THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARIANS IN BUILDING SECURITY IN AND FOR EUROPE

IAN ANTHONY
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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The Role of Parliamentarians in Building Security in and for Europe

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Preface

This policy paper focuses on the role of parliamentarians in Europe as a stakeholder group. The paper seeks to evaluate the positive contribution that parliamentarians make today (and there are many examples from which to choose), and suggests ways to improve the impact and effectiveness of their work.

This should not be interpreted to mean that institutions are not important. None of the complex and interconnected problems currently on the agenda of European decision makers can be solved quickly or easily. Sustaining engagement over the period needed to make significant change is not possible without institutional capacity. While ‘coalitions of the willing’ can provide momentum and initiate actions, they lack staying power. As political priorities change, and attention moves elsewhere, informal initiatives cannot be sustained, and unless resources are embedded in more permanent structures they shift to other priorities.

The dense web of laws, institutions, instruments and capacities developed over decades failed to prevent major armed conflict breaking out in Ukraine in 2014, and there is an obvious need to enhance effectiveness of all parts of the European security system. Effectiveness might be based on statutory powers and legal authority, but the appetite for major institutional reform initiatives in present conditions is very low.

Institutions can best increase their effectiveness by being catalysts for change, whether through multilateral normative action—what John Ruggie, the former United Nation’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, once called principles that specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions—or through projects and initiatives that bring together diverse resources to address issues of great current concern. This paper focuses first and foremost on the second approach that could, if successful, feed back into new interpretations of existing European security norms and principles (which remain fundamentally sound).

In preparing this project, SIPRI would like to acknowledge the invaluable support of different kinds.

The project would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the Swedish Parliament, and the personal engagement of key parliamentarians—in particular Swedish representatives to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly, Kent Härstedt, Walburga Habsburg Douglas and Margareta Cederfelt.

The Swiss Chairmanship was extremely helpful in facilitating a range of contacts in Vienna and elsewhere across the different parts of the OSCE. SIPRI would particularly like to thank Ambassador Fred Tanner for opening a number of important pathways, and thanks are also due to many OSCE officers who were generous with their time.
With great patience and considerable diplomatic skill, Maria Chepurina of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat played an essential role in helping to convene two meetings in Stockholm to discuss issues of relevance to the paper.

Members of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions facilitated participation in several meetings in Vienna, as well as engaging SIPRI in projects that were beneficial to the preparation of the paper. SIPRI would particularly like to thank network partners Wolfgang Zellner, Frank Evers and Kari Möttölä.

SIPRI Governing Board member Wolfgang Ischinger was instrumental in helping to convene a meeting on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference to discuss issues of direct relevance to the paper.

Last, but not least, the contributions of SIPRI staff and Distinguished Associate Fellows (Göran Lennmarker, Lars-Erik Lundin and Tarja Cronberg) were decisive in framing issues and developing the thinking behind the paper.

While all of those mentioned above made positive and constructive contributions, full responsibility for the content of the paper—including its flaws and weaknesses—rests with the author.

Dr Ian Anthony
Programme Director
European Security Programme
Stockholm, December 2015
Summary

At the end of the first quarter of 2015, the conflict in Ukraine, in the heart of Europe, was responsible for the deaths of over 6000 people and had forced more than a million people from their homes. Few believe that the conflict has been contained. There are signs that the demilitarization of European politics (previously seen as a major achievement) is increasingly seen as a mistake that should be at least partly reversed. Citizens were murdered in terrorist attacks in Belgium, Denmark and France, and the linked, politically motivated attacks raised fears of a campaign of violence, rather than isolated attacks by individuals. Violent manifestations of prejudice and intolerance remain a pervasive problem across Europe.

The web of legal conventions, political agreements, institutions and instruments in place in Europe could not prevent any of the above events, which underlined that Europe is still very far from achieving a security system worth the name. This is not a reason to abandon the cooperative approach to security, since a more convincing model has not yet been presented. Instead, it is necessary to think about how to build the *acquis* of agreement on how to cope with current threats, along with the capacities needed to implement it.

The understanding of how security is built in Europe has changed fundamentally in a world where commerce, communications, finance and human mobility are increasingly integrated and internationalized. Nevertheless, states are introducing intrusive, tighter and more restrictive controls, some of which challenge the current understanding of how to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties. Parties and groups that advocate reducing openness, reversing integration and re-imposing national controls of different kinds have gained political support.

The necessary reassessment of European security cannot be limited to intergovernmental consultation. State authorities, historically seen as ‘security providers’, are one actor among many now that security challenges require a more complex response that goes beyond the use of executive powers of the state, and the forces and resources under their direct control. Security building has to be a common and shared endeavour, and parliamentarians will be expected to play their part in a new phase of building security in, and for, Europe—and to play that part more effectively. What is expected from parliamentarians?

- To make their voices heard in the debate and discussion over what European security means in current conditions and how it can be achieved.
- To carry out their traditional tasks of legislation, resource allocation and budget preparation, oversight and accountability in security-related fields—all of which will become more important in the coming years.
- To make a constructive contribution in security-related issue areas based on specific, and probably unique, parliamentary skills and capacities.
This policy paper pinpoints parliamentary capacities, identifies useful instruments, and recommends approaches and actions for consideration. The paper presents brief case studies that illustrate the powerful influence that parliamentarians can exert. The cases are intended to be indicative, and not in any sense comprehensive. However, they do bring out some of the key elements that contribute to the impact of actions by parliamentarians.

**Key capacities of parliamentarians:**
- Statutory powers within national constitutional systems;
- Influence over resource allocations;
- Local, national, regional and international networks;
- Direct contact with citizens; and
- Communication and media skills.

**Key instruments available to parliamentarians:**
- Convening power;
- Intellectual leadership;
- Mobilizing resources; and
- Investigations and monitoring.

**Recommendations to increase impact and effectiveness:**
- Take a problem-solving approach; do not emphasize institution-building. Effective action is the most convincing way to increase influence;
- Share ownership of good ideas; emphasize the inclusive use of the available instruments;
- Highlight, publicize and promote cases where parliamentarians have made a powerful impact on problems of current concern. There are many such cases, but too little is known about them; and
- Use existing frameworks and integrate available instruments; there are already many networks and institutions, and more are not needed.

**Three specific proposals**

Three specific projects are proposed, because they have both a value *per se* and would be instrumental in further developing high-impact parliamentary contributions to building cooperative security in, and for, Europe.

The proposals are deliberately generic, rather than proposed as projects to be taken forward by an identified parliamentary body. Many parliamentary frameworks could promote the projects, but they need not be ‘owned’ by any single institution. A more appropriate and future-oriented approach is to see them as broad and inclusive activities, in which many different kinds of participants could find a role.

The approach rests on the proposition that in current circumstances it is better to avoid efforts that seek comprehensive solutions to the very complex web of
problems that Europe faces. More is likely to be accomplished by promoting relatively modest projects that can produce tangible (and ideally measurable) results. Success in projects of this kind might subsequently provide some of the methodologies, momentum and confidence that could lead to a more ambitious agenda.

While addressing discrete problems, the projects in themselves are nonetheless ambitious and large-scale. They should be designed in a way that makes them difficult to block, by focusing on issues that are recognized to be in the common interest. To implement them there is a need for some structure and capacity. A Special Coordinator for each project should draw on administrative and logistical capacities in an existing body. However, the mandate and terms of reference of the Special Coordinators would be deliberately designed to bring together a wide range of diverse partners to achieve project objectives.

1. Design and implement counter-extremism communications strategies to address the toxic ideas and imagery that violent extremist groups promote.
2. Establish an integrated monitoring and support mechanism to support anti-corruption reform initiatives in Ukraine.
3. Organize and convene a multi-stakeholder evaluation of the rules that apply to the deployment and actions of soldiers and the use of lethal force on national territory.
Abbreviations

ACN  Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
ELN  European Leadership Network
HRW  Human Rights Watch
IPU  Inter-Parliamentary Union
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTI  Nuclear Threat Initiative
ODIHR OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization
1. The European threat environment

Few, if any, would argue with the proposition that security threats can no longer be defined strictly in terms of geography or limited to one functional area—such as security against the risk of attack by the armed forces of another state. It is beyond dispute that the way in which security threats are framed and discussed has changed irrevocably during the 25 years since the cold war ended. However, capturing the full scope of what European security is remains a difficult exercise.

In April 2014, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions produced its first report on the subject of threat perceptions in the OSCE area.¹ The OSCE Network was created in 2013, and the background research on which the report is based was completed before the end of that year. The results highlighted concerns about ‘domestic threats combined with questions about the efficiency and legitimacy of governance. The common denominator is concern about weak, insufficient and/or worsening governance capacities. This concern is shared by all kinds of countries’.²

By early 2015, by conservative estimates, over 6000 people had been killed in fighting in Ukraine, and well over 1 million people had been displaced from their homes. Despite the dense web of legal conventions, political agreements, institutions of different kinds and other instruments in place in Europe, it took only a few months for the political crisis in Ukraine to escalate into major conflict. It could be predicted that if a project on threat perceptions was conducted in 2015, more traditional politico–military security threats would have greater prominence.

It is too soon to make a definitive assessment of the likely future course of events, but whether Europe is returning, step-by-step, to a concept of security based on traditional forms of power politics has become a legitimate and widely asked question. In the past, when providing security was predominantly seen as an executive function, parliaments and parliamentarians had important, defined functions in many European states. Parliamentarians have played an essential role in the fields of legislation, budget development, oversight and accountability.

In the coming years this traditional role of parliamentarians is likely to become more prominent once again. What is the appropriate level of resources that European states should devote to their defence in conditions where economies remain under strain but the public feel a need for reassurance in the face of potential military threats? What types of security assurances should states seek from each other, and what kind of assurances should states offer to others?

¹ OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area (OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions: Vienna, Apr. 2014).
² OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions (note 1), p. 5.
These are questions on which parliaments will expect to be consulted and they have a responsibility to take a view. There should also be an international dimension to the dialogue on ‘how much is enough’ in defence. Historically, if the views of other international stakeholders are not taken into account, national approaches about resource allocation, military force generation and military doctrine have led to ‘action–reaction’ decision making and arms races.

The role of states as security providers

While parliamentarians now need to focus more attention on traditional security tasks, which have taken on a renewed salience, they will also increasingly be compelled to engage with new debates and take on new security-related tasks.

The OSCE Network report referred to above was based on national surveys in 18 OSCE countries, and the conclusions indicate that citizens in a significant number of European states are losing confidence in the capacity of national authorities to manage a mounting set of interconnected problems. Groups and populations that lose confidence in the capacity of states or state institutions may develop other affiliations—religious, national or ethnic—in the hope that their needs can be met more effectively. The serious breakdown in security both regionally and within several European states has led to a reassessment of the role of the state as a security provider.

The incorporation of Crimea into Russia against the wishes of Ukraine triggered widespread fears that the consensus around the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states (on which a great deal of the thinking about European security is based) is an illusion. However, the crisis that preceded the conflict also demonstrated that Ukraine had not succeeded in building a resilient and successful state that could meet the needs of all its citizens in the 25 years since becoming a sovereign entity. When the moment of truth arrived, it became clear that Ukraine was suffering from serious deficits in most of the areas where a state is expected to perform (including the economic, judicial, military and social spheres).

In terms of Russian policy towards Ukraine, a number of observers highlighted the domestic dimension as a factor, including a perceived need to solidify support for the current Russian regime in the aftermath of mass domestic protests in 2011–12. From this perspective, Russian external action not only appears to have reduced the risk of spillover from developments in Ukraine, but it also seems to have increased public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Other observers have pointed to the importance of another factor: a graduated approach to sovereignty in Russian thinking—something that has been evolving

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3 OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions (note 1).
4 Makarychev, A. and Yatsyk, A., A New Russian Conservatism: Domestic Roots and Repercussions for Europe, Notes Internacionals no. 93 (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, CIDOB: Barcelona, June 2014).
over an extended period. According to this view, the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states is fundamental but requires interpretation. Moreover, the mechanisms that ensure respect for these principles should be reviewed and revised. In this context, Ukraine (and other states that can be seen as having limited sovereignty) would need the support and oversight of outside guarantors in order to preserve stability, but this support should be provided in the framework of what Russian leaders have called in the past ‘equal security’—ideally under the auspices of a European security system in which the OSCE is recognized as the primary authority, rather than through participation in military alliances where (in the Russian view) some states ensure their own security at the expense of others.

While Russia has consistently advocated versions of this proposal in different forms since 2007–2008, it has equally consistently been rejected by other states that stress the right of states to choose their forms of association freely, including the right to be (or not to be) a party to treaties of alliance or a right to neutrality—which are specific elements of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

An intensified discussion of state resilience, fragility, weakness and failure—including the meaning of these terms, and how they are used—is now needed in Europe to help determine the proper relationship between sovereign obligations and collective solidarity. Identifying fragile states could be an essential element in understanding where future threats lie and preparing appropriate kinds of intervention. Conversely, identifying the elements that make states resilient could be an important contribution to reducing security risk.

Classifying ‘weak’ and ‘resilient’ states can also be seen as a pragmatic recognition of reality—since states with the same status de jure have very different capacities de facto. Moreover, the performance of a state is not static over time, and there have been efforts to measure both the decay of institutions and also the strengthening of their capacity.

The notion of degrees of statehood is challenging when international institutions are based on the principle of sovereign equality, and equal rights and responsibilities. However, the United Nations World Summit Outcome document issued in 2005, which was adopted by heads of state and government by consensus, accepted the principle that if a government were unable to meet its obligations, it could forfeit its legitimate authority in the eyes of the international community.

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7 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act (Helsinki Final Act), Helsinki, signed 1 Aug. 1975.


The suspicion, or allegation, that in reality this principle has been a thin cover for unacceptable forms of interference in the internal affairs of states (in extreme cases leading to regime change), has been one factor reducing trust and confidence. However, this perspective on sovereignty, a key element in statehood, is perhaps undergoing a reinterpretation in the current conditions.

When it was assumed that states were moving towards a common destination—albeit at different speeds and via different routes—there was no conceptual inconsistency between ideas based on human security and promoting a global civil society, on the one hand, and efforts to create order in a state through direct action by outside powers, on the other. However, where external actors are reluctant to assume responsibility for the internal security of other states, or are uncertain about which kinds of intervention can play a constructive role, a reassessment is called for. It is debatable whether international action to strip authority from governments would be seen as a constructive approach today, even in cases where behaviour falls far short of the standards considered acceptable internationally.

Whether or not there is a basis for a new agreement on how to balance the responsibility of states to manage their affairs competently and the right of other states to be safeguarded against the impact of poor performance should be explored. This is a debate in which parliamentarians should play an active and prominent role.

The Helsinki Final Act also underlines that frontiers can be changed ‘in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement’, and there are examples where borders have been adjusted in this way. After the end of the cold war the consolidation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic into one state and the division of Czechoslovakia into two separate states were accomplished peacefully.

In different parts of Europe there are active debates among various populations about whether or not the current constitutional arrangements of sovereign states can meet their needs. In 2014 a referendum was held in Scotland under a process agreed by all parties in the United Kingdom. The majority of voters in Scotland decided to remain as part of the UK, but it is clear that large numbers of people living in Scotland have lost confidence in current constitutional arrangements. In Spain, procedures that would have allowed voters in Catalonia to express a view on whether or not to establish an independent state could not be agreed. However, Catalan political groups are actively exploring other mechanisms to promote a debate over whether the future of Catalonia lies within Spain, or whether the needs of the population would be better served in a separate state.

In Crimea, the events of 2014 illustrated that the failure to find a satisfactory framework in which to decide whether or not borders should change can not only create serious security problems at the local level but can also have an impact on the wider European security environment. There is a need for a new

\footnote{Helsinki Final Act (note 7), Article 1(a)(I).}
assessment of how to reconcile and make consistent the principle that borders may be modified peacefully with the principle of territorial integrity of states, and here too parliamentarians should play a prominent and active role.

Organizing for success: multi-stakeholder security building

As the definition of what it means to be secure has changed in Europe, it has become increasingly clear that the question of whom or what is a ‘security provider’ has also evolved. Citizens (and private businesses) have traditionally relied on the state to provide security, but as the concept of what constitutes a security threat has widened, non-state actors of various kinds have been called on to contribute solutions.

Many of the things on which people rely for what they now see as a normal standard and quality of life are increasingly outside government ownership and control. If organized criminals or politically motivated extremists target electronic banking systems, compromise internet-based communications or attack critical infrastructure such as power plants or energy grids, the ‘first responders’ are likely to be private companies that own and operate the relevant assets. From another perspective, governments can legislate and set rules, but many of the tools of modern statecraft—such as ‘smart sanctions’, anti-money laundering measures or non-proliferation and counter-proliferation instruments like export controls—are easily defeated unless private actors take a leading role in enforcement. In a world where urbanization is a strong tendency everywhere (including in Europe), building and maintaining social cohesion in fast-changing cities can only be achieved if municipal and local government takes the lead.

It would seem to be beyond dispute that security responses can only be effective if an integrated approach that includes sub-national, national, regional and global elements is applied. Under those conditions it is natural that there should also be a focus on how parliamentarians can maximize the effectiveness of their contribution to security building.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows:

Section 2 examines parliamentarian capacities in a generic way and briefly outlines the instruments that are at the disposal of parliamentarians.

Section 3 uses several brief case studies to illustrate parliamentary actions that have had a major impact on specific security challenges in the past and tries to identify the factors that contributed to success.

Section 4 focuses on a number of generic recommendations aimed at maximizing the contributions of parliamentarians in security building and proposes some specific actions to be taken. These actions have a value per se, in that they address three key contemporary security issues and are also intended to be illustrative—offering ideas about how parliamentarians could increase the effectiveness of their actions and maximize their impact.
2. The key capacities of parliamentarians

Scrutiny and oversight of the security sector

Scrutinizing national security policies, plans and budgets is an important task for national parliaments. In many countries it is a statutory obligation. Democratic oversight involves oversight and review of defence policies, military budgets and spending, and equipment procurement decisions in the executive, the military and other statutory authorities. International cooperation to help parliamentarians carry out their security-related tasks will become a more important priority in coming years.

SIPRI has monitored the trends in military spending of states since the 1960s and maintains the most comprehensive military expenditure data set in the world. The data on military spending for recent years indicates variable approaches in different parts of Europe. Spending in central and western Europe has consistently declined since 2011, in contrast to most world regions, where military spending is increasing. In 2014, decisions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) included a Readiness Action Plan that provides for the creation of a new Spearhead Force—a joint task force available for rapid deployment to NATO’s outer perimeters at short notice—follow-on forces based on the existing NATO Response Force, and planning for the regeneration of large military forces configured for territorial defence. The decisions taken in 2014 also included a defence investment pledge that could lead to a concerted attempt to first arrest the recent decline in military spending and then begin to increase the resources devoted to defence.

In the same period (i.e. since 2011), military spending in the eastern part of Europe has been increasing rapidly. The pressures on the Russian state budget caused by falling prices of oil and gas have required a modification to the pace of implementation of ambitious military reform and equipment modernization programmes in Russia. However, the Russian leadership has emphasized that reform and modernization plans will be implemented in full, albeit over a longer period.

As these decisions are developed in detail and then implemented, it is the responsibility of elected representatives to assess national security policies, defence budgets and arms procurement decisions against security needs, and to consider their impact on broader societal priorities. In conditions where European economies are fragile, with either low levels of growth or no growth at all, the need to ensure that resources are not being misapplied is even greater.

Several different dimensions of national security require scrutiny. First, in the field of broad military and politico–security issues the threat assessments on which military planning is based should be evaluated and tested, for example, in systematic analyses of the content of long-term planning guidelines or White Papers. This is not only to reassure the public that the policies and plans for the armed forces are based on a solid foundation, but also to assess the relative return
in terms of enhanced security from investment in the military with regard to other, non-military investments.

Second, defence budgets and defence budget planning processes need to be assessed to try to ensure the maximum return on invested resources. Increases in military spending are an input measure, but parliamentarians need to ascertain the outputs that spending translates into by evaluating methods used by the executive in long-term budget planning, and in contracting and procurement procedures.

Third, parliamentarians need to take a close interest in techno-industrial issues, both the current industrial base and the future research and technology base on which military capabilities rest.

Fourth, parliamentarians need to scrutinize the operational plans and field activities of the military, to make sure that they remain within agreed parameters, and respect international humanitarian and human rights law, arms control agreements and politically binding codes of conduct agreed at the European and international level.

These are familiar and traditional tasks for parliaments, and there are already developed networks in place to promote international dialogue and cooperation among parliamentarians on the politico–military dimensions of security. However, despite considerable investments in security-sector reform in Europe, recent reports underline that there are still very large differences in the statutory powers, as well as the technical and analytical capacities of parliaments around Europe.\(^\text{11}\)

A recent joint report by the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly underlined that, in the face of current challenges, active dialogue among the parliamentarians from various European institutions has a crucial role to play and should be reinforced.\(^\text{12}\)

**Strategic communication**

In defining elements of modern democratic systems, European states have identified freedom of expression as a necessary element in a democratic society and a fundamental human right. A free media is essential to an open society, and a powerful tool to promote accountable governance and a means of exposing corruption that can have a corrosive effect on the levels of trust that citizens’ place in authority.

At the same time, there has been growing concern that the media can also be exploited for anti-social and malicious purposes. Recently, the active participation


of citizens from European countries in armed conflicts inside Europe and at its periphery has been the catalyst for a discussion about the permeability of borders, the security implications of migration and whether or not the benefits derived from high mobility of people outweigh the potential risks.

The extensive use of modern information technology, mass communication through electronic media, and the widespread use of online social media have all been identified as instruments used by groups to recruit foreign fighters. More broadly, extremist groups of different kinds have become adept at using modern strategic communication techniques. One example that has been highlighted is the professional and ‘user-friendly’ communications by Salafi extremist groups inside Europe. The escalating numbers of European citizens that are volunteering to fight in Syria and Iraq are testimony to the effectiveness of the methods used, especially for young people.

Strategic communications emphasize the distribution of multi-media content via the Internet, with a rapid increase in the number of Salafist websites in recent years. Apart from distribution via the Internet, linked websites host chat rooms, forums and social networks that facilitate communication between extremist groups.

Islamist propaganda is only one cause for concern. Extremists that support more traditional European right-wing and left-wing political ideologies remain active. Moreover, recent reports have underlined the growing use of modern strategic communication techniques in contemporary statecraft. Media outlets are increasingly used by state authorities to broadcast messages that are intended to present a one-sided and favourable narrative in order to shape public opinion, both domestically and internationally.

The role of strategic communications in the conflict in Ukraine has been highlighted as an aspect of what is often now labelled ‘hybrid war’. However, there are also more general concerns about the impact of strategic communications strategies in European states. In Lithuania, for example, the national Radio and Television Commission has repeatedly suspended the operations of Russian-owned broadcasters accused of violating the Law on Provision of Information to the Public.

Recent reports by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) have underlined that hate crimes remain a pervasive phenomenon across Europe. While some OSCE participating states criminalize hate speech, ODIHR does not consider hate speech to fall within the scope of hate crime, because ‘speech’ is not a criminal act.

However, ODIHR recognizes that hate crimes do not happen in a vacuum, and OSCE participating states have acknowledged that ‘hate crimes can be fuelled by

13 German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, ‘The content and objectives of Salafist ideology’, [n.d.]
racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic propaganda’. Moreover, intolerant speech can lend a sense of social acceptance to potential perpetrators of violence.\footnote{\textit{OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: Incidents and Responses. Annual Report for 2011} (OSCE ODIHR: Warsaw, Nov. 2012).}

A number of national points of contact on hate crime in OSCE participating states have underlined the need for a harmonized understanding of what constitutes hate speech in order to develop more effective responses. Agreed definitions would also help with reporting and data collection in order to build a better Europe-wide understanding of the extent of hate speech and information on trends.\footnote{See e.g. OSCE ODIHR, ‘Report from the national points of contact on hate crimes annual meeting’, Vienna, 20–21 Nov. 2014.} In sum, there is growing concern that toxic ideas and imagery are being promoted and distributed in increasing volume by violent extremist groups of different kinds.

An interview with a major television news programme or a large circulation national newspaper is an opportunity to reach a mass audience, and so interaction with the media is also a key instrument for parliamentarians as part of their communication with the public. Parliamentarians are increasingly active users of online social media. In future, if not already today, a parliamentarian who does not understand how to use modern strategic communications will be severely disadvantaged professionally.

Parliamentarians should therefore play an important role in countering the various negative forms of strategic communications, as well as helping to preserve and respect the legitimate and necessary media freedoms and the right to free speech. At the very least, parliamentarians should not be complicit in negative uses of strategic communications or active promoters of hate speech.

Parliamentarians have agreed on many resolutions condemning hate crimes—in the past 15 years the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly alone has passed 25 such resolutions—but the impact of these decisions seems to have been limited. The killing of 17 people in Paris, including staff of the satirical magazine \textit{Charlie Hebdo}, policemen and Jewish citizens, was the catalyst for a more direct form of action. In January 2015 the No Hate Parliamentary Alliance was officially launched with an exchange of views on the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe.\footnote{Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ‘The No Hate Parliamentary Alliance is launched’, Press release, 29 Jan. 2015.}

At the launch of the No Hate Parliamentary Alliance, Anne Brasseur, the President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, noted:

For several months, racist hate speech has taken on an alarming dimension. Xenophobia and intolerance today pose the most serious threat for the peaceful existence of our multicultural societies, a real danger for our European values. There is an urgent need to act. As elected representatives we have a greater responsibility than anyone else in this matter.\footnote{Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (note 17).}
The same line of thinking was echoed by Milena Santerini, the first Coordinator of the Alliance, who said that: ‘Parliamentarians, who are at the forefront of public life, have a special responsibility to lead the way on combating hate speech and racism—in all they say and do’.19

**Early warning**

In August 2011, officers of the British Metropolitan Police shot and killed Mark Duggan, who was the subject of an ongoing surveillance operation in connection with firearms and drug-related offences in Tottenham, north London. The police had gathered a considerable amount of intelligence that suggested Duggan was rising to prominence within the criminal community as a member of an organized criminal network in north London.20

Duggan was shot on 4 August 2011, and two days later a group of roughly 100 people assembled at Tottenham police station requesting a meeting with a senior police officer to discuss the shooting. By the evening of 6 August the situation had escalated into a full-scale riot in Tottenham that lasted all night. The following day there were violent disturbances all over London. On 8 August rioting continued in London, but spread to other parts of England, with serious violent disorder in Birmingham, West Bromwich and Nottingham, clashes with police in Liverpool and less serious incidents in dozens of other locations as far afield as Kent and Yorkshire. The following day London was quiet after a large surge in police deployment—over 16,000 police officers were mobilized and deployed in the capital. However, while London was relatively quiet, serious violent disorder broke out in Manchester.

While the participants in the unrest that took place in the immediate vicinity of Tottenham police station may have had some connection with or knowledge of Duggan, the same could not be said of those involved in the sustained period of rioting and looting in other areas that followed. The events in Tottenham were simply the spark that ignited flames in other cities where factors that could provoke violent disorder were already present. However, the local conditions that facilitated the violence were undetected until the moment when major acts of disorder broke out.

A chain of events of this kind, which take law enforcement authorities, politicians and civil society by surprise, should be possible to prepare for. Subsequent investigations suggest that the outbreaks had multiple explanations, including opportunistic greed, an inner-city gang culture that was stronger than expected, and a sense of social injustice that presented the events as a protest

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19 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (note 17).
movement rather than rioting. Could these tendencies have been detected if available information was collected and analysed in a systematic way? If sufficient information to forewarn of potential risk was available, what how could preparedness be improved?

Through their contacts at local level with individuals as well as various kinds of grass-roots movements and groups based in their constituencies, could parliamentarians—and perhaps even more to the point, party organizations at constituency and regional level—play a more active role in identifying changes that might be creating fertile ground for unrest?

It would perhaps be timely to revisit the issue of the proper balance between centralization and decentralization in European political parties from the perspective of societal security, and not only see this issue as a matter of effective election performance. Should a parliamentarian, along with the support system at local level, be more active as an initial point of contact for reporting local grievances? A good understanding of changes in the demographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition at constituency level is one important basis for election strategy, but perhaps this data can also play a more instrumental role in reducing security risks. In particular, could the risk of violent social disorder be reduced through enhanced contact between a parliamentarian and elected counsellors or other local politicians, journalists, police, school representatives and many other parts of local society? In the case of the civil unrest in the UK in 2011, it does not seem to be the case that parliamentarian networks picked up signals from the local community or, if they did acquire the information, they were not able to draw the correct conclusions from it. As European societies become more diverse, and political systems become more pluralistic, the need for a new discussion about the role of different actors in promoting social cohesion, risk early warning and effective conflict management is likely to become more acute.

In 2012, the Global Parliamentary Report produced by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) provided a great deal of food for thought about the relationship between citizens and parliaments and the challenges facing parliamentarians. Connecting local and international issues in the minds of their constituents is a difficult task for parliamentarians, and the question of how to convince a domestic audience of the need to ratify an international agreement can thus become an important issue for parliamentarians. Similarly, the incentives for parliamentary support to an international agreement might require a link to be made to domestic politics.

The great majority of constituents think locally, and although they may respond to the local manifestation of an international issue, they often fail to

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connect the work that a parliamentarian does on international issues to what is seen as a local problem. On the contrary, international engagement may be seen as distracting attention from local issues or an inappropriate use of time and resources. A methodology is needed to explain the interconnectedness of security problems in a way that is accessible and understandable to constituents.

From the perspective of a parliamentarian trying to decide which actions to take, issues that are contested and polarizing may pose particular dilemmas. Individual parliamentarians may be placed in a situation where being loyal to their political party, supporting the national government, responding to the views of their constituents and following their own conscience may suggest different responses. Whether to support military interventions outside Europe, approaches to counterterrorism, and responses to the implications of migration are recent examples of security issues that may require individual parliamentarians to reconcile cross-pressures imposed by duties and loyalties to party, government, constituents and individual conscience.

A recent analysis by a British university pointed to a growing rebelliousness among members of parliament, who appear to be less constrained by party discipline and more willing to vote against the line proposed by party leaders, including making informal alliances across party lines to bargain with executive authority on specific issues.\(^\text{23}\) At the same time, taking an independent view on a contested and polarizing issue can involve serious risk in terms of career development. A recent comparative analysis concluded that the degree to which a parliamentarian takes independent positions correlates closely with the way in which they visualize their future career path.\(^\text{24}\)

The survey data from citizens on which the *Global Parliamentary Report* is based suggests that levels of trust in politicians are relatively high when citizens feel they have a direct contact with their local representative. Moreover, the level of trust grows with regular dialogue and an exchange of views, but falls if there is a perception of corruption or if representatives are seen to become a remote political elite.\(^\text{25}\)

The data gathered from individual parliamentarians about the way they see their job, in particular their work in the local constituency, suggests a growing difficulty in balancing local, national and international responsibilities. The proliferation of parliamentary oversight bodies of different kinds, as well as the growing amount of information that is collected and shared through the media may increase transparency, accessibility and accountability of parliamentarians;


\(^{25}\) Power et al. (note 22).
however, these developments further increase the pressure on parliamentarians to participate in local, national and international initiatives in order to be seen to be productive.

The parliamentarians from Europe that participated in the preparation of the Global Parliamentary Report emphasized the impact of changes in working practices in the past decade, in particular the growing belief that specialized committees are the most effective way of developing legislation, exercising oversight of executive action and increasing expertise. Representatives from the French National Assembly, for example, reported a rise in the number of committees and committee hearings—which were also taking up more and more time. Between 2002 and 2010 the number of ministers, civil society representatives and experts participating in National Assembly committee activities increased tenfold. Representatives from the Finnish Parliament noted a significant change in the approach to the use of experts in committee hearings. Whereas one expert would have been called in the past, it has become increasingly common to call many, perhaps dozens, of experts to a hearing. Moreover, in addition to committee hearings, other types of meetings—such as seminars and on-site visits—are also becoming increasingly frequent.

As the use of specialized standing committees has grown, so have other parliamentary instruments, such as ad hoc inquiries instigated and appointed by Parliament. The use of commissions of inquiry has become accepted practice, even on very sensitive issues related to security and intelligence matters. Moreover, the proceedings and final reports from such commissions are generally expected to be public (at least in part). One recent study has concluded that ‘the days when the report of a commission of inquiry, even into issues as sensitive as intelligence and national security, could be completely withheld from the public are increasingly a thing of the past’.

The growing demand to participate in specialized committees and other activities may reduce the time available to parliamentarians for interaction with their constituents. Against this background, opening a dialogue on how to reconcile demands for closer contact at local and constituency level, pressures to participate in national activities in parliament and to be active in international engagement, would be timely. A discussion about whether the right balance is being struck should draw on international as well as national perspectives.

3. Examples of high impact actions by parliamentarians

Different forms of impact

Once they have determined that a problem exists, which should be addressed through a defined course of action, parliamentarians (like any other actor) want to be reassured that their actions are having some positive effect. Assessing and measuring impact is notoriously difficult. There are usually quantitative metrics that can be applied, but these are not always meaningful in demonstrating that an action has made a clear contribution to solving an identified problem. In the context of parliamentary action, for example, the number of resolutions that are passed or the number of reports that are published can be counted. However, few people would see an increase in the number of resolutions as a meaningful measure of higher impact.

In the security field, success might be invisible—if there are no terrorist attacks or outbreaks of violent disorder within a defined period, this might testify to the effectiveness of counterterrorist policies and actions, or successful conflict prevention. However, identifying and demonstrating cause and effect in such cases is likely to be very difficult.

Assessing the impact of security initiatives taken by parliamentarians is likely to be better served through a qualitative, rather than quantitative, approach. It could be possible to identify specific cases that demonstrate fairly clearly when an action influenced the development of policy, shaped legislation or altered the behaviour of a given stakeholder. The impact of an action might be conceptual—for example, if it contributes to a better understanding of policy issues, or reframes the terms of the debate on a particular topic.

The four initiatives briefly described below are all examples of parliamentary initiatives whose impact can be demonstrated. Obviously they represent only a limited sample and are not comprehensive. While a more comprehensive survey would be an interesting project, the examples below are intended to be illustrative. For each case, three key elements that seem to have contributed significantly to success are highlighted.

Cooperative threat reduction: intellectual leadership and mobilization of resources

In the late 1980s Europe was by far the most heavily militarized place on earth, and the scale of the military effort in central Europe was of particular significance. Large armies, equipped with huge quantities of weapons faced off against each other in a relatively small space on either side of a dividing line through the centre of Europe. The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) ceased to be a functioning military alliance in 1990 and was formally dissolved in the first half
of 1991. By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union (which owned and controlled the lion’s share of WTO military assets, and all of its nuclear weapons) had also dissolved. Suddenly, and without prior warning, it became unclear who was taking responsibility for the physical custody of vast arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons.

In 1991 the United States put in place the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, legislation intended to help address these concerns. However, few people know the legislation by its original name, or by the name of the follow-on legislation (the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act) that widened the scope of activities to include chemical and biological weapons. It is much more commonly referred to as the Nunn–Lugar Program, after the two US senators (Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar) who were instrumental in establishing, developing and supporting what became a multi-agency, international assistance effort that still continues today.

According to a first-hand account from one of the participants in the development of the Nunn–Lugar Program, the initial response of the US Department of Defense to the proposal was not supportive. Nunn and Lugar convened a bipartisan group of senators at a working breakfast, where they briefed on the need for action and presented draft legislation that had been prepared in advance. Nunn and Lugar asked the senators to support the draft legislation, and approximately a week later the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 was passed as an amendment to the implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

The idea on which the Nunn–Lugar Program was based was completely new at the time. Arms control was the exclusive prerogative of states, and each party to an agreement was entirely responsible for implementing its provisions using its own capacities and at its own expense. The Nunn–Lugar Program, on the other hand, consisted of practical measures to enhance security, jointly implemented and with consent on the territory of one state by a coalition of parties that included states, international organizations, local and regional governments, private companies and non-governmental organizations. Programme activities rapidly expanded beyond the realm of traditional military security. Projects implemented in the military sector were contributions to environmental protection and nuclear safety, while projects in the civilian sector were undertaken to alleviate military security concerns.

The impact of the Nunn–Lugar Program cascaded through the international system. The USA quickly adopted the idea as a central element in national security policy, and dedicated large resources to designing and implementing

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projects. However, the ideas were also taken on by other states and international organizations, and used in frameworks for informal cooperation between states. A few examples can be used to illustrate the impact.

After the mass-impact terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001, the underlying ideas on which the Nunn–Lugar Program was based were used to develop counterterrorism initiatives in multiple frameworks. The 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540—considered by many to be a pioneering initiative because it is effectively legislation that has some of the characteristics of multilateral conventions, but was developed in the Security Council—builds on the ideas behind the Nunn–Lugar Program.\(^{31}\)

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction established by the G8 (Group of Eight) in 2002 drew explicitly on the Nunn–Lugar Program.\(^{32}\) The Global Partnership rapidly expanded to link together 25 countries that have coordinated their national cooperative threat reduction projects, and also designed and implemented joint projects.

In 2003, the European Union (EU) launched its strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—the first functional strategy developed by the EU.\(^{33}\) An important emphasis in the EU non-proliferation strategy is mobilizing resources to strengthen capacities in other countries to lower proliferation risk and prevent mass-impact terrorism.

The Nunn–Lugar Program, the brainchild of two parliamentarians, has had a huge international impact partly because of the convincing idea on which it is based. Where there is a mutual threat, it is self-defeating to insist that another state that clearly lacks the capacity to reduce risk on its own is held to be exclusively responsible for taking action. International solidarity is, in a very direct sense, in the national interest. However, the activities inspired by the two parliamentarians have also had the practical effect of mobilizing tens of billions of euros invested in projects to reduce and eliminate large numbers of weapons, find and secure sensitive materials and technologies, and prevent the mis-application of scientific knowledge in unauthorized military programmes or mass-impact terrorism.

After Nunn’s retirement from the US Congress, the Nunn–Lugar Program continued to make an impact in innovative ways. Nunn was instrumental in the creation of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)—a framework for attracting private financing for threat reduction projects and programmes. The NTI has attracted sponsorship from two philanthropic donors—Ted Turner and Warren Buffett—that has allowed it to support threat reduction projects that would normally only be within the financial capacity of states. The sustained

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engagement of Nunn is a precondition for support from the largest philanthropic donors.

**Three elements that created the conditions for success:**

- Intellectual leadership by parliamentarians with a strong commitment and deep knowledge of international security;
- Effective partnerships and sustained engagement with states and international organizations, as well as the private and non-governmental sectors; and
- Effective mobilization of significant resources in the public and private sector.

**Rendition and secret detention in Europe: investigative reporting to enhance transparency and accountability**

In 2002, media reports began to make persistent reference to the existence of secret detention centres in Europe where individuals who were suspected of participating in mass-impact terrorist attacks, or related activities, were held without access to normal legal processes.

In a 2002 joint US congressional hearing before the Intelligence Committees of the US Senate and House of Representatives, Cofer Black—who was head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Counterterrorism Center in 2001—was asked about how much operational flexibility there was in pursuing terrorist suspects. In response, Black said: ‘This is a highly classified area. All I want to say is that there was “before” 9/11 and “after” 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off.’

According to Black, nearly 3000 al-Qaeda terrorists and their supporters were detained during 2002, but information about how they were detained and their current whereabouts was not in the public domain. Media reports quoting US officials suggested that about 625 were at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and roughly 100 detainees were extradited to other states. The whereabouts of the remaining individuals remained largely a subject for speculation, but it was widely suspected that they were being held outside of the USA, but at the request of the US administration.

In the absence of information, those concerned about the possible human rights implications of the procedures for capture and detention were unable to challenge the arrangements. Analyses of the response to rendition and secret detention underline the contribution of parliamentary initiatives in gradually generating more and more authoritative information. In particular, assessments

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34 Black, C., Former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Counterterrorism Center, Statement before the Joint House and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US Congress, Senate Hearing 107-1086, 26 Sep. 2002.

underline the key role of reports published by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2006 and 2007 and the European Parliament in 2007, as well as a follow-up report from the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee in 2012.36

The actions of the Council of Europe were particularly influential after November 2005. In early November 2005, the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Washington Post and ABC television all published allegations that European countries were hosting, or had hosted, secret detention centres. HRW named two countries—Poland and Romania.37

The Council of Europe Secretary General, Terry Davis, sent a questionnaire to the 45 states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights asking for information on national implementation of the relevant parts of the Convention, and the Parliamentary Assembly launched an investigation led by Swiss Senator Dick Marty.38

Before becoming a parliamentarian, Marty was a state prosecutor with a reputation for being ‘a dogged prosecutor, legal stickler, absolutist on human rights, and defensive nationalist’.39 Marty spent his professional career as a prosecutor working on cases related to Italian organized crime gangs. In 2005 Marty was already actively involved in the domestic Swiss debate over rendition when he accused the Swiss prosecutors of launching cases to appease the US Government, without proper justification in Swiss law.

In mid-2006 Marty published his first report, which used the metaphor of a ‘spider’s web’ to describe and document the rendition programme.40 The report includes the locations of what are alleged to be secret detention centres, and a detailed mapping of the aircraft said to be used in rendition, including their schedules and flight paths. Marty acknowledges that the level of detail would not have been possible without effective cooperation with the European Parliament—which was instrumental in promoting access to satellite images and the data sets on aircraft movements maintained by the Eurocontrol agency.

In February 2007 the Temporary Committee established by the European Parliament to examine the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners released its own report, which reached broadly the same conclusions as Marty.41

41 European Parliament resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, 2006/2200(INI), 14 Feb. 2007.
In June 2007 Marty released a second report, which concluded that:

What was previously just a set of allegations is now proven: large numbers of people have been abducted from various locations across the world and transferred to countries where they have been persecuted and where it is known that torture is common practice. Others have been held in arbitrary detention, without any precise charges levelled against them and without any judicial oversight—denied the possibility of defending themselves. Still others have simply disappeared for indefinite periods and have been held in secret prisons, including in member states of the Council of Europe, the existence and operations of which have been concealed ever since.42

Although the term ‘investigation’ is used in this paper as convenient shorthand, Marty does not use that term or the term ‘investigator’ to describe himself or his activities. As he points out, he has no special powers or legal authority to make what would be considered an investigation in law enforcement circles. Nevertheless, the impact of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly reports was significant.

Using information put in the public domain by the reports, the European Court of Human Rights has (to this point) mounted cases leading to three judgments concerning CIA rendition and secret detention operations (one against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and two against Poland). As of June 2015, individual applications related to cases in Italy, Lithuania and Romania were pending.43 In addition, the political pressure in a number of other Council of Europe member states from the media and civil society increased significantly as national authorities were asked to explain information and findings in the reports.

Three elements that created the conditions for success:

• Timely action on an issue of great current interest and concern to the public;
• Effective partnership between the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament; and
• Close cooperation between parliamentarians, non-governmental groups and the media.

Engagement with OSCE field missions: support for conflict prevention and mediation

The OSCE has established a diverse set of field operations, each based on an individual, tailor-made mandate. The operations are deployed in a host country

and can only operate because the mandate and the necessary founding documents are agreed between the host state and the OSCE.

In 2014 the OSCE Network published a report on the future of OSCE field operations. The report noted that, at the point where they are created, OSCE field operations are by definition welcomed by the host state. However, the report also noted the difficulties sometimes encountered in addressing issues related to contested areas and the territory of de facto regimes. The fact that such territories exist in the first place is a central reason why the OSCE field operation is needed, but working with non-recognized regimes while maintaining host nation consent is a major obstacle to implementing a range of important tasks, such as arms control, crisis management, economic reform and the implementation of human rights.

A field operation was established in Moldova in 1993, under the auspices of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the OSCE precursor), after the warring parties in an internal conflict reached a ceasefire agreement and pledged to negotiate a peace settlement. No permanent settlement has yet been found and formal negotiations have not taken place since 2006. Informal talks continue in a ‘5+2’ format involving Moldova, representatives of the region of Trans-Dniester, Russia, Ukraine, the USA, the EU and the OSCE.

There is great concern that Moldova is one of the countries at greatest risk from the spillover effects of the conflict in Ukraine. It has the potential to become an unwilling victim of the wider breakdown in relations between Russia, on the one hand, and countries that are members of the EU and allies in NATO on the other.

Parliamentarians have been very active in their more formal tasks, such as election monitoring. This task is extremely important to the political development of Moldovan democracy. However, a focus on election monitoring does not do justice to the constructive role parliamentarians have played in other areas.

During the preparation of this paper, interviews and discussions took place with past heads of the OSCE field operation in Moldova, as well as with Swedish parliamentarians and officials that have been deeply engaged in the political processes of that country. The findings highlight the important, constructive role that parliamentarians have played in helping to develop and facilitate dialogue between a diverse set of actors in Moldova. The relatively low-key nature of this aspect of parliamentary involvement in Moldovan dialogues and security-building processes may be one of its comparative advantages.

Parliamentary visits and delegations can be highly instrumental for the work of an OSCE field operation. Parliamentarians are generally much less constrained in meeting and discussing issues with a very wide range of actors. These engagements

44 OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, The Future of OSCE Field Operations (Options) (OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions: Vienna, 5 Dec. 2014).
45 OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions (note 44), pp. 17–18.
can (and should) be ‘status neutral’ in that they do not confer legitimacy on dialogue partners, or even suggest a position on legitimacy. The talks can be a framework for interactions that would be interpreted differently if held under more formal auspices or sponsorship. The risk to the relationship between the field operation and the host government is therefore minimized.

Parliamentarians naturally tend to engage across a wide spectrum of issue areas without the compartmentalization that can be a tendency in more official negotiations. The nature of the engagement between parliamentarians and local actors in Moldova has helped to find and explore the interconnected dimensions of problems—for example, the links between conflict resolution, promoting human rights and democratization, and a free media.

When reflecting on the experience of interaction with a field operation in a fragile and conflict-affected country, parliamentarians will have views on how to improve effectiveness. At an informal roundtable in Stockholm in November 2014, parliamentarians with experience of interaction with OSCE field operations noted that coordination frameworks could be strengthened to facilitate discussions before, during and after visits with, for example, parliamentarians from other countries active in the same country, or parliamentarians working in the framework of other institutions. When planning and conducting visits, parliamentarians could also find it useful to have a more comprehensive picture of the other actors that are engaged, their roles and the outcome of their activities.

There is a benefit in continuity—with regular visits by the same team, and enough time in-country to follow-up on the results of meetings. A coordination framework could also help here. Continuity may also reduce any negative effects resulting from the sudden presence of significant numbers of parliamentarians in a crisis situation or conflict location. The presence of a group of foreign parliamentarians generates publicity, but can be a complicating factor, rather than assisting, if the parliamentarians are seen to take sides in a dispute.

It would be useful to develop a guidance document or strategy for how and when parliamentarians interact with field operations. Structured interviews with parliamentarians that have a history of engagement could be the starting point for a ‘lessons learned’ paper and ‘best practice’ guide. The guidance document should (a) take account of the preparations prior to a visit, including a procedure for establishing clear objectives; (b) provide guidance on how to establish contact and manage dialogue with representatives of conflicting parties; and (c) include guidance on a systematic approach to after-action reporting and the horizontal dissemination of results to the widest possible community.

Guidance for a document tailored to the needs of parliamentarians could be drawn from the family of handbooks produced by the IPU. An initiative to include a new book in the series, a ‘Handbook on Engagement with Field Operations in Fragile and Conflict Affected States’, could be explored. While the

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46 Roundtable on Enhancing the role of OSCE field missions, SIPRI, Stockholm, 26 Nov. 2014.
IPU has a Standing Committee on Peace and International Security, an alternative might be to explore the idea of preparing a Handbook as a project undertaken together with the IPU Forum of Young Parliamentarians.\(^\text{47}\)

**Three elements that created the conditions for success:**

- Frequent contact and sustained engagement;
- Inclusive, bipartisan activities and initiatives across a range of problem areas; and
- Status neutral interaction with a wide range of actors, including representatives of contested territories and de facto regimes.

**The European Leadership Network: expert analysis and assessment of current European security problems**

In September 2009 an All-Party Parliamentary Group on global security and nuclear non-proliferation from the UK’s House of Commons visited Washington for consultations. The discussions revealed that US parliamentarians lacked an understanding of the broad spectrum of views on the role of nuclear weapons in European security held by their British counterparts.

On returning to the UK, former Defence Secretary Des Browne coordinated the formation of a group called the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. While the group included parliamentarians with a broad spectrum of views (from advocates of nuclear deterrence to nuclear abolitionists), all of the participants had, at some point, held high office with a role in the implementation of some aspect of British nuclear weapons policy. The unifying element in the group was the shared commitment to strengthen the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).\(^\text{48}\)

While the UK Top Level Group is still active, the initiative has subsequently broadened into the European Leadership Network (ELN), which has attracted well over 150 members from 30 European states, the overwhelming majority having been parliamentarians that held high office in their respective countries.\(^\text{49}\)

Through dedicated research, both by its own staff and by partner organizations, ELN produces a significant number of publications of different kinds, as well as providing the underpinning for discussion and debate among the active network of senior leaders. The combination of research and the convening power of senior political representatives means that the ELN is a prominent source used

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\(^{47}\) The list of publications produced by the IPU is extensive and includes a significant number of handbooks on conflict- and security-related issues. The list of publications can be found at the website of the IPU, <http://www.ipu.org/english/handbks.htm>.


\(^{49}\) Information about the European Leadership Network is available at: <http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/>. 
frequently by a wide range of news and media organizations. In addition, the ELN is very active in social media and through digital communications.

The ELN is also developing institutional partnerships with similar initiatives across Europe, North America, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. In November 2014 a Global Networks Forum brought together the ELN participants with similar networks from other world regions—the Asia–Pacific Leadership Network, Latin American Leadership Network and the North American Nuclear Security Leadership Council.

*Three elements that created the conditions for success*

- The convening power of senior political figures;
- Inclusive and bipartisan activities and initiatives; and
- The effective use of experts and policy-relevant research.
4. Increasing the impact and effectiveness of parliamentarians in building security in and for Europe: recommendations and proposals

Recommendations to increase impact and effectiveness

- Take a problem-solving approach; do not emphasize institution-building. Effective action is the most convincing way to increase influence.
- Focus, in a timely way, on issues of great public interest and public concern.
- Share ownership of good ideas; emphasize the inclusive use of the available instruments.
- Highlight, publicize and promote cases where parliamentarians have made a powerful impact—there are many such cases, but too little is known about them.
- Use existing frameworks and integrate available instruments; there are many networks and institutions, and more are not necessary.

Three specific proposals

Three specific projects are proposed, because they have both a value per se, and because they would be instrumental in further developing high-impact parliamentary contributions to building cooperative security in and for Europe.

The proposals are deliberately generic, and many parliamentary frameworks could in theory promote them. However, projects should not be ‘owned’ by any single institution. A more appropriate and future-oriented approach is to see them as broad and inclusive activities, in which many participants could find a role.

The projects should take note of the elements that contributed to the success of past initiatives identified in section 3 above, and consider which of them would be most applicable in these specific cases. There is a need for structure and capacity, however. The 1999 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe could offer a useful starting point for thinking about how to organize broad cooperation across many different institutional lines, without a sense of formal hierarchy, or a feeling that initiatives are under the ownership and control of any single institution.

In a statement to the OSCE Permanent Council in October 2000, Ambassador Kim Traavik—at that time Chairman of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Working Table on Security Issues—said: ‘The OSCE is an integral part of the Stability Pact. Formally, this is reflected in the fact that the Pact has been placed under the auspices of the OSCE. No one knows exactly what this means.’

Traavik was drawing attention to the Stability Pact as an example of how to achieve complementarity between institutions.

A Special Coordinator for each project should draw on existing administrative and logistical capacities in a current body. However, the mandate and terms of reference of the Special Coordinators would be deliberately designed to bring together the existing capacities of a wide range of diverse partners to achieve project objectives.

1. **Design and implement counter-extremism communications strategies to address the toxic ideas and imagery that violent extremist groups promote.**

Section 2 above described the foundation of the No Hate Parliamentary Alliance. One instrument of the alliance is a Charter of Commitments for Membership.51

The charter includes a commitment to raise awareness against racism and intolerance among politicians and civil society, at the national and European levels, and to conduct campaigning activities against racism, hatred and intolerance by all means. The charter also calls for an exchange of information on law and best practice in preventing and combating racism, hatred and intolerance. These elements of the charter could be the basis for a specific project that draws on some of the generic recommendations above.

There is also a need for balance to ensure that the responses to hate speech and violent extremist propaganda are proportionate to the real threat. In conditions of insecurity, when decision makers are temporarily knocked off balance, past experience suggests that there can be a tendency to over-emphasize restrictive and coercive security measures. The measures that are taken should not unduly put at risk basic freedoms, or interfere with the legitimate activities of citizens—including those carried out together with partners from conflict-affected countries around the periphery of Europe. The parliamentary function of checking and balancing executive authority provides a unique role for parliamentarians in avoiding past mistakes.

The No Hate Parliamentary Alliance has already demonstrated the intellectual leadership needed to underpin a project, beginning with the structured exchange of information on law and best practice in preventing and combating racism, hatred and intolerance, and subsequent improvement of those instruments. Those good ideas should be shared as widely as possible rather than kept within the alliance, and the project should take a problem-solving approach. Instead of aiming at building any new institutions, the project should draw on the resources that already support the alliance.

The project should be based on the widest possible cooperation, not only with national parliaments, but with parliamentary groups at the European and inter-

51 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Charter of commitments for membership in the No Hate Parliamentary Alliance’, 29 Jan. 2015.
national levels and should be inclusive in terms of geography, welcoming parliamentarians from other countries, including those outside Europe. The project should emphasize the inclusive use of the available instruments, and include input from academics, civil society organizations and the media.

2. Establish an integrated monitoring and support mechanism to support anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine.

In the Corruption Perceptions Index compiled by Transparency International, Ukraine was ranked 142 out of 152 countries for which data was compiled—placing it below Russia and in the lowest place of any OSCE participating state.52

Pervasive corruption is considered to have been a key factor behind popular demonstrations against the Ukrainian Government during the period preceding the outbreak of major armed conflict. Corruption was an element in political control in what has been labelled a ‘blackmail state’, with corrupt practices permitted, or maybe encouraged, by central authority, and state resources used to collect compromising information that could be used to enforce cooperation.53

In the year since the change in government, Ukraine has made important legislative changes, and updated its national policies, introducing an Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2014–17. Two new institutions are being created: a National Agency for Corruption Prevention under the government and a National Council for Anti-Corruption Policy, an advisory body reporting to the president. The government has also promised to establish new law enforcement bodies, including a specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.54

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has underlined that the effective implementation of anti-corruption initiatives is of critical importance to the political and economic future of Ukraine.55 National anti-corruption initiatives in Ukraine have many dimensions, and there are several aspects where action by parliamentarians would be of central importance. The immunity from prosecution for parliamentarians and effective governance for the financing of political parties (where private interests currently play a key, but not transparent, role) are both unresolved issues.

Elements that contributed to high-impact parliamentarian initiatives noted in section 3 above included effective partnerships and sustained engagement with states, international organizations, and the private and non-governmental

52 The Corruption Perceptions Index can be accessed on the website of Transparency International at: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>.
55 OECD (note 54).
sectors, as well as making effective use of policy relevant research. At present, the focal point for monitoring Ukrainian anti-corruption initiatives and supporting capacity building for effective implementation is the OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN), which is a sub-regional initiative of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Plan. The ACN lacks a parliamentary dimension, and a project to address those issues where parliamentarians can make a direct and unique contribution would be extremely valuable.

3. Organize and convene a multi-stakeholder evaluation of the rules that apply to the deployment and actions of soldiers and the use of lethal force on national territory.

In January 1995, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico–Military Aspects of Security came into effect. The code is a politically binding instrument that establishes norms for fighting forces, including when operating on the territory of their own state. The code has been called the first ‘toolkit for soft security’, and the Swiss Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Didier Burkhalter, described it in 2014 as ‘the first-ever multilateral instrument to encompass norms and principles regulating the conduct of armed and security forces both at the national and international level’.

The code’s focus on the appropriate deployment of forces for internal security missions was an important innovation. A project to assess how the relevant provisions of the code apply in Ukraine, including the role of national laws and regulations, would be timely. Questions regarding how the code applies to paramilitary forces (e.g. armed police units under the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs or security services) or organizations (e.g. militias and private security forces that are outside state control) and whether the code is applicable to opposition forces are extremely important issues of current concern.

According to the code, participating states ‘will not tolerate or support forces that are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities’. The fragmentation of violence is a tendency that has been reported for many years. Contemporary conflict is unlikely to be limited to fighting between the armed forces of states. A much more common model of contemporary conflict is fighting among warring parties of different kinds in the same location. The conflict in Ukraine illustrates the fragmentation and complexity of violence.

56 The Istanbul Action Plan and the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia are described at the OECD’s website at: <www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/istanbulactionplancountryreports.htm>.
59 OSCE (note 57), Article VII, para. 25.
First, in addition to the armed forces of Ukraine, armed units of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs and special units of the Ukrainian security services have participated in the fighting.

Second, in 2014 the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the creation of a new professionally trained militia partly funded by local and regional authorities as well as the private sector. Some militia units grew out of existing self-defence groups, which arose to provide security in locations where police forces lacked the trust of the population (especially following the Maidan events). The creation and evolution of such self-defence groups has been documented by the OSCE. Other militia groups have subsequently been raised by powerful regional figures, in part to protect their private property and interests. These units reflect a public-private partnership to supplement existing private security forces.

Third, foreign fighters have been incorporated into special volunteer units. Some of the volunteer units (known as territorial battalions) were under the command of the Ministry of Defence and others were under the command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (known as special police battalions).

Fourth, there remains at least one significant fighting force (the Right Sector volunteer battalion) operating outside the chain of command reporting to Ukrainian authorities. Not only has this group refused to be fully subordinated under Ukrainian state structures, it operates a battalion-sized force that seems to be responsible for most of the offensive operations in eastern Ukraine aimed at separatist forces.

Fifth, the chain of command for irregular forces claiming allegiance to the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics includes significant numbers of foreign fighters. It is difficult to be certain about the status of these forces as the chain of command for foreign fighters is not easy to establish, and it is not clear who is accountable for their behaviour. The Russian Government, for example, does not deny that Russian citizens have fought alongside armed units in eastern Ukraine, but describes these individuals as volunteers—even though some of those in uniform wear insignia identifying them as members of active Russian military units.

The problem of foreign fighters has been highlighted as a concern by many OSCE participating states, and states have proposed an examination of how to

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63 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, ‘Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 28 May 2015’, 29 May 2015.
‘limit the number of persons that travel abroad to participate in armed conflicts, or better, to eliminate this problem altogether’.\textsuperscript{64}

In his address to the European Conference of Presidents of Parliament, Ilkka Kanerva, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, stated that impunity could not be tolerated when it comes to acts being perpetrated in the Ukraine conflict.\textsuperscript{65} The reports of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission indicate that non-state armed units that are several hundred strong fight one another with tanks, heavy artillery, mortars and heavy machine-guns, as well as small arms and light weapons. However, the fighters that participate in the conflict but fall outside identifiable chains of command are difficult to hold to account. Moreover, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that units outside a recognized chain of command have been responsible for acts that fall outside the normal rules of war, and that are inconsistent with the OSCE Code of Conduct.

A project that examines ways and means to establish accountability for non-state armed groups using Ukraine as a case study would have an impact if it produced more clarity on current problems and proposed practical solutions. A formal role for parliamentary bodies in monitoring implementation of existing norms and guidelines might be one element that follows in a natural way, depending on the findings of such a project. To maximize effectiveness of any project of this type, however, the primary goal should be to highlight an urgent issue and examine ways and means to solve a critical problem in European security.

\textsuperscript{64} OSCE Permanent Council, Permanent delegation of Norway to the OSCE, ‘Statement on Russian fighters in Ukraine as delivered by Ambassador Robert Kvile’, PC.DEL/1252/14, 31 Oct. 2014.

\textsuperscript{65} Kanerva, I., OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President, Remarks at the European Conference of Presidents of Parliament, Oslo, 11 Sep. 2014.
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The Role of Parliamentarians in Building Security in and for Europe

Europe does not have a common security system that is capable of preventing conflicts and violence. Despite the trend towards tighter controls from individual states, the cooperative approach to security in Europe remains the most convincing model in light of the increased integration and internationalization of the world. This Policy Paper focuses on the role of parliamentarians in reassessing and building security in Europe.

The paper presents parliamentary expectations and capacities, identifies available instruments, and recommends approaches and actions to increase effectiveness. Brief case studies illustrate the powerful influence that parliamentarians can exert. Finally, the paper proposes three specific projects that address discrete security problems and could help to develop high-impact parliamentary contributions to building cooperative security in and for Europe.

Dr Ian Anthony is Director of the SIPRI European Security Programme. He was previously Director of the SIPRI Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme. His publications include Strengthening the European Union’s Future Approach to WMD Non-proliferation, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 37 (2013, co-author) and The Future of Nuclear Weapons in NATO (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010, co-author).