Annexe A. Arms control and disarmament agreements

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Notes

1. The agreements are listed in the order of the date on which they were opened for signature (multilateral agreements) or signed (bilateral agreements); the date on which they entered into force and the depositary for multilateral treaties are also given. Information is as of 1 January 2001 unless otherwise indicated. Where confirmed information on entry into force or new parties became available in early 2001, this information is given in notes.

2. The main source of information is the lists of signatories and parties provided by the depositaries of the treaties.

3. For a few major treaties, the substantive parts of the most important reservations, declarations and/or interpretive statements made in connection with a state’s signature, ratification, accession or succession are given in footnotes below the list of parties.

4. States listed as parties have ratified, acceded or succeeded to the agreements. Former non-self-governing territories, upon attaining independence, sometimes make general statements of continuity to all agreements concluded by the former colonial power. This annexe lists as parties only those new states which have made an uncontested declaration on continuity or have notified the depositary about their succession.

5. The Russian Federation, constituted in 1991 as an independent state, confirmed the continuity of international obligations assumed by the Soviet Union. In order to become signatories/parties, the other former Soviet republics which were constituted in 1991 as independent sovereign states subsequently signed, ratified or acceded to agreements.

6. Czechoslovakia split into two states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in 1993. Both states have succeeded to all the agreements listed in this annexe to which Czechoslovakia was a party.

7. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) split into several states in 1991–92. In accordance with the information received from the depositaries, ‘Yugoslavia’ is listed for the agreements which the SFRY (former Yugoslavia) signed or ratified. ‘Yugoslavia (FRY)’ is listed for the agreements to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has acceded. On 6 March 2001 the FRY notified the United Nations that it intends to succeed to a number of treaties deposited with the Secretary-General. The former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia have succeeded, as independent states, to several agreements.

8. Taiwan, while not recognized as a sovereign state by some nations, is given as a party to those agreements which it has ratified.

9. Unless otherwise stated, the multilateral agreements listed in this annexe are open to all states for signature, ratification, accession or succession.

10. A complete list of UN member states, with the year in which they became members, appears in the glossary at the front of this volume. Not all the states listed in this annexe are UN members.

SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)

Signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925; entered into force on 8 February 1928; depositary French Government

The protocol declares that the parties agree to be bound by the prohibition on the use in war of these weapons.

Parties (133): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia

Signed but not ratified: El Salvador

1 The protocol is binding on this state only as regards states which have signed and ratified or acceded to it. The protocol will cease to be binding on this state in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in it.

2 The protocol is binding on Israel only as regards states which have signed and ratified or acceded to it. The protocol shall cease to be binding on Israel in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, or the regular or irregular forces, or groups or individuals operating from its territory, fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of the protocol.

3 Jordan undertakes to respect the obligations contained in the protocol with regard to states which have undertaken similar commitments. It is not bound by the protocol as regards states whose armed forces, regular or irregular, do not respect the provisions of the protocol.

4 The protocol shall cease to be binding on this state with respect to use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, in regard to any enemy state if such state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the protocol.

Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-defence among Western European states (Brussels Treaty)

Signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948; entered into force on 25 August 1948; depositary Belgian Government

The treaty provides for close cooperation of the parties in the military, economic and political fields.

Parties (7): Original parties: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK

Germany and Italy acceded through the 1954 Protocols.

See also Modified Brussels Treaty and Protocols of 1954.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention)

Adopted at Paris by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948; entered into force on 12 January 1951; depositary UN Secretary-General

Under the convention any commission of acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such is declared to be a crime punishable under international law.

**Parties (131):** Afghanistan, Albania*, Algeria*, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain*, Bangladesh*, Barbados, Belarus*, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China*, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary*, Iceland, India*, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Malaysia*, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia*, Morocco*, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma)*, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines*, Poland*, Portugal*, Romania*, Russia*, Rwanda*, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore*, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain*, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine*, Uruguay, USA*, Uzbekistan, Venezuela*, Viet Nam*, Yemen*, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe

Signed but not ratified: Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay

* With reservation and/or declaration.

**Note:** Yugoslavia (FRY) acceded to the convention on 12 March 2001.

Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

Signed at Geneva on 12 August 1949; entered into force on 21 October 1950; depositary Swiss Federal Council

The convention establishes rules for the protection of civilians in areas covered by war and on occupied territories.

**Parties (189):** Afghanistan, Albania*, Algeria, Andorra, Angola*, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia*, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados*, Belarus*, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China*, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic*, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany*, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau*, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary*, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran*, Iraq, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (North)*, Korea (South)*, Kuwait*, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of)*, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova,
Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan*, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland*, Portugal*, Qatar, Romania*, Russia*, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa (Western), San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore*, Slovakia*, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname*, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, UK, Ukraine*, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay*, USA*, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam*, Yemen*, Yugoslavia*, Zambia, Zimbabwe

* With reservation and/or declaration.

In 1989 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) informed the depositary that it had decided to adhere to the four Geneva Conventions and the two Protocols of 1977.

See also Protocols I and II of 1977.

**Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence (Modified Brussels Treaty); Protocols (Paris Agreements)**

*Signed at Paris on 23 October 1954; entered into force on 6 May 1955; depositary Belgian Government*

The 1948 Brussels Treaty was modified by four protocols which amended the original text to take account of political and military developments in Europe, allowing the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to become parties in return for controls over German armaments and force levels (annulled, except for weapons of mass destruction, in 1984). The Western European Union (WEU) was created through the Modified Brussels Treaty. The treaty contains an obligation for collective defence of its members.

*Members of the WEU: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK*

**Antarctic Treaty**

*Signed at Washington, DC, on 1 December 1959; entered into force on 23 June 1961; depositary US Government*

Declares the Antarctic an area to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Prohibits any measure of a military nature in the Antarctic, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, and the carrying out of military manoeuvres or the testing of any type of weapon. The treaty bans any nuclear explosion as well as the disposal of radioactive waste material in Antarctica.

In accordance with Article IX, consultative meetings are convened at regular intervals to exchange information and hold consultations on matters pertaining to Antarctica, as well as to recommend to the governments measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty.

The treaty is subject to ratification by the signatories and is open for accession by UN members or by other states invited to accede with the consent of all the parties entitled to participate in the consultative meetings provided for in Article IX.

**Parties (44):** Argentina†, Australia†, Austria, Belgium†, Brazil†, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile†, China†, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador†, Finland†, France†, Germany†, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India†, Italy†, Japan†, Korea (North), Korea (South)†, Nether-
lands†, New Zealand†, Norway†, Papua New Guinea, Peru†, Poland†, Romania, Russia†, Slovakia, South Africa†, Spain†, Sweden†, Switzerland, Turkey, UK†, Ukraine, Uruguay†, USA†, Venezuela†

† Party entitled to participate in the consultative meetings.


Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT)

Signed at Moscow by three original parties on 5 August 1963, opened for signature by other states at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 8 August 1963; entered into force on 10 October 1963; depositaries British, US and Russian governments

The treaty prohibits the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion: (a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; and (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted.

Parties (125): Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa (Western), San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Signed but not ratified: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Paraguay, Portugal, Somalia

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 27 January 1967; entered into force on 10 October 1967; depositaries British, Russian and US governments

The treaty prohibits the placing into orbit around the earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of them in outer space in any other manner. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies are also forbidden.

**Parties (102):** Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

**Signed but not ratified:** Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Somalia, Trinidad and Tobago, Yugoslavia

**Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

*Original treaty opened for signature at Mexico, Distrito Federal, on 14 February 1967; entered into force on 22 April 1968. The treaty was amended in 1990, 1991 and 1992; depositary Mexican Government*

The treaty prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means, as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons by Latin American and Caribbean countries.

The parties should conclude agreements with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to their nuclear activities. The IAEA has the exclusive power to carry out special inspections.

The treaty is open for signature by all the independent states of the region.

Under *Additional Protocol I* states with territories within the zone (France, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA) undertake to apply the statute of military denuclearization to these territories.

Under *Additional Protocol II* the recognized nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia (at the time of signing, the USSR), the UK and the USA) undertake to respect the statute of military denuclearization of Latin America and not to contribute to acts involving a violation of the treaty, nor to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the treaty.

**Parties to the original treaty (32):** Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

**Signed but not ratified:** Cuba
Amendments ratified by: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

Parties to Additional Protocol I: France¹, Netherlands, UK², USA³

Parties to Additional Protocol II: China⁴, France⁵, Russia⁶, UK², USA⁷

¹ France declared that Protocol I shall not apply to transit across French territories situated within the zone of the treaty, and destined for other French territories. The protocol shall not limit the participation of the populations of the French territories in the activities mentioned in Article 1 of the treaty, and in efforts connected with the national defence of France. France does not consider the zone described in the treaty as established in accordance with international law; it cannot, therefore, agree that the treaty should apply to that zone.

² When signing and ratifying Protocols I and II, the UK made the following declarations of understanding: The signing and ratification by the UK could not be regarded as affecting in any way the legal status of any territory for the international relations of which the UK is responsible, lying within the limits of the geographical zone established by the treaty. Should any party to the treaty carry out any act of aggression with the support of a nuclear weapon state, the UK would be free to reconsider the extent to which it could be regarded as bound by the provisions of Protocol II.

³ The USA ratified Protocol I with the following understandings: The provisions of the treaty do not affect the exclusive power and legal competence under international law of a state adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny transit and transport privileges to its own or any other vessels or aircraft irrespective of cargo or armaments; the provisions do not affect rights under international law of a state adhering to this protocol regarding the exercise of the freedom of the seas, or regarding passage through or over waters subject to the sovereignty of a state. The declarations attached by the USA to its ratification of Protocol II apply also to Protocol I.

⁴ China declared that it will never send its means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons to cross the territory, territorial sea or airspace of Latin American countries.

⁵ France stated that it interprets the undertaking contained in Article 3 of Protocol II to mean that it presents no obstacle to the full exercise of the right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter; it takes note of the interpretation by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America according to which the treaty does not apply to transit, the granting or denying of which lies within the exclusive competence of each state party in accordance with international law. In 1974, France made a supplementary statement to the effect that it was prepared to consider its obligations under Protocol II as applying not only to the signatories of the treaty, but also to the territories for which the statute of denuclearization was in force in conformity with Protocol I.

⁶ On signing and ratifying Protocol II, the USSR stated that it assumed that the effect of Article 1 of the treaty extends to any nuclear explosive device and that, accordingly, the carrying out by any party of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be a violation of its obligations under Article 1 and would be incompatible with its non-nuclear weapon status. For states parties to the treaty, a solution to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions can be found in accordance with the provisions of Article V of the NPT and within the framework of the international procedures of the IAEA. It declared that authorizing the transit of nuclear weapons in any form would be contrary to the objectives of the treaty.

Any actions undertaken by a state or states parties to the treaty which are not compatible with their non-nuclear weapon status, and also the commission by one or more states parties to the treaty of an act of aggression with the support of a state which is in possession of nuclear weapons or together with such a state, will be regarded by the USSR as incompatible with the obligations of those countries under the treaty. In such cases it would reserve the right to reconsider its obligations under Protocol II. It further reserves the right to reconsider its attitude to this protocol in the event of any actions on the part of other states possessing nuclear weapons which are incompatible with their obligations under the said protocol.

⁷ The USA signed and ratified Protocol II with the following declarations and understandings: Each of the parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, to grant or deny non-parties transit and transport privileges. As regards the undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties, the USA would consider that an armed attack by a party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear weapon state, would be incompatible with the treaty.
The treaty prohibits the transfer by nuclear weapon states (defined in the treaty as those which have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967) to any recipient whatsoever, of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over them, as well as the assistance, encouragement or inducement of any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or devices. It also prohibits the receipt by non-nuclear weapon states from any transferor whatsoever, as well as the manufacture or other acquisition by those states, of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The parties undertake to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to ensure that potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear weapon parties to the treaty. They also undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Non-nuclear weapon states undertake to conclude safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A Model Protocol additional to the safeguards agreements, strengthening the measures, was approved in 1997; Additional Safeguards Protocols are signed by states individually with the IAEA.

A Review and Extension Conference, convened in 1995 in accordance with the treaty, decided that the treaty should remain in force indefinitely.

Parties (188): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa (Western), San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, ...
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Slovenia†, Solomon Islands†, Somalia, South Africa†, Spain†, Sri Lanka†, Sudan†, Suriname†, Swaziland†, Sweden†, Switzerland†, Syria†, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand†, Togo, Tonga†, Trinidad and Tobago†, Tunisia†, Turkey†, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu†, Uganda, UK†, Ukraine†, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay†, USA†, Uzbekistan†, Vanuatu, Venezuela†, Viet Nam†, Yemen, Yugoslavia†, Zambia†, Zimbabwe†.

† Party with safeguards agreements in force with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as required by the treaty, or concluded by a nuclear weapon state on a voluntary basis.

Additional Safeguards Protocols are in force for 18 states: (Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Lithuania, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Uzbekistan.) Taiwan, although it has not concluded a safeguards agreement, has agreed to apply the measures contained in the Model Additional Safeguards Protocol.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 11 February 1971; entered into force on 18 May 1972; depositaries British, Russian and US governments

The treaty prohibits implanting or emplacing on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a 12-mile seabed zone any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.

Parties (95): Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina1, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil2, Bulgaria, Canada3, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Congo (Republic of), Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India4, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy5, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea (South), Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico6, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey7, UK, Ukraine, USA, Viet Nam8, Yemen, Yugoslavia9, Zambia

Signed but not ratified: Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Myanmar (Burma), Paraguay, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uruguay

1 Argentina precludes any possibility of strengthening, through this treaty, certain positions concerning continental shelves to the detriment of others based on different criteria.

2 Brazil stated that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as prejudicing in any way the sovereign rights of Brazil in the area of the sea, the seabed and the subsoil thereof adjacent to its coasts. It is the understanding of Brazil that the word ‘observation’, as it appears in para. 1 of Article III of the treaty, refers only to observation that is incidental to the normal course of navigation in accordance with international law.

3 Canada declared that Article I, para. 1, cannot be interpreted as indicating that any state has a right to implant or emplace any weapons not prohibited under Article I, para. 1, on the seabed and ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, or as constituting any limitation on the principle that this area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof shall be reserved for...
exclusively peaceful purposes. Articles I, II and III cannot be interpreted as indicating that any state but the coastal state has any right to implant or emplace any weapon not prohibited under Article I, para. I on the continental shelf, or the subsoil thereof, appertaining to that coastal state, beyond the outer limit of the seabed zone referred to in Article I and defined in Article II. Article III cannot be interpreted as indicating any restrictions or limitation upon the rights of the coastal state, consistent with its exclusive sovereign rights with respect to the continental shelf, to verify, inspect or effect the removal of any weapon, structure, installation, facility or device implanted or emplaced on the continental shelf, or the subsoil thereof, appertaining to that coastal state, beyond the outer limit of the seabed zone referred to in Article I and defined in Article II.

4 The accession by India is based on its position that it has full and exclusive rights over the continental shelf adjoining its territory and beyond its territorial waters and the subsoil thereof. There cannot, therefore, be any restriction on, or limitation of, the sovereign right of India as a coastal state to verify, inspect, remove or destroy any weapon, device, structure, installation or facility, which might be implanted or emplaced on or beneath its continental shelf by any other country, or to take such other steps as may be considered necessary to safeguard its security.

5 Italy stated, inter alia, that in the case of agreements on further measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the seabed and ocean floor and in their subsoil, the question of the delimitation of the area within which these measures would find application shall have to be examined and solved in each instance in accordance with the nature of the measures to be adopted.

6 Mexico declared that the treaty cannot be interpreted to mean that a state has the right to emplace weapons of mass destruction, or arms or military equipment of any type, on the continental shelf of Mexico. It reserves the right to verify, inspect, remove or destroy any weapon, structure, installation, device or equipment placed on its continental shelf, including nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

7 Turkey declared that the provisions of Article II cannot be used by a state party in support of claims other than those related to disarmament. Hence, Article II cannot be interpreted as establishing a link with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Furthermore, no provision of the Seabed Treaty confers on parties the right to militarize zones which have been demilitarized by other international instruments. Nor can it be interpreted as conferring on either the coastal states or other states the right to emplace nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the continental shelf of a demilitarized territory.

8 Viet Nam stated that no provision of the treaty should be interpreted in a way that would contradict the rights of the coastal states with regard to their continental shelf, including the right to take measures to ensure their security.

9 In 1974, the Ambassador of Yugoslavia transmitted to the US Secretary of State a note stating that in the view of the Yugoslav Government, Article III, para. I, of the treaty should be interpreted in such a way that a state exercising its right under this article shall be obliged to notify in advance the coastal state, in so far as its observations are to be carried out ‘within the stretch of the sea extending above the continental shelf of the said state’. The USA objected to the Yugoslav reservation, which it considers incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)**

*Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, DC, on 10 April 1972; entered into force on 26 March 1975; depositaries British, Russian and US governments*

The convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition by other means or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification of prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The destruction of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery in the possession of the parties, or their diversion to peaceful purposes, should be effected not later than nine months after the entry into force of the convention. According to a mandate from the 1996 BTWC Review Conference,
verification and other measures to strengthen the convention are being discussed and considered in an Ad Hoc Group.

**Parties (144):** Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland*, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe

**Signed but not ratified:** Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates

*With reservation.

**Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)**

*Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow on 26 May 1972; entered into force on 3 October 1972*

The parties undertake not to build nationwide defences against ballistic missile attack and limits the development and deployment of permitted strategic missile defences. The treaty prohibits the parties from giving air defence missiles, radars or launchers the technical ability to counter strategic ballistic missiles and from testing them in a strategic ABM mode.

The 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty introduces further numerical restrictions on permitted ballistic missile defences.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine signed the 1997 Memorandum of Understanding on Succession (MOUS) in which they assumed the obligations of the former USSR regarding the treaty. Russia and the USA signed a set of Agreed Statements, including the 1997 Demarcation Agreement, specifying the demarcation line between strategic missile defences, which are not permitted under the treaty, and non-strategic or theatre missile defences (TMD), which are permitted under the treaty. The MOUS and Agreed Statements were ratified by Russia in April 2000.
Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests
(Threshold Test Ban Treaty, TTBT)

Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow on 3 July 1974; entered into force on
11 December 1990

The parties undertake not to carry out any individual underground nuclear weapon
test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons.

Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes
(Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, PNET)

Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow and Washington, DC, on 28 May 1976;
entered into force on 11 December 1990

The parties undertake not to carry out any underground nuclear explosion for peace-
ful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons or any group explosion having an
aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons.

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (Enmod Convention)

Opened for signature at Geneva on 18 May 1977; entered into force on
5 October 1978; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention prohibits military or any other hostile use of environmental modifica-
tion techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to states party to the convention. The term
‘environmental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for changing—
through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition
or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere,
or of outer space. The understandings reached during the negotiations, but not written
into the convention, define the terms ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’.

Parties (66): Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (North), Korea (South)*,
Kuwait, Laos, Malawi, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Niger, Norway,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen

Signed but not ratified: Bolivia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Ethiopia, Holy See,
Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Morocco, Nicaragua, Portugal, Sierra
Leone, Syria, Turkey, Uganda
* With declaration.
Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts

Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

Opened for signature at Bern on 12 December 1977; entered into force on 7 December 1978; depositary Swiss Federal Council

The protocols confirm that the right of the parties to international or non-international armed conflicts to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited and that it is prohibited to use weapons or means of warfare which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

Parties to Protocol I (157) and Protocol II (150): Albania, Algeria*, Angola*, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia*, Austria*, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium*, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada*, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China*, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the)\(^1\), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark*, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt*, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland*, France\(^2\), Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany*, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See*, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland*, Ireland, Italy*, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (North)\(^1\), Korea (South)*, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein*, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta*, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico\(^1\), Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique\(^1\), Namibia, Netherlands*, New Zealand*, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman*, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines\(^2\), Poland, Portugal, Qatar*\(^1\), Romania, Russia*, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa (Western), San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia*\(^1\), Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain*, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Syria\(^1\), Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates*, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam\(^1\), Yemen, Yugoslavia*, Zambia, Zimbabwe

In 1989 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) informed the depositary that it had decided to adhere to the four Geneva Conventions and the two Protocols.

\* With reservation and/or declaration.

\(^1\) Party only to Protocol I.

\(^2\) Party only to Protocol II.

\*

**Note:** France deposited its instruments of ratification for Protocol I on 11 April 2001. A declaration was attached to the ratification.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Opened for signature at Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980; entered into force on 8 February 1987; depositary IAEA Director General

The convention obligates the parties to protect nuclear material for peaceful purposes while in international transport.

Parties (64): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina*, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China*, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Euratom*, Finland, France*, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia*, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (South)*, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia*, Netherlands*, Norway, Panama, Pakistan*, Paraguay, Peru*, Philippines, Poland*, Portugal†, Romania, Russia*, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain*, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey*, UK, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia

Signed but not ratified: Dominican Republic, Haiti, Israel, Morocco, Niger, South Africa

* With reservation and/or declaration.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, or ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention)

The convention, with protocols I, II and III, was opened for signature at New York on 10 April 1981; entered into force on 2 December 1983; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention is an ‘umbrella treaty’, under which specific agreements can be concluded in the form of protocols. To become a party a state must ratify a minimum of two of the original protocols.

Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons intended to injure by fragments which are not detectable in the human body by X-rays.

Protocol II prohibits or restricts the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices.

Amended Protocol II, which entered into force on 3 December 1998, reinforces the constraints regarding landmines.

Protocol III restricts the use of incendiary weapons.

Protocol IV, which entered into force on 30 July 1998, prohibits the employment of laser weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.

Parties to the convention and original protocols (84): Argentina*, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin†, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus*, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France*2, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel2, Italy, Japan, Jordan1, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania1, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Maldives1, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco3, Mongolia, Netherlands*, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru1, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA
Signed but not ratified the convention and original protocols: Afghanistan, Egypt, Iceland, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Turkey, Viet Nam
* With reservation and/or declaration.
  1 Party only to Protocols I and III.
  2 Party only to Protocols I and II.
  3 Party only to Protocol I.

Parties to Amended Protocol II (57): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA

Parties to Protocol IV (56): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, UK, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

Opened for signature at Rarotonga, Cook Islands, on 6 August 1985; entered into force on 11 December 1986; depositary Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (from 1988, South Pacific Forum Secretariat)

The treaty prohibits the manufacture or acquisition by other means of any nuclear explosive device, as well as possession or control over such device by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone area described in an annex. The parties also undertake not to supply nuclear material or equipment, unless subject to IAEA safeguards, and to prevent in their territories the stationing as well as the testing of any nuclear explosive device and undertake not to dump, and to prevent the dumping of, radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the zone. Each party remains free to allow visits, as well as transit, by foreign ships and aircraft.

The treaty is open for signature by the members of the South Pacific Forum.

Under Protocol I France, the UK and the USA undertake to apply the treaty prohibitions relating to the manufacture, stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories situated within the zone, for which they are internationally responsible.

Under Protocol 2 China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA undertake not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against the parties to the treaty or against any territory within the zone for which a party to Protocol I is internationally responsible.

Under Protocol 3 China, France, the UK, the USA and Russia undertake not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the zone.

Parties (13): Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa (Western), Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Parties to Protocol 1: France, UK; signed but not ratified: USA

Parties to Protocol 2: China, France\(^1\), Russia, UK\(^2\); signed but not ratified: USA

Parties to Protocol 3: China, France, Russia, UK; signed but not ratified: USA

\(^1\) France declared that the negative security guarantees set out in Protocol 2 are the same as the CD declaration of 6 Apr. 1995 referred to in UN Security Council Resolution 984 of 11 Apr. 1995.

\(^2\) The UK declared that nothing in the treaty affects the rights under international law with regard to transit of the zone or visits to ports and airfields within the zone by ships and aircraft. The UK will not be bound by the undertakings in Protocol 2 in case of an invasion or any other attack on the UK, its territories, its armed forces or its allies, carried out or sustained by a party to the treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state or if a party violates its non-proliferation obligations under the treaty.


Signed by the USA and the USSR at Washington, DC, on 8 December 1987; entered into force on 1 June 1988

The treaty obligates the parties to destroy all land-based missiles with a range of 500–5500 km (intermediate-range, 1000–5500 km; and shorter-range, 500–1000 km) and their launchers by 1 June 1991. The treaty was implemented by the two parties before this date.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Original treaty signed at Paris on 19 November 1990; entered into force on 9 November 1992; depositary Netherlands Government

The treaty sets ceilings on five categories of treaty-limited equipment (TLE)—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery of at least 100-mm calibre, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—in an area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (the Atlantic-to-the-Urals, ATTU, zone).

The treaty was negotiated and signed by the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and NATO within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (from 1995 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE).

The 1992 Tashkent Agreement adopted by the former Soviet republics (except the three Baltic states) with territories within the ATTU zone, and the 1992 Oslo Document (Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty), introduced modifications to the treaty required because of the emergence of new states after the break-up of the USSR.

Parties (30): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA

The first Review Conference of the CFE Treaty adopted the 1996 Flank Document, which reorganized the flank areas geographically and numerically, allowing Russia and Ukraine to deploy more TLE along their borders.

The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty replaces the CFE Treaty bloc-to-bloc military balance with individual state limits on TLE holdings and provides for a new structure of limitations and new military
flexibility mechanisms, flank sublimits and enhanced transparency; it opens the CFE regime to all the other European states. It will enter into force when it has been ratified by all the signatories. The **1999 Final Act**, with annexes, contains politically binding arrangements with regard to the North Caucasus, Central and Eastern Europe, and withdrawals of armed forces from foreign territories.

1 ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation deposited: Belarus

**Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement)**

*Signed by the parties to the CFE Treaty at Helsinki on 10 July 1992; entered into force simultaneously with the CFE Treaty; depositary Netherlands Government*

The agreement limits the personnel of the conventional land-based armed forces of the parties within the ATTU zone.

**Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty)**

*Signed by the USA and the USSR at Moscow on 31 July 1991; entered into force on 5 December 1994*

The treaty requires the USA and Russia to make phased reductions in their offensive strategic nuclear forces over a seven-year period. It sets numerical limits on deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs)—ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers—and the nuclear warheads they carry. In the Protocol to Facilitate the Implementation of the START Treaty (*1992 Lisbon Protocol*), which entered into force on 5 December 1994, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also assumed the obligations of the former USSR under the treaty. They pledged to eliminate all the former Soviet strategic weapons on their territories within the seven-year reduction period and to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest possible time.

**Treaty on Open Skies**

*Opened for signature at Helsinki on 24 March 1992; not in force as of 1 January 2001; depositaries Canadian and Hungarian governments*

The treaty obligates the parties to submit their territories to short-notice unarmed surveillance flights. The area of application stretches from Vancouver, Canada, eastward to Vladivostok, Russia.

The treaty was negotiated between the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and NATO. It is open for signature by the NATO states, the new states of the former WTO members, and the new states of the former Soviet Union except the three Baltic states. For six months after entry into force of the treaty, any other OSCE member state may apply for accession. The treaty will enter into force 60 days after the deposit of 20 instruments of ratification, including those of the depositaries (Canada and Hungary), and all the signatories with more than eight ‘passive quotas’ (i.e., flights which the state is obliged to accept); that is, Belarus, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the UK, Ukraine and the USA. After the treaty has entered into force, other OSCE states may apply for accession.
24 ratifications deposited: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA

Signed but not ratified: Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia

Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty)

Signed by the USA and Russia at Moscow on 3 January 1993; not in force as of 1 January 2001

The treaty requires the USA and Russia to eliminate their MIRVed ICBMs and sharply reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3000–3500 each (of which no more than 1750 may be deployed on SLBMs) by 1 January 2003 or no later than 31 December 2000 if the USA and Russia reach a formal agreement committing the USA to help finance the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons in Russia.

On 26 September 1997 the two parties signed a Protocol to the treaty providing for the extension until the end of 2007 of the period of implementation of the treaty.

Note: The US Senate ratified the treaty on 26 January 1996; the Russian Duma and Federation Council approved ratification on 14 and 19 April 2000, respectively.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC)

Opened for signature at Paris on 13 January 1993; entered into force on 29 April 1997; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention prohibits both the use of chemical weapons (also prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol) and the development, production, acquisition, transfer and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Each party undertakes to destroy its chemical weapons and production facilities within 10 years after the treaty enters into force.

Parties (141): Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (South), Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UK, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia (FRY), Zimbabwe
Signed but not ratified: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Myanmar (Burma), Nauru, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa (Western), Sierra Leone, Thailand, Uganda, Zambia

Note: Zambia ratified the convention on 9 February 2001 and Dominica on 12 February 2001.

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

Signed at Bangkok on 15 December 1995; entered into force on 27 March 1997; depositary Government of Thailand

The treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition or testing of nuclear weapons inside or outside the zone area as well as the stationing and transport of nuclear weapons in or through the zone. Each state party may decide for itself whether to allow visits and transit by foreign ships and aircraft. The parties undertake not to dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the zone any radioactive material or wastes or dispose of radioactive material on land. The parties should conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of full-scope safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

The zone includes not only the territories but also the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the states parties.

The treaty is open for signature by all the states in South-East Asia.

Under a Protocol to the treaty China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty. They should further undertake not to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone. The protocol will enter into force for each state party on the date of its deposit of the instrument of ratification.

Parties (9): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam

Signed but not ratified: Philippines

Protocol: no signatures, no parties

Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina between Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska

Signed at Vienna on 26 January 1996, entered into force on 26 January 1996

The agreement is largely based on the Vienna Document 1994 but includes additional restrictions and restraints measures on military movements, deployments and exercises and provides for exchange of information and data relating to major weapon systems.
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)

Signed at Cairo on 11 April 1996; not in force as of 1 January 2001; depositary Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

The treaty prohibits the research, development, manufacture and acquisition of nuclear explosive devices and the testing or stationing of any nuclear explosive device. Each party remains free to allow visits, as well as transit by foreign ships and aircraft. The treaty also prohibits any attack against nuclear installations. The parties undertake not to dump or permit the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter anywhere within the zone. The parties should conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of comprehensive safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

The zone includes the territory of the continent of Africa, island states members of the OAU and all islands considered by the OAU to be part of Africa.

The treaty is open for signature by all the states of Africa. It will enter into force upon the 28th ratification.

Under Protocol I China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are to undertake not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against the parties to the Treaty.

Under Protocol II China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are to undertake not to test nuclear explosive devices anywhere within the zone.

Under Protocol III states with territories within the zone for which they are internationally responsible are to undertake to observe certain provisions of the treaty with respect to these territories. This protocol is open for signature by France and Spain.

The protocols will enter into force simultaneously with the treaty for those protocol signatories that have deposited their instruments of ratification.

15 ratifications deposited: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Zimbabwe


Signed but not ratified: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia

Protocol I: ratifications deposited: China, France1; signed but not ratified: Russia2, UK3, USA4

Protocol II: ratifications deposited: China, France; signed but not ratified: Russia2, UK3, USA4

Protocol III: ratifications deposited: France

Note: The UK deposited its instruments of ratification for Protocols I and II on 13 March 2001, confirming the reservations made at the time of signature.

1 France stated that the Protocols did not affect its right to self-defence, as stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It clarified that its commitment under Article 1 of Protocol I was equivalent to the negative security assurances given by France to non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, as confirmed in its declaration made on 6 Apr. 1995 at the Conference on Disarmament, and as referred to in UN Security Council Resolution 984.

2 Russia stated that as long as a military base of a nuclear state was located on the islands of the Chagos archipelago these islands could not be regarded as fulfilling the requirements put forward by the
Treaty for nuclear-weapon-free territories. Moreover, since certain states declared that they would consider themselves free from the obligations under the Protocols with regard to the mentioned territories, Russia could not consider itself to be bound by the obligations under Protocol I in respect to the same territories. Russia interpreted its obligations under Article 1 of Protocol I as follows: It would not use nuclear weapons against a state party to the Treaty, except in the case of invasion or any other armed attack on Russia, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a state towards which it had a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty, in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.

3 The UK stated that it did not accept the inclusion of the British Indian Ocean Territory within the African nuclear weapon-free zone without its consent, and did not accept, by its adherence to Protocols I and III, any legal obligations in respect of that territory. Moreover, it would not be bound by its undertaking under Article 1 of Protocol I in case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a state towards which it had security commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state, or if any party to the treaty was in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the treaty.

4 The USA stated, with respect to Protocol I, that it would consider an invasion or any other attack on the USA, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a state toward which it had a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state, to be incompatible with the treaty party's corresponding obligations. The USA also stated that neither the treaty nor Protocol III would apply to the activities of the UK, the USA or any other state not party to the treaty on the island of Diego Garcia or elsewhere in the British Indian Ocean Territories. No change was, therefore, required in US armed forces operations in Diego Garcia and elsewhere in these territories.

Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control concerning Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia (Florence Agreement)

Adopted at Florence on 14 June 1996; entered into force upon signature

The agreement was negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE in accordance with the mandate in the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement). It sets numerical ceilings on armaments of the former warring parties: Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two entities, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Five categories of heavy conventional weapons are included: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery (75 mm and above), combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The reductions were completed by 31 October 1997. It is confirmed that 6580 weapon items were destroyed by that date.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Opened for signature at New York on 24 September 1996; not in force as of 1 January 2001; depositary UN Secretary-General

The treaty prohibits the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and urges each party to prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control and refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The treaty will enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification of the 44 states listed in an annexe to the treaty but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. All the 44 states possess nuclear power reactors and/or nuclear research reactors.
The 44 states whose ratification is required for entry into force are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea (North), Korea (South), Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA and Viet Nam.

69 ratifications deposited: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (South), Laos, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UK, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan

Signed but not ratified: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bahrain, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Congo (Republic of), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Samoa (Western), San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Note: Between 1 January and 15 April 2001 Benin, Croatia, Guyana, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Uganda and Ukraine ratified the treaty.

Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces

Signed by the USA and Russia at Helsinki on 21 March 1997

In the Joint Statement the two sides agree that once the 1993 START II Treaty enters into force negotiations on a START III treaty will begin. START III will include lower aggregate levels of 2000–2500 nuclear warheads for each side.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention)

Opened for signature at Ottawa on 3–4 December 1997 and at the UN Headquarters, New York, on 5 December 1997; entered into force on 1 March 1999; depositary UN Secretary-General

The convention prohibits anti-personnel mines, which are defined as mines designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and which will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.

Each party undertakes to destroy all its stockpiled anti-personnel mines as soon as possible but not later that four years after the entry into force of the convention for
that state party. Each party also undertakes to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention for that state party.

**Parties (109):** Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa (Western), San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe

**Signed but not ratified:** Algeria, Angola, Brunei, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Cook Island, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Gambia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall Islands, Poland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia


**Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures**

*Adopted by the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe at Istanbul on 16 November 1999; entered into force on 1 January 2000*


The Vienna Document 1999 introduces regional measures aimed at increasing transparency and confidence in a bilateral, multilateral and regional context and some improvements, in particular regarding the constraining measures.