1. Major armed conflicts

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I. Introduction

The major armed conflicts in 2000 displayed characteristics that were similar to those observed for other years since the end of the cold war. The vast majority of the conflicts were intra-state rather than interstate. There were approximately equal numbers of contests for control of government and for territory. They often involved communal identity as a source of motivation. Virtually all the conflicts elicited the direct political, economic or military involvement of other states and multinational organizations. Africa and Asia continued to be the regions with the greatest number of conflicts, while the rest of the world was peaceful by comparison although not entirely at peace. This chapter reports on the actors and events of the most deadly conflicts in 2000. Appendix 1A gives a quantitative overview of the major armed conflicts since the end of the cold war.

For the purposes of this chapter, a major armed conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two or more organized armed groups, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single year and in which the incompatibility concerns control of government, territory or communal identity. This definition is more inclusive than the one which applies to the data on major armed conflicts presented in appendix 1A in that it does not require a government to be one of the parties to the conflict and takes into account conflicts that are motivated by communal identity and not clearly about control of government or territory. In both the chapter and the appendix, once a conflict has reached the threshold of 1000 deaths in a single year it continues to be recorded even if the level of violence decreases significantly. Appendix 1A continues to track residual conflicts at a very low level of violence. The conflicts reviewed in this chapter meet two criteria: they conform to the above definition of a major armed conflict, and they caused over 100 deaths in 2000.

The account of each conflict provides information on the parties to the conflict, where each is located, what the parties are fighting about and the most important events during 2000. Each account provides an estimate of the costs

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1 Table 1A.1, appendix 1A, presents data on the number of conflicts fought over government and territory for the period 1990—2000, by region.

2 The conflicts reviewed in the chapter that were motivated by communal identity and are not recorded in appendix 1A are the Hema—Lendu fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Muslim—Christian violence on the Molucca Islands, Indonesia. The conflicts covered in appendix 1A that do not appear in this chapter are those waged by the Assam separatists in India, the Mujahideen e-Khalq in Iran, the Karen rebels in Myanmar, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey, and political violence in Rwanda and Somalia.
of the conflict in human terms, as measured by the numbers of people killed and displaced by violence. Each account of an internal conflict identifies the cross-border effects and their potential for creating regional instability. In addition, the extraction and sale of natural resources are noted in cases where they play a significant role in the motives and capabilities of at least one of the actors.

The human costs of violent conflict have long been a concern for peace researchers and have been reported in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1987. In recent years, the human security dimension of conflicts has become increasingly important to national governments and international organizations. When United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in preparation for the UN Millennium Summit, he urged the member states to do more in terms of protecting people from the ravages of war. In 1999 states launched military operations in Kosovo and East Timor, at least in part out of concern for the welfare of the civilian populations there. The fate of civilians and protection of their basic human rights are frequent themes in UN Security Council debates and resolutions. This chapter’s focus on the number of people killed and displaced in each conflict provides a measure of the intensity of the violence and offers an objective assessment of whether the conflict is escalating or de-escalating. Finally, it emphasizes that violent conflict is a costly endeavour.

The frequent observation that most conflicts today are intra-state held true in 2000. However, this observation is simplistic: most intra-state conflicts do not remain confined within the borders of a single country. Nominally internal conflicts typically exhibit transnational (i.e., cross-border) characteristics, such as the outflow of refugees, the illicit international trade in natural resources and weapons, and the transit across international borders of rebel and government forces. Many of the conflicts in 2000 exhibited transnational characteristics.

This chapter examines intra-state conflicts in 14 countries. In 10 of the cases, the conflicts spilled over into neighbouring states. Three of the remaining four conflicts are in island countries, where transnational spread is possible but must overcome a natural barrier. The only interstate major armed conflicts were between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. The former conflict spilled over into neighbouring states, and the latter affected the dynamic of the Kashmiri separatist conflict that is internal to India. The transnational characteristics of intra-state conflicts are also important because they helped to sustain the conflicts and threatened the security of

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4 Whether or not their welfare was promoted by military intervention is an open question.
5 This chapter does not provide the ratio of military to civilian deaths nor take up the issue of the extent to which that ratio has changed over the past century. The available information is too sparse.
6 These 10 conflicts are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India (Kashmir), Israel, Russia (Chechnya), Sierra Leone and Sudan.
7 The 3 island countries in conflict are Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Algeria is the only country with contiguous borders where the internal conflict did not spill over into neighbouring states.
neighbouring states. Any attempt to resolve a major armed conflict or to prevent it from spreading must take into account its transnational characteristics.

The illicit trade in natural resources coming from zones of conflict was a transnational phenomenon that received considerable political attention in 2000. Conflict diamonds were the subject of three UN special investigations and at least two intergovernmental conferences.8 Oil, gold and other minerals, timber, coffee and illegal drugs provided groups and governments engaged in conflict with an impetus to continue to fight and with the financial means to do so in 7 of the 14 countries with intra-state conflicts in 2000.9 Analysis of the political economy of violent conflicts is receiving increased attention as a way to improve conflict prevention and resolution practices.10

The conflicts described in section II are divided into the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South America. Where they are applicable, the themes of transnationalism and resource extraction are substantiated. Section III highlights the major findings from this review and presents several policy and research implications.

II. Conflicts

Africa

Algeria

The hope for a new political era in Algeria faded in 2000. Rebels continued to use violence as a means of political expression. The government continued its counter-insurgency efforts and did not open the political arena to non-violent Islamic political expression. The conflict began in 1992, when the military Algerian Government banned the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) to prevent it from taking control of the government after it won a national election. Upon taking office in 1999, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika enacted the Law on Civil Concord an amnesty offer to Algerian rebels that ended on 13 January 2000. Under the offer, insurgents who laid down their

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9 These 7 countries are Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia (Aceh), Sierra Leone and Sudan.

10 The World Bank project The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence is one of the most comprehensive efforts to analyse political and economic factors that increase the risk of civil wars and violent crime in developing countries and to identify policies conducive to reducing those risks. World Bank, URL <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/index.htm>.
arms and had not committed murder, rape or bombings would be pardoned. The Arm e Islamique du Salut (AIS, Islamic Salvation Army) the armed wing of the FIS officially dissolved itself the day before the amnesty ended. The event had little effect on the level of violence since the AIS had largely respected a ceasefire since November 1997. The FIS is still illegal, and there is no sign that the government will allow a strong Islamic force to participate.

The Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group) did not accept the government’s offer because it viewed the Law on Civil Concord as a police measure and because blood crimes were not pardoned. Several smaller groups also refused the amnesty offer, the most notable of which is the Jamiiyyat al Islamiyya Da wa wal Jihad (variously translated as the Islamic Group for Mission and Holy War or the Islamic Group for Call and Combat).

Six days after the amnesty offer expired, the government followed through on its threat to launch a military offensive against the remaining rebels, who were thought to number at least 1500 and possibly 3000. As has been true throughout the conflict, the fighting occurred in the northern part of the country, north of the Sahara desert, where most of the population lives. Assaults on the GIA about 150 kilometres south-west of Algiers and on Da wa wal Jihad near Algiers constituted some of the fiercest fighting in years. The fighting between government troops and rebels continued inconclusively throughout the year. Although the level of violence did not return to that of the period 1992—98, a new spate of civilian massacres, primarily by the GIA, showed no sign of abating. At least 200 deaths a month were reported during the first half of the year; later in the year the number increased to about 300 a month. The official and widely accepted figure for the number of people killed since 1992 is 100,000, the vast majority of them civilians, out of a population of about 30 million. Almost all the violence occurs in rural mountainous areas outside of urban centres, removing one possible incentive for the country’s elite to try to end the conflict. The conflict has had a minimal regional impact so far, but in 2000 the GIA extended its area of operations to the Tunisian border.

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14 In French, the group is known as Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) or Group Salafiyyste de Da wa et Djihad (GSDJ). Burns, J., Campaign to end Algerian civil war sets off fierce fighting, *International Herald Tribune*, 26 Jan. 2000, p. 2; International Crisis Group (note 13), p. 1; and Boutef rides his luck (note 12).
16 Burns (note 14); and Boutef rides his luck (note 12).
18 Burns (note 14); The Bouteflika paradox (note 15); and International Crisis Group (note 13), p. 1.
Fighting in Angola continued throughout 2000, with the government of President Jos É Eduardo dos Santos gaining significant military and political advantage over the rebel movement União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), led by Jonas Savimbi. After surprising military successes during the last months of 1999 that reversed rebel advances, the Forças Armadas de Angola (FAA, Angolan Armed Forces) controlled most of the country at the beginning of 2000, including most of the southern border with Namibia and most of UNITA's former bases. The FAA slowly consolidated its control throughout the year. UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor on Africa Ibrahim Bambari told the Security Council in July that the government controlled over 92% of Angolan territory and that more than 11,000 rebels had laid down their arms. In the same month, the government claimed that it controlled most of the diamond-rich Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces in the north-east, from which UNITA had previously sustained its war effort through illegal diamond mining and trade. The government's successes in 2000 can also be attributed to UNITA's loss of conventional warfare capacity in 1999, disrupted UNITA supply lines in Namibia and Zambia, rebel supply difficulties resulting from international sanctions and the FAA's recent ability to intercept the rebels' communications.

UNITA returned to guerrilla tactics early in the year in response to the success of the FAA offensive, which the government claimed had destroyed 80% of the rebels' conventional war capacity. Their military operations during 2000 consisted of hit-and-run attacks on military locations and raids on civilian locations in an attempt to get supplies. The rebels clearly were on the defensive throughout the year. Nevertheless, they reportedly inflicted hundreds of casualties on government troops. By October the military situation had reached a stalemate. At the end of the year UNITA recaptured a diamond mining centre in northern Malange province.

Extraction of natural resources plays a central role in the Angolan civil war. Angolan diamonds are of the highest quality in the world. Since 1992 UNITA has sold an estimated $3.7 billion worth of diamonds. The UN Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, known as the Fowler Report, stated that diamonds played a uniquely important role for the rebels by enabling them to buy weapons and fuel and to acquire external supporters. The UN Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions noted that UNITA’s ability to procure arms and fuel diminished significantly in 2000, but it urged continued vigilant sanctions implementation to prevent the lure of diamonds from enabling UNITA to reinforce itself with the assistance of arms dealers.

Petroleum also provides an incentive and the means to continue fighting. All of Angola’s oilfields are in government-controlled areas and most of the revenue goes to prosecuting the war and sustaining the elite. Virtually none of it is spent on infrastructure or services for the population. There is widespread speculation that government officials personally profit from oil revenues.

The human costs of the 25-year war are high. Out of a population of about 12 million, the war has cost approximately 500,000 lives and displaced more than 25 per cent of Angola’s population. At the beginning of 2000 there were an estimated 2 million internally displaced persons in Angola, and about 42 per cent of the children under five years of age were severely or moderately underweight. The malnutrition rate in the African countries which are not at war is far lower. Continued fighting led to an increased estimate in August of more than 2.7 million displaced persons, with large movements occurring in many parts of the country. At the end of 2000 the UN noted improvements in humanitarian conditions in areas controlled by the government but also noted that displacement, killing and severe health problems persisted in areas where fighting continued.

The conflict could become even more costly as refugees and military operations cross into Namibia to the south and into Zambia to the east. Namibian President Sam Nujoma allowed the Angolan Army and Air Force to use Namibian territory to launch attacks into Angola beginning in November 1999. Since then, UNITA raids into Namibia have increased, provoking military responses from the Namibian Government to launch attacks into Angola beginning in November 1999. Since then, UNITA raids into Namibia have increased, provoking military responses from the Namibian Government that have involved Namibian public's demands.
troops operating inside Angola. The danger of escalation is particularly high in the Caprivi Strip, where there is already a militant separatist group. Zambian border areas have suffered attacks by UNITA rebels who are under pressure in Angola’s Moxico province. Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, who is widely seen as dos Santos’ silent ally, said that the Zambian military would act against UNITA in Zambia but would remain neutral in the conflict and not allow Angolan forces to use Zambian territory. The FAA threatened to invoke the right of hot pursuit into Zambia amid Zambian denials that it was helping UNITA.

**Burundi**

The conflict in Burundi began in 1993 with the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye and continued throughout the 1996 coup that put Major Pierre Buyoya in power. In 2000 there was continued violence throughout the country while the peace talks at Arusha intensified under the new mediator, former South African President Nelson Mandela. The struggle for power is founded on the historical animosity between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis, who have dominated the government and military since colonial times. However, the conflict is not simply two-sided since rival organizations from the same ethnic group also oppose each other. The largest opposition groups continued to use violence and did not attend the Arusha talks. They were the Conseil National pour la D efense de la D ecratie—Forces pour la D ecratie de la D ecratie (CNDD—FDD, National Council for the Defence of Democracy—Forces for Defence of Democracy), which split off from the CNDD, and the Forces Nationales de Lib ration (FNL, National Liberation Forces), which split off from the Parti pour la Lib ration du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People).

Fighting persisted throughout the year, with several periods of increased rebel activity and government responses. Fighting intensified in late April around the capital Bujumbura and on the eastern border with Tanzania, prior to a visit by Mandela. In late May the government engaged in intense fight-

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43 For information on the Burundi peace process, see chapter 2 in this volume.


At the end of July and for most of August there were outbursts of violence in the south-east and around the capital, as the 28th August deadline to sign a peace agreement drew near. Fighting continued near the capital and along the Tanzanian border after most of the parties signed the peace accord. The accord did not include a general ceasefire, and the FDD and the FNL refused to sign it. In September clashes occurred in several provinces and were particularly heavy in the north-west.

Up to 200,000 people have been killed since 1993, over half of whom were civilians, out of a population of about 7 million. The most intense violence occurred in 1993. Most victims were civilians who were killed in rebel and government raids and reprisals. In June about 100,000 people were living in squalid government regroupment camps around Bujumbura, down from over 300,000 in January. The government was condemned internationally for its counter-insurgency practice of removing Hutu farmers from their land and containing them in overcrowded camps, where many died of disease. Mandela acted on the international condemnation when he demanded that the government close the camps by the end of July. The government stated on 1st August that it had nearly met the goal. Camp residents were often not able to return home because they feared for their lives. In September about 327,500 people were internally displaced, according to government figures.

Rebels have bases in Tanzania and move back and forth across the border at will. Their movements are tangled up with those of several hundred thousand refugees who have fled to Tanzania. The interplay of ethnic tensions in Burundi and Rwanda was apparent when Rwandan Hutu militiamen joined up with armed groups in Burundi. Rwandan militiamen fought for the FNL until Burundian members of the organization killed over 100 of them at the begin-

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49 IRIN-CEA, Burundi: fighting intensifies, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 37, 11—15 September 2000; and IRIN-CEA Burundi: heavy fighting continues countrywide, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 41, 7—13 October 2000.
51 Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Emptying the Hills: Regroupment in Burundi*, HRW country report, vol. 12, no. 4(A), (June 2000), section I.
53 IRIN-CEA, Burundi: more than 300,000 still internally displaced, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 38, 16—22 September 2000.
54 Old war, new mediator, *The Economist*, 22 January 2000, p. 44.
55 Human Rights Watch (note 44); and Old war, new mediator (note 54).
ning of the year. Hard-line Tutsis in Burundi reportedly recruited soldiers who had been demobilized from Rwanda’s national army to form a militia in opposition to President Buyoya’s apparent willingness to compromise at the Arusha peace talks. The Burundian military and Hutu rebel groups fight on opposite sides of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Looking further afield, the Zambian Government charged some of its own nationals with transporting arms from Zimbabwe to FDD rebels in Tanzania for use in Burundi.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since August 1998, the eastern half of the DRC has been the site of several intertwined conflicts that involve indigenous and foreign armed forces with multiple agendas. The DRC Government, under President Laurent-Désir Kabila, allied itself with several domestic paramilitary groups as well as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which sent troops to save Kabila’s regime from defeat. Angola’s military presence also allows it to attack UNITA bases and supply routes located in the DRC. The Zimbabwean Government and military have the additional objective of exploiting the DRC’s mineral and timber wealth. In opposition, Uganda supports two rebel groups the Mouvement de Libération Congolais (MLC, Congolese Liberation Movement) and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie—Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML, Congolese Rally for Democracy—Liberation Movement). Rwanda supports the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie—Goma (RCD-G, Congolese Rally for Democracy—Goma) against the government and in rivalry with the other two rebel groups. Rwanda and Uganda both pursue their own rebels within the DRC and military personnel profit from the mineral trade.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed in July and August 1999 by six governments and three rebel groups involved in the fighting, was repeatedly violated by all the parties in 2000 and did not move the parties towards peace. Localized fighting in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale, Equateur, Kasai and Katanga did not substantially change the areas under government or rebel control or advance a military resolution of the overall conflict. Throughout the year, the government controlled roughly the southwestern half of the country while rebels controlled the northeastern half. The Security Council authorized the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) up to a strength of 5537, but only 224 unarmed liaison officers and military observers were deployed.

56 IRIN-CEA, Burundi: rebel sources confirm fighting between Hutu groups, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 6, 5—11 Feb. 2000; and Human Rights Watch (note 44).
57 Human Rights Watch (note 44).
because of ceasefire violations and the lack of security guarantees. An unexpected turn of events in January 2001 gave a fresh impetus to the peace process. Laurent-Décorps Kabila was shot dead by a DRC Army officer. His son Joseph Kabila replaced him as president and immediately began a diplomatic initiative to revive the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

The most deadly violence in January and February 2000 was incidental to the conflict over control of the government. It occurred in the north-eastern Ituri region of Orientale province between members of the Hema and Lendu tribes, who have clashed over land rights in the past. The breakdown of order during the civil war, and possibly encouragement by officers in the Ugandan Army, which controls the area, led to an eruption of fighting in June 1999. By the end of February 2000, militiamen with rudimentary weapons had killed 4000—7000 people and displaced over 150,000.

Civilian massacres and military clashes occurred throughout the year in North and South Kivu provinces in eastern DRC, on the border with Burundi and Rwanda. Mayi-Mayi militiamen, indigenous to Kivu, Interahamwe militia and former members of the Rwandan Army, who arrived from Rwanda after committing genocide there, acted in loose alliance with the DRC Government to attack villages and to weaken rebel forces behind the so-called front line and for purposes of banditry. The RCD-G rebels and Rwandan Army units fought back. The violence killed hundreds of people and displaced hundreds of thousands.

Erstwhile allies Rwanda and Uganda fought pitched battles for control of strategically located Kisangani city in May. MONUC brokered an agreement to demilitarize the city but the armies engaged even more intensely in early June. Heavy use of artillery by both sides caused extensive physical damage, killed approximately 760 people and injured over 1200, about three-quarters of whom were civilians. The confrontation was grounded in disagreements about how to support the DRC rebel groups, but it appears that the spark was competition between military officers over control of a lucrative mineral trade.

62 This conflict is distinct from the DRC civil war and does not appear in appendix 1A because the government is not a party to the conflict.
and was symptomatic of the contest for supremacy between the two small but politically important countries in the middle of Africa. Both armies withdrew from the city in early August after the Rwandan and Ugandan presidents held talks.  

Kabila took advantage of the fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops and pushed back the Ugandan-supported MLC in north-eastern Equateur province from June until the end of August. The MLC reversed the tide in mid-August and recovered territory in heavy fighting. At the end of 2000 the MLC was poised to attack the eastern city of Mbandaka on the Congo River.  

DRC Government troops clashed with Rwandan troops and RCD-Goma rebels several times throughout the year in the central province of Kasai and in northern parts of southern Katanga province. Both sides were accused of planned, large-scale offensives. Angolan, Zambian and Zimbabwean troops successfully defended the Mbuji-Mayi diamond mining centre from RCD and Rwandan troops, who consider it to be a strategically important objective. However, in December the RCD-Goma captured the border town of Pweto in Katanga province in a drive to the south. Heavy fighting caused over 60,000 refugees to flee to Zambia. Several thousand DRC Government soldiers also fled to Zambia, many of whom refused to give up their weapons. Their presence threatened to draw Zambia into the DRC conflict. Zambian President Frederick Chiluba had brokered the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and was determined not to become militarily involved.  

Diamonds and other minerals in eastern DRC have enriched some of the belligerents, although not as much as Zimbabwe’s military apparently had hoped. An estimated two-thirds of the diamonds produced annually by the DRC are smuggled across borders by the government’s allies and opponents alike, and are sold in neighbouring countries. Illicit mineral extraction further adds to the regional instability that is a defining characteristic of the DRC conflict. At the end of the year there were indications that all the states with troops in the DRC were looking for a way to bring their troops home because  

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70 In Congo, war gets serious, The Economist, 23 Sep. 2000, pp. 59—60; and International Crisis Group (note 64), pp. 4—5.  
71 Fifth report of the Secretary-General (note 61), paras 30, 37; and IRIN-CEA, DRC: rebels say Kabila has launched general offensive, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 42, 14—20 Oct. 2000.  
72 In the heart of darkness, The Economist, 9 Dec. 2000, p. 29; and International Crisis Group (note 64), pp. 6—8.  
75 Harden, B., To some countries, gems bring only misery, International Herald Tribune, 7 Apr. 2000, p. 2.
they were not achieving their economic and military objectives.\textsuperscript{76} All the external parties reduced the number of their troops in 2000.\textsuperscript{77} There was no indication of such an interest on the part of the DRC rebel groups, which fractured into rival factions during the year. The militia fighting on the side of the government also showed no sign of pursuing their objectives through political means.

The violence in 2000 killed thousands of people, by far the largest proportion of them civilians, and forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes.\textsuperscript{78} In May the International Rescue Committee estimated that since 1998 the war had caused 1.7 million deaths, approximately 200,000 directly from violence and the rest from the collapse of health services and the food supply.\textsuperscript{79} Fighting in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Equateur in particular displaced more than 800,000 people during the year, raising the total number since 1998 to approximately 1.8 million. Many of them were inaccessible to humanitarian aid agencies because of the violence and the lack of transport infrastructure.\textsuperscript{80} Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International accused all the armed parties of gross abuses of human rights.\textsuperscript{81}

**Eritrea—Ethiopia**

On 6 May 1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia began one of Africa’s few interstate wars in the post-colonial era and one of the world’s deadliest conflicts in recent years. The immediate cause was a dispute over their 1000-km border, which was never fully demarcated when Eritrea peacefully seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. The underlying causes were divergent economic policies, within national economies that were heavily dependent on one another, and personal antagonism between Eritrean President Issayas Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who had been allies in a rebellion against the former Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The three main fronts in the war were at Badme in the west, Zela Ambessa-Egala in the central area and Burrie in the east.

In 1999 the countries signed two documents, known as the Framework Agreement and the Modalities, which the Organization of African Unity

\textsuperscript{76} Fifth report of the Secretary-General (note 61), paras 5—16, 40—41; and Congo-Kahasa: dropping Kabila, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 20 (13 Oct. 2000), pp. 3—5.
\textsuperscript{78} Most of the devastation is caused by small arms and light weapons. For information on the suppliers of weapons to the DRC and their motives, see appendix 5F in this volume.
\textsuperscript{79} International Rescue Committee, *Mortality in Eastern DRC: Results from Five Mortality Surveys* (International Rescue Committee: Bukavu, DRC, May 2000).
(OAU) brokered in an effort to end the conflict. The agreements led to a lull in the fighting for several months.\textsuperscript{82} The peace process stalled when Ethiopia refused to accept a third document, the Technical Arrangements, which set out the details of how to implement the first two agreements, because it did not fully guarantee a return to the \textit{status quo ante}.\textsuperscript{83}

On 12 May Ethiopian troops launched a surprise attack in the west near the contested town of Badme. At the same time, artillery exchanges took place at Zela Ambessa-Egala and Burrie. Ethiopia pressed its advantage in the west during intense combat.\textsuperscript{84} The battles pitted two conventional militaries against each other along an identified front line, in striking contrast to nearly all other conflicts in the world during the year. Both sides favoured infantry assaults on defensive trenches and barriers, accompanied by the limited use of artillery, tanks and other armoured vehicles, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.\textsuperscript{85} The two militaries also had a different relationship to the civilian population from those of rebel and government forces in the vast majority of contemporary conflicts. Rather than preying on uprooted civilians, the armies reportedly assisted them with transport and food.\textsuperscript{86}

The OAU immediately expressed its grave concern at the new fighting and urged the sides to resume negotiations.\textsuperscript{87} The UN Security Council strongly condemned the fighting, demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and imposed an arms embargo on both countries.\textsuperscript{88} The arms embargo was largely symbolic since both countries had spent the previous year and a half buying weapons and ammunition. The OAU and UN statements had no perceptible impact on the Ethiopian offensive.

Within seven days, Ethiopian troops occupied Barentu, a town 80 km inside Eritrea that had served as Eritrea’s headquarters and logistical base on the western front.\textsuperscript{89} Following successes in the west, the Ethiopian Army launched an assault on 23 May on the Zela Ambessa central front, where it was reported to have amassed 100 000 troops with tanks. The attack at Zela Ambessa proved decisive within a day.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{82} Framework Agreement for a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Annex I to Organization of African Unity (OAU), Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU under the leadership of the current chairman on the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, OAU document AHG/220(XXXVI), July 2000; and Modalities for the implementation of the Framework Agreement, Annex II to OAU document AHG/220(XXXVI).

\textsuperscript{83} Technical Arrangements for the implementation of the Framework Agreement and the Modalities, Annex III to Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82).


\textsuperscript{85} Vick, K., Ethiopia starts a new assault, claiming war’s finish is near, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 25 May 2000, pp. 1, 4; and Ethiopia s and Eritrea s forgotten war, resumed, \textit{The Economist}, 20 May 2000, pp. 57—58.

\textsuperscript{86} IRIN, Eritrea: IRIN focus on war displacement, 29 May 2000.

\textsuperscript{87} Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82), paras 17, 21—23.

\textsuperscript{88} UN Security Council Resolution 1297, 12 May 2000; and UN Security Council Resolution 1298, 17 May 2000. For information on arms embargoes in force in 2000, see chapter 5 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{89} Vick, K., Ethiopian troops celebrate a victory, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 20—21 May 2000, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{90} Vick (note 85); IRIN-CEA, Ethiopia/Eritrea: Zala Anbesa completely destroyed, IRIN news brief, 25 May 2000; and Into the hills, \textit{The Economist}, 27 May 2000, p. 49.
On 24 May the Eritrean Government announced that it would redeploy its forces to positions it held before 6 May 1999. The announcement came after a three-day visit to the Eritrean and Ethiopian capitals by the Personal Envoy of the OAU Chairman. OAU-sponsored peace talks resumed on 29 May. Both sides reported new fighting at Burrie on 3–4 June, about 70 km from the Eritrean port town of Assab. Artillery exchanges and armour-supported infantry battles continued all along the 1000-km border until 11 June.

Eritrean President Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Zenawi signed an OAU-brokered Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities on 18 June in Algiers. The interim agreement clearly reflected Ethiopia’s dominant military position. Ethiopian troops occupied the disputed regions around Badme and Burrie pending the final settlement of the border and did not have to withdraw from Eritrean territory until the arrival of UN troops. On 12 December Afwerki and Zenawi signed a formal peace agreement that established committees to demarcate the border, exchange prisoners, return displaced persons and hear war compensation claims. A UN peacekeeping force was designated to monitor the agreement. There was no timetable for any of the provisions.

The war cost two of the world’s poorest countries approximately $1 billion. Eritrea, with a population of about 3.5 million, had approximately 200,000—250,000 troops under arms in January 2000. The conflict was also costly in human terms. In January 2000 a UN Country Team estimated the number of internally displaced Eritreans at 258,300. In addition Ethiopia deported about 67,300 Eritreans. The Eritrean Relief and Refugee Commission estimated in late May that 1.5 million Eritreans had been displaced by the recent fighting and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 40,000 of them had crossed into Sudan. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) confirmed that the fighting in

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91 For information on the Eritrea—Ethiopia peace process, see chapter 2 in this volume.
92 Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82), paras 17, 28—31.
93 Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82), para. 36.
95 Despite peace pact, war rages in Horn of Africa, *International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 2000, p. 6; and Eritrea accuses Ethiopia of attack (note 94).
96 Agreement on cessation of hostilities, Annex VIII to Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82).
102 IRIN-CEA, Ethiopia/Eritrea: Eritrean Commission says 1.5 million people displaced and Sudan: 10,000 Eritrean refugees cross into Sudan in 24 hours, IRIN news brief 31 May 2000.
May had adversely affected the livelihood of one-third of the population.\textsuperscript{103} Normally, the war-affected parts of the country produce 75 per cent of Eritrea’s food. The war prevented Eritrea’s agricultural sector from responding to the drought and caused people who fled the fighting to move in to drought-stricken areas. Substantial international humanitarian assistance was the only thing that averted mass starvation.\textsuperscript{104}

Ethiopia, with a population of about 60\textquotesingle million, fielded an army of about 350,000 troops.\textsuperscript{105} The UN Country Team in Ethiopia estimated that more than 349,800 people were displaced by the conflict with Eritrea as of January 2000.\textsuperscript{106} There was no substantial addition to the Ethiopian displacement in May because the fighting took place entirely on Eritrean territory. Nor did Eritrea respond to Ethiopia’s deportation policy with a similar policy.\textsuperscript{107}

In May the Eritrean Government claimed to have killed 7,200 and wounded 18,000 Ethiopian troops in the first three days of fighting and twice that number after five days.\textsuperscript{108} Ethiopia disputed the claims but did not give any figures of its own. Throughout the war, both sides made exaggerated claims about the damage they inflicted on the other and no definitive estimates are available. It is likely that the Eritrean and Ethiopian armies both sustained a very high number of casualties in May, as they did during earlier phases of the war. In late May the US Department of State estimated 50,000—60,000 deaths during the first two years of the conflict.\textsuperscript{109} Also in late May, Eritrean President Afwerki estimated that 70,000 people had been killed.\textsuperscript{110} Other sources estimated that approximately 50,000 had died on each side.\textsuperscript{111} Since the Eritrean population is much smaller, the death toll is a much larger proportion of the population.

The war caused as many as 50,000 Eritrean refugees to flee to Sudan, primarily during the fighting in May and June 2000.\textsuperscript{112} They joined about 320,000 Eritreans already in Sudan as a result of Eritrea’s war of independence, which ended in 1991.\textsuperscript{113} The war also spilled into Somalia in 1999 and 2000. The Ethiopian Government accused Eritrea of giving weapons to Ethiopian opposition groups based in Somalia. Ethiopian troops retaliated

\textsuperscript{103} IRIN-CEA, Eritrea: OCHA report says dramatic deterioration in Eritrea, IRIN update for Horn of Africa, 3 July 2000.
\textsuperscript{104} IRIN-CEA, Horn of Africa: crisis averted but drought-affected [areas] precarious, 6 Oct. 1999.
\textsuperscript{105} Bloch (note 100).
\textsuperscript{107} IRIN-CEA, Eritrea—Ethiopia: IRIN focus on Assab, 5 June 20000.
\textsuperscript{109} IRIN-CEA (note 108).
\textsuperscript{110} Hughes, R., Eritrea agrees to pull back, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 31 May 2000, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{111} Time of reckoning (note 97); and Eritrea and Ethiopia at doubtful peace, The Economist, 24 June 2000, p. 56.
against Ethiopian insurgents in Somalia and Somali factions believed to support them.\textsuperscript{114}

\textit{Sierra Leone}

The conflict between the Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began in 1991 and continued throughout 2000, despite the Lomé Peace Agreement, signed on 7\textsuperscript{th} July 1999.\textsuperscript{115} The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) replaced the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).\textsuperscript{116} Thousands of rebels participated in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, but thousands of others engaged in ceasefire violations, reciprocal detentions of faction members and battles during the first four months of the year.\textsuperscript{117} In addition, they detained UNAMSIL soldiers and took their weapons on several occasions.\textsuperscript{118}

Had it not been for the unilaterally deployed British troops who assisted the Sierra Leone Army and UNAMSIL, RUF forces would have entered the capital Freetown, as they had done in 1999.\textsuperscript{119} The rebels continued to control most of the diamond-rich area in the east.\textsuperscript{120} At the end of the year limited numbers of rebels and militia continued to disarm. At the same time, fighting continued around several towns in the north-west and in the east along the borders with Guinea and Liberia, where the government pursued military efforts to dislodge the RUF.\textsuperscript{121}

The fighting caused the displacement of about 500,000 people, increased the incidence of starvation and infectious disease, and hindered relief operations.\textsuperscript{122} Mutilation of civilians, for which the conflict is infamous, continued

\begin{thebibliography}{122}
\bibitem{115} United Nations, Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, UN document S/1999/777, 7 July 1999, annex. For a detailed account of the war and the troubled peace process in Sierra Leone, see appendix 2B in this volume.
\bibitem{117} Appendix 5F in this volume provides information on arms transfers to Sierra Leone.
\bibitem{119} The battle for Freetown, \textit{Africa Confidential}, vol. 41, no. 10 (12 May 2000), pp. 1—2; and Freetown defenders repel rebels, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 12 May 2000, p. 4.
\bibitem{120} Sierra Leone: going east, \textit{The Economist}, 16 Sep. 2000, p. 53.
\bibitem{122} Seventh report of the Secretary-General (note 121), paras 40—44.
\end{thebibliography}
in 2000. Estimates vary widely, but it appears that over 60,000 people have been killed as a result of the conflict.

The conflict has had a transnational character from the beginning, when Charles Taylor encouraged the RUF to enter Sierra Leone from Liberia. Taylor is currently the president of Liberia, but at the time he was a rebel trying to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe. In 2000 the Liberian Government stood accused of sustaining the RUF by allowing (and profiting from) the illicit transit of diamonds from RUF-controlled areas of Sierra Leone. Although President Taylor strongly denied it, ample evidence showed that Liberia provided material support, territorial access and military advice to the RUF. Investigation by a UN-appointed panel shows that Burkina Faso also played a central role in the sanctions-breaking transshipment of diamonds from and arms to the RUF. The Burkina Faso Government denied the charge.

Fighting began to spread beyond Sierra Leone at the end of the year as RUF fighters assisted Guinean insurgents by attacking villages in Guinea and causing hundreds of civilian deaths, according to the Guinean Government. Guinea accused the Liberian Government of supporting the attacks, a charge also made by the UN Security Council. Liberia accused Guinea of backing Liberian dissidents. The two governments denied each other’s charges. Regional governments expressed grave concern at the potential for regional destabilization and ECOWAS decided in principle to deploy military observers along the borders of Guinea and Liberia.

Sudan

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), under John Garang, and other groups in southern Sudan have fought for independence from the government in Khartoum since 1983. A second dimension of opposition to the national government opened in 1989 when the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in a coup that installed a fundamentalist Islamic regime, under President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir. Northern opposition groups emerged that sought a unified country and a secular government.

125 Report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (note 8), paras 181—194, 199—218.
126 Report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (note 8), paras 198, 204—212.
130 Report of the Security Council mission to Sierra Leone (note 127), paras 34—35; and Eighth report of the Secretary-General (note 129), para. 12.
Southern and northern opposition groups formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), despite differences over the degree of southern autonomy and the proper means of opposition.131

In the second week of January 2000, the government and the SPLM/A extended their unilaterally declared humanitarian ceasefires for three months. The SPLM/A immediately accused the government of violating its ceasefire by bombing a town in the southern Equatoria region.132 Throughout the year, both sides followed a pattern of violating and then renewing their ceasefires.133 The provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal in the south-west and Upper Nile in the south-east suffered the most violence, particularly from May onward.134 The SPLM/A launched ground assaults on government-held towns and rail links.135 They made small advances northward during the year, but the areas of control in the south did not change substantially.136 The government responded primarily by bombing rebel-held towns, which it did more than 150 times.137 Many of the towns were also humanitarian aid distribution points. It appears that one of the government’s objectives is to depopulate areas where it wants to expand oil drilling fields.138 The SPLM/A has said that oil extracting areas are legitimate military targets and pledged to sabotage oil facilities.139

The biggest military change was the NDA’s use of violence in the Ashe Sharqiyyah province, east of Khartoum near the Eritrean border. From there the rebels potentially threaten road, rail and oil pipeline links to the Red Sea.140 Two events presaged the new fighting. Sudanese dissidents were forced to leave Eritrea in the wake of an Eritrean—Sudanese rapprochement and the Islamisist Umma Party left the NDA, which removed from the Alliance a

137 US Committee for Refugees, Sudan’s military bombed civilian sites 152 times last year, 23 Jan. 2001.
138 US Committee for Refugees (note 137).
139 IRIN-CEA, Sudan oil wells burning, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 22, 27 Jan.—2 Feb. 2001.
strong voice against the use of violence.\textsuperscript{141} Many of the fighters in the northern province are reportedly southerners who do not belong to the SPLM/A.\textsuperscript{142} In November the NDA briefly captured Kassala for the first time before government forces drove them out in heavy fighting.\textsuperscript{143} The army also made gains in December in the Nuba Mountains of Kordofan province in central Sudan.\textsuperscript{144}

Rival peace processes proposed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and by Egypt and Libya did not produce results in 2000.\textsuperscript{145} Distinct from these was a peace agreement between tribal militia in southern Sudan in May that appeared to end internecine fighting. Militia violence had been a major cause of the humanitarian crisis in the south since the government instigated it in the early 1980s to weaken the SPLM/A.\textsuperscript{146}

At the regional level, the conflicts in Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda tie into each other. The SPLM/A had the backing of Eritrea and Ethiopia until 1999, when the war in the Horn of Africa led Ethiopia to seek closer ties with the government in Khartoum in an effort to build alliances with Eritrea’s dissidents residing in Sudan. This caused Eritrea also to seek favour with the Sudanese Government.\textsuperscript{147} Sudan’s relationship with Eritrea remained strained in 2000 over mutual accusations of support to each other’s opposition groups.\textsuperscript{148} In December 1999 Sudan and Uganda agreed to stop harbouring each other’s rebels.\textsuperscript{149} However, both sides’ commitments to the agreement are questionable. In March Ugandan Foreign Minister Eriya Kategaya said that Uganda would continue to support the SPLM/A.\textsuperscript{150}

The costs of the war have been enormous. At least 1.9 million people died from violence, famine and disease in 1983—98.\textsuperscript{151} In 2000 the estimate of the number of people who have died from causes linked to the war was 2 million. Over 4 million people were internally displaced or refugees, constituting the largest displaced population in the world.\textsuperscript{152} UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) through Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) assist the southern population. The political and military importance of humanitarian aid was highlighted in early 2000 when the Sudan Relief and

\textsuperscript{142} Johnson (note 131), p. 69.
\textsuperscript{143} IRIN-Horn of Africa, Sudan: army claims control of Kassala, IRIN weekly round-up 10, 4–10 Nov. 2000.
\textsuperscript{145} For information on both peace processes, see chapter 2 in this volume.
\textsuperscript{146} US Agency for International Development (note 134); and Johnson (note 131), pp. 62—63, 67—68.
\textsuperscript{147} Africa’s forgotten war, \textit{The Economist}, 8 May 1999, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{152} US Committee for Refugees (note 133).
Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), an arm of the SPLM/A, imposed a memorandum of understanding on relief organizations which many NGOs said compromised their neutrality. Some NGOs withdrew but most eventually returned. The Sudanese Government also tried to control the flow of aid by insisting that all relief flights pass through Khartoum, but it soon relaxed the requirement.

Asia

Afghanistan

Fighting continued in the northern part of Afghanistan between the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA, also called the Northern Alliance), led by military chief Ahmad Shah Massoud and political head Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the Taliban, under Supreme Leader Mullah Muhammad Omar. The two groups have fought over control of the state since 1994, although the country has been at war since 1978, when the Soviet Union invaded in an attempt to ensure a pro-Moscow government. The Taliban are the acting government, in control of the capital Kabul and 90—95% per cent of the country, which they call the Emirate of Islamic Afghanistan. However, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognize them as the legitimate government. The UIFSA holds the Afghan seat at the United Nations.

Small-scale infantry, artillery and armour clashes occurred on an almost weekly basis from January until May in the northern provinces and near Kabul, as the UIFSA tried to consolidate gains it had made in 1999 and the Taliban tried to reverse them. Each battle typically caused military and civilian casualties in the range of 20—30 people. Fighting subsided in June, but 5000—7000 Taliban fighters attacked UIFSA troops on 1 and 9 July around the Bagram airbase 50 km north of Kabul. Between 200 and 400 people were killed and 500—650 wounded, about 75 per cent of them from the Taliban.


154 Sudan aid flight order, BBC News Online, 1 Aug., URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ross Mountain, Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator, rejects allegations against relief community, 1 Aug. 2000.


Despite the losses, 8000—10 000 Taliban and non-Afghan fighters launched an offensive on 28 July against the 10'000- to 15 000-strong UIFSA in provinces north of Kabul.\(^{159}\) Within days, they cut off an important UIFSA supply route from Tajikistan to the Panjshir valley, which is a stronghold of the UIFSA.\(^{160}\) This opened the way for an armoured and infantry assault on Taloqan, the last major town controlled by the UIFSA, which the Taliban captured on 6' September, with heavy losses on both sides.\(^{161}\) The UIFSA's desperate situation induced generals Abdul Rashid Dostum and Abdulmelik Khan, who were rivals of UIFSA leaders Rabbani and Massoud and resided outside Afghanistan, to rejoin military activities on the side of the UIFSA.\(^{162}\) At the beginning of 2000 there were 500'000—750'000 internally displaced Afghans and over 2.6 million refugees, almost all of whom were in Iran and Pakistan.\(^{163}\) Iran and Pakistan both claimed that they hosted nearly 2' million refugees.\(^{164}\) Fighting around Taloqan caused at least 70'000 additional people to flee, many of whom went to Pakistan but most of whom remained in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Tajikistan closed their borders, fearing destabilization and claiming that most refugees were fleeing the worst drought in 30 years, not violence.\(^{165}\)

The Afghan conflict has several transnational manifestations. Concerns that it creates instability in Central Asia centre on allegations that Pakistan materially supports the Taliban, who then provide training and support for fighters in Chechnya and Uzbekistan.\(^{166}\) In a significant departure from previous policy, the Uzbeki Government became the first of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to open bilateral talks with the Taliban. The Taliban claimed that they want friendly relations with all their neighbours.\(^{167}\) Fears of regional destabilization intensified as civilians and UIFSA

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\(^{160}\) Bashir, M., Agence France-Presse, 28 July 2000, in Afghanistan's ruling Taliban militia captures key northern town, FBIS-NES-2000-0728, 31 July 2000; and Davis, Taliban ignores UN appeal to end war (note 159).


\(^{164}\) Xinhua News Agency, Iran repatriates over 150,000 Afghan refugees, 15 Nov. 2000; and IRIN-CA, Pakistan: Afghan refugees an economic burden, official says, 14 Nov. 2000.


fled the September Taliban advance to the closed Tajik border, where Russia maintained approximately 16'000 border guards and 6592 special army troops.168

Additionally, Afghanistan is the world’s leading producer of opium, the production and trade of which provide income for the Taliban and some Central Asian insurgent groups.169 A 27 July decree by the Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, banned opium poppy cultivation, and a preliminary assessment showed a 10 per cent reduction in poppy cultivation in 2000 compared to the record large crop in 1999.170 It is important to keep in mind, however, that the drought alone could account for the reduction. Central Asian governments continued to view drug trafficking as a serious threat and stepped up efforts to stop it.171

In December Russia and the USA jointly sponsored a UN Security Council resolution that condemned the Taliban for supporting and training international terrorists and for profiting from drug trafficking. It imposed diplomatic and economic restrictions and a total arms embargo on the Taliban (but not the UIFSA).172

**India: Kashmir**

The Indian Government has fought a number of Muslim separatist groups in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989 in a conflict that has killed at least 25’000 people, according to Indian police, and maybe as many as 70’000. Most estimates are below 40’000.173 Civilians account for at least half of the deaths.174 Separatists continued throughout 2000 to detonate bombs on almost a weekly basis. Security forces responded by shooting and detaining suspected rebels, and sometimes killing suspects while they were in custody.175

The Indian Government and independent observers accuse Pakistan of training, supplying and directing the militants.176 A number of separatists are

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170 The situation in Afghanistan (note 158), paras 43, 45.


172 UN Security Council Resolution 1333, 19 Dec. 2000. For information on transfers of major and light weapons to both sides in 2000, see chapter 5 and appendix 5F in this volume.


known to have bases on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-held territory. Pakistan insists that it provides only political and moral support to the separatists. The composition of the separatist movement has changed since 1989. Hizbul Mujahideen is now the only large group dominated by Kashmiris. The two other most prominent groups, Lashkar-e-Toyeba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, are newer and are made up mainly of Afghans and Pakistanis who are more ideological and strictly Islamic. Some insurgent groups want an independent Kashmiri state; others want Kashmir to become a part of Pakistan.

A weak chance for a diplomatic breakthrough came on 24 July, when the Hizbul Mujahideen unilaterally declared a ceasefire. A wide array of violent and non-violent dissident groups criticized the unilateral action. Militants opposed to the ceasefire killed over 100 people during the first two days of August. Indian and Hizbul Mujahideen officials met once, but Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee refused the separatists’ demand to allow Pakistan to join the talks and insisted that talks take place within the framework of the Indian constitution, which identifies Kashmir as a part of India. The Hizbul Mujahideen did not accept the conditions and ended its ceasefire on 8 August after two weeks. On 19 November India unexpectedly declared a unilateral ceasefire for the month of Ramadan in an apparent effort to bring Kashmiri guerrillas to the negotiating table and isolate Pakistani-based extremist groups. Rebel groups opposed to the Indian initiative, notably Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toyeba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, continued their violent struggle.

Regular small engagements between Indian and Pakistani troops across the Line of Control raised the spectre of full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed countries in their long-running border conflict. However, an encouraging sign was Pakistan’s neutrality regarding talks between the Indian Government and rebels. Pakistan took the opportunity to call for renewed talks.

181 Bearak (note 173).
between the two countries, but India refused on the grounds that armed militants continued to cross into India from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{186} When India renewed its unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir in December, Pakistan announced the partial withdrawal of troops along the Line of Control.\textsuperscript{187}

\textit{Indonesia}

The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) has since 1976 sought an independent state in the Indonesian province of Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra. The conflict has killed over 5000 people, most of them since 1989, and generated about 70'000 refugees out of a population of 4—4.5 million.\textsuperscript{188} In 2000 the violence killed over 800 people, according to a local human rights group.\textsuperscript{189} The GAM’s violent tactics contrast with other groups’ non-violent methods and make them unpopular with most Acehnese, who often fall victim to attacks and intimidation by police, government soldiers and rebels.\textsuperscript{190} In May the GAM and the Indonesian Government agreed to their first ceasefire, from 2 June to 2 September. The government called it a humanitarian pause and did not formally recognize the rebel movement. The GAM said that it was a means to explore the possibilities of an end to the violence.\textsuperscript{191} Both sides renewed the agreement in September until 15 January 2001.\textsuperscript{192} The agreements did not stop the attacks on civilians. Civil authority weakened, the GAM attacked military and police targets, and security forces retaliated without making a careful distinction between rebels and non-rebels. The government said that 40 civilians and 21 members of the security forces died from the time the ceasefire was supposed to begin through September, but observers said that there were over 100 civilian deaths.\textsuperscript{193} By the end of the year estimates of civilian deaths since the beginning of the humanitarian pause ranged from over 240 to 400.\textsuperscript{194}

The conflict has not moved towards settlement despite Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid’s consent to the application of Islamic Sharia law in the province, one trial of soldiers for a civilian massacre, statements in 1999 about a referendum on autonomy, and promises of greater local benefit from oil and

\textsuperscript{191} Indonesia: Aceh ceasefire pact signed, \textit{Asian Defence Journal}, June 2000, p. 52; and Olson (note’188).
\textsuperscript{193} Human Rights Watch (note 192); Sims, C., Leading critic of Indonesia crackdown is slain in Aceh, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 18 Sep. 2000, p. 5; and Aglionby (note 188).
gas revenue generated in Aceh. The GAM demands independence, which Wahid has ruled out. GAM representatives did not attend planned peace talks in November because of escalating government violence and refused to meet Wahid when he briefly visited Aceh in December.

Inter-communal fighting in Indonesia’s Molucca province erupted on 19 January 1999 in the city of Ambon, apparently in response to a fight between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger. Police and military units were unable or unwilling to quell the violence, which spread over the group of islands, causing the deaths of 3000—4000 people and forcing more than 500,000 from their homes. The conflict is driven by competition for local economic and political control, which traditionally have been accompanied by patronage and corruption. Christians predominantly populated the islands until Muslims from other parts of Indonesia began to arrive 30 years ago. The population is now about half Christian and half Muslim. Members of the Muslim community, appointed by central authorities in Jakarta, now dominate the local bureaucracy. It appears that fighting is encouraged by some military officers and opposition politicians who want to weaken President Wahid.

Increased police and army presence and a presidential declaration of a state of emergency on 26 July did not stem the violence. Instead, policemen and soldiers began to join the fight, taking sides according to their religion. The conflict intensified when the Islamic militant group Laskar Jihad, based on the island of Java, sent 2000—3000 fighters to Molucca in May and June. The militants give residents the choice between converting to Islam or facing death. Government officials said that up to 2000 members of Laskar Jihad remained in Molucca in November.

The Philippines

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has fought for an independent Islamic state on the southern island of Mindanao since 1984, when it broke off

195 Ravich (note 188); Chandrasekaran, R. and Rianom A., 24 soldiers are convicted of killing Aceh villagers , International Herald Tribune, 18 May 2000, pp. 1, 6; and Indonesia’s Aceh to have Sharia law , BBC News Online, 4 Dec. 2000, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>.


200 International Crisis Group (note 198), p. 4 and fn. 2; and Human Rights Watch (note 199).

201 Aglionby (note 199); McCawley, T., Moluccas may need outside aid to stop conflict , Financial Times, 20 July 2000, p. 6; and Human Rights Watch (HRW), Indonesia must control troops , HRW press release, 29 June 2000, URL <http://www.hrw.org>.

202 Aglionby (note 199); and Human Rights Watch (note 199).

203 Agence France-Presse (note 199).
from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF ended its 25-year armed struggle in 1996. The MILF is the largest Philippine rebel group, with 12,000—15,000 armed members and much wider popular support.\textsuperscript{204} The MILF took the towns of Talayan in January and Kauswagan in March.\textsuperscript{205} Government forces responded by capturing a rebel base in February and recaptured Kauswagan in March.\textsuperscript{206} Continued clashes led to a government offensive at the end of April that pushed the rebels back from an important highway near the main MILF camp of Abu Bakar and led the MILF to withdraw from talks on 30 April.\textsuperscript{207} They called a unilateral ceasefire a week later.\textsuperscript{208} Although the peace talks, which had made little progress since they began in 1997, resumed as scheduled, the army and air force continued to overrun rebel bases.\textsuperscript{209} A brief round of talks did not lead to agreement, and on 9 July the army captured Abu Bakar.\textsuperscript{210} The fighting after March cost hundreds of lives and caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee.\textsuperscript{211} Although weakened, the MILF continued to attack military posts until the end of the year.\textsuperscript{212}

The New People’s Army (NPA) is a communist organization that has fought for a Marxist government in the Philippines since 1968. It operates on a number of islands but, with a maximum of 11,000 fighters, it is dramatically weaker than it was in the mid-1980s, at its peak strength of more than 26,000.\textsuperscript{213} Factional splits within the NPA became apparent in 1999, when one of the largest factions, on the island of Negros, agreed to disarm. In 2000 the NPA engaged in sporadic hit-and-run attacks throughout the country.\textsuperscript{214} The Philippine Army responded with attacks on rebel camps.\textsuperscript{215} The NPA and the MILF announced a loose alliance in April.\textsuperscript{216}


\textsuperscript{205} Davis, A., Philippines set for wider war (note 204).


\textsuperscript{207} In Philippines, 100,000 flee as fighting rages in south (note 204); Davis, A., MILF rebels agree to resume peace talks with Manila, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 31 May 2000, p. 14; and Davis, A., Evolution in the Philippines (note 204), p. 32.


\textsuperscript{211} The Philippines: one victory, more needed (note 210); and Rebels announce pullout (note 208).


\textsuperscript{216} Davis, Evolution in the Philippines (note 204), p. 31.
Sri Lanka

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Vellupillai Prabhakaran, have sought a separate state for the minority Tamil population in the north and east of the island country of Sri Lanka since the 1970s. The conflict turned violent in 1983 and since then has killed approximately 60,000 soldiers and civilians and displaced about 700,000.217 The LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government, led by Prime Minister Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, agreed to accept a Norwegian intermediary in February but the conflict continued unabated.218 The battles between the army and the LTTE take place in the north, well away from the capital Colombo, so the political elite does not directly feel the effects. In an attempt to increase pressure on the elite, LTTE suicide bombers attacked political and civilian targets in the capital Colombo and other cities throughout the year, killing several hundred people. Bombings were most frequent before the parliamentary elections held in October.219 Military engagements and terrorist bombs killed about 4000 soldiers and civilians in 2000.220

The LTTE, numbering about 7000 at the beginning of the year, sporadically engaged the Sri Lankan Army of about 90,000, as well as the air force and navy in January and February.221 The rebels built on their gains in the previous year when they pre-empted a planned government offensive on 26 March 2000 with a northward attack on Elephant Pass. A rebel force of 1800—3500 with superior tactics and morale drove about 10,000 army troops from the heavily defended land link between the main part of the island and the northern Jaffna Peninsula on 22 April.222 The month-long battle killed hundreds of soldiers on both sides and caused over 12,000 civilians to flee.223 The rebels captured a second government line of defence at Pallai on 30 April.224 During
May, artillery and infantry attacks by about 5000 rebels steadily pushed 30’000—35’000 government troops towards Jaffna city, at the end of the peninsula. The LTTE advance overturned previous government gains and put them in their strongest position since 1998. India stood ready to evacuate Sri Lankan forces as the LTTE approached Jaffna and shelled the airport and seaport that were the government’s main supply points.

India does not want the LTTE secessionist movement to succeed because of the precedent this would set for separatists in India. At the same time, India is constrained in its support to the Sri Lankan Government by the Tamil parties in India, which give the government a parliamentary majority, and by its intervention experience in the 1980s, when over 1000 Indian troops died. This led India to lend diplomatic support and probably secret assistance through its foreign intelligence and security services to the Sri Lankan government armed forces.

The rebel offensive stalled several kilometres from Jaffna in the face of sustained bombing by the Sri Lankan Air Force and increased army firepower purchased, and in some cases received as aid, from China, the Czech Republic, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Africa. Engagements in June, July and August stymied Norwegian mediation efforts but did not have a significant military impact. On 3 September the government launched a counter-offensive that the LTTE stopped within a day at the cost of several hundred dead fighters and several thousand displaced civilians. A second push by government forces recaptured Chavakachcheri, the peninsula’s second largest city, and escalated the conflict at the end of September. After her party maintained its parliamentary majority in October, President Kumaratunga vowed to beat the Tigers militarily. In November, repeated LTTE attacks on the Jaffna Peninsula and near the eastern city of Trincomalee
challenged her position. Then, as a consequence of the Norwegian mediation, Prabhakaran announced that the LTTE was ready for unconditional peace talks with the Sri Lankan Government. The government, distrustful of the rebels’ motives, launched a new offensive at the end of the year.

**Europe**

**Russia: Chechnya**

In the war between the Russian Government and separatist rebels in Chechnya, Russian troops began a ground assault on the capital city of Grozny in mid-December 1999, which led to its capture on 6 February 2000, after intensive artillery and aircraft bombardment and fierce block-by-block infantry fighting. Federal troops suffered up to 25 deaths per day as they advanced. The rebels sustained hundreds of casualties as they retreated towards the mountains south of the city, and it was unclear how many active fighters remained. Russian officials estimated that there were between 2000 and 7000, while Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said that 2000 rebels had escaped the city to join others already in the mountains.

Heavy fighting took place at Argun Gorge south of Grozny in early March, with casualties in the hundreds. Russian troops eventually tempered their pursuit of rebels in the mountains and attempted to control rebel movements in the rest of the republic. There were several large-scale clashes from April until the end of the year, but none prevented the development of a military stalemate. The separatists were too weak to push the federal troops back, so they launched daily hit-and-run attacks on Russian troops throughout the southern part of the republic, killing 10—20 soldiers per week, repeating the guerrilla strategy that drove the Russian military out of Chechnya in 1994.

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235 Harrison (note 220).
237 Williams (note 236).
Russian military officers tacitly admitted that their occupation did not amount to control of the territory but said that they were determined to prevail.\(^{242}\)

European and other governments urged Moscow to seek a political solution.\(^{243}\) Newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin ruled out talks with Maskhadov, whom Moscow considers a criminal, and imposed direct Kremlin rule on 8 June.\(^{244}\) To lead the administration, Putin appointed Akhmed Kadyrov, the official spiritual leader of the Chechen Muslims, who was an opponent of Russia during the previous Chechen conflict and is opposed to Islamic Wahhabism, which appears to motivate many of the rebels.\(^{245}\) In November Russian Government officials said that they expected to complete military operations in Chechnya by March 2001, after which time the Defence Ministry troops would withdraw and the Interior Ministry would re-establish constitutional order.\(^{246}\)

There were 93,000 Russian Army and Interior Ministry troops in Chechnya at the height of the war, according to official figures.\(^{247}\) The number of army troops was gradually reduced by about half during the year. Estimates of the number of Russian Army and Interior Ministry troops killed vary. The Russian General Staff said on 12 May that 2251 servicemen had died since the conflict began.\(^{248}\) By September, the government figures were nearly 3000 killed and over 6000 wounded.\(^{249}\) The protest group Association of Soldiers Mothers claimed that those numbers had been reached by January 2000.\(^{250}\)

The rebels have not provided estimates of their casualties, but Russia claimed to have killed up to 20,000 by July.\(^{251}\) During the early months of the conflict, Western governments condemned Russian artillery and aerial bombardment of population centres because it indiscriminately killed rebels and civilians alike. After the fall of Grozny, human rights groups provided evidence that Russian troops regularly killed and tortured civilians.\(^{252}\)


\(^{247}\) Thornhill (note 236).

\(^{248}\) Wines, M., Chechen rebels attack Russian unit, killing 18, *International Herald Tribune*, 12 May 2000, p. 5.


\(^{251}\) No half-peace, *The Economist*, 15 July 2000, p. 34.

denied the charges but it did not allow Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers into the republic.\textsuperscript{253}

Flows of refugees were one of the main effects of the conflict on the region. In early March, the UNHCR estimated that there were 150'000—180'000 refugees in Ingushetia.\textsuperscript{254} Continuing violence deterred them from returning home, so the number had not changed by October.\textsuperscript{255} In addition, the conflict seriously worsened relations between Georgia and Russia. Russia accused Georgia of allowing Chechen rebels to use Georgian territory and for the first time imposed visa requirements on a CIS state.\textsuperscript{256} There were also rumours that the Taliban supported the Chechen fighters, and a number of rebels captured by Russian troops admitted their foreign origins. Official support did not appear to extend beyond a Chechen embassy in Kabul.\textsuperscript{257}

The Middle East

\textit{Israel—Palestine, southern Lebanon}

The Israeli Government, led by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and the Palestinian Authority, led by Yasser Arafat, continued their long-running negotiations over Palestinian autonomy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{258} In mid-May hundreds of Palestinians and several Israeli soldiers were injured during the worst violence since 1996 on the occasion of the 52nd anniversary of the founding of Israel, an event that many Palestinians see as a catastrophe.\textsuperscript{259} In July, US President Bill Clinton brought the two leaders together at Camp David. Fifteen days of negotiations did not resolve the essential sticking point of who would have sovereign control of the holy city of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{260}

As the two sides appeared close to solving the issue, conservative Israeli leader Ariel Sharon sparked violent riots on 28 September when he visited the religious site in Jerusalem known to Jews as the Temple Mount and to Mus-
lims as Haram al-Sharif. The street fighting rapidly intensified as Palestini-
ans from Arafat’s Fatah and the more radical Hamas movements, armed with 
rocks and a few automatic rifles, confronted well-armed Israeli troops and 
Jewish settlers throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Despite attempts 
by a number of regional and world leaders to broker a lasting ceasefire, the 
violece continued into 2001. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were accused 
of excessive use of force for using live ammunition, tanks and attack heli-
copters. The violence caused the death of more than 300 people by the end of 
the year, about 90 per cent of whom were Palestinians. Leaders of neigh-
bouring Arab states feared that the violence could spread beyond the Israeli 
borders.

Earlier in the year, violence had already increased in southern Lebanon. The 
Hizbullah (Party of God) fighters launched rockets along the border in Febru-
ary and the IDF reacted with artillery fire and air attacks. In March the 
Israeli Cabinet voted to withdraw its troops by July, ending its occupation 
since 1978 of a strip of land inside Lebanon that was intended to protect 
Israel’s northern border. Fighting intensified in early May in anticipation of 
the withdrawal. By the end of the month, all the IDF troops and many of their 
Lebanese supporters had made a hasty retreat. The United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) demarcated and patrolled the Lebanese—Israeli 
border but the Lebanese Government did not deploy troops in the area for over 
two months, which opened the way for Hizbullah to assume control. Spor-
dic shooting across the border occurred in August. In early October 
Hizbullah guerrillas kidnapped three IDF soldiers. Violence escalated in 
November as Hizbullah activity increased at a small, disputed part of the bor-
der and Israeli jet aircraft and helicopters attacked suspected guerrilla posi-
tions. In December Israel warned Syria that the conflict could spread if Syria

did not control the Islamic guerrillas that it supports along the Israeli—Lebanese border.272

South America

Colombia

Since the 1960s, successive Colombian administrations have fought a number of leftist rebel groups. At present, there are up to 19 violent opposition groups, but only 2 groups of major concern.273 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is the largest group with approximately 15,000 members.274 The second largest rebel organization is the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army) with about 4000 members.275 The FARC and the ELN see each other as rivals, although the stated objectives of both groups include a more pluralist political system, economic policies that emphasize development and equality, and a military dedicated exclusively to external defence.276

In the 1970s, landowners and businesses began to establish militia groups to protect their interests from the rebels. Most of those groups now belong to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), numbering about 5000 and increasingly active in the past two years.277 The AUC has close ties with some units of the Colombian armed forces but it operates outside military lines of command. With no discernible political agenda, they have been responsible for the vast majority of human rights abuses and civilian deaths in recent years.278

Soon after he was elected in 1998, President Andrés Pastrana initiated the first peace talks in eight years with the FARC.279 Copying a formula that had succeeded with other rebel groups, he removed all government troops from a 42,000-square kilometre area in southern Colombia and turned it over to the FARC so that they could negotiate in safety. The gamble has not paid off. The rebels set up a parallel administration and use the zone to generate revenue

275 Notimex (note 274); and Reynolds, J., Colombia overture to rebels, BBC News Online, 7 June 2000, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>; and Pardo (note 274), p. 69.
276 Klepak (note 274), p. 44.
279 Pardo (note 274), p. 70.
and recruit and train new members.\textsuperscript{280} In April 2000 President Pastrana agreed to establish a similar zone in northern Colombia for the ELN, who asked for talks and stepped up their practice of mass kidnapping and sabotage to put pressure on the government. Local politicians and the AUC oppose the zone and by the end of the year it had not come into being.\textsuperscript{281}

The FARC, the AUC and to a lesser extent the ELN have close ties to drug manufacturers and traffickers. They tax the drug trade and provide protection in their areas of operation. As Colombia’s share of the world coca market has grown, so have the armed groups’ revenues. Up to 70 per cent of the AUC’s revenues comes from the drug trade.\textsuperscript{282} The FARC received an estimated $400—600 million in drug-related money in 2000.\textsuperscript{283}

President Pastrana, in close cooperation with the USA, introduced Plan Colombia to combat illegal drug production and trade. In the process the plan would undermine the financial base of the rebels. The multi-year, $7.5 billion plan includes social development programmes, incentives for farmers to grow crops other than coca and funding for increased forceful eradication efforts.\textsuperscript{284} The USA agreed to contribute over $1.3 billion to Plan Colombia in 2000 and 2001, 65 per cent of which was designated for Colombia, with the rest going to US agencies and other countries in the region. Together with the $330 million in aid previously planned, Colombia would receive $1.19 billion in the two years, with $952.3 million (80 per cent) designated for military and police assistance and $238 million (20 per cent) designated for programmes to assist displaced people, promote economic development, promote human rights and strengthen the judiciary.\textsuperscript{285} Colombian and US NGOs, the presidents of the five countries that border Colombia and the European Union criticized Plan Colombia and the US contribution, claiming that it inappropriately targeted small farmers, did not hold the military to human rights standards and would dramatically escalate the level of violence.\textsuperscript{286} The USA insists that its involvement is simply a counter-narcotics measure, but observers note that the relationship between rebels and drug producers means that military units assisted by the USA will inevitably engage in counter-insurgency operations.\textsuperscript{287}

\begin{footnotes}
\item Dealing with Colombia’s death-squads (note 277); and Colombian para military claims business funding, BBC News Online, 7 Sep. 2000, URL \texttt{<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>}.\textsuperscript{282}
\item Chalk, P., The war on drugs: is the USA’s Colombia policy working?, \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review}, Dec. 2000, p. 41.\textsuperscript{283}
\item Putumayo’s tense wait for the arrival of Plan Colombia, \textit{The Economist}, 19 Aug. 2000, pp. 47—48.\textsuperscript{284}
\item Center for International Policy, U.S. aid to Colombia, URL \texttt{<http://www.ciponline.organization/colombia/aid/aid0001.htm>}.\textsuperscript{285}
\item Rohter (note 280).\textsuperscript{287}
\end{footnotes}
Clashes between government forces, the rebels and the paramilitary as well as civilian massacres occurred in rural areas across the country throughout 2000 and significantly increased at the end of the year.\textsuperscript{288} Over 2000 people were killed, many of them civilians.\textsuperscript{289} The increase was most notable in the southern Putumayo district, far from urban centres, where coca is the primary crop, the FARC is strong, the AUC is increasing its presence and three new army mobile battalions with US helicopters will be based.\textsuperscript{290}

At the end of the year, negotiations between the government and both rebel groups broke down and the military component of Plan Colombia was about to begin.\textsuperscript{291} The FARC have been accumulating weapons to counter US military assistance to the government.\textsuperscript{292} The government had little negotiating room between armed groups on the left and right; the rebels, with their own territory and source of income, had little incentive to negotiate.\textsuperscript{293}

The human costs of the conflict are already high. The number of people killed is uncertain, although there is widespread agreement that in the past 10—15 years over 35,000 have died as a direct result of the conflict.\textsuperscript{294} A far higher number have been killed in general lawlessness.\textsuperscript{295} Over 1.5 million people have had to flee their homes in the past 10 years and there were almost 135,000 newly displaced persons in the first half of 2000.\textsuperscript{296} Each year the rebels and paramilitary kidnap thousands of people.\textsuperscript{297} For several years, the conflict has spilled over porous borders into Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, resulting in rebel sanctuaries, refugee flows, and trade in drugs and weapons. The problem increased in 2000 and all five countries reinforced security personnel along their borders, fearing that it would become much worse in 2001 as the military component of Plan Colombia went into effect.\textsuperscript{298}


\textsuperscript{290} Wilson (note 286); McDermott, J., Colombia changes tactics in drugs war, BBC Online Network, 22 Aug. 2000, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>; and FARC puts negotiations on hold (note 289).

\textsuperscript{291} For information on the stop-and-go negotiations, see chapter 2 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{292} Scale of FARC’s arms buildup revealed, Latin American Weekly Report, WR-00-34, 29 Aug. 2000, p. 398; and El Comercio (Quito), 23 Aug. 2000, in Arms trafficking to Colombia increases, FBIS-LAT-2000-0827, 28 Aug. 2000. For information on the transfer of small arms to Colombia, see appendix 5F in this volume.

\textsuperscript{293} Pardo (note 274); Jones, J., A misguided aid package to Colombia, Guardian Weekly, 13—19 Apr. 2000, p. 32; and Klepak (note 274).

\textsuperscript{294} Rohter (note 280); and Colombian troops hunt rebel force, International Herald Tribune, 17 Jan. 2000, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{295} The assault on democratic society, The Economist, 18 Mar. 2000, p. 57; and Pardo (note 274), p. 65.

\textsuperscript{296} Rohter (note 280); and Norwegian Refugee Council, 134,799 new IDPs during the first half of 2000 (August 2000), Global IDP Database, URL <http://www.db.idpproject.org/>.


III. Conclusions

The major armed conflicts of 2000 revealed a diverse set of antagonistic groups, variously driven by political ambitions, economic motives, ideology and fear. The ultimate objective of all the armed groups reviewed in section II was to secure control over governmental power or territory. In addition, in several cases, individuals within the groups and their outside supporters were motivated by personal greed. Communal identity, in the form of ethnicity or religious belief, was a common enabling mechanism a tool used by leaders to define and motivate a group. It did not appear to be a cause of violence by itself.299

Most of the conflicts have proved difficult to end, with the majority having lasted for seven years or more.300 One of the reasons is that none of the parties involved is militarily strong enough to prevail by force. Rebel groups rarely have the personnel, weapons and other resources needed to defeat national armed forces.301 Governments face the difficult task of counter-insurgency when rebels employ a guerrilla strategy. When major armed conflicts do end, this is usually the result of a negotiated agreement. For example, conflicts that were active in 1999 in Kosovo, East Timor and the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) were not active in 2000 because of the conclusion of political agreements. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia ended with a peace agreement in 2000.302

Unfortunately, many of the conflicts reviewed here are difficult to resolve diplomatically because of the characteristics of the actors, their motives and the remote location of most of the fighting. A hallmark of contemporary rebel organizations is their tendency to break apart into factions when members of the group disagree about objectives or strategies. The splintering of rebel groups in the DRC and the proliferation of separatist groups in Kashmir are prime examples. In 2000 some armed groups entered talks or actually joined the government while other armed groups chose to continue to fight in Algeria, Burundi, the DRC, Kashmir, the Philippines and Sierra Leone.303 Peace is more difficult to achieve when combatants have the will and capacity


299 Even in the cases of the Hema—Lendu fighting in the DRC and the Christian—Muslim fighting in Molucca, the antagonists were driven largely by competition over resources in the former case by a contest over land between agriculturalists and pastoralists, and in the latter case by access to income through appointments in the governing bureaucracy.

300 Appendix 1A in this volume provides a quick reference for the starting date of each conflict.

301 The most recent example of a rebel military victory was the 1997 overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now the DRC). However, the rebels themselves were weak. It was substantial Rwandan and Ugandan military involvement that caused the already feeble Zairean military and government to crumble.

302 In all these examples, changes on the battlefield played a central role in the willingness of the parties to reach settlement through negotiation.

303 Appendix 2B in this volume, on Sierra Leone, uses the British attack on the West Side Boyz to demonstrate how a loosely organized militia group has no central authority that can surrender, even when it is effectively defeated.
to continue to fight even after some of their leaders agree to a political settlement.

Although most armed groups have publicly stated a political agenda, many of the individuals within them are motivated by personal gain. Greed is manifested in many forms, from large-scale diamond trading by military and political leaders to village-level pillage by youths with guns. It is unclear whether micro-level economic motives for conflict are increasing or whether it is only the awareness of observers that has been heightened. It is all too clear that the development of war economies contributes to the persistence of conflicts.304

It is also evident in the major armed conflicts of 2000 that the worst fighting in most cases took place in rural areas. Civilian mortality and suffering in these conflicts are high because of the indiscipline of armies and rebel groups; the guerrilla—counter-insurgency nature of the fighting, in which civilians are hard to distinguish from fighters; and the lethality of modern weapons. However, the political and economic elite, who reside in the cities, are insulated from the direct effects of the battles that others fight on their behalf.305 When the costs of conflict are not acutely felt by political leaders, they are less likely to make compromises in the interest of ending the conflict.


305 The LTTE in Sri Lanka provide an interesting example of a rebel group that is trying both to capture land using conventional war-fighting techniques and to influence politicians using terrorist bombs in cities.