

# Introduction

## International security, armaments and disarmament in 2008

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### I. Overview

#### **Assessing the past year**

The past year saw increasing threats to security, stability and peace in nearly every corner of the globe. The effects of the global financial crisis will be likely to exacerbate these challenges as governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) struggle to respond with effective resources. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, with moderate improvements to the security situation in the latter and worsening conditions in the former. Elsewhere around the world, 16 major intrastate conflicts raged on—in places such as Burundi, Colombia, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan—with many gathering intensity over the course of 2008. Deliberate violence against civilians perpetrated by warring parties was increasingly and appallingly common.

Relations between Russia and the United States, and between Russia and many of its European neighbours, worsened considerably over the course of 2008, highlighted most by the brief but intense conflict between Georgia and Russia in August which left hundreds of civilians and soldiers dead and wounded. That conflict, combined with US plans to install elements of a ballistic missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland, undermined Russian-US cooperation on a host of questions, including on global nuclear disarmament and addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions. Relations between India and Pakistan remained tense in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, in November—a type of attack which looks likely to be repeated. The year ended with Israel launching one of its most intense assaults in decades against Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip.

Global military spending, arms production and the arms trade all continued their overall upward trend while efforts to stem nuclear proliferation made little progress. The countries that possess nuclear weapons showed few concrete signs of disarming, indeed many took important steps

in 2008 to significantly improve their arsenals, while the countries that aspire to a nuclear weapon capability took further steps towards that goal. One of the world's most sophisticated and acclaimed conventional arms control agreements, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, was in abeyance throughout 2008 because of Russia's unilateral decision in December 2007 to suspend its participation in the treaty.

The past year saw some promising developments. High expectations—probably overly so—generated by the election of Barack Obama as US President carried with them hopes for a sound exit strategy from Iraq, stabilization in Afghanistan and changes in the way that the USA engages with the international community. Expectations are also high that the new US President will seek to rebuild transatlantic relations, establish more productive relations with Russia, reach out to the Muslim world and—with the appointment of special envoys to address developments in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Pakistan, and regarding Iran—devote more time and energy to improving the security situation in these regions.

Elsewhere in the world, the election in March 2008 of the Kuomintang leader Ma Ying-jeou as President of Taiwan significantly improved relations between mainland China and Taiwan and the two sides expressed their intentions to introduce more confidence-building measures (CBMs) into their relationship. In other CBM-related moves, China established bilateral military hotlines in 2008 with the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), Russia and the USA. Also in 2008, the leaders of 12 South American countries agreed to establish a new regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR), to include a South American parliament, with the intention of deepening political and economic integration in the region.

In one of the most positive developments of 2008, 94 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Oslo in December, including 18 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The CCM prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions. In addition, the goal of nuclear disarmament continued to receive senior-level attention and endorsement from high-ranking former officials and serving political leaders in Europe and the USA.

### **Key themes of *SIPRI Yearbook 2009***

In this volume, the 40th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, the contributors delve into these issues and more in such areas as international and regional security, peace operations, multilateral security institutions, military expenditure, military industries, arms trade, non-proliferation and arms control. Drawn from more than a dozen countries, the 2532 contributors to

*SIPRI Yearbook 2009* represent some of the world's leading experts in their respective fields.

The core of the volume is comprised of 12 chapters divided in to three themes: international security, armaments and disarmament. The first part sets the broad context of international security, presenting and examining some of the fundamental developments that define the international security scene. The second part of the Yearbook provides information and analysis on global, regional and national trends in armaments, including on military spending, arms production, the arms trade and nuclear forces. The third part focuses on disarmament, providing an account and explanation of the past year's developments related to nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, reducing the threat posed by chemical and biological materials, conventional arms control, and controlling the transfers of other security-related goods and technologies.

The 2009 edition of the SIPRI Yearbook also includes vast amounts of data and analysis on all of these issues, as well as extensive annexes that catalogue international arms control and non-proliferation agreements, multilateral security institutions and a chronology of major events in arms control, non-proliferation and international security in 2008.

Three important themes emerge from the research and findings in *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*.

First, the international security situation is increasingly characterized by the diffusion and fragmentation of violence, perpetuated by more and more actors, who exact a progressively more dreadful toll on the lives of civilians and render the task of conflict management and resolution by global security institutions more difficult and challenging. The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan illustrates this trend all too well.

Second, the trends in military spending, arms production and the arms trade are all on a continued upward trajectory, driven primarily by the USA and its decisions and policies related to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the time of writing, the global financial crisis that took hold at the end of 2008 had not yet had a significant impact on these overall rising trends. Nuclear weapons, while fewer in number worldwide, remain central to the strategic security of their possessors, with more than 23 300 warheads in the hands of the known and suspected nuclear weapon states.

Third, international institutions and other mechanisms to reduce the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons and weapon technologies are struggling to fully meet their goals or adjust to new challenges, even as key non-proliferation and disarmament milestones—such as the May 2010 review conference for the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—draw near.

## II. Highlights and findings of *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*

### **Security and conflicts**

The first four chapters of *SIPRI Yearbook 2009* address and analyse emergent challenges of contemporary conflict: mass displacement of persons, one-sided violence against civilians, the legitimacy of peace operations and weakening international security institutions in Afghanistan.

In the opening chapter of the volume, two of the world's foremost experts on internally displaced persons (IDPs), Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, provide an in-depth study of the challenges posed by the mass displacement of civilians as a result of violence. The chapter details the traumatic scale and impact of violence-related mass displacement, which is an increasingly common feature of contemporary conflict. The authors report that there are 26 million IDPs in the world and also demonstrate the weaknesses of the international community in responding effectively to the massive displacement of persons as a result of violence.

Cohen and Deng stress the need for peace accords to take into account and resolve the root causes which led to the mass displacement of civilians in the first place, in order to assure the safe and secure resettlement of displaced persons to their homes. In doing so, the displaced persons themselves should be consulted and involved in post-conflict peace processes. Cohen and Deng also argue that governments must take effective responsibility for their displaced citizens and cooperate more closely with the international community. The United Nations, too, must strengthen its institutions that are responsible for alleviating the plight of IDPs, and the international community should be more willing to conduct discussions with insurgent groups, which often control areas where large numbers of IDPs live. Finally, the authors argue, the international community must build a stronger consensus on the need for intervention if and when mass atrocities are about to be or are being committed against innocent civilians.

Chapter 2, which tracks trends and data related to armed conflicts worldwide, focuses this year on the issue of one-sided violence against civilians. While there have been some positive trends related to armed conflicts since the 1990s, one-sided violence—the deliberate perpetration of armed force against civilians by a government or a formally organized group—continues largely unabated. The main patterns of one-sided violence in contemporary armed conflict are also detailed and specific cases of one-sided violence are analysed with reference to the conflicts in 2008 in Colombia, Georgia, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The chapter reaches the key conclusion that one-sided violence is increasingly perpetrated by non-state actors that often enjoy strong government ties and support. The rise in one-sided violence by non-state actors follows the overall rise in the diversity

and role of non-state actors in armed conflicts, particularly in weak and failed states.

Chapter 2 is followed by two important appendices. One, prepared by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, presents data and analysis on the patterns in major armed conflict from 1998 to 2008, including information on one-sided violence in the context of armed conflict. The other appendix presents the Global Peace Index (GPI) for the first time in the SIPRI Yearbook. The GPI is a scoring mechanism that was recently developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace in cooperation with the Economist Intelligence Unit. The GPI employs 23 indicators to rank 144 countries by their relative state of peace.

Chapter 3 provides extensive analysis and data on key developments in multilateral peacekeeping operations, including an in-depth and highly detailed appendix that presents information and insights on the 60 multilateral peace operation in 2008. This year the chapter takes up widespread concerns that peacekeeping is facing a systemic crisis and the role that the issue of legitimacy may play in this crisis. Over the course of 2008, events in such places as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Georgia and Sudan—including problems in managing ‘spoiler groups’, misconduct by peacekeepers, political deadlock and deployment paralysis—arguably placed the future of peacekeeping in jeopardy.

The chapter discusses the political, legal and moral factors that define the legitimacy of peace operations and then examines the role that legitimacy (or the lack thereof) played in a number of peacekeeping missions in 2008. A number of ongoing missions are analysed, including the South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces, the European Union (EU) Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), the EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Chapter 3 concludes by drawing a strong link between the political, legal and moral legitimacy of a given peace operation and its ultimate effectiveness. Missions that are perceived locally as lacking an appropriate mandate or that engage in illegal activities and other misbehaviour (arms trafficking and sexual exploitation, for example, as alleged against members of MONUC) will not be able to execute their mandates effectively. In an era when the demand for effective peacekeeping far outpaces supply, the UN and other organizations that deploy peace operations must improve decision making, oversight and training not simply to ‘make the numbers’, but to ensure that the missions enjoy full political, legal and moral standing, and legitimacy in order to have the most positive impact possible.

Chapter 4 analyses the security situation in Afghanistan. In particular, it examines the role and challenges of the principal international institutions

tasked with bringing greater security and stability to Afghanistan: the UN, the EU, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

In detailing these roles and challenges, the chapter emphasizes that, as a result of difficult political, economic, infrastructural and physical conditions in Afghanistan and a lack of understanding about the country, international efforts in Afghanistan are fragmented, duplicative and often of poor quality—a view similar to that expressed by the outgoing EU envoy to Afghanistan in 2008. Among other coordination challenges, the chapter notes that the Government of Afghanistan tries to work with approximately 60 donor countries, 41 troop-contributing countries and hundreds of NGOs. Within ISAF and NATO, questions arise about command, burden sharing and coordination across some 26 diverse and geographically dispersed provincial reconstruction teams contributed by 15 countries. These and other challenges are a factor in, and are exacerbated by, the deteriorating security situation in the country.

Chapter 4 concludes soberly by arguing that, while the role of international institutions will be crucial to the security, reconstruction and development of Afghanistan as a viable state, current conditions and prospects do not bode well for the effectiveness of these institutions. The contributions of individual states will be hostage to the vagaries of domestic politics and, as such, the institutions in which they serve will face continuing divisions given their members' differing interests, capabilities and agendas. Afghanistan's future in the next few years will remain troubled and tenuous at best.

### **Military spending and armaments**

The four chapters in part II of this volume offer authoritative and comprehensive analysis and data on military spending, arms production, the arms trade and nuclear forces. *SIPRI Yearbook 2009* documents continued upward trends for military spending, arms production and the arms trade. The chapter on nuclear forces outlines the continuing modernization of the world's nuclear arsenals and notes that thousands of nuclear weapons remain on high alert today—particularly those in the hands of Russia and the USA.

Chapter 5 provides a rich and detailed discussion of trends in military spending region by region around the globe. The chapter's appendices provide military spending data for 168 countries for the period 1999–2008 and disaggregated data on military spending on equipment and personnel by members of NATO. In addition, the chapter focuses on military spending by the USA in 2008, with a special emphasis on spending related to the 'global war on terrorism'. It also provides one of the first systematic calculations of spending on the Iraqi security forces.

Among its principal findings, the chapter notes that Eastern Europe saw the greatest increase—174 per cent—in military spending between 1999 and 2008, most of it accounted for by Russia. Military spending in the USA—which grew by 66 per cent between 1999 and 2008—has risen to its highest level in real terms since World War II. Unlike past practice in funding wars, the USA pays for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq through emergency supplemental appropriations, financed by borrowing.

Chapter 5 concludes by noting that the average annual rate of growth in military spending has been nearly 4 per cent over the past 10 years and that this rate is likely to continue in the near term even as the global financial crisis takes hold. Such growth in military spending is also likely to continue despite a non-binding UN Security Council statement in November 2008 that stressed ‘the importance of appropriate levels of military expenditure in order to achieve undiminished security for all at the lowest appropriate level of armaments’ and appealed for increased spending on development.

Trends and key developments in global arms production are detailed and analysed in chapter 6, which also includes the SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing companies for 2007 and an appendix listing the principal acquisitions by arms producers in 2008. In step with the continuing increases in military spending noted in chapter 5, global arms production also continues to rise. Arms sales by the 100 largest arms-producing firms rose by 11 per cent in nominal terms, to nearly \$350 billion in 2007. The chapter details some of the principal sources of growth in the industry, discusses the major merger and acquisition deals and briefly considers the early impact of the global financial crisis on global arms production.

Chapter 6 finds that the growth in arms production results from the continuing rise in US military spending, expenditure that benefits British and US companies for the most part. A notable trend is the increased activity of British firms, such as BAE Systems, which have established a stronger presence in the US market through mergers and acquisitions. Manufacturers of armoured vehicles—such as BAE Systems, Navistar and Force Protection—benefited considerably from the increase in demand for mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles for US and other forces in Iraq. The chapter also documents the success of military services companies, particularly those engaged in providing information and communications technology support. In spite of the ongoing global financial crisis, it appears that continued high US military spending and at least stable European spending, combined with the lengthy lead times required for major weapon purchases, mean that larger arms producers will probably be able to sustain strong sales in the near to medium term. For now, the chapter concludes, most of the world’s major weapon manufacturers will continue to enjoy sales equalling or exceeding those at the height of the cold war.

Chapter 7 provides SIPRI's annual in-depth measurement and analysis of the international arms trade. The chapter analyses the main exporters—the USA, Russia and certain EU states—and the principal arms importers, in particular China and India, while also taking up arms transfers to Sri Lanka, scene of one of the most intense conflicts in 2008. The chapter also addresses the impact of the global financial crisis and lower oil prices on the international arms trade. Extensive appendices provide data and information on the recipients and suppliers of major conventional weapons, on the financial value of the arms trade and on the current mechanisms—such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)—that seek greater transparency in the arms trade.

The chapter documents the continuing upward trend in the volume of arms deliveries worldwide. It notes that, since the end of the cold war, the USA and Russia, followed by Germany, France and the United Kingdom, have been the top five arms exporters, accounting for about three-quarters of global arms exports over that period (and 78 per cent from 2004 to 2008). From 2004 to 2008, the five largest weapons importers were, in rank order, China, India, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea and Greece.

Chapter 7 concludes that, while the global financial crisis and the fall in oil prices will probably reduce arms transfers somewhat in coming years, the major suppliers still have large back orders to fulfil, especially the USA. On the other hand, the second largest arms exporter, Russia, may see a downturn in its weapon exports. Chinese imports from Russia have come to a nearly complete stop in the past year with no major new orders currently pending. Russia is also likely to face stiff competition in the years ahead from US and European suppliers for the Indian market, the other major destination for Russian arms exports in recent years.

Chapter 8 takes an in-depth look at nuclear forces in eight states: the USA, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Pakistan and Israel. The chapter presents several tables on current arsenals and delivery systems and an appendix, prepared by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, tallying global stocks of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium. At the start of 2009 eight states possessed nearly 8400 operational nuclear weapons, with some 2000 of them kept on a high operational alert. Counting all nuclear warheads, including those in operation, spares, those in storage and those intact warheads slated for dismantlement, these eight countries possess a total of more than 23 300 warheads, about 90 per cent of which are in the hands of Russia and the USA. The chapter also offers an assessment of the nuclear weapon development programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).

The chapter discusses each of these states' nuclear force levels and posture, research and development programmes, and doctrinal debates.



Among other important findings, the chapter concludes that all five of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, as defined by the NPT, appear firm in their determination to continue developing their nuclear weapon capabilities for the foreseeable future and to maintain these capabilities as a central aspect of their respective security strategies. China, France and the UK have all made recent statements announcing their intentions to deploy new nuclear weapon systems. In addition to these states, India, Israel and Pakistan continue to develop and deploy new nuclear-capable delivery systems.

It is true that Russia and the USA are taking steps to reduce the number of operational nuclear weapons under the auspices of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START Treaty) and the 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT). However, it is unclear at the time of writing whether there will be a new US–Russian nuclear arms reduction agreement to replace the START Treaty, which expires in December 2009. Moreover, Russia, in the face of the growing conventional superiority of the USA and its NATO allies and having enjoyed growing financial resources in recent years, has given nuclear weapons a more central place in its security strategy. In the USA, the dismantlement of warheads has slowed compared to rates in the 1990s as priority is given to extending the lives of those warheads that will make up the so-called ‘enduring stockpile’.

### **Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament**

In part III, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009* turns to the principal ongoing efforts to reduce the threats posed by weapons and weapon technology worldwide, with individual chapters focusing on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, chemical and biological materials, conventional weapons, and the trade in security-related items.

Chapter 9 takes up the major developments in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation in 2008. A particular focus is given to developments over the past year in three countries. First, the chapter reviews developments related to Iran’s nuclear programme and describes findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s past and ongoing nuclear activities. Second, the chapter reviews the series of disputes—particularly over the establishment of a verification regime acceptable to North Korea and the USA—which undermined and derailed full implementation of the February 2007 action plan for denuclearizing North Korea. Third, the chapter details the findings of an IAEA inspection of a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria. Major developments in Russian–US nuclear arms control discussions and other multilateral arms control and non-proliferation mechanisms are also covered by the chapter.

The chapter concludes by noting that, in spite of greater attention to strategic arms control between the Russia and the USA and renewed calls for nuclear disarmament by senior political leaders and well-known former officials, the controversies and unanswered questions surrounding the nuclear programmes of Iran, North Korea and Syria underscore the weaknesses of the non-proliferation regime. Iran's ability to defy the UN Security Council's clear insistence that it halt its uranium enrichment programme calls into question the capacity of the Security Council to enforce the will of the international community in support of the non-proliferation regime. Israel's attack on the suspected nuclear site in Syria demonstrates the lack of confidence that some states have in the regime's ability to stem proliferation. The success of the Six-Party Talks was also called into question in 2008 as the denuclearization of North Korea was once again at an impasse.

Chapter 10 delves into the efforts over the past year to reduce potential threats posed by chemical and biological materials. It includes an in-depth review of developments in the implementation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), including progress in the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and facilities.

The chapter details the growing and complex challenge of preventing the misuse of chemical and biological materials: thousands of chemical toxins and pathogenic agents could theoretically be used for malign purposes. Moreover, most threat assessments foresee the misuse of such materials not by states, but by non-state actors, further complicating preventive and remedial measures. In addition, ongoing industrial and bioscientific advancement—a welcome development overall—may add to the lethality and availability of materials that could be misused. The chapter also reviews chemical and biological weapon-related allegations in 2008 and summarizes and analyses the investigation in the USA into the anthrax letter attacks of 2001.

Chapter 10 concludes by pointing to a number of positive developments in the efforts to prevent the misuse of chemical and biological materials. These steps include more effective national regulations and prevention strategies, an increase in regional awareness-building workshops and training activities, and stepped-up attention and action under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the EU and within the framework of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In addition, laboratory and institutional bio-safety and bio-security practices receive greater and greater attention. Nevertheless, the authors reach the realistic conclusion that realizing 'absolute security' is not possible, and significant concerns and uncertainties about chemical and biological threats will persist.

Chapter 11 examines developments in conventional arms control and discusses the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the CFE Treaty, conventional arms control in the Western Balkans and confidence building among the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The chapter paints a mixed picture for institutions and agreements that attempt to reduce threats from conventional arms.

On the one hand, 2008 saw some important breakthroughs, the most significant being the successful negotiation of the CCM, a legally binding instrument to prohibit the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions, which was signed by 94 countries in December 2008. On the other hand, the situation for European conventional arms control remained troubled. With Russia's decision in December 2007 to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty—a longstanding cornerstone of European security—the agreement was in abeyance throughout 2008. Russia has put forward a number of factors to justify its decision to rethink its participation in the treaty: NATO enlargement efforts, including membership bids by Georgia and Ukraine and invitations to join being extended to Albania and Croatia; US plans to introduce missile defence units in the Czech Republic and Poland; Ukraine's demand that Russia remove its Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol by 2017; and NATO's growing 'out of area' activities such as those in Afghanistan. As a result, the quality of information exchanged among the parties has declined and the collapse of the treaty is possible.

One of the key conclusions of the chapter is that with the CFE's continuing erosion, and in the absence of its robust regime of transparency and verification, a growing environment of mistrust and risk could develop in Central and Eastern Europe, akin to that in the cold war. On the other hand, this impasse could catalyse some rethinking about security mechanisms relevant to the new realities of European security.

Chapter 12 focuses attention on a range of other security-related transfers and gives special attention to important developments in 2008, including those in the principal multilateral export control regimes, the decisions to open civil nuclear cooperation with India taken within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), changes in military- and dual-use export control policies in the EU, and steps taken to liberalize the trade in military equipment and technologies among allies and other trusted partners. An appendix includes data, information and analysis on the 27 mandatory multilateral arms embargoes in force during 2008.

Among other key findings, the chapter details the continuing trend for export control regimes to move away from the principle of universal application and towards a system of 'tailoring and targeting' that treats individual countries differently depending on political, security and other considerations. The chapter also notes that the NSG's decision to grant a country-specific exemption to allow for civil nuclear cooperation with

India will, in turn, raise questions about the political ‘price’ that countries would pay for proliferation activities and stimulate a new debate on the role and value of export controls in stemming nuclear proliferation.

### III. Conclusions

The 12 chapters of *SIPRI Yearbook 2009* provide a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of developments in international security, armaments and disarmament over the past year. Broadly speaking, the contributors describe and analyse a world facing increasingly difficult and unrelenting security challenges from intensifying intrastate conflicts to proliferation in weapons, and the weakening ability of international institutions to address these challenges. Among the few bright spots in 2008, the security situation in Iraq became steadily better—although far from stable—and most of the international community was able to come together to ban the manufacture and use of cluster munitions.

There are high expectations that the new administration in the USA will succeed in its efforts to achieve progress across a number of these security challenges. However, looking ahead, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009* underscores just what a difficult task that will be. The fragmentation of violence in weak states of the developing world appears set to continue and carry with it protracted suffering for vulnerable civilians and further regional instabilities. The security situation in Afghanistan is likely to worsen further before long-hoped-for stability and development can be achieved for that war-torn country, with the security situation in neighbouring Pakistan—arguably a more important long-term concern for regional and global security—also taking a turn for the worse. Russia and the USA may be able to improve relations quickly in the coming year, including cooperation on arms control and non-proliferation. Nonetheless, a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010—and with it progress on disarmament and tightened controls against would-be proliferators—seems far from certain at the time of writing, even as a range of high-profile efforts are mobilized to assure such progress. Attacks by non-state actors with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons remain an ominous prospect. These and other challenges may well be exacerbated by the effects of the world financial crisis as key countries find it difficult to muster the necessary political and economic will to collectively address global and regional security problems.