Introduction
The organizing principles of global security

ADAM DANIEL ROTFELD

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the third millennium have inspired many observers and politicians to analyse and forecast global security scenarios. The main question is whether, and if so how far, the existing global security system is adequate to the new risks and challenges.

I. Globalization

The two opposing processes of globalization and fragmentation have gained momentum since the start of this decade.

There are two important dimensions of globalization: its intensity and the extent of international interaction. Globalization identified with intensity overlaps to some degree ‘with related ideas of integration, interdependence, multilateralism, openness and interpenetration’.1 Globalization identified with interaction relates to ‘the geographical spread of these tendencies and is adequate with globalism, spatial compression, universalization and homogeneity’.2

Fragmentation obviously refers to opposite processes: disintegration, anarchy, unilateralism, closure and isolation, on the one hand, and nationalism or regionalism, spatial distension, separatism and heterogeneity, on the other hand. Processes of fragmentation spread simultaneously, albeit with diverse levels of intensity, both in interstate relations and within states. Whereas globalization is often seen chiefly as a positive process, promoting world peace and stability, fragmentation is seen as creating instability and conflicts. In fact, this is a simplification. Globalization and fragmentation are two sides of the same coin—two aspects of major interrelated tendencies. Globalization is widening the development gap between states and regions. The highly developed countries, international corporations and financial groups are becoming increasingly richer and dictate the terms for the rest of the world.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan brought the significance of globalization to the attention of the international community.3 In his view the central challenge which the world faces today is to ensure that globalization

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2 Clark (note 1), p. 2.

SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
becomes a positive force: ‘Globalization offers great opportunities, but at present its benefits are very unequally distributed while its costs are borne by all’.

Confronted with this trend, the disadvantaged nations and groups see regionalism, nationalism and separatism as the only tools with which they can defend and protect their identity, culture and social justice. Therefore, as the UN Secretary-General observed: ‘Few people, groups or governments oppose globalization as such. They protest against its disparities’. Protests are raised because, first, the benefits and opportunities of globalization are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of countries and are spread unequally among them. Second, for many people, globalization has come to mean greater vulnerability to unfamiliar and unpredictable forces that can cause economic instability and social dislocation.

The magnitude of the changes taking place is illustrated by a recent telecommunications takeover, which created a firm whose market value exceeded the gross national product of nearly half of all the UN member states, although it ranks as only the world’s fourth largest company. In other words, globalization has become a new context for and a new connection between economic actors. This has been made possible by the dismantling of barriers to trade and capital mobility, along with fundamental technological advances and steadily declining costs for transport, communications and computing. As a result of the rapid development of information and communications technologies and capital flows, unpredictable chain reactions are having destabilizing effects on some countries and causing economic crises in others. There is growing anxiety that the situation may get out of control and that the integrity of cultures and the sovereignty of states may be jeopardized. There is therefore an urgent need to adapt principles, norms and institutions to the new threats and challenges.

II. Good governance and new threats and challenges

The basic problem is that the procedures and mechanisms of the existing security system were predicated on relations regulated by and between states, while in the new ‘global world’ the main destabilizing threats are emerging from within states. Of the 56 major armed conflicts waged since the end of the cold war, only three were interstate wars (Iraq–Kuwait, India–Pakistan and Ethiopia–Eritrea). The remaining conflicts are domestic, although they have a destabilizing impact on the international situation, both in immediate neighbourhoods and in regions. For the UN Secretary-General the challenge is

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7 ‘Even in the most powerful countries, people wonder who is in charge, worry for their jobs and fear that their voices are drowned out in globalization’s sweep.’ Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (note 3), p. 10.
8 See chapter 1 and appendix 1A in this volume.
clear: ‘if we are to capture the promises of globalization while managing its adverse effects, we must learn to govern together’.\(^9\)

What is governance in the context of the international security environment? The answer is neither a world government nor new multilateral institutions or international bureaucracies. Proposals for such types of governance are opposed by governments and societies that fear they could result in the loss of the sovereignty and identity of peoples, a deepening of the democratic deficit in the world today and an increase in the already excessive costs of the international structures while not providing better efficiency. In other words, new international institutions are not the remedy or a substitute for weak or bad governments. At the present stage of development of the international community, ‘there exists no other entity that competes with or can substitute for the state’.\(^10\) Thus better governance requires a more advanced civil society: internal democratization, progressive participation of citizens, respect for the rule of law and accountability of those governing.

The essential role which the formal governance structure must continue to play is normative. It should define objectives, set standards and monitor compliance. However, the formation of a new international security system is much more contingent on material conditions than on new ideas and proposals for rules of international conduct.

In the past decade the perception of what constitutes a security threat underwent a major change. ‘What is under attack today is not the territory of a state, but its fabric, the nature of its society, the functioning of its institutions and the well-being of its citizens.’\(^11\) In other words, the main threat to the security of the international community is the weakness of states owing to a lack of democratic structures and an inability to manage and combat such phenomena as organized crime, international and domestic terrorism, corruption, lack of political liberties, human rights abuses, religious and ethnic conflicts, and aggressive nationalism. In many states, institutional mechanisms are unable to resolve these problems with norms and the tenets of the rule of law.

In the future, internal conflicts will pose the greatest threat to world stability. The direct effect of such conflicts is internal displacements, refugee flows, humanitarian emergencies and other regionally destabilizing dislocations. If the international community cannot constrain the parties and engage them in dialogue, the conflicts may not only become long-term civil wars but also trigger interstate wars since neighbouring states will move to exploit opportunities for gain or try to limit the damage to their national interests.\(^12\)

The present international system is predicated on the sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in internal affairs.\(^13\) External intervention by international organizations, coalitions of states and individual governments are

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\(^13\) United Nations Charter, Article 2, para. 1, and Article 2, para. 4.
often denounced as dangerous precedents challenging state sovereignty. The view that neither one state nor a coalition or group of states may intervene on its own authority is not questionable in theory.14 Only the UN Security Council is empowered to authorize intervention. In practice, however, both international organizations and states that could prevent or stop a conflict, even if they were to intervene for humanitarian reasons, are often helpless because of their inability to carry out a mandate from the Security Council. While Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter15 could constitute the legal basis for regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to take action for peace enforcement, they would still need the approval of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: ‘[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council’.16 For various reasons, however, as evidenced by developments after the collapse of the bipolar system, it is extremely difficult for China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States to arrive at a joint position regarding the use of force. The obstacles are their differing assessments of the positions of conflicting parties and the difficult job of providing adequate resources as well as their fundamentally different interpretations of the sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in internal affairs. Making these two tenets—sovereign state equality and non-intervention—absolute may effectively cripple any responses on the part of the international community.

The main threat to international peace is not classic wars between states but gross violations of human rights and the rights of minorities within states. Brian Urquhart, former UN Under-Secretary-General, rightly noted:

[T]he failure to act during the Rwanda genocide in 1994 is now universally deplored, but who would have supported the UN secretary general had he proposed strong action when the first warnings of the planned massacres were received, some four months before the genocide actually started? Such a proposal would almost have been generally opposed as a violation of the sovereignty of a UN member (Rwanda was actually a member of the Security Council at the time), and therefore as a dangerous precedent. The strong opposition to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s ideas about intervention in cases of gross violations of human rights makes one wonder, in spite

15 In the chapter Regional Arrangements, Article 52, para. 1, reads: ‘Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’. Article 53, para 1, reads: ‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority’. Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (United Nations Office of Public Information: New York, 1963), pp. 28–29.
of the after-the-fact criticism of the UN failure in Rwanda, what the world really learned from that catastrophe?17

Similar issues were raised after the massacre of thousands of civilians in the UN ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica in 1995 and in the context of the UN operation in East Timor and the NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999. The basic question is how the international community should respond to gross violations of human rights. Different factors have determined the failures of the UN and the international community as a whole: lack of political will, inappropriate Security Council mandates and inadequate resources.18 In 2000 the UN spent on all peace operations less than 1 per cent of total world military expenditure, amounting to nearly $800 billion.19 It is also true that the international security organizations, including the UN system, have a number of weaknesses which diminish their effectiveness. However, the key problem is that the mandate of those organizations is to manage and regulate mainly relations between states, not within them.

III. New organizing principles of security

There is a need to review international law and reform the major international security institutions so that they can effectively meet the new threats and challenges. The community of states must redefine some of the norms and principles of international law, in particular the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention. Rules must be elaborated in domestic legislation for protecting the right of nations to self-determination both with regard to individuals and the participation of minority groups in public life. Thus, at the beginning of the new century the most important task is to promote democratization not only between states but also within them.20

The emergence of democracy as a universally accepted form of government is the crucial new organizing principle. In his opening address to the conference Towards a Community of Democracies, held in Warsaw in June 2000 and attended by over 100 ministers of foreign affairs and other high representatives of the international community, Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek asked ‘Why democracy?’21 In answering this question he presented five compelling reasons: (a) human rights; (b) peace and security, both within and between nations; (c) economic development and the well-being of indi-

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18 In 1999 the UN Secretary-General initiated a number of studies and reviews to determine what caused those failures: a UN Secretariat Study on Srebrenica and an Independent Inquiry Study on Rwanda. In Mar. 2000 he established a high-level panel, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, former Algerian Foreign Minister, to undertake a major review and recommend ways of ensuring that future peace operations will be more effective. Report of the UN Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (note 3), p. 1. See also chapter 2 in this volume.
19 See chapter 4 in this volume.
individuals and whole societies; (d) justice and solidarity; and (e) participation, responsibility and empowerment of the individuals and social groups which form civil society and thus have a say in shaping government policy priorities.

The conference confirmed the participants’ commitment to respect for the instruments of international law, recognized the universality of democratic values and stressed the interdependence between peace, development, human rights and democracy. An essential element of the Warsaw Declaration is that its 19 rules, described as the core democratic principles and practices, have traditionally belonged to the exclusive, discretionary competence of governments. The representatives of the democratic states and ‘emerging democracies’ agreed to abide by these tenets in practice and ‘to support one another in meeting these objectives which we set ourselves today’. The principles of democracy elaborated in the Warsaw Declaration include regular, free and fair elections—open to multiple parties, conducted by secret ballot, monitored by independent electoral authorities and free from fraud and intimidation. However, democracy is not confined to free elections only, as even today, many dictators enjoy the support of most of their constituencies.

Democracy is a system based on institutions, tenets and norms of law. Among the commitments undertaken by the conference participants, two rules of the Warsaw Declaration are of particular importance for internal and international security. The first concerns persons belonging to minorities, who have the right to equal protection of the law and freedom to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their religion, and use their own language. There is a common understanding that had these rules been respected in domestic law in the Balkans, Africa, Asia and the areas of the former Soviet Union, in the Caucasus and Central Asia in particular, most of the violent armed conflict might have been avoided.

The second important commitment is to good governance: ‘that government institutions be transparent, participatory and fully accountable to the citizenry of the country and take steps to combat corruption, which corrodes democracy’. The legislature should be ‘duly elected and transparent and accountable to the people’, and ‘civilian, democratic control over the military should be established and preserved’.

Those who believe that the international order, shaped over 350 years ago, after the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, is collapsing fear that we may be enter-

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22 The Warsaw Declaration ‘Towards a Community of Democracies’, 27 June 2000, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs (note 22), pp. 59–64. The declaration contains a political commitment by the participating states, codifying the rules of conduct which are essentially of a legal nature. For this reason, the text of the document was published in International Legal Materials, vol. 39, no. 6 (Nov. 2000), pp. 1306–308.

23 Polish Quarterly of International Affairs (note 22), p. 63.

24 In this context, noteworthy are the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, as elaborated by a group of independent experts at the request of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel. The main value of the Lund Recommendations lies in exploring the possibilities offered by non-territorial forms of autonomy and the evolving notion of good governance and the principle of subsidiarity. See more on this in Packer, J., ‘The origin and nature of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, Helsinki Monitor, Quarterly on Security and Co-operation in Europe, The Hague, vol. 11, no. 4 (2000), pp. 29–62.

ing a period comparable to that which immediately preceded the Peace of Westphalia—‘a time of great violence and religious wars, now made even worse by weapons of mass destruction’. However, the collapse of the bipolar system and the end of the cold war which brought it about should not lead us to believe that the world is doomed to return to the post-Westphalian disorder. The world is today in search of a new stability which would harmonize nation states with an organized system of interdependence based on a global rule of law.

IV. SIPRI findings

The main findings and conclusions drawn from the original data, facts and analyses of the developments in 2000 in security and conflicts; military spending and armaments; and non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament presented in this volume are the following.

*Armed conflicts.* For the period 1990–2000, 56 major armed conflicts were recorded for 44 locations. All but three of the conflicts registered during those 11 years were internal. The three interstate conflicts were Iraq versus Kuwait, India versus Pakistan and Ethiopia versus Eritrea. In 2000 there were 25 major armed conflicts recorded in 23 locations. Both the number of conflicts and the number of locations were lower than in 1999, when 27 major armed conflicts were recorded for 25 locations. The only two interstate conflicts active in 2000 were between India and Pakistan and between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The former persisted at a low level and the latter reached a political settlement by the end of the year. The analysis of the 14 most violent intra-state conflicts and the two interstate conflicts that occurred in 2000 reveals that the ultimate objective of all the diverse antagonistic groups was to secure control over governmental power or territory.

*Conflict prevention, management and resolution.* The negative spillover of internal conflicts remained the primary motivation for external engagement in this most dominant form of violent conflict throughout the world in 2000. The need to address the consequences of internal conflict (among them refugees, economic devastation and crime) as well as the spread of violence beyond the borders of the state concerned are intensifying the challenge to one of the fundamental norms of international relations, the sovereignty of the state. The assertion that individual rights lie at the heart of the international system and that state sovereignty is conditional on the manifestation of responsibility towards the population in question was increasingly articulated in international forums, notably the UN Security Council. This new normative environment raises questions of the responsibility of the international community to protect individual rights in the face of state incapacity and/or violation.

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26 Guéhenno, J. M., ‘Globalization and fragmentation’ in Plattner and Smolar (note 21), p. 27. Guéhenno writes: ‘The age of nation-states was born when the primacy of political institutions over religion was asserted by the treaties of Westphalia. This period is coming to an end’.

27 See chapter 1 and appendix 1A in this volume.

28 See chapter 2 in this volume.
Sierra Leone. The breakdown of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) provoked an international crisis in 2000. The humiliating seizure of hundreds of UN peacekeepers by RUF rebels brutally demonstrated the weaknesses of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the efforts of the UN to address the conflict.

The Middle East. Events in the second half of 2000 constituted the worst crisis in the Middle East peace process since the signing in 1993 of the Oslo Agreement. Progress was difficult throughout the year as Israeli and Palestinian mediators came closer to core negotiating issues: borders, refugee rights of return and the sovereignty of Jerusalem. The leadership of both sides was weakened by internal dissension and public disaffection and it was only through the concerted pressure of the outgoing US Administration that the negotiations climaxed with the Camp David Summit Meeting in July. While the details of the summit meeting remain secret, it appeared that many previously taboo subjects were raised. The talks collapsed, however, on the question of the division and future sovereignty of Jerusalem.

Europe. The decisions adopted in 2000 by the Nice European Council effectively undid the political division of Europe established at Yalta in 1945. The reform launched by the Intergovernmental Conference opened the way for enlargement of the EU. The European economic space has been supplemented with new institutions in the security sphere—the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy. It remains an open question whether, and if so to what extent, these institutions will shape the new political and military reality within the Union and outside it, in transatlantic relations. The broadly conceived transatlantic relationship covers three parallel processes: the emergence of Europe as a quasi-power; the shaping of a new type of relationship between the EU and the United States within NATO as one of the significant security factors and certainties in the new security environment; and the firm anchoring of democratic values and interlinking of vital interests which have enabled Europe to become a community of democracies.

Military expenditure. Provisional figures for 2000 show that world military expenditure amounted to $798 billion (in current prices). This was an annual increase of as much as 3.1 per cent in real terms and an increase of 5 per cent over 1998. Military spending increased in all main regions (Africa, the Americas, Asia and Oceania, Europe and the Middle East) during the three years 1998–2000. While US military expenditure increased by 2.3 per cent in real terms (according to SIPRI and NATO data), provisional figures for Russian military expenditure in 2000 showed an increase of 43 per cent in real terms over 1998. Still, the level of Russian military expenditure is only one-sixth of...
that of the USA. The group of European NATO countries have increased their expenditures for military equipment by 11 per cent in real terms since 1998.

The region with the steepest rise is Africa, where military expenditure increased by 37 per cent in real terms between 1998 and 2000. This is the result of strong increases in the military budgets of countries involved in wars and in those contiguous to conflict countries. In South Asia military expenditure continues to rise as a result of the India–Pakistan conflict. The increase in 1998–2000 was 23 per cent in real terms.

**Russian military expenditure and arms production.** Since Vladimir Putin became President of Russia the budgetary situation of the Russian armed forces has improved. In the year 2000 actual allocations to national defence exceeded those planned and their share of gross domestic product reached 2.75 per cent, higher than budgeted. The federal budget for 2001 includes increased allocations to defence. Serious problems remain: frequent administrative reorganization, debts and the lack of a coherent policy for restructuring arms production.

**The SIPRI ‘top 100’ companies.** The combined value of arms sales of the 100 largest arms-producing companies in the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and developing countries (except China) increased by about 11 per cent in 1999 as a result of the continued high rate of mergers and acquisitions (to a total value of $157 billion in 1999). On both sides of the Atlantic, companies continue to search for closer industrial alliances to broaden their markets. In 2000 these efforts resulted in a number of acquisitions by British companies of companies in the USA and in the establishment of joint ventures among large US and West European companies.

**Arms transfers.** The level of global arms transfers fell by nearly 27 per cent from 1999 to 2000, mainly because of a temporary drop in US aircraft deliveries. The largest suppliers of major conventional weapons in the period 1996–2000 were the USA, Russia, France, the UK and Germany. They accounted for close to 85 per cent of total arms transfers. Among them, Russia was the only one showing a substantial increase in 2000. The major recipients in the period 1996–2000 were Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Korea and China. China was the major recipient in 2000. The USA alone accounted for 47 per cent of total arms transfers in the period 1996–2000. The strong US supplier position is complemented by US attempts to influence the arms export behaviour of other countries in support of US policies. The main examples in 2000 include Australia, Israel and the UK.

**Transfers of small arms.** A survey of arms transfers to five current conflicts shows that most governments involved have access to a wide range of arms suppliers and can obtain relatively easily both small arms and major weapons. Many suppliers export weapons to governments for economic rea-
sons. While the ceiling for commercial arms procurement by governments is set mainly by economic factors, arms procurement by rebel forces is also restricted by the fact that fewer suppliers are willing to provide them with weapons. In all of the five conflicts, military aid was provided to both the governments and rebels by third parties with political interests in the conflict region.

*Nuclear arms control.* In 2000 the nuclear arms control agenda continued to be dominated by the controversy over the USA’s plans for a limited national missile defence (NMD) system and proposal to amend the ABM Treaty to permit its deployment. This controversy largely overshadowed the vote by the Russian Federal assembly to ratify the START II Treaty and disrupted efforts to negotiate deeper bilateral reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. There were indications during the year that the strategic nuclear arms control process, as it has existed since the 1960s, might be reaching the end of the road. There was political pressure in both Russia and the USA to adjust what are essentially cold war-era nuclear force postures and underlying targeting strategies to bring them into line with changed political and fiscal circumstances. The 2000 Review Conference of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Document setting out a number of concrete nuclear disarmament goals. Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a global ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives did not open and the START II Treaty remained stalled in the Russian Duma, thereby blocking progress towards deeper reductions in the still sizeable Russian and US nuclear arsenals within the framework of a START III accord.

*The illicit traffic in nuclear materials.* Despite the decline since 1995 in the number of reported cases of illicit trafficking involving fissile material and the fact that a major proliferation catastrophe has so far been averted, challenges will remain for a long time to come. There is an urgent need to: (a) reduce existing highly enriched uranium and plutonium stockpiles; (b) raise global standards and uniformity for physical protection; (c) strengthen and extend the application of safeguards; (d) ensure the existence of modern prevention and detection infrastructures; (e) facilitate better cooperation and information sharing among countries and international bodies; and (f) continue to assist Russia and the other newly independent states to contain proliferation.

*Chemical and biological developments and arms control.* The four states which possess chemical weapons—India, South Korea, Russia and the USA—are now destroying them, although destruction activities in South Korea, Russia and the USA are complicated by the environmental and safety concerns of local populations. The negotiations on a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) reached a critical stage in 2000. The intention is still to complete the document before the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC, in November 2001. However, the biotechnology and pharma-

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37 See chapter 6 in this volume.
38 See appendix 6C in this volume.
39 See chapter 7 in this volume.
Chemical weapons have been less willing to provide solutions that merge transparency and preserve their business interests. Although the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission became operational in 2000, Iraq continues to refuse any cooperation under UN Security Council Resolution 1284, arguing that it has met all its disarmament obligations. The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons remained a concern in 2000 with regard to other states as well.

**Conventional arms control.** Arms reductions under the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty have been conservative and reflect a desire for a ‘security insurance’ rather than a strong commitment to major weapon cuts. Instances of non-compliance with treaty terms continued in 2000, but the EU and NATO have chosen to overlook the arms control-related shortcomings of the post-Soviet states while pursuing a policy of cooperative and inclusive security, towards Russia in particular. Increasing attention is being paid to ‘soft’, broad regional security arrangements and building wide-ranging stability rather than strategic parity or balance. The fragile stability in the Balkan region continues to impede efforts to bring arms control in the Balkans closer to the overall European model. Following the success of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sub-regional arms control agreements in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, arms control-related efforts are now being focused on the Balkans as a region.

**CSBMs in Europe.** Two major challenges have confronted the OSCE participating states in recent years as regards CSBMs: at the OSCE level, their applicability in adverse conditions (e.g., domestic conflict) and, at the regional level, the need for greater transparency and improved contacts and cooperation among states. There has been some success at both these levels. In Chechnya, Russia allowed a precedent-setting multinational observation visit to be made to a ‘region of on-going military activities’. As regards conflict prevention and crisis management, there is disagreement as to whether additional measures are needed or whether existing CSBMs should be more effectively utilized.

**Multilateral weapon and technology export controls.** In 2001 the European Union revised its system for licensing exports of dual-use goods and technologies. In addition, the EU member states put in place legal obligations to control intangible transfers of technology for the first time, as well as continuing to develop cooperation in export controls over conventional arms.

**V. Conclusions**

The new organizing principles of regional and global security are democracy, good governance and the rule of law. There are close relationships between globalization and international security, on the one hand, and democratization, human rights and respect for the rights of minorities, on the other. In the

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40 See chapter 8 in this volume.
41 See appendix 8B in this volume.
42 See chapter 9 in this volume.
21st century democracy should be seen not only as a form of government but also as a way towards the peaceful coexistence of nations.\textsuperscript{43} Today, the distribution of power is increasingly of a functional character: sovereign states delegate part of their power to global and regional institutions and organizations, part to the national sphere, and part to the sub-national level. Democratic governments, however stable, are not static: they are part of the process in which norms, tenets, procedures and institutions must be constantly reworked.\textsuperscript{44} Good governance and democracy, as the new organizing principles of global security, will promote the kind of relationship between states that takes account of divergent interests but eliminates the use of force as a means of settling conflicts of interests.

\textsuperscript{43} Message by Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, to the Warsaw Conference, in \textit{Polish Quarterly of International Affairs} (note 22), pp. 24–25.

\textsuperscript{44} Speech by Joschka Fischer, in \textit{Polish Quarterly of International Affairs} (note 22), p. 41.