survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2008); and Layne, C., 'The waning of US hegemony: myth or reality?', *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 1 (summer 2009).

[33] See e.g. Gowan, R. and Brantner, F., 'The EU and human rights at the UN: 2010 review', Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, Sep. 2010, <http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/the_eus_approach_to_human_rights_in_a_post-western_world>.

The growing role of emerging powers in peace operations

While India has long been one of the most important contributors to UN peace operations (ranking third among troop contributors in December 2010), Brazil, China and South Africa have only more recently become key players.[34] Even India has nearly quadrupled its contributions of uniformed personnel (troops and civilian police) since 2001.[35] China is now the top contributor of uniformed personnel among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, deploying 2040 personnel in December 2010. It participates in nine UN peace operations worldwide, which is in sharp contrast to its near absence from peace operations at the turn of the century. China is particularly present in Africa, but also in MINUSTAH and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[36] Brazil has also significantly increased its presence in UN operations over the past decade, with a particular focus on its own region: Brazil leads the military component of MINUSTAH and deploys 2187 uniformed personnel (all but three of them troops) to the operation. Of the Latin American countries, only Uruguay contributes more personnel to UN peace operations. In the same vein, South Africa has recently become more visible in Africa, in both African Union (AU) and UN operations, deploying 2187 personnel to MONUSCO and UNAMID at the end of 2010.

Motivations

Participation in global efforts to maintain international peace and security has different meanings and reflects different types of motivation for contributing states, depending on their political and economic weight, their foreign policy orientation, the nature of their political system and the role of domestic issues in foreign policy decision making.[37] Alongside idealistic and purely materialistic motives, participation in contemporary peace operations is largely about projecting power, hard and soft. Through peacekeeping and peacebuilding, states can both buttress narrowly defined inter-

---

[34] See appendix 3A, figures 3A.5, 3A.6 and 3A.8.

[35] See appendix 3A, figure 3A.7.

[36] National deployment figures for 4 categories of personnel, along with data on national contributions to individual operations, are available in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>.

[37] For an analysis of states' motivations for participating in peace operations see Sotomayor, A. C., 'Why states participate in UN peace missions while others don't: an analysis of civil–military relations and its effects on Latin America's contributions to peacekeeping operations', *Security Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Jan. 2010); Marten Zisk, K., 'Lending troops: Canada, India, and UN peacekeeping', Paper presented at the 41st International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, CA, Mar. 2000; and Daniel, D. C. F., 'Why so few troops from among so many?', eds D. C. F. Daniel, P. Taft and S. Wiharta, *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects* (Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC, 2008).

ests and push their normative agendas at a relatively low cost. This is of particular interest for countries like Brazil, China, India and South Africa that aspire to enhance their international and regional profiles while demonstrating political, economic and military strength. For such states, the notion of the responsibility of a great or regional power implies a commitment to broader efforts in security governance, including in peace-keeping and peacebuilding.

For China, a desire to reassure others about its peaceful intentions as well as to be perceived as a responsible power makes contributing to inter-national peacekeeping a valuable foreign policy tool.[38] For Brazil, India and South Africa, participating in peace operations helps assert regional leader-ship as well as serving international objectives, among them permanent membership of the UN Security Council.[39] The importance of both regional and international objectives is illustrated by the Brazilian Government's will to play a central role in MINUSTAH, to which several other Latin American countries contribute, in the face of domestic resistance.[40] South Africa's presence in peacekeeping—like its active role in peacemaking—is equally motivated by these two-level considerations: through its presence in African operations, post-apartheid South Africa asserts its authority and legitimacy within Africa and the AU—positioning itself as a regional power able and willing to shape the African security environment—and demon-strates its capacity to operate among the great powers. Similarly, for India, participation in UN operations serves both its regional power politics interests in relation to Pakistan and its global aspirations.[41]

Actual and potential impacts

The growing involvement of emerging powers in peace operations affects peacekeeping and peacebuilding in various ways. First, it confirms the obsolescence of the paradigm by which conflict management is a North–

---

[38] Gill, B. and Huang, C., *China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Impli-cations*, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 25 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Nov. 2009), p. 12. See also International Crisis Group (ICG), *China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping*, Asia Report no. 166 (ICG: Beijing, New York and Brussels, 17 Apr. 2009).

[39] On Brazil see Soares de Lima, M. R., 'Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities', *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1 (Jan. 2006), pp. 21–40; Sotomayor, A. C., *The Peace Soldier from the South: From Praetorianism to Peacekeeping*, Unpublished PhD dis-sertation, Columbia University, 2004, chapter 5. On India see Salma Bava, U., 'India's role in the emerging world order', Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Briefing Paper 4 (FES: New Delhi, Mar. 2007). On South Africa see Landsberg, C., 'South Africa's global strategy and status', Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Briefing Paper 16 (FES: Berlin, Nov. 2006).

[40] See Gauthier, A. and de Souza, S. J., 'Brazil in Haiti: debate over the peacekeeping mission', FRIDE Comment, 15 Nov. 2006, <http://www.fride.org/download/COM_BraHaiti_ENG_nov06.pdf>.

[41] See Salma Bava (note 39). On similar motives underlying the military budgeting decisions of these 4 countries see chapter 4 in this volume.

South interaction, with conflicts occurring in the South while the responses come from the North. The role of emerging powers in peace-keeping is one example, among others, of a South–South interaction pattern. Although in a UN context peacekeeping has been characterized by a South–South relationship since at least the mid-1990s, when Northern states largely stopped contributing personnel to UN operations, the arrival of emerging powers marks a qualitative shift in this South–South cooperation.

Second, from the point of view of the UN Secretariat, increased contribution of personnel, equipment and specialized skills by countries with large military and police capabilities is a welcome development that potentially provides an answer to the serious shortfalls in capabilities that have afflicted UN operations in recent years.[42] In the absence of significant participation by the major Northern powers, the presence of emerging powers also enhances the operations' legitimacy in the sense that it reinforces the idea of an international community acting through the UN, as opposed to second-tier countries carrying the bulk of the burden. For Northern states, increased resources from non-Northern powers may alleviate the pressure they face due to their limited participation in UN operations. While Northern states remain engaged primarily in other types of conflict management activity, in particular in EU and NATO operations, the role played by emerging powers in UN operations can be presented as an illustration of global burden sharing.

Emerging powers in peacekeeping debates

A third way in which the increasing involvement of emerging powers may have an impact on peacekeeping and peacebuilding is policy, as they put forward alternatives to the prevailing ideas and policy options. Despite their rising economic and diplomatic statures, Brazil, India and South Africa still see themselves as part of the Global South and as champions of the developing world.[43] While it now has the second largest economy in the world and has long held a permanent Security Council seat, China is still considered part of the South and clearly differentiates itself from the Western powers.[44] Also, India and South Africa are prominent members of the NAM. Overall, this may lead these countries to distance themselves from the current policies.

---

[42] See Xinhua, 'UN official lauds China's peacekeeping efforts', *China Daily*, 30 July 2010; and Gill and Huang (note 38), p. 1.

[43] See e.g. India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA), 'Brasília Declaration', IBSA Dialogue Forum, Fourth Summit of Heads of State/Government, Brasília, 15 Apr. 2010. For information and documentation on IBSA see <http://www. ibsa-trilateral.org/>.

[44] 'China overtakes Japan as world's second-biggest economy', BBC News, 14 Feb. 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321>.

In peacekeeping debates, Brazil, China, India and South Africa agree on some guiding principles. In particular, they adhere strongly to the concept of state sovereignty and take a relatively strict and narrow stance on the three peacekeeping principles, generally opposing the conceptual over-stretch discussed above. Their insistence on state sovereignty, which is driven by a certain conception of international relations, shapes these emerging powers' vision of the appropriate level of ambition of peace oper-ations. They thus advocate a 'light footprint' approach rather than a heavier one that risks generating dependence;[45] insist on local ownership and the host state's responsibilities;[46] and warn against transplanting models from one region to another.[47]

Although the critiques vary, they reflect normative divergences as well as a common uneasiness about current practices in peacekeeping and peace-building. Moreover, they implicitly call into question the view of liberal peacebuilding as a panacea. For example, India contends that its own post-independence state-building experience could be put to better use in UN peacebuilding, and China rejects 'unified standards for peacebuilding endeavours' and emphasizes development as the central long-term object-ive of peacebuilding.[48]

Such normative divergences might affect peacekeeping or peacebuilding mandates under discussion whenever Brazil, India or South Africa sit on the Security Council or the PBC (as a permanent member of the Security Council, China also has a permanent PBC seat; India sits permanently in the PBC as one of the top five troop and police contributors) or manage to get their positions defended by others in these forums. In the longer run, the normative divergences could also pervade thinking about peacebuild-ing wherever it is discussed or implemented. Already, mandates are regu-larly softened in the Security Council to accommodate China's positions.[49] It will be interesting in 2011, when Brazil, China, India and South Africa all

[45] See Cordeiro Dunlop, R. M., Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, Statement to the general debate of the UN General Assembly Special Political and Decolonization Committee 'Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects', 25 Oct. 2010, <http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/10d-dunlop-descolonization.html>.

[46] Liu, Z., Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN, Statement to the Security Council debate on post-conflict peacebuilding, 22 July 2009, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t575181.htm>.

[47] Puri, H. S., Permanent Representative of India to the UN, Statement at the informal meeting on the 2010 Review of the Peacebuilding Commission, New York, 10 May 2010, <http://www.betterpeace.org/files/PBCReview_Consultation2_Stmt_India_10May10.pdf>; and United Nations, GA/PK/203 and GA/PK/204 (note 27).

[48] Puri (note 47); Lei, Z., 'China's influence on the future of UN peacekeeping', eds de Coning, Stensland and Tardy (note 16), pp. 92–93; Liu (note 46); and Liu, T., 'Marching for a more open, confident and responsible great power: explaining China's involvement in UN peacekeeping operations', *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, vol. 13, nos 1–2 (Jan. 2009).

[49] See International Crisis Group (note 38), p. 17.

sit on the Security Council, to see how their behaviours and tactics shape peace operation mandates.

More broadly, despite its general acceptance by the UN General Assembly, Brazil, China, India and South Africa have all shown themselves to be uncomfortable with the concept of the responsibility to protect, which they perceive as a potential threat to state sovereignty in the hands of Northern powers.[50] In this debate, as in many others, the emerging powers and other Southern countries have explicitly challenged the normative agenda of the North. However, they have so far failed to come up with convincing alternative narratives.

Clash or cooperation?

While emerging powers may in the future represent a force that can potentially affect the way peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities are run, measuring their influence to date is difficult and is furthermore complicated for a number of reasons. Whatever role they may play in the longer run, several factors suggest that no major normative clash with the traditional setters of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda is looming. Some of these factors are discussed below.

An uncertain political force

First, the characterization of emerging powers as an entity that could speak and act as such is empirically problematic. Fears of an imminent confrontation over peace operation norms presuppose the existence of emerging powers as a political force bringing together like-minded states and buttressing common interests. In general terms, such cohesion has not materialized and disparities among these four countries abound.[51] As has been observed about the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), they have 'distinctive cultural and historical trajectories, as well as domestic political systems, economic development and structure, location and interests' to such an extent that a relative-gains approach may prevail over a 'desire for absolute collective gains'.[52] China's political system distinguishes it from the 'league of democracies' gathered in the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) forum.[53] China's long-standing rivalry with India—and

---

[50] See Hamilton, R. J., 'The responsibility to protect: from document to doctrine–but what of implementation?', *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, vol. 19 (2006); and Bellamy, A. J., *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities* (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2009).

[51] See Nye, J., 'What's in a BRIC? Not as much as many observers imagine', *Daily Star* (Beirut), 14 May 2010.

[52] Herd, G. P., *The Global Puzzle: Order in an Age of Primacy, Power-Shifts and Interdependence*, Geneva Papers—Research Series no. 1 (Geneva Centre for Security Policy: Geneva, 2011), p. 26.

[53] See Mohan, C. R., 'IBSA to BRICSA: China churns the new alphabet soup', *Indian Express*, 16 Apr. 2010.

its lukewarm position on an Indian permanent Security Council seat—also tends to reduce the probability of a political alliance in the peacekeeping sphere.[54] At the UN, China's status in the Security Council puts it in a substantially different position to the IBSA members, all of whose foreign policies are, to a degree, determined by their aspiration to sit on the Security Council permanently.

As a consequence, be it on the issues of sovereignty, degree of intrusiveness or conception of the type of political and economic model that peace operations should promote, the lines of convergence among the four emerging regional powers are more likely to be on a case-by-case basis than the result of them acting as a 'Southern caucus'. Likewise, these countries forming a united front in case of a political disagreement between one of them and the Northern countries over peacekeeping or peacebuilding seems an unlikely scenario. Even if Brazil has shown evidence of independence vis-à-vis Northern countries in recent years, it arguably shares as many interests with the EU and the USA as it does with China or India. Likewise, India's relationship with the USA may well prevail over that with China in a North–South disagreement.

Insofar as the critique of the liberal peace model is concerned, a united front is equally unlikely to see the light. Interestingly enough, many of the critiques addressed by Brazil, China, India and South Africa to current peacekeeping and peacebuilding practices are similar to those made at a general level vis-à-vis the liberal peace model. However, with a few caveats on state sovereignty and the degree of intrusiveness of operations, Brazil and India—democracies with liberal economic systems—would presumably have little problem with the liberal peace approach. Indeed, Brazil's policy as chair of the country-specific configuration for Guinea-Bissau in the PBC has not revealed any significant distance from the traditional peacebuilding agenda. Even China would most probably tolerate economic liberalization—provided that the host state gives its consent and the level of local ownership is sufficient—and only question the political dimension of liberal peacebuilding. Finally, critiques of liberal peacebuilding have been confined to academic circles and, to a limited degree, to institutions such as the UN.[55] The types of connection between academic critiques and the policy orientations of countries such as Brazil or China that would be expected to emerge from a convergent scepticism about liberal peacebuilding have not been observed.

---

[54] Emmott, W., *Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: New York, 2008).

[55] Paris, R., 'Saving liberal peacebuilding', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 36, no. 2 (Apr. 2010), p. 339.

Differences in peacekeeping and peacebuilding participation

In the peacekeeping field, emerging powers present very different profiles that make any generalization difficult and further weaken the idea of a homogenous group of countries that would conceive of their peacekeeping roles in the same way. Brazil, China and South Africa have only recently started to see peace operations as vehicles of their foreign policies. As of December 2010, India, Brazil, South Africa and China were all among the top 15 contributors of civilian police and military personnel to UN operations, ranking 3rd (with 8691 personnel), 13th (2267 personnel), 14th (2187 personnel) and 15th (2039 personnel), respectively.[56] Ten years earlier, however, while India already ranked third (contributing 2738 out of the total 37 733 uniformed personnel deployed), China ranked 43rd (98 personnel), Brazil 44th (95 personnel) and South Africa 80th (with only 4 personnel deployed).[57] While the motivations and objectives behind Brazil, China and South Africa's increased engagement in peacekeeping is beginning to be relatively well documented, the story of the impact of their engagement is yet to be written. It is also worth noting that, despite their growing importance, the three newcomers contribute fewer personnel to peacekeeping than countries of much more modest size and political and economic stature, such as Jordan, Nepal and Senegal.[58]

Furthermore, besides India, only China among the four countries examined here contributes significantly to several operations on different continents. Brazil is mainly present in Haiti, and South Africa contributes uniformed personnel to only two operations, both in Africa: MONUSCO and UNAMID. Only India deploys substantial numbers of civilian personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, peace operations headquarters or political missions.[59] While South Africa has participated in three of the four AU-led operations to date, the conflict management policies of the other three countries have not developed outside the UN framework.[60] China and India have only ever participated in UN-led operations. Brazil contributed to the EU Military Operation in the DRC (Operation Artemis) in 2003, but

---

[56] United Nations (note 8).

[57] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Monthly summary of troops contribution to United Nations operations', 31 Dec. 2000, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/>. See also appendix 3A, figures 3A.5–8.

[58] See appendix 3A, figure 3A.3; and United Nations (note 8).

[59] See New York University, Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010* (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO, 2010), pp. 155–56; Gowan, R. (ed), *Review of Political Missions 2010* (New York University, Center on International Cooperation: New York, 2010), pp. 129–30; and the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 36).

[60] South Africa has participated in the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, which preceded UNAMID; the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), to which it contributed the bulk of the troops; and UNAMID. It does not participate in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

otherwise has only contributed to UN operations, and refused to partici-
pate in the ad hoc coalition force deployed in Haiti in 2003.

The four emerging powers also contribute to peace operations in differ-
ent ways. India has a long record of providing both troops and 'force
enablers', such as helicopters; has had many high-ranking positions in UN
operations; and regularly takes part in coercive actions, despite expressing
unease about the concept of robust peacekeeping. South Africa had raised
its profile as a peacemaker in Africa before it became significantly engaged
in peacekeeping operations. In contrast, while Chinese cooperation—or
non-obstruction—is increasingly required for conflict resolution world-
wide, its peacemaking record is mixed.[61] China did use its political clout in
negotiations with the Sudanese Government to secure consent for the
deployment of UNAMID and in discussions on the DRC with Congolese
and Rwandan parties.[62] Nevertheless, China is often presented in the West
as part of the problem as much as of the solution in conflict resolution.[63]
For example, in the case of Darfur, China had previously used its Security
Council seat to protect the Sudanese Government from sanctions and to
delay the deployment of a peace operation, invoking Sudan's sovereignty
and the necessity of the government's consent. In the peacekeeping field,
China's contribution has so far been confined to engineering battalions,
field hospitals and police personnel. Although China has contemplated the
deployment of combat troops, it would probably not consider coercive mis-
sions to the extent that India does.[64]

Furthermore, with the exception of China, emerging powers still lag
behind in financial terms. While China is now the seventh largest contrib-
utor to the UN peacekeeping budget (accounting for 3.94 per cent of the
total budget in 2010–12)—behind the USA, Japan, the United Kingdom,
Germany, France and Italy—the assessment rates for the financing of
peacekeeping operations make Brazil, India and South Africa minor
players, with Brazil contributing 0.322 per cent (comparable with Singa-
pore and the United Arab Emirates), India 0.107 per cent (comparable with
Slovenia and Hungary) and South Africa 0.077 per cent (comparable with
Venezuela and Luxembourg).[65]

Most importantly, the increasing contributions of emerging powers to
peacekeeping operations have not so far been matched by parallel efforts in
the area of peacebuilding. Be it in the fields of humanitarian or develop-

---

[61] See Richardson, C., 'Explaining variance in Chinese peacekeeping policy: international image
and target audience concerns', Paper presented at the 50th International Studies Association Annual
Convention, New York, 18 Feb. 2009.

[62] Gill and Huang (note 38), p. 14; and International Crisis Group (note 38), p. 16.

[63] International Crisis Group (note 38), p. 16.

[64] Gill and Huang (note 38), p. 28.

[65] United Nations, General Assembly, 'Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235
and 55/236', Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/220, 23 Sep. 2009.

ment aid in post-conflict environments, Brazil, China, India and South Africa still lag behind Northern countries. China has significantly increased its bilateral aid to African countries but keeps a low profile in peacebuilding debates. India frequently draws attention to its unique state-building experience and comparative advantages in peacebuilding areas such as security-sector reform and post-conflict transition.[66] Nevertheless it is far less active in peacebuilding than it is in peacekeeping, partly as a matter of policy and partly due to a lack of financial resources.[67] Within the PBC, where all emerging powers sat in 2010, only Brazil played a proactive role as chair of the country-specific configuration for Guinea-Bissau. South Africa ensured some visibility by acting as one of the three co-facilitators of the PBC review, but was not a driving force in the discussions.

Peacebuilding is an area where liberal peacebuilding norms could be openly challenged. Instead, Brazil, China, India and South Africa have generally gone along with the objectives and policies of the PBC. One reason may be that full host state consent is a precondition for country-level activities of the PBC. Another is financial. More than in the peacekeeping field, donors play a key role in peacebuilding. Data on Brazil's, China's, India's and South Africa's total financial contribution to peacebuilding programmes is difficult to obtain. In deposits to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, China ranks 16th out of the 47 donors, India 19th, Brazil 23rd (South Africa does not contribute), and their gross contribution is significantly lower than those of most members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[68]

Socialization and pragmatism

Another reason to believe that a normative clash is not imminent is that greater involvement in peace operations may influence the four countries' own conceptions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in a way that brings them closer to the current philosophy and practice, whether through a process of socialization or due to pragmatism. Contributing to peace operations, and the related involvement in international institutions and social interactions that characterize multilateral policymaking, could help to shape the emerging powers' positions and policies. As an example, 'there is

---

[66] See United Nations, 'General Assembly weighs in on UN peacebuilding architecture, adopts text recognizing central importance of Peacebuilding Commission', Press Release GA/11017, New York, 29 Oct. 2010, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga11017.doc.htm>.

[67] For the 4 countries' voluntary contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund see 'Pledges, commitments and deposits', 28 Feb. 2010, <http://www.unpbf.org/pledges.shtml>.

[68] See UN Peacebuilding Fund, 'Peacebuilding Fund cumulative pledges, commitments and deposits, 28 February 2010', <http://www.unpbf.org/pledges.shtml>. On China see also Lum, T. et al., *China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress R40361 (US Congress: Washington, DC, 25 Feb. 2009).

considerable, if subtle, evidence of the socialization of Chinese diplomats, strategists, and analysts in certain counter-realpolitik norms and practices as a result of participation in [international] institutions'.[69]

There is also evidence that the emerging powers are more pragmatic in their approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding than their public statements would imply. Current operations have shown how they draw a distinction between principled positions on issues such as state sovereignty, host states' consent or protection of civilians on the one hand, and country-specific situations on the other hand. China is a case in point. Be it in relation to its 'One China' policy, its state-centric approach to international relations or its narrow conception of sovereignty, China has revealed pragmatism and flexibility, for example by contributing to MINUSTAH even though Haiti formally recognizes Taiwan, or by tacitly endorsing intrusive Security Council mandates and the broad interpretation of the peacekeeping principles.[70]

Brazil's and India's policies have equally been to a degree shaped by the operations they have participated in. If sovereignty and host state consent are central to their conceptions of peace operations, their own contributions, from Haiti—where Brazilian forces are deeply involved in confronting criminal gangs—to the DRC—where Indian peacekeepers are engaged in operations against rebels and militias—have shown that pragmatism often prevails over ideology. In the case of Brazil in particular, the gap between the positions it has taken on state sovereignty in peacekeeping debates—along with its initial reluctance to have a Chapter VII mandate for MINUSTAH[71]—and its policy within MINUSTAH, including an insistence on more intrusiveness, is revealing of such pragmatism.

It is also possible that the emerging powers will go through the process of disillusionment and retrenchment experienced by Western states in the early 1990s. Difficulties and failures could well dampen their enthusiasm for UN multilateralism, especially in democracies like Brazil, where domestic support for involvement in UN operations is shaky.

Finally, the importance of peace operations in the broader realm of international politics should not be overestimated. A major confrontation over norms may simply not be worth the fight, particularly—in the case of the IBSA countries—if it could damage their prospects of a permanent Security Council seat or their relationship with the USA. Although India is developing a well-articulated discourse on peacekeeping issues and is critical of the

[69] Johnston, A. I., *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 2008), p. xiv.

[70] See Gill and Huang (note 38), pp. 13–14; and International Crisis Group (note 38), pp. 17–22.

[71] On Brazil's opposition to a Chapter VII mandate for MINUSTAH see Center for Economic and Policy Research, 'Wikileaked documents shed more light on U.S., Brazilian motives behind MINUSTAH', 23 Dec. 2010, <http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/wikileaked-documents-shed-more-light-on-us-brazilian-motives-behind-minustah>.

Security Council's working methods, it has not acquired political influence commensurate with its massive field presence, nor has it given any indication that it intends to do so.[72] India wants to play a role for the reasons mentioned above and puts forward its own views, but does not necessarily see peacekeeping as an area where norms should be broken. In the same vein, despite its growing contribution and insistence on some key issues, the level of political input that China has provided has also remained limited. Zhao Lei underlines the 'significant shift' in Chinese strategic culture, 'from passively satisfying international norms to actively shaping them' and contends that China rejects the liberal peace model.[73] Nevertheless, China has kept a low profile in mandate design as well as in strategic oversight of operations, including those to which it contributes personnel. Furthermore, the document produced by a group of developing countries that gathered in Rio de Janeiro in June 2010, at the initiative of Brazil, to develop 'perspectives from the South' as part of the New Horizon consultation process is remarkably close to mainstream policies.[74] This leads back to the issue of the relatively low strategic importance of peace operations and the relative costs and gains of breaking or following existing norms. If challenging the peacekeeping consensus is politically costly and, as Roland Paris states in relation to liberal peacebuilding, 'alternative strategies would likely create more problems than they would solve', then change is more likely to come through reform of current practices rather than a major normative clash.[75]

V. Conclusions: towards a new consensus?

Peace operations are simultaneously institutional responses to extremely complex situations and mirrors of states' foreign policies and interactions, with all the ambiguities and constraints that come with them. They are the product of international organizations' policies as well as states' commitment and visions. These two characteristics are central to an understanding of what peace operations can achieve and of their degree of success, failure and possible progress. They also account for the nearly permanent state of crisis in which peace operations find themselves, be it in terms of legitimacy or effectiveness. Since the end of the cold war, policy and aca-

[72] See 'Peacekeeping: relationship with TCCs/PCCs', *Security Council Report*, Update Report no. 4, 25 June 2009; Krishna, S. M., External Affairs Minister of India, Statement to the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, 29 Sep. 2010, <http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail1594/statement-by-external-affairs-minister-s.m.-krishna-at-65th-session-of-unga,-ny>; and Puri, M. S., Deputy Permanent Representative of India, Statement to the Security Council debate on peacekeeping, New York, 6 Aug. 2010, <http://www.un.int/india/2010/ind1715.pdf>.

[73] Lei (note 48), p. 93.

[74] United Nations, General Assembly, 'A new horizon for UN peacekeeping: perspectives from the South, 16 to 18 June 2010', A/64/907, 13 Sep. 2010.

[75] Paris (note 55), p. 357.

demic literature has abounded on the political and operational difficulties that peace operations have faced and on the need to rethink and improve how institutional practice and states' policies interact in trying to establish sustainable peace in post-conflict settings.

At the core of this debate is a broad international consensus on the principles, purpose and methods of peace operations. This consensus is not openly threatened, and UN operations are still theoretically created in accordance with broadly accepted principles and norms. However, the consensus is fragile, and may have been further undermined by recent developments in relation to peacekeeping policies and states' contributions. Not only are the key characteristics of contemporary peace operations being challenged, but a common understanding of what these operations can be expected to achieve is also missing. Peace operations suffer from a commitment gap between different categories of states, as well as from divergences between states on some of the key parameters of outside intervention.

Against this backdrop, the growing role of emerging powers in peace operations sheds new light on the peacekeeping consensus, as these countries potentially challenge the status quo. States like Brazil, China, India and South Africa can bring—and already have brought—many benefits to peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in terms of capabilities, expertise and political input. Their engagement can be seen as bringing a quantitative as well as a qualitative shift in peace operations, but can also be seen as a threat to the Northern-dominated peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda. These four countries take a principled approach to peace operations in debates, emphasizing sovereignty, non-interference and local ownership in a way that may have an impact on actual operation mandates. However, in most cases they have only started to become significantly involved in peace operations in the past few years; thus, any definite conclusion on their long-term policies would be premature.

While the prospect of a clash of normative agendas between two diverging visions of conflict management may intuitively make sense, an analysis of recent developments as well as of the four countries' respective characteristics and policies yields little evidence that such a clash is looming. Existing peacekeeping and peacebuilding norms, principles and practices may well be, and indeed are, challenged, at the institutional, state and academic levels. Nevertheless, the dividing lines in any coming disputes will not necessarily be along a North–South axis. Furthermore, Brazil, China, India and South Africa have revealed high degrees of pragmatism, which appears to have shaped their policies in line with current practices rather than taking fundamentally different approaches. In the end, the question arises whether peacekeeping, as an activity of relatively low importance to most states, is worth the costs that a normative clash would

probably entail. For emerging powers, the concept of responsibility associated with the great power status to which they aspire will also shape their peacekeeping policies.

Notwithstanding, peace operations are going through a period of uncertainty, and if the UN and others are now focusing on the consolidation of existing practices, efforts must also aim to restore consensus among states, international organizations and local actors, without which effective and legitimate peace operations are unlikely to exist. To what extent and how emerging powers will influence this consensus will be crucial. If they become even more prominent in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding field, will they continue with the relatively benign approach that they have followed so far or will they be more assertive and develop a truly distinct agenda? If so, how close will they come to constituting a political force?

Key in the debate will be the role of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. No matter how determined a country may be, it will only be able to significantly shape the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda through the five permanent members. This might constitute a guarantee of a certain level of stability, unless China decides otherwise. However, an alternative scenario could be a shift of power and responsibilities away from the UN and towards more ad hoc mechanisms, in which case the broad consensus could once again be undermined. It is thus in Northern states' interests to co-opt emerging powers and make sure that they act within existing institutions rather than outside them. Beyond peacekeeping and peacebuilding, what is at stake is the evolving international political framework, and the way that emerging powers choose to carve out their place in the system. The responsibility is theirs as well as that of established powers. UN peace operations are only one area among many where this process will be played out.