1. Euro-Atlantic organizations and relationships

P A L D U N A Y and Z D Z I S L A W L A C H O W S K I

I. Introduction

The year 2003 was one of extremes for Euro-Atlantic relations, moving between traumatic divisions and efforts to restore unity that may have led inter alia to irreversible institutional change. In the first half of the year politics ruled, with events driven by the national policy priorities of the United States, on the one hand, and the diverging reactions of major West European partners and Russia, on the other. In the second half of the year there was a clear trend to place organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) back at the centre of security activity, even if the political reconciliations opening the way for this were made elsewhere. Little-noticed in the fray, previously agreed changes—such as NATO’s continuing transformation from a territorial defence organization and the countdown to NATO and EU enlargement—continued largely on schedule.

Section II of this chapter discusses the development of those US policies initially framed in 2001–2002. Section III describes developments in NATO, and section IV discusses the EU. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the main political developments in the Western Balkans are covered in section V. Section VI examines Russia’s relations with its partners and neighbours, and section VII presents conclusions.

II. The policies of the United States

In 2003, as the Administration of George W. Bush entered its third year in office, its declared security policy moved to the implementation phase. It addressed itself to putting into practice the policies, defined by the shock it faced on 11 September 2001, that were laid down in three major documents adopted in 2002 to address different aspects of the security of the USA. The priorities of 2003 were: (a) the successful conduct of the war in Iraq and subsequent post-conflict consolidation in that country; (b) further measures to

implement the strategy on homeland security; and (c) measures to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

As the USA and its main coalition partner, the United Kingdom, went to war in Iraq on 20 March 2003, and during the build-up to that event, the associated debates overtook every other item on the security agenda. With the launch of the Iraqi operation the USA was at war on two levels—fighting an enduring war on terrorism generally and a concrete military conflict in Iraq. It was essential for the USA both domestically and internationally to create a link across this conflict dyad and demonstrate the coherence of its motives.

While this chapter does not address the Iraq campaign and its consequences, it may be noted that the Bush Administration faced a genuine dilemma over how to address the lasting political problem and security challenge of Saddam Hussein’s regime against the background of its own policy tenets and the expectations these had created. Its decision to carry out forcible regime change in Iraq, as early as March and without a United Nations mandate, was consistent with its stated policies (notably on pre-emption of threats to US vital interests) but limited the international support available. Justifying the action publicly with a case based on imminent danger from Iraqi WMD helped to strengthen such support as there was, but carried a price of credibility loss and protracted recrimination, in the USA and other coalition countries, when the intelligence underlying it was questioned. The administration did not, as a result, change any aspect of its declared doctrines and policy emphases. However, by the end of 2003 the balance and style of its activities in pursuit of them had shifted notably towards more diplomatic, multilateral and even international–legal approaches. The retrospective justifications cited for action in Iraq became less WMD-centred over time and administration representatives began to de-emphasize the ‘pre-emption’ concept as such. It was still an open question at the end of 2003 how far these were tactical adaptations forced to a great extent by Iraq’s heavy drain on US resources, and with a view to the presidential election in the USA in November 2004, and how far they reflected rethinking and lessons learned that could ultimately give the Iraq campaign the character of a ‘war to end war’.

Putting the strategy on homeland security into practice

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 fundamentally rearranged the US security agenda. The impression that the territory of the USA was a sanctuary came to an end. This resulted in a change of emphasis for US security policy.

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2 It is curious to note that the previous US Administration also went to war in its 3rd year, in that instance against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the spring of 1999, 20 months before the presidential elections.

3 The intervention in Iraq and post-conflict developments are covered in chapter 2 in this volume. For the military–technological lessons of the campaign see also chapters 11 and 12, and for the WMD issue, chapters 15 and 16 in this volume.


5 See chapter 2 in this volume.
There were also organizational implications, the most important of which was the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. During its first full year of operation, its activities covered *inter alia* institutional consolidation, including consolidating its resource base; establishing cooperation with other relevant organizations, both nationally and internationally; and, most importantly, addressing security issues in its area of responsibility. Although a good part of this activity was not international in the sense of involving other states in decision making, it has had international repercussions on different levels. Institutional consolidation was necessary because:

[s]ome of the responsible agencies had considerable organizational deficiencies and insufficient equipment, for instance, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which is responsible for immigration matters. The cooperation with the agencies responsible for security and civil defence (FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and NSA [National Security Agency]) was not sufficient either.7

The USA tolerated the notable shortcomings of the INS, so long as these did not affect the security of the country. When, after 11 September 2001, it proved that such deficiencies had contributed to the launch of terrorist attacks from the territory of the USA, it became only a matter of time before they would have to be addressed.8 The consolidation of structures has probably improved performance in this respect.

Although most discussion of the USA’s growing federal budget deficit in 2003 focused on the costs of the operations in Iraq, homeland security made its contribution in this respect as well. The Homeland Security Department’s $37.7 billion budget for fiscal year (FY) 2003 was increased to $40.2 billion for FY 2004, a gross increase of 6.6 per cent.9

The establishment of the new cabinet-level department reflected the changing security agenda, which made it necessary to address coherently all issues related to the defence of US territory. The measures taken in the department’s first year focused on border security in reaction to the pre-11 September success by terrorists in infiltrating the territory of the USA. As a side effect, the biometric identification system introduced for this purpose resulted, during the first two weeks of its use, in the capture of 107 individuals who were wanted for crimes in the USA or who had returned after having been deported. Customs controls were developed further, including the extensive checking of containers. More than 80 per cent of container shipments destined for the USA

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8 Anthony *et al.* (note 1), p. 54.
will now be subject to inspection before they leave their port of origin.\textsuperscript{10} As a side effect, cocaine worth more than $4 billion has been intercepted. All applications for citizenship are now subject to security checks, which might also make it more difficult for organized crime networks to operate in the USA. It was also in reaction to past problems that the ‘BioWatch’ programme was introduced to detect airborne pathogens, such as anthrax, in time to distribute life-saving pharmaceutical antidotes.\textsuperscript{11}

For operational security reasons, it is difficult to gain access to information concerning the failures of homeland security. Nonetheless, there have been indications that the security sector of the administration may not be able to adequately address problems related to the extensive employment of biological weapons on US territory. In his budget proposal for FY 2004 President Bush proposed to allocate almost $6 billion ‘to quickly make available effective vaccines and treatments against agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola and plague’—diseases which, it has been speculated, the enemies of the USA might use as weapons.\textsuperscript{12}

Beyond the substantive achievements of homeland security, the new department pursued two important sets of organizational measures—decentralization and ‘exporting’ activities. On the first point, efforts to improve state and local emergency preparedness were supported by a large allocation of funds. As for exporting homeland defence activities, the USA intends to establish a cooperative network with other countries, which would ensure that they take on some of the burden. Such ‘extraterritorial’ measures include: (a) checking the content of shipments exported to the USA; (b) checking passengers as they board aircraft bound for the USA; and (c) establishing checkpoints on the other side of mutual land borders, which primarily involves the cooperation of Canada and Mexico. The USA plans to expand facilities for issuing visas overseas to ensure that homeland security needs are fully taken into account before visas are granted.

A broad array of technical measures also contributes to the consolidation of homeland security, ranging from the introduction of modern equipment to check containers to new anti-fraud techniques for passports (e.g., the incorporation of biodata). Concern about technical security is also widespread outside the USA, and US policies will ensure that its producers are competitive in the resulting new markets.\textsuperscript{13} Since industry has an increasingly operational role to


play in various fields of homeland security, efforts may need to be shared even more between the private and public sectors in future.

For 2004, the Department of Homeland Security has put forward an ambitious and more forward-looking agenda than during its first year. It includes the pursuit of: (a) stronger information sharing and infrastructure protection; (b) interoperable communications and equipment; (c) integrated border and port security systems; (d) new technologies and tools; and (e) improved customer service for immigrants. Some of these measures are related to the experience of the recent past, such as the need for interoperable communications equipment, which was an identified shortcoming of the reaction to the 11 September terrorist attacks. Other measures, such as improved services for immigrants, are designed to compensate for increased scrutiny by the authorities and to address associated human rights concerns.

In sum, during the first year of its existence, the department focused on reacting to failures of the recent past. By the end of 2003, many shortcomings had already been remedied, demonstrating a largely successful adaptation to new challenges. However, just as strategists tend to plan the next operation on the basis of experience gathered from past wars, homeland security experts may be subject to the same distortions.

Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by states and non-state actors

The US Government continued in 2003 to press for a new intensity and a change of style in international non-proliferation efforts. It regarded the existing formal arrangements as difficult to adapt to changing circumstances and believed that, in some cases, the breadth and pattern of state membership restricted their ability to adapt and develop. Thus, the USA placed the emphasis on launching new programmes designed to meet its national priorities. Preference was given to arrangements that were not legally binding, had a flexibly growing circle of participants and could be applied to proliferation threats originating from non-state actors as well as states. The clearest example was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which, although launched as an initiative covering maritime, ground and air interception, focused in practice on maritime interception as its prime activity. PSI operations are to be carried out on the basis of intelligence information predominantly provided by the USA. A number of interceptions of shipments of weapons and dual-use equipment at sea may have increased the motivation for states such as North Korea and Libya to change their attitude and demonstrate more transparency regarding their WMD programmes. It is a US objective to increase the number of states participating in the PSI and to involve NATO in

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15 See chapter 14 in this volume.
16 Activities included the interception of a shipment of Scud missiles from North Korea by Spanish vessels participating in Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-led operation in Afghanistan. Yemen later announced that it had purchased the missiles.
it. Nine of the current PSI participants in 2003 were NATO members. The emphasis of the initiative also makes it important to provide for the involvement of major maritime nations. The USA has made efforts to achieve this and attached particular importance to enlisting China and Russia.

President Bush also called on the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution calling on all members of the UN to ‘criminalize the proliferation of weapons . . . of mass destruction’. By promoting such measures the USA has contributed to a climate in which WMD are probably proliferating more slowly than would otherwise have been the case. At the same time, it has also de facto preserved or strengthened the ‘strategic advantage’ of legitimate nuclear weapon states.

In sum, US security policy has remained centred on its priorities as declared in the 2002 National Security Strategy and related documents, including statements by the president. In so doing the USA has also systematically pursued its national interests. There may be debate as to whether this security policy reflected a pursuit of democratic ideals by (excessive) use of military means, or a realist agenda of increasing the US sphere of influence, the ‘unhindered assertion of US power and interests in a unipolar international system’. Either way, heavy reliance on ‘hard’ security, and the pursuit of the military dominance to underpin it, seem to have become a lasting feature of US policy, reaffirmed after the terrorist attacks of September 2001.

III. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: overcoming marginalization

Developments in 2003 put NATO to an existential test as a security actor both in Europe and elsewhere. No longer openly opposed by its former main adversary, Russia, it suffered a further political shock by being reduced by its leading member, the USA, to a military ‘toolbox’ for building ‘coalitions of the willing’ in time of need—rather than a political forum or a vital partner. It also faced challenges related to the significant divisions among its members and, as

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21 Thomas Risse divides the current Bush Administration into ‘offensive liberal’ and ‘offensive realist’ groups on this basis. He leaves no doubt, however, that both groups share the view that the world ‘needs to be rearranged in accordance with American global power interests’. Risse, T., ‘For a new transatlantic—and European—bargain’, Internationale Politik (transatlantic edn) no. 3 (2003), pp. 24–25.
a result, was often bypassed in major political decisions. NATO’s prolonged crisis, the roots of which go back to the end of the cold war, and its ensuing gradual marginalization in transatlantic relations have made the key questions regarding NATO’s raison d’être, mission and capabilities more acute.

The attack on Iraq and the disputes during its build-up precipitated a profound rift among NATO’s members—epitomized by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe—which bred new doubts about the organization’s viability.\(^2^2\) At the extremes, US officials disparaged the organization while France rejected US plans to involve NATO in what it regarded as ‘exotic’ operations. Nonetheless, among NATO’s efforts during 2003 to maintain its relevance and seek a new role, it was the initiatives launched outside of its treaty area of activity that gave hope for its revitalization. In the last months of the year there were signs of recovery as the USA (and France) adopted a more positive attitude to the organization.\(^2^3\)

NATO’s problems did not discernibly affect progress in the other areas of its adaptation to the new security environment—enlargement and the transformation of its forces and structures—on which significant new decisions had been made at the end of 2002.\(^2^4\)

**The crisis over Iraq**

Events in 2002 allowed NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to announce in January 2003 that NATO was ‘back in business’.\(^2^5\) The November 2002 NATO Prague Summit took several strategic decisions regarding enlargement, a new expeditionary force, drastic reform of the command structure and a new-style capability commitment focusing more narrowly on overseas operations.\(^2^6\) Relations with the EU entered a new phase with the lifting of blockages to ‘Berlin Plus’ cooperation between both organizations.\(^2^7\) The partner-

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\(^{24}\) On 26 Mar. 2003 representatives of 19 NATO member states signed the protocols of accession of the 7 candidate states—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. NATO has given assurances that the door to membership remains open. The foreign ministers commended Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) for their reforms and pursuit of regional cooperation and promised to continue to support and assist their reforms. NATO, Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Madrid on 3 June 2003, Press Release (2003) 059, 3 June 2003; and NATO, Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 4 Dec. 2003, Press Release (2003)152, 4 Dec. 2003.


\(^{27}\) The Berlin Plus Agreement is a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU, based on the conclusions of the 1999 NATO Washington Summit. It consists of the following major parts: (a) a NATO–EU security agreement; (b) assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led
ship with Russia was renewed in the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) ‘at 20’ and NATO played an effective role in the Balkans. This optimism was to be dashed by subsequent events.

On 15 January 2003 the USA proposed ‘possible roles for NATO in case of military action against Iraq’. NATO rapidly found itself at an impasse—unable to take a decision because some of its members were either opposed to the war or demanded UN involvement. To overcome the lengthening stalemate, Robertson sought to win consensus on a modest proposal on preparations to meet the defensive needs of Turkey in case of Iraqi reprisals. In this connection, on 10 February Turkey invoked Article 4 of the 1949 Washington Treaty for the first time in NATO’s history. Belgium, France and Germany, however, blocked the activation of plans for Turkey’s defence, again advocating UN efforts to resolve the situation in Iraq. Their veto plunged NATO into its worst internal crisis for many years. It was only on 16 February that it managed to end the impasse and reach agreement—not in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) but in the NATO Defence Planning Committee (DPC)—thus outmanoeuvring France, which had been the most intransigent objector but was absent from the DPC as a non-participant in NATO’s military structure. Despite Robertson’s assurances about the formal correctness of the decision ‘at 18’ as ‘an important demonstration of the solidarity of NATO’, serious political harm was done. Since then NATO’s role ‘at 18’ has been limited to defence assistance to Turkey (Operation Display Deterrence), strictly separate from the military operations that started in and around Iraq on 20 March.

Soon after the war, there was speculation from US defence sources that NATO forces might take over the main security role in Iraq. However, there

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29 Atlantic News, no. 3446 (17 Jan. 2003), p. 1; and no. 3448 (24 Jan 2003), p. 3. Originally, the proposal was made by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on 4 Dec. 2002. His suggestions concerned planning measures, including the use of collective forces, possibly protecting Turkey, the use of command facilities and air cover for ground troops, etc.

30 Article 4 enables an ally which feels under threat to ask NATO to start negotiations and make preparations in order to take defence measures.


33 Operation Display Deterrence was concluded on 16 Apr. and NATO started to pull out its airborne warning and control system aircraft, Patriot air missile batteries and other assets at that time. The last NATO forces left Turkey on 3 May 2003.
was no formal request from the US Government in 2003. NATO did find something of a face-saving formula, however, in its acceptance of Poland’s request for support with force generation, logistics, communications and intelligence in the creation of a stabilization force in a sector of Iraq. The NAC decision of 3 June, unanimously endorsing assistance to Poland, gave NATO an indirect role in Iraq’s post-war security. Following extensive aid and assistance by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and other bodies, on 3 September the US Army handed command of the south-central sector of Iraq to a Polish-led multinational division of some 9200 troops.

In December 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell signalled US interest in further expanding NATO’s role in Iraq. Spain’s idea that NATO should eventually take control of the Polish-led contingent was still at an early stage. Some members, particularly France and Germany, continued to insist on a stronger UN role in overseeing the operation before there could be any greater NATO involvement. Moreover, taking over the Iraq operation would risk leaving NATO overstretched because of its existing commitments in Afghanistan.

The International Security Assistance Force: an out-of-area mission

After the Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002 put an end to intra-NATO disputes over whether it could act ‘out of area’, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan created the first opportunity to launch the organization on its new track and provide it with a new sense of purpose. With NATO’s role in wartime and post-war Iraq uncertain at best, it was Afghanistan that offered it a chance to depart from its obsolete cold war role. NATO had first become involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in October 2002, in response to a request from Germany and the Netherlands for support in the planning and execution of ISAF III.

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35 NATO (note 24).
36 ‘Poland assumes command of multinational division in Iraq with NATO support’, NATO Press Release (2003)093, 3 Sep. 2003. Spain offered its contingent to serve alongside other troops under Polish command and 18 of the 26 current and prospective NATO members sent their contingents to Iraq.
38 NATO agreed to review its contribution to the stabilization efforts ‘on a regular basis’. NATO (note 24).
41 ISAF was created and deployed on the authorization of UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 20 Dec. 2001. The purpose of ISAF was to secure Kabul and the Bagram airbase from Taliban and al-Qaeda elements and factional warlords, and to allow for the establishment and security of the Afghan Transitional Administration. ISAF I (Dec. 2001–June 2002) was led by the UK; ISAF II (June 2002–Feb. 2003) by Turkey; and ISAF III (Feb.–Aug. 2003) by Germany and the Netherlands.
In February 2003, Germany and the Netherlands took over command of the 31-member, 5500-strong force from Turkey for a six-month period. This was the first time that two countries had shared the command responsibility for an international force. It was also the first time that NATO capabilities (force generation; logistics; and command, control and intelligence) had been used to prepare an out-of-area mission.

Having overcome initial US reluctance and French suspicion, NATO members preferred that—with NATO countries providing 95 per cent of the troops involved—the organization take over collective command and thus ensure continuity of the operation, rather than seeking volunteers for command every six months and incurring the sizeable costs of rotation. Consequently, on 16 April, NATO decided to ‘enhance its support for ISAF’ with a permanent headquarters; consistent coordination, command and control exercised by SHAPE; and other responsibilities taken by the NAC. This decision meant that NATO had resolved to operate collectively in an out-of-area mission for the first time. The name of the mission, in common with the UN mandate, remained the same.

NATO thus settled in for a long haul.\(^{42}\) It formally took over the strategic command, control and coordination of ISAF IV from Germany and the Netherlands on 11 August 2003. Its area of operation was at that time limited to Kabul, but the idea of extending ISAF’s presence beyond the capital had been discussed for some time. With the active support and participation of Afghan, German, non-governmental organization and UN personnel, the eventual aim is to incorporate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) into ISAF in the provinces.\(^{43}\) This reflects another new mission for NATO—increasing involvement not only in military protection but also in nation building, including the creation of civilian organizations. Germany proposed a resolution at the United Nations to authorize the expansion of ISAF and the deployment of troops in several Afghan towns to guarantee security there.\(^{44}\) The German concept received a lukewarm response because of the need for additional forces and capabilities. Nevertheless, Germany began preparations for a pilot mission in the northern town of Kunduz.\(^{45}\)

Following NATO’s decision, taken ‘in principle’ on 6 October, to give ISAF a larger mandate for its peacekeeping mission, on 13 October a UN

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\(^{42}\) ‘Until we succeed’, according to NATO Secretary General Robertson in *Atlantic News*, no. 3472 (18 Apr. 2003). German Lt.-Gen. Götz Gliemeroth led the NATO–ISAF mission. The operation was placed under the overall command of Allied Command Operations and the operational command of regional headquarters Northern Europe (AFNORTH).

\(^{43}\) Provincial Reconstruction Teams are small teams of civilian and military personnel to complement efforts by the new Afghan National Army and ISAF, provide security for aid workers and help with reconstruction work. In Aug. 2003 Germany sent a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan’s northern province of Kunduz to investigate whether it could join the hitherto US-directed programme.


\(^{45}\) The extension of the ISAF mission was seen partly as Germany’s move to repair ties with the USA, which had been strained by the Iraq war. The first German contingent, which provides security for reconstruction efforts and to help disarm former Afghan fighters, left for Kunduz at the end of Oct. 2003. They are also expected to provide security for elections in Afghanistan in 2004. Williamson, H., ‘Berlin backs mission beyond Kabul’, *Financial Times*, 25–26 Oct. 2003, p. 5.
Security Council resolution extended the remit of ISAF beyond Kabul.\textsuperscript{46} NATO began military planning in three fields—the operation in Kunduz under German leadership (to be taken over from the USA),\textsuperscript{47} a comprehensive plan for extending the ISAF mandate, and the development of Kabul airport to cater for increased movements resulting from such an extension.\textsuperscript{48} In December 2003, NATO formally adopted an operational concept authorizing the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul, to incorporate the German-led PRT as a pilot project in a gradual process that would include the establishment of other PRTs in the future.\textsuperscript{49} On 19 November NATO appointed its Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, thus emphasizing the non-military aspects of its mission. The issue of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) operational plan for the extension of ISAF had to wait until December because of the lack of offers of reinforcements, particularly additional helicopters and military personnel, from member states. There was also a lack of agreement concerning the number of new PRTs.

The suggestions made by Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld at the Brussels ministerial meeting in December about increased NATO responsibility in Afghanistan indicated a US willingness to revamp NATO for its new role.\textsuperscript{50}

The Balkans

While expanding its missions out of area, NATO took further steps to scale down its involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where post-conflict stabilization and security had advanced sufficiently to allow a handover to the EU.\textsuperscript{51} The decision came in parallel with the adoption by Bosnia and Herzegovina of its first central defence law unifying the command of its separate ethnic armies,\textsuperscript{52} which also opened the way for it to participate in the 46-state Partnership for Peace.\textsuperscript{53} NATO decided that the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) there would be reduced from 12 000 personnel to a deterrent force of some 7000 troops by June 2004 and that it would aim to end the mission by the end


\textsuperscript{47} Germany wants its Provincial Reconstruction Team to focus on reconstruction and civilian matters rather than military security.


\textsuperscript{49} A further measure to unify command in Afghanistan by extending the ISAF command to include command of Operation Enduring Freedom has also been discussed. The operational plan ensuring coordination and a clear command structure was presented in Feb. 2004.

\textsuperscript{50} ‘We must also consider the possibility of NATO taking over all military operations in Afghanistan at some point in the future’. US Department of State (note 37). See also US Department of State, International Information Programs, ‘Rumsfeld praises new freedoms in Afghanistan, NATO presence’, 5 Dec. 2003, URL <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/03120407.htm>.

\textsuperscript{51} On 25 July 2003 a ‘Framework for an enhanced NATO–EU dialogue and a concerted approach on security and stability in the Western Balkans’ was agreed to assist the joint endeavours of both organizations. \textit{Atlantic News}, no. 3532 (6 Dec. 2003), p. 2.


\textsuperscript{53} However, another critical condition is success in the arrests of war criminals hiding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the membership of the Partnership for Peace see the glossary in this volume.
of that year. However, NATO will not disengage completely as the EU takes over, retaining a liaison office and a capacity for contingencies under the Berlin Plus arrangements.\textsuperscript{54} Because the situation in Kosovo calls for the retention of a large NATO force, KFOR will be restructured rather than reduced.\textsuperscript{55}

**Defence capabilities**

The 2002 Prague NATO Summit approved the agenda for the transformation of NATO capabilities under three main headings: \((a)\) the NATO Response Force (NRF); \((b)\) a new NATO strategic command structure; and \((c)\) the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). In 2003 there were enhanced efforts to pursue these goals.\textsuperscript{56}

The concept of the *NATO Response Force* was approved by NATO defence ministers on 12 June 2003 with the aim of moving away from the legacy of passive territorial defence and towards active, highly capable, flexible, fast and mobile forces for multi-task missions. The concerns previously expressed by some EU states about possible rivalry between the NRF and the EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) have not abated,\textsuperscript{57} but nor have they hampered preparations for the NATO force’s launch.

The split within NATO over Iraq apparently accelerated the process of creating the high-quality force. The first force generation conference of the NRF, held on 16 July, endorsed the advanced status of the force enabling it to be launched a year ahead of schedule. It was agreed that an ‘initial entry brigade’, with air and maritime components, would be ready by mid-October. This was achieved against the background of the announcement by the US Department of Defense of a minimal US contribution to the NRF, reportedly with the aim of ending the ‘over-reliance’ on the USA by NATO members.\textsuperscript{58} During a crisis management seminar in Colorado Springs, USA, in early October, the capabilities of the NATO European partners were once again the topic of debate in the context of the force’s ‘usability’. Questions were raised about national legislation affecting internal crisis reaction lead-times, which might hamper quick deployments of expeditionary forces.\textsuperscript{59}

A prototype NRF was launched on 15 October giving NATO a joint force combining air, land, sea and special operations under a single commander for the first time.\textsuperscript{60} The NRF is due to reach its initial operating capability in

\textsuperscript{54} In this context, the possible use of NATO’s Response Force will be considered.
\textsuperscript{56} Prague Summit Declaration (note 26).
\textsuperscript{57} For discussion of these concerns see Anthony et al. (note 1).
\textsuperscript{58} According to a US official, ‘If they deliver the capabilities for the NRF, the Pentagon might review its contributions’. Dempsey, J., ‘US offers minimum contribution to allies’, *Financial Times*, 28 Aug. 2003, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{60} The first simulation exercise for the NRF was carried out in November in Izmir, Turkey.
October 2004 and to be fully operational in the autumn of 2006. The force has a personnel strength of 9500, far more than the 6000 originally envisaged.61

The issue of a new strategic command structure has for some time been challenged by Greece and Spain, which felt they would be under-represented in the new structure.62 This notwithstanding, on 12–13 June 2003 NATO defence ministers approved the new streamlined command provisions aimed at making the NATO command structure ‘leaner, more flexible, more efficient and better able to conduct future military operations’ by the summer of 2006.63 At the strategic level, there will be one Operational Command in Europe, SACEUR, which will combine its current responsibilities with those of the former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). A new US-based functional Transformation Command will be entrusted with the task of overseeing the transformation process. The operational level will consist of two (down from the existing five) standing Joint Force Commands and a Joint Headquarters (including command nuclei for deployable and sea-based Combined Joint Task Forces). The third level, the tactical level, will be reduced from 13 subordinate operational commands to six. This means an overall reduction from 20 to 11 command headquarters. In addition, the Combat Air Operation Centres will be reduced from 10 to 6.64

The first review of implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment found that ‘significant progress’ had been made.65 In his assessment delivered at NATO Headquarters on 28 May, Robertson gave the NATO members high marks for improvements in precision-guided munitions, strategic sea-lift, airlift and air-to-air refuelling.66 At the 12 June meeting of the NATO defence ministers, letters of intent were signed on cooperation in strategic airlift and sea-lift. The lowest grades of approval were given to the NATO ground surveillance effort (aimed at giving NATO a collective capability to track ground targets) and combat service support (where the goal is to equip one or two brigades from each member state for sustained operations).67 Multinational sharing and role specialization as well as effectiveness and interoperability will remain a key focus for future capabilities.68

Apart from these major adaptation programmes, NATO has pursued other capability measures such as: the establishment of the NATO–EU Capability Group to ensure the coherent and transparent development of the capabilities of both organizations (the European Capability Action Plan, ECAP, and the

64 For more on the new structure see ‘NATO Fact Sheet’, Atlantic News, no. 3488 (18 June 2003), pp. 3–4.
65 NATO, Statement on Capabilities, 12 June 2003 (note 63).
67 Fiorenza (note 66).
68 NATO, Statement on Capabilities, 12 June 2003 (note 63).
PCC; and mutual reinforcement between the NRF and the ERRF); the decision to set up a multinational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence battalion;69 a NATO missile defence feasibility study; and measures to achieve common military funding and interoperability.70

IV. The European Union: pursuing a strategic role

In common with NATO, the EU is facing the challenge of redefining its role and place, although this occurs on many more fronts ranging from its traditional competences, for example, in trade and the economy, to new ones such as a shared foreign policy and security identity, and military strength. Constitutional changes are being sought, with the laudable aim of making the EU system more effective, more accountable (democratic) and more comprehensible to its citizens, alongside the enlargement agreed in December 2002. The Iraq crisis and the divergences it caused between the ‘old’ Europe and the more pro-USA existing and soon-to-be members exacerbated the problems of the EU in 2003. In the early months of the year the traditional divide in attitudes to the USA not only rebounded on the EU but also affected the Central European newcomers. All of the latter demonstrated strong ‘Atlanticist proclivities’,71 as was vividly demonstrated in the letters of ‘eight’ and ‘ten’ made public in the spring in support of the USA’s Iraq policies.72 They were heavily criticized by France—President Jacques Chirac’s blunt advice about ‘missing a good opportunity to shut up’ was accompanied by a warning of the possible blocking of the enlargement process.73 This and other developments added to existing concerns, fears and uncertainties about leadership and future commitments, power sharing and the shape of the organization—sowing the seeds for a breakdown of negotiations on the new EU constitution at the end of the year, when the EU would have hoped to be giving a fresh, uniting purpose to its current and future members. In response, ideas of a closer ‘core’ integration project have again been mooted by their traditional supporters in France and Germany.

A major challenge for the EU is to overcome its long-standing reputation for being an organization of ‘much talk but little action’ in addressing security challenges and threats. One major opportunity has arisen from US detachment from and the resulting marginalization of NATO. The effort to build a strate-

69 Launched in Dec. 2003, once it becomes fully operational in July 2004 the battalion will be made available to the NRF.
70 NATO, Statement on Capabilities, 12 June 2003 (note 63); and ‘NATO missile defence advances’, Atlantic News, no. 3487 (14 June 2003), annex, p. 4.
71 This has turned out to fit well with the new countries’ more ‘communautaire’ approach to the economic and financial assistance aspects of the EU.
gic profile produced a chance to operationalize the EU’s much vaunted Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The common initiatives agreed and put forward by France, Germany and the UK with regard to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the second half of the year seemed to offer promise of a fresh boost to this project. At the same time, the rapprochement of the ‘big three’ and their significant diplomatic actions outside the EU framework (e.g., regarding Iran’s nuclear programme) gave rise to renewed concern about who would politically control the CFSP’s future.

The constitutional treaty and the Intergovernmental Conference

The challenge faced by the European Convention (February 2002–June 2003) had seemed significant at the outset because its participants appeared to disagree on everything apart from a general consensus on the imperatives of enlargement, efficiency and democratization. The motives for its inception appeared disparate. The need to sort out the treaties and consolidate them in a single text was seen by some as a chance to constrain the growing power of the EU while others saw it as a step towards the ‘ever closer union’ envisaged in the 1957 Treaty of Rome.74

The timetable for the production of the EU constitutional document was clear enough—conclusion of the work of the European Convention in June 2003 and its endorsement by the Council of the European Union soon after; further deliberations on the draft treaty text in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) scheduled to start in September 2003; the possible signing of a new treaty in December; referendums in some countries and other modes of approval in others, followed by ratifications in 2004; and the entry into force of the treaty in 2005 or 2006.

In early 2003 it seemed impossible that the Convention would be able to reach a consensus. The main lines were already drawn regarding the future distribution of power between the ‘intergovernmentalists’—mostly comprising the larger EU states which (not visibly affected in this regard by the Iraq crisis) opted together for a stronger political leadership of the EU, a stable Council, a full-time president of the Council and a foreign minister; and the ‘federalists’, made up of the medium-sized and small countries as well as the European Commission and its president. At the same time, on matters of detail, varying and often unexpected coalitions were formed across traditional divisions. There were more than 200 participants in the Convention (105 full members and their alternates) from the 28 current and prospective member states, representing almost all political persuasions and a broad spectrum of interests. Participants were politicians rather than diplomats and their debates were carried out in the open rather than behind closed doors. The Chair of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was criticized from all directions for either allegedly taking the side of the big states or going too far towards the creation of a ‘superstate’.

The first draft of the 16 articles of the EU Constitution was presented by the Chair of the Convention in February. It was criticized by both the small member states and the ‘big powers’. Further drafts concerning successive articles and parts of the future constitution, for example, the ‘exit clause’ from EU membership and institutional proposals such as a strengthened position for the Council and new presidency arrangements, the perceived concomitant weakening of the role of the Commission, and so on, gave rise to further criticism and concern.

The Convention did not exist in a political vacuum. The crisis over Iraq cast its shadow, harshly demonstrating the limits of the CFSP. At the end of February the presidium even decided to delay publishing further draft articles. With European and transatlantic arguments elsewhere at their peak the progress of the talks in the assembly slowed but did not cease. Interestingly, for all the criticism of the Convention’s Chair, the presidium for the most part endorsed his proposals. This was largely due to Giscard d’Estaing’s negotiating skills. He carefully balanced differing interests, avoiding any final breach between factions while pursuing his aims. On 26–28 May the Convention published its first full draft of the constitution while at the same time admitting that the members of the body were strongly divided over the key section on reforming the EU institutions. The Convention’s Chair proposed inter alia a full-time president of the European Council to replace the six-month rotating presidency; a new ‘double-hatted’ foreign minister to replace the dual role played by the High Representative and the External Affairs Commissioner; a slimmed-down Commission to replace the current arrangement of ‘one country, one commissioner’; and a simplified ‘double majority’ voting system. The draft drew sharp criticism from various quarters including the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, the small states and many Euro-sceptics. They complained that Giscard d’Estaing had ridden roughshod over their views. The major powers, however, backed the package. By June, Giscard d’Estaing had watered down or abandoned some of his own proposals, delayed some difficult changes and inserted creative formulations concerning some divisive issues, thereby winning the cautious endorsement of

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77 The General Affairs and External Relations Council agreed a common position on Iraq on 27 Jan. 2003, to see it quickly unravel in the coming weeks. The Convention’s draft articles on external action were published on 23 Apr. 2003.


79 For the texts of the individual parts of the draft constitution see URL <http://european-convention.eu.int/docregister.ASP?MAX=61&LANG=EN&Content=DOC>.

80 It was envisaged that at least half the member states, comprising 60% of the EU’s population, must vote in favour in order to pass a draft EU measure into law. Small and medium-sized states argued that this would give too much power to the big countries.

81 Among the discarded ideas were a vice-president of the Council, a high-level board to assist the president and a role for a ‘Congress of the Peoples of Europe’.
members of the European Parliament and the Commission. In a gesture to the small countries, the implementation of a simplified voting system was postponed until 2009 and the powers of the proposed Council president were reduced—the small states are afraid that this longer-term post combined with the new EU ‘foreign minister’ (likely to be selected from a larger country) would weaken their role and that of the Commission. A new arrangement for the rotation of commissioners was also introduced and a larger role for the European Parliament was agreed.82

A number of issues remained unresolved including such major matters as: taxation provisions; the introduction of majority voting to foreign policy, social security and revenue raising; the double majority voting system;83 the British concern about the impact on its judiciary of the proposed incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EU Treaty; France’s insistence on its ‘cultural exception’;84 and the lack of a reference to Christianity in the draft preamble of the Constitution.

At the Thessaloniki EU Summit on 20 June 2003 all the large EU states approved the draft constitutional treaty with reservations.85 There was less enthusiasm from the smaller countries. Doubts over the future strength of the Commission also remained. For all the criticism voiced,86 it was evident that the document surpassed in scope all previous EU grand acts. It would enhance the powers of the EU by giving it a ‘legal personality’ and explicitly stating the supremacy of EU law over national legislations, and provide a simplified system of dividing powers between the EU and its member states. It was widely agreed by negotiators and commentators that some 95 per cent of the draft was acceptable. The problem was over how tractable the remaining 5 per cent would be.

The hope had been expressed that the IGC would complete its work between 4 October and December 2003 in time for a new treaty to be signed in Brussels. By the end of the summer, however, the list of issues to be reopened had started to grow. The small countries, some 17 ‘like-minded’ states coordinated by Austria and Finland, began to forge common positions aimed at opposing the pressure, or ‘bullying’ as they saw it, from their bigger partners to accept

82 The European Parliament’s remit was widened, from 34 to 70 policy areas, to include such sensitive areas as asylum policy, the annual budget and regional funds.
83 In a compromise deal the Nice Treaty introduced a 3-tier system of ‘weighted’ votes in the Council, giving extra votes to the medium-sized countries. In effect, Spain and Poland got 27 votes each, 2 votes less than each of the big 4 members, France, Germany, Italy and the UK. This would inter alia enable them to more easily assemble ‘blocking minorities’ to stop unwanted Council decisions. In turn, the proposed double-majority system would effectively reward France and Germany in that respect.
86 E.g., in a leader, The Economist called the Convention a ‘lamentable piece of work’, riddled with ‘botched compromises, anomalies and absurdities’ that the member governments should dump ‘in the nearest bin’. ‘Where to file it’, The Economist, 21 June 2003, p. 11. While attacked as a recipe for ‘accelerated instability’, it was also called a blueprint for centralizing authority. See, e.g., MacCarthy, C., ‘Euro-phile finds little to love in EU’, Financial Times, 3 Sep. 2003, p. 9.
the treaty. In principle, the main sticking points concerned the status of the European Commission, a better definition or limitation of the powers of the proposed EU Council president and ‘foreign minister’, the voting system, national vetoes, the allocation of seats in the European Parliament and energy policies. The ensuing dilemma was how far it was possible to go in altering the draft constitution without unraveling it. By December some progress had been achieved on most of the issues. The main area of disagreement remained the Polish–Spanish demand, later accepted by the UK, to retain the complex voting procedures set out in the 2000 Treaty of Nice. Various pressures were brought unsuccessfully to bear on the two states.

Because of their inflexibility in insisting that no changes be made to the draft treaty’s voting provisions, and that of France and Germany, the December 2003 meeting of the European Council broke down on the issue. Further talks were deferred until the second quarter of 2004, while France and Germany reverted to their familiar hints about a ‘core’ or ‘pioneer’ group of countries pressing ahead with closer integration.

The European Security and Defence Policy

Having successfully jumped a number of hurdles which had prevented the ESDP from achieving operational capability in previous years, the EU succeeded in launching Operation Concordia, its first modest military field operation, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on 31 March 2003. In May–June 2003, the EU approved a French-led peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo—Operation Artemis. Unlike the FYROM mission, which had NATO assistance and could therefore use SHAPE planning and command capabilities and back-up in case the EU force required assistance, the 1400-strong Operation Artemis was an ‘autonomous’ operation and the first EU force to be deployed outside Europe.

87 A warning signal about the pace and substance of the European project was sent from Sweden in Sep. 2003 when it voted against adopting the euro as its currency in a referendum.
89 The 2001 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Official Journal of the European Communities, C80/1 (10 Mar. 2001), URL <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nice_treaty_en.pdf>. Change was supported by 7 countries (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden and, initially, the UK). Poland and Spain demanded that power-sharing arrangements remain unchanged.
90 At one point they were warned by France and Germany about the risk of losing a significant amount of EU aid. Parker, G. and Barber, T., ‘Poland and Spain may face cuts to EU aid’, Financial Times, 6 Oct. 2003, p. 1. The suspension of the rules of the EU stability and growth pact in late Nov. to spare France and Germany the threat of sanctions for running deficits further exacerbated the fears of the smaller members about giving too much power to their bigger partners.
It was the first successful test of the EU’s capacity to respond quickly to a UN appeal for help in a crisis situation. However, a real test of performance in a major conflict situation still lies ahead of the EU rapid reaction force.

Before commencing its first military operation, the EU launched a police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 1 January 2003. Another EUPM, Operation Proxima, was agreed on 29 September 2003 and launched on 15 December in the FYROM, succeeding Operation Concordia, the military operation.

In November a first joint EU–NATO crisis management exercise (CME/CMX 03) was carried out in accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements. In the meantime both organizations made preparations to hand over the SFOR mission to the EU at the end of 2004, a third and thus far potentially the most challenging military operation for the EU.

The key to the success or failure of the ESDP remains the development of European capabilities. In May 2003 EU ministers agreed that the ECAP should move to the establishment of 10 project groups to gradually fill the gaps in military capabilities. Having reviewed the past accomplishments in the conduct of operations, the establishment of relevant bodies, the EU–NATO arrangements and the appropriate arrangements with non-EU NATO members and other interested states, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) announced that the EU had achieved operational capability across the full range of the Petersberg tasks, albeit ‘limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls’.

Despite such progress, the record of capability development remained unsatisfactory in 2003. In November, the GAERC announced the creation of a European capabilities and armaments agency to be operational by late 2004—although at the end of the year the project still lacked a legal basis and a budget and was mired in political disputes. The large states’ motives for agreeing, outside of the main constitutional processes, to the creation of the

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95 See chapter 8 in this volume.
97 The Petersberg tasks, as agreed in 1992 to strengthen the operational role of the Western European Union and later incorporated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, include humanitarian intervention and evacuation operations; peacekeeping; and crisis management, including peace making.
98 EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (note 96).
agency included the hope that it would devise better focused means for making up capability shortfalls.

The pursuit of a defence policy

To demonstrate their commitment and give a boost to the ESDP, while disagreeing strongly on policy towards Iraq, France and the UK at the February 2003 EU Summit in Le Touquet, France, presented inter alia a new initiative to promote the principle of solidarity and mutual assistance in the face of terrorist threats. Developments in the Iraq crisis quickly soured the short-lived improvement in the atmosphere in the wake of the meeting. A Belgian proposal worked out in March, on the eve of the Iraq intervention, called for the creation of a ‘core’ of countries to push forward European defence cooperation. The suggested ‘coalition of the willing’ (or rather unwilling to align with the USA) inside the EU lay within the earlier tradition of an ‘integrationist’ approach to European defence, but also expressed a political reaction against proposed US-led coalitions and especially the one being built against Iraq. On 29 April a ‘mini-summit’ comprising Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg was held, where a ‘strategy’ of building European defence around a French–German nucleus was announced. The programme contained a mix of old and new initiatives, some of them requiring further elaboration, preferably within the European Convention. The most controversial, however, was the renewal of the concept of building a separate European military planning headquarters in Tervuren, Belgium, which, in the wake of ‘core’ European opposition to the Iraq war, was perceived by those not involved in the scheme to be adding insult to injury. The ‘gang of four’, as it was ironically dubbed, ultimately failed to command the support of other EU members. The proponents of reform, especially Germany, sought to placate the uninvited UK and insisted that the meeting had not been an anti-US gathering but an attempt to reinvigorate more autonomous EU defence policy efforts.

Although a non-starter at the time, the ‘Tervuren initiative’ was to reappear in a watered-down version later in the year. With a view to breaking the deadlock at the coming IGC and to repairing relations damaged earlier by the Iraq issue, the UK accepted—at the informal British–French–German meeting held in Berlin on 20 September—the suggestion by its partners to pursue a joint capacity to plan and conduct EU operations without recourse to NATO assets.

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103 ‘Autonomous’ or ‘separate’ EU planning capabilities had been opposed by the USA and by Atlanticist opinion within the EU ever since the formative discussions on the ESDP in 1999, on the grounds that they would duplicate and compete with NATO facilities (designed to be equally at the EU’s disposal through Berlin Plus).
and capabilities, either within the group of ‘25 current and future member states’ or ‘in a circle of interested partners’. The UK received assurances from the two partners that EU ‘structured cooperation’—a new concept envisaged in the Convention’s draft constitution for defence matters in which a group of countries would take the lead in creating more integrated defence structures and better capabilities while setting criteria for others wishing to join later—would be transparent, more flexible in how it was established, and cooperate with NATO.

The UK’s consequent consent to an independent European military planning cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) met not only opposition from the non-aligned members of the EU, wary of a vanguard group or an ‘exclusive club’ within the EU, but also, and perhaps above all, with an exceptionally strong reaction from the US ambassador to NATO. Once again, the European NATO members went to great lengths to assure the US Administration that various options being considered by the EU would not duplicate or compete with the role of NATO headquarters. In the run-up to the December meetings of the EU and NATO, efforts were made to reassure the USA and others that an EU compromise would not diminish NATO’s role as Europe’s primary security provider.

The decision of the EU foreign ministers’ ‘conclave’ in Naples, Italy, on 28–29 November to create a modest operational planning cell and to adopt a mutual defence clause in the EU framework (with a proviso securing NATO commitments) was received fairly calmly by NATO and the USA, although their fears were not entirely dispelled. The December Brussels EU Summit agreed on 12 December to: (a) create a permanent cell for EU civil and military operations with or without the use of NATO assets; (b) set up a small permanent EU cell at SHAPE for EU operations conducted with NATO assets;

105 See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 85), Article III-213.
107 See, e.g., Tuomioja, E. (Finland’s Foreign Minister), ‘Europe needs to work as a whole on defence’, Financial Times, 28 Oct. 2003, p. 15. British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s consent to an independent military planning cell also met with opposition from the British defence establishment.
108 US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns was reported to have called EU defence plans ‘one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship’. Dempsey, J., ‘NATO urged to challenge European defense plan,’ Financial Times, 17 Oct. 2003.
110 The compromise also provided for the watering down of Article I-40 concerning the mutual defence clause and for unanimity of all 25 members and prospective members in a decision to launch a mission within ‘structured cooperation’. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, European Security and Defence Policy, Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, 5 Dec. 2003, IGC document CIG 57/1/03, rev. 1, PRESID 13, URL <http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00057-re01.en03.pdf>.
111 In an EU diplomat’s assessment, ‘[t]he planners will function in their national capacity—not as EU planners—so the whole thing is really just one of coordination between the big EU countries’ national headquarters, with a NATO presence tacked on. It’s the illusion of independent EU planning. Maybe it will evolve in that direction, but for the moment it’s a bizarre arrangement’. ‘Compelling times for European Union’ (note 96), p. 24.
and (c) ensure the permanent presence of a NATO liaison officer with the EU Military Staff to enhance transparency and cooperation with NATO. At the same time, the EU non-aligned countries reacted vehemently to the wording of the mutual defence clause and insisted on adding further wording which would effectively give themselves an opt-out, creating another difficult issue awaiting final settlement in the coming talks on the constitutional treaty.

Towards a European strategic personality

The extraordinary meeting of the European Council devoted to the Iraq crisis on 17 February 2003 underscored the sharp divisions in the EU and the humiliating inability of the EU to speak ‘with one voice’ or agree on the rationale for use of force abroad. The Iraq intervention made the member states painfully aware that, without common positions on the nature of threats and the mechanisms for dealing with them, the EU cannot be credible and coherent in its foreign and security policy vis-à-vis the USA, or the various states of concern, or its own future new neighbours and their proliferation problems. After the conclusion of fighting in Iraq, the EU began to work to retrieve and enhance its unity in the security policy field along several tracks.

On 14 April the GAERC instructed Secretary-General/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana to undertake work on the proliferation of WMD. The declaration on a common policy on WMD adopted at the Thessaloniki EU Summit addressed the principal US concerns with regard to proliferation of WMD and missiles. As set out in the EU Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the related Action Plan for their implementation, the new European policy included pledges to carry out a common assessment of global proliferation threats and to deploy all necessary multilateral instruments to deter, halt and reverse proliferation, including the use, as a last resort, of...


coercive measures ‘in accordance with the United Nations Charter’. It also presented a list of specific measures to implement the EU Action Plan. The package was a compromise between different EU members, which may have regarded it, respectively, as a reactive, proactive or limited and partial programme. To be effective, it will obviously need to be followed up by concerted action and backed by appropriate resources.\(^{118}\)

The discussion on security doctrine also led to another, wider EU accord. The initiative launched at an informal foreign ministers’ meeting in Rhodes, Greece, on 2–3 May to develop a strategic concept for, and the possible option of using force by, the EU was generally supported by the member states with a view to dealing more effectively with transnational threats such as terrorism and WMD. Javier Solana was given the task of drawing up a European Security Strategy. His document ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, provisionally endorsed by EU member states in June 2003, presented a list of threats including terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional insecurity, state failure and organized crime.\(^{119}\) However, in contrast to the US approach, it emphasized the primacy of ‘effective multilateralism’ based on international law, and the importance of the international system, the UN in particular, regional organizations, disarmament regimes, and so on, as well as the need to use political persuasion and reassurance as part of a multi-functional set of instruments vis-à-vis states that seek to acquire WMD. Accordingly, Solana put forward three strategic objectives: (a) extending the security zone around Europe by creating a ‘zone of good governance’ as a first defence against threats; (b) pursuing a more stable and equitable international order, and particularly an effective multilateral system; and (c) providing effective defences against threats.\(^{120}\) Following discussion of Solana’s draft at three public seminars and a redrafting process among states, the December 2003 Brussels EU Summit adopted a revised version of the strategy document and gave Solana a mandate to elaborate concrete proposals for its implementation.\(^{121}\) The main prerequisites for the EU to make progress in building its strategy in the present volatile world were identified as more activism, including ‘preventive engagement’ but falling short—at German and French insistence—of a refer-


\(^{119}\) ‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention.’ Solana, J., ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, Report submitted by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to the Council of the European Union, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>.

\(^{120}\) Solana (note 119). The final draft adopted in Dec. put the strategic objectives in a different order: addressing the threats, building security in our neighbourhood and an international order based on effective multilateralism.

ence to the use of force or pre-emptive strikes, more capability, more coherence, and acting with partners—particularly the USA. Initial follow-up areas will consist of work on ‘effective multilateralism’, combating terrorism, a strategy towards the Middle East and a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Overall, the outcome of its work in 2003 left the EU halfway towards a more assertive strategic role.

V. Broader European security issues

The OSCE in search of not-so-soft security

The contribution of the OSCE to European security in 2003 continued to be subject to the same constraints that it has faced since the late 1990s. Major security matters are decided by the main powers of the Euro-Atlantic area or their coalitions, as well as by the more closely integrated organizations to which most of these countries belong either as members or partners. The OSCE thus continues to search for the niche it could fill in European security. The Dutch chairmanship-in-office of the OSCE in 2003 set out to modify its agenda, creating a better balance among different dimensions of its activities. According to an influential background paper prepared for the Dutch chairmanship, ‘the less other participating states are inclined to believe that the country holding the Chairmanship has its own national agenda, the more credit it is given to act as an honest broker in reconciling different viewpoints. Given that the Netherlands has no desire to join any other international organizations . . . this is precisely the Dutch position’. The Dutch concluded that there was a need ‘to give more, and more visible, attention to military and other first dimension security issues’ and thus ‘to do justice to the comprehensive concept of security that the OSCE stands for’. The priorities of their chairmanship combined some regular, not to say ritual, issues with a new focus. Efforts to enhance the contribution of the organization to fighting terrorism were accompanied by a focus on trafficking, in people, arms and drugs, and new attempts to address ‘frozen’ conflicts with an emphasis on the Caucasus and Moldova. The Dutch chairmanship also had to address the pending

122 ‘It would have been difficult to sell to the public an EU security doctrine that makes a direct reference to pre-emptive strikes.’ Dempsey, J. ‘Words of war: Europe’s first security doctrine backs away from a commitment to US-style pre-emption’, Financial Times, 5 Dec. 2003, p. 11.
123 Council of the European Union (note 112).
124 Advisory Council on International Affairs, ‘The Netherlands and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2003: role and direction’ (Advisory Council on International Affairs: The Hague, 2002), p. 29, URL <http://www.AIV-Advice.nl>. This is extremely telling in its hint about the challenges and pressures that are faced by the chairmanship-in-office when the country concerned has aspirations to join the EU and/or NATO. It also says a lot about the current structure of Euro-Atlantic relations more broadly.
administrative reform of the OSCE, which turned out to be more problematic than many had expected.126

The fact that the achievements of the year were fairly limited cannot be blamed on the Dutch chairmanship. In any case, it is often difficult to quantify the performance of the OSCE. This is particularly the case with respect to its contribution to fighting terrorism. The situation is not much better in the case of trafficking, although awareness of the problem has increased and the OSCE Action Plan is the most detailed blueprint yet devised by an international organization. At the Maastricht OSCE Council meeting in December 2003, ministers appointed a special representative to ensure that its provisions are carried out.127 The OSCE also approved a policy for improving the situation of the Roma and Sinti, the first of its kind in the region.128 In this case, too, it will be important to measure implementation against the commitments. Finally, the OSCE succeeded in adopting a major document in the arms control area—a handbook of best practices on small arms and light weapons.129 This reflected a long-standing OSCE philosophy that soft-security measures are the preferred methods when security challenges are closely linked with culture and traditions. Transparency and the sharing of national practices belong to this category.

On the question of solving frozen conflicts, the record of the OSCE in 2003 was not positive. The emphasis on the case of Moldova (the Trans-Dniester region) was logical because it seemed to be more ‘ripe for resolution’ than other cases in the South Caucasus. The effort ended in deadlock nonetheless, because the parties found a proposed federative solution unacceptable.130 It provided additional evidence that the OSCE and the chairmanship country cannot gain sufficient influence to solve conflicts without the genuine interest of the parties themselves and the cooperation of the major players, who have both sticks and carrots with which to influence them.

Some of the OSCE’s routine activities, such as the continuing field presence in parts of its area where ‘weak’ states have to be helped to develop certain capacities, the regular observation of elections and the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, continue to be among its most useful functions. Although it is difficult to measure their immediate impact, without the presence of field missions many projects would not take place in these

130 See section VI below.
countries. All such activities suit and support a cooperative security framework. Currently, however, three concerns are being voiced in relation to the field missions of the OSCE: (a) the geographical asymmetry of such missions, which are concentrated in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union; (b) their functional asymmetry—they are active primarily in the human dimension of the OSCE; and (c) the frequent allegation that missions intrude on the internal affairs of the participating state. Although these accusations have a lot to do with the current deadlock in the institutional development of the OSCE, it is possible to make the following observations. As far as geographical asymmetry is concerned, there is no objective need for OSCE missions in many countries. In other cases, while there is a need for such missions, they are unlikely to achieve the necessary consensus. Second, the development of water management projects, police training and establishing cross-border cooperation cannot be identified exclusively with the human dimension. Last but not least, there is a delicate balance between the effectiveness of missions and intrusion, and this can only be judged on a case-by-case basis. It should be recognized that OSCE missions have exceeded their mandate in some cases and been drawn into the internal political situation of the host country. Although this has made such missions valuable sources of political information, they have been the cause of understandable dissatisfaction for the host authorities.

Regarding the monitoring and observation of elections, Hrair Balian, the former head of the elections section of the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has described its purpose as: (a) ‘a deterrent to irregularities. . . . Gross manipulations and severe cases of fraud are less likely when there are observers on the ground’; (b) ‘a confidence-building measure’ to ‘provide the margin of confidence needed to convince opposition parties or domestic observer groups to participate in an election process’; and (c) ‘a tool for the prevention of conflicts: without [an OSCE] presence, the parties involved might be more likely to settle their differences on the streets rather than through liberal and democratic means’.

It is a separate matter, as the December 2003 parliamentary elections in Serbia and Montenegro eloquently demonstrated, that free and fair elections may not necessarily bring the result preferred by the international community (see below). In such cases election observation does not help and broader, long-term political processes need to be addressed.

During 2003 the OSCE participating states devoted significant time and energy to addressing institutional adaptation. There were several initiatives on the agenda, including: (a) the establishment of an analytical unit within the Conflict Prevention Centre; (b) the possible opening of OSCE liaison offices;


and (c) an annual report on OSCE activities. Agreement could only be achieved on the annual report. Other decisions were prevented by significant disagreements between Russia and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan over the issues concerning OSCE field activities mentioned above. More importantly, Russia believes the OSCE to be ‘chairmanship heavy’ and would like to confine the activities of missions to their mandates and increase the role of participating states, including in the nomination and appointment of heads of missions. As a result, consensus was not achieved on several items at Maastricht.

For the future of European security it is worth noting Russia’s objections to several measures put forward at the Maastricht meeting. These include: (a) a refusal to accept any linkage between Russia’s Istanbul military commitments (withdrawal of troops and armaments from Moldova and the elimination of its military bases in Georgia) and the bringing into force of the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; (b) rejection of provisions confirming Russia’s resolve to continue complying with its Istanbul commitments; and (c) dissatisfaction that many other participating states did not endorse Russia’s proposal on the resolution of the conflict in the Trans-Dniester region by means of a federal scheme.

Because of the lack of consensus on the draft Maastricht Ministerial Declaration, the Dutch Chairmanship issued a ‘perception statement’ under its own authority. The Russian delegation rejected the statement as a non-consensus document. Thus, for the second time in recent OSCE history, an OSCE Ministerial Council meeting ended without a general political declaration.

There is an underlying problem caused by the increasingly apparent tension between the pro-Western attitude of the current leadership of Russia, on the one hand, and Russia’s claim to a hegemonic role in the post-Soviet space, on the other. Once the two clash, they inevitably weaken cooperation between Russia and many other participating states. There is an obvious contradiction between the two main geographical directions—south and west—of Russian foreign policy activity. Given the importance of Russia for global and some regional political matters, it is understandable that the majority of OSCE participating states would like to postpone the moment for a showdown, especially when some of them regard the local and sub-regional conflicts taking place in the post-Soviet area as of secondary importance. For the present, the Maastricht Council meeting demonstrated that no breakthrough is likely to occur soon on important matters related to the security dimension of the


134 Russian support is essential for the OSCE because it was Russia’s active support that resulted in a significant increase in the importance of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, as the OSCE was then known, in the first half of the 1990s and because the OSCE carries out most of its activity in the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia.

135 The first occasion was Nov. 2000, when the Vienna Ministerial Council meeting ended without consensus. Interestingly, some of the Russian reservations at that time concerning the ‘bias of the OSCE’, and its near-exclusive focus on the ‘east’ were identical to those voiced in Maastricht.
OSCE, which may imply a continuing, nearly exclusive and arguably excessive reliance on the human dimension.

The Western Balkans: steps forward and steps back

The history of the security of the Western Balkans, the territory of Albania and the former Yugoslavia, can best be understood by analysing the dominant concerns on the agenda since the end of the cold war. In the first half of the 1990s it was predominantly the Balkan wars, and their potential spread, that caused concern. In the second half of the decade it was domestic instability and dictatorial tendencies in some major countries of the region, including Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, that shaped the agenda. In 2003, international concern focused on two areas. The first was the results of democratic elections, which might reflect certain anti-Western tendencies in political life, primarily in Serbia and Montenegro, or bring back to power political forces that were regarded as sources of concern—such as the Croatian Democratic Union in Croatia. Nothing demonstrates the change of agenda so clearly as the fact that concerns are now being voiced about the outcome of elections rather than the need to hold free and fair elections. The second set of concerns was about maintaining some level of economic stability and avoiding economic collapse. Both sets of concerns, with some exceptions, are related to domestic stability and the prospects for a sustainable and successful transformation.

Within the area of the former Yugoslavia, different constituent entities of the former federation have followed divergent development paths and have arrived at different stages in their development. Such a ‘parting of the ways’ is demonstrated most dramatically by Slovenia’s membership of the EU and NATO in 2004. Croatia submitted its application for EU membership in February 2003 and expects to receive a positive answer from the EU Commission in the spring of 2004. The desire to maintain as great a distance as possible from their Yugoslavian past is one common factor in the international policies of these two countries.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina nationalist forces dominated the elections of 2002. The political situation is unsettled, and the economic situation even more so. If instability continues it will be impossible to provide for prosperity, or even prevent further economic decline. In practice, the international community governs the country and it is increasingly likely that further High Representatives will follow before political power can be left in the hands of the local political class. Economic transformation has been largely unsuccessful.

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and dependence on foreign assistance remains high. Domestic stability is partly provided by external forces.\footnote{For further discussion of these and the other national cases addressed below, from a security perspective, see chapter 8 in this volume.}

In the case of the FYROM, there are more signs of reconciliation between the two ethnic communities, although compromise and cooperation may still not prevail, particularly if economic decline contributes to challenging it. The change of ethno-national composition linked to higher birth rates among ethnic Albanians may also weaken cohesion. Transformation has been under way since the 2001 Ohrid Agreement but the situation continues to be fragile.\footnote{For a discussion of the Ohrid Agreement see chapter 8 in this volume.}

It is Serbia and Montenegro that presents the most difficult questions for the future, not only because of its size and importance in the region but also because of the complexity of its problems. The events of 2003 have shown how international and domestic problems coexist in the country. The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March indicated that non-state entities may react violently if they perceive central decisions to be harming their interests. Organized criminal groups could challenge the authority of the state. Similar signals were repeated in the autumn of 2003. The fact that the murderers of Djindjic faced trial later in the year could be considered reassuring. In general, however, many signs persist that Serbia and Montenegro is a weak state. The priority given to anti-corruption legislation by the government formed in 2004 also reflects the seriousness of the problem. The situation is aggravated by the absence of economic recovery.

The persistent problems were exacerbated by the results of the December 2003 Serbian elections. It turned out to be extremely difficult to form a coalition government after the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) gained the largest number of votes and seats in the parliament. The government eventually formed in March 2004 is dependent on the support of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS),\footnote{International Foundation for Election Systems, electionguide.org., ‘Results summary: Serbia’, Parliamentary elections, 28 Dec. 2003, URL <http://209.50.195.230/eguide/resultsum/serbia_par03.htm>}. the party which former President of the Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic used to lead, and it has not been made clear to the public what type of compromises were made in order to guarantee its initial support. There are assumptions that a promise not to hand any further Serb citizens over to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia forms part of the bargain.\footnote{On the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia see chapter 5 in this volume.} It is a fact that the coalition government will often have to seek difficult compromises in order to guarantee the continuation of SPS support and preserve the coalition. This may weaken its ability to take controversial decisions, or take them with the necessary urgency.

The domestic scene is complicated by a fragile situation among the \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} constituent entities of Serbia and Montenegro. The new State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is in many respects an artificial construction. In fact, the constitutional arrangement on which the union is based is subject
to a possible revision after three years.\textsuperscript{141} Pro-independence groups in Montenegro may renew their activity even before the three-year moratorium expires.

Internationally, by far the most explosive issue remains the future of Kosovo.\textsuperscript{142} The complexity of the Kosovo problem stems from the fact that it lies at the intersection of domestic and international politics. The population of Serbia is not yet prepared to give up a territory which it regards as the cradle of Serbian statehood. Furthermore, the current government may find it difficult to engage on the matter when the SRS could easily exploit the issue for its own advantage. It is also difficult to imagine that the SPS would provide its promised support to the government in resolving this particular problem. Experts and Serbian politicians may privately contemplate partition as a solution, but it is not only domestic politics that prevents them from considering the idea officially.\textsuperscript{143} The international repercussions of partition, with a northern Kosovo joining Serbia and the rest becoming independent,\textsuperscript{144} could be enormous, given the internal divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the FYROM, as well as other similar cases elsewhere in the OSCE area such as Moldova and the South Caucasus. The solution developed for the status of Kosovo will be closely monitored by those concerned and may eventually be taken as an example. In 2003 head of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)\textsuperscript{145} Harri Holkeri paid more attention to the character of the future Kosovar entity than to its constitutional status.\textsuperscript{146} This approach maintains the line taken by his predecessor, Michael Steiner, that the entity has a number of practical conditions to fulfil before its final status can be regulated.

Under current conditions, and given that the EU has already held out the prospect of eventual EU membership to the area of the Western Balkans, the EU has delicate choices to make in this region. Its main interest is to contribute to the stability of the area. It must measure that goal against its resources and consider what needs to be offered to keep these countries on track and promote their stabilization.

VI. Russia

Russia’s policies in 2003 generally followed the road mapped out in preceding years.\textsuperscript{147} Its pragmatic pro-Western line combined with an authoritarian domestic course remained unchanged in principle, with the overriding goal of internal renewal and consolidation of its influence in its direct geographical

\textsuperscript{142} The Constitutional Charter refers to Kosovo and Metohija.
\textsuperscript{143} See Bugajski, J., Hitchner, R. B. and Williams, P., Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Achieving a Final Status Settlement for Kosovo (CSIS: Washington, DC, Apr. 2003).
\textsuperscript{144} Wagstyl, S., ‘The Kosovo question: why “the last spot of danger in the heart of Europe” holds the key to the Balkans’ future’, Financial Times, 14 Oct. 2003, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{145} See chapters 3 and 8 in this volume; and the UNMIK Internet site, URL <http://www.unmikonline.org>.
\textsuperscript{147} See Anthony et al. (note 1), pp. 70–78.
Domestically, the dominant influence of Russian President Vladimir Putin was reasserted with the victory of the Kremlin-backed ‘power’ parties—such as Unified Russia—in the December 2003 State Duma election, opening the way for his re-election in March 2004 and further consolidating his personal power. The Kremlin’s strengthened domestic position was, however, accompanied by growing regression in Moscow’s record on human and political rights. The rigged local and presidential elections in Chechnya; the continuing suppression of media freedom; the progressively increasing strength of the ‘power agencies’ (siloviki), especially the Federal Security Service; widespread bureaucratic corruption; the possible misuse of state powers in pursuit of Putin’s desire to break the independent power of economic ‘oligarchs’; and so on, all drew protest from pro-democracy lobbies within Russia—and increasingly from Western observers as well.

The Yukos oil company affair, in particular the arrest of its Chief Executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who openly supported the liberal opposition, aroused particularly wide debate about the motives of the administration. Along with the inequitable December parliamentary election, all these factors demonstrate even more strongly that the upravlyvaemaya demokratiya (‘managed democracy’) pursued by Putin is far from Western standards and from the declared goal of the rule of law in Russia. At the end of 2003, with continued uncertainty as to the motives and directions of Putin’s policies—strategic reorientation or electoral expediency—some observers expressed the hope that Russia’s behaviour might at least become easier to read after the presidential election.

In parallel with Russia’s withdrawal from the Middle East and the Balkans (see below) and its growing focus on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) area, developments both in Russia and on its periphery demonstrated continuing misunderstandings and unrealistic expectations on the part of Moscow and the West alike.

The Iraq crisis was an interim test of Putin’s foreign policy. Russia decided to straddle the division within NATO, striking a delicate balance between the quarrelling Western partners and seeking national advantage from the intra-NATO rift. It chose not to openly confront the USA, while joining with France

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and Germany in advocating a leading role for the UN. By forming an expedient ‘troika’ with the two big European states, however, Russia made itself ‘more follower than leader’ in the anti-Iraq coalition.\footnote{For forgive Russia, but not forget, \textit{Wall Street Journal,} editorial, 2 June 2003.} Such a stance revealed the lack of a long-term policy on the issue other than that of de facto alignment with (some part of) the Euro-Atlantic community.\footnote{On the other hand, it did contribute to the Bush Administration’s reluctance to build a meaningful partnership with Russia. See Trenin, D., ‘Food for thought ahead of Bush–Putin summit’, \textit{Moscow Times} (Internet edn), 22 Sep. 2003, URL <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/indexes/01.html>.} Nevertheless, many Russian analysts took pride in Russia allegedly having developed better relations with the USA and Europe than the two had with each other.\footnote{Felgenhauer, P., ‘Putin dreaming of empire’, \textit{Moscow Times} (Internet edn), 2 Dec. 2003.}

The alignment with France and Germany during the Iraq war did not visibly harm Russia’s relations with the USA.\footnote{It was even claimed that ‘Mr Putin has kept his ties with the US intact, improved his relationship with France and Germany and maintained his record standing in the Russian opinion polls’. Jack, A. and Wagstyl, S., ‘Putin emerges a winner after Iraq war’, \textit{Financial Times,} 27 May 2003, p. 2.} It was treated leniently compared to the punishment Washington administered to Russia’s fellow troika members, in line with the publicized advice ascribed to US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice—‘punish France, isolate Germany, forgive Russia’.\footnote{However, in Dec. 2003 the USA announced a competition for reconstruction contracts in Iraq while apparently excluding countries which opposed the war, such as France, Germany and Russia.} However, the mood of the post-11 September 2001 Russian–US ‘strategic partnership’ was affected by a growing number of US and Russian disappointments. Developments in 2003, such as the opening of the Russian–CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) airbase in Kyrgyzstan, the ‘Russian mafia’ scandal around Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas, the Kerch Strait–Azov Sea border dispute between Russia and Ukraine, the unilateral attempt to settle the Moldova problem and the meeting of Georgian separatist leaders in Moscow, led a prominent Russian observer to conclude that ‘Putin’s Russia, while returning to the past, becomes not only an authoritarian, but also an expansionist power’.\footnote{Trenin, D., ‘Russia vkhodit v ‘novyi izolatsionizm”’ [Russia embraces a ‘new isolationism’], \textit{Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Dipkur’er,} 8 Dec. 2003, pp. 9, 13.} In turn, Russia was disappointed by the perceived US–European lack of even-handedness regarding minority rights in Estonia and Latvia, the ‘prolonged’ US deployments in Central Asia, airborne warning and control system (AWACS) flights over Georgian territory, the US ‘takeover’ of Georgia after the fall of Shevardnadze and the Western rejection of Moscow’s peace plan in Moldova. In the light of these and other developments, a new mood is emerging in some quarters in Moscow which perceives the growing scope and strength of the EU (and NATO) as an inherently threatening development.\footnote{Trenin (note 157).}

A symbolic event in the scaling down of its active security involvement outside the CIS perimeter was Russia’s final withdrawal from the Balkans, announced in May 2003, bringing home its peacekeeping contingents that had been stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996 and in Kosovo since 1999. Russia continued to stick to its ‘calmly negative’ attitude to NATO
enlargement. In spite of the earlier voiced concerns about the future of the NRC, the year witnessed enhanced cooperation ‘at 20’ and considerable progress was made in cooperation on defence and military issues. At the same time, however, as part of the general revision of Russian military doctrine, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov announced on 2 October a review of Russia’s nuclear strategy in the light of NATO and US ‘offensive military doctrines’, thus indicating that he still regarded the West as Russia’s most likely major adversary.

EU–Russian relations, which the Italian EU Presidency had sought to patch up, came under increasing strain at the start of 2004. A list of Russian priorities vis-à-vis the EU included: (a) accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on Moscow’s terms; (b) a relaxation of visa requirements; (c) more frequent summits with the participation of all 25 EU member states; (d) ‘decision sharing’ in the EU’s defence project; (e) ‘minimum EU involvement’ in the former Soviet republics; (f) the EU desisting from commenting on internal Russian affairs; and (g) compensation for the negative effects of EU enlargement. From its side, Russia has: (a) not ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; (b) continued to resist EU requests on Siberian overflight payments; (c) threatened to block the extension of its 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU to the new member states; and (d) failed to conclude a readmission agreement with the EU (for migrants deported from the EU after crossing from Russian territory). The November EU–Russia joint statement concerning dialogue on political and security measures reaffirmed both sides’ determination to build a ‘balanced and reciprocal strategic partnership’ but resulted only in a promise to reinforce cooperation with a view to creating a ‘common space of cooperation in the field of external security’.

161 Suslov. D., ‘Rossiya ob’yavlyaet NATO kholodnuyu voynu [Russian declares a cold war on NATO], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 Oct. 2003, p. 5.
162 Russia’s accession to the WTO stumbled once again over the Russian domestic gas monopoly, agriculture subsidies, constrained access for foreign investors to Russian markets and other issues.
164 The Kyoto Protocol is available at URL <http://unfccc.int/>.
In 2003 there was an intensification of Moscow’s policy in its ‘near abroad’, aimed at strengthening its strategic positions east and south of its borders in order to both secure its interests and stave off alleged Western attempts to ‘squeeze’ Russia out of the southern part of the post-Soviet space (the ‘southern underbelly’). Already relatively successful in Armenia, Belarus and Central Asia, Russian policy now aims to reinvigorate its engagement in other states of the volatile South Caucasus region and Moldova, especially in view of the USA’s growing involvement and perceived strategic competition there. The issue of ‘transportation corridors’ from the Caspian Sea basin to central and Western Europe becomes crucial. Of particular concern are the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Odessa–Brody (with a planned extension to Gdansk, Poland) oil pipeline routes that bypass Russia—potentially jeopardizing both the large profits it currently earns and its political influence in the former Soviet republics.

In the southern part of Eastern Europe the steps taken by Moscow seemed to be aimed at the resubordination of the former Soviet republics, Georgia and Moldova. Adopting an intricate strategy, Russia strives to subject Georgia to its own political and economic (energy) interests and disrupt its relations with Western partners. Within Georgia, a country weakened by corrupt rule, Russia strengthened its links with the two breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russian troops are stationed, and another potentially secessionist area, Adzharia. However, at the time of the profound political crisis in November, the Russian Government eventually cast its vote for Georgia’s fragile stability and helped persuade Eduard Shevardnadze to peacefully step down as president of the country.

Russia’s second violation of its 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit commitments concerning its military presence in Georgia and Moldova demonstrated a refusal to loosen its grip on its southern periphery. The issue of Russian bases deployed in Georgia remained unresolved. In Moldova, Russia sought unsuccessfully to broker, outside the OSCE framework, a compromise solution between the central government and its separatist Trans-Dniester region, which would give it control of and military basing rights in a new confederate state. Moscow’s refusal at the OSCE ministerial meeting in Maastricht to accept the criticism of its violation of the ‘Istanbul commitments’ made it

and the EU signed a protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement extending the agreement to the 10 new member states of the EU on 1 May 2004.


167 One indication was Russia’s increased concern in the autumn of 2003 over an alleged US plan to deploy military bases in the South Caucasus, especially in Azerbaijan.

168 Week-long talks were held by Russia in Moscow with the leaders of Abkhazia, Adzharia and South Ossetia during the Georgian crisis in Nov.–Dec. 2003, despite the objections of the new Georgian interim regime. In turn, the USA put its unconditional support behind the new authorities, pledging financial assistance to fund elections and to resume aid to the country.


170 The OSCE document that was not accepted by Russia also committed the OSCE to the territorial integrity of Georgia. See chapter 17 in this volume.
impossible to reach agreement on a ministerial political declaration and regional statements on Georgia and Moldova.

In the light of the EU’s imminent extension of its territory to form a common border with the CIS, Russia has unsuccessfully pursued a free-trade zone covering the CIS area, exerting enhanced pressure on Moldova and Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Community, another Russia-centric framework of economic integration set up in 2001. Instead, the framework agreement on the establishment of a ‘single economic space’, grouping Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, was signed at the CIS Summit in Yalta in September 2003 with the aim of accelerating the economic and political integration of those countries. In this context, Ukraine was eager not to damage its prospective economic integration with the EU or its chances of joining the WTO.

Russia also took further measures to consolidate its position in the post-Soviet space. In Tajikistan, Russia has sought to give its deployment of the 201st Motor Rifle Division on the Tajikistan–Afghanistan border the status of a military base. On 28 April, at a meeting in Dushanbe, the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the final documents creating the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization and agreed to establish a joint military command for a regional rapid reaction force to fight drug trafficking and terrorism in the CSTO area. Russia reiterated its offer to provide arms and military equipment to other CSTO members at the prices and on the terms at which the Russian military purchases them. At a press conference on 9 October, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that Russia retains the right to use military force on the territory of the former Soviet republics. He expressed Russia’s determination to boost its military presence in the CIS, especially in Central Asia, and called for the ultimate withdrawal of military bases established there by the US-led international anti-terrorism coalition. He noted that Russia had only agreed to the presence of such bases for the period necessary to stabilize Afghanistan and to achieve the goals set by the coalition. Two weeks later a CSTO (Russian) airbase was inaugurated in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, evidently as a political demonstration and a

171 The Eurasian Economic Community was established in Minsk on 31 May 2001 to boost cooperation between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Moldova and Ukraine have observer status.

172 Ukraine opposed the signing of a far-reaching agreement on integration. According to a Ukrainian diplomat ‘Ukraine’s course has no alternative—it is Euro-Atlantic integration’. Samarina, A., ‘Amerika odemula Ukrainu’ [America called Ukraine to heel], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 Sep. 2003, p. 2. However, Ukraine, along with Kazakhstan and Russia, ratified the agreement on 20 Apr. 2004.

173 In 2003 the Tajik authorities obliged the division’s staff and some of its units to leave downtown Dushanbe and relocate to the capital’s outskirts. Tajikistan has also raised the question of Russia paying for the division’s presence in the country and the possibility of putting the contingent at the Tajikistani leadership’s disposal ‘in extraordinary situations’.


175 Ivanov stated that ‘[t]he CIS is a very crucial sphere for our security. Ten million of our compatriots live there and we are supplying energy to them at prices below international levels. We are not going to renounce the right to use military power there in situations where all other means have been exhausted.’ ‘Moscow stresses possibility of using military force in the CIS’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RFE/RL Newsline, 10 Oct. 2003, URL <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/10/100309.asp>.
counterweight to the US-led coalition’s airbase at Bishkek’s Manas airport. Officially, the purpose of the Kant airbase is to protect the borders of Russia and the CIS states but, in the long run, Moscow hopes that it may become an outpost of Russia’s interests in Central Asia.176 Despite the CSTO’s expressed interest in closer cooperation with NATO, the latter dismissed the offer, making it clear that it has no plans to work with the group and prefers bilateral cooperation with its members.177

VII. Conclusions

West–West dynamics dominated the security scene in 2003, to such a degree that even Russia seemed to spend most of its time deciding where to place itself within the Western spectrum. The policy agendas of this Euro-Atlantic community, wielding as it does enormous weight—political, economic, military, and so on—in world relations, will continue to dominate the international system at least in the short to medium term.

In the first months of the year an argument over a policy challenge—a supposed ‘rogue state’ outside Europe—for which neither NATO nor EU policies had been expressly calibrated risked sidelining these organizations and even ‘re-nationalizing’ the relations of influence within them. The efforts subsequently made (from as early as April onwards) to rebuild Euro-Atlantic and European consensus and to retrieve the institutions’ relevance resulted in major new adaptations by both the EU and NATO to the challenges of a world combining transnational and regional threats. The price of success in this was seen by many as the increasing of the odds on de facto domination of these Western organizations by small groups of the most powerful states. Arguably, however, the whole process also diverted energies that might well have been spent in more thorough internal and external preparation for the momentous transition to a much larger EU and NATO (with 7 and 10 new members, respectively) in the spring of 2004. At the end of 2003, and in early 2004, there were some signs that enlargement-related disputes could become one of several factors raising tension between the West and President Putin’s Russia. This had serious knock-on effects inter alia for the OSCE, which has been searching for some time for ways and means to increase its relevance and utility against the background of the EU and NATO enlargements. The violence in Kosovo in March 2004 demonstrated once again that the Western Balkan region is still not fully immunized against the scourges of ethnic hatred and terror. In the first years of the 21st century, at least, the northern hemisphere’s family of democratic states does not seem to have found the formula for becoming at once more inclusive and more united.