2. Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution

RENATA DWAN

I. Introduction

Expansion and consolidation, rather than initiation, characterized international prevention, management and resolution efforts in 2000. The failure of the two major peace agreements of 1999, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone, forced increased United Nations and regional engagement and the expansion of the UN peace operations established in the two states. The large civilian administration operations launched in East Timor and Kosovo in 2000 proved intensely challenging throughout the year. An internationally negotiated peace agreement brought the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea to an end and paved the way for the only new UN peacekeeping operation of 2000. North and South Korea set in motion their own peace process with a historic summit meeting in June, while US-led efforts to conclude a final settlement in the Middle East collapsed in violence in September. Externally facilitated peace processes in Burundi and Somalia concluded in formal agreements, in the case of Somalia enabling government to be re-established for the first time since 1991. The long-running conflicts in Colombia and Sri Lanka moved closer to international mediation. The increasing engagement of external actors in intra- and interstate conflicts around the world was reflected in the launch of comprehensive UN peacekeeping reform and the continued development of diverse regional organizations’ crisis management capacities. Conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, meanwhile, gained new prominence on the international agenda.

This chapter describes efforts undertaken by a range of international actors to prevent, manage and contain violent conflict in 2000. The list of actors is inevitably selective, with an emphasis on states and intergovernmental organizations. To identify all actions aimed at potential or ongoing conflict would be an impossible undertaking, and to measure their impact even more so. The chapter therefore focuses on current peacekeeping and conflict resolution, and does not analyse the impact of these activities on current or threatened conflicts.

Section II surveys the main peace and conflict activities of the UN system during 2000. Section III describes the parallel efforts undertaken by the principal regional organizations, sometimes separately, sometimes in coordination with the UN, and section IV looks at a number of multinational ad hoc coalitions that addressed conflicts during 2000. Section V explores the role played by individual states and section VI considers significant non-state actors in
peace promotion and conflict resolution—individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private business actors. The final section offers some brief conclusions about dominant trends in prevention, management and resolution.

II. The United Nations

The Secretary-General

The UN Secretary-General’s position is one of the most visible in international politics. His good offices are engaged in some way in almost every current conflict; he directs the UN’s relations with other international organizations, states and non-state actors; and he is a primary shaper of the UN agenda. Kofi Annan’s appointment to the position in 1997 was seen initially by many as a ‘safe’, bureaucratic choice. Over the past three years, however, he has initiated a series of reforms and practices that collectively represent an ambitious effort to re-energize the UN system. This effort culminated in 2000 with a special Millennium Summit and a comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping.

The Millennium Summit

For only the second time in the UN’s history, heads of state and government gathered in September 2000 for the Millennium Summit of the General Assembly. The focus of the summit meeting was the Secretary-General’s report, ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. The report centred on the challenge of globalization, identifying rapid volatile growth and rising inequality as two potentially destabilizing consequences of the changes in the global economy. The need for the cooperative management of global affairs, a broader range of actors and new, more flexible tools is the core of Annan’s message. These include informal transnational networks of state and non-state actors focused around specific issues, global partnerships between international institutions and private business actors, and greater use of new technologies. The UN’s role in these ‘coalitions for change’, according to Annan, is that of a convenor and consensus builder rather than a director.

The Secretary-General remained unapologetic about his human security-based approach, which had prompted controversy in the debate over humanitarian intervention in 1999. He acknowledged the difficulty of balancing legitimate sovereignty concerns with individual human rights but insisted that: ‘In essence the problem is one of responsibility: in circumstances in which universally accepted human rights are being violated on a massive scale we have a responsibility to act’. To encourage the spread of norms based on the concept of universal human rights, the UN made 25 existing multilateral treaties avail-

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3 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization (note 2).
able to states during the summit in order to encourage them to sign, ratify or accede to them.4

The Millennium Declaration adopted at the end of the summit called for global policies and measures and set deadlines for a range of collective actions directed at development and the eradication of poverty as well as environmental protection, good governance and special attention to Africa.5 The very breadth of the declaration, however, raised immediate questions as to its potential for implementation. The UN Secretariat and agencies, for their part, sought to put in place an individual rights-based framework for peace and security. Examples in 2000 included the focus of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the problem of internally displaced persons and the need for international action to address their lack of rights and safeguards; the work of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) with UN peacekeeping bodies to integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into peace operations; and the increased emphasis on the role and rights of women and children, especially in conflict.6

The Brahimi Report

The climax of the Millennium Summit was the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.7 This report, known as the Brahimi Report after Lakhdar Brahimi, chair of the high-level panel established by the Secretary-General in March 2000, is the most comprehensive and practically oriented review of UN peace operations yet undertaken. It built directly on the findings of the 1999 Srebrenica and Rwanda reports.8 With approximately 58,000 peacekeeping personnel now deployed in 15 operations (see figure 2.1), the need for serious UN reform has never been so evident.

The 10-member panel criticized the UN for deploying peacekeeping operations in situations that were not ready for post-conflict operations and then subsequently trying to create such environments. It queried the UN’s cherished self-perception of impartiality, arguing that ‘No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor’. UN forces, it insisted, must have sufficiently robust mandates to defend themselves successfully and, where mandated, protect civilians. The repeated failure of the UN member states to equip peacekeepers adequately in terms of mandate, funds, personnel and equipment was also highlighted.

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Figure 2.1. Statistics on UN peacekeeping operations in 1990–2000

Notes: Cost figures are approximate and based on annualized costs of UN operations. Note that the cost of UN operations in 2000 is estimated at $2.6–3.0 billion. Email from Wasantha Bandarage, Information Officer, United Nations. The lower figure is represented here.

Source: Based on information from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1999 and 2000.
The Brahimi Report’s recommendations on peacekeeping included changes to the decision-making process. The Secretariat would first undertake a needs assessment of a potential operation to obtain a realistic view of what must be included in an authorizing resolution. The subsequent Security Council resolution should remain in draft form until the Secretary-General confirmed that sufficient troop and other commitments have been received from UN member states. Moreover, planning should include worst-case scenarios from the outset and attention to exit strategies. A wide range of practical reforms were listed, including: capacity for information-gathering and analysis at UN headquarters; substantial development of the stand-by arrangements system to permit more rapid deployment of troops; the creation of national and pooled databases of civilian experts, especially police officers, civil administrators and legal experts; and improved planning capacity throughout the UN system through the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces.

The report also drew attention to the increased significance of post-conflict peace-building in UN operations and the need for the UN to strengthen its permanent capacity in this regard. It called *inter alia* for a more strategic approach to peace-building; a focus on flexible ‘quick impact projects’ in the initial post-conflict phase; and a doctrinal shift in the use of police and rule of law elements in peace operations.

The report sets an ambitious target for UN peacekeeping reform. It is not utopian and its recommendations take account of the reality of member states’ reluctance to provide the UN with permanent peacekeeping forces and resources. Indeed, it reflects many of the criticisms voiced by states such as the United Kingdom and the United States. This facilitated the discussion of the report by the heads of state of the Security Council members on 7 September—a meeting which resulted in a resolution pledging to enhance the UN’s effectiveness in dealing with all stages of conflict. The Secretary-General kept up the momentum for change, presenting on 20 October a detailed report on the steps already taken and those needed to implement the panel’s recommendations. He admitted that this would cost money: a separate report on the financial and budgetary implications of the Brahimi Report requested $7.5 million from the regular budget for July 2000–June 2001, and an additional $14.675 million from the peacekeeping Support Account. The total estimated amount required in the two years 2002–2003 is $71 million. However, as Annan pointed out, these figures represent less than 0.5 per cent of the current regular budget and 1.5 per cent of current peacekeeping cost levels.

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The Security Council and its specially created Working Group have also responded expeditiously. A resolution adopted on 13 November agreed to give future operations clear, credible and achievable mandates which when necessary include deterrent credibility. The Security Council also discussed the issue of the closure of operations and the importance of ensuring a smooth transition from the conflict to the post-conflict phase of an operation. The General Assembly has proved less enthusiastic, out of resentment at perceived Western dominance of the reform process, reluctance to support changes that might facilitate a more interventionist norm, and fear that UN development budgets might be affected by the costs of peacekeeping reform. The decision of the Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to request a comprehensive review of the ‘management, structure, recruitment processes and inter-relationships of all relevant elements within the Secretariat’ is likely to prove an impediment to reform efforts in the first half of 2001.

The Security Council

The Security Council made an effort to recover its authority in the maintenance of international peace and security in 2000 after the divisions created by NATO’s unauthorized intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In so doing, the 5 permanent and 10 elected members made progress in adopting new working methods. Yet the patchy success of a more disciplined Security Council in fulfilling its UN Charter mandate to negotiate the peaceful settlement of disputes and respond to threats to or breaches of peace and acts of aggression illustrated the enormity of this task. It also highlighted the vulnerability of the Security Council and the risk of loss of prestige when it becomes directly engaged in a conflict.

Security Council missions

A mission to Indonesia in September 1999 was the first time the Security Council had sent a delegation to a conflict zone to bring its influence to bear on a crisis. This initiative was followed up by four missions in 2000, each of which had the two-fold purpose of assessing the progress of a complex UN operation and securing greater cooperation with peace efforts from the parties involved. In a less direct way, such visits also allow New York-based diplomats to gain a more realistic appreciation of a conflict situation. The first mission, an eight-member Security Council delegation to Kosovo on 27–30 April, was the least successful, after Chinese and Russian representatives made an unscheduled prior visit to the President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, an indicted war criminal. The other permanent members (France,

17 The delegation followed an invitation by the then Special Representative in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner. United Nations, Report of the Security Council Mission on the implementation of Security
the UK and the USA) were not represented on the delegation. Despite these divisions, the delegation’s tour of the province enabled it to get a first-hand view of the work of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the complexities of the continued inter-ethnic violence. This helped to moderate Russian claims that the mission was violating Yugoslav sovereignty by giving Kosovo the trappings of statehood and failing to adequately protect the province’s Serb minority. In departing, the group declared that it would recommend to the Security Council the continuation of UNMIK’s operations and an increase in its police and civilian staff.

The second mission, a more coherent one, was to the DRC from 2 to 8 May. It took in seven countries and reflected US efforts to give priority to Africa in the Security Council. The mission’s terms of reference focused on the conflict in the DRC and aimed to secure the ceasefire, national cooperation and regional withdrawal necessary for the full deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC. However, mounting tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia shifted attention to the Horn of Africa. The Security Council mission shuttled between the two countries in a desperate attempt to help the lead mediator, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), prevent war from breaking out. The delegation’s offer of a draft Security Council resolution calling for proximity talks failed to stop a new round of fighting. The mission, on its return to New York, claimed that its effort was ‘right from every perspective, moral, political, strategic and from the standpoint of the interests and the role of the Security Council’. The subsequent 12 May resolution, calling for an immediate end to the hostilities, followed by a Security Council arms embargo five days later, appeared to concur.

The third Security Council mission went to Sierra Leone on 7–15 October to review the UN operation there after its May crisis. It, too, emphasized the importance of the regional environment for future stability by visiting neighbouring states and the secretariat of the regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The delegation pledged UN support for the ECOWAS efforts to manage West African conflicts, particularly in Sierra Leone.
The fourth mission was that to Indonesia on 9–18 November. The repeated failure of the Indonesian Government to disarm the militia that had wreaked havoc in East Timor in 1999 and was continuing to harass refugees and aid workers in West Timor drew Security Council fury in September 2000 after the murder of three UNHCR personnel. A strongly worded resolution called on the government to take immediate steps to ensure the safety and return of East Timorese refugees, and was followed by the announcement that a mission would be dispatched to East Timor and Indonesia to assess implementation. Indonesia, insisting it would not accept intervention in its sovereign affairs and promising a reinforced campaign against the militia, forced the Security Council to delay the visit until November. Afraid that more violence would be provoked throughout the country if President Abdurrahman Wahid, who was already domestically weak, fell, the Security Council was constrained in enforcing its decision. The subsequent visit did signal the Security Council’s commitment to monitor progress actively.

Sanctions

There was also innovation in the controversial area of sanctions. On 10 March a report by an Expert Panel on Sanctions against the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) was presented by the Chairman of the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee, Robert Fowler. The examination of the breaching of sanctions imposed on UNITA was significant both in its depth and in its naming of individuals, companies and governments that had not complied with the Security Council’s directives. Moreover, it made no fewer than 39 recommendations on how the sanctions regime could be improved. Although the report provoked outrage from the countries it named (Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso and Togo) each initiated national investigations as a result. This new forthrightness was kept up in the report published in December of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to the Security Council’s July

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resolution banning trade in diamonds from and weapons to Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{33} It gave a detailed account of illicit diamond- and weapon-trading channels and, in identifying Liberia as the primary sanctions breaker, suggested that all UN members impose a travel ban on senior Liberian officials and diplomats and that a permanent focal point be established within the UN to monitor adherence to sanctions. The report echoed wider efforts to tackle the issue of ‘conflict diamonds’ at the levels of the UN, national governments and the diamond industry, and recommended a global certification scheme in order to regulate the flow of rough diamonds from producing countries.\textsuperscript{34}

Ongoing discussion of the need to improve the effectiveness of sanctions led the Security Council to establish a working group in April to undertake a policy review of sanctions. Information on violators, examination of how sanctions can be more clearly defined and tailored to specific situations, and assessment of their negative collateral effects are all included in the mandate of the working group.\textsuperscript{35} The continuing sanctions against Iraq remained at the forefront of the debate on ‘smart’ sanctions.\textsuperscript{36} Growing calls for reform of sanctions regimes, led by the UN Secretariat, did not prevent the Council from imposing broad new measures against the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan in December, demanding an end to their support of terrorists and the turning over of the indicted terrorist, Usama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{37}

\textit{Thematic discussions}

The Security Council continued to pursue thematic discussions in Secretariat-led attempts to give UN peace efforts greater coherence. Most of these centred on the humanitarian aspects of issues before the Council and underlined concerns for individual human rights over the sovereign prerogatives of nation-states.\textsuperscript{38} In particular, the rights of women and children in conflict were highlighted by a special resolution in October.\textsuperscript{39} In its second meeting dedicated to conflict prevention, in July, the Council acknowledged the importance of a coordinated response to the economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems at the root of armed conflicts—a theme echoed at the Millennium Summit and in the resolution that followed the 7 September meeting of the heads of state of the Security Council members.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{34} On efforts by the diamond industry to regulate trade, see section VI below.


\textsuperscript{36} For a discussion of UN sanctions against Iraq see chapter 7 in this volume.


New UN peace operations

The Security Council launched one new peacekeeping operation in 2000. Given the current international preoccupation with intra-state conflict and rehabilitation, the establishment of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was a reminder of the continued pertinence of ‘classic’ UN peacekeeping. A UN border-monitoring mission had already been foreseen in 1998–99 as part of the OAU-negotiated peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but it was only with the signing of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities on 18 June that serious preparations for a UN force got under way.

UNMEE’s deployment reflected efforts by the UN Secretariat to adopt some of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. The Security Council established an initial mission of up to 100 military observers to set up liaison offices in both countries and a ceasefire verification mechanism. A reconnaissance mission led by experienced officers helped the Secretariat to elaborate a report which set out in detail the tasks, personnel and logistical assets required for the operation. The Secretary-General proposed a three-phase deployment—liaison officers first, followed by the 100 military observers and, finally, a force of up to 4200 troops. In addition to monitoring the ceasefire, the position of both states’ forces and the temporary security zone (TSZ) between them, UNMEE is also charged with assisting demining activities around the TSZ and chairing the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to be established in cooperation with the OAU. An experienced Dutch Force Commander was appointed and among troops deployed is the Danish-headquartered, Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). This marks the debut of the 14-nation framework established in 1997.

In approving UNMEE, Security Council members stressed that the force did not remove the need for a comprehensive settlement and must avoid becoming a semi-permanent fixture, as had happened in Cyprus. UNMEE’s point of exit has been clearly identified as the completion of the delimitation and demarcation of the Eritrean–Ethiopian border set out in the Agreement on Cessation.

Complex peace operations

Although technically peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in Indonesia and UNMIK represent
a new type of UN peace activity in terms of substance and scope. The task is no less than the assumption of full administrative and governance responsibilities for a society, the management of post-conflict rehabilitation and, simultaneously, the construction of new political, economic and social structures. The extent of the undertaking rapidly became clear in both cases, and raises questions about the technical feasibility as well as the political desirability of international civilian administrations.

UNTAET, initiated on 25 October 1999, has a clear mandate—the building and preparation of a state for independence. This goal is supported almost unanimously by the East Timorese population and in the region by states such as Australia, China and Thailand, which actively support UNTAET. UNTAET inherited a stabilized environment from its predecessor, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), and is the sole authority managing the territory. Indonesia has relinquished its claim to East Timor and has begun to make efforts to restore relations with its former colony, which included the signing of a series of memoranda with UNTAET on cooperation in legal, judicial and human rights matters as well as border management. UNTAET operates, therefore, in a positive political climate.

Nevertheless the low level of development in East Timor and the extent of the destruction wrought by the militia in August 1999 present formidable obstacles for the UN operation, not least in terms of the financial and human resources required. Led by one of the UN’s most experienced officials, Sergio Vieira de Mello, the mission gave priority to setting up a basic legal and financial framework, adopting the US dollar as the official currency and establishing a National Consultative Council, later replaced by a larger National Council. The 33 members of the Council appointed by de Mello are led, albeit unofficially, by Xanana Gusmão, president of the pro-independence movement, the Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense (National Council of Timorese Resistance, CNRT).

Gusmão’s popularity and the country’s relative stability may explain UNTAET’s slowness in disarming and demobilizing the pro-independence guerrilla group, the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste (FALINTIL, Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor), headed

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48 Two earlier UN missions were the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in Irian Jaya in the early 1960s and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992–93.
until August by Gusmão. Debate as to whether FALINTIL, which numbers around 1000, should provide the basis for a national security force intensified in July when anti-independence militia groups in West Timor launched a new wave of violence. Clashes along the border between troops of the 9000-strong UN force and armed gangs killed two peacekeepers, injured others and halted plans to reduce UNTAET’s military component.\(^{54}\) A FALANTIL unit joined UN peacekeepers in tracking down the pro-Indonesian militia groups responsible for attacks on refugee camps and UNHCR workers.\(^{55}\)

Despite evidence of greater determination on the part of the Indonesian Government to disarm the militia, including an amnesty for the voluntary surrender of weapons and the arrest of one of its leaders, Eurico Guterres, the militia remains the most serious immediate threat to stability in East Timor.\(^{56}\) In the longer term, UNTAET’s greatest challenge is to accelerate the social and economic development of the territory so as to permit its transition to stable independence.\(^{57}\) The political framework—including plans for national elections and the creation of a constituent assembly in 2001—has so far proved an easier nut to crack.\(^{58}\)

East Timor stands in stark contrast to Kosovo, where politics, not reconstruction, threatens UNMIK’s mandate to establish an international civilian administration providing ‘substantial autonomy’ to the Kosovo population.\(^{59}\) This political tension exists on the international level, particularly among the permanent members of the Security Council; at the national level, between Kosovo and the FRY, the legal sovereign entity; and between ethnic communities within the province itself. The future status of Kosovo is the source of dispute, and the ambiguity of both UNMIK’s mandate and its authority has done little to help resolve it.\(^{60}\)

Inter-ethnic violence, mainly between the majority Albanians and minority Serbs, was the overriding problem for UNMIK and its four-pillar administration—NATO leading the international security presence; the UNHCR for humanitarian issues; the European Union (EU) for social and economic reconstruction; and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for institution-building. Although the rate of refugee return (880 000 in the 18 months since June 1999) enabled UNMIK’s humanitarian ‘pillar’ to be ended in July, it fuelled the intimidation and violence that were a daily fea-

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ture in many towns and regions throughout Kosovo. The Serb-dominated town of Mitrovica saw the worst of this fighting and remained a flashpoint throughout the year.\footnote{61}{See section III below.}

The failure of UNMIK and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to bring an end to communal fighting and restore public order, the large number of weapons in the province and the rising crime rate focused international attention on the role of UNMIK’s police component.\footnote{62}{Kozaryn, L. (American Forces Press Service), ‘Kosovo violence spotlights need for more police’, 16 Feb. 2000, URL <http://www.defenselink.mil.news/Feb2000/n02162000_20002162.html>.


In Kosovo, as in East Timor, UN civilian police have, for the first time, law enforcement authority, but staffing shortages, the absence of adequate judicial and penal frameworks and ongoing violence were serious obstacles to their carrying this out. By September 2000, after repeated emergency appeals from the head of UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner, numbers and capacity had increased, facilitating the introduction of special measures to increase the security of non-Albanian communities. KFOR retains primary responsibility for security in the most volatile regions of the province, however.

Fighting also hindered the development of UNMIK’s local administration initiative, the Joint Interim Administration Structure (JIAS), comprising the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) and the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). Moderate Serbs temporarily suspended their participation in June in protest at increased attacks on Serbs. When a Joint Understanding was signed between the Serb National Council leader, Bishop Artemije, and UNMIK on steps to enhance Serb security, the party of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leader Hashim Thaci walked out in protest.\footnote{63}{Steele, J., ‘One year on, Annan fears for Kosovo’, Guardian Weekly, 15–21 June 2000, p. 4; ‘UN mission signs compact with Kosovo Serbs’, Kosovo News Reports, 29 June 2000, URL <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news>; and United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN document S/2000/878, 18 Sep. 2000.


Vojislav Kostunica, a former constitutional lawyer, as President of the FRY on 24 September 2000 is a potentially important step for the improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the international community, and thereby the management of Kosovo’s future. Kostunica, who initially opposed the 28 October elections, declared his readiness to negotiate with Rugova while warning that the Kosovo Albanians’ drive for independence would endanger stability in the region.\(^{66}\) The Security Council, keen to assist the change of regime and create the conditions for political settlements in the FRY, expedited Yugoslavia’s admission into the UN as the first step in its international rehabilitation.\(^{67}\) It was admitted on 1 November 2000.

### Expanding peace operations

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) offered a textbook example of the weaknesses of UN peacekeeping.\(^{68}\) The mission, established in October 1999 to assist the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement between the Sierra Leone Government and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was hampered from the outset by troop shortfalls and the unwillingness of the parties, especially RUF rebels, to engage actively in peace implementation.\(^{69}\) A further blow was the decision of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone.\(^{70}\) Desperate to keep the peace process on track, the UN had little alternative but to extend UNAMSIL’s mandate to include ECOMOG’s former responsibilities for security in the capital, Freetown, and to increase the peacekeeping force from 6000 to 11 100.\(^{71}\) UNAMSIL’s task was nothing less than the single-handed provision of security for the entire country while simultaneously restructuring and reforming Sierra Leone’s armed forces and disarming and demobilizing rebels. The failure of Western countries to contribute significant resources left the operation undermanned and desperately short of equipment, especially in communications. Although the Secretary-General warned of the need for robust rules of engagement, the Chapter VII mandate enabling ‘necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of its personnel . . . and to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’ was deemed sufficient.\(^{72}\) The havoc that accompanied ECOMOG’s final departure on 2 May, with the seizure of around 500 UN peacekeepers by RUF rebels in the three days following, testified to all these shortcomings. Only the unilat-

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\(^{68}\) On the war in Sierra Leone, see chapter 1 in this volume; appendix 2B; and appendix 5F.


\(^{70}\) ECOWAS’s role in Sierra Leone is addressed in more detail in section III below.


eral intervention of 800 British troops prevented the fall of Freetown and the complete collapse of the UN operation.\textsuperscript{73}

The Secretary-General recommended the further expansion of UNAMSIL to 20 500 troops but is committed to the Brahimi Report recommendation that a Council mandate should not be issued before the feasibility of the number proposed has been ascertained. This proved difficult in 2000. Most troop-contributing states are unwilling to have their forces take part in a peace enforcement operation, while others are critical of Western refusals to commit soldiers to difficult operations.\textsuperscript{74} The UK’s military assistance to Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL reflects this: the UK refuses to put its forces under UN command.\textsuperscript{75} India and Jordan, providers of two of the largest UNAMSIL contingents, announced their decision to withdraw from the operation—in the case of India after a difficult relationship between the Indian UNAMSIL Force Commander, Major General Vijay Jetley, and his Nigerian subordinates.\textsuperscript{76} At over 12 000 troops UNAMSIL was the UN’s largest operation by the end of 2000: it is also its most troubled.

The failure of another African peace accord, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999,\textsuperscript{77} impeded the planned expansion of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The first phase of the ceasefire monitoring operation began in November 1999: in February 2000 the Security Council added 5537 military personnel to the 500 observers already authorized.\textsuperscript{78} By October only 24 troops and 218 observers had been deployed.\textsuperscript{79} The Secretary-General put the problem succinctly: ‘Only once all the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement have demonstrated genuine commitment to its terms . . . can the United Nations hope to succeed in assisting them to do so.’\textsuperscript{80} This commitment was absent throughout 2000, despite repeated Council resolutions, a special mission to the DRC, and multiple mediation efforts by the Secretary-General and his envoys.\textsuperscript{81} Continued confrontations between the belligerent parties and particularly fierce fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops created a dangerous environment for


\textsuperscript{79} Figures are available on the MONUC Internet site, URL <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monucF.htm>.


MONUC personnel, many of whom are unarmed. The greatest obstacle to deployment, however, was the DRC Government’s refusal to provide the mission with security guarantees, authorize their access to large parts of the country or provide any form of practical cooperation. Not until late August did President Laurent-Désiré Kabila finally let MONUC deploy in government-controlled areas of the vast country. Kabila’s record of bewildering policy shifts and reversals made a more cooperative relationship impossible. Hostilities continued, calling into question this difficult peacekeeping operation.

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) finally had a chance to carry out its 1978 mandate to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the border zone they had occupied for 22 years and helping the Lebanese Government re-establish its authority in the area. This followed Israel’s sudden announcement in April that it would withdraw its forces unilaterally by July 2000. In order to enable UNIFIL to facilitate and verify the withdrawal, the Secretary-General proposed the two-stage expansion of UNIFIL from 4500 to 5600 and eventually to almost 8000 troops. Although extra forces were slow to arrive, UNIFIL was able identify a line of withdrawal along the poorly demarcated border and, on 16 June, confirmed Israel’s full departure from Lebanon. The Lebanese Government prevented the force from deploying to the area until 28 July, citing continued Israeli border violations. UNIFIL is now helping the Lebanese authorities develop the physical infrastructure, security and economy of the area. It has been obliged to continue its observation and monitoring tasks since Lebanon refuses to have its army guard the border in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel. Arab–Israeli tension was reflected in popular and Hizbollah attacks along the withdrawal line on 7 October and made UNIFIL’s future role a delicate issue.

**Peace-building operations**

The Secretary-General’s February report on the role of UN peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration drew attention to the critical significance of international support in the post-conflict phase. The growing...
recognition of this is reflected in the increasing number of UN peace-building offices that seek to move beyond the immediate challenges of stabilization and rehabilitation in the aftermath of war to promote long-term sustainable peace through political, social and economic development.92

The first UN peace-building support office was established in Liberia in 1997, and a second opened in Guinea-Bissau two years later. In 2000, the Secretary-General replaced two closing UN missions, in the Central African Republic and Tajikistan, with similar offices intended to provide local actors with continued assistance in national reconciliation and development processes. One of the objectives of UN peace-building offices is to provide a framework for the gamut of UN-related activities in a specific country and promote coherence among the various UN agencies on the ground. The fragility of post-conflict states was illustrated in Guinea-Bissau in November when a coup attempt by the head of the former military junta threatened to plunge the country into crisis.93 Secretary-General Annan told a day-long Security Council meeting on the situation that ‘post-conflict peace building often fell between relief and traditional development assistance’ and that his Special Representative played a prominent role in the early stages of a post-conflict situation, for which increased funds were necessary.94

The offices mirror the work of larger peace-building missions also supervised by the UN’s Department of Political Affairs and often administered by the UN Development Programme, the UN’s ‘default organization’.95 The most significant is the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). Although 2000 was to be the final year of implementation of the 1994 peace agreement, all parties proposed to extend the process and MINUGUA’s activities. In February the General Assembly created a new peace-building mission, the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH), to replace the UN Civilian Police Mission and International Civilian Mission helping to re-establish democracy and protect human rights in the country.96 However, MICAH’s establishment was hindered by a shortage of funds and by growing instability in Haiti following a flawed and controversial presidential election.97

92 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization (note 2).
International legal mechanisms

The continuing development of international legal norms is one of the most striking and hopeful features of current international politics. The fact that norms are developing in many instances in non-traditional forums reflects the weaknesses and inefficiencies of established international legal mechanisms. The primary institution, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), based in The Hague, hears cases brought by signatory states in accordance with international law. The only new case in 2000 was the proceedings instituted by the DRC against Belgium on 17 October after a Belgian judge issued an international arrest warrant against the DRC’s acting foreign minister, Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi. The DRC claimed that the warrant for alleged grave violations of international law violated the principles of sovereignty and diplomatic immunity and requested the Court to declare for its annulment.98

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the Security Council in May 1993 to investigate and prosecute gross violations of international law on human rights by individuals in the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, also serves in this capacity on the tribunal for Rwanda. The Security Council agreed in November to expand the number of permanent judges from 14 to 16 and to establish a pool of ad litem judges to help expedite proceedings.99 The tribunal’s strategy of pursuing high-level offenders reaped dividends in 2000, largely as a result of increased cooperation from national states.

On 3 April French troops in the Stabilization Force (SFOR), previously criticized for turning a blind eye to suspects in their sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, seized Momcilo Krajsnik, former president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and the most senior political figure yet to be apprehended for war crimes.100 The newly elected government in Croatia declared its commitment to full cooperation with the tribunal and in April an ICTY investigation team began examination of mass graves in Croatia.101 This departure from previous policy was further underscored in September when the Croatian authorities arrested soldiers accused of war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. Seven army generals who had publicly attacked the government’s action were dismissed.102

The investigation of war crimes in Kosovo before and during 1999 was a prominent and controversial aspect of the ICTY’s work in 2000. After a year-long consideration of NATO’s bombing campaign, the tribunal concluded that NATO, although guilty of mistakes, had not deliberately targeted civilians or unlawful military targets and that it would not open a criminal investigation

against the alliance.103 The Prosecutor’s office confirmed in September that investigations of the KLA’s part in incidents of 1998 were going on, thus opening the possibility of war crimes indictments of Kosovo Albanian leaders.104 Carla del Ponte continued to insist on the impartiality of the tribunal in the face of Russian allegations of anti-Serb bias.105 She publicly questioned the US commitment to pursue indicted suspects and rejected any suggestion that indictments against Slobodan Milosevic be dropped either in return for his revocation of power or to help the new regime of Vojislav Kostunica.106

The FRY’s policy of non-compliance with the ICTY continued under Kostunica, who declared that judicial processes should take place under national law. The new regime did agree, however, to the re-opening of the ICTY office in Belgrade.107

Currently 39 cases are in proceedings at The Hague, with 35 indictees in detention. The ICTY has to date issued 15 sentences, none of which is for genocide.108 The tribunal’s harshest sentence yet, 45 years’ imprisonment, was handed down in March 2000 to the Bosnian Croat General Tihomir Blaskic.109

The profile of the six-year-old International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) continued to rise in 2000, facilitated in part by the release of the results of independent UN and OAU inquiries into the Rwandan genocide.110 The three trial chambers in Arusha, Tanzania, share an appeal chamber with the ICTY. The Rwanda tribunal has enjoyed more cooperation from national states than its Yugoslav counterpart in the apprehension of indicted war criminals. In February the British authorities arrested and subsequently extradited a former Rwandan army chief—the first time anyone living in Britain has been indicted by either tribunal. France made its first extradition of a former Rwandan officer to the ICTR in March.111 Rwanda, which had suspended its cooperation with the tribunal in November in protest at the release on procedural grounds of a former government official accused of genocide, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, resumed relations with the tribunal in February. This was in response to Prosecutor del Ponte’s commitment to campaign for the decision

to be overturned, a step that the court did indeed take one month later.\textsuperscript{112} Barayagwiza began trial in September, accused of inciting genocide through radio and newspaper campaigns.\textsuperscript{113}

The ICTR launched an innovative programme in Rwanda to provide the victims of genocide with legal guidance, counselling, and help in physical rehabilitation and reintegration.\textsuperscript{114} Such a restitutive justice approach suggests that international criminal justice norms could expand beyond the current focus on retributive justice for perpetrators. At the end of 2000 there were 44 detainees in the UN’s detention facility (UNDF) in Arusha. Seven judgements have so far been delivered to eight people, including three convictions for genocide and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{115}

The framework for a \textit{Special Court for Sierra Leone} was elaborated by the Secretary-General in response to a Security Council resolution in August.\textsuperscript{116} Unlike the Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals, the court will be established by agreement between the UN and the Sierra Leone Government and be based on a combination of national and international law. This hybrid arrangement aims to strengthen the government’s ability to prosecute criminals while avoiding the delays and financial costs involved in international tribunals. How financial commitment to voluntary contributions for the Special Court will be sustained remains unclear.

The proposed court will prosecute persons with ‘greatest responsibility’ for crimes against humanity—an ambiguous term partly intended to assuage the Sierra Leone Government’s initial preference for prosecuting only RUF members and focusing on leaders in the conflict.\textsuperscript{117} The temporal jurisdiction of the court will date from 30 November 1996, the date of the first peace agreement. Crucially, the amnesty clause of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement will not be recognized, on the grounds that amnesty provisions cannot apply to crimes against humanity and war crimes.\textsuperscript{118} The possible prosecution of child soldiers proved controversial: the Security Council finally agreed that children between 15 and 18 years of age at the time atrocities were committed should stand trial under special safeguards such as rehabilitation programmes.\textsuperscript{119}

The experience of war crimes tribunals in the 1990s testifies to the political, legal and financial burdens involved in the pursuit of justice after violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. This has pro-


\textsuperscript{113} The only foreigner charged by the tribunal, a Belgian-born radio journalist, was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for the same crime 3 months earlier.


\textsuperscript{115} ICTR, Status of detainees on 28 Nov. 2000, URL <http://www.ictr.org/about.htm>.


\textsuperscript{118} The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sierra Leone appended a disclaimer to the amnesty provision when he signed the Lomé Peace Agreement on behalf of the UN.

duced renewed calls for the permanent *International Criminal Court* (ICC), the statute of which was adopted by 120 states at the Rome Conference in July 1998, to be established quickly and assume responsibility for the task. However, only 27 of the 60 ratifications needed have so far been secured.\(^{120}\) The opposition of the USA, which refuses to submit its citizens to the jurisdiction of an international court, remains a significant obstacle.\(^{121}\) It is worth noting that the ICC’s founding statute provides for judicial primacy over national systems only after it is determined that the states involved are unwilling or unable to prosecute. One of the more positive trends in 2000 was the growing number of states showing willingness to take on this responsibility. Investigations of human rights abuses and/or corruption under former authoritarian leaders are under way in Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Indonesia, Nigeria, Paraguay and Uruguay, while a number of countries have moved to indict former rulers to whom they previously gave shelter in exile.\(^{122}\)

### III. Regional organizations

Considerable attention has been paid to the role of regional organizations in the prevention and management of conflict and, in the debate over the legitimacy and efficacy of humanitarian intervention, and their peacekeeping and peacemaking potential.\(^{123}\) The UN, conscious of its own limitations, has concentrated on encouraging regional organizations to act in accordance with Security Council resolutions and UN peacekeeping norms.\(^{124}\) During 2000, however, Secretary-General Annan drew attention to the role of regional actors in peace-building and the need to establish clearly defined, functional cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in this area.\(^{125}\)

#### Europe

Europe provides the most substantial example of the interweave between the UN and regional institutions, notably in the Balkans. Institutional developments during the year reflected European countries’ increased commitment to improving regional capacity for neighbourhood crisis management. Such activities raise new questions concerning the continued primacy of the UN in European peace and security and the future willingness of powerful actors in

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124 Chapter VIII, Article 53 of the UN Charter recognizes the contribution of regional organizations to peace and security maintenance under UN primacy.
Europe to become involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution where it may be most needed, namely, outside Europe’s borders.

Europe’s immediate neighbourhood, meanwhile, offered a striking example of the limitations of regional organizations in the face of powerful state actors. The OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU failed in their efforts to influence Russia’s conduct of its war against separatists in the republic of Chechnya. President Vladimir Putin refused to permit international observers to enter Chechnya except in specific, restricted circumstances and rejected calls for the establishment of an independent commission of investigation and negotiation between Moscow and Chechen rebels. Direct rule was established in Chechnya in June under an interim government. Guerrilla warfare continues in the now devastated republic amid reports of war crimes, indiscriminate arrests and inhumane detention camp conditions.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The OSCE’s claim to be the primary instrument for early warning and conflict prevention, management and post-conflict rehabilitation rests on its geographical reach and the breadth of its activities. Missions and field activities in Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media address institution- and democracy-building, as well as human rights. Since 1999 the OSCE has expanded into new areas of post-conflict rehabilitation, notably police, judicial and civil administrative training, and managing large electoral operations in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Concurrently, the OSCE has sought to improve its crisis response capacity following the decision of its 1999 Istanbul summit meeting to create Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT). The OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) is responsible for developing a standardized programme for the recruitment, training and deployment of perma-


129 See also chapter 3, section V in this volume.

nently on-call field mission personnel under the supervision of a new Operations Centre.131

The OSCE mediates in three secessionist conflicts in the CIS region, none of which made significant progress during 2000. It stepped up its efforts to end the decade-long conflict between the breakaway region of Trans-Dniester and Moldova following Russian agreement at the Istanbul summit meeting to withdraw the 2000 remaining troops of its former 14th Army from the region by 2002.132 Although OSCE mediators were careful to avoid linking the withdrawal to negotiations on Trans-Dniester’s future status within Moldova, they failed to convince the Trans-Dniester authorities of the distinction. The latter, encouraged by Putin’s creation of a new state commission on Trans-Dniester headed by former Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, turned increasingly to Russia, one of the three mediators in the conflict (along with Ukraine and the OSCE), to facilitate a settlement.133 Trans-Dniester representatives refused to participate in OSCE-held meetings on the conflict in Vienna in October.134

Although OSCE-sponsored talks between the parties to the conflict in South Ossetia continued during 2000, there was no sign of breakthrough in this, one of two secessionist conflicts on the territory of Georgia. The OSCE mission in Georgia continues to monitor the tripartite peacekeeping force (Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia) in the region. The mandate of the mission was temporarily expanded in 2000 to include monitoring by unarmed personnel of the Georgian–Chechen border. The OSCE continued to express concern at the delay in re-establishing its Assistance Group to Chechnya despite Russia’s declared agreement to an OSCE presence in the republic. Tension over the issue prevented OSCE ministers from issuing a final declaration at the end of their November Ministerial Council meeting.135

Domestic political tensions in both Armenia and Azerbaijan blocked progress in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, where the OSCE Minsk Group is co-chaired by France, Russia and the USA.136 The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Robert Kocharian and Heidar Aliyev, respectively, continued bilateral meetings, albeit with a lower profile, while OSCE mediators adopted a new strategy for confidence building focused on the resumption of economic cooperation. No substantive new proposals were introduced to resolve the

135 OSCE Chairman-in-Office Press Release, 28 Nov. 2000. See also chapter 3 in this volume.
status of Nagorno-Karabakh and mediators maintain that elements of all past proposals are open for consideration.137

The extensive OSCE operations in the states of the former Yugoslavia prompted the adoption in March of a regional strategy for South-Eastern Europe, emphasizing cross-border policies and better coordination between OSCE field missions.138 Kosovo commands a large part of the OSCE’s resources, and its efforts were repaid with the successful holding by the OSCE of the local elections on 28 October. Over 2000 police officers have passed through the OSCE-run Kosovo Police Service School since September 1999.139 Bosnia, however, provided ample reminder of the difficulties of imposing peaceful order from the outside. The OSCE was forced to organize the November general elections there after the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly refused to adopt a new permanent election law.140 It warned that this election, the sixth it had organized in the country, would be its last.141 The election was largely peaceful, but the resulting victory for the hard-line Serb and Croat nationalist parties over moderate social democratic forces was a bitter disappointment for the international community.142 The lack of cooperation between Bosnia’s different ethnic groups prompts questions as to the continued viability of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement).143

**NATO**

Operations in the Balkans remained the primary influence on the development of NATO’s crisis management and peace-support activities. While debate over the legality and efficacy of the 1999 air attacks on the FRY continued to simmer, NATO’s peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo proved equally capable of taxing international consensus and unity during 2000.144

This was particularly true in Kosovo, where the NATO-led operation of around 45 000 troops from 39 states encountered significant hurdles in its

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attempt to establish a safe and secure environment in the province.\textsuperscript{145} The greatest threat was continued inter-ethnic violence, principally directed at Serb and Roma minorities, much of it manifested through violent public demonstrations. The divided town of Mitrovica in the north-west was the site of the most serious tensions: Kosovo Serb and Albanian residents clashed repeatedly. The first outbreak of violence occurred in response to a rocket attack on a bus transporting Kosovo Serbs on 3 February, and by mid-March at least 11 people, including one KFOR soldier, had been killed. KFOR troops attempting to quell the violence came under attack from both sides. Albanian residents targeted French soldiers, accusing them of favouring Serbs, while US troops came under attack from angry Serbs for alleged pro-Albanian bias.\textsuperscript{146} Elsewhere Russian troops were singled out by Albanians for alleged partisanship.\textsuperscript{147} An emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 25 February sought to reaffirm solidarity, which had been shaken by the management of the situation, and to increase troop commitments.\textsuperscript{148} Although KFOR finally managed to restore an uneasy calm in Mitrovica by cordonning off areas on both sides of the bridge dividing the town and creating ‘confidence zones’, Albanians and Serbs continued to exert control on their respective sides of the river Ibar.\textsuperscript{149} Much of KFOR’s day-to-day work in the province remains the provision of security and services to Kosovo Serb communities.\textsuperscript{150}

The challenge of public security has prompted questions as to how a military force can and should provide peace support in a volatile civilian setting. KFOR responded by increasing the number of patrols—to over 800 by October—and placing soldiers on guard in 550 ‘sensitive’ sites such as churches and businesses.\textsuperscript{151} The shortage of UNMIK civilian police officers reinforced the centrality of KFOR multinational specialized units (MSU) for public security and search operations but raised issues of command and control between police and military components. In May UNMIK civilian police and KFOR agreed to establish joint operation centres to help coordination between them.\textsuperscript{152} KFOR is also charged with helping UNMIK establish and


\textsuperscript{147} KFOR Press Update, 27 Apr. 2000.


\textsuperscript{150} This includes targeted projects such as Operation Trojan II near the capital Pristina. KFOR Daily Press Release, 4 Oct. 2000.


supervise the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the unarmed multi-ethnic civil emergency force intended to replace the KLA. Responsibility for handling violations of the law by the 4500-strong force proved a substantial task for the first part of the year given the high number of reported incidents of weapons violations and threatening behaviour on the part of KPC personnel.153 Weapons collection has been one of the most visible of KFOR’s tasks, often through major house-to-house search operations.154

The appearance of a new Albanian guerrilla force, the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), in the east of the province led to security being reinforced along the internal Kosovo–Serbia border during the summer. This presence was maintained as a deterrent in the run-up to September’s presidential elections in Yugoslavia, and included ground and air patrols after the UCPMB attacks on Serbian security forces in the Presevo valley in November. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson took steps to reassure the new regime of Vojislav Kostunica of KFOR’s determination to combat anti-Serb and guerrilla violence.155 KFOR served as an intermediary in ceasefire talks in November between the FRY and the UCPMB, although it refused to discuss renegotiation of the 5 km-wide safety area along the internal Kosovo–Serbia border created after the end of the 1999 Kosovo conflict.156

SFOR, the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, is in the fourth year of its peace stabilization mandate. SFOR is now one-third the size of the first post-Dayton Agreement force, with 20 000 troops serving in 12 smaller battalions.157 Continued overall stability has enabled the force to concentrate on the search for and removal of weapons, inspection of weapon storage sites, demining and the arrest of indicted war criminals.158 SFOR also provides support for other international organizations, in particular the unarmed International Police Task Force (IPTF) monitoring police reform and the refugee return programmes of the UNHCR. Reaction to returnees and displaced persons remains the main source of low-level violence in the country.159

The ability to respond to two crises simultaneously is one goal of ongoing NATO reform and, towards that end, efforts to increase the number of high-readiness forces and rapidly deployable multinational headquarters available to the alliance are currently under way. Another lesson from the Balkans rein-

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155 ‘NATO/Kosovo–Yugoslavia: letter from President Kostunica. Lord Robertson reassures him that KFOR continues to provide a secure environment’, Atlantic News, no. 3248 (24 Nov. 2000).
158 SFOR Fact Sheets, URL < http://www.nato.int/sfor/>.
forcing the need for increased resource capabilities is NATO’s acknowledge-
ment that peace support operations are likely to be lengthy.160

The Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme established in 1994 and its
political forum, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), created in
1997, are also developing in line with NATO’s crisis management goals.161
Sixteen partner states, as non-NATO participants are described, are contrib-
ting forces to the SFOR and KFOR operations, and the PFP programme
focuses increasingly on developing interoperability for peacekeeping and
peace support activities.162 Moreover the PFP, involving regular regionally
organized peacekeeping and humanitarian disaster exercises, is a confidence-
building measure in its own right. Croatia marked the start of its international
political rehabilitation by becoming the newest and 27th partner of the PFP in
May.

The European Union/Western European Union

The EU continued to navigate the uncharted waters of a common security and
defence policy.163 The commitment of December 1999, agreed at the European
Council meeting in Helsinki, to establish a rapid reaction force of 60 000
troops for crisis management took shape in November 2000 when member
states pledged troops and equipment to the force. The scenarios anticipated
include peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, humanitarian assist-
tance and civilian evacuation, but do not envisage an autonomous EU crisis
management operation before 2003.164 The institutional changes under way
include the development of an EU military staff and planning capacity—a
delicate task given the presence of non-aligned states in the EU and the author-
ity of NATO. Its relationship with NATO is crucial to this capacity develop-
ment, and its efforts to establish a permanent mechanism for the use of NATO
assets in EU-led operations have been blocked by Turkey.165 The Western
European Union (WEU), hitherto the defence arm of the EU, was formally
incorporated into the EU at the Nice European Council in December and with
it responsibility for the WEU’s two operations, the Demining Assistance

nato.int/doc/update/2000/1108/e.htm>; and ‘NATO/Military Committee: reform of force structure’,
161 For the memberships of the PFP and the EAPC, see the glossary in this volume.
162 NATO Press Release M-EAPC (2000)62, 9 June 2000; and Hill, L. ‘NATO seeks to enhance part-
ner participation’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 Nov. 2000, p. 3.
163 See also chapter 3, sections III and IV in this volume.
164 Council of the European Union–General Affairs/Defense, ‘Military capabilities commitment decla-
ration’, Press release no. 13427/2/00, Brussels, 20 Nov. 2000, URL <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/
LoadDoc.cfm?MAX=1&DIC=!!!&BID=75&DID=63995&GRP=2957&LANG=1> ; Norman, P., ‘EU
rapid reaction force set at 60,000’, Financial Times, 18–19 Nov. 2000, p. 2; and Mackenzie, C., ‘Chiefs
165 ‘Talks held on EU and NATO joint structure’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 May 2000, p. 6; and
‘EU/DSDP/NATO: first meeting of Copsi and NATO Council with Duclos, Solana and Robertson’,
Mission (WEUDAM) to Croatia and the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) for Albania.\textsuperscript{166}

For some states, the EU’s core competence lies not so much in military as in civilian crisis management given that it is primarily an economic actor. Plans for the development of a non-military capacity, especially the development of an EU police force as well as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and electoral assistance, are already under way. EU member states agreed in June to provide up to 5000 police officers to international missions while the European Commission proposed the establishment of a civilian ‘rapid-reaction facility’ to provide crisis prevention and management in emergencies, including demining and electoral assistance.\textsuperscript{167}

These developments raise far-reaching questions for the nature and scope of the EU’s foreign and security policies. The geographic focus of future EU crisis management remains ambiguous and has raised some fears that European emphasis on managing stability in its neighbourhood will diminish its engagement in other parts of the world, particularly Africa.\textsuperscript{168} Another question is the balance of power between the EU’s new institutions—especially the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—national governments and the supranational European Commission.\textsuperscript{169} Finally, it is still unclear how far EU states are prepared to provide the financial and personnel resources necessary to create a credible crisis response mechanism.

The Balkans remained the EU’s primary policy concern. The 1999 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe offered the states of the former Yugoslavia for the first time a perspective of EU integration—Europe’s most successful conflict prevention mechanism. Although the EU, which has provided some $16.5 billion to the region since 1991, committed substantial funds to the envisaged regional infrastructure and private business schemes, it acknowledged in March that the pact was not proceeding as well as might be hoped.\textsuperscript{170} EU leaders agreed to increase funding to the region and to speed up its aid-delivery processes.\textsuperscript{171} It was political transformations, however, that provided the biggest impetus to EU assistance to the Balkans—in February the establishment of a moderate regime in Croatia which favoured integration into international institutions, and then in October the fall from power of Slobodan Milosevic in the FRY. The EU responded by lifting the sanctions imposed on

\textsuperscript{166} WEUDAM has been an EU-tasked and -funded project from the start, MAPE having been brought under the EU framework in 1999.


\textsuperscript{169} Solana was a visible actor in international crises throughout the year, enabling the EU to be represented for the first time at a Middle East negotiation at the Sharm-el Sheikh summit meeting in Nov.


the FRY in 1998 and extending its assistance programmes to the country.\textsuperscript{172} A special EU–Balkan Summit in Zagreb in November agreed new diplomatic and economic support measures to encourage regional economic cooperation, the development of civil society and the start of the process towards EU membership through association agreements.\textsuperscript{173}

\textit{The Council of Europe}

The Council of Europe, unusually, stoked controversy in April when its Parliamentary Assembly suspended the voting rights of its Russian delegation in censure of human rights violations in Chechnya.\textsuperscript{174} However, the Council’s Committee of Ministers did not carry out its threat to suspend Russia’s membership after Russia agreed to implement recommendations made by the Council’s Commissioner for Human Rights, who visited Chechnya in March. Five experts from the Council of Europe Secretariat help staff the newly established Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring human and civil rights and freedoms in the Chechen Republic.\textsuperscript{175} Russia maintained its refusal to open talks with Chechen rebels on a political settlement.\textsuperscript{176} Its new human rights body did not begin investigation of war crimes in 2000.

\textit{The Commonwealth of Independent States}

The security identity of the CIS moved further away from that of peacekeeper and closer to that of a traditional collective security organization between 6 of the 12 members in 2000. In October Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan agreed new arrangements to revitalize the 1992 Collective Security Treaty (Tashkent Treaty), including legal procedures for the deployment of troops from one member state to another for joint action against military aggression.\textsuperscript{177} Violent attacks by armed Islamic fundamentalists in Central Asia during the late summer provided a vital impetus: radicals belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and believed to be operating from camps in Tajikistan launched a series of armed incursions

\textsuperscript{172} ‘EU/Serbia: Council lifts sanctions against Belgrade and decides to provide economic support to FRY’, \textit{Atlantic News}, no. 3237 (12 Oct. 2000), pp. 4–5.


into neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{178} Emergency meetings of the Central Asian and Russian leaders to discuss the crisis produced general agreement on military cooperation but little substantive collective effort.\textsuperscript{179}

The war in Afghanistan was identified as the primary source of instability by CIS states after Taliban forces in July began a new offensive against the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA, also known as the Northern Alliance) in the 10 per cent of Afghan territory that remained outside their control. Reinforcements were added to the Russian border troops already based along the Afghan–Tajik frontier, and Russia warned in October that it would uphold its obligations under the Tashkent Treaty if Taliban forces stationed near the Tajik border crossed into Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{180}

The mandate of the seven-year-old CIS collective peacekeeping force in Tajikistan expired in September. The Government of Tajikistan and (later) CIS defence ministers declared that implementation of the 1997 General Agreement on Peace and National Accord had progressed sufficiently to permit the withdrawal of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force.\textsuperscript{181} Russian border guards remain in substantial numbers in Tajikistan, directing the greater part of their efforts at drug trafficking along the Afghan–Tajik border. A bilateral agreement in July paved the way for the establishment of a permanent Russian military base in Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{182}

The CIS foreign ministers extended the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the breakaway republic of Abkhazia in Georgia—a Russian force of up to 3000 soldiers—for another year in June.\textsuperscript{183} Increasing crime led the CIS force to introduce daily armoured patrols in areas along the Abkhaz–Georgian


border during the harvest season. However, the agreement signed by Georgia and Russia at the OSCE Istanbul summit meeting in November 1999 under which Russia was to close down two of its four bases in Georgia by 2001, remained a source of uncertainty as one of those designated to close is located in Gudauta in Abkhazia and Abkhaz leaders warn that the departure of the Russian peacekeepers would reignite the conflict. Russia is a facilitator in the peace process led by the UN Special Representative for Georgia, Dieter Boden, which made some progress on the drafting of a peace agreement and guarantees for the prevention of hostilities. There was no progress on the central issue—the definition of the future status of Abkhazia within Georgia.

Africa

Regional organizations failed Africa in 2000. For all the declarations of intent to engage in management of the continent’s conflicts, the principal regional organizations made little progress either in developing institutional capacity or in successfully addressing ongoing wars. Most originated as economic and development cooperative ventures and only belatedly acknowledged the impossibility of ignoring conflicts between and within member states. African countries argue that they lack the necessary financial and technical resources for regional conflict management and, often rightly, accuse the UN and Western governments of failing to offer adequate support. At the same time, Africa’s regional bodies remain hamstrung by their member states, many of which invoke the principle of sovereignty in order to prevent regional organizations from engaging while failing to respect the same principle in their national policies. The fact that the majority of current African leaders came to or remain in power by non-democratic means further undermines the credibility of regional organizations as promoters of peace and democracy.

The Organization of African Unity

The OAU, the only pan-African institution, remained the focal organization for UN and Western partnership efforts. Its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and its Peace Fund have so far failed to develop into powerful instruments, not least because of divisions among its 53 member states. UN Secretary-General Annan did not shrink from crit-

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icizing African leaders at the OAU summit meeting in July for their failure to invest in policies to promote peace and development.\(^\text{188}\)

The OAU’s efforts to facilitate an end to the vicious conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia illustrated the limitations of external mediation when warring parties perceive the possibility of victory through fighting. The OAU has led peace efforts since the breakout of war in May 1998 and was responsible for the first two steps towards a negotiated settlement signed by both parties, the 1999 Framework Agreement and Modalities for Implementation.\(^\text{189}\)

The OAU Envoy, Algerian Ahmed Ouyahia, supported by the UN, US and EU special envoys, used a lull in the fighting to convene proximity talks in April 2000 on a third document, the Technical Arrangements for the Modalities.\(^\text{190}\) Ethiopia objected to this document on the basis that it did not specify a full return to the *status quo ante* of 6 May 1998. It was clear, however, that its foot-dragging was intended to maximize its increasing superiority in the conflict.\(^\text{191}\)

On 12 May 2000 Ethiopia launched a new attack along the border, driving Eritrean forces from the disputed territory they had seized two years before. The OAU Chairman, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, travelled to both capitals on 24–26 May and secured commitments for a new round of talks in Algiers.\(^\text{192}\) Ethiopia declared an end to its attack on 31 May, two days into the talks, and on 18 June the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities proposed by the OAU was signed.\(^\text{193}\)

The peace agreement provides for the redeployment of both sides to their 1998 positions and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force under OAU auspices along a 25-km buffer zone in Eritrean territory. Only upon full UN deployment will Ethiopia withdraw from this area. This falls short of earlier OAU drafts, which included a procedure for border demarcation and mechanisms to assess the war’s socio-economic consequences. Eritrea can claim success in securing a UN peacekeeping force to monitor the border, rather than the OAU military observer mission initially envisaged (and preferred by Ethiopia) but the settlement reflects, above all, Ethiopia’s victories in battle.\(^\text{194}\)

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190 Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 189).


The OAU, through President Bouteflika, then led the post-ceasefire negotiations for a comprehensive settlement. These culminated in a peace agreement on 12 December. However, its position in the post-conflict process is increasingly secondary to that of the UN. The peace agreement provides for an OAU-supervised independent investigation into the origins of the conflict and a neutral border demarcation commission administered by the UN.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo offered an equally stark example of the difficulty of peacemaking in the absence of a will for peace. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 1999 gave the OAU responsibility for the establishment of an interim monitoring body, the Joint Military Commission (JMC), to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire until the UN peacekeeping force was deployed. Progress on operationalizing the JMC was slow, however, partly because of a lack of resources but more importantly because of ongoing violence. The OAU was also charged with appointing a facilitator for reconciliation talks, nominating former Botswanan President Ketumile Masire to the post, only to have him rejected by Kabila. Although the OAU, along with the UN and the JMC, cajoled the warring sides to agree on a new ceasefire on 8 April, no further progress was made towards peace talks before the end of 2000. President Kabila’s belief that his forces could overturn earlier gains by rebel groups after their backers, Rwanda and Uganda, began fighting each other was a central obstacle. Kabila’s allies (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) failed to persuade him at a regional summit meeting in August to break any new ground.

The OAU reacted angrily to events in the Indian Ocean tri-island state of Comoros, where it had been responsible for brokering peace between separatists on the island of Anjouan and the government—in the Antananarivo Agreement of 23 April 1999. The OAU had already withdrawn its observer mission following a military coup in May 1999. Despite its continued media-
tion efforts, both sides rejected the peace agreement. In February 2000 the OAU brought in sanctions against Anjouan in response to a referendum organized by the separatist leadership endorsing the breakaway. It rejected the 26 August peace deal signed between the military junta and the separatists, which gives each island control of most of its affairs, dispatching an assessment mission to explore a possible military intervention in Anjouan just prior to the signing.

The organization was also frustrated by the military coup in Côte d’Ivoire in December 1999. Declarations by the junta leader, General Robert Guei, that he intended to stay in power only long enough to organize democratic elections encouraged the OAU not to act on its 1999 decision to refuse membership to countries whose leaders seize power illegally. The situation in West Africa’s hitherto most stable and prosperous country looked very different by August, with army unrest, growing violence and repression, when General Guei announced his intention to stand in presidential elections scheduled for 22 October. The OAU tried to ease tensions by mandating a committee of seven heads of state to travel to Côte d’Ivoire on 24 September with a proposal for a transitional council of representatives to be established and the election delayed, to allow time for tensions to ease. Guei rejected this and declared himself president before counting of the controversial vote was completed. Civilian protests swept his rival, Laurent Gbagbo, to power two days later, the first time a popular uprising has successfully overthrown a military regime in Africa. The OAU called on Gbagbo to hold new elections to help end fighting between supporters of rival candidates.

The Economic Community of West African States

The 25th anniversary of the founding of ECOWAS was marked by the conclusion of its one remaining peace operation. The withdrawal of ECOMOG forces from Sierra Leone began a month after the conclusion of the Lomé

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206 The decision was made during the OAU’s 35th summit meeting in July 1999.
Peace Agreement in July 1999 when Nigeria, the principal contributor to the 15,000-strong force, announced its intention to end the financially draining operation. The other main participants, Ghana and Guinea, expressed a similar desire despite UN appeals for a continued regional peacekeeping presence. ECOMOG agreed to put off the departure of its last 5000 troops until the UNAMSIL force reached full strength. A number of Ghanaian and Nigerian former ECOMOG troops were also incorporated into the UN force.

The final withdrawal from Sierra Leone on 2 May introduced a new level of crisis. RUF combatants turned on UNAMSIL and seized 500 UN troops in the space of five days. ECOWAS heads of state held an emergency summit meeting on 9 May to discuss the situation and approved Liberian President Charles Taylor’s mediation in the hostage crisis. A subsequent meeting of ECOWAS defence ministers and chiefs of staff agreed to the immediate deployment of 3000 more troops and called for UNAMSIL’s mandate to be changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. ECOWAS did not oppose the UN Secretary-General’s determination to maintain UNAMSIL as the single peacekeeping presence, a decision influenced by persistent reports of mistreatment of civilians, malpractice and corruption on the part of ECOMOG soldiers. The vociferous opposition of the RUF rebels to ECOMOG was another factor.

ECOWAS plays a central role in parallel diplomatic efforts to resolve the Sierra Leone crisis, maintaining that the framework provided by the Lomé Peace Agreement offers the best means to achieve this. ECOWAS’ influence (or, more accurately, that of one of its member states, Liberia) with the RUF makes it a crucial element in the coordination mechanism established in September between the UN, ECOWAS and the Sierra Leone Government.

The regional effects of the Sierra Leone conflict led ECOWAS to mediate in border crises between Guinea and its Liberian and Sierra Leonean neighbours. Guinea, flooded by almost 500,000 refugees from both countries, responded to increased cross-border rebel raids in September by closing its borders, rounding up suspects and publicly blaming refugees for harbouring rebels. The President of Mali, Omar Alpha Konare, currently ECOWAS chairman, held talks to ease tensions with leaders from all three countries and secured agreement for an ECOWAS military observer mission to be deployed along their

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common borders. The ECOWAS summit meeting in December put in motion plans for the deployment of 1676 armed military observers along the three common borders. Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal all agreed to contribute troops.

A new ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, comprising defence and foreign ministers, met regularly during the year while a Defence and Security Commission, made up of chiefs of defence staff and government officials, held its inaugural meeting in July. A US military delegation visited the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria, in October and underscored the US commitment to deploy US Army Special Forces to Nigeria to train Nigerian, Ghanaian and Senegalese battalions for regional peacekeeping duties.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), established in 1996, brings together East African states in a similar economic integration initiative. Conflicts between its seven members have prevented IGAD from developing into an active regional organization or elaborating a conflict management capacity. Nevertheless, mediation initiatives in the civil wars in Sudan and indirectly in Somalia give IGAD an international profile.

The progress made by IGAD in 1999 to resolve Sudan’s 17-year civil war stalled in 2000, despite the agreement of the Islamist government and the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in July 1999 to IGAD’s Declaration of Principles (DOP). A central provision of the DOP is a referendum on unity in the south of the country. The IGAD Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya, held three rounds of inconclusive talks on religion in the state (the majority population in the south demands a secular state, while the government insists that the Muslim north must be free to maintain Islamic law) and autonomy arrangements for the south. The breakdown of the fragile ceasefire in May ended the talks, the SPLM/A boycotting them in protest at government bomb attacks. IGAD talks resumed when a ceasefire was


219 For a discussion of the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms see appendix 5F in this volume.


221 For the membership of IGAD see the glossary in this volume.

re-established in September; however, continued fighting on the ground challenges the participants’ commitment to negotiate an end to the conflict.223

IGAD’s lack of success comes despite the increased interest of both sides, which are weakened by internal splits, in engaging in a peace process, and despite political and financial support from Western states, administered through the IGAD Partners Forum.224 The alternative joint peace initiative of Egypt and Libya is an important factor in explaining this failure. Both countries oppose the IGAD idea of a referendum that could lead to Sudan breaking up and have proposed instead a comprehensive reconciliation conference in Khartoum, an approach favoured by President Omar al-Bashir’s government.225 Egypt and Libya also used their influence with the government and the principal northern opposition grouping, the National Democratic Alliance, to facilitate agreement between them in September to hold direct negotiations for the first time.226

IGAD’s engagement in the Somali peace process during 2000 was primarily that of supporting the peace initiative launched in 1999 by its then chairman, Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Gelleh.227 The proposal to end the clan-based factional fighting that had left Somalia without a central government for almost a decade bypassed Somalia’s warlords to focus on civil society. The central element was the convening of a Somali National Peace Conference in Djibouti on 2 May 2000, which over 2000 elders, traditional leaders and representatives of civil society attended for over two months of discussions.228 Although the UN, the Arab League, the OAU, IGAD and the EU officially backed the conference, a low-key approach was deliberately adopted during the first phase of the talks.229 Djibouti financed almost the entire initial costs, with subsequent support primarily from Arab League countries. The strongest opposition came from the leaders of the breakaway republic of Somaliland and

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the regional government of Puntland in the Somali north-east as well as a number of Mogadishu-based warlords, notably Hussein Aideed. On 16 July conference delegates agreed a Transitional National Charter, providing for a three-year, federally organized government and a national assembly elected on a clan basis. The transitional parliament was inaugurated in Djibouti on 13 August and elected Abdulkassim Salad Hassan as interim president. A new government was formed in October. Public support, including that of clan leaders, business interests and the Islamic courts, remains the strongest ground for optimism for this peace process. The influence of the Somali warlords has declined, although their violent opposition remains the most immediate threat. The clan basis of the transitional system may be the only current option for peace, but in the longer term it remains a challenge to the construction of a centralized state. External support is crucial: by October no official international funding had yet been provided.

The Southern African Development Community

The 14-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) made no progress in restoring its credibility as an actor in crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa during 2000. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe maintained forces in the DRC in support of the government of President Kabila, an intervention initiated in 1999 ostensibly under the framework of the SADC Allied Forces. Implementation of the agreement of October 1999 to reform the SADC’s institutional structures so as to prevent future unauthorized military operations in its name was postponed when Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe reneged on the plan to incorporate the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security into the SADC proper. In practice this means that Zimbabwe retains the presidency of the SADC’s security arm while the chairmanship rotates annually. Mugabe’s refusal came in spite of the other member states’ support for his controversial land redistribution policies and flawed general elections in Zimbabwe in June.

Angola welcomed the SADC’s denunciation of the opposition UNITA force and commitment to uphold international sanctions against Jonas Savimbi’s

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234 On the membership of the SADC, see the glossary in this volume.
movement. However, it firmly rejected a proposal from the then chair, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, to hold a SADC meeting on means of resolving the Angolan conflict, claiming that the matter was an internal issue. The last troops of the SADC Training Team in Lesotho, remaining after the 1998 unauthorized intervention by Botswana and South Africa under the name of the SADC, were withdrawn in May. The SADC’s Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, supported by Denmark, held a number of seminars and courses during the year.

**Asia**

Asian states maintained their well-established position of caution with regard to regional cooperation outside the economic sphere. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) made a limited move to address the changing regional environment in establishing a new body to improve its ability to respond to regional security crises. The ASEAN Troika will be an ad hoc body of present, past and future ASEAN chairs that can be activated to address a crisis on the approval of the 10 member states. This constraint, coupled with the principle that member states’ internal affairs are not the business of ASEAN, makes a change in the organization’s regional security identity very unlikely. This was demonstrated in October, when Viet Nam, currently the chair, declared that ASEAN would not interfere in ongoing political events in Myanmar (Burma), characterizing them as ‘internal affairs’.

ASEAN’s existing mechanism for security discussions is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It serves as a forum for encouraging confidence-building measures towards the stated goal of preventive diplomacy. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) was admitted to the ARF at the ministerial meeting in July. Further progress in the field of institutionalized cooperation remained scant, however. ASEAN’s cautious position on the development of a regional security role is neatly encapsulated in its approach to East Timor. ASEAN does not have a collective presence in UNTAET although a number of member states contribute significantly to the operation. The ASEAN summit meeting of July 2000 noted the importance of the mission for East Timor’s future while articulating its support for the territorial integrity and unity of Indonesia.

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239 Course calendar available at URL <http://www.rptc.org.zw>.

240 ASEAN, ‘The ASEAN troika’, URL <http://www.aseansec.org/amm/as_troika.htm>. For the membership of ASEAN, see the glossary in this volume.


242 Joint Communique of the 33rd ASEAN ministerial meeting, 24–25 July 2000, URL <http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pramm33.htm>. For the membership of the ARF see the glossary in this volume.

The Middle East

Few regional security mechanisms exist in the Middle East; most cooperative frameworks are based on a broader Arab identity. The 22-member Arab League was reactivated when Egypt and Syria called a summit meeting on 21–22 October—the first such since 1996—prompted by the violent collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. The League’s leaders renewed their solidarity in vigorous denunciation of Israeli attacks on Palestinians and Islamic sites but stopped short of collective action against Israel. The larger Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) went further at its 12 November meeting, calling on members to break off relations with Israel, although the final declaration was vague. Iran used its turn as president to initiate talks sponsored by the OIC between representatives of the warring parties in Afghanistan, the Taliban and the UIFSA. Two rounds of talks, held in Jeddah in March and May, made no progress on a workable peace plan before the seasonal renewal of fierce fighting in north-eastern Afghanistan.

Latin America

The Organization of American States (OAS) is the principal regional organization in the Americas undertaking peace and security activities. Its focus on democracy promotion through electoral observation moved in the direction of greater political engagement in member states’ domestic politics in 2000, albeit as a way of avoiding serious clashes with the states concerned. The OAS was the main observer of Haiti’s parliamentary elections in May but suspended its observation before the second ballot over the government’s vote-counting process. It subsequently returned to lead talks between the government and the opposition in the run-up to November’s presidential and senatorial elections.

There was a similar pattern in Peru, where OAS observers withdrew before the 28 May presidential elections, claiming that the conditions for a fair vote had not been put in place. Despite the organization’s 1991 resolution to expel members that fail to follow democratic procedures, the OAS did not ostracize...
Peru after the uncontested victory of President Alberto Fujimori. Instead it dispatched a democracy-strengthening mission headed by the Canadian foreign minister and the OAS Secretary-General, César Gaviria.249 The mission presented a 29-point proposal in July centring on electoral reform, judicial and press independence, and civilian control of military and intelligence services. An OAS office was established in the capital, Lima, to mediate in talks between the government and opposition groups.250 The transitional government appointed after Fujimori’s surprise departure in November remained committed to holding the April 2001 elections agreed during these discussions.251

The OAS continued its mediation efforts in border demarcation disputes between Honduras and Nicaragua and between Guatemala and Belize in 2000. These failed to prevent Honduras and Nicaragua from resolving to take their dispute to the ICJ.252 The OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy administers demining assistance programmes in Central America and in June agreed to undertake mine-clearing along the Ecuadorian–Peruvian border.253

IV. Multinational coalitions

Ad hoc multinational coalitions have been discussed as a promising future tool for peacekeeping and crisis management in the future given their flexibility and capacity for swift action. States jealous of their sovereignty may regard the intervention of a small group of states as less intrusive than action by regional or international organizations. Yet in practice ad hoc multinational action has usually been confined to parts of the world in which regional organizations are weak or non-existent. Groups such as those led by Australia in East Timor in 1999 and the Solomon Islands in 2000 represent not so much an alternative to an existing regional institutional order as an effort to make up for its absence. In such contexts, the willingness of a particular state to provide the political leadership and resources required for collective action becomes the critical determinant of success.

The Group of Eight industrialized states (G8) has become a significant international actor through its annual summit meeting and regular meetings of foreign and finance ministers. The value of these meetings lies in signalling the commitment of powerful economic actors to the initiatives of international organizations and in elaborating new cooperative norms on a range of economic and political issues.254 This was evidenced at the annual summit meet-

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252 ‘Regional leaders seek agreement on way of resolving territorial disputes’, Latin American Caribbean and Central America Report, RC-00-05, 13 June 2000, p. 1.
ing in Japan in July, when the G8 agreed a series of practical initiatives on conflict prevention. The areas identified are small arms and light weapons, conflict and development, illicit trade in diamonds, children in armed conflict and international civil police. The G8 did not propose new mechanisms to implement these initiatives, focusing rather on members’ national policies and action within the UN and existing international organizations.

Although the G8’s Balkan profile was considerably lower than during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, G8 finance ministers met in November 2000 to review and coordinate their long-term financial assistance to the region in the wake of Milosevic’s fall from power.

Asia

A number of informal groups continue to serve as facilitators for peace processes. The UN Secretary-General and his Personal Representative in Afghanistan, Francesc Vendrell, continued efforts to invigorate the ‘Six-plus-Two’ group made up of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, along with Russia and the USA. UN officials insist that resolution of the civil war between the Taliban and the northern-based UIFSA is impossible without the commitment of neighbouring states to withhold support to combatants and their active engagement in a UN-led peace process. Although periodic meetings have been initiated and agreement was reached by foreign ministers in September to launch a regional plan to stem the flow of heroin from Afghanistan, the Six-plus-Two failed to initiate any new peace drive or to coordinate their positions on the Taliban movement.

and not regular soldiers.\textsuperscript{260} The UN Special Representative continues bilateral talks with Six-plus-Two members in an effort to build consensus among them. Concern at the Afghan conflict was also expressed by the Shanghai Forum.\textsuperscript{261}

### The South Pacific

Australia and New Zealand brokered peace negotiations on the Solomon Islands after 18 months of skirmishes between two rival ethnic militia groups climaxed in a coup on 5 June.\textsuperscript{262} An August ceasefire enabled peace talks, primarily on land disputes, to be held. The talks concluded on 15 October with the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement.\textsuperscript{263} The two brokers agreed to dispatch an international peace-monitoring team of unarmed observers and to provide economic assistance to underpin the peace process.\textsuperscript{264} In November the UN Security Council gave its support to the mission, initially comprising 49 Australian and New Zealand military and police personnel.\textsuperscript{265}

The extension of the term of the interim government on the Papua New Guinean island of Bougainville enabled the continuation of the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) established by the 1998 Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development between the government and secessionists.\textsuperscript{266} The mandate of the 295 Australian, New Zealand, Fijian and Vanuatun troop monitors includes creating and training a police force on the island.

### The Middle East

Three ad hoc monitoring missions are active in the Middle East, reflecting the extreme complexity of the Arab-Israeli situation. The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) monitors Israeli–Palestinian relations in the West Bank town which remains a flashpoint. Eighty-five observers from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey are intended to provide


\textsuperscript{261} ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 July 2000, in ‘Tajikistan: Uzbek president supports Shanghai Five on settling Afghan problem’, FBIS-SOV-2000-0705, 6 July 2000. For the membership of the Shanghai Forum see the glossary in this volume.


reassurance to the Palestinians in the city and, before the September violence, had judged the situation stable enough to downsize the mission.\textsuperscript{267} The ensuing crisis affected Hebron severely. Part of the city was placed under curfew and the TIPH delivered food and medical supplies to some 4800 trapped inhabitants.\textsuperscript{268} The five-nation \textit{Monitoring Group}, which consists of monitors from France, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the USA and has observed the Israeli–Lebanon ceasefire in southern Lebanon since 1996, continued to meet at UNIFIL headquarters during the year to consider complaints of violations from both sides of the 1996 understanding banning attacks on civilians.\textsuperscript{269} The \textit{Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai} (MFO) continues to monitor military activities along the common border in accordance with the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel.

V. State actors

\textbf{Bilateral rapprochements}

Bilateral negotiations, formerly a dominant element of conflict management, have been eclipsed by the relative decline of interstate as opposed to intra-state conflict and by the increased engagement of international organizations in peace efforts. Nevertheless, in a number of interstate conflicts bilateral rapprochement remained the single and essential medium for progress towards peace.

An historic breakthrough in relations between \textit{North Korea} and \textit{South Korea}, which have been technically at war for the past 50 years, enabled their first-ever summit meeting in Pyongyang on 13–15 June 2000, where the two countries recognized each other for the first time. The meeting was as much a testimony to the two-year-old ‘sunshine’ policy of Kim Dae-Jung, South Korean President and Nobel peace prize winner, as a reflection of North Korea’s effort to manage its protracted economic crisis. Severe food shortages have forced the world’s most isolated country to open up its relations with other states.\textsuperscript{270} Kim Dae-Jung and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed a landmark South–North Joint Declaration of five general principles acknowledging the goals of reunification, humanitarian exchanges and economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{271} This was followed up by a series of interministerial meetings, including, on 26 September, a meeting of defence ministers.\textsuperscript{272}

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The practical outcome of these meetings has so far been slow in coming. The first reunions of families divided by partition took place in August, and South Korea has honoured a joint agreement to repatriate political prisoners. Border liaison offices have reopened and the resumption of cross-border transport services is planned.\textsuperscript{273} Above all, talks have focused on the frameworks for the economic cooperation which for many observers is the principal objective of North Korea in this process.\textsuperscript{274} On military and political issues, particularly North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, there has been little movement, although North Korea appears to have dropped its traditional demand for the departure of the 37,000 US troops stationed in South Korea.\textsuperscript{275}

South Korea has encouraged the improvements in North Korea’s relations with other states in the region and with the USA as a way of facilitating the peace process without undermining its own security.\textsuperscript{276} North Korean Chairman Kim’s suggestion to Russian President Putin that North Korea might be willing to curb its nuclear missile programme in exchange for financial support to develop an industry offering commercial satellite launching services prompted a flurry of discussions between the USA and Moscow. However, a proposed visit by US President Bill Clinton did not take place after the USA rejected North Korea’s demand for payments of $1 billion per year in exchange for curbing missile exports, although both sides appear willing to continue discussions.\textsuperscript{277} The Korean rapprochement raises hopes that the hitherto unproductive Four-Party Peace Talks between the two Korean states, China and the USA, suspended in 1999, might resume.\textsuperscript{278}

A series of half-hearted peace proposals by the main protagonists did little more than demonstrate the depth of the divide between \textit{India} and \textit{Pakistan} over the disputed Himalayan state of Kashmir. In the run-up to President Clinton’s tour of the subcontinent in March, Pakistan’s military leader, General Pervez Musharraf, offered to resume bilateral talks broken off after the fighting of the summer of 1999 across the Line of Control which divides Kashmir if India recognized the rights of the predominantly Muslim popula-


India maintained its refusal to talk to Pakistan until it halts support to insurgent movements in Indian-administered Kashmir. However, India took some steps towards easing regional tensions by releasing leaders of the indigenous Kashmiri nationalist movement, Hurriyat, and, for the first time, suggesting a possible dialogue with separatist groups.

On 24 July one of the largest militant Kashmiri groups, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, announced a three-month ceasefire and offered talks with the Indian Government. However, after strong opposition from more hardline militants, mainly based in Pakistani and of Pakistani origin, the rebel group demanded that Pakistan be allowed to join the peace process. The Indian Government’s rejection of this and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s insistence that peace talks must take place within the framework of the Indian Constitution, which declares Kashmir to be a part of India, brought the ceasefire to a quick end.

Reluctance to consider any proposal that could pave the way for secession was also behind the Indian Government’s dismissal of the pro-autonomy vote by the provincial legislature in Kashmir in June. Despite this, many Indian officials acknowledge the need to address the grievances of the alienated population in a region that has the highest soldier/civilian ratio in the world. The government declared a ceasefire during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, beginning on 27 November. Rebel groups themselves are divided in their aims, some demanding Kashmir’s independence, others, including most of the biggest groups, seeking accession to Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, continues to call for international mediation in the conflict.
Facilitation by external states

A notable feature of 2000 has been the moves by a number of states, hitherto strongly opposed to external engagement in their internal conflicts, towards accepting a degree of international mediation. The length and stalemate condition of many such conflicts and the failure of the use of force to produce a final settlement are considerations for belligerents. Domestic politics and, in particular, the relative security of the governing power’s position are significant. As important, however, is the willingness of countries to engage in the conflicts of other states. Power and national interest remain central in external motivations; but external concern at the human, social and economic costs of long-running internal conflict also reflects developing international norms and is indicative of a longer-term shift from state sovereignty to basic human rights as the central precept of the international system.

The power of the United States and its frequent preference for unilateral action makes it a significant actor in conflict management in practically every corner of the world. US influence is most often brought to bear in unblocking a stalemate or defusing a crisis situation, thus opening the way for the more detailed engagement of others, either multilateral organizations or the belligerents themselves. Continued US diplomatic support of UN-sponsored proximity negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots is a cogent example.288 In the Middle East, however, the US role is quite distinct. Three decades of US-led peace efforts there shattered in September, as the worst violence in years between Palestinian protesters and the Israeli Army threatened to destroy the dividends arduously negotiated over the past decade.289

Most US attention remained focused on the Palestinian–Israeli track of the Arab–Israeli peace process, where President Clinton, his personal envoy Dennis Ross and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright launched an energetic effort to conclude a final agreement. The sense of time pressure was a consequence not only of Clinton’s last year of office but also of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s establishment of 13 September as the date for the declaration of Palestinian statehood. Protracted wrangling during the spring convinced Washington that only another of the intense peace summits that have become a feature of the Middle East process would lead to a final settlement. The USA undertook a round of shuttle talks to convince both sides to come to the USA in July.290 Two weeks of round-the-clock talks at Camp David between Arafat, Barak and Clinton, amid a strict news blackout, ended in deadlock and the US Administration, accused by some of having forced the pace of discussions too much, had to conclude the meeting without a deal.

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289 The collapse of the Middle East peace process is examined in appendix 2C.
Egypt, through the personal diplomacy of its President, Hosni Mubarak, had continued to play a crucial facilitating role in the peace process.\textsuperscript{291} It became even more central in the effort to quell renewed violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire agreed at the emergency summit meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh on 16 October 2000 did not stop further fighting. Egypt, and Mubarak personally, came under increasing pressure in efforts to persuade fellow Arab states not to break diplomatic relations with Israel.\textsuperscript{292} Outrage at the Israeli bombing of the populous Gaza strip brought Egypt to breaking-point, and on 21 November it recalled its ambassador from Israel.\textsuperscript{293} A proliferation of mediators are now engaged in efforts to end the violence spreading in an already inflamed region, including the UN Secretary-General, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, and Russian and other national envoys.\textsuperscript{294} Egypt and the USA will remain key players in a future peace process, but they are unlikely to be alone and the challenge of coordination of the complex peace process is likely to grow.

Egypt and Libya are active in efforts to resolve a number of African conflicts, notably, as mentioned above, in Sudan—a reflection of the two countries’ relative power and charismatic leaders as well as their Arab–African identity. Libya was also involved in resolving a spate of kidnappings in the Philippines, stoking controversy by its payment in August 2000 of an undisclosed ransom (estimated at about $5 million) to the Muslim rebel group, Abu Sayyaf, to secure the release of foreign hostages.\textsuperscript{295}

International support for the peace process in Colombia failed to bring closer an end to over 30 years of civil war. Although the largest leftist guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC), was given effective control of a 42 000-square kilometre demilitarized zone in late 1998, it has not yet agreed to a comprehensive ceasefire.\textsuperscript{296} Many Colombians suspect that FARC is using its control in the south of the country to establish a parallel government and maximize its drug-trafficking profits, a fear apparently confirmed in April when FARC declared the launch of a new political party, the Bolivarian

\textsuperscript{291} Buccianti, A., ‘L’Egypte retrouve un rôle pivot dans le deblocage du processus de paix’ [Egypt resumes a pivotal role in unblocking the peace process], \textit{Le Monde}, 30 Aug. 2000, p. 3.


Movement. Brutal terrorist attacks in May and FARC’s refusal to hand over a escaped guerrilla hijacker who fled to the zone in September led the government to suspend peace talks twice. Agreement on the creation of a second demilitarized zone in the north between the government and Colombia’s second rebel group, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), was thwarted by the opposition of the increasingly strong right-wing paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, AUC). The AUC demands to be included in any peace negotiations with the ELN. Although the government, assisted for the first time by diplomats from Cuba, France, Norway, Spain and Sweden as well as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisor, Jan Egeland, held exploratory talks with the ELN in Geneva in July, there was little conclusive result. External observers maintain that the two sets of talks need to converge, but territorial and resource rivalry between the ELN and FARC makes this unlikely at present.

The terror campaigns of both left- and right-wing groups were given added impetus by the government’s Plan Colombia to stem the supply of cocaine produced in the country, estimated at 90 per cent of the world total, that constitutes the main source of guerrilla funds. The aggressive strategy, which rests on a $1.3 billion aid package, mainly in the form of military equipment and training, has evoked widespread criticism for its neglect of the socio-economic root causes of drug production and the potential for widespread human rights abuse by the Colombian Army. Although President Clinton visited Colombia to demonstrate his support for Colombian President Andres Pastrana, EU states manifested their concern by reducing their aid package and directing more funds towards NGOs. Colombia’s neighbours are increasingly concerned about the spillover effects of Plan Colombia, and pointedly refrained from declaring approval at their summit meeting in September.

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along their Colombian borders against guerrilla incursions as well as refugee influxes as implementation of the Plan got under way.303

There was a brief flicker of hope for a negotiated end to the 17-year conflict in Sri Lanka between the separatist Tamil movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) based in the north-east of the island, and the government when the opposition party offered to support the devolution proposals of President Chandrika Kumaratunga.304 This opened a new opportunity for Norway in its discreet efforts to serve as an intermediary between the government and the LTTE.305 However, the LTTE’s successful seizure of communication routes and an army base at the foot of the Jaffna Peninsula in April brought a swift end to any prospect of peace. The heavy losses incurred by the army forced the government to appeal for international emergency assistance. Donations of military equipment and money to a value of $350 million, mainly from Israel, enabled the army to halt the rebel advance.306 Kumaratunga’s devolution plans, which require parliamentary support for constitutional amendment, were the most immediate casualty of the crisis, and the October parliamentary elections did not produce an overall majority for her party. The LTTE had in any case already rejected the proposals.307 The installation in October of a Prime Minister, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, who supports the influential Buddhist clergy’s hard-line approach confirmed the abandonment of peace negotiations and the pursuit of a new army offensive. Growing Sri Lankan recognition that the conflict can no longer be internally managed, and signs of Indian, Norwegian and US willingness to engage offer a slim prospect that talks to end the conflict will resume.308


Indonesia is an example of a state struggling to manage its internal conflicts unilaterally. Under the new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, it attempted to contain the implications of events in East Timor for other separatist movements while simultaneously restoring control over its police and military forces. This proved a daunting task. A government commission of inquiry into the violence in East Timor in 1999 reported in January 2000. It found evidence of an orchestrated campaign of terror by the military and their militia cohorts, and recommended the investigation of actions of senior army officials, including its then head, General Wiranto. Further action was suspended by the parliament’s decision in August to amend the constitution so as to prevent new human rights laws from applying to past actions by the security forces. International outrage at the killing of three UN workers by pro-Jakarta militia in West Timor one month later, however, forced Indonesia to make greater efforts to disarm the militia and actively pursue gang leaders.

The sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians in the southern Molucca Islands left Wahid’s government nonplussed. Over 3000 people have been killed since fighting began in 1999 and one of Wahid’s first tasks as president was to appoint Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri to lead peace efforts in the region. Fighting only intensified, however, with the arrival in May of 2000 militant Muslims trained in Java for a jihad against Moluccan Christians, despite Wahid’s orders to the security forces to prevent the rebels from leaving Java. The government called a state of emergency on Molucca in June and changed its military personnel assigned to the islands, many of whom were observed fighting alongside Muslim groups. The Indonesian Government admitted in July that it needed international help in dealing with the situation, calling for regional political support and Western financial and humanitarian assistance in the form of equipment and logistical support. Moluccan Christians, however, demand foreign intervention to halt the violence.

VI. Other players

Individuals

A number of individuals have played important roles as instigators, mediators and/or facilitators, usually at the start of a peace process or during particularly delicate moments of stalemate. The influence of a particular individual may derive from his or her relationship to one or more of the parties in a conflict, or to his or her status as an informal representative of a significant third party.

The appointment of former South African President Nelson Mandela in December 1999 as mediator in the Burundi peace process encouraged optimism in the talks which had been under way in Arusha, Tanzania since mid-1998. Mandela, unlike his predecessor, the late Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, opted for inclusive negotiations and pressed the principal armed opposition Hutu groups—the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD–FDD, National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for Defence of Democracy)—and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL, National Liberation Forces) to meet the Tutsi-dominated regime led by General Pierre Buyoya. Mandela’s ability to engage high-level international support and his firm approach, including public chastisement of Burundi’s political leaders at the 21 February opening of the talks, were the other pillars of his strategy.\(^{315}\) However, they failed to overcome the deep mistrust between the 19 parties involved in the lackluster discussions, while the rebel groups refused to join before the government halted its internationally condemned policy of rounding up the Hutu majority into ‘regroupment’ camps.\(^{316}\)

At the second plenary session, in July, Mandela presented the parties with a 100-page draft power-sharing arrangement which includes provisions for a new electoral system, reform of the Tutsi-dominated army to provide for more equal ethnic representation, and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address issues of genocide. An outline for a phased transition period to shared power was a key element.\(^{317}\) Mandela set 28 August 2000 as the deadline for signing an agreement and enlisted the support of regional leaders and US President Clinton to attend the final ceremony. However, disension among the parties on a wide range of questions proved intractable, and the final face-saving text signed by 13 of the parties provided only the bare outlines of a framework for peace.\(^{318}\) It does not include a ceasefire. The six Tutsi groups who refused to sign had all relented by 20 September, but Hutu


\(^{317}\) ‘Un fragile accord de paix sur le Burundi est signé’ [Fragile peace accord signed on Burundi], Le Monde, 30 Aug. 2000, p. 5.

rebel groups remain firmly outside the process and have added the release of political prisoners to their list of conditions for participation. An Implementation Monitoring Committee, including UN and OAU representation, was established in Arusha in October to oversee implementation of the accord even as a new surge of violence spread through Burundi. Mandela continues his facilitating role, accused of partisanship by some Tutsi and of being too forthright by many more.

Prominent individuals remained vital for the implementation of the Northern Ireland 1998 Good Friday Agreement, helping to circumvent impasses between Republican and Unionist sides. The International Independent Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) established in November 1999 and led by retired Canadian General John de Chastelain made its first report in February in which it noted the lack of progress made by the main Republican force, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), in giving up arms. This led the British Government to suspend the devolved government, the Northern Irish Executive, in order to prevent the Ulster Unionist Party leader, David Trimble, from resigning as Northern Ireland’s First Minister as he had committed himself to do if the IRA did not begin decommissioning. It was not until May that a breakthrough was made when the IRA offered to resume contact with the IICD. This did not signal a willingness to hand over arms, which for the IRA are its most crucial bargaining chip. Rather, the IRA proposed that two international inspectors, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former African National Congress (ANC) Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa, examine IRA arms caches to verify that the arms were out of use. The announcement paved the way for a Unionist return to the province’s power-sharing executive, further confirmed by a positive inspection report from Ahtisaari and Ramaphosa in June.

The reform of the Northern Ireland police force recommended by an international panel under the chairmanship of former British minister Chris Patten is another serious obstacle to the peace agreement. Unionists reject proposals aimed at making the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) more politically neutral and increasing Catholic representation in the force, seeing the issue as

a symbol of the threat to their own identity. The difficulties encountered by both Republicans and Unionists in maintaining factional unity were illustrated by increasing internecine violence in the province, forcing British soldiers back into street patrols in August for the first time since 1998.

Former US President Jimmy Carter and his institute, the Carter Center, remained engaged in peace efforts between Sudan and Uganda to resolve their border dispute and tensions over alleged sheltering of rebels. In November both parties agreed a series of steps to implement their 1999 peace agreement established under the auspices of the Carter Center.

Non-governmental organizations

Although the work of NGOs is central to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, their activities usually focus on civil society and long-term transformation of conflict situations. Humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operate under principles of strict neutrality or, in the case of Nobel peace prize-winners Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), impartiality, which inhibit them from mediating in conflicts or peace processes. Proximity to vulnerable situations makes many NGOs important contributors of early-warning information; indeed, European NGOs such as Saferworld and International Alert are spearheading the drive towards a ‘culture’ of conflict prevention.

Lobbying organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group take a rights-based approach to security and bring to international attention human rights violations by both governments and rebel movements. Apart from early-warning and peace monitoring, these NGOs serve as pressure groups on Western states and international organizations and are at the forefront of what UN Secretary-General


330 Saferworld and International Alert (note 167).

Annan calls ‘coalitions of change’. Recent campaigns against landmines, the issue of child soldiers and the establishment of an international criminal court all reflect NGO leadership.

The Comunita di Sant’Egidio (Community of Sant’Egidio) is a public association of around 30 000 Christian lay people based in Rome. It became active in conflict resolution in Mozambique’s civil war in 1992 and since then has played a discreet but significant role in multiple conflict zones. Community representatives are active in the Arusha peace process in Burundi, participating in the commission exploring army reform. Government officials and civil society representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Kosovo have participated in reconciliation meetings organized in Rome.

The United States Institute of Peace, co-sponsored by the US State Department, convened three days of intensive talks between 40 Kosovo Albanian and Serb leaders in Virginia in July 2000. In the concluding Airlie Declaration, welcomed by UNMIK and KFOR, both sides agreed to seek an end to violence, to dissolve illegitimate governing and security structures, and to respect the outcome of the October elections in Kosovo.

Financial and business actors

The World Bank defines a role for itself as a facilitator in the transition to sustainable peace and has led the international financial institutions in increasing awareness of the impact of development policies on conflict and the potential for conflict. It is involved in a wide range of partnership arrangements with UN agencies and regional organizations, notably with the EU in South-Eastern Europe, focusing on funds for infrastructure rehabilitation and economic policy advice. In addition, the bank’s Post-Conflict Unit manages a $22 million Post-Conflict Fund intended to provide quick grants for demobilization and reintegration, as well as community development programmes. A large project on the economics of crime and violence is currently under way which in June 2000 released a report on the economic causes of civil conflict and their impact for policy. Such research has drawn attention to the conflict

333 Internet site of the Community of Sant’Egidio, URL <http://www.santegidio.org.>.
335 The text of the Airlie Declaration is available on the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Internet site, URL <http://usip.org>. See also USIP, ‘Kosovo leaders agree to pact against violence’, Peacewatch, vol. 6, no. 5 (Aug. 2000).
336 The World Bank is a group comprising the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Financial Corporation (IFC) as well as associated organizations. Although it is a specialized agency of the UN, like all such bodies it is a separate autonomous organization established by intergovernmental agreement.
prevention potential of policy reform and increased aid, pointing to a possible new orientation in World Bank activities.339

The diamond industry finally bowed to the multiple campaigns of the UN, leading states (the UK in particular) and NGOs to revise its system of self-regulation so as to prevent trade in ‘conflict diamonds’. The South African company De Beers, which controls two-thirds of the world market, continued reforms begun in 1999 by agreeing to demand guarantees from buyers that they do not deal in diamonds from African conflict zones.340 In July the International Diamond Manufacturers’ Association agreed to a new certification of origin scheme and introduced a life ban for those found trading in illegal diamonds. The World Diamond Council, which held its first meeting in September, participated in international conferences organized by South Africa and the UK, and committed its members to cooperate with the UN in its efforts to cut off the major fuel of conflicts in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone.341

VII. Conclusions

The diverse prevention, management and resolution efforts reviewed in this chapter are, in large part, directed at conflicts within states. The fact that so few of these conflicts remain contained within national borders is one of the principal motivations for external engagement by international organizations, states and non-state actors.342 The human and other costs of intra-state conflicts and their resistance to swift resolution are other considerations. Yet the patchy success record of international actors raises questions as to the suitability of current patterns of international conflict management. Certainly, the norms and tools of the international community are undergoing review and adaptation: whether reforms are moving in the right direction and fast enough to enable improvement remains to be seen.

The overarching change in the international normative environment is the growing assertion that individuals and human rights lie at the heart of the international system. State sovereignty, in this perspective, is not an absolute but conditional on the manifestation of responsibility towards the population in question. This responsibility incorporates a comprehensive conception of rights, a set of positive rather than negative propositions. Moreover, with it

342 For further discussion of the international dimensions of internal conflict, see chapter 1 in this volume.
comes an acknowledgement of non-state actors and the active role they can and should play in international politics. This normative shift was manifested in 2000 in successive UN Security Council resolutions, the naming of sanctions-breaking states in Security Council reports, and attention to the linkage between economics—particularly the trade in diamonds—and conflicts, within which engagement with private business has been significant.

The corollary of a conditionality approach is that the international system of states bears a responsibility to protect individual rights where a state is unable to or is violating these rights. It is here that the debate on international intervention begins and where any semblance of consensus breaks down. The degree to which the international community has a collective duty to intervene in an intra-state crisis or conflict situation, the nature and timing of an intervention and the means to be employed continue to prove highly controversial. This lack of agreement on the implications of an individual rights-based norm is the most fundamental impediment to efforts to improve the tools of the international community for addressing conflict.

**Conflict prevention**

The imperative of conflict prevention is the most widely accepted element of an individual rights-oriented perspective. The need for comprehensive prevention was expressed in multiple forums during 2000—the UN, regional organizations such as the EU and the OAU, and economic actors such as the G8. With this has come increased emphasis on the socio-economic root causes of conflict, as the Millennium Summit declaration illustrated, and the core elements of successful prevention such as good governance and transparency. So far, however, the process of translating goals into substantive strategies has been slow. This is partly a problem of the potentially all-embracing nature of practical prevention, as Western states, the leading forces in the debate on conflict prevention, are discovering in their efforts to elaborate concrete policies. The inevitable demands of such proactive policies on resources are another impediment.

The fact that the prevention debate has been, to date, dominated by Western actors, and particularly non-state actors, makes some states reluctant to pay the issue more than lip service. Secretary-General Annan has commissioned a special report on prevention and how the UN can better address it; the report is scheduled to appear in May 2001. It is to be hoped that this can help further the elaboration of more substantive prevention policies that will also engage non-Western states and non-state actors.

**Peacekeeping and peace enforcement**

After the ignominy of the near-collapse of the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone and the failure of the NATO-led operation to enforce a stable peace in post-conflict Kosovo, it is perhaps the failures rather than the suc-
cesses of international peacekeeping that come first to mind. Yet this would be to ignore the range of peacekeeping operations that performed well under difficult conditions during 2000, such as those in East Timor and Lebanon. The new UN mission in the Horn of Africa, UNMEE, has seen one of the fastest-ever deployments of a UN peacekeeping operation. The weaknesses of international peacekeeping have provoked widespread acknowledgement of the need for reform and a general consensus that the credibility of the UN is at stake. The Brahimi Report on peacekeeping articulates this realism and, in so doing, charts the development of a new international peacekeeping norm.

Ironically, it is continued dissension over the legitimacy of intervention, whether UN-sanctioned or not, that is provoking the reform process. The Democratic Republic of the Congo testifies to every danger of unauthorized intervention and provides the strongest argument for the maintenance of the norm of non-intervention, even as it demonstrates the need for determined international engagement if the countries involved are to withdraw.

The political and resource difficulties of sustaining UN-sanctioned regional peacekeeping confirm the centrality of UN engagement. Kosovo and Sierra Leone are two, albeit different, cases in point. This recognition has provided the basis for one of the most striking new trends in peace operations, namely, international preparedness to engage in ‘robust’ peace operations. This does not reflect international consensus on coercive intervention or a willingness to intervene to enforce a settlement where none exists. It suggests, rather, a more sober international awareness of the complexity of peacemaking in intra-state conflict where the economic and political incentives for ‘spoiling’ are high.

If the Brahimi Report has articulated evolving peacekeeping norms, the debate on its implementation illustrates the distance that remains to be travelled before new or improved tools are put in place. At the close of 2000 there was little indication that states were prepared to assign significant financial resources to adapt existing UN instruments, and even less likelihood of their exploring new options for recruiting, financing and managing peace operations. The reluctance of wealthier states—notably the USA and European countries—to take on leadership roles in UN peacekeeping is a source of concern. Equally disappointing is the unwillingness of many developing states to support proposed UN internal reforms, particularly in terms of staffing structures.

The role of regional organizations in UN-led or UN-approved peacekeeping continues to be a focus for reform efforts. However, the potential for regional mechanisms to function as efficient peacekeeping and crisis management tools varies enormously from region to region. European institutions, notably the EU, are taking impressive steps towards the realization of capacity for diverse peace operations and as a consequence are becoming increasingly centred on crisis management in the neighbourhood of Europe. This makes non-European states, like the USA, even more eager to facilitate progress in African and Asian regional capacities. However, the funds so far provided to African regional organizations are unlikely to provide the basis for any substantive
improvement in standing institutional capacity. African and Asian states, meanwhile, remain divided in their views and uncertain in their commitment to regional crisis management.

**Peace-building**

The difficulty of building peace in countries ravaged by war was the starkest feature of 2000. The challenge of reconstructing, or in some cases establishing, the infrastructure and economic basis of a viable state is proving immense. Developing a functional and equitable political system is more difficult still, as examples such as Guinea-Bissau or Liberia illustrate. However, it is the depth of resistance to external efforts to reconcile divided societies that has most frustrated international peace-building. These challenges raise questions as to the feasibility of externally-led or externally-implemented peace. Continued difficult peace-building experiences could prove, in fact, the greatest threat to future peace operations.

Peace-building is also the phase of conflict management for which the international community is least equipped. Peace-building requires a broad panoply of tools many of which are not part of the classic security framework, such as judicial expertise or grass-roots activists. It demands new mechanisms for coordination at the intra-institutional level, for instance, within the different agencies of the UN, as well as between the different actors involved in peace-building operations. One positive example of the Kosovo operation has been the apparent determination of the organizations involved—the UN, the OSCE, the EU and NATO—to avoid the inter-institutional wrangling that weakened the first years of the peace operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. More work needs to be done, however, on fashioning new coordination tools to enable coherent peace-building strategies and their efficient implementation.

Equally important is the need to broaden the range of actors involved in peace-building, particularly the financial institutions, such as the World Bank, and NGOs working at local and regional levels. This requires that national governments and international organizations accept the participation of non-state actors in decision-making processes and not simply at the implementation phase.

Finally, peace-building confronts the international community with the challenge of establishing tools of measurement to assess progress in all peace support operations. These are all ambitious requirements. It is not yet evident that states and international organizations are willing to take on the challenges.