

1. Major armed conflicts

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I. Introduction

The major armed conflicts in 2000 displayed characteristics that were similar to those observed for other years since the end of the cold war. The vast majority of the conflicts were intra-state rather than interstate. There were approximately equal numbers of contests for control of government and for territory.¹ They often involved communal identity as a source of motivation. Virtually all the conflicts elicited the direct political, economic or military involvement of other states and multinational organizations. Africa and Asia continued to be the regions with the greatest number of conflicts, while the rest of the world was peaceful by comparison although not entirely at peace. This chapter reports on the actors and events of the most deadly conflicts in 2000. Appendix^o1A gives a quantitative overview of the major armed conflicts since the end of the cold war.

For the purposes of this chapter, a major armed conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two or more organized armed groups, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single year and in which the incompatibility concerns control of government, territory or communal identity. This definition is more inclusive than the one which applies to the data on major armed conflicts presented in appendix^o1A in that it does not require a government to be one of the parties to the conflict and takes into account conflicts that are motivated by communal identity and not clearly about control of government or territory. In both the chapter and the appendix, once a conflict has reached the threshold of 1000 deaths in a single year it continues to be recorded even if the level of violence decreases significantly. Appendix^o1A continues to track residual conflicts at a very low level of violence. The conflicts reviewed in this chapter meet two criteria: they conform to the above definition of a major armed conflict, and they caused over 100^o deaths in 2000.²

The account of each conflict provides information on the parties to the conflict, where each is located, what the parties are fighting about and the most important events during 2000. Each account provides an estimate of the costs

¹ Table^o1A.1, appendix 1A, presents data on the number of conflicts fought over government and territory for the period 1990–2000, by region.

² The conflicts reviewed in the chapter that were motivated by communal identity and are not recorded in appendix 1A are the Hema—Lendu fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Muslim—Christian violence on the Molucca Islands, Indonesia. The conflicts covered in appendix^o1A that do not appear in this chapter are those waged by the Assam separatists in India, the Mujahideen e-Khalq in Iran, the Karen rebels in Myanmar, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey, and political violence in Rwanda and Somalia.

of the conflict in human terms, as measured by the numbers of people killed and displaced by violence. Each account of an internal conflict identifies the cross-border effects and their potential for creating regional instability. In addition, the extraction and sale of natural resources are noted in cases where they play a significant role in the motives and capabilities of at least one of the actors.

The human costs of violent conflict have long been a concern for peace researchers and have been reported in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1987. In recent years, the human security dimension of conflicts has become increasingly important to national governments and international organizations. When United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in preparation for the UN Millennium Summit, he urged the member states to do more in terms of protecting people from the ravages of war.³ In 1999 states launched military operations in Kosovo and East Timor, at least in part out of concern for the welfare of the civilian populations there.⁴ The fate of civilians and protection of their basic human rights are frequent themes in UN Security Council debates and resolutions. This chapter's focus on the number of people killed and displaced in each conflict provides a measure of the intensity of the violence and offers an objective assessment of whether the conflict is escalating or de-escalating. Finally, it emphasizes that violent conflict is a costly endeavour.⁵

The frequent observation that most conflicts today are intra-state held true in 2000. However, this observation is simplistic: most intra-state conflicts do not remain confined within the borders of a single country. Nominally internal conflicts typically exhibit transnational (i.e., cross-border) characteristics, such as the outflow of refugees, the illicit international trade in natural resources and weapons, and the transit across international borders of rebel and government forces. Many of the conflicts in 2000 exhibited transnational characteristics.

This chapter examines intra-state conflicts in 14 countries. In 10 of the cases, the conflicts spilled over into neighbouring states.⁶ Three of the remaining four conflicts are in island countries, where transnational spread is possible but must overcome a natural barrier.⁷ The only interstate major armed conflicts were between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. The former conflict spilled over into neighbouring states, and the latter affected the dynamic of the Kashmiri separatist conflict that is internal to India. The transnational characteristics of intra-state conflicts are also important because they helped to sustain the conflicts and threatened the security of

³ United Nations, Secretary-General's statement to the UN General Assembly, 3 Apr. 2000, URL <<http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/state.htm>>.

⁴ Whether or not their welfare was promoted by military intervention is an open question.

⁵ This chapter does not provide the ratio of military to civilian deaths nor take up the issue of the extent to which that ratio has changed over the past century. The available information is too sparse.

⁶ These 10 conflicts are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India (Kashmir), Israel, Russia (Chechnya), Sierra Leone and Sudan.

⁷ The 3 island countries in conflict are Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Algeria is the only country with contiguous borders where the internal conflict did not spill over into neighbouring states.

neighbouring states. Any attempt to resolve a major armed conflict or to prevent it from spreading must take into account its transnational characteristics.

The illicit trade in natural resources coming from zones of conflict was a transnational phenomenon that received considerable political attention in 2000. Conflict diamonds were the subject of three UN special investigations and at least two intergovernmental conferences.⁸ Oil, gold and other minerals, timber, coffee and illegal drugs provided groups and governments engaged in conflict with an impetus to continue to fight and with the financial means to do so in 7 of the 14 countries with intra-state conflicts in 2000.⁹ Analysis of the political economy of violent conflicts is receiving increased attention as a way to improve conflict prevention and resolution practices.¹⁰

The conflicts described in section II are divided into the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South America. Where they are applicable, the themes of transnationalism and resource extraction are substantiated. Section III highlights the major findings from this review and presents several policy and research implications.

II. Conflicts

Africa

Algeria

The hope for a new political era in Algeria faded in 2000. Rebels continued to use violence as a means of political expression. The government continued its counter-insurgency efforts and did not open the political arena to non-violent Islamic political expression. The conflict began in 1992, when the military Algerian Government banned the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) to prevent it from taking control of the government after it won a national election. Upon taking office in 1999, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika enacted the Law on Civil Concord an amnesty offer to Algerian rebels that ended on 13 January 2000. Under the offer, insurgents who laid down their

⁸ Information on the investigations is presented in Report of the panel of experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA, contained in United Nations, Letter dated 10 March 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council committee established pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN document S/2000/203, 10 Mar. 2000; Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions, contained in United Nations, Note by the President of the Security Council, UN document S/2000/1225, 21 Dec. 2000; and United Nations, Report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) paragraph 19 in relation to Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/1195, 20 Dec. 2000. Information on the conferences is presented in African diamond industry: challenges of the 21st century, Kimberly, South Africa, 11–12 May 2000, URL <<http://www.dme.government.za/minerals/forumvolweb.html>>; and London conference on conflict diamonds, London, England, 25–26 Oct. 2000, URL <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?4309>>.

⁹ These 7 countries are Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia (Aceh), Sierra Leone and Sudan.

¹⁰ The World Bank project The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence is one of the most comprehensive efforts to analyse political and economic factors that increase the risk of civil wars and violent crime in developing countries and to identify policies conducive to reducing those risks. World Bank, URL <<http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/index.htm>>.

arms and had not committed murder, rape or bombings would be pardoned. The Arm e Islamique du Salut (AIS, Islamic Salvation Army) the armed wing of the FIS officially dissolved itself the day before the amnesty ended. The event had little effect on the level of violence since the AIS had largely respected a ceasefire since November 1997.¹¹ The FIS is still illegal, and there is no sign that the government will allow a strong Islamic force to participate.¹²

The Groupe Islamique Arm (GIA, Armed Islamic Group) did not accept the government's offer because it viewed the Law on Civil Concord as a police measure and because blood crimes were not pardoned.¹³ Several smaller groups also refused the amnesty offer, the most notable of which is the Jamiyya a Islamiyya Da wa wal Jihad (variously translated as the Islamic Group for Mission and Holy War or the Islamic Group for Call and Combat).¹⁴

Six days after the amnesty offer expired, the government followed through on its threat to launch a military offensive against the remaining rebels, who were thought to number at least 1500 and possibly 3000.¹⁵ As has been true throughout the conflict, the fighting occurred in the northern part of the country, north of the Sahara desert, where most of the population lives. Assaults on the GIA about 150 kilometres south-west of Algiers and on Da wa wal Jihad near Algiers constituted some of the fiercest fighting in years.¹⁶ The fighting between government troops and rebels continued inconclusively throughout the year. Although the level of violence did not return to that of the period 1992–98, a new spate of civilian massacres, primarily by the GIA, showed no sign of abating. At least 200 deaths a month were reported during the first half of the year; later in the year the number increased to about 300 a month.¹⁷ The official and widely accepted figure for the number of people killed since 1992 is 100 000, the vast majority of them civilians, out of a population of about 30 million.¹⁸ Almost all the violence occurs in rural mountainous areas outside of urban centres, removing one possible incentive for the country's elite to try to end the conflict. The conflict has had a minimal regional impact so far, but in 2000 the GIA extended its area of operations to the Tunisian border.¹⁹

¹¹ Truehart, C., Did gamble pay off in Algeria?, *International Herald Tribune*, 15–16 Jan. 2000, p. 5.

¹² Bouteflika's bid for concord, *The Economist*, 29 Jan. 2000, pp. 51–52; and Bouteflika rides his luck, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 4 (18 Feb. 2000), pp. 4–5.

¹³ International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet*, ICG Africa report no. 24 (ICG: Algiers/Paris/London/Brussels, 20 Oct. 2000), p. 7, URL <<http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/>>.

¹⁴ In French, the group is known as Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) or Group Salafiyyste de Da wa et Djihad (GSDJ). Burns, J., Campaign to end Algerian civil war sets off fierce fighting, *International Herald Tribune*, 26 Jan. 2000, p. 2; International Crisis Group (note 13), p. 1; and Bouteflika rides his luck (note 12).

¹⁵ The Bouteflika paradox, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 15 (21 July 2000), pp. 5–6.

¹⁶ Burns (note 14); and Bouteflika rides his luck (note 12).

¹⁷ International Crisis Group (note 13), p. 1; Algerian anti-rebel drive failing, BBC News Online, 12 July 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/>>; and Renewed violence in Algeria, BBC News Online, 5 Oct. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/>>.

¹⁸ Burns (note 14); The Bouteflika paradox (note 15); and International Crisis Group (note 13), p. 1.

¹⁹ International Crisis Group (note 13), p. 2.

Angola

Fighting in Angola continued throughout 2000, with the government of President Jos Eduardo dos Santos gaining significant military and political advantage over the rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), led by Jonas Savimbi. After surprising military successes during the last months of 1999 that reversed rebel advances, the Forças Armadas de Angola (FAA, Angolan Armed Forces) controlled most of the country at the beginning of 2000, including most of the southern border with Namibia and most of UNITA's former bases.²⁰ The FAA slowly consolidated its control throughout the year. UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor on Africa Ibrahim Bambari told the Security Council in July that the government controlled over 92 per cent of Angolan territory and that more than 11 000 rebels had laid down their arms.²¹ In the same month, the government claimed that it controlled most of the diamond-rich Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces in the north-east, from which UNITA had previously sustained its war effort through illegal diamond mining and trade.²² The government's successes in 2000 can also be attributed to UNITA's loss of conventional warfare capacity in 1999, disrupted UNITA supply lines in Namibia and Zambia, rebel supply difficulties resulting from international sanctions and the FAA's recent ability to intercept the rebels' communications.²³

UNITA returned to guerrilla tactics early in the year in response to the success of the FAA offensive, which the government claimed had destroyed 80 per cent of the rebels' conventional war capacity.²⁴ Their military operations during 2000 consisted of hit-and-run attacks on military locations and raids on civilian locations in an attempt to get supplies.²⁵ The rebels clearly were on the defensive throughout the year. Nevertheless, they reportedly inflicted hundreds of casualties on government troops.²⁶ By October the military situation had reached a stalemate.²⁷ At the end of the year UNITA recaptured a diamond mining centre in northern Malange province.²⁸

²⁰ McGreal, C., 'Angolan rebels lose former HQ', *Guardian Weekly*, 6–12 Jan. 2000, p. 4; and 'Angolan troops seize UNITA base', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 Jan. 2000, p. 14.

²¹ United Nations, 'Security Council holds meeting on situation in Angola', UN press release, UN document SC/6899, 27 July 2000.

²² Angola claims battlefield successes, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 26 July 2000, p. 28.

²³ Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions (note 8), paras 18–19; and Gordon, C., 'Angola: between war and peace', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 2000, pp. 39–40.

²⁴ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA), 'Angola: UNITA warns of guerrilla campaign', IRIN-SA weekly round-up 4, 22–28 Jan. 2000; and Gordon (note 23), p. 39. News items from all the IRIN offices Central Asia, IRIN-CA (Islamabad, Pakistan), Central and Eastern Africa, IRIN-CEA (Nairobi, Kenya), Western Africa, IRIN-WA (Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire) and Southern Africa, IRIN-SA (Johannesburg, South Africa) are archived on ReliefWeb, URL <<http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/index.phtml>>.

²⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola, UN document S/2000/977, 10 Oct. 2000, para. 10.

²⁶ UNITA claims heavy damage to Angola, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 Mar. 2000, p. 6.

²⁷ IRIN-SA, 'Angola: a military stalemate', IRIN-SA weekly round-up 36, 30 Sep.–6 Oct. 2000.

²⁸ IRIN-SA, 'Angola: state authority is re-established in three north Cuanza districts and Angola: rebels re-take diamond center', IRIN-SA weekly round-up 50, 9–15 Dec. 2000.

Extraction of natural resources plays a central role in the Angolan civil war. Angolan diamonds are of the highest quality in the world.²⁹ Since 1992 UNITA has sold an estimated \$3.7 billion worth of diamonds.³⁰ The UN Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, known as the Fowler Report, stated that diamonds played a uniquely important role for the rebels by enabling them to buy weapons and fuel and to acquire external supporters.³¹ The UN Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions noted that UNITA's ability to procure arms and fuel diminished significantly in 2000, but it urged continued vigilant sanctions implementation to prevent the lure of diamonds from enabling UNITA to reinforce itself with the assistance of arms dealers.³²

Petroleum also provides an incentive and the means to continue fighting. All of Angola's oilfields are in government-controlled areas and most of the revenue goes to prosecuting the war and sustaining the elite. Virtually none of it is spent on infrastructure or services for the population. There is widespread speculation that government officials personally profit from oil revenues.³³

The human costs of the 25-year war are high. Out of a population of about 12 million, the war has cost approximately 500 000 lives and displaced more than 25 per cent of Angola's population.³⁴ At the beginning of 2000 there were an estimated 2 million internally displaced persons in Angola, and about 42 per cent of the children under five years of age were severely or moderately underweight.³⁵ The malnutrition rate in the African countries which are not at war is far lower. Continued fighting led to an increased estimate in August of more than 2.7 million displaced persons, with large movements occurring in many parts of the country.³⁶ At the end of 2000 the UN noted improvements in humanitarian conditions in areas controlled by the government but also noted that displacement, killing and severe health problems persisted in areas where fighting continued.³⁷

The conflict could become even more costly as refugees and military operations cross into Namibia to the south and into Zambia to the east. Namibian President Sam Nujoma allowed the Angolan Army and Air Force to use Namibian territory to launch attacks into Angola beginning in November 1999. Since then, UNITA raids into Namibia have increased, provoking military responses from the Namibian Government that have involved Namibian

²⁹ Spears, I., Angola's elusive peace, *International Journal*, autumn 1999, p. 564.

³⁰ Matheson, I., Zambia's diamond smuggling trade thrives, BBC News Online, 19 Apr. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/>>.

³¹ Report of the panel of experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA (note 8), para. 77.

³² Final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions (note 8), paras 20–21.

³³ Jeter, J., Awash in oil, mired in poverty, *Guardian Weekly*, 5–11 Oct. 2000, p. 33.

³⁴ Jeter (note 33); Matheson (note 30); and United Nations, *Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola, 2001* (United Nations: New York, Nov. 2000), p. 10, available on ReliefWeb at URL <<http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/>>.

³⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA), UN document S/2000/23, 14 Jan. 2000, para. 19.

³⁶ Report of the Secretary-General (note 25), para. 33.

³⁷ *Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola, 2001* (note 34).

troops operating inside Angola.³⁸ The danger of escalation is particularly high in the Caprivi Strip, where there is already a militant separatist group.³⁹ Zambian border areas have suffered attacks by UNITA rebels who are under pressure in Angola's Moxico province.⁴⁰ Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, who is widely seen as dos Santos' silent ally, said that the Zambian military would act against UNITA in Zambia but would remain neutral in the conflict and not allow Angolan forces to use Zambian territory.⁴¹ The FAA threatened to invoke the right of hot pursuit into Zambia amid Zambian denials that it was helping UNITA.⁴²

Burundi

The conflict in Burundi began in 1993 with the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye and continued throughout the 1996 coup that put Major Pierre Buyoya in power. In 2000 there was continued violence throughout the country while the peace talks at Arusha intensified under the new mediator, former South African President Nelson Mandela.⁴³ The struggle for power is founded on the historical animosity between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis, who have dominated the government and military since colonial times. However, the conflict is not simply two-sided since rival organizations from the same ethnic group also oppose each other. The largest opposition groups continued to use violence and did not attend the Arusha talks. They were the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie—Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD—FDD, National Council for the Defence of Democracy—Forces for Defence of Democracy), which split off from the CNDD, and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL, National Liberation Forces), which split off from the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People).⁴⁴

Fighting persisted throughout the year, with several periods of increased rebel activity and government responses. Fighting intensified in late April around the capital Bujumbura and on the eastern border with Tanzania, prior to a visit by Mandela.⁴⁵ In late May the government engaged in intense fight-

³⁸ McGreal (note 20); Swarns, R., 'Angola's long civil war spills over into Namibia', *International Herald Tribune*, 10 Jan. 2000, p. 2; and IRIN-SA, 'Namibia: Nujoma pledges to crush Angolan rebels', IRIN-SA weekly round-up 17, 22–29 Apr. 2000.

³⁹ Dissez, A., 'Namibia repays debt by joining the war against Unita', *Guardian Weekly*, 20–26 Jan. 2000, p. 30.

⁴⁰ IRIN-SA, 'Zambia: villagers flee border area', IRIN-SA weekly round-up 10, 10 Mar. 2000.

⁴¹ IRIN-SA, 'Angola—Zambia: concern at border raids', IRIN-SA weekly round-up 3, 15–21 Jan. 2000.

⁴² Agence France-Presse, 'Angolan Army will pursue rebels into Zambia: government daily', 20 Oct. 2000, available on ReliefWeb at URL <<http://www.reliefweb.int/>>.

⁴³ For information on the Burundi peace process, see chapter 2 in this volume.

⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Burundi: Neglecting Justice in Making Peace*, HRW country report, vol. 12, no. 2(A) (Apr. 2000), section II; and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Office for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN-CEA), 'Burundi: parties sign scaled-down accord', IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 35, 28 Aug.—1 Sep. 2000.

⁴⁵ 'Fighting raging in Burundi capital', *International Herald Tribune*, 26 Apr. 2000, p. 4; and International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Burundi peace process: new developments', ICG press release, 12 May 2000.

ing in the south-east with FDD rebels based in Tanzania.⁴⁶ At the end of July and for most of August there were outbursts of violence in the south-east and around the capital, as the 28° August deadline to sign a peace agreement drew near.⁴⁷ Fighting continued near the capital and along the Tanzanian border after most of the parties signed the peace accord. The accord did not include a general ceasefire, and the FDD and the FNL refused to sign it.⁴⁸ In September clashes occurred in several provinces and were particularly heavy in the north-west.⁴⁹

Up to 200 000 people have been killed since 1993, over half of whom were civilians, out of a population of about 7°million. The most intense violence occurred in 1993. Most victims were civilians who were killed in rebel and government raids and reprisals.⁵⁰ In June about 100°000 people were living in squalid government regroupment camps around Bujumbura, down from over 300 000 in January.⁵¹ The government was condemned internationally for its counter-insurgency practice of removing Hutu farmers from their land and containing them in overcrowded camps, where many died of disease. Mandela acted on the international condemnation when he demanded that the government close the camps by the end of July. The government stated on 1° August that it had nearly met the goal. Camp residents were often not able to return home because they feared for their lives.⁵² In September about 327°500 people were internally displaced, according to government figures.⁵³

Rebels have bases in Tanzania and move back and forth across the border at will. Their movements are tangled up with those of several hundred thousand refugees who have fled to Tanzania.⁵⁴ The interplay of ethnic tensions in Burundi and Rwanda was apparent when Rwandan Hutu militiamen joined up with armed groups in Burundi.⁵⁵ Rwandan militiamen fought for the FNL until Burundian members of the organization killed over 100 of them at the begin-

⁴⁶ Fighting intensifies in Burundi, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 24 May 2000, p. 16.

⁴⁷ Intense fighting in Burundi, BBC News Online, 26 July 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; Burundi soldiers die in massacre, BBC News Online, 7° Aug. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; and Panafican News Agency, Over 60 people injured in grenade attack in Burundi, 23 Aug. 2000, URL <<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200008230037.html>>.

⁴⁸ IRIN-CEA, Burundi: fresh outbreak of violence, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 36, 4—8 Sep. 2000; and Burundi bishops call for peace, BBC News Online, 12 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

⁴⁹ IRIN-CEA, Burundi: fighting intensifies, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 37, 11—15 Sep. 2000; and IRIN-CEA Burundi: heavy fighting continues countrywide, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 41, 7—13 Oct. 2000.

⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch (note 44); Bloch, G., Burundi's bleak prospects for peace, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2000, pp. 44—45; and Mandela's poisoned chalice, *The Economist* 12 Aug. 2000, p. 34.

⁵¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Emptying the Hills: Regroupment in Burundi*, HRW country report, vol. 12, no. 4(A), (June 2000), section I.

⁵² Burundi camps under scrutiny, BBC News Online, 1 Aug. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

⁵³ IRIN-CEA, Burundi: more than 300,000 still internally displaced, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 38, 16—22 Sep. 2000.

⁵⁴ Old war, new mediator, *The Economist*, 22 Jan. 2000, p. 44.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch (note 44); and Old war, new mediator (note 54).

ning of the year.⁵⁶ Hard-line Tutsis in Burundi reportedly recruited soldiers who had been demobilized from Rwanda's national army to form a militia in opposition to President Buyoya's apparent willingness to compromise at the Arusha peace talks.⁵⁷ The Burundian military and Hutu rebel groups fight on opposite sides of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Looking further afield, the Zambian Government charged some of its own nationals with transporting arms from Zimbabwe to FDD rebels in Tanzania for use in Burundi.⁵⁸

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since August 1998, the eastern half of the DRC has been the site of several intertwined conflicts that involve indigenous and foreign armed forces with multiple agendas.⁵⁹ The DRC Government, under President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, allied itself with several domestic paramilitary groups as well as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which sent troops to save Kabila's regime from defeat. Angola's military presence also allows it to attack UNITA bases and supply routes located in the DRC. The Zimbabwean Government and military have the additional objective of exploiting the DRC's mineral and timber wealth. In opposition, Uganda supports two rebel groups the Mouvement de Libération Congolais (MLC, Congolese Liberation Movement) and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie—Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML, Congolese Rally for Democracy—Liberation Movement). Rwanda supports the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie—Goma (RCD-G, Congolese Rally for Democracy—Goma) against the government and in rivalry with the other two rebel groups. Rwanda and Uganda both pursue their own rebels within the DRC and military personnel profit from the mineral trade.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed in July and August 1999 by six governments and three rebel groups involved in the fighting, was repeatedly violated by all the parties in 2000 and did not move the parties towards peace.⁶⁰ Localized fighting in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale, Equateur, Kasai and Katanga did not substantially change the areas under government or rebel control or advance a military resolution of the overall conflict. Throughout the year, the government controlled roughly the south-western half of the country while rebels controlled the north-eastern half. The Security Council authorized the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) up to a strength of 5537, but only 224 unarmed liaison officers and military observers were deployed

⁵⁶ IRIN-CEA, Burundi: rebel sources confirm fighting between Hutu groups, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 6, 5—11 Feb. 2000; and Human Rights Watch (note 44).

⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch (note 44).

⁵⁸ IRIN, Zimbabwe: IRIN focus on arms links to Burundi, 3 Feb. 2000.

⁵⁹ For a detailed account of the war and the peace process in 1998—99 see Seybolt, T., *The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), pp. 59—75.

⁶⁰ The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is contained in United Nations, Letter dated 23 July 1999 from the permanent representative of Zambia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN document S/1999/815, 23 July 1999, URL <<http://www.un.org/search/>>.

because of ceasefire violations and the lack of security guarantees.⁶¹ An unexpected turn of events in January 2001 gave a fresh impetus to the peace process. Laurent-Désiré Kabila was shot dead by a DRC Army officer. His son Joseph Kabila replaced him as president and immediately began a diplomatic initiative to revive the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

The most deadly violence in January and February 2000 was incidental to the conflict over control of the government. It occurred in the north-eastern Ituri region of Orientale province between members of the Hema and Lendu tribes, who have clashed over land rights in the past.⁶² The breakdown of order during the civil war, and possibly encouragement by officers in the Ugandan Army, which controls the area, led to an eruption of fighting in June 1999. By the end of February 2000, militiamen with rudimentary weapons had killed 4000–7000 people and displaced over 150,000.⁶³

Civilian massacres and military clashes occurred throughout the year in North and South Kivu provinces in eastern DRC, on the border with Burundi and Rwanda. Mayi-Mayi militiamen, indigenous to Kivu, Interahamwe militia and former members of the Rwandan Army, who arrived from Rwanda after committing genocide there, acted in loose alliance with the DRC Government to attack villages and to weaken rebel forces behind the so-called front line and for purposes of banditry. The RCD-G rebels and Rwandan Army units fought back. The violence killed hundreds of people and displaced hundreds of thousands.⁶⁴

Erstwhile allies Rwanda and Uganda fought pitched battles for control of strategically located Kisangani city in May. MONUC brokered an agreement to demilitarize the city but the armies engaged even more intensely in early June.⁶⁵ Heavy use of artillery by both sides caused extensive physical damage, killed approximately 760 people and injured over 1200, about three-quarters of whom were civilians.⁶⁶ The confrontation was grounded in disagreements about how to support the DRC rebel groups, but it appears that the spark was competition between military officers over control of a lucrative mineral trade.⁶⁷ The fighting seriously undermined international efforts to stop the war

⁶¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1279, 30 Nov. 1999; UN Security Council Resolution 1291, 4 Feb. 2000; and United Nations, Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN document S/2000/1156, 6 Dec. 2000, para. 47.

⁶² This conflict is distinct from the DRC civil war and does not appear in appendix 1A because the government is not a party to the conflict.

⁶³ Gough, D., Ethnic rivalry sparks Congo killing spree, *Guardian Weekly*, 17–23 Feb. 2000, p. 7; Heitman, H., DRC's tangled web of war, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 Mar. 2000, p. 18; IRIN-CEA, Democratic Republic of Congo: Uganda denies training Lendu people, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 5, 29 Jan.—4 Feb. 2000; and Congo-Kinshasa: hanging on, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 4 (18 Feb. 2000), p. 3.

⁶⁴ International Crisis Group (ICG), *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, ICG Africa Report no. 26 (ICG: Nairobi/Brussels, 20 Dec. 2000), pp. 1–10.

⁶⁵ United Nations, Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN document S/2000/566, 12 June 2000, paras 7–17.

⁶⁶ IRIN-CEA, DRC: displaced still leaving tense but quiet Kisangani, IRIN-CEA update 949, 20 June 2000; and IRIN-CEA, DRC: Kisangani death toll upped to 760, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 28, 8–14 July 2000.

⁶⁷ International Crisis Group (ICG), *Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies?*, ICG Africa Report no. 14 (ICG: Nairobi/Brussels, 4 May 2000); and Congo's hidden war, *The Economist*, 17 June 2000, pp. 49–50.

and was symptomatic of the contest for supremacy between the two small but politically important countries in the middle of Africa. Both armies withdrew from the city in early August after the Rwandan and Ugandan presidents held talks.⁶⁸

Kabila took advantage of the fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops and pushed back the Ugandan-supported MLC in north-eastern Equateur province from June until the end of August.⁶⁹ The MLC reversed the tide in mid-August and recovered territory in heavy fighting. At the end of 2000 the MLC was poised to attack the eastern city of Mbandaka on the Congo River.⁷⁰

DRC Government troops clashed with Rwandan troops and RCD-Goma rebels several times throughout the year in the central province of Kasai and in northern parts of southern Katanga province. Both sides were accused of planned, large-scale offensives.⁷¹ Angolan, Zambian and Zimbabwean troops successfully defended the Mbuji-Mayi diamond mining centre from RCD and Rwandan troops, who consider it to be a strategically important objective. However, in December the RCD-Goma captured the border town of Pweto in Katanga province in a drive to the south. Heavy fighting caused over 60'000 refugees to flee to Zambia.⁷² Several thousand DRC Government soldiers also fled to Zambia, many of whom refused to give up their weapons. Their presence threatened to draw Zambia into the DRC conflict. Zambian President Frederick Chiluba had brokered the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and was determined not to become militarily involved.⁷³

Diamonds and other minerals in eastern DRC have enriched some of the belligerents, although not as much as Zimbabwe's military apparently had hoped.⁷⁴ An estimated two-thirds of the diamonds produced annually by the DRC are smuggled across borders by the government's allies and opponents alike, and are sold in neighbouring countries.⁷⁵ Illicit mineral extraction further adds to the regional instability that is a defining characteristic of the DRC conflict. At the end of the year there were indications that all the states with troops in the DRC were looking for a way to bring their troops home because

⁶⁸ IRIN-CEA, Rwanda: troops return from DRC, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 32, 5–11 Aug. 2000.

⁶⁹ Congo-Kinshasa: a losing gamble, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 7 (1 Sep. 2000), pp. 1–3; and IRIN-CEA, DRC: Rwanda, Uganda concerned over government offensive, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 31, 29 July–4 Aug. 2000.

⁷⁰ In Congo, war gets serious, *The Economist*, 23 Sep. 2000, pp. 59–60; and International Crisis Group (note 64), pp. 4–5.

⁷¹ Fifth report of the Secretary-General (note 61), paras 30, 37; and IRIN-CEA, DRC: rebels say Kabila has launched general offensive, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 42, 14–20 Oct. 2000.

⁷² In the heart of darkness, *The Economist*, 9 Dec. 2000, p. 29; and International Crisis Group (note 64), pp. 6–8.

⁷³ Kunda, A., Zambia on war alert, BBC News Online, 19 Dec. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

⁷⁴ Congo-Kinshasa/Zimbabwe: soldiers of misfortune, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 18 (15 Sep. 2000), pp. 6–7; and Heitman, H., Diamonds reveal DRC military links, *Jane's Intelligence Review* vol. 12, no. 7 (July 2000), p. 7.

⁷⁵ Harden, B., To some countries, gems bring only misery, *International Herald Tribune*, 7 Apr. 2000, p. 2.

they were not achieving their economic and military objectives.⁷⁶ All the external parties reduced the number of their troops in 2000.⁷⁷ There was no indication of such an interest on the part of the DRC rebel groups, which fractured into rival factions during the year. The militia fighting on the side of the government also showed no sign of pursuing their objectives through political means.

The violence in 2000 killed thousands of people, by far the largest proportion of them civilians, and forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes.⁷⁸ In May the International Rescue Committee estimated that since 1998 the war had caused 1.7 million deaths, approximately 200,000 directly from violence and the rest from the collapse of health services and the food supply.⁷⁹ Fighting in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Equateur in particular displaced more than 800,000 people during the year, raising the total number since 1998 to approximately 1.8 million. Many of them were inaccessible to humanitarian aid agencies because of the violence and the lack of transport infrastructure.⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International accused all the armed parties of gross abuses of human rights.⁸¹

Eritrea—Ethiopia

On 6 May 1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia began one of Africa's few interstate wars in the post-colonial era and one of the world's deadliest conflicts in recent years. The immediate cause was a dispute over their 1000-km border, which was never fully demarcated when Eritrea peacefully seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. The underlying causes were divergent economic policies, within national economies that were heavily dependent on one another, and personal antagonism between Eritrean President Issayas Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who had been allies in a rebellion against the former Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The three main fronts in the war were at Badme in the west, Zela Ambessa-Egala in the central area and Burrie in the east.

In 1999 the countries signed two documents, known as the Framework Agreement and the Modalities, which the Organization of African Unity

⁷⁶ Fifth report of the Secretary-General (note 61), paras 5—16, 40—41; and Congo-Kinshasa: dropping Kabila, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 20 (13 Oct. 2000), pp. 3—5.

⁷⁷ IRIN-CEA, Rwanda: troops return from DRC, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 32, 5—11 Aug. 2000; and IRIN-CEA, DRC: Zimbabwe air force downsized, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 40, 30 Sep.—6 Oct. 2000. Estimates of the numbers of troops for each state and rebel group in 2000 are available in International Crisis Group (note 64), p. 4. Estimates for 1999 are available in Seybolt (note 59), pp. 66.

⁷⁸ Most of the devastation is caused by small arms and light weapons. For information on the suppliers of weapons to the DRC and their motives, see appendix 5F in this volume.

⁷⁹ International Rescue Committee, *Mortality in Eastern DRC: Results from Five Mortality Surveys* (International Rescue Committee: Bukavu, DRC, May 2000).

⁸⁰ UN World Food Programme (WFP), *WFP Emergency Report*, Report no. 41, 13 Oct. 2000, URL <<http://www.wfp.org/ereport/2000/001013.htm>>; and IRIN-CEA, DRC: humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 38, 16—22 Sep. 2000.

⁸¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Democratic Republic of Congo: Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest*, HRW country report, vol. 12, no. 3(A) (May 2000); and Amnesty International, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Killing Human Decency*, document no. AFR 62/007/2000, 31 May 2000.

(OAU) brokered in an effort to end the conflict. The agreements led to a lull in the fighting for several months.⁸² The peace process stalled when Ethiopia refused to accept a third document, the Technical Arrangements, which set out the details of how to implement the first two agreements, because it did not fully guarantee a return to the *status quo ante*.⁸³

On 12 May Ethiopian troops launched a surprise attack in the west near the contested town of Badme. At the same time, artillery exchanges took place at Zela Ambessa-Egala and Burrie. Ethiopia pressed its advantage in the west during intense combat.⁸⁴ The battles pitted two conventional militaries against each other along an identified front line, in striking contrast to nearly all other conflicts in the world during the year. Both sides favoured infantry assaults on defensive trenches and barriers, accompanied by the limited use of artillery, tanks and other armoured vehicles, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.⁸⁵ The two militaries also had a different relationship to the civilian population from those of rebel and government forces in the vast majority of contemporary conflicts. Rather than preying on uprooted civilians, the armies reportedly assisted them with transport and food.⁸⁶

The OAU immediately expressed its grave concern at the new fighting and urged the sides to resume negotiations.⁸⁷ The UN Security Council strongly condemned the fighting, demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and imposed an arms embargo on both countries.⁸⁸ The arms embargo was largely symbolic since both countries had spent the previous year and a half buying weapons and ammunition. The OAU and UN statements had no perceptible impact on the Ethiopian offensive.

Within seven days, Ethiopian troops occupied Barentu, a town 80 km inside Eritrea that had served as Eritrea's headquarters and logistical base on the western front.⁸⁹ Following successes in the west, the Ethiopian Army launched an assault on 23 May on the Zela Ambessa central front, where it was reported to have amassed 100 000 troops with tanks. The attack at Zela Ambessa proved decisive within a day.⁹⁰

⁸² Framework Agreement for a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Annex I to Organization of African Unity (OAU), Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU under the leadership of the current chairman on the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, OAU document AHG/220(XXXVI), July 2000; and Modalities for the implementation of the Framework Agreement, Annex II to OAU document AHG/220(XXXVI).

⁸³ Technical Arrangements for the implementation of the Framework Agreement and the Modalities, Annex III to Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82).

⁸⁴ *Addis Tribune*, Eritrea/Ethiopia: heavy fighting continues at Bure, Mereb River and Zalambessa-Egala, 13 May 2000, available on ReliefWeb at URL <<http://www.reliefweb.int/>>; and Vick, K., Ethiopia and Eritrea resume border war, *International Herald Tribune*, 13–14 May 2000, p. 2.

⁸⁵ Vick, K., Ethiopia starts a new assault, claiming war's finish is near, *International Herald Tribune*, 25 May 2000, pp. 1, 4; and Ethiopia's and Eritrea's forgotten war, resumed, *The Economist*, 20 May 2000, pp. 57–58.

⁸⁶ IRIN, Eritrea: IRIN focus on war displacement, 29 May 2000.

⁸⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82), paras 17, 21–23.

⁸⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1297, 12 May 2000; and UN Security Council Resolution 1298, 17 May 2000. For information on arms embargoes in force in 2000, see chapter 5 in this volume.

⁸⁹ Vick, K., Ethiopian troops celebrate a victory, *International Herald Tribune*, 20–21 May 2000, p. 4.

⁹⁰ Vick (note 85); IRIN-CEA, Ethiopia/Eritrea: Zala Ambessa completely destroyed, IRIN news brief, 25 May 2000; and Into the hills, *The Economist*, 27 May 2000, p. 49.

On 24 May the Eritrean Government announced that it would redeploy its forces to positions it held before 6 May 1999.⁹¹ The announcement came after a three-day visit to the Eritrean and Ethiopian capitals by the Personal Envoy of the OAU Chairman.⁹² OAU-sponsored peace talks resumed on 29 May.⁹³ Both sides reported new fighting at Burrie on 3–4 June, about 70 km from the Eritrean port town of Assab.⁹⁴ Artillery exchanges and armour-supported infantry battles continued all along the 1000-km border until 11 June.⁹⁵

Eritrean President Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Zenawi signed an OAU-brokered Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities on 18th June in Algiers.⁹⁶ The interim agreement clearly reflected Ethiopia's dominant military position. Ethiopian troops occupied the disputed regions around Badme and Burrie pending the final settlement of the border and did not have to withdraw from Eritrean territory until the arrival of UN troops.⁹⁷ On 12th December Afwerki and Zenawi signed a formal peace agreement that established committees to demarcate the border, exchange prisoners, return displaced persons and hear war compensation claims. A UN peacekeeping force was designated to monitor the agreement. There was no timetable for any of the provisions.⁹⁸

The war cost two of the world's poorest countries approximately \$1 billion.⁹⁹ Eritrea, with a population of about 3.5 million, had approximately 200 000–250 000 troops under arms in January 2000.¹⁰⁰ The conflict was also costly in human terms. In January 2000 a UN Country Team estimated the number of internally displaced Eritreans at 258 300. In addition Ethiopia deported about 67 300 Eritreans.¹⁰¹ The Eritrean Relief and Refugee Commission estimated in late May that 1.5 million Eritreans had been displaced by the recent fighting and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 40 000 of them had crossed into Sudan.¹⁰² The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) confirmed that the fighting in

⁹¹ For information on the Eritrea–Ethiopia peace process, see chapter 2 in this volume.

⁹² Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82), paras 17, 28–31.

⁹³ Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82), para. 36.

⁹⁴ Eritrea accuses Ethiopia of attack, *International Herald Tribune*, 10–11 June 2000, p. 4.

⁹⁵ Despite peace pact, war rages in Horn of Africa, *International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 2000, p. 6; and Eritrea accuses Ethiopia of attack (note 94).

⁹⁶ Agreement on cessation of hostilities, Annex VIII to Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the OAU (note 82).

⁹⁷ Time of reckoning, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 13 (23 June 2000), p. 8.

⁹⁸ Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, United Nations, Annex to Identical letters dated 12 December 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN document A/55/686-S/2000/1183, 13 Dec. 2000.

⁹⁹ According to the UN Development Programme's human development index, in 1998 Eritrea ranked 159 and Ethiopia ranked 171 out of a total of 174 countries. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2000* (Taylor & Francis: Basingstoke and Levittown, Pa., 2000), table 2, HDI ranks, 1998, p. 149; and Eritrea signs peace accord with Ethiopia, *International Herald Tribune*, 13 Dec. 2000, p. 10.

¹⁰⁰ Bloch, G., Ethiopia plans renewed offensive, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Apr. 2000, pp. 42–43.

¹⁰¹ IRIN-CEA, Eritrea: update on figures of displaced, deported, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 3, 15–17 Jan. 1999.

¹⁰² IRIN-CEA, Ethiopia/Eritrea: Eritrean Commission says 1.5 million people displaced and Sudan: 10,000 Eritrean refugees cross into Sudan in 24 hours, IRIN news brief 31 May 2000.

May had adversely affected the livelihood of one-third of the population.¹⁰³ Normally, the war-affected parts of the country produce 75 per cent of Eritrea's food. The war prevented Eritrea's agricultural sector from responding to the drought and caused people who fled the fighting to move in to drought-stricken areas. Substantial international humanitarian assistance was the only thing that averted mass starvation.¹⁰⁴

Ethiopia, with a population of about 60 million, fielded an army of about 350 000 troops.¹⁰⁵ The UN Country Team in Ethiopia estimated that more than 349 800 people were displaced by the conflict with Eritrea as of January 2000.¹⁰⁶ There was no substantial addition to the Ethiopian displacement in May because the fighting took place entirely on Eritrean territory. Nor did Eritrea respond to Ethiopia's deportation policy with a similar policy.¹⁰⁷

In May the Eritrean Government claimed to have killed 7200 and wounded 18 000 Ethiopian troops in the first three days of fighting and twice that number after five days.¹⁰⁸ Ethiopia disputed the claims but did not give any figures of its own. Throughout the war, both sides made exaggerated claims about the damage they inflicted on the other and no definitive estimates are available. It is likely that the Eritrean and Ethiopian armies both sustained a very high number of casualties in May, as they did during earlier phases of the war. In late May the US Department of State estimated 50 000–60 000 deaths during the first two years of the conflict.¹⁰⁹ Also in late May, Eritrean President Afwerki estimated that 70 000 people had been killed.¹¹⁰ Other sources estimated that approximately 50 000 had died on each side.¹¹¹ Since the Eritrean population is much smaller, the death toll is a much larger proportion of the population.

The war caused as many as 50 000 Eritrean refugees to flee to Sudan, primarily during the fighting in May and June 2000.¹¹² They joined about 320 000 Eritreans already in Sudan as a result of Eritrea's war of independence, which ended in 1991.¹¹³ The war also spilled into Somalia in 1999 and 2000. The Ethiopian Government accused Eritrea of giving weapons to Ethiopian opposition groups based in Somalia. Ethiopian troops retaliated

¹⁰³ IRIN-CEA, Eritrea: OCHA report says dramatic deterioration in Eritrea, IRIN update for Horn of Africa, 3 July 2000.

¹⁰⁴ IRIN-CEA, Horn of Africa: crisis averted but drought-affected [areas] precarious, 6 Oct. 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Bloch (note 100).

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Country Team Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), UNCT Appeal: Relief action plan and Appeal 2000 for victims of natural disasters in Ethiopia, 28 Jan. 2000, available on ReliefWeb at URL <<http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals>>.

¹⁰⁷ IRIN-CEA, Eritrea—Ethiopia: IRIN focus on Assab, 5 June 2000.

¹⁰⁸ Eritrea alleges heavy Ethiopian losses in new clash, *International Herald Tribune*, 15 May 2000, p. 4; and IRIN-CEA, Ethiopia/Eritrea: massive casualty figures reported, IRIN news brief, 24 May 2000.

¹⁰⁹ IRIN-CEA (note 108).

¹¹⁰ Hughes, R., Eritrea agrees to pull back, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 31 May 2000, p. 17.

¹¹¹ Time of reckoning (note 97); and Eritrea and Ethiopia at doubtful peace, *The Economist*, 24 June 2000, p. 56.

¹¹² US Committee for Refugees, The crisis in Eritrea and Ethiopia, May 2000, URL <http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/eritrea_ethiopia.htm>.

¹¹³ US Committee for Refugees, Country report: Eritrea, [n.d.], URL <<http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/eritrea.htm>>.

against Ethiopian insurgents in Somalia and Somali factions believed to support them.¹¹⁴

Sierra Leone

The conflict between the Sierra Leone Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began in 1991 and continued throughout 2000, despite the Lomé Peace Agreement, signed on 7 July 1999.¹¹⁵ The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) replaced the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).¹¹⁶ Thousands of rebels participated in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, but thousands of others engaged in ceasefire violations, reciprocal detentions of faction members and battles during the first four months of the year.¹¹⁷ In addition, they detained UNAMSIL soldiers and took their weapons on several occasions.¹¹⁸

Had it not been for the unilaterally deployed British troops who assisted the Sierra Leone Army and UNAMSIL, RUF forces would have entered the capital Freetown, as they had done in 1999.¹¹⁹ The rebels continued to control most of the diamond-rich area in the east.¹²⁰ At the end of the year limited numbers of rebels and militia continued to disarm. At the same time, fighting continued around several towns in the north-west and in the east along the borders with Guinea and Liberia, where the government pursued military efforts to dislodge the RUF.¹²¹

The fighting caused the displacement of about 500,000 people, increased the incidence of starvation and infectious disease, and hindered relief operations.¹²² Mutilation of civilians, for which the conflict is infamous, continued

¹¹⁴ Deutsche Presse Agentur, Ethiopia—Eritrea conflict reaches into Somalia, 28 June 1999; and Reuters, Ethiopia extends zone of control in Somalia, 29 June 1999.

¹¹⁵ United Nations, Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, UN document S/1999/777, 7 July 1999, annex. For a detailed account of the war and the troubled peace process in Sierra Leone, see appendix 2B in this volume.

¹¹⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1270, 22 Oct. 1999; and UN Security Council Resolution 1289, 7 Feb. 2000.

¹¹⁷ Appendix 5F in this volume provides information on arms transfers to Sierra Leone.

¹¹⁸ Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/455, 19 May 2000, paras 14–24, 57–63.

¹¹⁹ The battle for Freetown, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 10 (12 May 2000), pp. 1–2; and Freetown defenders repel rebels, *International Herald Tribune*, 12 May 2000, p. 4.

¹²⁰ Sierra Leone: going east, *The Economist*, 16 Sep. 2000, p. 53.

¹²¹ United Nations, Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/1055, 31 Oct. 2000, paras 3–7, 14; World Food Program (WFP), *WFP Emergency Report*, Report no. 42 (20 Oct. 2000), URL <<http://www.wfp.org/organization/ereport/2000/001020.htm>>; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Office for Western Africa (IRIN-WA), Sierra Leone: more fighters disarm, IRIN-WA weekly round-up 40, 30 Sep.—6 Oct. 2000; and Venter, A., Taking control in Sierra Leone, *Jane's International Defence Review*, Sep. 2000, p. 61.

¹²² Seventh report of the Secretary-General (note 121), paras 40–44.

in 2000.¹²³ Estimates vary widely, but it appears that over 60°000 people have been killed as a result of the conflict.¹²⁴

The conflict has had a transnational character from the beginning, when Charles Taylor encouraged the RUF to enter Sierra Leone from Liberia. Taylor is currently the president of Liberia, but at the time he was a rebel trying to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe. In 2000 the Liberian Government stood accused of sustaining the RUF by allowing (and profiting from) the illicit transit of diamonds from RUF-controlled areas of Sierra Leone. Although President Taylor strongly denied it, ample evidence showed that Liberia provided material support, territorial access and military advice to the RUF.¹²⁵ Investigation by a UN-appointed panel shows that Burkina Faso also played a central role in the sanctions-breaking transshipment of diamonds from and arms to the RUF. The Burkina Faso Government denied the charge.¹²⁶

Fighting began to spread beyond Sierra Leone at the end of the year as RUF fighters assisted Guinean insurgents by attacking villages in Guinea and causing hundreds of civilian deaths, according to the Guinean Government.¹²⁷ Guinea accused the Liberian Government of supporting the attacks, a charge also made by the UN Security Council.¹²⁸ Liberia accused Guinea of backing Liberian dissidents. The two governments denied each other's charges.¹²⁹ Regional governments expressed grave concern at the potential for regional destabilization and ECOWAS decided in principle to deploy military observers along the borders of Guinea and Liberia.¹³⁰

Sudan

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), under John Garang, and other groups in southern Sudan have fought for independence from the government in Khartoum since 1983. A second dimension of opposition to the national government opened in 1989 when the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in a coup that installed a fundamentalist Islamic regime, under President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir. Northern opposition groups emerged that sought a unified country and a secular government.

¹²³ Human Rights Watch, U.N. chief urged to protect civilians: letter to Kofi Annan, 29 Nov. 2000, URL <<http://www.hrw.org/organization/press/2000/11/annanltr.htm>>.

¹²⁴ Diamonds I: masters of war, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 16 (4 Aug. 2000), p. 1. Other estimates are 75°000, in Smillie, I., Gberie, L. and Hazleton, R., *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security (Complete Report)*, (Partnership Africa Canada: Ottawa, Jan. 2000), p.°8, and 100°000, in de Hoyos, L., Donors abandon Sierra Leone, *Africanews*, vol. 5, no. 12 (15 Dec. 1999), p. 9.

¹²⁵ Report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (note°8), paras 181—194, 199—218.

¹²⁶ Report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (note°8), paras 198, 204—212.

¹²⁷ United Nations, Report of the Security Council mission to Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/992, 16°Oct. 2000, para. 33.

¹²⁸ United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN document S/PRST/2000/41, 21 Dec. 2000.

¹²⁹ United Nations, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN document S/2000/1199, 15 Dec. 2000, para. 10.

¹³⁰ Report of the Security Council mission to Sierra Leone (note 127), paras 34—35; and Eighth report of the Secretary-General (note 129), para. 12.

Southern and northern opposition groups formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), despite differences over the degree of southern autonomy and the proper means of opposition.¹³¹

In the second week of January 2000, the government and the SPLM/A extended their unilaterally declared humanitarian ceasefires for three months. The SPLM/A immediately accused the government of violating its ceasefire by bombing a town in the southern Equatoria region.¹³² Throughout the year, both sides followed a pattern of violating and then renewing their ceasefires.¹³³ The provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal in the south-west and Upper Nile in the south-east suffered the most violence, particularly from May onward.¹³⁴ The SPLM/A launched ground assaults on government-held towns and rail links.¹³⁵ They made small advances northward during the year, but the areas of control in the south did not change substantially.¹³⁶ The government responded primarily by bombing rebel-held towns, which it did more than 150 times.¹³⁷ Many of the towns were also humanitarian aid distribution points. It appears that one of the government's objectives is to depopulate areas where it wants to expand oil drilling fields.¹³⁸ The SPLM/A has said that oil extracting areas are legitimate military targets and pledged to sabotage oil facilities.¹³⁹

The biggest military change was the NDA's use of violence in the Ashe Sharqiyah province, east of Khartoum near the Eritrean border. From there the rebels potentially threaten road, rail and oil pipeline links to the Red Sea.¹⁴⁰ Two events presaged the new fighting. Sudanese dissidents were forced to leave Eritrea in the wake of an Eritrean—Sudanese rapprochement and the Islamisist Umma Party left the NDA, which removed from the Alliance a

¹³¹ Johnson, D., *The Sudan conflict: historical and political background*, eds F. Loane and T. Sch mer, *The Wider Impact of Humanitarian Assistance: The Case of Sudan and the Implications for European Union Policy*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Conflict Prevention Network 60/6 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: Baden-Baden, 2000), pp. 60—69; Sudan's chance for peace, *The Economist*, 22 Jan. 2000, p. 43; and Sudan's decades of war, BBC News Online, 17 Jan. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

¹³² IRIN-CEA, Sudan: rebels, government extend humanitarian ceasefire, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 3, 15—17 Jan. 2000.

¹³³ Secretary-General welcomes Sudan Government's announcement of humanitarian ceasefire, 29 April to 15 July, Press release, UN document SG/SM/7374, 1 May 2000; Sudan Government extends ceasefire, BBC News Online, 22 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; and US Committee for Refugees, Government of Sudan renews aerial bombings after losing bid for UN Security Council seat, Press release, 13 Oct. 2000.

¹³⁴ IRIN, Sudan: EU concerned over break of Bahr el Ghazal ceasefire, IRIN update for the Horn of Africa, 3 July 2000; IRIN-CEA, Sudan: renewed fighting causes deep concern, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 28, 8—14 July 2000; and US Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Sudan complex emergency information bulletin #1 (FY 2000), 13 Sep. 2000.

¹³⁵ Agence France-Presse (World Service), 4 Aug. 2000, in Sudan: SPLA spokesman says rebels capture strategic town in south, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report—Sub-Saharan Africa (FBIS-AFR)*, FBIS-AFR-2000-0804, 7 Aug. 2000.

¹³⁶ Agence France-Presse (World Service), 29 Aug. 2000, in Sudan: rebels claim capturing strategic bridge, FBIS-AFR-2000-0829, 30 Aug. 2000.

¹³⁷ US Committee for Refugees, Sudan's military bombed civilian sites 152 times last year, 23 Jan. 2001.

¹³⁸ US Committee for Refugees (note 137).

¹³⁹ IRIN-CEA, Sudan oil wells burning, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 22, 27 Jan.—2 Feb. 2001.

¹⁴⁰ IRIN-CEA, Sudan: rebels attack strategic Kassala airport, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up 13, 25—31 Mar. 2000.

strong voice against the use of violence.¹⁴¹ Many of the fighters in the northern province are reportedly southerners who do not belong to the SPLM/A.¹⁴² In November the NDA briefly captured Kassala for the first time before government forces drove them out in heavy fighting.¹⁴³ The army also made gains in December in the Nuba Mountains of Kordofan province in central Sudan.¹⁴⁴

Rival peace processes proposed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and by Egypt and Libya did not produce results in 2000.¹⁴⁵ Distinct from these was a peace agreement between tribal militia in southern Sudan in May that appeared to end internecine fighting. Militia violence had been a major cause of the humanitarian crisis in the south since the government instigated it in the early 1980s to weaken the SPLM/A.¹⁴⁶

At the regional level, the conflicts in Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda tie into each other. The SPLM/A had the backing of Eritrea and Ethiopia until 1999, when the war in the Horn of Africa led Ethiopia to seek closer ties with the government in Khartoum in an effort to build alliances with Eritrea's dissidents residing in Sudan. This caused Eritrea also to seek favour with the Sudanese Government.¹⁴⁷ Sudan's relationship with Eritrea remained strained in 2000 over mutual accusations of support to each other's opposition groups.¹⁴⁸ In December 1999 Sudan and Uganda agreed to stop harbouring each other's rebels.¹⁴⁹ However, both sides' commitments to the agreement are questionable. In March Ugandan Foreign Minister Eriya Kategaya said that Uganda would continue to support the SPLM/A.¹⁵⁰

The costs of the war have been enormous. At least 1.9 million people died from violence, famine and disease in 1983–98.¹⁵¹ In 2000 the estimate of the number of people who have died from causes linked to the war was 2°million. Over 4°million people were internally displaced or refugees, constituting the largest displaced population in the world.¹⁵² UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) through Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) assist the southern population. The political and military importance of humanitarian aid was highlighted in early 2000 when the Sudan Relief and

¹⁴¹ Connell, D., Rebel coalition escalates Sudan's civil war, *Guardian Weekly* (27 Apr.—3 May 2000), p. 3; and Conquests in Cairo, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 41, no. 8 (14 Apr. 2000), p. 8.

¹⁴² Johnson (note 131), p. 69.

¹⁴³ IRIN-Horn of Africa, Sudan: army claims control of Kassala, IRIN weekly round-up 10, 4–10 Nov. 2000.

¹⁴⁴ IRIN-Horn of Africa, Sudan: army claims victory in southern Kordofan, IRIN weekly round-up 15, 9–15 Dec. 2000; and Sudanese Army retakes rebel stronghold, BBC News Online, 14 Dec. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

¹⁴⁵ For information on both peace processes, see chapter 2 in this volume.

¹⁴⁶ US Agency for International Development (note 134); and Johnson (note 131), pp. 62–63, 67–68.

¹⁴⁷ Africa's forgotten war, *The Economist*, 8 May 1999, p. 45.

¹⁴⁸ Agence France-Presse (World Service), 18 July 2000, in Sudan claims evidence of Eritrean backing for planned rebel offensive, FBIS-AFR-2000-0718, 19 July 2000.

¹⁴⁹ Agence France-Presse (World Service), Uganda: Sudan rebel Garang says accord not to affect war, 11 Dec. 1999, in FBIS-AFR-2000-0718, 13 Dec. 1999.

¹⁵⁰ Pan-African News Agency (Dakar), 3 Mar. 2000, in Ugandan foreign minister vows to continue support for Sudanese rebels, FBIS-AFR-2000-0304, 6 Mar. 2000.

¹⁵¹ Burr, M., *Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, 1983–1998* (US Committee for Refugees: Washington, DC, Dec. 1998), p. 3, URL <<http://www.refugees.organization/news/crisis/sudan.pdf>>.

¹⁵² US Committee for Refugees (note 133).

Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), an arm of the SPLM/A, imposed a memorandum of understanding on relief organizations which many NGOs said compromised their neutrality. Some NGOs withdrew but most eventually returned.¹⁵³ The Sudanese Government also tried to control the flow of aid by insisting that all relief flights pass through Khartoum, but it soon relaxed the requirement.¹⁵⁴

Asia

Afghanistan

Fighting continued in the northern part of Afghanistan between the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA, also called the Northern Alliance), led by military chief Ahmad Shah Massoud and political head Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the Taliban, under Supreme Leader Mullah Muhammad Omar. The two groups have fought over control of the state since 1994, although the country has been at war since 1978, when the Soviet Union invaded in an attempt to ensure a pro-Moscow government. The Taliban are the acting government, in control of the capital Kabul and 90–95 per cent of the country, which they call the Emirate of Islamic Afghanistan. However, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognize them as the legitimate government.¹⁵⁵ The UIFSA holds the Afghan seat at the United Nations.

Small-scale infantry, artillery and armour clashes occurred on an almost weekly basis from January until May in the northern provinces and near Kabul, as the UIFSA tried to consolidate gains it had made in 1999 and the Taliban tried to reverse them. Each battle typically caused military and civilian casualties in the range of 20–30 people.¹⁵⁶ Fighting subsided in June, but 5000–7000 Taliban fighters attacked UIFSA troops on 1 and 9 July around the Bagram airbase 50 km north of Kabul.¹⁵⁷ Between 200 and 400 people were killed and 500–650 wounded, about 75 per cent of them from the Taliban.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ Agence France-Presse (World Service), 20 Jan. 2000, in Sudanese rebels give NGOs working in south ultimatum, FBIS-AFR-2000-0120, 24 Jan. 2000; and IRIN-CEA, Sudan: expelled NGOs call on SRRA to negotiate, IRIN-CEA weekly round-up '9, 26 Feb.—3 Mar. 2000.

¹⁵⁴ Sudan aid flight order, BBC News Online, 1 Aug., URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ross Mountain, Assis-tant Emergency Relief Coordinator, rejects allegations against relief community, 1 Aug. 2000.

¹⁵⁵ Ullah, I., Interview with Mulla Amir Khan Muttaqi, *The Nation* (Islamabad), 30 May 2000, in Taleban minister on Afghan situation, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report—Near East/South Asia* (FBIS-NES), FBIS-NES-2000-0530, 31 May 2000; Drier and more desperate, *The Economist*, 12 Aug. 2000, p. 55; and Integrated Regional Information Network for Central Asia (IRIN-CA), Afghanistan: IRIN interview with Taliban Ambassador Abdul Salam Zaeef, 8 Nov. 2000.

¹⁵⁶ Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Dari), 26 Jan. 2000, in Afghan Taleban reportedly losing ground in north, FBIS-NES-2000-0126, 27 Jan. 2000; and Agence France-Presse, 22 May 2000, in Heavy fighting erupts in north Afghanistan, FBIS-NES-2000-0522, 23 May 2000.

¹⁵⁷ Agence France-Presse, 2 July 2000, in Afghanistan: fighting subsides after heavy battle north of Kabul, FBIS-NES-2000-0702, 3 July 2000; and Agence France-Presse, 9 July 2000, in Fierce fighting erupts north of Afghan capital Kabul, FBIS-NES-2000-0709, 10 July 2000.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/55/393-S/2000/875, 18 Sep. 2000, paras 24–26.

Despite the losses, 8000—10 000 Taliban and non-Afghan fighters launched an offensive on 28 July against the 10°000- to 15 000-strong UIFSA in provinces north of Kabul.¹⁵⁹ Within days, they cut off an important UIFSA supply route from Tajikistan to the Panjshir valley, which is a stronghold of the UIFSA.¹⁶⁰ This opened the way for an armoured and infantry assault on Taloqan, the last major town controlled by the UIFSA, which the Taliban captured on 6°September, with heavy losses on both sides.¹⁶¹ The UIFSA's desperate situation induced generals Abdul Rashid Dostum and Abdulmelik Khan, who were rivals of UIFSA leaders Rabbani and Massoud and resided outside Afghanistan, to rejoin military activities on the side of the UIFSA.¹⁶²

At the beginning of 2000 there were 500°000—750°000 internally displaced Afghans and over 2.6 million refugees, almost all of whom were in Iran and Pakistan.¹⁶³ Iran and Pakistan both claimed that they hosted nearly 2°million refugees.¹⁶⁴ Fighting around Taloqan caused at least 70°000 additional people to flee, many of whom went to Pakistan but most of whom remained in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Tajikistan closed their borders, fearing destabilization and claiming that most refugees were fleeing the worst drought in 30°years, not violence.¹⁶⁵

The Afghan conflict has several transnational manifestations. Concerns that it creates instability in Central Asia centre on allegations that Pakistan materially supports the Taliban, who then provide training and support for fighters in Chechnya and Uzbekistan.¹⁶⁶ In a significant departure from previous policy, the Uzbeki Government became the first of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to open bilateral talks with the Taliban. The Taliban claimed that they want friendly relations with all their neighbours.¹⁶⁷ Fears of regional destabilization intensified as civilians and UIFSA

¹⁵⁹ Davis, A., Taliban ignores UN appeal to end war, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Sep. 2000, p. 2; Davis, A., Latest Taliban conquest a major loss for Northern Alliance, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Oct. 2000, p. 7; and The situation in Afghanistan (note 158), paras 27—28.

¹⁶⁰ Bashir, M., Agence France-Presse, 28 July 2000, in Afghanistan's ruling Taliban militia captures key northern town, FBIS-NES-2000-0728, 31 July 2000; and Davis, Taliban ignores UN appeal to end war (note 159).

¹⁶¹ Agence France-Presse, 6 Aug. 2000, in Heavy fighting rages in northeastern Afghanistan, FBIS-NES-2000-0806, 7 Aug. 2000; and The situation in Afghanistan (note 158), para. 29.

¹⁶² Anatolia (Ankara), 8 Aug. 2000, in Some 40,000 Taleban opponents in Afghanistan said expecting Turkey's support, FBIS-NES-2000-0808, 9 Aug. 2000; and Afghan opposition to open new fronts, BBC News Online, 5 Oct. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

¹⁶³ US Committee for Refugees, Country report: Afghanistan, 2000, URL <<http://www.refugees.org/>>.

¹⁶⁴ Xinhua News Agency, Iran repatriates over 150,000 Afghan refugees, 15 Nov. 2000; and IRIN-CA, Pakistan: Afghan refugees an economic burden, official says, 14 Nov. 2000.

¹⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch, Refugee crisis in Afghanistan, 11 Nov. 2000, URL <<http://www.hrw.org/>>; IRIN-CA, Pakistan: Afghan refugees an economic burden, official says, 14°Nov. 2000; and Davis, A., Latest Taliban conquest (note 159).

¹⁶⁶ Korgun, V., Afghan factor in regional geopolitics, *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, no. 5 (2000), pp. 138—46; ITAR-TASS (in Russian), 27 Sep. 2000, in Russia: Presidential envoy hopes for Pakistani influence on Afghan Taleban, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV)*, FBIS-SOV-2000-0927, 28 Sep. 2000; and Price, S., Russia urges Afghan clampdown, BBC News Online, 27 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

¹⁶⁷ Kuznechevskiy, V., *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (in Russian), 10 Oct. 2000, in Implications of Uzbekistan's separate talks with Afghan Taleban viewed, FBIS-NES-2000-1010, 13 Oct. 2000; and RIA, in Russian), 16 Oct. 2000, in Afghan Taleban says it presents no threat to Uzbekistan, FBIS-SOV-2000-1016, 17 Oct. 2000.

fled the September Taliban advance to the closed Tajik border, where Russia maintained approximately 16°000 border guards and 6592 special army troops.¹⁶⁸

Additionally, Afghanistan is the world's leading producer of opium, the production and trade of which provide income for the Taliban and some Central Asian insurgent groups.¹⁶⁹ A 27th July decree by the Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, banned opium poppy cultivation, and a preliminary assessment showed a 10 per cent reduction in poppy cultivation in 2000 compared to the record large crop in 1999.¹⁷⁰ It is important to keep in mind, however, that the drought alone could account for the reduction. Central Asian governments continued to view drug trafficking as a serious threat and stepped up efforts to stop it.¹⁷¹

In December Russia and the USA jointly sponsored a UN Security Council resolution that condemned the Taliban for supporting and training international terrorists and for profiting from drug trafficking. It imposed diplomatic and economic restrictions and a total arms embargo on the Taliban (but not the UIFSA).¹⁷²

India: Kashmir

The Indian Government has fought a number of Muslim separatist groups in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989 in a conflict that has killed at least 25°000 people, according to Indian police, and maybe as many as 70°000. Most estimates are below 40°000.¹⁷³ Civilians account for at least half of the deaths.¹⁷⁴ Separatists continued throughout 2000 to detonate bombs on almost a weekly basis. Security forces responded by shooting and detaining suspected rebels, and sometimes killing suspects while they were in custody.¹⁷⁵

The Indian Government and independent observers accuse Pakistan of training, supplying and directing the militants.¹⁷⁶ A number of separatists are

¹⁶⁸ Information supplied by the Russian Embassy in Stockholm, 26 Feb. 2001. The situation in Afghanistan (note 158), para. 56; McCarthy, R., 'Starving Tajiks fear new wave of Afghan refugees', *Guardian Weekly*, 19–25 Oct. 2000, p. 7; and Olimova, S., 'Tajikistan—Russia: from divorce to integration', *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, no. 3 (2000), p. 39.

¹⁶⁹ McCarthy, R., Agence France-Presse, 18 Feb. 2000, in 'Taleban \$100 million war chest from drugs, transit', FBIS-NES-2000-0218, 22 Feb. 2000; and McCarthy (note 168).

¹⁷⁰ The situation in Afghanistan (note 158), paras 43, 45.

¹⁷¹ Central Asian states assess narcotics threat, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline*, vol. 5, no. 20, part 1 (30 Jan. 2001).

¹⁷² UN Security Council Resolution 1333, 19 Dec. 2000. For information on transfers of major and light weapons to both sides in 2000, see chapter 5 and appendix 5F in this volume.

¹⁷³ Talking and killing in Kashmir, *The Economist*, 3 June 2000, pp. 63–64; Constable, P., 'Awful routine of Kashmir violence', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 July 2000, p. 9; Bearak, B., 'At least 101 are slain in Kashmir massacres', *International Herald Tribune*, 3 Aug. 2000, p. 4; Dhume, S., 'Try harder', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 Aug. 2000, p. 20; and Hussain, Z., 'A short-lived ceasefire', *Newsweek*, 28 Aug. 2000, p. 39.

¹⁷⁴ Bedi, R., 'Kashmir: India under siege', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 Feb. 2000, pp. 24–25.

¹⁷⁵ Bomb explodes on Kashmir train, *International Herald Tribune*, 11 Feb. 2000, p. 3; Police kill 10 Kashmir protesters, *International Herald Tribune*, 4 Apr. 2000, p. 8; and Constable (note 173).

¹⁷⁶ Lak, D., 'Kashmir: the unbearable cost of conflict', BBC News Online, 7 Mar. 2000, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_669000/669406.stm>; Bokhari, F., 'Separatist leader warns against peace moves', *Financial Times*, 8 July 2000, p. 4; and Bedi, R., 'No peace in Kashmir', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 Aug. 2000, p. 17.

known to have bases on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-held territory. Pakistan insists that it provides only political and moral support to the separatists.¹⁷⁷ The composition of the separatist movement has changed since 1989. Hizbul Mujahideen is now the only large group dominated by Kashmiris. The two other most prominent groups, Lashkar-e-Toyeba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, are newer and are made up mainly of Afghans and Pakistanis who are more ideological and strictly Islamic.¹⁷⁸ Some insurgent groups want an independent Kashmiri state; others want Kashmir to become a part of Pakistan.

A weak chance for a diplomatic breakthrough came on 24 July, when the Hizbul Mujahideen unilaterally declared a ceasefire.¹⁷⁹ A wide array of violent and non-violent dissident groups criticized the unilateral action.¹⁸⁰ Militants opposed to the ceasefire killed over 100 people during the first two days of August.¹⁸¹ Indian and Hizbul Mujahideen officials met once, but Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee refused the separatists' demand to allow Pakistan to join the talks and insisted that talks take place within the framework of the Indian constitution, which identifies Kashmir as a part of India. The Hizbul Mujahideen did not accept the conditions and ended its ceasefire on 8° August after two weeks.¹⁸² On 19 November India unexpectedly declared a unilateral ceasefire for the month of Ramadan in an apparent effort to bring Kashmiri guerrillas to the negotiating table and isolate Pakistani-based extremist groups.¹⁸³ Rebel groups opposed to the Indian initiative, notably Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toyeba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, continued their violent struggle.¹⁸⁴

Regular small engagements between Indian and Pakistani troops across the Line of Control raised the spectre of full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed countries in their long-running border conflict.¹⁸⁵ However, an encouraging sign was Pakistan's neutrality regarding talks between the Indian Government and rebels. Pakistan took the opportunity to call for renewed talks

¹⁷⁷ Constable, P., Pakistani leader urges Kashmir rebels to unite, *International Herald Tribune*, 7°Feb. 2000, p. 9.

¹⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant Groups Continue*, July 1999, document C1104; and Who are the Kashmir militants?, BBC News Online, 10 Aug. 2000, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_355000/355616.stm>; and Breakthrough in Kashmir?, *The Economist*, 29 July 2000, p. 59.

¹⁷⁹ Cease-fire begins in Kashmir, *International Herald Tribune*, 25 July 2000, p. 5.

¹⁸⁰ Breakthrough in Kashmir? (note 178); and Kashmiris split on cease-fire, *International Herald Tribune*, 27 July 2000, p. 3.

¹⁸¹ Bearak (note 173).

¹⁸² New row hits Kashmir process, BBC News Online, 7 Aug. 2000, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_869000/869915.stm>; and Bearak, B., Bomb in India Kashmir kills 10 and wounds 24, *International Herald Tribune*, 11 Aug. 2000, p. 5.

¹⁸³ Constable, P., India's cease-fire offer on Kashmir ignites some wary reactions, *International Herald Tribune*, 23 Nov. 2000, p. 8.

¹⁸⁴ Militant groups reject Kashmir ceasefire, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 Nov. 2000, p. 8; and Hussain, A., Nine die in Kashmir violence, BBC News Online, 14 Dec. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

¹⁸⁵ Miller, J. and Risen, J., U.S. fearful that a Pakistan—India war could turn nuclear, *International Herald Tribune*, 9 Aug. 2000, p. 5; Mann, P., Tensions remain high in volatile South Asia, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 28 Feb. 2000, p. 62; and Indian and Pakistani forces clash, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 27 Sep. 2000, p. 6.

between the two countries, but India refused on the grounds that armed militants continued to cross into India from Pakistan.¹⁸⁶ When India renewed its unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir in December, Pakistan announced the partial withdrawal of troops along the Line of Control.¹⁸⁷

Indonesia

The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) has since 1976 sought an independent state in the Indonesian province of Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra. The conflict has killed over 5000 people, most of them since 1989, and generated about 70°000 refugees out of a population of 4—4.5°million.¹⁸⁸ In 2000 the violence killed over 800 people, according to a local human rights group.¹⁸⁹ The GAM's violent tactics contrast with other groups' non-violent methods and make them unpopular with most Acehnese, who often fall victim to attacks and intimidation by police, government soldiers and rebels.¹⁹⁰ In May the GAM and the Indonesian Government agreed to their first ceasefire, from 2 June to 2 September. The government called it a humanitarian pause and did not formally recognize the rebel movement. The GAM said that it was a means to explore the possibilities of an end to the violence.¹⁹¹ Both sides renewed the agreement in September until 15°January 2001.¹⁹² The agreements did not stop the attacks on civilians. Civil authority weakened, the GAM attacked military and police targets, and security forces retaliated without making a careful distinction between rebels and non-rebels. The government said that 40 civilians and 21 members of the security forces died from the time the ceasefire was supposed to begin through September, but observers said that there were over 100 civilian deaths.¹⁹³ By the end of the year estimates of civilian deaths since the beginning of the humanitarian pause ranged from over 240 to 400.¹⁹⁴

The conflict has not moved towards settlement despite Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid's consent to the application of Islamic Sharia law in the province, one trial of soldiers for a civilian massacre, statements in 1999 about a referendum on autonomy, and promises of greater local benefit from oil and

¹⁸⁶ India rebuffs call for Kashmir talks, *International Herald Tribune*, 6 Dec. 2000, p. 6.

¹⁸⁷ Bearak, B., Both sides step back on Kashmir, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 Dec. 2000, p. 5.

¹⁸⁸ Olson, E., Indonesians sign pact on cease-fire in Aceh, *International Herald Tribune*, 13—14 May 2000, p. 2; Aceh ceasefire extended, BBC News Online, 2 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; Aglionby, J., Aceh rebels spurn talks with Jakarta, *Guardian Weekly*, 16—22 Nov. 2000, p. 4; and Ravich, S., Eyeing Indonesia through the lens of Aceh, *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 3 (summer 2000), p. 14.

¹⁸⁹ Chandrasekaran, R., Aceh aid worker reports execution-style killings, *International Herald Tribune*, 14 Dec. 2000, p. 5.

¹⁹⁰ Haseman, J., Aceh rebels take step towards peace, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 24 May 2000, p. 13.

¹⁹¹ Indonesia: Aceh ceasefire pact signed, *Asian Defence Journal*, June 2000, p. 52; and Olson (note°188).

¹⁹² Human Rights Watch (HRW), Indonesia: Aceh situation worsening, human rights groups warn, HRW press release, 25 Sep. 2000.

¹⁹³ Human Rights Watch (note 192); Sims, C., Leading critic of Indonesia crackdown is slain in Aceh, *International Herald Tribune*, 18 Sep. 2000, p. 5; and Aglionby (note 188).

¹⁹⁴ Husarska, A., Aceh and Jakarta are drifting apart, *International Herald Tribune*, 30 Nov. 2000, p.°6; and Sims, C., Security tight in restive Aceh ahead of visit by president, *International Herald Tribune*, 19 Dec. 2000, p. 7.

gas revenue generated in Aceh.¹⁹⁵ The GAM demands independence, which Wahid has ruled out.¹⁹⁶ GAM representatives did not attend planned peace talks in November because of escalating government violence and refused to meet Wahid when he briefly visited Aceh in December.¹⁹⁷

Inter-communal fighting in Indonesia's Molucca province erupted on 19 January 1999 in the city of Ambon, apparently in response to a fight between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger.¹⁹⁸ Police and military units were unable or unwilling to quell the violence, which spread over the group of islands, causing the deaths of 3000–4000 people and forcing more than 500 000 from their homes.¹⁹⁹ The conflict is driven by competition for local economic and political control, which traditionally have been accompanied by patronage and corruption. Christians predominantly populated the islands until Muslims from other parts of Indonesia began to arrive 30 years ago. The population is now about half Christian and half Muslim. Members of the Muslim community, appointed by central authorities in Jakarta, now dominate the local bureaucracy.²⁰⁰ It appears that fighting is encouraged by some military officers and opposition politicians who want to weaken President Wahid.

Increased police and army presence and a presidential declaration of a state of emergency on 26 July did not stem the violence. Instead, policemen and soldiers began to join the fight, taking sides according to their religion.²⁰¹ The conflict intensified when the Islamic militant group Laskar Jihad, based on the island of Java, sent 2000–3000 fighters to Molucca in May and June.²⁰² The militants give residents the choice between converting to Islam or facing death. Government officials said that up to 2000 members of Laskar Jihad remained in Molucca in November.²⁰³

The Philippines

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has fought for an independent Islamic state on the southern island of Mindanao since 1984, when it broke off

¹⁹⁵ Ravich (note 188); Chandrasekaran, R. and Rianom A., 24 soldiers are convicted of killing Aceh villagers, *International Herald Tribune*, 18 May 2000, pp. 1, 6; and Indonesia's Aceh to have Sharia law, BBC News Online, 4 Dec. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/>>.

¹⁹⁶ A president on a limp mission, *The Economist*, 29 Jan. 2000, p. 72.

¹⁹⁷ Aceh peace talks break down, *International Herald Tribune*, 13 Nov. 2000, p. 4; and Chandrasekaran, R., Wahid seeks reconciliation with Aceh, *International Herald Tribune*, 20 Dec. 2000, p. 4.

¹⁹⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia's Maluku crisis: the issues, ICG Indonesia briefing (Jakarta/Brussels), 19 July 2000, p. 2.

¹⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), Moluccan Islands: communal violence in Indonesia, HRW Backgrounder, June 2000, URL <<http://www.hrw.org>>; Aglionby, J., Army sides with Muslims in Moluccas fighting, *Guardian Weekly*, 20–26 July 2000, p. 2; and Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 27 Nov. 2000, in Indonesia: more Islamists arrive in Maluku, situation worsening for refugees, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report East Asia (FBIS-EAS)*, FBIS-EAS-2000-1127, 29 Nov. 2000.

²⁰⁰ International Crisis Group (note 198), p. 4 and fn. 2; and Human Rights Watch (note 199).

²⁰¹ Aglionby (note 199); McCawley, T., Moluccas may need outside aid to stop conflict, *Financial Times*, 20 July 2000, p. 6; and Human Rights Watch (HRW), Indonesia must control troops, HRW press release, 29 June 2000, URL <<http://www.hrw.org>>.

²⁰² Aglionby (note 199); and Human Rights Watch (note 199).

²⁰³ Agence France-Presse (note 199).

from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF ended its 25-year armed struggle in 1996. The MILF is the largest Philippine rebel group, with 12°000—15°000 armed members and much wider popular support.²⁰⁴ The MILF took the towns of Talayan in January and Kauswagan in March.²⁰⁵ Government forces responded by capturing a rebel base in February and recaptured Kauswagan in March.²⁰⁶ Continued clashes led to a government offensive at the end of April that pushed the rebels back from an important highway near the main MILF camp of Abu Bakar and led the MILF to withdraw from talks on 30 April.²⁰⁷ They called a unilateral ceasefire a week later.²⁰⁸ Although the peace talks, which had made little progress since they began in 1997, resumed as scheduled, the army and air force continued to overrun rebel bases.²⁰⁹ A brief round of talks did not lead to agreement, and on 9°July the army captured Abu Bakar.²¹⁰ The fighting after March cost hundreds of lives and caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee.²¹¹ Although weakened, the MILF continued to attack military posts until the end of the year.²¹²

The New People's Army (NPA) is a communist organization that has fought for a Marxist government in the Philippines since 1968. It operates on a number of islands but, with a maximum of 11°000 fighters, it is dramatically weaker than it was in the mid-1980s, at its peak strength of more than 26°000.²¹³ Factional splits within the NPA became apparent in 1999, when one of the largest factions, on the island of Negros, agreed to disarm. In 2000 the NPA engaged in sporadic hit-and-run attacks throughout the country.²¹⁴ The Philippine Army responded with attacks on rebel camps.²¹⁵ The NPA and the MILF announced a loose alliance in April.²¹⁶

²⁰⁴ Davis, A., Evolution in the Philippines, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2000, p. 30; Davis, A., Philippines set for wider war, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 2000, p. 3; and In Philippines, 100,000 flee as fighting rages in south, *International Herald Tribune*, 14 Apr. 2000, p. 5.

²⁰⁵ Davis, A., Philippines set for wider war (note 204).

²⁰⁶ Government action against MILF continues, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 Mar. 2000, p. 6.

²⁰⁷ In Philippines, 100,000 flee as fighting rages in south (note 204); Davis, A., MILF rebels agree to resume peace talks with Manila, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 31°May 2000, p. 14; and Davis, A., Evolution in the Philippines (note 204), p. 32.

²⁰⁸ Rebels announce pullout in Philippines, *International Herald Tribune*, 16 May 2000, p. 8.

²⁰⁹ Kirk, D., For Filipinos, a triumph in war, *International Herald Tribune*, 17 July 2000, p. 1; Davis, A., Evolution in the Philippines (note 204), p. 33; and Philippine Army seizes rebel camp, BBC News Online, 30 May 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²¹⁰ Philippine rebels weigh proposal for autonomy, *International Herald Tribune*, 2 June 2000, p. 5; and The Philippines: one victory, more needed, *The Economist*, 15 July 2000, pp. 60—61.

²¹¹ The Philippines: one victory, more needed (note 210); and Rebels announce pullout (note 208).

²¹² MILF launches new attack, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 Aug. 2000, p. 15; Fighting in southern Philippines, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 Oct. 2000, p. 21; and Philippine rebel attacks kill 9, *International Herald Tribune*, 20 Oct. 2000, p. 9.

²¹³ Philippine army convoy ambushed, BBC News Online, 21 Aug. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²¹⁴ McLean, J., Soldiers killed in Philippines ambush, BBC News Online, 28 June 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; 13 die in Philippines shoot-out, *International Herald Tribune*, 6 July 2000, p. 6; Philippine army convoy ambushed (note 213); and Philippine rebels kill 17°soldiers, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 30 Aug. 2000, p. 14.

²¹⁵ Philippine army attacks rebel camp, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 22 Mar. 2000, p. 14.

²¹⁶ Davis, Evolution in the Philippines (note 204), p. 31.

Sri Lanka

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Vellupillai Prabhakaran, have sought a separate state for the minority Tamil population in the north and east of the island country of Sri Lanka since the 1970s. The conflict turned violent in 1983 and since then has killed approximately 60 000 soldiers and civilians and displaced about 700 000.²¹⁷ The LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government, led by Prime Minister Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, agreed to accept a Norwegian intermediary in February but the conflict continued unabated.²¹⁸ The battles between the army and the LTTE take place in the north, well away from the capital Colombo, so the political elite does not directly feel the effects. In an attempt to increase pressure on the elite, LTTE suicide bombers attacked political and civilian targets in the capital Colombo and other cities throughout the year, killing several hundred people. Bombings were most frequent before the parliamentary elections held in October.²¹⁹ Military engagements and terrorist bombs killed about 4000 soldiers and civilians in 2000.²²⁰

The LTTE, numbering about 7000 at the beginning of the year, sporadically engaged the Sri Lankan Army of about 90 000, as well as the air force and navy in January and February.²²¹ The rebels built on their gains in the previous year when they pre-empted a planned government offensive on 26 March 2000 with a northward attack on Elephant Pass. A rebel force of 1800—3500 with superior tactics and morale drove about 10 000 army troops from the heavily defended land link between the main part of the island and the northern Jaffna Peninsula on 22 April.²²² The month-long battle killed hundreds of soldiers on both sides and caused over 12 000 civilians to flee.²²³ The rebels captured a second government line of defence at Pallai on 30 April.²²⁴ During

²¹⁷ Estimates range from 50 000 to 65 000. Most sources say over 60 000. Joshi, C., 'Needed: Tiger balm', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 Mar. 2000, p. 23; 'Tamil Tigers threaten army's supply lines', *International Herald Tribune*, 18 May 2000, p. 2; Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 27 June 2000, in 'Norwegian-funded aid agency bombed in Sri Lankan capital', FBIS-NES-2000-0627, 29 June 2000; and 'The war the world is missing', *The Economist*, 7 Oct. 2000, pp. 27—28, 36.

²¹⁸ For more on the Norwegian peace effort, see chapter 2 in this volume. 'Battle mars Sri Lanka peace hopes', BBC News Online, 16 Feb. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²¹⁹ Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 11 Feb. 2000, in 'Fresh Sri Lanka fighting kills 10 Tamil Tiger guerrillas', FBIS-NES-2000-0111, 14 Feb. 2000; and 'Candidate killed in Sri Lanka blast', *International Herald Tribune*, 3 Oct. 2000, p. 4.

²²⁰ Harrison, F., 'Secrecy surrounds Sri Lanka talks', BBC News Online, 10 Jan. 2001, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²²¹ Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 16 Jan. 2000, in 'Colombo says 33 killed [in] clashes with Tamil guerrillas', FBIS-NES-2000-0116, 19 Jan. 2000; and 'Battle mars Sri Lanka peace hopes' (note 218).

²²² Jayasinghe, A., Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 27 Mar. 2000, in 'Sri Lanka: toll 26 in ferocious land, air, sea battles', FBIS-NES-2000-0327, 29 Mar. 2000; 'Tamils capture Jaffna—Kandy highway', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 Apr. 2000, p. 6; and Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 23 Apr. 2000, in 'Colombo admits losing strategic base; LTTE claims victory', FBIS-NES-2000-0423, 24 Apr. 2000.

²²³ Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 3 Apr. 2000, in 'Refugee exodus as Sri Lanka fighting enters second week', FBIS-NES-2000-0403, 7 Apr. 2000; and Dhume, S., 'Taming the tiger', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 May 2000, pp. 20—21.

²²⁴ Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 1 May 2000, in 'Heavy fighting in Sri Lanka as LTTE take another town', FBIS-NES-2000-0501, 2 May 2000.

May, artillery and infantry attacks by about 5000 rebels steadily pushed 30°000—35°000 government troops towards Jaffna city, at the end of the peninsula.²²⁵ The LTTE advance overturned previous government gains and put them in their strongest position since 1998. India stood ready to evacuate Sri Lankan forces as the LTTE approached Jaffna and shelled the airport and seaport that were the government's main supply points.²²⁶

India does not want the LTTE secessionist movement to succeed because of the precedent this would set for separatists in India. At the same time, India is constrained in its support to the Sri Lankan Government by the Tamil parties in India, which give the government a parliamentary majority, and by its intervention experience in the 1980s, when over 1000 Indian troops died. This led India to lend diplomatic support and probably secret assistance through its foreign intelligence and security services to the Sri Lankan government armed forces.²²⁷

The rebel offensive stalled several kilometres from Jaffna in the face of sustained bombing by the Sri Lankan Air Force and increased army firepower purchased, and in some cases received as aid, from China, the Czech Republic, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Africa.²²⁸ Engagements in June, July and August stymied Norwegian mediation efforts but did not have a significant military impact.²²⁹ On 3 September the government launched a counter-offensive that the LTTE stopped within a day at the cost of several hundred dead fighters and several thousand displaced civilians.²³⁰ A second push by government forces recaptured Chavakachcheri, the peninsula's second largest city, and escalated the conflict at the end of September.²³¹ After her party maintained its parliamentary majority in October, President Kumaratunga vowed to beat the Tigers militarily.²³² In November, repeated LTTE attacks on the Jaffna Peninsula and near the eastern city of Trincomalee

²²⁵ Harding, L., Tamil Tigers close net on panicky army, *Guardian Weekly*, 11—17 May 2000, p. 4; The Tamil Tigers close in, *The Economist*, 13 May 2000, pp. 59—60; and Sri Lanka military base captured, Tigers claim, *International Herald Tribune*, 19 May 2000, p. 6.

²²⁶ Majumder, D., *The Telegraph* (Calcutta), 23 May 2000, in Indian troops stand by for Sri Lanka evacuation request, FBIS-NES-2000-0523, 24 May 2000; and Tamil Tigers threaten army's supply lines (note 217).

²²⁷ The Tamil Tigers close in (note 225); and Subramanian, N. V., Sri Lanka calls for Indian assistance, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2000, p. 5.

²²⁸ For an assessment of arms transfers to Sri Lanka, see chapter 5 and appendix 5F in this volume. Aneja, A., *The Hindu* (Chennai), 11 May 2000, in Indian daily: Sri Lankan troops getting arms from abroad, FBIS-NES-2000-0511, 12 May 2000; Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 30 May 2000, in Sri Lanka claims 100 rebels dead in overnight fighting, FBIS-NES-2000-0530, 31 May 2000; and Harris, P., LTTE turns up heat in Sri Lankan power struggle, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Aug. 2000, pp. 44—46.

²²⁹ Lawson-Tancred, A., Sri Lanka army says it has halted rebel offensive, *Guardian Weekly*, 20—26 July 2000, p. 7; and Fierce fighting in Sri Lanka, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 Aug. 2000, p. 10.

²³⁰ Jayasinghe, A., Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong), 4 Sep. 2000, in Sri Lanka: at least 329 killed, over 1,100 wounded in ferocious fighting, FBIS-NES-2000-0904, 5 Sep. 2000; and Sri Lanka dead handed over, BBC News Online, 6 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²³¹ Sri Lanka opens offensive, *International Herald Tribune*, 27 Sep. 2000, p. 5; and Fighting rages in northern Sri Lanka, BBC News Online, 28 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²³² Gardner, D., Sinhalese parties raise stakes with warlike rhetoric, *Financial Times*, 10 Oct. 2000, p. 6.

challenged her position.²³³ Then, as a consequence of the Norwegian mediation, Prabhakaran announced that the LTTE was ready for unconditional peace talks with the Sri Lankan Government.²³⁴ The government, distrustful of the rebels' motives, launched a new offensive at the end of the year.²³⁵

Europe

Russia: Chechnya

In the war between the Russian Government and separatist rebels in Chechnya, Russian troops began a ground assault on the capital city of Grozny in mid-December 1999, which led to its capture on 6 February 2000, after intensive artillery and aircraft bombardment and fierce block-by-block infantry fighting.²³⁶ Federal troops suffered up to 25 deaths per day as they advanced.²³⁷ The rebels sustained hundreds of casualties as they retreated towards the mountains south of the city, and it was unclear how many active fighters remained. Russian officials estimated that there were between 2000 and 7000, while Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said that 2000 rebels had escaped the city to join others already in the mountains.²³⁸

Heavy fighting took place at Argun Gorge south of Grozny in early March, with casualties in the hundreds. Russian troops eventually tempered their pursuit of rebels in the mountains and attempted to control rebel movements in the rest of the republic.²³⁹ There were several large-scale clashes from April until the end of the year, but none prevented the development of a military stalemate.²⁴⁰ The separatists were too weak to push the federal troops back, so they launched daily hit-and-run attacks on Russian troops throughout the southern part of the republic, killing 10–20 soldiers per week, repeating the guerrilla strategy that drove the Russian military out of Chechnya in 1994.²⁴¹

²³³ Athas, I., Sri Lanka braces for Tiger attacks, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8 Nov. 2000, p. 21.

²³⁴ Dugger, C., Tamil rebel leader ready for peace talks in Sri Lanka, *International Herald Tribune*, 28 Nov. 2000, p. 12.

²³⁵ Harrison (note 220).

²³⁶ For an analysis of the war in Chechnya, see Chufin, G., Russia: separatism and conflicts in the North Caucasus, *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (note 59), pp. 157–80; Williams, D., A turning point? Rebels reported fleeing Grozny, *International Herald Tribune*, 2 Feb. 2000, p. 4; and Thornhill, J., Putin declares victory in Chechnya, *Financial Times*, 7 Feb. 2000, p. 2.

²³⁷ Williams (note 236).

²³⁸ Williams, D., Russians scour Grozny and pursue fleeing rebels to mountains, *International Herald Tribune*, 8 Feb. 2000, p. 7; and Gentleman, A. and Traynor, I., Russians take Grozny, *Guardian Weekly*, 10–16 Feb. 2000, p. 2.

²³⁹ Russians battle to contain rebel forces, *International Herald Tribune*, 8 Mar. 2000, p. 5; and Russian troops draw back from Chechen village, *International Herald Tribune*, 20 Mar. 2000, p. 6.

²⁴⁰ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Fuller, L., One year after invading Chechnya, what has Moscow achieved?, *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*, vol. 3, no. 38 (28 Sep. 2000); and Williams, D., Chechnya's bloody stalemate goes on, *International Herald Tribune*, 22 Sep. 2000, p. 2.

²⁴¹ Tyler, P., Chechen ambush kills 15 Russians, *International Herald Tribune*, 25 Apr. 2000, p. 5; Russian troops killed in Chechnya, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 3 May 2000, p. 13; 4 Russians killed in Grozny, *International Herald Tribune*, 9–10 Sep. 2000, p. 2; and 12 soldiers killed in Chechnya, *International Herald Tribune*, 8 Dec. 2000, p. 5.

Russian military officers tacitly admitted that their occupation did not amount to control of the territory but said that they were determined to prevail.²⁴²

European and other governments urged Moscow to seek a political solution.²⁴³ Newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin ruled out talks with Maskhadov, whom Moscow considers a criminal, and imposed direct Kremlin rule on 8 June.²⁴⁴ To lead the administration, Putin appointed Akhmed Kadyrov, the official spiritual leader of the Chechen Muslims, who was an opponent of Russia during the previous Chechen conflict and is opposed to Islamic Wahhabism, which appears to motivate many of the rebels.²⁴⁵ In November Russian Government officials said that they expected to complete military operations in Chechnya by March 2001, after which time the Defence Ministry troops would withdraw and the Interior Ministry would re-establish constitutional order.²⁴⁶

There were 93 000 Russian Army and Interior Ministry troops in Chechnya at the height of the war, according to official figures.²⁴⁷ The number of army troops was gradually reduced by about half during the year. Estimates of the number of Russian Army and Interior Ministry troops killed vary. The Russian General Staff said on 12 May that 2251 servicemen had died since the conflict began.²⁴⁸ By September, the government figures were nearly 3000 killed and over 6000 wounded.²⁴⁹ The protest group Association of Soldiers Mothers claimed that those numbers had been reached by January 2000.²⁵⁰

The rebels have not provided estimates of their casualties, but Russia claimed to have killed up to 20 000 by July.²⁵¹ During the early months of the conflict, Western governments condemned Russian s artillery and aerial bombardment of population centres because it indiscriminately killed rebels and civilians alike. After the fall of Grozny, human rights groups provided evidence that Russian troops regularly killed and tortured civilians.²⁵² Russia

²⁴² Gordon, M., Russian admits military laxity, *International Herald Tribune*, 4 Apr. 2000, p. 4; and Rodgers, J., Chechnya: destruction defying description, BBC News Online, 7 June 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²⁴³ Russia presses drive against rebel fighters, *International Herald Tribune*, 10 Apr. 2000, p. 4.

²⁴⁴ Putin pledge on Chechnya welcomed by EU envoys, *International Herald Tribune*, 8–9 Apr. 2000, p. 2; and Hoffman, D., Putin places Chechnya under Kremlin rule, *International Herald Tribune*, 9 June 2000, p. 3.

²⁴⁵ Williams, D., Kremlin picks Muslim cleric to head administration in Chechnya, *International Herald Tribune*, 13 June 2000, p. 5; Galeotti, M., The Chechen quagmire, *Jane s Intelligence Review*, Aug. 2000, pp. 8–9; and Chufirin (note 236), pp. 165–66.

²⁴⁶ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Fuller, L., Moscow sets new deadline for ending Chechen war, *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*, vol. 3, no. 47 (8 Dec. 2000).

²⁴⁷ Thornhill (note 236).

²⁴⁸ Wines, M., Chechen rebels attack Russian unit, killing 18, *International Herald Tribune*, 12 May 2000, p. 5.

²⁴⁹ Orr, M., Russia s Chechen war reaches crisis point, *Jane s Intelligence Review*, Oct. 2000, p. 15; and Gordon, M., Russian army cuts back operations in Chechnya, *International Herald Tribune*, 26 June 2000, p. 1.

²⁵⁰ Russia hiding true Chechen toll, BBC News Online, 16 Jan. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²⁵¹ No half-peace, *The Economist*, 15 July 2000, p. 34.

²⁵² Reynolds, M., Bespredel reigns in Chechnya, *St Petersburg Times*, 22 Sep. 2000, pp. 1, 4–5; Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Russia/Chechnya: Civilian Killings in Staropromyslovski District of Grozny*, HRW country report, vol. 12, no. 2(D), (Feb. 2000); Human Rights Watch, *Russia/Chechnya: no happiness remains: civilian killings, pillage, and rape in Alkhan-Yurt, Chechnya*, HRW country

denied the charges but it did not allow Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers into the republic.²⁵³

Flows of refugees were one of the main effects of the conflict on the region. In early March, the UNHCR estimated that there were 150°000—180°000 refugees in Ingushetia.²⁵⁴ Continuing violence deterred them from returning home, so the number had not changed by October.²⁵⁵ In addition, the conflict seriously worsened relations between Georgia and Russia. Russia accused Georgia of allowing Chechen rebels to use Georgian territory and for the first time imposed visa requirements on a CIS state.²⁵⁶ There were also rumours that the Taliban supported the Chechen fighters, and a number of rebels captured by Russian troops admitted their foreign origins. Official support did not appear to extend beyond a Chechen embassy in Kabul.²⁵⁷

The Middle East

Israel—Palestine, southern Lebanon

The Israeli Government, led by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and the Palestinian Authority, led by Yasser Arafat, continued their long-running negotiations over Palestinian autonomy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.²⁵⁸ In mid-May hundreds of Palestinians and several Israeli soldiers were injured during the worst violence since 1996 on the occasion of the 52nd° anniversary of the founding of Israel, an event that many Palestinians see as a catastrophe.²⁵⁹ In July, US President Bill Clinton brought the two leaders together at Camp David. Fifteen days of negotiations did not resolve the essential sticking point of who would have sovereign control of the holy city of Jerusalem.²⁶⁰

As the two sides appeared close to solving the issue, conservative Israeli leader Ariel Sharon sparked violent riots on 28 September when he visited the religious site in Jerusalem known to Jews as the Temple Mount and to Mus-

report vol.°12, no. 5(D) (Apr. 2000); and Human Rights Watch, *Russia/Chechnya: February 5: A Day of Slaughter in Novye Aldi*, HRW country report, vol. 12 no. 9(D) (June 2000).

²⁵³ Hoffman, D., Falsification, Russia retorts on videos of mass graves, *International Herald Tribune*, 26—27 Feb. 2000, p. 1.

²⁵⁴ Thornhill, J., Chechnya future under spotlight as army closes in, *Financial Times*, 8 Mar. 2000, p.°3.

²⁵⁵ World Food Program (WFP), *WFP Emergency Report*, no. 44 (3 Nov. 2000), URL <<http://www.wfp.org/>>; and Tyler, P., Wary of more violence, Chechens are loath to go home, *International Herald Tribune*, 1 Sep. 2000, p. 7.

²⁵⁶ Eke, S., Russia slaps visa controls on Georgia, BBC News Online, 5 Dec. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²⁵⁷ Zelenin, D., Moscow ITAR-TASS (in English), 23 Jan. 2000, in TASS: Chechen embassy opening announced in Kabul, FBIS-SOV-2000-0123, 24 Jan. 2000; Suprun, V., Moscow ITAR-TASS (in English), 1 Feb. 2000, in Russia: Taleban confirms siding with Chechen fighters, FBIS-SOV-2000-0201, 2 Feb. 2000; and Are foreigners fighting there?, *The Economist*, 8 July 2000, pp. 33—34.

²⁵⁸ For more on the breakdown of the peace process, see appendix 2C in this volume.

²⁵⁹ O Connor, M. and Hockstader, L., Hundreds wounded in West Bank gun battles, *International Herald Tribune*, 16 May 2000, pp. 1, 5.

²⁶⁰ Knowlton,°B., Mideast peace talks collapse, *International Herald Tribune*, 26 July 2000, pp.°1, 4.

lims as Haram al-Sharif.²⁶¹ The street fighting rapidly intensified as Palestinians from Arafat's Fatah and the more radical Hamas movements, armed with rocks and a few automatic rifles, confronted well-armed Israeli troops and Jewish settlers throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip.²⁶² Despite attempts by a number of regional and world leaders to broker a lasting ceasefire, the violence continued into 2001. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were accused of excessive use of force for using live ammunition, tanks and attack helicopters. The violence caused the death of more than 300 people by the end of the year, about 90 per cent of whom were Palestinians.²⁶³ Leaders of neighbouring Arab states feared that the violence could spread beyond the Israeli borders.²⁶⁴

Earlier in the year, violence had already increased in southern Lebanon. The Hizbullah (Party of God) fighters launched rockets along the border in February and the IDF reacted with artillery fire and air attacks.²⁶⁵ In March the Israeli Cabinet voted to withdraw its troops by July, ending its occupation since 1978 of a strip of land inside Lebanon that was intended to protect Israel's northern border.²⁶⁶ Fighting intensified in early May in anticipation of the withdrawal. By the end of the month, all the IDF troops and many of their Lebanese supporters had made a hasty retreat.²⁶⁷ The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) demarcated and patrolled the Lebanese—Israeli border but the Lebanese Government did not deploy troops in the area for over two months, which opened the way for Hizbollah to assume control.²⁶⁸ Sporadic shooting across the border occurred in August.²⁶⁹ In early October Hizbullah guerrillas kidnapped three IDF soldiers.²⁷⁰ Violence escalated in November as Hizbullah activity increased at a small, disputed part of the border and Israeli jet aircraft and helicopters attacked suspected guerrilla positions.²⁷¹ In December Israel warned Syria that the conflict could spread if Syria

²⁶¹ Dempsey, J., Optimism as Arafat and Barak meet, *Financial Times*, 27 Sep. 2000, p. 6; and Hockstader, L., Sharon visit sparks rioting at East Jerusalem shrine, *International Herald Tribune*, 29 Sep. 2000.

²⁶² Hockstader, L., 2d day of violence at Jerusalem site, *International Herald Tribune*, 30 Sep.—1 Oct. 2000, pp. 1, 5; and Hockstader, L., Death toll climbs as Arab—Israeli street battles intensify, *International Herald Tribune*, 3 Oct. 2000, pp. 1, 6.

²⁶³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority Territories*, HRW country report, vol. 12, no. 3(E) (Oct. 2000); and Hockstader, L., Mideast violence kills 10 as revolt regains force, *International Herald Tribune*, 9—10 Dec. 2000, p. 1.

²⁶⁴ The spreading of Palestine's war, *The Economist*, 28 Oct. 2000, pp. 54—55.

²⁶⁵ Hockstader, L., 3 Israeli soldiers killed by Hezbollah guerrillas, *International Herald Tribune*, 1 Feb. 2000, p. 4; and Israeli planes raid South Lebanon, *International Herald Tribune*, 4 Feb. 2000, p. 6.

²⁶⁶ Machlis, A., Israel votes on leaving Lebanon, *Financial Times*, 6 Mar. 2000, p. 8.

²⁶⁷ Orme, W., Israelis and allies speed withdrawal of Lebanon zone, *International Herald Tribune*, 24 May 2000, pp. 1, 4; and UN confirms Israeli pullout, *International Herald Tribune*, 17—18 June 2000, p. 2.

²⁶⁸ Lebanon: blue border, *The Economist*, 24 June 2000, p. 56; and Kifner, J., Lebanese Army returns to south after 22 years, *International Herald Tribune*, 10 Aug. 2000, p. 4.

²⁶⁹ Israeli soldiers wound 3 at border, *International Herald Tribune*, 8 Aug. 2000, p. 10.

²⁷⁰ Smyth, G., Stakes raised as Hizbullah gains support, *Financial Times*, 13 Oct. 2000, p. 3; and Hizbullah basks in its glory, *The Economist*, 14 Oct. 2000, p. 56.

²⁷¹ Dempsey, J., Israeli jets pound positions in Lebanon, *Financial Times*, 27 Nov. 2000, p. 4.

did not control the Islamic guerrillas that it supports along the Israeli—Lebanese border.²⁷²

South America

Colombia

Since the 1960s, successive Colombian administrations have fought a number of leftist rebel groups. At present, there are up to 19 violent opposition groups, but only 2 groups of major concern.²⁷³ The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is the largest group with approximately 15°000 members.²⁷⁴ The second largest rebel organization is the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army) with about 4000 members.²⁷⁵ The FARC and the ELN see each other as rivals, although the stated objectives of both groups include a more pluralist political system, economic policies that emphasize development and equality, and a military dedicated exclusively to external defence.²⁷⁶

In the 1970s, landowners and businesses began to establish militia groups to protect their interests from the rebels. Most of those groups now belong to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), numbering about 5000 and increasingly active in the past two years.²⁷⁷ The AUC has close ties with some units of the Colombian armed forces but it operates outside military lines of command. With no discernible political agenda, they have been responsible for the vast majority of human rights abuses and civilian deaths in recent years.²⁷⁸

Soon after he was elected in 1998, President Andrés Pastrana initiated the first peace talks in eight years with the FARC.²⁷⁹ Copying a formula that had succeeded with other rebel groups, he removed all government troops from a 42°000-square kilometre area in southern Colombia and turned it over to the FARC so that they could negotiate in safety. The gamble has not paid off. The rebels set up a parallel administration and use the zone to generate revenue

²⁷² Israel warns Syrians of Lebanon war risk, *International Herald Tribune*, 2—3 Dec. 2000, p. 4.

²⁷³ Rodríguez, L., Notimex, 9 Aug. 2000, in Intelligence reports 17 small guerrilla groups complicate peace efforts, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report The Americas (FBIS-LAT)*, FBIS-LAT-2000-0809, 10 Aug. 2000.

²⁷⁴ Notimex (Mexico City), in Spanish, 29 July 2000, in ELN proposes nonaggression pact to FARC, FBIS-LAT-2000-0729, 31 July 2000; Klepak, H., Colombia: why doesn't the war end?, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 2000, p. 41; and Pardo, R., Colombia's two-front war, *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 2000, p. 69.

²⁷⁵ Notimex (note 274); and Reynolds, J., Colombia overture to rebels, BBC News Online, 7 June 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; and Pardo (note 274), p. 69.

²⁷⁶ Klepak (note 274), p. 44.

²⁷⁷ Dealing with Colombia's death-squads, *The Economist*, 8 Apr., 2000, pp. 63—64; and DeYoung, K., Army faulted for close ties to Colombian militia groups, *International Herald Tribune*, 25 Feb. 2000, p. 4.

²⁷⁸ United Nations, Statement of Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights, 56th session, 14 Apr. 2000; Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Colombia: The Ties that Bind: Colombia and Military—Paramilitary Links*, HRW country report, vol. 12, no. 1(B) (Feb. 2000); and DeYoung (note 277).

²⁷⁹ Pardo (note 274), p. 70.

and recruit and train new members.²⁸⁰ In April 2000 President Pastrana agreed to establish a similar zone in northern Colombia for the ELN, who asked for talks and stepped up their practice of mass kidnapping and sabotage to put pressure on the government. Local politicians and the AUC oppose the zone and by the end of the year it had not come into being.²⁸¹

The FARC, the AUC and to a lesser extent the ELN have close ties to drug manufacturers and traffickers. They tax the drug trade and provide protection in their areas of operation. As Colombia's share of the world coca market has grown, so have the armed groups' revenues. Up to 70 per cent of the AUC's revenues comes from the drug trade.²⁸² The FARC received an estimated \$400–600 million in drug-related money in 2000.²⁸³

President Pastrana, in close cooperation with the USA, introduced Plan Colombia to combat illegal drug production and trade. In the process the plan would undermine the financial base of the rebels. The multi-year, \$7.5 billion plan includes social development programmes, incentives for farmers to grow crops other than coca and funding for increased forceful eradication efforts.²⁸⁴ The USA agreed to contribute over \$1.3 billion to Plan Colombia in 2000 and 2001, 65 per cent of which was designated for Colombia, with the rest going to US agencies and other countries in the region. Together with the \$330 million in aid previously planned, Colombia would receive \$1.19 billion in the two years, with \$952.3 million (80 per cent) designated for military and police assistance and \$238 million (20 per cent) designated for programmes to assist displaced people, promote economic development, promote human rights and strengthen the judiciary.²⁸⁵ Colombian and US NGOs, the presidents of the five countries that border Colombia and the European Union criticized Plan Colombia and the US contribution, claiming that it inappropriately targeted small farmers, did not hold the military to human rights standards and would dramatically escalate the level of violence.²⁸⁶ The USA insists that its involvement is simply a counter-narcotics measure, but observers note that the relationship between rebels and drug producers means that military units assisted by the USA will inevitably engage in counter-insurgency operations.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁰ Rohter, L., Colombia offers 2d sanctuary for leftist rebels, *International Herald Tribune*, 27 Apr. 2000, p. 2; and Rohter, L., Cocaine war: a special report, New York Times on the web, 21 Apr. 2000, URL <<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/americas/042100colombia-drugs.html>>.

²⁸¹ Rohter (note 280); *El País* (Cali), 23 Aug. 2000, in Cali, Valle officials object to ELN request for DMZ to release hostages, FBIS-LAT-2000-0823, 24 Aug. 2000; and ELN offensive hurts economy, *Latin American Weekly Report*, WR-00-32, 15 Aug. 2000, p. 378.

²⁸² Dealing with Colombia's death-squads (note 277); and Colombian para military claims business funding, BBC News Online, 7 Sep. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>.

²⁸³ Chalk, P., The war on drugs: is the USA's Colombia policy working?, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Dec. 2000, p. 41.

²⁸⁴ Putumayo's tense wait for the arrival of Plan Colombia, *The Economist*, 19 Aug. 2000, pp. 47–48.

²⁸⁵ Center for International Policy, U.S. aid to Colombia, URL <<http://www.ciponline.organization/colombia/aid/aid0001.htm>>.

²⁸⁶ Dudley, S., Groups say drug plan puts them in danger, *International Herald Tribune*, 24 Aug. 2000, p. 6; Wilson, S., EU sharply cuts aid to Colombia, *International Herald Tribune*, 20 Oct. 2000, p. 3; and Wilson, J., Carrot appeals to coca farmers, *Financial Times*, 3 Nov. 2000, p. 7.

²⁸⁷ Rohter (note 280).

Clashes between government forces, the rebels and the paramilitary as well as civilian massacres occurred in rural areas across the country throughout 2000 and significantly increased at the end of the year.²⁸⁸ Over 2000 people were killed, many of them civilians.²⁸⁹ The increase was most notable in the southern Putumayo district, far from urban centres, where coca is the primary crop, the FARC is strong, the AUC is increasing its presence and three new army mobile battalions with US helicopters will be based.²⁹⁰

At the end of the year, negotiations between the government and both rebel groups broke down and the military component of Plan Colombia was about to begin.²⁹¹ The FARC have been accumulating weapons to counter US military assistance to the government.²⁹² The government had little negotiating room between armed groups on the left and right; the rebels, with their own territory and source of income, had little incentive to negotiate.²⁹³

The human costs of the conflict are already high. The number of people killed is uncertain, although there is widespread agreement that in the past 10–15 years over 35 000 have died as a direct result of the conflict.²⁹⁴ A far higher number have been killed in general lawlessness.²⁹⁵ Over 1.5 million people have had to flee their homes in the past 10 years and there were almost 135 000 newly displaced persons in the first half of 2000.²⁹⁶ Each year the rebels and paramilitary kidnap thousands of people.²⁹⁷ For several years, the conflict has spilled over porous borders into Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, resulting in rebel sanctuaries, refugee flows, and trade in drugs and weapons. The problem increased in 2000 and all five countries reinforced security personnel along their borders, fearing that it would become much worse in 2001 as the military component of Plan Colombia went into effect.²⁹⁸

²⁸⁸ Agence France-Presse, 18 Jan. 2000, in Colombian paramilitaries murder 19 peasants, FBIS-LAT-2000-0118, 19 Jan. 2000; Agence France-Presse, 16 Feb. 2000, in FARC kills 11, blows up airport during attacks, FBIS-LAT-2000-0216, 18 Feb. 2000; and *El Pais* (Cali), 16 Oct. 2000, in Army operations in Farallones continue, FBIS-LAT-2000-1016, 17 Oct. 2000.

²⁸⁹ Colombia/violence, *Latin American Weekly Report*, WR-00-36, 12 Sep. 2000, p. 432; and FARC puts negotiations on hold, *Latin American Weekly Report*, WR-00-46, 21 Nov. 2000, p. 548.

²⁹⁰ Wilson (note 286); McDermott, J., Colombia changes tactics in drugs war, *BBC Online Net work*, 22 Aug. 2000, URL <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>>; and FARC puts negotiations on hold (note 289).

²⁹¹ For information on the stop-and-go negotiations, see chapter 2 in this volume.

²⁹² Scale of FARC's arms buildup revealed, *Latin American Weekly Report*, WR-00-34, 29 Aug. 2000, p. 398; and *El Comercio* (Quito), 23 Aug. 2000, in Arms trafficking to Colombia increases, FBIS-LAT-2000-0827, 28 Aug. 2000. For information on the transfer of small arms to Colombia, see appendix 5F in this volume.

²⁹³ Pardo (note 274); Jones, J., A misguided aid package to Colombia, *Guardian Weekly*, 13–19 Apr. 2000, p. 32; and Klepak (note 274).

²⁹⁴ Rohter (note 280); and Colombian troops hunt rebel force, *International Herald Tribune*, 17 Jan. 2000, p. 4.

²⁹⁵ The assault on democratic society, *The Economist*, 18 Mar. 2000, p. 57; and Pardo (note 274), p. 65.

²⁹⁶ Rohter (note 280); and Norwegian Refugee Council, 134,799 new IDPs during the first half of 2000 (August 2000), Global IDP Database, URL <<http://www.db.idpproject.org>>.

²⁹⁷ Beers, R., Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 4 Apr. 2000, URL <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000404_beers_sasc.html>; and Putumayo's tense wait for the arrival of Plan Colombia (note 284).

²⁹⁸ Spillover begins before Plan Colombia, *Latin American Weekly Report*, WR-00-42, 24 Oct. 2000, p. 498; Colombia and its neighbours: in the firing line, *The Economist*, 23 Sep. 2000, pp. 77–78;

III. Conclusions

The major armed conflicts of 2000 revealed a diverse set of antagonistic groups, variously driven by political ambitions, economic motives, ideology and fear. The ultimate objective of all the armed groups reviewed in section II was to secure control over governmental power or territory. In addition, in several cases, individuals within the groups and their outside supporters were motivated by personal greed. Communal identity, in the form of ethnicity or religious belief, was a common enabling mechanism a tool used by leaders to define and motivate a group. It did not appear to be a cause of violence by itself.²⁹⁹

Most of the conflicts have proved difficult to end, with the majority having lasted for seven years or more.³⁰⁰ One of the reasons is that none of the parties involved is militarily strong enough to prevail by force. Rebel groups rarely have the personnel, weapons and other resources needed to defeat national armed forces.³⁰¹ Governments face the difficult task of counter-insurgency when rebels employ a guerrilla strategy. When major armed conflicts do end, this is usually the result of a negotiated agreement. For example, conflicts that were active in 1999 in Kosovo, East Timor and the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) were not active in 2000 because of the conclusion of political agreements. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia ended with a peace agreement in 2000.³⁰²

Unfortunately, many of the conflicts reviewed here are difficult to resolve diplomatically because of the characteristics of the actors, their motives and the remote location of most of the fighting. A hallmark of contemporary rebel organizations is their tendency to break apart into factions when members of the group disagree about objectives or strategies. The splintering of rebel groups in the DRC and the proliferation of separatist groups in Kashmir are prime examples. In 2000 some armed groups entered talks or actually joined the government while other armed groups chose to continue to fight in Algeria, Burundi, the DRC, Kashmir, the Philippines and Sierra Leone.³⁰³ Peace is more difficult to achieve when combatants have the will and capacity

Colombia and its neighbours: fear of trouble upstream , *The Economist* , 30 Sep. 2000, p. 72; and Colombia and its neighbours: nervous in Darien , *The Economist* , 7 Oct. 2000, p. 78.

²⁹⁹ Even in the cases of the Hema—Lendu fighting in the DRC and the Christian—Muslim fighting in Molucca, the antagonists were driven largely by competition over resources in the former case by a contest over land between agriculturalists and pastoralists, and in the latter case by access to income through appointments in the governing bureaucracy.

³⁰⁰ Appendix 1A in this volume provides a quick reference for the starting date of each conflict.

³⁰¹ The most recent example of a rebel military victory was the 1997 overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now the DRC). However, the rebels themselves were weak. It was substantial Rwandan and Ugandan military involvement that caused the already feeble Zairean military and government to crumble.

³⁰² In all these examples, changes on the battlefield played a central role in the willingness of the parties to reach settlement through negotiation.

³⁰³ Appendix 2B in this volume, on Sierra Leone, uses the British attack on the West Side Boyz to demonstrate how a loosely organized militia group has no central authority that can surrender, even when it is effectively defeated.

to continue to fight even after some of their leaders agree to a political settlement.

Although most armed groups have publicly stated a political agenda, many of the individuals within them are motivated by personal gain. Greed is manifested in many forms, from large-scale diamond trading by military and political leaders to village-level pillage by youths with guns. It is unclear whether micro-level economic motives for conflict are increasing or whether it is only the awareness of observers that has been heightened. It is all too clear that the development of war economies contributes to the persistence of conflicts.³⁰⁴

It is also evident in the major armed conflicts of 2000 that the worst fighting in most cases took place in rural areas. Civilian mortality and suffering in these conflicts are high because of the indiscipline of armies and rebel groups; the guerrilla—counter-insurgency nature of the fighting, in which civilians are hard to distinguish from fighters; and the lethality of modern weapons. However, the political and economic elite, who reside in the cities, are insulated from the direct effects of the battles that others fight on their behalf.³⁰⁵ When the costs of conflict are not acutely felt by political leaders, they are less likely to make compromises in the interest of ending the conflict.

³⁰⁴ Berdal, M. and Malone, D. (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda in Civil Wars* (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colo., and London, 2000); see also papers available from the World Bank project The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence (note 10).

³⁰⁵ The LTTE in Sri Lanka provide an interesting example of a rebel group that is trying both to capture land using conventional war-fighting techniques and to influence politicians using terrorist bombs in cities.