4. Multilateral peace missions

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I. Introduction

Fourteen multilateral peace missions were launched in 2003, seven of which were in Africa. The conclusion of peace agreements resulted in five new peace missions: the United Nations (UN) Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI); the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI); and the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). In some cases, the resurgence of hostilities (e.g., in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) or the threat of resumed fighting (e.g., between Ethiopia and Eritrea) led to the reinforcement or extension of the mandates of existing operations. Eleven of the 14 operations established in 2003 were conducted by regional organizations or UN-sanctioned coalitions of states. A partial exception to this is the Multinational Force in Iraq, which received UN Security Council authorization only in October 2003 but has been in existence since May 2003.[1] The European Union (EU), in its first year of crisis-management operationality, launched four operations: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM); Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); Operation Artemis[2] in the DRC; and Operation Proxima in FYROM. African regional organizations carried out four operations: one by the African Union—AMIB; two under ECOWAS—ECOMICI and ECOMIL; and one by the Communauté Economique et Monétaire d'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC, or the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States) in the Central African Republic. Although the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is not a new operation, it has since August 2003 operated under the banner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the South Pacific, two operations were initiated by coalitions of states, both of which are led by Australia: the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI); and the Bougainville Transition Team (BTT) in Papua New Guinea. The UN undertook three new missions in 2003: UNMIL; MINUCI; and the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI).

A number of new operations are co-located, either concurrently or consecutively, and are therefore closely linked. In Côte d'Ivoire, ECOMICI, together

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[1] The Multinational Force in Iraq is an operation tasked and authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1511, 16 Oct. 2003, but carried out by an ad hoc coalition of states. This and other UN Security Council resolutions cited in this chapter are available on the United Nations Internet site at URL <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.

[2] Operation Artemis is also referred to as the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF).

with a battalion of French troops (authorized under the provisions of Chap-ter VIII of the 1945 UN Charter),[3] provides the security framework for the implementation of the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.[4] MINUCI was established with a view to coordinating all peace-building activities in Côte d'Ivoire. The EU launched Operation Artemis, an 1800-strong force, to sup-plement the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in the eastern Ituri region of the DRC, until the UN was able to strengthen its presence there. ECOMIL and Operation Artemis were initiated specifically to serve as short-term holding mechanisms until a sufficiently mandated and equipped UN operation could be deployed. As such, both missions were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in addition to their respective organizations' legal instruments.[5] The lack of institutional links between UNAMI and the Multinational Force in Iraq was a function of the ambiguous relationship between the UN presence established in July and an occupying force that did not receive UN authorization until October 2003.[6] Moreover, UNAMI did not get off the ground in 2003: the deadly bomb attack at the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August resulted in the withdrawal of most of the mission's personnel.[7]

The UN Security Council strengthened the mandates of ISAF and MONUC in 2003 in an effort to better address ongoing security problems in Afghanistan and the DRC, respectively. MONUC troop strength was increased to stand at just under 10 500 personnel, with 4800 earmarked for the Ituri region.[8] In October, after repeated calls from the Afghan Government, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and humanitarian agencies, the Security Council passed Resolution 1510, expanding the geographical mandate of ISAF beyond Kabul.[9] However, NATO opted for a more limited interpretation of this mandate and extended ISAF's scope only to provide security for the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in and around the north-ern Kunduz province.[10] The term of operation of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was extended beyond its expected closure date as a result of Ethiopia's reluctance to abide by the decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia

[3] UN Charter Chapter VIII, on regional arrangements, is available at URL <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

[4] See chapter 3 in this volume. For the Jan. 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement see URL <http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?articleid=3570>.

[5] UN Charter Chapter VII, on action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, is available at URL <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

[6] UN Security Council Resolution 1500, 14 Aug. 2003.

[7] As of Dec. 2003, UNAMI had not been redeployed to Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution 1511 (see note 1) mandates the Multinational Force in Iraq to provide security for UNAMI personnel.

[8] United Nations, Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN document S/2003/1098, 17 Nov. 2003, pp. 2, 22.

[9] UN Security Council Resolution 1510, 13 Oct. 2003.

[10] 'NATO/Military Committee meetings: ISAF, capabilities, command structure—OPLAN for ISAF extension—exercises with Russia', *Atlantic News*, no. 3525 (19 Nov. 2003). The governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed an agreement on 12 Dec. 2000 in which they agreed to set up a neutral EEBC which would delimit and demarcate the borders between the 2 countries. The parties agreed to abide by the decision of the Commission. United Nations, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN document S/2001/45, 12 Jan. 2001.

Boundary Commission (EEBC) and the subsequent failure to complete the border demarcation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.[11]

Eight multilateral peace missions were closed in 2003, four of which had begun in 2003. They were closed either because they had successfully discharged their mandates or because they were judged insufficient to address new conditions and new operations were required. The UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) wound down as a result of the US intervention in Iraq. NATO's Allied Harmony operation in FYROM, the EU's Operation Concordia in FYROM and Operation Artemis in the DRC all fulfilled their mandated goals in 2003. ECOMIL and the South African Protection and Support Detachment (SAPSD) in Burundi were integrated into larger missions—UNMIL and AMIB, respectively. The emphasis on peace-building in Papua New Guinea meant that a more appropriately mandated peace operation was needed to replace the Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). The BTT, a primarily civilian-staffed mission, was set up for a period of six months to facilitate this changeover.

Two of the largest UN missions—the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)—began scheduled downscaling in 2003. The planned drawdown of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) was slowed after riots in the capital Dili in early 2003 demonstrated deficiencies in the local management of security threats.[12]

The year 2003 highlighted a number of features of contemporary crisis-management and peace operations, including the reinforced emphasis on the role of the UN in post-conflict peace-building and the diverse nature of non-UN peacekeeping activities. The latter trend includes out-of-area operations by European regional organizations, a renewed focus on regional peacekeeping capacities in Africa and the increasing prevalence of interventions by non-standing coalitions of states. Another area of attention in 2003 was the dangers of peacekeeping. Sections II–IV discuss these trends and developments while section V offers some short conclusions. The table of multilateral peace missions which were initiated, ongoing or terminated in 2003 is presented in section VI.

II. The role of the UN in post-conflict peace-building

The build-up to and subsequent war in Iraq dominated the UN agenda in 2003 and marked one of the deepest political crises in the turbulent history of the

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[11] United Nations, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN document S/2003/858, 4 Sep. 2003, p. 9.

[12] UNMISET troops drew down from 3300 to 1750 in the last quarter of 2003. A formed police unit was added to UNMISET and further training provided to the Timorese police force to facilitate better public order management. United Nations, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UN document S/2003/243, 3 Mar. 2003. East Timor, under the new name Timor-Leste, was admitted as a member of the UN General Assembly on 27 Sep. 2003.

UN Organization.[13] Divisions within the Security Council over how to address the alleged threat of Iraq to international peace and security, the overriding of UN mechanisms established to monitor Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions, and the eventual decision of the United States and the United Kingdom to use non-authorized force against Iraq shook the UN system severely.[14] The subsequent bombing attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, only five days after the establishment of UNAMI, dealt a catastrophic blow to the confidence of UN officials in their efforts to maintain an independent and useful role in the wake of the war.

By the end of the year, however, the UN was arguably in a stronger position than at any time in recent years: in 2003 it deployed a monthly average of over 38 500 military peacekeepers in the field.[15] First, the unique legitimizing role of the UN was reflected in widespread domestic protests in many of the countries that chose to support the US–British war against Iraq and in the difficulty experienced by the USA and the UK in securing international assistance during and after formal hostilities in Iraq. The coalition's dogged pursuit of a UN Security Council resolution after the invasion reflected this acknowledgement and eventually led to a resolution recognizing the USA and the UK as occupying powers but stressing the need to restore Iraq's sovereignty and self-rule as quickly as possible.[16]

Second, the work of UN inspection mechanisms, notably the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), was increasingly vindicated by the failure of coalition search efforts to shed any new light on Iraqi weapon programmes and by the findings of domestic investigations within both the USA and the UK on their respective governments' decision to go to war.[17] Third, and most important, the need for active UN engagement in managing and assisting post-conflict peace-building in Iraq became increasingly obvious in the chaotic aftermath of the war. The UN's experience in the administration of post-conflict authority and/or assistance—most recently in Cambodia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan—and the range of coordinated agencies and experts it can bring to bear in this effort are unique. This, combined with the unique authority of the UN, makes it a crucial actor in post-conflict peace-building.

The emphasis on UN primacy in post-conflict peace-building and conflict prevention, rather than peacemaking and peace enforcement, predates the Iraq war and reflects wider changes in the international system since the end of the

[13] This fact was acknowledged by the UN Secretary-General in his annual report; see United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN document A/58/1, 28 Aug. 2003, chapter 1, 'Achieving peace and security'.

[14] 'Irrelevant, illegitimate or indispensable', *The Economist*, 22 Feb. 2003, p. 25; and O'Brien, T. L., 'US dismisses calls for peace', *International Herald Tribune*, 20 Mar. 2003, p. 3. See also chapter 2 in this volume.

[15] The monthly average number of military peacekeepers sent to the field peaked in 1994 at just over 72 000 and was at the lowest point in 1999, at 13 600. From 1999 there was a general rise in the number of deployed peacekeepers until 2001. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Monthly summary of military and CivPol personnel deployed in current United Nations operations as of 31 Dec. 2003', URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.htm>.

[16] UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003.

[17] For more on these investigations see chapter 16 in this volume.

cold war. These include an international environment that no longer regards the principle of state sovereignty as sacrosanct, the rise of regional actors and a shift away from UN-brokered peace agreements to internally negotiated peace processes.[18] It is also based on an explicit recognition of the UN's limitations, particularly in the making and enforcing of peace through military force.[19] The practical focus of UN peace activities, from West Africa to Afghanistan and Kosovo to Timor-Leste, has increasingly come to rest on the establishment of frameworks and mechanisms for sustainable peace and development. Considerable experience and learning have been amassed within the UN system in this area, resulting in a substantial body of doctrine[20] and a wide range of activities, including humanitarian aid and food relief, refugee protection and return, health and human rights, civilian administration and expertise, election organization and monitoring, and civil society and governance. Under the tenure of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and spurred on by the recommendations of the Brahimi Report in 2000, significant progress has been made in improving coordination among UN agencies and offices as well as with other actors in the field.[21] No other single state or international organization can call upon a similar panoply of instruments and experts.[22] It is this capacity that drove the setting up of substantial multidimensional UN operations in Liberia and the DRC as well as demands for a greater UN role in Iraq in 2003.[23]

At the same time as peace-building, and the UN's role in peace-building, are receiving renewed attention, concerns remain about the potential for the UN to become bogged down in long and costly operations. Thus the initiation of new peace operations in 2003 has been accompanied—in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Timor-Leste—with a significant scaling down of existing multidimensional peace operations. Although this insistence on transition to local respon-

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[18] For a discussion of these trends see, i.a., Pugh, M. and Singh Sidhu, W. (eds), *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond* (Lynne Rienner: London, 2003); Osman, M., *The United Nations and Peace Enforcement: Wars, Terrorism and Democracy* (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2002); and Darby, J. and MacGinty, R. (eds), *The Management of Peace Processes* (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2000).

[19] For a comprehensive discussion see Findlay, T., SIPRI, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002).

[20] See, e.g., Reports of the Secretary-General, Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN document A/58/323, 2 Sep. 2003, and UN document A/57/270, 31 July 2002; and United Nations, 'No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations', UN document S/2001/394, 20 Apr. 2001. See also Caplan, R., International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories*, Adelphi Paper 341 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002); and Chesterman, S., *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building*, Final Report of the Project on Transitional Administrations (International Peace Academy (IPA): New York, Nov. 2003), available at URL <http://www.ipacademy.org>.

[21] United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN document A/55/305, 21 Aug. 2000, known as the Brahimi Report, is available at URL <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>; for a full discussion of the report see Dwan, R., 'Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution', *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), pp. 71–74. See also Durch, W., 'Picking up the peaces: the UN's evolving postconflict roles', *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 4 (autumn 2003), pp. 195–210; and Berdal, M., 'Ten years of international peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 10, no. 4 (winter 2003), pp. 5–11.

[22] For a brief overview of the various agencies' activities see United Nations (note 13).

[23] Planning for future UN operations in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan was also set in motion.

sibility as soon as possible is based on genuine concerns about democracy and human rights, it is shaped, in calculation as much as in practice, by the resource constraints continually facing the UN. The UN has sought to balance its emphasis on peace-building with the reality of its limited financial and manpower resources in three overlapping ways. The first is internal and focuses on improving coordination across the UN system. Previously, special political missions and peace-building operations were administered by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and were distinct from UN Charter Chapters VI and VII operations under the responsibility of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).[24] In early 2003 all multidimensional operations (e.g., UNAMA) were put under DPKO administration. Part of the thinking behind this is to enable the DPA to be more of a political and strategic unit and the DPKO a more operationally focused body. Efforts have also been made to develop integrated mission planning within the UN and to bring all the relevant UN bodies into the process.[25] The Secretary-General has made extensive use of Special Representatives in a country to serve as the principal UN authority and to coordinate the various UN actors and agencies in the field. These efforts acknowledge the development challenge at the heart of peace-building and attempt to accelerate and improve the transition from a short-term crisis approach to a development perspective.

A second option is to hand over responsibility for longer-term development support to regional organizations, but this is as yet only practically feasible for wealthier European institutions (e.g., the transition from UN to EU operations in the Balkans). A third option is through bilateral development activities (e.g., the case of Afghanistan, where different European states have taken on responsibility for a particular sector, e.g., the UK and drug production). However, this approach depends on the strategic or other interests of external actors in the host state (e.g., British and French former colonial links in Africa) and risks a patchy approach to multidimensional peace-building, as has been evidenced in Afghanistan.[26]

These considerations serve to underscore the wide range of actors involved in international peace operations and the coordination that is required among them. If the UN's capacities give it a unique role in peace-building, it also has reason to claim a special role and responsibilities in setting out the principles for intervention and coordinating international peace-building efforts. In so doing, it asserts a legitimate right to involvement in how that peace is made.

[24] UN Charter Chapter VI, on pacific settlement of disputes, is available at URL <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>; on Chapter VII see note 5.

[25] The 'integrated mission task force' concept was first introduced in the 2000 Brahimi Report (note 21).

[26] In parallel with the UK's efforts, Germany has taken responsibility for police reform while Italy has the lead in law reform in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that all 3 areas are interlinked, there is little formal coordination between the European lead nations and there are very different paces of reform within each bilateral programme. See Sedra, M., 'Security first: Afghanistan's security sector reform process', *Ploughshares Monitor*, winter 2003, available at URL <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/mond03a.html>.

III. Regional organizations—back to the centre?

The increased engagement of regional organizations in international peace and security is one of the most salient and discussed features of the post-cold war environment. While the primacy of the UN in the management of peace and security is set out in the UN Charter, the Charter explicitly recognizes the legitimacy of regional activity in dispute settlement and conflict resolution, and the potential advantages regional organizations bring to peacekeeping activities are well known. Regional organizations, depending on their nature, size, capacity and location, may be able to make and implement decisions more cohesively, deploy faster to a conflict area, and undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement with greater skill and efficiency than a UN peacekeeping force. Attention has focused especially on the relatively greater success of regional peacekeeping forces in dealing with the problem of 'spoilers' in post-conflict environments.[27]

A wide range of regional actors are currently engaged in peace operations (see table 4.3). Moreover, as suggested in section I, one of the features of this engagement is the diversity of partnerships between regional actors and the UN in particular peace operations. The activities of these regional organizations include: temporarily holding the ground until UN peace operations are in place (as in the transition from ECOMIL to UNMIL and from Operation Artemis to MONUC II); operations that follow on from UN operations (such as EUPM); participation in overall UN missions (e.g., the activities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in UNMIK); dual presence with some control retained by the UN (as in earlier NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina); complementary deployment (e.g., in ISAF and UNAMA); and participation in coalitions of states endorsed by the UN that may or may not become UN peace operations (as SAPSD in the former case and RAMSI in the latter) as well as in coalitions acting independently of UN authorization or control (e.g., the multinational coalition in Iraq prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1511).[28]

Out-of-area operations by the EU and NATO

One of the most noteworthy developments in the context of partnerships between the UN and regional organizations in 2003 was the initiation of out-of-area operations by two organizations—the EU in the DRC (Operation Artemis) and NATO in Afghanistan (the takeover of ISAF). This was new and striking for a number of reasons. First, many in the UN have been extremely concerned at the recent development of European organizations' crisis-management capacities. This is not so much out of fear of what European

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[27] On spoilers see Stedman, J. S., 'Spoiler problems in peace processes', *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 2 (autumn 1997), pp. 5–53.

[28] For more on partnerships between the UN and regional organizations see Cater, C. (Rapporteur), International Peace Academy (IPA), *The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention*, IPA Seminar Report (IPA: New York, May 2003), available at URL <http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/REGIONALIZATION_OF_CONFLICT.pdf>.

actors might do but rather what European states will not do, that is, contribute to UN peacekeeping. UN officials, noting the existing lack of contributions of personnel from developed states to UN peace operations, have been concerned that a focus on EU and NATO crisis-management capacity building will lead Western states to give still less attention and assistance to UN operations in Africa and Asia.[29] The deployment of the EU's Operation Artemis explicitly to assist a UN operation to manage a dangerous security situation went some way towards addressing this concern. The rapid deployment of the force surprised those sceptical of the reality of EU capabilities. More significantly, the introduction of African conflicts onto the EU agenda went some way towards closing the gap between Western states' rhetoric and action on the need to strengthen UN peacekeeping. The EU pledged to reinforce development assistance to the DRC and by the end of 2003 was exploring the possibility of sending a police training mission to Kinshasa to help establish integrated police units there.[30]

At the institutional level, the DRC experience helped spur the deepening of formal UN–EU coordination, evidenced in the September 2003 Joint Declaration on EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management.[31] It remains to be seen, however, whether the EU's foray into Africa will be a one-off effort. The EU still lacks the logistic and command and control capacities to mount and run a sizeable military operation: Operation Artemis was a French-led operation, mounted and run from Paris headquarters. Its autonomy from UN control and its limited time span testify to EU member states' continued hesitancy about risky out-of-area peace operations. The incorporation of 10 new EU members on 1 May 2004, none of which has active interests in Africa, may reinforce these hesitations. Nevertheless, the experience offers a potential model for the delivery of EU short-term assistance and capabilities for UN crisis-management efforts. The elaboration in 2003 of an EU Security Strategy, in its forceful articulation of an EU responsibility for global security, appeared to point to the likelihood of future EU contributions.[32]

In some respects, NATO's takeover of the command of ISAF appeared to be an even more fundamental departure for Euro-Atlantic out-of-area engagement, given Afghanistan's relative distance from Europe and the lack of a legacy of a colonial relationship with any European state. Moreover, in terms of troop size and the open-ended period of the operation, the commitment is far greater than in Operation Artemis.[33] In reality, however, NATO's first out-

[29] See, e.g., an article by the Deputy Secretary-General for peacekeeping: Guéhenno, J. M., 'Maintien de la paix: les nouveaux défis pour l'ONU et le Conseil de sécurité' [Peacekeeping: the new threats for the UN and the Security Council], *Politique Étrangère*, vol. 68, no. 3–4 (autumn/winter 2003). For more on the lack of troop contributions by developed states see Durch, W. *et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Henry L. Stimson Center: Washington, DC, 2003), pp. 70–74.

[30] European Union, 2541st Council Meeting on External Relations, EU document 14500/03 (Presse 321), 17 Nov. 2003.

[31] Joint Declaration on EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management, 24 Sep. 2003, available at URL <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=2768>.

[32] Council of the European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, available at URL <http://ue.eu.int/cm3_fo/showpage.asp?id=391&lang=EN.asp>; see also chapter 1 in this volume.

[33] For more on NATO's takeover of ISAF see chapter 1 in this volume.

of-area operation reflected commitments already undertaken by its member states. Command of ISAF had rotated among NATO members (the UK, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands), a costly and relatively inefficient means of sharing the burdens of the operation. NATO planning capabilities were already used by Germany and the Netherlands in helping to prepare their joint command of ISAF (February–August 2003). The significance of the NATO takeover was thus mainly political and internal to the organization: it signalled assent among NATO member states to the US call for a new role and identity for an alliance that has its roots in a cold war collective defence paradigm. It also signalled a bridge-mending effort after the divisive Iraq experience: NATO entered Afghanistan precisely because a NATO operation in Iraq was impossible in the immediate aftermath of the war in Iraq. It is unlikely, therefore, that this experience will in the short term lead to any fundamental re-examination of the UN–NATO relationship. Cooperation between the organizations on the ground continues to be based on their common experiences in the Balkans, in which large, separate UN and NATO presences and NATO autonomy of operation were key tenets.

However, two distinct factors make the picture more complicated in Afghanistan than in previous cases of UN–NATO co-location. First, ISAF's presence, limited for the moment to Kabul and Kunduz, sits alongside US-led coalition forces (mainly in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan). Although the main task of the coalition forces is to hunt down and apprehend Taliban fighters, they constitute an important security presence in the troubled country. PRTs have been established under coalition command with responsibility for supporting local government forces, providing local security and assisting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.[34] Second, the UN presence in Afghanistan is limited and follows, by its own description, a 'light footprint approach'.[35] UNAMA is a small civilian-staffed peace-building operation, focused on providing support to the Afghan Interim Authority and coordinating UN humanitarian and reconstruction activities in the country. Given the continuing instability in Afghanistan, the UN is thus heavily reliant on the support and protection of international security forces to carry out its tasks. The multiplicity of actors, their patchy presence across a wide terrain and the difficult security environment in which they operate make international coordination as challenging as it is necessary. In this respect, Afghanistan constitutes a potentially significant test case for international peace operations.

[34] United Nations, 'The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security', Report of the Secretary-General, UN document S/2003/1212, 30 Dec. 2003.

[35] United Nations, 'The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security', Report of the Secretary-General, UN document S/2002/278, 18 Mar. 2002; and UN Security Council Resolution 1401, 28 Mar. 2002. See also Cottey, A., 'Afghanistan and the new dynamics of intervention: counter-terrorism and nation building', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*: *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 167–94.

Table 4.1. Number of peace missions in Africa, 1994–2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
UN peace operations (DPKO- and DPA- administered)	8	7	4	4	4	6	5	4	5	6
Peace operations led by regional organ- izations and non- standing coalitions	3	2	2	5	7	7	6	4	4	6
Total	**11**	**9**	**6**	**9**	**11**	**13**	**11**	**8**	**9**	**12**

DPKO = UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DPA = UN Department of Political Affairs.

Source: SIPRI peacekeeping missions database.

Regional peacekeeping in Africa

The regional peacekeeping capacity of Africa remained a prominent theme in 2003 and was given practical expression with the initiation of new operations in West and Central Africa. ECOWAS returned as an active peacekeeping actor in its troubled region with the launch of ECOMICI in Côte d'Ivoire in February and of ECOMIL in Liberia in July, the first operations it has under-taken since its controversial interventions in Sierra Leone (1997–2000) and Liberia (1990–99). The lessons of these operations influenced the shape and conduct of ECOMICI and ECOMIL. In both cases ECOWAS forces did not deploy before receiving UN Security Council authorization (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and then only in close coordination with the UN.[36] ECOWAS is the secondary player in both situations: in Côte d'Ivoire it was France, the former colonial power, which took the lead in mediating the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement between the Ivorian Government and northern-based rebels. Around 3800 French troops, under Security Council authorization, serve alongside 1500 or so ECOWAS troops in overseeing a ceasefire.[37] In Liberia, notwithstanding the lead role which ECOWAS played in mediating between rebel forces and the government of Charles Taylor, ECOMIL was explicitly established only as a bridgehead before a larger UN force (UNMIL) could be set up. Once this took place, in October, most of the 3800 or so ECOMIL troops were incorporated into UNMIL. ECOMIL's efforts to man-age the chaotic security situation were facilitated by the deployment of three US warships to Liberian waters, as well as a small number of marines to the mainland, between August and October.[38]

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[36] UN Security Council Resolution 1464, 4 Feb. 2003; and UN Security Council Resolution 1497, 1 Aug. 2003.
   [37] See chapter 3 in this volume.
   [38] 'US pulls out of Liberia', BBC News Online, 29 Sep. 2003, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3150650.stm>. See also chapter 3 in this volume.

The first peace operation of the new African Union, AMIB, followed a similar pattern to those of ECOWAS. AMIB was established on the basis of agreement with the government of Burundi to supervise and monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the consolidation of the peace process in Burundi.[39] AMIB is seen explicitly as a precursor to a larger UN force expected to be deployed in 2004. The planning and deployment of the mission took place in close coordination with the UN Secretariat in New York.[40]

The time-limited nature of these three peace operations is based wholly on financial considerations. African regional organizations and their member states do not have the capacity and resources to mount and maintain large multidimensional peace operations. A number of African states, namely regional powers such as Nigeria, South Africa and potentially Ethiopia and Angola, are capable of deploying military peacekeeping forces at short notice but only with financial and logistical international support. A sustained and large autonomous operation is simply not an option for African countries. Western assistance—in the form of either direct financial support for African regional initiatives or direct bilateral engagement in crisis management (such as the engagement of the UK in Sierra Leone, France in Côte d'Ivoire and the USA in Liberia) or through UN funding—is therefore vital to international peace and security efforts in Africa. The increased political will among African states to develop African institutional capacities for crisis management, particularly in the frameworks of the AU, ECOWAS and, more hesitantly, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is welcome. However, it is only likely to reap results with sustained international support. Recent signs of some redirection of emphasis from the provision of peacekeeping training to individual African states and regions towards regional institutional capacity building for crisis management and peacekeeping by the Group of Eight industrialized nations (G8), the EU and individual Western nations is a positive sign.[41]

[39] African Union, Communiqué of the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Heads of State and Government Level, document no. Central Organ/MEC/AHG/Comm.(VII), 3 Feb. 2003; and Boshoff, H. and Francis, D., 'The AU Mission in Burundi: technical and operational dimensions', *African Security Review*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2003). On the conflict in Burundi see chapter 3 in this volume.

[40] African Union, Executive Council, 3rd Ordinary Session, 4–8 July 2003, Maputo, Mozambique, 'Report of the Interim Chairperson on conflict situations in Africa', document EX/CL/42 (III), URL <http://www.au.org/african union>.

[41] In July 2003 EU foreign ministers agreed to provide financial support to African peacekeeping capacities, and the EU is currently exploring the establishment of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union. See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be adopted by the Community within the ACP–EC Council of Ministers regarding the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa (presented by the Commission), COM (2003) 638, 27 Oct. 2003. See also Council of the European Union, Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, 5268/04, 20 Jan. 2004. On the G8 initiatives see chapter 7 in this volume, and for the members of the G8 and the EU see the glossary.

Table 4.2. Number of peace missions conducted by the United Nations and non-standing coalitions worldwide, 1994–2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
UN peace operations (DPKO- and DPA-administered)	24	26	24	23	21	24	22	18	20	18
Peace operations led by non-standing coalitions	6	5	4	7	8	7	7	7	7	8

DPKO = UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DPA = UN Department of Political Affairs.

Source: SIPRI peacekeeping missions database.

Coalitions of the willing

The war in Iraq brought a renewed focus on the growing use of ad hoc 'coalitions of willing states' for external interventions. This has become a more controversial issue in the light of the US–British action in 2003. It is therefore important to note: (*a*) the variety of such coalitions, (*b*) the diversity of their relationships with the UN, and (*c*) the number of interventions that have been carried out by such coalitions in the past decade.[42]

Coalitions of the willing, where they are large, can be an expression of widespread international support for a particular action. For example, a number of countries provided support for Operation Desert Storm, the US-led liberation of Kuwait in the 1991 Iraq War, and for the launch of US–British military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in October 2001.[43] In the former, the US-led coalition acted under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 678,[44] while in the latter the legal basis for the operation was provided by the Security Council's condemnation of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 as a threat to international peace and security, and by its reference to member states' right to self-defence, including retaliatory action.

In the parts of the world where regional organizations are not well developed and/or have eschewed peacekeeping roles (e.g., the Association of South-East Asian Nations), coalitions of the willing can act as a replacement regional partner for the UN. They are therefore, more often than not, comprised mainly of states from the region in question. Thus in the South Pacific, Australian-led coalitions provided peace support operations in 2003 to stabilize and implement post-conflict agreements in Papua New Guinea and the

[42] See Wilson, G., 'UN authorized enforcement: regional organizations versus "coalitions of the willing"', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 10, no. 2 (summer 2003), pp. 89–106.

[43] Seybolt, T. B., 'Major armed conflicts', *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 21–62; and Cottey (note 34).

[44] UN Security Council Resolution 678, 29 Nov. 1990.

Solomon Islands. The legal basis for such operations is agreement with the host state and endorsement by the UN Security Council. In the case of East Timor, the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) operation provided the rapid military intervention required to stabilize an intensifying conflict situation before a larger UN mission could be deployed. The US-led intervention (Operation Uphold Democracy) in Haiti following the 1994 military junta is a similar example. These interventions received UN authorization.[45]

The viability of most coalitions of the willing depends on the leadership of one state and the capabilities it can bring to an operation, for example, the French-led Operation Turquoise in Rwanda in 1994, or the roles of the USA and Australia in the cases mentioned above. This has prompted fears that such coalitions risk being the vehicle for the interests and policies of a particular state. While this is undoubtedly a concern, it is not one from which regional organizations are immune, as past ECOWAS operations in Liberia, the 1999 SADC intervention in the DRC and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace operations in the Southern Caucasus amply demonstrate. More-over, few states are willing or capable of intervening alone in a civil conflict, whether sanctioned or not by the UN, to enforce and keep peace. This is par-ticularly the case in Africa. Examples such as the UK in Sierra Leone in 2001 and France in Côte d'Ivoire in 2003 reflect the legacies of colonial relation-ships and the responsibilities that these may incur, as well as a sense of being a last and short-term resort. Such UN-supported unilateral action is likely to remain the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, where it does take place, it raises challenges of legitimacy, responsibility and transparency.

IV. Safety of personnel in peace operations

In the wake of the Secretary-General's reports on the UN's failure to prevent the massacres in Rwanda and Srbrenica, the 2000 Brahimi Report and the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), attention has focused on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the mandates required for UN peace operations to provide protection.[46] The inclusion of protection principles in the mandates of peace operations in dangerous environments (e.g., MONUC, Operation Artemis and ECOMICI) and better UN inter-agency coordination are two ways in which this has been implemented.[47] In 2003, the focus shifted somewhat to the safety of the peacekeepers themselves. Although the growing risk faced by peace-

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[45] UN Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 Sep. 1999; and UN Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994.

[46] United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, UN document S/1999/1257, 15 Dec. 1999; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: the fall of Srebrenica, UN document A/54/549, 15 Nov. 1999; United Nations (note 21); and International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect* (International Development Research Centre: Ottawa, 2001), available at URL <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp>.

[47] United Nations (note 13), p. 21.

keepers and humanitarian aid workers has been acknowledged for many years, the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August and repeated targeted attacks against UN and other international aid personnel in Afghanistan underscored how difficult the environment of peace operations has become.[48]

The UN has sought to strengthen the international legal framework for the protection of peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel through the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel; the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which defines an attack on such personnel as a war crime; and, in 2003, UN Security Council Resolution 1502, which reiterates this definition.[49] The Secretary-General's annual report to the General Assembly on the safety and security of personnel is another way in which the UN has sought to remind member states of their obligations to provide safe environments and, where necessary, support for UN personnel.[50]

There is also recognition that practical measures are required within the UN, not least because safety concerns remain a major factor behind the reluctance of some Western member states to contribute personnel to UN missions. In the wake of the attack in Baghdad, Annan appointed an Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq to investigate the incident and, following the panel's conclusion that the UN's current security management system was 'dysfunctional', set up an expert team to determine accountability within the system and review responsibilities for decision-making, to report by early 2004.[51] Although many within the UN fear that this may be more of an attempt to find a scapegoat, it has exposed the weaknesses of the UN's security management system.

This also touches upon another controversial area—the relationship between military intervention forces and humanitarian aid actors. The distance between them has become increasingly blurred in the light of: (*a*) the number of military interventions carried out for the declared purpose of humanitarian relief; (*b*) the interdependence between military and humanitarian aid actors in the field for personnel protection, support in the delivery of humanitarian aid, early warning and local information; (*c*) the targeting of civilians in conflict; and (*d*) the growing diversity of interventions, especially in the context of the global war on terrorism.[52] None of these elements is particularly new, and they

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[48] Between Jan. 1992 and Apr. 2003, 220 UN civilian staff were killed. Currier, N., '"Protecting the protectors": strengthening staff security: priorities and challenges', *United Nations Chronicle*, vol. 40, no. 2 (2003), available at URL <http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue2/0203p5.html>.

[49] The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel is available at URL <http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm>; the Rome Statute, opened for signature on 17 July 1998, at URL <http://www.icc-cpi.int/php/index.php>; and UN Security Council Resolution 1502 was adopted on 26 Aug. 2003.

[50] United Nations, 'Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel', Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/58/344, 5 Sep. 2003.

[51] United Nations, Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, 20 Oct. 2003, available at URL <http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf>. The panel was led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.

[52] On the last point see Macrae, J. and Harmer, A., *Humanitarian Action and the 'Global War on Terror': A Review of Trends and Issues*, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Report 14, July 2003.

form part of the perennial dilemma over neutrality/impartiality. However, their conjunction in 2003 has sparked a new debate within the humanitarian and development communities on the merits and desirability of close links between them and military and peacekeeping actors. The question of security of personnel in peace operations also throws up the entire issue of cooperation and interaction between UN and regional actors. The gains made in the past decade in linking the security and development communities in a more cooperative relationship in conflict zones are by no means secure.

V. Conclusions

Notwithstanding the bruising inflicted on the concept of UN primacy in peace and security in 2003, the UN remains very much in the business of peace operations and, in particular, the demanding field of post-conflict peace-building. Two of the three new UN missions established in 2003, MINUCI and UNAMI, were peace-building missions: UNMIL was the only new operation authorized under Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter. The UN is increasingly focused on peacebuilding, in part because of its peacekeeping and peace enforcement limitations, and in part because of the skill it brings to it. It is currently the organization that brings the widest range of security and development actors together across the widest geographical spectrum and with some degree of coordination in multidimensional peace operations. This may not be a particularly comforting thought, given the UN's evident weaknesses, but it should serve to underscore the international community's continued reliance on the UN.

Regional actors, whether standing organizations, ad hoc coalitions of states or leading states, are not a replacement for the UN. They are, however, an important reinforcement for the UN and the multilateral system it represents as a number of examples in 2003, particularly in Africa, demonstrated. Regional actors can bring the military capabilities required for rapid and effective peace enforcement; they bring knowledge and comprehension of the historical, religious, ethnic, social, economic and political factors that lie behind complex emergencies; and they offer mechanisms for the provision of emergency aid and the implementation of sustainable development. The issue is how this can be done in a way that is consistent with the principles of the UN Charter and in coordination with the UN and international donors. Guidelines and principles are urgently required at the strategic and operational level if UN–regional partnerships in peace operations are to successfully meet the challenges of joint peace and security management. These include principles of command and coordination, transparency and reporting in the field as well as at headquarters levels. Such procedures are particularly necessary for non-standing coalitions of states, given their lack of institutional frameworks and formal relations with the UN.

On a practical level, operations run by regional actors, in particular, coalitions of the willing, might well benefit from the input and advice of experi-

enced UN actors. Operational liaison (seconded UN officials, points of con-
tacts, and so on) should be considered as a basic principle for any such coali-
tion and institutionalized as part of the standing relations between the UN and
regional organizations with a crisis-management capacity. Consideration
could also be given to joint evaluation and lessons learned for ongoing as well
as completed operations. Steps taken by the EU and the UN in 2003 to inten-
sify practical cooperation are therefore welcome, as is the evidence of closer
coordination between the UN and African regional organizations, AU and
ECOWAS.

The most comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping, the 2000 Brahimi
Report, had little to say about the relationship between the UN and regional
actors in peace operations. The year 2003 demonstrated forcefully that it is no
longer possible to set this question aside. It is likely to be a central question
for the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, established by
Secretary-General Annan in September 2003, and, as such, the start of a chal-
lenging and overdue process of change.[53]

VI. Table of multilateral peace missions

Table 4.3 lists 52 multilateral peace missions (peacekeeping, peace-building,
and combined peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations) initiated,
ongoing or terminated in 2003. The table lists only missions that are con-
ducted under the authority of the UN, of regional organizations and/or by ad
hoc coalitions of states sanctioned by the UN, with the stated intention to:
(a) serve as an instrument to facilitate peace agreements already in place,
(b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conflict prevention and/or peace-
building efforts. This list does not include peace-building offices established
by the DPA. Peace missions comprising non-resident individuals or teams of
negotiators or operations not sanctioned by the UN are not included.[54] The
missions are grouped by organization, either sole or lead, and are listed chron-
ologically within these groups.

The first group, covering UN missions, is divided into three sections:
14 operations run by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 4 missions
that are defined as special political missions and peace-building operations;
and 1 mission authorized by UN Security Council resolutions but carried out

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[53] The panel is charged with examining the major threats and challenges in the field of peace and
security, including socio-economic issues, and with making recommendations for a collective response.
United Nations, 'Secretary-General names high-level panel to study global security threats and recom-
mend necessary changes', UN document SG/A/857, 4 Nov. 2003.

[54] E.g., a coalition of countries initiated a peace operation in the Nuba Mountains Region of Sudan as
part of the 2002 Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement; in Aceh, a group of international peace monitors
was sent at the end of 2002 to observe the ceasefire between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh
Movement) and the Indonesian Government; in the Philippines, Malaysia sent a team of observers to
monitor the ceasefire between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and in Sri Lanka,
the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was set up under the auspices of the Norwegian-led peace process to
observe the ceasefire between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
See also chapter 3 in this volume, and the chapters on major armed conflicts in previous editions of the
SIPRI Yearbook.

by an ad hoc coalition of states. The next five groups cover missions conducted or led by regional organizations: 10 by the OSCE; 4 by NATO; 5 by the EU; 3 by the CIS, including 1 mission carried out by Russia under bilateral arrangements; 1 by the AU; 2 by ECOWAS; and 1 by CEMAC. The final group lists seven missions led by other organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states recognized by the UN.

Missions which were initiated in 2003, or new participating states in an existing mission, are listed in bold text; operations or individual participation which ended in 2003 are shown in italics. Legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation—UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by regional organizations—are cited in the first column. Start dates of the missions refer to actual deployment dates. Personnel numbers include civilian observers or civilian staff only where indicated. The main exception is for observers in OSCE missions, who are usually civilian. Mission fatalities are recorded from the beginning of the mission until the last reported date for 2003 and as a total for 2003. Unless otherwise stated all figures are as of 31 December 2003. Budget figures are given in millions of US dollars. For UN operations, unless otherwise stated, budget figures are for the fiscal year 1 July 2003–30 June 2004. Conversions from budgets set in other currencies are based on 30 December 2003 conversion rates.

Table 4.3. Multilateral peace missions, 2003

Acronym/ (Legal instrument[a])/ Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2003	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (14 operations)[1] (UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII)[1]			**(94 countries participated in 2003)**	**39 329** **1 851** **4 635**[2]	**1 865**[3] **63**	**2 190.2**[4] **1 070.0**[5]
UNTSO (SCR 50)[6] — UN Truce Supervision Organization	Egypt/Israel/ Lebanon/ Syria	June 1948	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, USA[7]	– 154[8] –	38 –[9]	27.7[10] –
UNMOGIP (SCR 91)[11] — UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	India/Pakistan (Kashmir)	Jan. 1949	Belgium, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Korea (South), Sweden, Uruguay[12]	– 44[13] –	9 –[14]	7.3[15]
UNFICYP (SCR 186)[16] — UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Cyprus	Mar. 1964	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, **India**, Ireland, Korea (South), **Netherlands**, Slovakia, **UK**[17]	1 214 – 47[18]	172 2[19]	43.8[20] 19.9[21]
UNDOF (SCR 350)[22] — UN Disengagement Observer Force	Syria (Golan Heights)	June 1974	Austria, Canada, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, *Sweden*[23]	1 032[24] – –	40 –[25]	41.8[26] 26.0[27]
UNIFIL (SCR 425 & 426)[28] — UN Interim Force in Lebanon	Lebanon	Mar. 1978	*Fiji*, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Ukraine[29]	1 991[30] – –	247 1[31]	90.0[32] 75.2[33]
UNIKOM (SCR 689)[34] — UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission	Iraq/Kuwait (Khawr 'Abd Allah water- way and UN DMZ)	Apr. 1991	Argentina, Austria, Australia, Bangladesh, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela[35]	1 4[36] –	18 1[37]	12.0[38] 8.6[39]

Acronym (SCR)	Location	Start	Contributing countries							
MINURSO (SCR 690)[40]	Western Sahara	Sep. 1991	Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, China, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, **Greece**, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, *Jordan*, Kenya, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, *Norway*, Pakistan, Poland, *Portugal*, Russia, *Senegal*, **Sri Lanka**, *Sweden*, Uruguay, USA[41]	27	200	–[42]	10	–[43]	41.5[44]	46.9[45]
UNOMIG (SCR 849 & 858)[46]	Georgia (Abkhazia)	Aug. 1993	Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Czech Rep., Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea (South), Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA[47]	1	118	10[48]	7	–[49]	32.1[50]	8.9[51]
UNMIK (SCR 1244)[52]	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	June 1999	Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, **Brazil**, Bulgaria, **Cameroon**, Canada, Chile, Czech Rep., Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, *Iceland*, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, **Mauritius**, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, **Senegal**, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe[53]	–	40	3 691[54]	24	4[55]	315.5[56]	105.2[57]
UNAMSIL (SCR 1270)[58]	Sierra Leone	Oct. 1999	Bangladesh, Bolivia, *Cameroon*, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, **Mauritius**, **Namibia**, Nepal, New Zealand, *Niger*, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, **Turkey**, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, **USA**, Zambia, Zimbabwe[59]	11 232	269	130[60]	131	32[61]	543.5[62]	181.7[63]

Acronym/ (Legal instrument[a])	Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2003	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
MONUC (SCR 1279)[64]	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Nov. 1999	Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, **Chile**, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Rep., Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, *Italy*, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, *Norway*, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, **Serbia and Montenegro**, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, **Turkey**, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia[65]	9 981 553 115[66]	23 11[67]	582.0[68] 239.2[69]
UNMEE (SCR 1312)[70]	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Ethiopia, Eritrea	July 2000	Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, *Canada*, China, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, India, Iran, *Ireland*, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, *Netherlands*, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, *Singapore*, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, **Tanzania**, Tunisia, *Turkey*, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, **USA**, Zambia[71]	3 795 209[72] –	5 2[73]	188.4[74] 60.1[75]
UNMISET (SCR 1410)[76]	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	Timor-Leste	May 2002	Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, *Chile*, China, Denmark, *Egypt*, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, *Slovakia*, *Slovenia*, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe[77]	1 675 79 312[78]	12 7[79]	185.0[80] 113.6[81]

Acronym (SCR)	Name	Location	Start	Contributors							
UNMIL (SCR 1509)[82]	United Nations Missions in Liberia	Liberia	Oct. 2003	Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, UK, USA, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe[83]	8 387 107 312[84]	5 5[85]	47.5[86] –			

UN special political missions and peace-building operations[87] (4 operations)

MINUGUA (A/RES/48/267)[88]	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	Guatemala	Oct. 1994	Argentina, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Germany, Honduras, Italy, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA[89]	– 40[90] 3[91]	4 –[92]	11.6[93] –			
UNAMA (SCR 1401)[94]	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Mar. 2002	Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Zimbabwe[95]	– 2076[96] 4[97]	– –[98]	37.9[99] –			
MINUCI (SCR 1479)[100]	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	May 2003	Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Gambia, Ghana, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Moldova, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Tunisia, Uruguay[101]	– 72[102] –	– –[103]	29.9[104] –			

Acronym/ (Legal instrument[a])	Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2003	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
UNAMI **(SCR 1500)**[105]	**United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq**	**Iraq**	**Aug. 2003**	**Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lebanon, Macedonia, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, UK, USA**[106]	– 30[107] –	**15** 15[108]	**9.6**[109] –
Multinational operations tasked and authorized by the UN (1 operation)							
– **(SCR 1511)**[110]	**Multinational Force in Iraq**	**Iraq**	**Oct. 2003**	**Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech. Rep., Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Korea (South), Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Thailand, UK, Ukraine, USA**[111]	**156 654**[112] – 24[113]	**539** 539[114]	**57562.3**[115] ..
OSCE operations[116] **(10 operations)**							
– (CSO 18 Sep. 1992)[117]	OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje	Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia	Sep. 1992	Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, **Bosnia and Herzegovina,** Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, **Hungary,** Ireland, **Italy,** *Latvia,* Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA[118]	– 139[119] 60[120]	– –[121]	21.0[122] –
– (CSO 6 Nov. 1992)[123]	OSCE Mission to Georgia	Georgia	Dec. 1992	**Armenia,** Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, **Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,** Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., *Denmark,* **Estonia,** Finland, France, Germany, **Greece,** Hungary, Ireland, **Italy,** Latvia, Lithuania, **Macedonia,** Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA[124]	– 169[125] –	– –[126]	27.6[127] –

	Name	Location	Start date	Participating states					
— (CSO 4 Feb. 1993)[128]	OSCE Mission to Moldova	Moldova	Feb. 1993	Canada, *Finland*, **Germany**, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, UK, USA[129]	—	10[130]	—	—[131]	1.6[132] —
— (Ministerial Council, 1 Dec. 1993)[133]	OSCE Centre in Dushanbe[134]	Tajikistan	Feb. 1994	Belarus, Bulgaria, *Denmark*, France, Hungary, **Italy, Latvia,** Moldova, **Netherlands, Norway,** *Poland*, Russia, *Switzerland, Ukraine*, USA[135]	—	16[136]	—	—[137]	3.8[138] —
— (10 Aug. 1995)[139]	Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference	Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Aug. 1995	Czech Rep., **Germany**, *Hungary*, Poland, *Slovakia*, UK, Ukraine[140]	—	6[141]	—	—[142]	1.2[143] —
— (MC/5/DEC/ 18 Dec. 1995)[144]	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec. 1995	Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep., *Estonia, Finland*, France, Georgia, Germany, *Greece*, Hungary, *Iceland*, Ireland, Italy, **Japan, Latvia, Lithuania**, *Macedonia*, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, *Slovakia, Slovenia*, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA[145]	—	143[146]	—	—[147]	25.9[148] —
— (PC/DEC 112, 18 Apr. 1996)[149]	OSCE Mission to Croatia	Croatia	July 1996	Armenia, Austria, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, **Czech Rep., Denmark**, Finland, France, Georgia, **Germany, Greece**, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, *Latvia,* **Lithuania**, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, **Portugal**, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, *Switzerland*, UK, Ukraine, USA[150]	—	67[151]	—	—[152]	13.4[153] —
— (PC/DEC 160, 27 Mar. 1997)[154]	OSCE Presence in Albania	Albania	Apr. 1997	Austria, **Canada**, Croatia, **Czech Rep.**, France, Finland, Germany, **Japan**, Ireland, Italy, **Hungary, Moldova**, *Poland*, Romania, Spain, *Switzerland*, UK, USA[155]	—	36[156]	—	—[157]	5.4[158] —

Acronym/ (Legal instrument[a])	Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2003	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
OMiK (PC/DEC 305, 1 July 1999)[159]	OSCE Mission in Kosovo	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	July 1999	Albania, Armenia, Austria, **Azerbaijan**, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, *Slovakia*, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA[160]	– 279[161] –	3 –[162]	60.5[163] –
OMiSaM (PC/DEC 401, 11 Jan. 2001)[164]	OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro[165]	Serbia and Montenegro	Mar. 2001	Austria, **Belgium**, Bosnia and Herzegovina, **Estonia**, *Finland*, France, *Georgia*, Germany, Greece, *Hungary*, Ireland, Italy, *Korea (South)*, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, **Netherlands**, Norway, *Portugal, Romania, Russia*, **Slovakia**, *Spain*, Sweden, Turkey, UK, *Ukraine*, USA[166]	– 37[167] 14[168]	– –[169]	11.3[170] –

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO-led operations (4 operations)

Acronym/ (Legal instrument[a])	Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2003	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
SFOR (SCR 1088)[171]	NATO Stabilization Force	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec. 1996	Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, *Belgium*, Bulgaria, Canada, **Chile**, Czech Rep., Denmark, *Estonia, Finland*, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, *Iceland*, Ireland, Italy, *Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg*, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, *Russia*, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA[172]	11 900[173] – –	809 –[174]	34.1[175] –
KFOR (SCR 1244)[176]	NATO Kosovo Force	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	June 1999	Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, **Canada**, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, *Latvia*, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, *Slovenia*, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, UK, Ukraine, USA[177]	18 500[178] – –	66 6[179]	30.9[180] –

Name	Location	Start date	Participating countries				
Allied Harmony (NAC, 29 Nov. 2002)[181]	*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	*Dec. 2002*	*Belgium, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA*[182]	*375*[183]	*2* 2[184]	*See KFOR*[185]	–
ISAF (SCR 1386)[186]	**Afghanistan**	**Dec. 2001**	**Albania**, *Austria*, **Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA**[187]	**5 500**[188]	**77** 71[189]	**64.7**[190]	–

European Union operations (5 operations)

Name	Location	Start date	Participating countries				
EUMM (Brioni Agreement)[191]	Albania, Former Yugoslavia[192]	July 1991	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, **Luxembourg**, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK[193]	– 110[194]	11 1[195]	6.5[196]	–
EUPM (Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP)[197]	**Bosnia and Herzegovina**	**Jan. 2003**	**Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine**[198]	– 493[199]	– 1[200]	**25.0**[201]	–
EUFOR Concordia (Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP)[202]	*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	*Mar. 2003*	*Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK*[203]	*400*[204]	– –205	*7.7*[206]	–

Acronym/ (Legal instrument[a])	Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2003	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
Operation Artemis (Joint Action 2003/423/ CFSP)[207]	**EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo**	**Democratic Republic of the Congo**	**June 2003**	**Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, UK[208]**	**1 800[209]** – –	– –[210]	**8.7[211]** –
EUPOL Proxima (Joint Action 2003/681/ CFSP)[212]	**EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**	**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**	**Dec. 2003**	**Austria, Belgium, Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK[213]**	– – **50[214]**	– –[215]	**9.9[216]** –

Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) operations (3 operations)

Acronym/ (Legal instrument)	Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
– (Bilateral, 24 June 1992)[217]	South Ossetia Joint Force	Georgia (South Ossetia)	July 1992	Georgia, Russia, (South Ossetia)[218]	1 200[219] 40[220] –	(2)[221] 1[222]	.. ..
– (Bilateral, 21 July 1992)[223]	Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force	Moldova (Trans-Dniester)	July 1992	Moldova, Russia, (Trans-Dniester), Ukraine[224]	1 381[225] 10[226] –	(–)[227] –[228]	–[229] –
– (CIS, 15 Oct. 1994)[230]	CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia	Georgia (Abkhazia)	June 1994	Russia[231]	2 283[232] – –	96[233] –[234]	.. ..

African Union (AU) operations (1 operation)

AMIB (AU, 3 Feb. 2003)[235]	African Mission in Burundi	Burundi	Apr. 2003	Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa[236]	2 634 42[237] –	1 1[238]	90.7[239] –

Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) operations (2 operations)

ECOMICI (SCR 1464)[240]	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	Feb. 2003	Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo[241]	1 510[242] – 70[243]	4 –[244]	23.6[245] –
ECOMIL (SCR 1497)[246]	*ECOWAS Mission in Liberia*	*Liberia*	*July 2003*	*Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo[247]*	3 820[248] – –	4 4[249]	4.1[250] –

Communauté Economique et Monétaire d'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC, Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States) operations (1 operation)

– (Libreville Summit, 2 Oct. 2002)[251]	CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic	Central African Republic	Dec. 2002	Chad, Gabon, Rep. of Congo[252]	380[253] – –	4 4[254]	4.6[255] –

Other operations (7 operations)

NNSC (Armistice Agreement)[256]	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission	North Korea/South Korea	July 1953	Poland, Sweden, Switzerland[257]	– 11[258] –	– –[259]	1.7[260] –

Acronym/ (Legal instrument[a])	Name	Location	Start date	Countries contributing troops, military observers (mil. obs), civilian police (CivPol) and/or civilian staff in 2003	Troops/ Mil. obs/ CivPol	Deaths: To date/ In 2003	Cost ($m): 2003/ Unpaid
MFO (Protocol to Treaty of Peace)[261]	Multinational Force and Observers	Egypt (Sinai)	Apr. 1982	Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay, USA[262]	1 685[263] –	48 –[264]	51.0[265] –
TIPH 2 (Hebron Protocol)[266]	Temporary International Presence in Hebron	Hebron	Jan. 1997	Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey[267]	21[268] –	2 –[269]	2.0[270] –
PMG (Lincoln Agreement 1998)[271]	Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group	Papua New Guinea	May 1998	Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Vanuatu[272]	200[273] –	1 –[274]	6.9[275] –
SAPSD (Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi)[276]	South African Protection and Support Detachment	Burundi	Nov. 2001	South Africa[277]	750	8 –	– –
BTT (Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001)[278]	Bougainville Transition Team	Papua New Guinea	July 2003	Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Vanuatu[279]	22[280] –	– –[281]	2.9[282] –
RAMSI (Biketawa Declaration)[283]	Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands	Solomon Islands	July 2003	Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu[284]	760[285] 108[286] 297	– –[287]	..[288] –

^a *Acronyms in the table and notes:* A/RES = UN General Assembly Resolution; CPA = Coalition Provisional Authority; CSO = OSCE Committee of Senior Officials (now the Senior Council); DDR = disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; DMZ = Demilitarized Zone; DPKO = UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; FY = fiscal year; GA = UN General Assembly; MC = Ministerial Council; MOU = Memorandum of Understanding; NAC = North Atlantic Council; PC = OSCE Permanent Council; PC.DEC = OSCE Permanent Council Decision; SC = UN Security Council; SCR = UN Security Council Resolution.

[1] These are operations administered and directed by the DPKO. Peacekeeping operations deployed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are typically monitoring and/or observer missions; while operations deployed under Chapter VII (peace enforcement missions) are authorized to use force when necessary.

[2] United Nations, DPKO, 'Monthly summary of military and CivPol personnel deployed in current United Nations operations as of 31 Dec. 2003', 14 Jan. 2004.

[3] Figure as of 31 Dec. 2003, including military, observer, police, international civilian staff, local staff and 'other' UN employees. Note that this figure represents the total mission fatalities for all UN missions since 1948, not only those listed below. DPKO Situation Centre, 'Fatalities by mission and incident type—as of December 31 2003', 7 Jan. 2004. UN Internet site, URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/fatal1.htm>.

[4] Total of costs of the 14 operations listed in the table. This sum does not include the member states' prorated share of the support account for peacekeeping operations nor the costs of UN Logistics Base at Brindisi (Italy).

[5] As of 31 Dec. 2003. United Nations 'Background note on peacekeeping operations', 15 Jan. 2004, UN Internet site, URL <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml>.

[6] UNTSO was established in May 1948 to assist the Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The mandate was maintained during 2003.

[7] United Nations (note 2).

[8] United Nations (note 2).

[9] United Nations (note 3).

[10] UNTSO is funded through the UN's regular budget and consequently should not suffer arrears. United Nations, 'Middle East–UNTSO: Facts and figures', UN Internet site, URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untso/untsoF.htm>.

[11] UNMOGIP was established in Mar. 1951 to replace the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (SCR 91, 30 Mar. 1951). Its task is to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir under the July 1949 Karachi Agreement. UNMOGIP Internet site, URL <www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmogip.htm>.

[12] United Nations (note 2).

[13] United Nations (note 2).

[14] United Nations (note 3).

[15] UNMOGIP is funded through the UN's regular budget and consequently should not suffer arrears. United Nations, 'India and Pakistan–UNMOGIP: Facts and figures', UN Internet site, URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmogip/unmogipF.htm>. A positive decision by the Security Council is required to terminate the mission.

[16] UNFICYP was established by SCR 186 (4 Mar. 1964) to prevent fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order. Since 1974 UNFICYP's mandate has included monitoring the ceasefire and maintaining a buffer zone between the 2 sides. The mandate was extended until 15 June 2004 by SCR 1517 (24 Nov. 2003).

[17] United Nations (note 2).

[18] United Nations (note 2).

19 Death by accident. United Nations (note 3).

20 Figure includes a voluntary contribution of $14.6 million from the Government of Cyprus and $6.5 million from the Government of Greece. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, UN document S/2003/1078, 12 Nov. 2003, para. 15.

21 As of 30 Sep. 2003. United Nations (note 19), para. 17.

22 UNDOF was established after the 1973 Middle East War under the Agreement on Disengagement and SCR 350 (31 May 1974), to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria and to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces. The mandate was extended until 30 June 2004 by SCR 1520 (22 Dec. 2003).

23 United Nations (note 2).

24 United Nations (note 2).

25 United Nations (note 3).

26 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, UN document S/2003/1148, 9 Dec. 2003, para. 8.

27 Sum outstanding as of 19 Nov. 2003. United Nations (note 26), para. 9.

28 UNIFIL was established by SCR 425 (19 Mar. 1978), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The mandate was renewed until 31 July 2004 by SCR 1525 (30 Jan. 2004).

29 United Nations (note 2).

30 United Nations (note 2).

31 Death as a result of illness. United Nations (note 3).

32 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UN document S/2004/50, 20 Jan. 2004, para. 23.

33 Sum outstanding as of 30 Nov. 2003. United Nations (note 32), para. 24.

34 UNIKOM was established by SCR 689 (9 Apr. 1991) as an unarmed observation mission with the mandate to monitor the Khawr ' Abd Allah waterway and the DMZ and to observe any hostile actions between the 2 states. In Feb. 1993 the mandate was expanded with the addition of an infantry battalion by SCR 806 (5 Feb. 1993) to prevent small-scale violations of the DMZ and the borders. Owing to the Mar. 2003 US military intervention in Iraq, the Secretary-General suspended the mission's mandate. Except for a small core team of officers operating in Kheitan, Kuwait, the rest of personnel were evacuated. Subsequently, having affirmed that it was no longer necessary to monitor for possible Iraqi incursions into Kuwaiti territory, SCR 1490 (3 July 2003) determined that the mission's mandate would cease on 6 Oct. 2003.

35 United Nations (note 2).

36 This figure represents the strength of the mission at the final stage of its mandated period. The mission was supported by 67 international civilian personnel and 168 locally employed staff. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission for the period 16 June–1 October 2003, UN document S/2003/933, 2 Oct. 2003, para. 13; and UNIKOM, 'Facts and Figures', URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/spko/missions/unikom/facts.html>.

37 Death by accident. United Nations (note 3).

38 The budget is financed through the Special Account for UNIKOM, with two-thirds of this amount borne by Kuwait and the remaining by assessed contributions. United Nations (note 36), para. 15.

39 As of 31 July 2003. United Nations (note 36), para. 16.

40 MINURSO was established by SCR 690 (29 Apr. 1991) to monitor the ceasefire between the Frente Polisario and the Moroccan Government, verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara, and organize a free and fair referendum. The mandate was renewed until 30 Apr. 2004 by SCR 1523 (30 Jan. 2004).

41 United Nations (note 2).

42 United Nations (note 2).

43 United Nations (note 3).

44 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN document S/2004/39, 19 Jan. 2004, para. 25.

45 Sum outstanding as of 30 Nov. 2003. United Nations (note 44), para. 26.

46 UNOMIG was established by SCR 849 (9 July 1993) and SCR 858 (24 Aug. 1993). The mission's original mandate of verifying the ceasefire between the Georgian Government and the Abkhaz authorities was invalidated by resumed fighting in Abkhazia in Sep. 1993, and UNOMIG was given an interim mandate to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military contingents and to monitor and report on the situation. Following the signing of the 1994 Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, UNOMIG's mandate was expanded to include monitoring and verification of the implementation of the agreement by SCR 937 (27 July 1994). The present mandate was renewed until 31 July 2004 by SCR 1524 (30 Jan. 2004).

47 United Nations (note 2).

48 In July 2003, SCR 1494 (30 July 2003) authorized the addition of a civilian police component of 20 officers with a view to help build local capacity to improve law and order in the Gali sector such that conditions are improved for the return of refugees and IDPS. United Nations (note 2).

49 United Nations (note 3).

50 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, UN document S/2004/26, 14 Jan. 2004, para. 31.

51 Sum outstanding as of 30 Nov. 2003. United Nations (note 50), para. 33.

52 UNMIK was established by SCR 1244 (10 June 1999). Its main tasks are: promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; civilian administrative functions; maintaining law and order; promoting human rights; and assuring the safe return of all refugees and displaced persons. A positive decision by the Security Council is required to terminate the mission. SCR 1244 (10 June 1999), Article 19.

53 United Nations (note 2).

54 United Nations (note 2).

55 1 fatality owing to hostile act, 1 to illness and 2 owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).

56 United Nations, Financing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: Report of the Fifth Committee, UN document A/57/827, 10 June 2003.

57 Sum outstanding as of 31 Mar. 2003. United Nations (note 56).

58 UNAMSIL was established by SCR 1270 (22 Oct. 1999) following the signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement between the Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) on 7 July 1999. In 2001, SCR 1346 (30 Mar. 2001) revised the mission's mandate to that of assisting the Sierra Leone Government's efforts to extend its authority, restore law and order in the country, to promote the resumption of DDR activities and to assist in the anticipated elections. SCR 1508 (19 Sep. 2003) extended the current mandate until 31 Mar. 2004.

59 United Nations (note 2).

60 United Nations (note 2).

61 15 fatalities owing to accident, 15 to illness and 2 owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).

62 United Nations, Nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN document S/2003/863, 5 Sep. 2003, para.56.

63 Sum outstanding as of 31 July 2003. United Nations (note 62), para. 57.

64 MONUC was established by SCR 1279 (30 Nov. 1999). It is mandated to liaise with the Joint Military Commission (JMC), plan for the observation of the ceasefire and the disengagement of forces, and provide humanitarian assistance. In 2000 the mandate was expanded to include the deployment of c. 5000 troops to protect UN and JMC personnel and civilians under imminent threat of violence. UN document S/2000/1291, 24 Feb. 2000. SCR 1493 (28 July 2003) increased the mission strength to 10 800 and revised the mandate to a Chapter VII mandate, which authorized the mission to use 'all necessary means' to fulfill its tasks.

65 United Nations (note 2).

66 United Nations (note 2).

67 5 fatalities owing to accident, 1 to illness and 3 owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).

68 United Nations, Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN document S/2003/1098, 17 Nov. 2003, para. 59.

69 Sum outstanding as of 30 Sep. 2003. United Nations (note 68), para. 60.

70 UNMEE was established by SCR 1312 (31 July 2000). The mission was mandated to prepare a mechanism for verifying the cessation of hostilities, the establishment of the Military Co-ordination Commission provided for in the ceasefire agreement, and a peacekeeping deployment. The mission was later expanded with the allocation of 4200 troops and 220 military observers and tasked to monitor the ceasefire, repatriate Ethiopian troops and monitor the positions of Ethiopian and Eritrean troops outside a 25-km temporary security zone, to chair the Military Co-ordination Commission of the UN and the OAU, and to assist in mine clearance. SCR 1320 (15 Sep. 2000). Delays in the demarcation process led to an extension of its mandate to 15 Mar. 2004. SCR 1507 (12 Sep. 2003).

71 United Nations (note 2).

72 United Nations (note 2).

73 1 fatality owing to illness and the other owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).

74 United Nations, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN document S/2003/1186, 19 Dec. 2003, para. 32.

75 Sum outstanding as of 31 Oct. 2003. United Nations (note 74).

76 UNMISET was established by SCR 1410 (17 May 2002) as a follow-on mission to UNTAET. The tasks of the mission are to provide assistance to the administrative structures of the Timorese Government, to provide interim law enforcement while assisting in the development of a new law enforcement agency, and to contribute to the overall security of Timor-Leste.

77 United Nations (note 2).

78 United Nations (note 2).

79 5 fatalities owing to accident, 1 to illness and 3 owing to other causes. United Nations (note 3).

80 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UN document S/2003/944, 6 Oct. 2003, para. 53.

81 As of 30 Sep. 2003. United Nations (note 80), para. 54.

82 UNMIL was established by SCR 1509 (19 Sep. 2003) with UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mission was mandated to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; assist the government's efforts in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military; support humanitarian and human rights activities; and protect UN staff, facilities and civilians.

83 United Nations (note 2).

84 United Nations (note 2).

85 4 fatalities owing to accident and 1 to illness. United Nations (note 3).

86 This figure is the approved expenditure of the mission between 1 Aug. and 31 Dec. 2003. A provisional budget of $564.6 million for fiscal period 1 Aug. 2003–30 June 2004 is at time of writing, under review by the General Assembly. United Nations, First progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN document S/2003/1175, 15 Dec. 2003, para. 60.

87 These are UN peace operations not deployed under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter but which are directed and administered by the DPKO with the exception of MINUGUA, which is administered by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA). This list does not include UN peace-building offices.

88 MINUGUA (Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala) had until 1997 been limited to verifying the 1994 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and the human rights aspects of the 1995 Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 1997 the parties to the agreements requested that MINUGUA expand its functions to verify both agreements, and that the mission's functions should also comprise good offices, advisory and support services and public information.

MINUGUA's mandate was renewed for a final term till 31 Dec. 2004 to assist the new government in the continued implementation of the peace agreements. UN document A/58/L.30/Rev.1, 15 Dec. 2003.

89 Email from Mercedes de Arevalo, Senior Personnel Assistant, MINUGUA, 26 Jan. 2004.

90 International civilian observers. The mission is supported by 116 local staff and 29 international UN volunteers. Email from de Arevalo (note 89).

91 Email from de Arevalo (note 89).

92 Email from de Arevalo (note 89).

93 $11 631 400. Email from de Arevalo (note 89).

94 UNAMA was established by SCR 1401 (28 Mar. 2002). The mission is mandated to promote national reconciliation; to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the UN in the 2001 Bonn Agreement, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues; and to manage all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan in coordination with the Afghan Transitional Authority.

95 The countries listed represent the nationalities of the international civilian staff who are recruited in their personal capacity. They are not seconded by their governments. Email from David Singh, Senior Media Relations Officer, UNAMA, 25 Feb. 2004.

96 8 are military advisers and the remaining 199 are civilian personnel. The mission is supported by 104 national professional officers, 633 local staff and 31 international UN volunteers. Email from Singh (note 95).

97 Email from Singh (note 95).

98 However, 2 local staff were killed—deaths owing to a road accident and illness. Email from Singh (note 95).

99 Budget for period Apr.–Dec. 2003. UNAMA official Internet site, URL <http://www.unama-afg.org/about/index.html#structure>.

100 MINUCI was established by SCR 1479 (13 May 2003) for an initial period of 6 months to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, but was subsequently extended by SCR 1514 (13 Nov. 2003) until 4 Feb. 2004. SCR 1527 (4 Feb. 2004) further extended the mission's mandate to 27 Feb. 2004 and expanded its authority to include UN Charter Chapter VII powers. The mission is due to close at the end of its mandated period.

101 United Nations (note 2).

102 The mission is supported by 42 international civilian personnel and 57 local staff. United Nations (note 2); and MINUCI, 'Facts and figures', URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpkp/missions/minuci/facts.html>.

103 Email from Shiyun Sang, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information, United Nations, 13 Feb. 2004.

104 United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire for the period 13 May 2003–30 June 2004.

105 UNAMI was established by SCR 1500 (July 2003) to support the UNSG's Special Representative's efforts to fulfil his mandate to coordinate the UN's humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, promote the safe return of refugees and IDPs, and facilitate international efforts to help rebuild the local institutional capacities, as provided for by SCR 1483 (22 May 2003).

106 The countries listed represent the nationalities of the international civilian staff who are recruited in their personal capacity. They are not seconded by their governments. Email from Sang (note 103), 6 Feb. 2004.

107 The mission is staffed by civilian personnel and is currently supported by c. 150 locally employed staff. The strength of the mission was reduced considerably following the Aug. 2003 bomb attacks on the mission's HQ in Iraq. UNAMI personnel are currently operating out of Nicosia, Cyprus. Email from Sang (note 103), 30 Jan. 2004; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 224 of Resolution 1483 (2003) and paragraph 12 of Resolution 1511 (16 Oct. 2003), UN document S/2003/1149, 5 Dec. 2003, paras 92–96.

108 Deaths caused by hostile act (19 Aug. 2003 bomb attack of the UN HQ). Email from Sang (note 103), 30 Jan. 2004.

109 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, 'Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General

Assembly and/or the Security Council', UN document A/C.5/58/20, 1 Dec. 2003, p. 9.

110 The Multinational Force in Iraq was authorized by SCR 1511 (16 Oct. 2003) to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of UNAMI's mandated tasks.

111 Email from Keith Peterson, Assistant Public Affairs Officer, Embassy of the United States of America in Stockholm, 11 Dec. 2003.

112 The USA contributed 133 000 soldiers and the remaining 23 654 were contributed by the rest of the coalition. The force is supported by *c.* 85 000 Iraqis who are being trained in policing, border services, civil defence, etc. Email from Peterson (note 111), 11 Dec. 2003.

113 The British officers were deployed to train Iraqi police officers at the Regional Police Training Academy in Al Basra. However, several police officers from Canada, Germany, the USA and the UK were training Iraqi police officers in a Jordanian facility. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'UK police officers deploy to Iraq', Press Release, 31 Dec. 2003.

114 Of the 539 fatalities, 52 were British soldiers and 29 from other countries. Prior to the SC authorization, there were 386 fatalities. From 16 Oct. to 17 Dec. 2003, there were 153 fatalities. AP Web Services, War Casualty Database, URL <http://apcasualty.ap.org/car/casualtyquery/totals.asp>, updated 16 Dec. 2003.

115 The figure is the sum of US and UK contributions; contributing countries bear the cost for their own personnel. The US contribution is $56.1 billion: $51 billion represents the amount requested by President Bush from the US Congress to be used for Operation Iraqi Freedom; the remaining $5.1 billion comes out of a budget package for the CPA. Letter from Joshua B. Bolten, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, to President George W. Bush, 17 Sep. 2003, Estimate No. 17, 108th Congress, 1st Session. The British contribution for FY 2002/2003 was £847 million. *Defence News Analysis*, Issue 03/47, 8 Dec. 2003. £1 = $1.7264 (SEBanken, Sweden).

116 Includes OSCE long-term missions and other field activities with a peacemaking or peace-building mandate, but not human rights offices, election monitoring groups or liaison offices.

117 Decision to establish the mission taken at 16th Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting, *Journal* no. 3 (18 Sep. 1992), Annex 1. The mission was authorized by the Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) through Articles of Understanding agreed by an exchange of letters on 7 Nov. 1992. The mission's tasks include assessing the level of stability and the possibility of conflict and unrest.

118 Email from Isabelle De Ruyt, Spokesperson, OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje, 20 Jan. 2004.

119 Supported by 272 locally employed staff. Email from De Ruyt (note 118).

120 20 are officers who work in the field (community policing) and the remaining 40 personnel are trainers or administrators within the Police Development Unit. Telephone conversation with Antonio Ortiz, Senior Mission Programme Officer, OSCE Secretariat, 24 Feb. 2004.

121 Email from De Ruyt (note 118).

122 €16 804 200. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002. €1 = $1.2488 (SEBanken, Sweden).

123 Decision to establish the mission taken at the 17th CSO meeting, 6 Nov. 1992, *Journal no.* 2, Annex 2. The mission was authorized by the Government of Georgia through an MOU on 23 Jan. 1993, and by South Ossetia's leaders through an exchange of letters on 1 Mar. 1993. Initially, the objective of the mission was to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties. The mandate was expanded on 29 Mar. 1994 to include monitoring of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia. In Dec. 1999 this was expanded to include the monitoring of Georgia's border with Chechnya. PC.DEC/344, 15 Dec. 1999. In Dec. 2001 the mission's tasks were further expanded to include the monitoring of Georgia's border with Ingushetia. PC.DEC/450, 13 Dec. 2001. In Nov. 2002, the mandate was yet again further expanded to observe and report on cross-border movement between Georgia and the Dagestan Republic of the Russian Federation. PC.DEC/522, 19 Dec. 2002.

124 Email from Clare Turney-Dann, Training & Staffing Officer, OSCE Mission to Georgia, 22 Dec. 2003.

125 Of the 169 international staff, 144 serve as border monitors. The mission is supported by 104 local staff. Email from Turney-Dann (note 124)

126 Email from Turney-Dann (note 124).

127 €22 070 300. PC.DEC/534, 27 Feb. 2003.
128 Decision to establish the mission taken at the 19th CSO meeting, *Journal* no. 3 (4 Feb. 1993), Annex 3. Authorized by the Government of Moldova through MOU, 7 May 1993. The mission's tasks include assisting the parties in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement to the conflict as well as gathering and providing information on the situation.
129 Email from Lt Col Henk Wenker, OSCE Mission to Moldova, 11 Feb. 2004.
130 Email from Wenker (note 129).
131 Email from Wenker (note 129).
132 €1 270 700. PC.DEC/534, 27 Feb. 2003.
133 Decision to establish the mission taken at 4th meeting of the Ministerial Council, Rome (CSCE/4-C/Dec. 1), Decision I.4, 1 Dec. 1993. No bilateral MOU was signed. The tasks of the mission include facilitating dialogue, promoting human rights and informing the OSCE about further developments. This was expanded in 2002 to include an economic and environmental dimension.
134 Formerly the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan. In Oct. 2002 a decision was taken to change the name of the mission to reflect the change of focus of the mission's activities.
135 Email from Bernard Rouault, OSCE Centre in Dushanbe, 10 Dec. 2003.
136 The mission is supported by 80 local staff. Email from Rouault (note 135)
137 Email from Rouault (note 135).
138 €3 009 200. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002.
139 In Aug. 1995 the OSCE Chairman-in-Office appointed a Personal Representative (PR) on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, which seeks a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The PR's mandate consists of assisting the Minsk Group in planning possible peacekeeping operations, assisting the parties in confidence-building measures and in humanitarian matters, and monitoring the ceasefire between the parties. OSCE, *Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities (1 Nov. 1999–31 Oct. 2000)*, 24 Nov. 2000.
140 Email from Press and Public Information Section, OSCE Secretariat, 25 Feb. 2004.
141 The Personal Representative is assisted by 5 field assistants. *Mission Survey*, URL <http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey22.htm>.
142 Email from Press and Public Information Section, OSCE Secretariat, 24 Feb. 2004.
143 €1 000 800. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002.
144 Decision to establish the mission taken at 5th meeting, Ministerial Council, Budapest, 8 Dec. 1995 (MC(5).DEC/1) in accordance with Annex 6 of the 1995 Dayton Framework Agreement. The tasks of the mission include assisting the parties in regional stabilization measures and democracy building.
145 Email from Maja Soldo, Personal Assistant to the Chief of Staff and Planning, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 Dec. 2003.
146 Email from Soldo (note 145).
147 Email from Soldo (note 145).
148 €20 742 100. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002.
149 The decision to establish the mission was taken by the PC on 18 Apr. 1996 (PC.DEC/112). Adjustment of the mandate was made by the PC on 26 June 1997 (PC.DEC/176) and 25 June 1998 (C/DEC/239). The mission's tasks include assisting and monitoring the return of refugees and displaced persons as well as the protection of national minorities.
150 Email from Slavka Jureta, Senior Media Assistant, Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Mission to Croatia, 28 Jan. 2004.
151 The mission is supported by 166 local staff. Email from Jureta (note 150).
152 Email from Jureta (note 150).

153 €10 766 900. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002.

154 The decision to establish the mission was taken at the 108th meeting of the Permanent Council in 27 Mar. 1997 (PC/DEC/160). The current mandate was set on 11 Dec. 1997 (PC.DEC/206).

155 Email from Dinka Zivalj, Acting Press and Public Information Officer, OSCE Presence in Albania, 18 Dec. 2003.

156 The mission is supported by 89 local staff. Email from Zivalj (note 155).

157 Email from Zivalj (note 155).

158 €4 288 100. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002.

159 On 1 July 1999 the PC established the OSCE Mission in Kosovo to replace the transitional OSCE Kosovo Task Force, which had been established on 8 June 1999 (PC.DEC/296). The tasks of the OSCE Mission to Kosovo include training police, judicial personnel and civil administrators, and monitoring and promoting human rights. The mandate was extended until 31 Dec. 2003 by PC.DEC/514, 12 Dec. 2002.

160 Email from Chris Cycmanick, Information Officer, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 11 Dec. 2003.

161 The mission is supported by 1028 locally recruited staff members. Email from Cycmanick. (note 160)

162 Email from Cycmanick. (note 160)

163 €48 469 200. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002.

164 On 11 Jan. 2001 the PC established the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with an initial mandate of 1 year. Its mandate is to provide expert assistance to the Yugoslav authorities and civil society groups in the areas of democratization and human and minority rights, assist with the restructuring and training of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, provide media support and facilitate the return of refugees. PC.DEC/401, 11 Jan. 2001. The mission opened in Mar. On 15 Nov. 2001 the Permanent Council directed the mission to open an office in Podgorica, Montenegro. PC.DEC/444, 15 Nov. 2001.

165 Formerly the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In Feb. 2003, a decision (PC.DEC/533) was taken to change the name following the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro.

166 Email from Olja Cojbasic, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, 19 Jan. 2004.

167 International civilian staff. Figure includes staff working out of the Podgorica office. The mission is supported by 118 locally employed staff. Email from Cojbasic (note 166).

168 International police trainers. Email from Cojbasic (note 166).

169 Email from Cojbasic (note 166), 20 Jan. 2004.

170 €9 085 100. PC.DEC/527, 30 Dec. 2002.

171 SFOR was established in Dec. 1996 to replace the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), created to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. SCR 1088 (12 Dec. 1996).

172 As of 13 Oct. 2003. Official Internet site of SFOR, URL <http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm>.

173 As of 13 Oct. 2003. Official Internet site of SFOR, URL <http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm>.

174 Telephone conversation with Dave Sullivan, spokesperson, SFOR, 9 Feb. 2004.

175 €24 731 425. This figure covers only the common costs, mainly the functioning costs of NATO headquarters (civilian personnel and operations & maintenance costs) and investments in infrastructure necessary to support the operation. Contributing countries provide separate finances for their contingents. Email from Lt. Commander Olivier Goudard, Budget and Finance Department, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Operations Centre, 13 Feb. 2004.

176 KFOR received its mandate from the SC on 10 June 1999. Its tasks include deterring renewed hostilities, ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return of the FRY military and police forces, demilitarizing the KLA, establishing a secure environment, supporting UNMIK and monitoring borders. SCR 1244, 10 June 1999.

177 Official Internet site of KFOR, URL <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/nations/default.htm>.

178 Email from Colonel Horst Pieper, Chief Public Information Officer, KFOR, 2 Mar. 2004.

179 Email from Pieper (note 178).

180 €27 280 402. This figure covers only the common costs, mainly the functioning costs of NATO headquarters (civilian personnel and operations & maintenance costs) and investments in infrastructure necessary to support the operation. Contributing countries provide separate finances for their contingents. Email from Goudard (note 175).

181 In response to a request from the President of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the NAC authorized a follow-on mission to TFF. Operation Allied Harmony consists of two pillars. Its operational elements will provide support for the international monitors, and its advisory elements will assist the government in taking ownership of security. NATO Press Release (2002)131, 29 Nov. 2002. Operation Allied Harmony closed on 31 Mar. 2003.

182 Email from Maurizio DeGiorgi, NATO AFSouth Public Information Office, 22 Jan. 2004.

183 Email from DeGiorgi (note 182).

184 As a result of a landmine accident. Email from DeGiorgi (note 182).

185 Operation Allied Harmony is funded through the KFOR budget. Email from DeGiorgi (note 182).

186 On 20 Dec. 2001 the SC, acting under UN Charter Chapter VII, authorized a multinational force to help the Afghan Interim Authority maintain security in and around Kabul, as envisaged in Annex I of the 2001 Bonn Agreement. UN document SC/7248, 20 Dec. 2001. Until NATO's takeover in Aug. 2003, ISAF was under the command and control of lead nations—Germany and the Netherlands (Feb.–Aug. 2003), Turkey (June 2002–Feb. 2003) and the UK (Dec. 2001–June 2002).

187 As of 2 Oct. 2003. Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Switzerland and the USA were new participants in 2003. Official Internet site of ISAF, URL <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure_structure.htm>.

188 Official Internet site of ISAF, URL <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure_structure.htm>.

189 A total of 69 fatalities were suffered during ISAF3 (Germany/Netherlands lead)—62 Spanish peacekeepers died in a plane crash, 1 German and 1 local staff in a mine explosion, 4 Germans as a result of a hostile act and 2 Germans due to natural causes. Email from Harald Guenther Rein, Assistant to the German Defence Attaché, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Stockholm, 3 Mar. 2004. 2 fatalities were suffered during ISAF4—deaths of the Canadian peacekeepers were due to accidental mine explosion. Telephone conversation with Major Ciszek, Public Information Officer, ISAF, 5 Mar. 2004.

190 €51 843 393. This figure covers only the common costs, mainly the functioning costs of NATO headquarters (civilian personnel and operations & maintenance costs) and investments in infrastructure necessary to support the operation. Contributing countries provide separate finances for their contingents. Email from Goudard (note 175).

191 The mission was established by the Brioni Agreement, signed at Brioni, Croatia, on 7 July 1991 by representatives of the European Community (EC) and the 6 republics of the former Yugoslavia. MOUs were signed with the governments of Albania in 1997 and Croatia in 1998. The ECMM became the EUMM upon becoming an instrument of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and was mandated to monitor political and security developments, borders, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns; to contribute to the early warning mechanism of the European Council; and to contribute to confidence building and stabilization in the region. Council Joint Action of 22 Dec. 2000 on the European Union Monitoring Mission, EU document 2000/811/CFSP, 23 Dec. 2000, Introduction, para. 6 and Article 1, para. 2.

192 The EUMM operates in Albania and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia (FYROM) and the FRY (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Presevo). Fax from Stephan Muller, Policy Unit of the General Secretariat, Council of the European Union, 22 Jan. 2001.

193 Official Internet site of EUMM, URL <http://www.ue.eu.int/pesc/ecmm/members.htm> .

194 The mission is supported by 87 locally employed staff. Email from Muller, 3 Dec. 2003.

195 Death caused by illness. Email from Muller (note 194).

196 €5 182 563. Email from Muller (note 194).

197 The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established by Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 Mar. 2002. The mandate of the mission was to ensure

sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership.

198 Official Internet site of EUPM, URL <http://www.eupm.org/people/en.htm>.

199 The mission is supported by 59 international civilian staff and 333 local staff. Email from Lena Andersson, Public Information Officer, EUPM, 9 Dec. 2003.

200 Death caused by traffic accident. Email from Andersson (note 199).

201 €20 million. The figure includes salaries for the international civilian staff and local staff, and infrastructure, but does not include salaries of the international police personnel which are borne by the contributing countries. Email from Andersson (note 199).

202 The EU military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was established by Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 Jan. 2003 as a follow-on mission to NATO's Allied Harmony in accordance with the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. The mandate of the mission was thus to contribute to a stable security environment to facilitate the implementation of the Framework Agreement. In July 2003 the mandate was extended till 15 Dec. 2003 when the mission closed.

203 Official Internet site of EUFOR Concordia, URL <http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/force-nations.htm>.

204 This figure includes civilian staff. *Atlantic News*, No. 3464, 21 Mar. 2003.

205 Telephone conversation with Ragne Gustafsson, EUFOR Concordia, 9 Feb. 2004.

206 €6 200 00. This figure refers to the common costs of the operation and does not include the salaries of the personnel, which are borne by the contributing countries. Official Internet site of EUFOR Concordia.

207 Operation Artemis (also known as the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, IEMF) was established by Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 and SCR 1484 (30 May 2003) for a period of 3 months to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. The mandate was briefly extended to 15 sep. 2003 to enable transition to the MONUC forces.

208 Fact sheet of the EU-Led Military Operation in the DRC: Operation 'Artemis', July 2003, available at URL <http://ue.eu.int/pesd/congo/index.asp?lang=EN>.

209 Fact sheet of the EU-Led Military Operation in the DRC: Operation 'Artemis', July 2003.

210 Email from Stavros Petropoulos, Council of the European Union Press Office, 16 Dec. 2003.

211 €7 000 00. This figure refers to the common costs of the operation and does not include the salaries of the personnel, which are borne by the contributing countries. Fact sheet of the EU-Led Military Operation in the DRC: Operation 'Artemis', July 2003.

212 EUPOL Proxima was established by Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 Sep. 2003 for an initial period of 12 months to support the development of a professional police service in FYROM in accordance to European policing standards. In carrying out its activities, the mission co-operates with the OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje.

213 Telephone conversation with Sheena Thomson, spokesperson, EU Police Mission Proxima, 6 Feb. 2004.

214 Initial deployed strength. Telephone conversation with Thomson (note 213).

215 Telephone conversation with Thomson (note 213).

216 €7 950 000, of which €7 300 000 was allocated for the mission's start up costs and €650 000 for the running costs (including personnel's per diem) for 2003. Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 Sep. 2003.

217 Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in South Assetia, signed in Dagomys, 24 June 1992, by Georgia and Russia. A joint Monitoring Commission with representatives of Russia, Georgia, and North and South Ossetia was established to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

218 The participation of parties to a conflict in peace operations is typically not included in the table; however, the substantial involvement of the parties to the conflict in this operation is a distinctive feature of CIS operations and of the peace agreement which is the basis for the establishment of the operation. The official name of the Ossetian battalion is called the Battalion of North Ossetian/Alania. Email from Joe McDonagh, Military Advisor, OSCE Mission to Georgia, 5 Feb. 2004.

219 Each side provides 1 battalion each. The Russian contribution amounts to 545 troops. Email from McDonagh (note 217); and Email from Vladimir Barbin, Minister-Counsellor of the Embassy of Russia in Stockholm, 5 Mar. 2004.

220 Email from McDonagh (note 218), 7 Feb. 2004.

221 This figure is tallied from 2001. Prior to 2001, data could not be ascertained.

222 As a result of accidental discharge of weapon. Email from McDonagh (note 218).

223 Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Trans-Dniester region, signed in Moscow, 21 July 1992, by the presidents of Moldova and Russia. A Monitoring Commission with representatives of Russia, Moldova and Trans-Dniester was established to coordinate the activities of the joint peacekeeping contingent.

224 The participation of parties to a conflict in peace operations is typically not included in the table; however, the substantial involvement of the parties to the conflict in this operation is a distinctive feature of CIS operations and of the peace agreement which is the basis for the establishment of the operation. Email from Wenker (note 129).

225 Russia, Moldova and Trans-Dniester contributed 443, 360 and 578 military personnel, respectively. Email from Barbin (note 219) and Wenker (note 129).

226 Ukraine provided the military observers. Email from Wenker (note 129).

227 This figure is tallied from 2001. Prior to 2001, data could not be ascertained.

228 Email from Wenker (note 129).

229 There is no designated budget for the mission. Each side bears the cost of sending their respective personnel. Email from Wenker (note 129), 12 Dec. 2002.

230 Georgian–Abkhazian Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow, 14 May 1994. The operation's mandate was approved by heads of states members of the CIS Council of Collective Security, 21 Oct. 1994, and endorsed by the UN through SCR 937, 21 July 1994. The period of the mission's mandate was extended indefinitely from Jan. 2004. Moscow ITAR-TASS, 17 Dec. 2003, in 'Russia peacekeepers begin planned rotation in Georgia–Abkhazia conflict zone', Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report–Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV)*, FBIS-SOV-3003-1217, 18 Dec. 2003.

231 Other CIS states may participate in the mission. Moscow ITAR-TASS, 25 Dec. 2003, in 'Russian Defense Minister rules out use of force in Georgian-Abkhaz conflict', FBIS-SOV-2003-1225, 2 Jan. 2004.

232 Email from Barbin (note 219).

233 Telephone conversation with Roman Sishuk, political officer, UNOMIG, 4 Mar. 2004. 'Dialog luschshe groma pushek' [Dialogue is better than the thunder of cannons], *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 27 June 2003 (in Russian), URL <http://www.redstar.ru/2003/06/27_06/3_01.html>.

234 Email from Barbin (note 219).

235 AMIB was established on 3 Feb. 2003 by the decision of the 7th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Heads of State and Government level. The mission's mandate is to monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements, to liaise between the conflicting parties, to assist the JCC, to facilitate the DDR process and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

236 Fax from Salinda Biyana, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of South Africa in Stockholm, 15 Dec. 2003.

237 Fax from Biyana (note 236).

238 Death by accident. Fax from Biyana (note 236).

239 Budget for FY 2003/2004. South Africa contributed R 510 000 000, while the UK funded Mozambique's deployment at a cost of R 31 000 000, and the USA funded Ethiopia's deployment, $6 100 000. R1 = $0.1563 (SEBanken, Sweden). Fax from Biyana (note 236).

240 The SC authorized under UN Chapter VIII the establishment of ECOMICI alongside French troops to contribute to a secure environment and allow for the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. SCR 1464 (4 Feb. 2003). The mission's tasks include monitoring the cessation of hostilities, facilitating the free movement of persons and goods, providing security for members of the national government of reconciliation as well as humanitarian workers, and to contribute to the implementation of DDR programmes. The mandate was extended till 4 Feb. 2004 by SCR 1498 (4 Aug. 2003).

241 Fax from Major General Cheick Oumar Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary, Political Affairs Defence and Security, ECOWAS, 3 Feb. 2004.

242 This figure includes 32 civilian personnel. Fax from Oumar Diarra (note 241). The mission was also supported by the *c.* 3800 French troops. 'Ivorian generals "not to resign"', BBC News Online, URL <http://www.bbc.co.uk>, 3 Dec. 2003.

243 50 gendarmes from Niger and 20 from Togo. ECOWAS press release no. 99, 21 Sep. 2003.

244 Fax from Oumar Diarra (note 241).

245 The estimated budget was $39 539 800, but total expenditure as of 12 Nov. 2003 was $23 568 756, of which $13 889 000 was provided in kind by the US. Fax from Oumar Diarra (note 241).

246 Acting under Chapter VII, the SC authorized a multinational force to maintain security in Liberia and to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed on 17 June 2003, in particular to establish Zones of Separation between the conflicting parties, provide security to humanitarian workers, facilitate the functions of the JMC in accordance with the Accra Agreement and to lay the foundation for the deployment of the UN Mission. ECOMIL forces were integrated into UNMIL on 1 Oct. 2003.

247 Fax from Oumar Diarra (note 241).

248 This figure includes 6 civilian personnel. Fax from Oumar Diarra (note 241). ECOMIL was also supported by several hundred US troops. ECOWAS press release no. 99, 21 Sep. 2003.

249 Mali and Nigeria lost 2 soldiers each. The deaths were a result of illness and a road accident. Fax from Oumar Diarra (note 241).

250 Total expenditure as of 5 Dec. 2003 was €3 288 848, but €6 120 000 was budgeted. Fax from Oumar Diarra (note 241).

251 The CEMAC Multinational Force was established on 2 Oct. 2002 by the decision of the Libreville Summit for an initial period of 6 months to secure the border between Chad and CAR and to guarantee the safety of former President Patassé. Following the 15 Mar. coup, CEMAC decided at the 21 Mar. 2003 Libreville Summit to amend the mission's mandate to contribute to the overall security environment, to assist in the restructuring of CAR's armed forces and to support the transition process. Communiqué Final du Sommet des Chefs d'Etat et de Délégation de la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale, Libreville, 2 Oct. 2002; 3rd Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, African Union, 4–8 July 2003.

252 Fax from Brigadier-General Jean Claude Ella-Ekogha, Commander, CEMAC Multinational Force, 28 Feb. 2004.

253 A contingent of *c.* 300 French troops were deployed to CAR to assist in securing airport in the capital Bangui. Fax from Ella-Ekogha (note 252); United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic and activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the central African Republic (BONUCA), UN document S/2003/661, 20 June 2003.

254 Fax from Ella-Ekogha (note 252).

255 €3 670 000. Fax from Ella-Ekogha (note 252).

256 Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea, signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953 by the Commander-in-Chief, UN Command; the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army; and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Entered into force on 27 July 1953.

257 The Polish delegation has no permanent presence in North Korea. Email from Birgitta Delorme, Office of the Defence Attaché, Embassy of Switzerland in Stockholm, 16 Dec. 2003.

258 Email from Delorme (note 257); and telephone conversation with Maj. Reto Senn, Deputy Defence Attaché, Embassy of Switzerland in Stockholm, 21 Jan. 2004.

259 Email from Delorme (note 257).

260 Sum of contributions paid by the 3 countries—$20 000, SEK 7 100 100 and CHF 870 000. 1 SEK = $0.1368, 1 CHF = $0.8009 (SEBanken, Sweden). Email from Artur Habant, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Stockholm, 5 Mar. 2004; Email from Irina Schoulgin, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 12 Feb. 2004; and Email from Delorme (note 257).

261 The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was established on 3 Aug. 1981 by the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, signed on 26 Mar. 1979. Deployment began on 20 Mar. 1982, following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai.

262 MFO, Director General's Report delivered to the Trilateral Meeting, Rome, 20 Oct. 2003, p. 8.

263 Director General's Report (note 262), p. 5.

264 Email from Mary Cordis, Chief of Personnel & Publications, MFO HQ, Rome, 19 Jan. 2004.

265 Budget for the period 1 Oct. 2002–30 Sep. 2003. Director General's Report (note 262), p. 32.

266 Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, signed on 15 Jan. 1997.

267 Email from Roar Bakke Sørensen, Senior Press and Information Officer, TIPH, 23 Jan. 2004.

268 Email from Sørensen (note 267).

269 Email from Sørensen (note 267).

270 Approximate amount of the core budget; it does not include salaries, which are paid by the contributing countries. Email from Sørensen (note 267), 9 Feb. 2004.

271 The PMG was set up in 1998 to monitor the ceasefire and to assist in democratic resolution of the conflict in Bougainville. Email from Capt. Lorraine Mulholland, Public Relations Officer, PMG Bougainville, 14 Dec. 2000. In early 2002, supporting the Bougainville weapons disposal process became a priority task for the PMG. The mission ceased its operation on 30 June 2003, but withdrew on 23 Aug. 2003. Fax from Maria Young, First Secretary, Embassy of Australia in Stockholm, 14 Jan. 2004.

272 Fax from Young (note 271).

273 This figure includes 42 civilian staff. Fax from Young (note 271).

274 Fax from Young (note 271).

275 AUD 11.5 million. 1 AUD = $0.5979 (SEBanken, Sweden). Fax from Young (note 271).

276 The Special Protection Force was established at the 15th Summit of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, on 23 July 2001, with a mandate to protect state institutions and Burundian political leaders returning from exile and to serve as a confidence-building measure. On 23 Oct. 2001 South Africa stated to the Security Council its intention to deploy an interim protection force on 1 Nov. 2001. The Security Council endorsed the establishment of the interim security presence in SCR 1375 (29 Oct. 2001). The OAU also expressed its support for the establishment of the SAPSD. The South African Government renewed the mission's mandate until May 2003. Joint Communiqué of the 15th Summit of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, 23 July 2001; and Fax from Biyana (note 236), 15 Jan. 2003. In Apr. 2003, the mission was subsumed into the AMIB mission.

277 Fax from Biyana (note 236). Other African countries had pledged to contribute personnel but due to resource constraints were ultimately not able to deploy forces.

278 The Bougainville Transition Team was set up in June 2003 pursuant to the amendments made to the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement, which in itself was an amendment to the 1997 Protocol. The mission ceased operation on 31 Dec. 2003.

279 Fax from Young (note 271), 14. Jan. 2004.

280 Fax from Young (note 271).

281 Fax from Young (note 271).

282 AUD 5 million. Fax from Young (note 271).

283 The Regional Assistance Mission was established under the framework of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration in which members of the Pacific Islands Forum agree to a collective response to crises usually on the request of the host government. 31st Pacific Islands Forum Comuniqué 2000, Tarawa, Kiribati, 23–30 Oct. 2000. The mission is mandated to assist the Solomon Islands Government in restoring law and order and to build up the capacity of the police force.

284 Email from Maria Young, First Secretary, Embassy of Australia in Stockholm, 11 Feb. 2004.

285 Initial deployment was 2000, which drew down to the current number as the security situation stabilized. Because RAMSI is a civilian-led operation, a further drawdown of military personnel numbers is expected subject to security situation in the Solomon Islands. Email from Young (note 284).

286 Civilian personnel. This figure includes the 48 international staff located in the Solomon Islands Government departments—prisons department, Finance, Justice and