

SUMMER 2016

2016 SECURITY JAM

BEYOND CONVENTIONAL
SECURITY CHALLENGES



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SUMMER 2016

2016 SECURITY JAM

BEYOND CONVENTIONAL
SECURITY CHALLENGES

Report of the global online brainstorming



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INCLUSIVE
europe

Friends of Europe is a leading think tank that connects people, stimulates debate and triggers change to create a more inclusive, sustainable and forward-looking Europe.

The Security Jam is part of Friends of Europe's security programme, which spans international security architectures, cybersecurity, crisis management, peacekeeping, EU-NATO relations, defence capabilities, human security, home affairs & violent extremism.

This report has been drafted on the basis of the four day online discussion among close to 2,500 experts from around the world, under the sole responsibility of Friends of Europe.

The views expressed in this report do not represent a common position agreed by all participants, nor are they necessarily the views of Security Jam partner organisations, the Friends of Europe Board of Trustees, its members or partners.

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FOREWORD

Friends of Europe has, for the fourth time since 2010, brought together a unique coalition of governments, think-tanks, businesses and civil society organisations for a global brainstorm on making our world a safer place. It is increasingly clear that present top-down decision-making mechanisms of national, regional and global leaders are failing to yield durable peace. Governments need more input from all elements of society – civil society organisations, business, academia, international organisations and think tanks. Heightened local knowledge and the involvement of regional actors are preconditions for success.

Friends of Europe's Security Jam is the only platform that permits a truly global whole-of-society consultation on issues as diverse as early-warning and strategic foresight, conflict prevention, security architectures, international military engagement, the fight against organised crime and against violent extremism. Some 2,500 participants from 131 countries took part in the 2016 Security Jam, and were joined by 48 VIPs. We're extremely proud to present the 10 recommendations that emerged from this discussion, together with some of the overarching themes that underpinned the Security Jam's debates. We believe they offer valuable food for thought to global security leaders.

Our gratitude and thanks go to the partners who made this exercise possible: the U.S. European Command, the European External Action Service, IBM, the Royal United Services Institute, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Eurasia Group, the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, the American Security Project, the International Strategic Research Organization, the Institute for Strategic Research in Paris, the Afghanistan Analysts Network, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, the Igarapé Institute, Hedayah, the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute for Security Studies ISS Africa, WATHI – the West African Citizen Think Tank, Women in International Security and Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Our thanks must also go to the coalition partners who gave the Jam its truly global and multidisciplinary nature.

We at Friends of Europe look forward to placing these recommendations at the heart of our work over the months to come.

Giles Merritt

Founder
and Chairman
Friends of Europe

**Geert Cami**

Co-Founder
and Managing Director
Friends of Europe

**Pauline Massart**

Deputy Director
Security Europe
Friends of Europe





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The deadly Brussels terror attacks in March brought the dangers of today's heightened threat levels chillingly close to home for Europe's security community.

The need to counter the violent extremism behind the Brussels bombings and so many other attacks around the world was a key theme running through the fourth biennial Security Jam, held barely a month after terrorists targeted Brussels airport and a crowded metro station a couple of blocks from Friends of Europe's offices.

Over the course of four days, close to 2,500 policymakers and experts from 131 countries joined this unique open forum. Friends of Europe presented the top 10 recommendations that emerged from the Jam to key stakeholders. The Jam provided input into the European Union's new Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and NATO's Warsaw Summit, aimed at adapting the Alliance to a fundamentally changed security environment.

One common thread was prominent across the online debates: the necessity of forging stronger cooperation between state and non-state actors, for governments to work closer with civil society and the private sector.

“Nobody can predict or prevent conflict and violence all by themselves. Governments and business, NGOs and civil society need to work together.”

Bert Koenders
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs

“Nobody can predict or prevent conflict and violence all by themselves. Governments and business, NGOs and civil society need to work together,” said [Bert Koenders](#), Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. “An important question, therefore, is how to improve knowledge-sharing practices and collaboration between all stakeholders involved in conflict prevention.”

Jammers highlighted the value of such partnerships in areas as diverse as supporting grassroots initiatives to counter jihadist youth recruitment, working with shipping lines against piracy and detecting early signs of conflict by tapping on-the-ground knowledge from non-government organisations.

The Jam was organised around six topics: Strategic foresight and earlier-warning; Global partnerships for conflict prevention; A regional security architecture for the Middle East; Foreign military engagement 2025; Policing 2025: new strategies against transnational crime; and Answers to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Throughout the debates, Jammers stressed the importance of developing early-warning capabilities to better anticipate emerging challenges and construct effective response mechanisms. “The contemporary international security environment is growing increasingly complex, with new capabilities and new actors emerging to challenge traditional concepts,” explained [Mara E. Karlin](#), U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development. “A key task of policymakers is to assess risk over time and space so that they can allocate scarce resources in the most efficient and effective way possible.”

Although the Jam was global in scope, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa was a clear focus given the carnage in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, and its broader international impact through refugee flows, violent extremism and the risk of still-wider conflict.

Among the ideas to defuse regional tensions were confidence building measures through regional talks in areas such as climate change, energy or water resources. International powers could act as facilitators to help bring rivals to the table.

“The EU should play a leading role, and build on its strengths,” wrote [Marietje Schaake](#), Member of the European Parliament, Vice-Chair of the Delegation for relations with the United States and Member of the Committee on International Trade. “Sometimes this is the role of facilitators, as in the Iran talks. This should give the EU greater access to Iranian leaders, which can and should be used to encourage reconciliation with Saudi Arabia.”

THE GLOBAL 2016 SECURITY JAM



2,466
PARTICIPANTS



131
COUNTRIES




77
HOURS



48
VIP JAMMERS



8
LEADING
THINK-TANKS



20

MODERATORS



40

FACILITATORS



11

LIVE-CHAT
PARTNERS



30

COALITION
PARTNERS



2,826

POSTS



93,000

PAGE VIEWS

**TOP TEN
RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ROADMAP**

THE TOP TEN RECOMMENDATIONS

01 Create a global early-warning mechanism

Improve international information sharing to provide timely warning of impending problems, be they natural such as diseases, earthquakes and other disasters; or political such as unrest, violent extremism and war. Improve intelligence on potential threats by integrating information from regional players, civil society and the private sector to provide a more complete picture.

02 Improve big data analysis for early action

There are massive amounts of data available but we lack the means for analysis and for turning information into recommendations while considering ethical issues on surveillance and privacy. To turn early-warning into early action and faster response we must make better use of open source data and social media.

03 Develop an integrated concept of security and defence

Replace narrow concepts of internal and external security & defence to facilitate international cooperation against hybrid and non-conventional threats and to improve the focus of forward planning and prevention. Instead of a strict focus on defence, security spending targets could include elements of police, intelligence, border guard and counterterrorism budgets, and parts of development budgets and humanitarian assistance - as long as in line with ODA rules.

04 Build trust in the Middle East through cooperation on non-security issues

Focusing on areas of common interest such as climate change, food security and energy security can help regional actors in the Middle East build trust to overcome conflict. The development of non-governmental channels can promote cooperation and reconciliation.

05 Strengthen women's role in conflict prevention and resolution

Enabling women to play a key role at every level adds new perspectives and promotes women's role as actors of change. Their inclusion in international leadership and in spearheading grassroots community initiatives is key to ensuring lasting peace and stability.

- 06 Strengthen internal security cooperation in Europe**
Greater coordination among security agencies in Europe is essential for more efficient responses to transnational threats – organised crime, trafficking and terrorism. A strengthened pan-European approach would raise the EU's profile, giving it a stronger international voice and greater credibility with its citizens.
- 07 Mainstream climate change into the security debate**
Climate change is the one threat facing all of humanity, be it through intensifying conflicts, resource competition, population movements or natural disasters. Climate change must therefore feature in all discussions on security.
- 08 Incorporate the fight against organised crime and corruption into broader security policy**
Organised crime presents a significant security risk, fuelling instability, eroding the state, and providing fertile ground for terrorism, gun-runners, drug gangs and human traffickers. Homicide remains a greater cause of death worldwide than either war or terrorism. Corruption, a common result of organised crime, undermines public faith in the political system.
- 09 Promote grassroots counter-radicalisation initiatives**
Civil society and community-based initiatives have more legitimacy and foster trust. They are an essential part of effective and sustainable approaches. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions, and local initiatives can provide adapted local responses to local challenges.
- 10 Reach out to civil society to build trust between citizens and security forces**
Working with grassroots organisations can improve relations between security forces and local communities at home and abroad, thereby reducing the risk of conflict and boosting awareness of local conditions.

ROADMAP

01 CREATE A GLOBAL EARLY- WARNING MECHANISM



SHORT-TERM

Create an international forum on global forecasting, bringing in civil society, private sector, academia.

MID-TERM

Create a UN early-warning office to coordinate strategic foresight and serve as a hub for information exchange and promotion of prevention policies.

LONG-TERM

Encourage regional and international bodies – the EU, the OSCE, ECOWAS, the African Union, NATO, the Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) and others – to feed in information.

Develop an EU-level data sharing/analysis capacity, using the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) as a basis.

Prohibit sales of surveillance equipment to governments with poor human rights records, taking into account the specificities of dual-use technologies.

Improve flexibility in decision-making to ensure quick transition from early-warning to early action: streamline national & regional decision-making; integrate national authorities (especially parliaments) more closely with EU and NATO decision-making to facilitate greater understanding and reduce delays.

Working with the newly created UN early-warning office, determine who should use big data analysis to act on findings/forecasts at national, regional, and global level, for instance a specific unit reporting directly to the UN Secretary General.

SHORT-TERM

MID-TERM

LONG-TERM

02 IMPROVE BIG DATA ANALYSIS FOR EARLY ACTION



03 DEVELOP AN INTEGRATED CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE



SHORT-TERM

Review task sharing between military and police forces both for internal security purposes (e.g. in counter-terrorism operations) and foreign missions (peacekeeping, capacity-building).

Increase focus on countering hybrid warfare, including information warfare and cyber capabilities.

MID-TERM

Review commonalities between NATO Smart Defence and EU Pooling & Sharing initiatives, and reduce duplications.

Establish a baseline security spending target for nations based on a common approach to the practical integration of security and defence capabilities, so that all nations can contribute their fair share; frontline nations can get credit for extra spending; and cross-levelling can occur.

LONG-TERM

Pool security and defence budgets into one security budget, possibly including parts of development budgets.

Create a regional civil society network in the Middle East.

SHORT-TERM

Set up a “council of elders” comprising Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Israelis as a non-government channel to develop avenues of reconciliation.

MID-TERM

Establish a regional “climate change adaption organisation” comprising Middle Eastern states, including Israel, Turkey and Iran, with international funding and expertise (e.g. from EU, GCC, P5+1), possibly using the Arctic Council as a model.

LONG-TERM

04 BUILD TRUST IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH COOPERATION ON NON- SECURITY ISSUES



05 STRENGTHEN WOMEN'S ROLE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION



SHORT-TERM

Incorporate (more) women into threat analysis & forecasting teams.
Support female education at all levels, including offering more places in Western universities to Middle Eastern women.

MID-TERM

Incorporate (more) women in peacekeeping forces.
Develop and provide specific training for women engaged in conflict prevention, peace-making, negotiation and counter-radicalisation to increase their role in these processes.

LONG-TERM

Increase the number of female leaders in international organisations, national administrations, security apparatuses, judicial systems, think tanks, and academia.

Map available police/gendarmerie/border control resources across the EU.

Carry out an EU-wide capabilities & gap analysis for police forces & intelligence services.

Set up an Erasmus-type exchange programme for police, as well as joint training, to promote a common European police culture.

Set up an information sharing/best-practice exchange forum among European police forces to improve community policing and improve trust between police forces and citizens.

Promote cooperation against serious, organised, transnational crime by making Europol – in collaboration with a new European inter-agency task force – the focal point for investment.

SHORT-TERM

MID-TERM

LONG-TERM

06 STRENGTHEN INTERNAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE



07 MAINSTREAM CLIMATE CHANGE INTO THE SECURITY DEBATE



SHORT-TERM

Make the security implications of potential climate change consequences a core element of all security discussions, noting the intersections between security, development and the environment.

MID-TERM

Set up a global initiative to address water management, climate risk insurance and conflict mediation.
Improve communication between the West and developing nations on climate change impact and mitigation.

LONG-TERM

Establish an international forum to analyse the impact of climate change on foreign, security, defence and development policy.

Enhance investigation of the nexus between corruption, criminal networks and terrorism.

Place justice reform at the heart of development programmes.
Increase civilian oversight of the police, promoting positive measures to counter corruption, incentives for clean police work and "officer of the month" programmes.
Coordinate EU and international actions against tax havens and any form of secret jurisdiction.

Focus prosecution on the most disruptive and violent offenders, rather than on low-level actors.

SHORT-TERM

MID-TERM

LONG-TERM

08 INCORPORATE THE FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION INTO BROADER SECURITY POLICY



09 PROMOTE GRASSROOTS COUNTER- RADICALISATION INITIATIVES



SHORT-TERM

Empower specific groups (youth, women, families, faith leaders, elders, community workers) by increasing funding to their programmes and specific projects, including narratives.

MID-TERM

Increase specific counter-radicalisation efforts in prisons.
Create an online information sharing platform/network involving states, NGOs, the private sector, community leaders, faith leaders, youth (e.g. via international youth meetings/summits) to improve sharing of information and best practices.

LONG-TERM

Create regional digital counter-messaging communications centres. Develop positive, value-based counter-narratives adapted to local issues.

Embed principles of good security sector governance in all cooperation initiatives.

International police missions should focus more on broad issues like education, awareness raising and consensus building rather than on technical capacity.

International military/police missions should routinely build close ties with local and international NGOs.

Incorporate civil society expertise in pre-mission training for military/police.

Place more focus on community policing to avoid alienating certain populations and parts of society.

SHORT-TERM


MID-TERM

LONG-TERM

10 REACH OUT TO CIVIL SOCIETY TO BUILD TRUST BETWEEN CITIZENS AND SECURITY FORCES



THE TOP 10 RECOMMENDATIONS EXPLAINED



01 CREATE A GLOBAL EARLY-WARNING MECHANISM

Complex security challenges are emerging ever more rapidly in our interconnected and interdependent world.

A desperate act by a Tunisian street vendor triggered a wave of protest across the Middle East that, in Syria, degenerated into civil war, triggering Europe's biggest refugee crisis since World War II and heightening the global threat of terror attacks.

Given such levels of interconnection, there is an urgent need to put in place an effective international early-warning system to facilitate crisis prevention and prepare

“The West must do a better job of assessing risk, testing core assumptions, and preparing itself for potential contingencies.”

Julianne Smith

Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

national governments and international organisations to face emerging conflicts, disasters and tension before they spin out of control.

“The West must do a better job of assessing risk, testing core assumptions, and preparing itself for potential contingencies,” wrote [Julianne Smith](#), Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “One way to do that would be through the creation of an international forum for global forecasting where groups of countries could identify emerging threats.”

Several Jammers picked up the idea of an international body to serve as a focal point for coordinating strategic foresight and earlier-warning and promoting conflict prevention policies.

Such a body could be particularly important in spotting danger signs and pre-crisis developments in fragile states vulnerable to man-made and natural disasters that can rapidly develop regional or global consequences.

One suggestion for a tangible next step was the formation of a United Nations early-warning office to act as a hub for information exchange, to promote prevention policies and take overall responsibility for early-warning and information sharing.

Another idea involved launching an international forum on global forecasting, bringing in civil society, the private sector and academia.

A UN body could overcome competing interests or failing political will to invest in strategic foresight at a national level. It could raise the public profile of strategic foresight imperatives.

To support it, strong collaborative mechanisms could be built through pooled resources and common approaches for countries to identify emerging threats and conduct risk assessments. Regional bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), EU or OSCE could feed in information.

The importance of reaching beyond state players, to incorporate civil society and the private sector in early-warning mechanisms, was underscored by several participants. Some NGO participants complained that too often their warnings were ignored.


“It is local actors who possess the most valuable and up-to-date information,” wrote [Anna Neistat](#), head of Amnesty International’s global research. “In many situations, compared to government actors, and even the UN agencies, local and international human rights organisations have fewer mandate limitations, [possess] extensive networks of contacts, are less restricted in movements and communication, and have less bureaucracy to deal with – all of which makes them efficient in collecting and sharing information. Yet, ironically, while such organisations are often accused of gathering ‘intelligence’, their findings and analysis are not always given sufficient attention in EWS [early-warning systems].”

She pointed to conflicts in Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Iraq as examples of when government agencies and the international community had ignored NGO alerts of impending crisis.

Technological advances, too, must be harnessed to improve early-warning capabilities, Jammers said.

In particular, social media analytics for public safety, enforcement and intelligence can be used in conflict

EU GOVERNMENTS SHOULD INVEST MASSIVELY IN STRATEGIC FORESIGHT TECHNOLOGIES AND MANPOWER



Strongly Agree	36%
Agree	38%
Neutral	20%
Disagree	4%
Strongly Disagree	2%

“I like the idea of improved global forecasting and investing further efforts in regional and global risk-assessments. But instead of establishing new forums, why not invest in present multilateral organisations such as the UN, NATO or the EU?”

Veronika Wand-Danielsson
Sweden's Ambassador
to France

prevention and crisis operations to provide sustained and time-sensitive communication between civil-society actors, citizens and government agencies.

“Strategic foresight and early-warning are crucial for all members of society – public organisations, companies and individuals – in order to be safe and to grow,” emphasised [Dr Katrin Suder](#), German Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence. “New methods of innovation, information and change management are crucial for the security environment too. We need to implement them into the security and military domains.”

Some cautioned against the risk of waste and duplication through the formation of new international early-warning institutions when the potential of existing bodies is under-exploited.

“I like the idea of improved global forecasting and investing further efforts in regional and global risk-assessments. But instead of establishing new forums, why not invest in present multilateral organisations such as the UN, NATO or the EU?” wrote [Veronika Wand-Danielsson](#), Sweden's Ambassador to France. “Creating new organisations risks both weakening the present fora and may lead to an overlap of ongoing efforts.”

[Leendert van Bochoven](#), the Global Lead for National Security and NATO at IBM, suggested building on existing structures. “Speed up the NATO Defence Planning Process and integrate this more effectively with the member nations. This drives shorter feedback cycles and a more dynamic, responsive planning and capability development approach,” he wrote. “Step up the efforts on a NATO-owned strategic early-warning capability that collects its own insights and acts as a platform for the member nations.”



02 IMPROVE BIG DATA ANALYSIS FOR EARLY ACTION

Lack of data is often not the problem. What is lacking are tools to analyse the massive amounts of information available and turn it into recommendations that can lead to early preventive action.

Deficiencies in the efficient and timely sharing of knowledge must be overcome and international organisations must develop workable models for intelligence cooperation that better share and analyse data. Otherwise, current shortcomings highlighted by lapses in terrorist warnings risk letting attackers reach their targets again.

Information technology (ICT) and big data need to be incorporated into every conversation, project and initiative related to strategic foresight, conflict prevention and tracking evolving security threats.

“We are not yet using the entire force of technology for strategic foresight, conflict prevention and tracking evolving security threats.”

Shada Islam
Director of Policy
at Friends of Europe

“We are not yet using the entire force of technology for strategic foresight, conflict prevention and tracking evolving security threats,” cautioned [Shada Islam](#), Director of Policy at Friends of Europe. “The use of ICT must become an integrated part of the worldwide conversation on security.”

The European Union needs to develop a regional data-sharing and analysis capacity, using its existing Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) as a basis. The suggested UN early-warning office could serve as a conduit for deciding where big data analysis needs to be shared and who should act upon the findings at a national, regional and global level – for instance a specific unit reporting directly to the UN Secretary General.

One area with clear room for improvement are the communication channels between security authorities and both business and civil society – who can often provide key data and analysis. Data sharing among public authorities also requires urgent attention. Local and municipal administrations often have comprehensive data that is not passed along information chains.

[Mara E. Karlin](#) outlined how the U.S. Department of Defense is learning from cutting-edge practices in the commercial sector as it intensifies efforts to use big datasets and analytic tools to characterise patterns in security challenges, and to use that data to gain operational advantage.

“Efforts such as these will not replace the experience and judgment of policymakers or military personnel, but they will supplement these judgments as additional sources of information with which to make effective policy choices, and will also catalyse a conversation with a more diverse set of voices, to make sure we are hearing and learning from a wider range of perspectives,” [Karlin](#) said.

Jammers said better use needs to be made of social media and open-source data to turn early-warning into early action, but they stressed the importance of resolving the ethical issues around surveillance and privacy.

Lock Pin Chew, Head of Singapore's Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) Programme Office at the National Security Coordination Secretariat, said optimal use of technology was essential.

“We use technology to help us analyse the online (big) data to find the small traces. Technology can pick up the subtle anomalies that the human eye cannot,” he explained. “With the help of systems, we dedicate time to connect the dots. From these connections, we can apprehend the patterns of trends and relationships. We also use technology to help us visualise complex interdependencies between the systems and identify vulnerabilities.”


Singapore uses systematic evaluation of data to help it better prepare for the future in terms of capacity building and capability developments. “The challenge is to embed it into government processes so that it becomes part and parcel of the system of governance,” **Chew** added.

Several Jammers emphasised the essential role of data evaluation in cybersecurity, monitoring risks of cyberattacks and helping prevent cybercrime and cyberterrorism. There were, however, also calls to prohibit sales of surveillance equipment to governments with poor human rights records, taking into account the specificities of dual-use technologies.


“We use technology to help us analyse big-data to find the small traces. Technology can pick up the subtle anomalies that the human eye cannot.”

Lock Pin Chew
 Head of Singapore's Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) Programme Office at the National Security Coordination Secretariat

THE EU'S MAIN FOCUS IN THE NEXT DECADE SHOULD BE



THE MOST POWERFUL
NATION IN 2030 WILL BE
THE ONE CONTROLLING



■ Cyberspace	52%
■ Space	19%
■ Sea	16%
■ Land	7%
■ Air	6%

“Achieving better cyber-resilience requires coordination between many agencies – the private sector and government departments,” wrote [Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar](#), Head of Cyber Policy Coordination at the European External Action Service (EEAS). “Addressing cybercrime needs more than norms. In addition to a legal basis, it needs training on many issues, such as collecting e-evidence, doing digital forensics, and mainstreaming cyber issues into the judicial system.”

The EU is cooperating with global partners to develop minimum cybercrime legislation and law enforcement capacity in a majority of countries worldwide as part of efforts to reduce cybercrime threats. Still, more effort is needed to increase awareness of cybersecurity and develop cyber cooperation in international organisations, [Tiirmaa-Klaar](#) said.

Even if data brings early-warning, greater flexibility is needed to ensure a timely transition to early and effective action.

That could involve adjustments to the UN Security Council, the streamlining of decision-making in NATO and the EU, and the closer integration of national parliaments to facilitate greater understanding, which would reduce the delays and national caveats imposed on actions.



03 DEVELOP AN INTEGRATED CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Replacing narrow external defence and internal security concepts with a wider definition that includes both can facilitate better responses to hybrid and non-conventional threats; provide clear spending definitions and efficient use of resources; encourage specialisation; and sharpen the focus on forward planning and prevention.

One concrete idea for achieving this would be setting security budget targets, rather than maintaining a narrow focus on defence budgets. These could possibly include parts of development budgets.

“The threats are now everywhere from extremism to cyber, from pandemic diseases to state-sponsored asymmetric attacks. To fight these threats we need to look at the entirety of the challenge and the context in which these challenges are able to threaten us. This requires a security dialogue not merely a defence one,” wrote [Michael C. Ryan](#) of the United States European Command (EUCOM).

“If we know what we are spending on security, we can then discuss how we are spending it; and when we discuss how we are spending it, we naturally think about how to spend it better.”

Michael C. Ryan
United States European
Command (EUCOM)

“If we know what we are spending on security, we can then discuss how we are spending it; and when we discuss how we are spending it, we naturally think about how to spend it better so that we can get more effect for the money available,” he added. “This conversation must be an important part of the collective discussion of how to protect ourselves.”

Setting a security spending standard and defining how to measure contributions could reduce imbalances within international alliances, rather than the current situation within NATO, for example, where most allies miss the target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defence and the United States carries a disproportionate part of the burden.

The security spending target would be based on a common approach to the practical integration of security and defence capabilities, so that all nations could contribute their fair share. Frontline nations could get credit for extra spending and cross-levelling could occur.

Several European countries have long argued that their security contribution is greater than their defence budget would suggest, because spending on development aid or forces such as paramilitary gendarmes does not fall under military spending.

The idea of a more holistic approach to security, blending military and non-military tools was widely backed. Jammers also urged a review of task-sharing between military and police forces both for internal security purposes, such as counter-terrorism, and foreign missions.

“NATO is already fully committed to a comprehensive approach,” wrote [Rear Admiral Giorgio Lazio](#), Chief of

Staff at the Allied Maritime Command in Northwood (UK). “I would stay away from ‘military responses’ as such, which could hardly solve any current and foreseeable security challenge without such a comprehensive design.”

However, not everybody was sold on the idea of fusing defence with other spending targets. “Security spending would undermine NATO’s defence commitments and member obligations,” warned Stefan Soesanto, non-resident [James A. Kelly](#) fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS.

[Sandy Johnston](#), a former official at the British Ministry of Defence, cautioned that any switch to a security spending basis should not let governments off the hook when it comes to adequate expenditure to keep citizens safe from threats both internal and external.


“All defence is security, but not all security is defence. If we are to conflate the budgets, then the benchmark has to be greater than 2%,” [Johnston](#) wrote. “We have all seen finance ministries juggling numbers to bump up their defence budgets by adding elements that might better be described as security-related in the wider sense. The lines are unquestionably becoming more blurred in the dangerous world we live in, but the terrifying cost of new high-end technology (F-35 anyone?) will always tempt the money men to look for cheaper – albeit still important – options, and that may turn out to be an expensive misjudgement in the longer term.”

Among other ideas raised by Jammers to overcome silos between the defence and security sectors were an increased joint focus on countering hybrid warfare, including information campaigns and cyber defences; and a review of commonalities between NATO Smart

“Let’s not get entangled in the debate about a European army, let’s work towards a more efficient European defence.”

Jorge Domecq
Chief Executive of the European
Defence Agency (EDA)

ANY ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE LINKED TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS



■ Strongly Agree	34%
■ Agree	38%
■ Neutral	11%
■ Disagree	15%
■ Strongly Disagree	2%

Defence and the pooling-and-sharing initiatives being developed by the EU.

There were calls to consolidate the mandate of the European Defence Agency (EDA), including by holding regular meetings with the European Council. The EDA's Chief Executive [Jorge Domecq](#) was among those who highlighted the blurring of divisions between classical defence and internal security challenges, and pointed to improved cooperation as the best response.

"The threats we face ignore borders. There is no longer any distinction between internal and external security. So there is no longer such a thing as a purely national response: collective security should become a cornerstone of the Common Security and Defence Policy," [Domecq](#) told the Jam. "More should be done in intelligence, border management and cybersecurity... Let's not get entangled in the debate about a European army, let's work towards a more efficient European defence."

Several contributors complained about a decline or lack of focus in security and defence spending, regardless of what heading they fall under. [Domecq](#) said European spending in defence R&D had declined 27% over the past decade, hurting both operational capabilities and the defence industrial base.

Key conflict prevention tools are also underfunded, said [Catherine Woollard](#), Secretary General of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). "The EU has had good policy and language on conflict prevention; [...] it also needs more human and financial resources committed to prevention, beyond the small team in the EEAS," she wrote. "Investment in preventive tools, for example diplomacy and development, has been cut drastically – and misguidedly – during the financial crisis."



04 BUILD TRUST IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH COOPERATION ON NON-SECURITY ISSUES

“The Middle East is arguably the most dangerous region in the world,” cautioned [Dawood Azami](#), BBC World Service journalist and “40 under 40” European Young Leader. “The security and political situation in the region has never been so complex and bleak since WWI a century ago.”

The urgency of finding new ideas to help end the bloody conflicts in the region, reduce tensions between rival powers and lay foundations for future stability was a major theme running through the Security Jam.

One key idea was building trust and reconciliation by focusing on areas of common interest, such as water, food and energy security, the economy, and a regional platform for dealing with the impact of climate change.

“Creating a regional security structure in the Middle East is imperative.”

Javier Solana

Former NATO Secretary General, former EU High Representative for CFSP and Friends of Europe trustee

“Creating a regional security structure in the Middle East is imperative,” counselled [Javier Solana](#), former NATO Secretary General, former EU High Representative for CFSP and Friends of Europe trustee. “One option would be to start with bilateral security agreements and gradually incorporate other countries into them. Another way would be to follow the model of the Gulf Cooperation Council: a mechanism of economic integration, growing over time.”

Climate change and water management were viewed as areas offering particular opportunities to provide common ground for states in the region, given the potentially high impact of global warming on the Middle East, including threats of extreme weather, water shortages and weakened food security.

Jammers suggested the establishment of a “climate change adaption organisation” that would comprise states in the Middle East, including Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Funding and expertise from Europe, the United States and international institutions like the World Bank could act as an additional incentive for countries to participate.

“The Middle East is a region that will be impacted by climate change in an almost unique way, but it is also uniquely – at least at this moment in time – unsuited for dealing with it. There is no regional organisation that includes all or most states,” wrote [Zebulon Carlander](#), Defence and Security Secretary at the Confederation of Swedish Conservative and Liberal Students. “So the advantage of a climate change adaption organisation (CCAO) is that it is technical in nature and focuses on practical solutions, such as building climate-resilient institutions and services ... Since the organisation would not be inherently political, that could possibly remove some of the tension that exists in the region.”

Awareness of climate change risks is growing in the Middle East. In Iran, the national security advisor has listed climate change as the second most dangerous threat to national security, and a former agriculture minister has warned that water shortages provoked by global warming could make the country “uninhabitable”, forcing millions to emigrate.

“Climate change is an issue that is very high up on the Iranian agenda,” wrote [Trita Parsi](#), President of the National Iranian American Council. “This would be a very good area for potential collaboration.”

Jammers stressed the importance of diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two most important players in the region. Outside actors could exercise a facilitating role: for instance, Europe could build on its position in the P5+1 negotiations that led to the deal on Iran’s nuclear programme. Despite their limited success to date, talks to end the bloodshed in Syria might present opportunities for regional rivals – and their wider international backers – to work together. A wider international coalition against extremist groups in the region was also suggested.

“There is no other future for Syria but as a secular, united, democratic country where all religions and national groups would live in peace and mutual respect,” wrote [Maria Zakharova](#), Spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The best way is a UNSC resolution to legitimise an international coalition against terrorism in the region. That could be the right solution at this particular moment.”

Beyond traditional diplomatic channels, Jammers suggested the development of regional civil society networks. Another idea was the formation of a coalition

“Climate change is an issue that is very high up on the Iranian agenda. This would be a very good area for potential collaboration.”

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President of the National Iranian
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
“The only ‘coalition of the willing’ that ought to be put forward is one made up of prominent and influential Arabs, Israelis, Turks and Iranians, dedicated to establishing regional peace, prosperity and stability.”

John Bruni
Founder and Director of
SAGE International

of respected figures from all sides to create a “council of elders” network that would seek paths to reconciliation.

“The only ‘coalition of the willing’ that ought to be put forward is one made up of prominent and influential Arabs, Israelis, Turks and Iranians, dedicated to establishing regional peace, prosperity and stability. This could start off through academic action and over time spill into a more broad-based social movement,” wrote [Dr John Bruni](#), Founder and Director of SAGE International, an online think tank and consultancy based in Adelaide, Australia.

CLIMATE CHANGE IS THE ULTIMATE
CATALYST FOR COOPERATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST





05 STRENGTHEN WOMEN'S ROLE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

Women can have an inestimable impact at every level of conflict prevention and resolution, from spearheading grassroots initiatives to bringing new perspectives on international leadership. Yet their value is often neglected.

It is clear that more women need to be incorporated into threat analysis and forecasting teams and into international military and policing operations.

“The involvement of women is essential because women are disproportionately affected by conflict and can disproportionately affect prevention and resolution,” wrote [Nathalie Tocci](#), Special Adviser to EU HR/VP Federica Mogherini and Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).

Jammers were adamant that peace cannot be sustained without meaningful female participation in conflict prevention, peace negotiation and post-conflict implementation.

“The involvement of women is essential because women are disproportionately affected by conflict and can disproportionately affect prevention and resolution.”

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Special Adviser to EU HR/VP
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“Women bring a different perspective on how to share power, promote human rights and address security. A world that is safe and fair for women is a better world for all.”

Irene Khan

Director-General of the
International Development Law
Organization

Research by the UN and other agencies provides broad backing for such approaches. A study published last year by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies’ Centre on Conflict, Development and Peace-building found that “when women’s groups have the opportunity and capacity to exercise effective influence on the peace process, the likelihood of peace agreements being reached and implemented is much higher.”

The Jam’s own statistics reflect the growing female involvement in the security community. During previous Jams in 2012 and 2014, women accounted for only 25% of the contributions. This year, they contributed 49% of all comments.

Nevertheless, parties involved in conflict often do not view women as equal partners in peace-making and peace-building. Excluded from negotiating tables, they are frequently forced into behind-the-scenes lobbying. This has to change.

“Women bring a different perspective on how to share power, promote human rights and address security. A world that is safe and fair for women is a better world for all,” wrote [Irene Khan](#), Director-General of the International Development Law Organization. “The stronger the women’s network gets, the more responsive the government institutions become.”

She listed concrete examples of where women are making positive contributions: cross-party groups of lawmakers lobbying for rights in post-conflict Nepal; the input of women’s groups in introducing constitutional changes following communal violence in Kenya; and grassroots movements securing improved access to justice in Afghanistan.

Contributors expressed support for improving female education at all levels, including offering more places in Western universities for women from the Middle East. There were calls for increasing the number of female leaders in international organisations, national administrations, security apparatuses, judicial systems, think tanks, and academia, with the UN urged to take a leading role. Increased training for women engaged in conflict prevention, peace-making, negotiations and counter-radicalisation was seen as crucial to increasing their participation in these processes.

“Peace cannot be sustained without women’s and civil societies’ meaningful participation in conflict prevention, resolution and dialogue. Lasting peace needs women. Women do not want to be victims; they want to be actors of change,” wrote [Marina Kaljurand](#), Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

As an example, [Diana Philip](#), a lawyer working with Strategic Foresight Group, a foreign policy think tank based in India, pointed to the success of India’s Female Formed Police Unit. The FFPU was the first all-woman police unit in the history of UN peacekeeping and it recently finished a nine-year mission to Liberia. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf hailed the FFPU as an inspiration for Liberian women, whose participation in the West African nation’s armed forces has since surged to 17%.

“This peacekeeping contingent is said to be paving the way for more countries to involve women in peacekeeping forces,” [Philip](#) said.


The Jam placed special emphasis on the part women can play in counter-radicalisation initiatives.

THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN WOULD BENEFIT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS



Strongly Agree	55%
Agree	34%
Neutral	7%
Disagree	4%
Strongly Disagree	0%

WHO DO YOU CONSIDER BEST PLACED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM?



“Applying a gender lens and ensuring equal participation will allow us to better understand and address the root causes and triggers of radicalisation and violent extremism,” wrote [Marriët Schuurman](#), NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security. “We have to stop perceiving women and girls only as victims of violent extremism, and recognise their agency, in all possible ways, and their equal right to have a voice and a say, to engage and to act. Women’s knowledge and experience is as meaningful as those of the other half of society. We can only prevent and stop violent extremism in a sustainable manner if women and men can equally contribute to the resilience of their communities.”

With that in mind, participants criticised the lack of funding and state support for female-led grassroots organisations working to counter radicalisation and extremist recruitment.

“Internationally, the funding for women’s NGOs is meagre, there is no real support for women activists who are being targeted by state and non-state actors,” stated [Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini](#), Co-Founder and Executive Director of the International Civil Society Network (ICAN). “Despite the rhetoric of ‘women’s participation and inclusion’, the international community is not willing to listen to women’s critiques of their interventions or take on board the practical recommendations that women’s groups offer.”



06 STRENGTHEN INTERNAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Greater coordination among security agencies in Europe is essential for more efficient countering of transnational threats, including terror attacks; trafficking in drugs, arms and people; and other forms of organised crime.

The Jam produced many suggestions for achieving enhanced cooperation, from more joint training and the strengthening of existing agencies like Europol or Frontex, to the formation of new bodies like a European inter-agency task force.

“What we need now is a kind of an EU-wide FBI if we want to be taken seriously,” wrote [Wolfgang Ischinger](#), Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and former German Ambassador to the U.S.

**“What we need now
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Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman of the Munich Security
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Ambassador to the U.S.

“There is a danger of creating an expensive ‘white elephant’ of an organisation.”

Colin Crowden
Intelligence analyst based
in Pakistan

Such a body, [Ambassador Ischinger](#) contended, would reassure European citizens that their security concerns are being taken seriously and would show them that the EU can be part of the solution to terrorism and other serious crimes, rather than part of the problem.

“Many may argue that now is simply not the time for further integration. I could not disagree more. If European citizens feel that the EU is an institution that creates and enhances their security, they will start to appreciate the EU again,” he said. “For that to happen, we must further integrate – in defence, in border protection, in intelligence and in police work.”

[Michael Printzos](#), Programme Director of The Hellenic Initiative, called for a European intelligence agency and a customs and border protection agency supported by all EU nations to control Schengen Area external borders.

“We need to establish a European intelligence agency,” he wrote. “We need to move forward with the roadmap and legislation that will allow the creation of a single European entity capable of collecting, analysing and sharing intelligence via the cooperation of all the national intelligence agencies.”

The recent jihadi attacks in Brussels and Paris, and earlier bombings in Madrid and London, showed the urgency of EU-wide intelligence sharing, [Printzos](#) said.

Some Jammers warned, however, that it was impossible to simply cut and paste U.S. agencies into a European context, given the differences between the U.S. federal structure and the relationships between the EU and its member states. Instead, they said, Europol should be

the focal point for investment – in collaboration with a new European inter-agency task force.

Others questioned whether any sort of major new agency was the way forward.


“There is a danger of creating an expensive ‘white elephant’ of an organisation,” cautioned [Colin Crowden](#), an intelligence analyst based in Pakistan. He recommended a focus on solving shortfalls in intelligence sharing through a common, accessible IT infrastructure that would allow for the secure, timely sharing of intelligence data among existing agencies.

That could eventually be followed by the establishment of a virtual EU intelligence fusion centre or portal to provide collective analysis of the data. “This would be a far more cost-effective and easily implemented approach – assuming that the successful prosecution of a threat is more important than the egos of individual states,” [Crowden](#) concluded.

Another idea emerging from the discussions was an EU-wide capabilities and gap analysis for all security agencies. That could lead to the creation of a “Blue Force Map” outlining available forces and the jurisdiction and capabilities of police, gendarmerie and other relevant security forces; and providing a shared database on their capacity for action and the best pathways for communications.


“A Blue Force Map is most useful for security actors who need to share information regarding threats they perceive,” wrote U.S. EUCOM’s [Michael Ryan](#). “In this case, actors need to know who has jurisdiction in any given geographic area or criminal topic. They also

THE EU SHOULD DEVELOP ITS OWN VERSION OF THE CIA



■ Yes 63%
■ No 37%

**WAS IT THE CORRECT DECISION
TO DEPLOY NATO FORCES AGAINST
HUMAN TRAFFICKERS?**



■ Yes 68%

■ No 32%

need to know, in addition to jurisdiction, who has the capability for action and what is their capacity for action.”

Ideas for boosting existing agencies included strengthening Frontex where necessary by providing military support; reinforcing Europol’s powers to combat transnational organised crime by collecting digital evidence; improved digital forensics to address cybercrime; and quicker knowledge-sharing on radicalisation.

There was wide support for expanding cross-border training programmes so that Europe’s interior security forces can boost contacts and work towards a common European police culture. A police training scheme similar to the EU’s Erasmus Programme of student exchanges was one idea to emerge.

Above all, nations need to develop the political will to cooperate, said former British policeman [Steve Harvey](#), who worked for 11 years at Europol as an organised crime expert.

“Organised crime is mainly successful not because of its sophistication but because of the lack of an effective response to its mobility and the reluctance of law enforcement agencies to work together at both national and international levels to investigate it,” [Harvey](#) observed. “The tools exist; it’s the willingness to implement that is lacking.”



07 MAINSTREAM CLIMATE CHANGE INTO THE SECURITY DEBATE

It is time to face up to climate change as a serious security threat; not just a question for environment or agriculture ministries, but a catalyst for conflict over ever-scarcer water, land and food resources; forcing mass population movements; and precipitating natural disasters.

This is not a distant threat; it is happening now. [Stéphane Dion](#), Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, made the impact of climate change on fragile states the focus of his contribution to the Jam. Pointing to Syria, he recalled a three-year drought up to 2010 – the worst on record, which saw almost 75% of farmers in the northeast of the country experience total crop failure and herders lose 85% of their livestock.

“Climate change poses a unique threat to the economy and safety of the population. As desertification advances and water reserves dry up, the search for new sources of energy and food could become a virtual race against time.”

Heraldo Muñoz
Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs

“The environmental disaster and resultant mass migration put significant strain on Syria’s economically and water-stressed cities, just as political unrest was intensifying,” [Minister Dion](#) wrote. “Climate change was not the direct cause of the civil war that eventually followed [in Syria], but it did amplify the risks.”

In response to such risks, governments should integrate climate change and security issues across foreign and development policies and make global warming a core element of all security discussions, with a particular emphasis on the impact on fragile states.

“To avoid future events like Syria and Darfur we need long-term international commitments to controlling greenhouse gas emissions, strategic natural resource management in fragile environments, resilience and capacity building in vulnerable regions, greater investment in basic development assistance, technology transfers, easier trade access for developing countries to Western markets... the list goes on,” said [Dr Robert McLeman](#), Associate Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada.

A global initiative is required to address water management, climate risk insurance and mediation of resource disputes. Communication must be improved between the West and developing nations on climate change resilience, adaptation and mitigation.

“Climate change poses a unique threat to the economy and safety of the population. As desertification advances and water reserves dry up, the search for new sources of energy and food could become a virtual race against time,” wrote [Heraldo Muñoz](#), Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs. “In addition, rising sea levels, acidification and illegal fishing all negatively affect marine environments, which are crucial to the wellbeing of our planet.”

Water diplomacy should be stepped up given the risk that climate change will increase uncertainty over the availability and quality of freshwater along the 260 river basins which are shared by one or more states. States not yet parties to UN Conventions that promote cooperation over shared water resources should be encouraged to join.

“Water diplomacy should be the centre of future attention,” insisted Friends of Europe’s [Shada Islam](#).

Handled correctly, collaboration over water management could be a trigger for wider cooperation and reconciliation among countries, notably in the Middle East. [Jörg Barandat](#), a lecturer at the German Armed Forces Command & Staff College, pointed to Central Asia as another area where the EU and OSCE could work to boost cooperation on water, energy and climate change, possibly improving relations with Russia and China. “Water can change from an object of conflicts to a catalyst for cooperation,” he wrote.

Besides preparing for the consequences of climate change, the defence sector also needs to play its part in reducing global warming. The U.S. navy is experimenting with ships and aircraft powered by a biofuel mix: a carrier strike group partly powered by a mix of petroleum and a beef-fat-based biofuel sailed on a seven-month Pacific Ocean deployment in January. The European Defence Agency is producing a database and mapping tool on the energy consumption of armed forces in Europe. The aim is to find appropriate efficiency measures and, where applicable, introduce alternative energy sources, including biofuels.

The December 2015 Paris Agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions was a step in the right direction, but greater international cooperation is urgently needed to


“We have reached our goals when climate change has become as mainstream as arms control for security experts, as the evolution of interest rates for economists, and as the weather for farmers.”

Stéphane Dion
Canadian Minister
of Foreign Affairs

handle the security threats being exacerbated by climate change, and especially to protect fragile states from impacts that can trigger conflict, participants said. It will not be easy.

“We will know we have reached our goals when climate change has become as mainstream as arms control is for security experts, as the evolution of interest rates is for economists, and as the weather is for farmers,” concluded [Minister Dion](#).

IN 2050, THE GREATEST THREAT TO HUMANITY WILL BE





08 INCORPORATE THE FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION INTO BROADER SECURITY POLICY

Organised crime is complex, flexible and rich. In an inter-connected world it represents a real security risk, fuelling instability and eroding fragile states. From heroin-funded violence in Afghanistan to the drug mobs of Latin America and human trafficking gangs exploiting refugees desperate to reach Europe, the nexus between organised crime and threats to state security is striking.

“Transnational crime is certainly a global threat of which trafficking humans - particularly women and children, as well as narcotics - and recently the impact of refugees are all having a significant impact on security,” wrote [Waldemar Vrey](#), Deputy Special Representative for the Rule of Law at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). “This is not an exhaustive list of issues, but it is important that a solution be found for these issues with the wider policing family.”

“It is equally clear that police and law enforcement agencies cannot operate in isolation within their own borders. Cooperation and coordination are more important than ever before.”

Clare Ellis

Research Fellow for National Security and Resilience at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Jammers agreed that greater cooperation between security forces is needed to combat the threat of organised crime – both internationally and within countries to tackle fragmentation among police, intelligence agencies and the military. Joint training and regular combined exercises were highlighted as important steps towards building understanding and interoperability.

“Whether in relation to narcotics, human trafficking, illicit trade or money laundering, we are seeing increasing evidence of large networks of organised criminals operating across borders,” wrote Jam moderator [Clare Ellis](#), Research Fellow for National Security and Resilience at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). “In response to this trend, it is equally clear that police and law enforcement agencies cannot operate in isolation within their own borders. Cooperation and coordination are more important than ever before.”

A number of imperatives emerged from the Jam: work is needed to reduce residual mistrust between national law enforcement communities and promote joint action; greater investment is needed in silo-busting institutional structures that can boost cooperation to combat transnational organised crime; stronger focus must be given to the most disruptive and violent offenders, rather than to low-level actors.

Particular emphasis should be placed on knowledge sharing around online radicalisation; collecting electronic and digital evidence; and digital forensics to address cybercrime.

“Cybercrime does not honour migration law, tax law, anti-money laundering policies and so on. We need special tax, migration and investment support options

for cyber companies and specialists. We should attract a talented workforce as cybercriminals already do,” wrote [Oleksandr Bodryk](#) from Russia.

Extending relationships with civil society, non-governmental organisations and the private sector was also seen as vital for improving police capabilities to tackle organised crime.


[Jérôme Michelet](#), the Associate Director of Oceans Beyond Piracy, said the success of multi-stakeholder approaches to tackle piracy, fostering cooperation between the shipping industry and state security agencies, could be extended into other areas.

“Multi-stakeholder discussions have much greater potential than a system that is only multinational without the industry component, or from private origins without a strong enough governmental component,” [Michelet](#) wrote.

The Jam also touched upon the impact of corruption and financial crime in undermining public faith in the economic and political system. [Ana Gomes](#), Member of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, said the European Union needs to act decisively against tax havens and secret jurisdictions that enable money laundering and organised crime.

“We must use the impact of the Panama Papers to make the EU, U.S. and other partners work together to fight financial secrecy schemes which foster corruption,” she wrote. “It is not just about fighting for tax justice and against tax and financial crime: It is about restoring the confidence of citizens in those governing or representing the state.”

GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD ARE WELL PREPARED FOR CYBERATTACKS



■ Strongly Agree	1%
■ Agree	4%
■ Neutral	4%
■ Disagree	60%
■ Strongly Disagree	31%


“We must use the impact of the Panama Papers to make the EU, U.S. and other partners work together to fight financial secrecy schemes which foster corruption.”

Ana Gomes
Member of the
European Parliament

Among the other ideas raised to advance the fight against organised crime were calls to place judicial reform at the heart of development programmes; increase civilian oversight of security forces, including through positive measures to counter corruption such as “officer of the month” programmes to promote clean police work; and crime-prevention programmes in communities to help vulnerable groups avoid falling into crime.

“Fighting crime does not only mean chasing after criminals, it also means intervening early among youth and families at risk, becoming aware of signs of disenchantment and radicalisation, and ameliorating the conditions which give rise to the marginalisation of the large unemployed youth population,” wrote [Mikael Barfod](#), EU Ambassador and Head of Delegation to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. “The EU’s programmes aimed at security reform in the region do not only upgrade the infrastructure and human resources of law enforcement agencies, but also promote community cohesion and give troubled youth fresh opportunities to change their lives before the problem becomes uncontrollable.”

SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA SHOULD BE UPHELD OR INCREASED





09 PROMOTE GRASSROOTS COUNTER-RADICALISATION INITIATIVES

Evidence shows that local, bottom-up initiatives involving peers, parents, communities and faith leaders are more effective in preventing the radicalisation of vulnerable youth than one-size-fits-all programmes associated with state authorities.

“We are not going to succeed only by preaching, lecturing,” wrote [Elisabeth Guigou](#), President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly, President of the Anna Lindh Foundation and Friends of Europe trustee. “We must invent the means, nurture the skills, build the approaches that youth and civil society need to erect a bulwark against political, religious and ideological violence.”

Empowering vulnerable groups to integrate into societies and build success stories can be among the most effective counter-narrative strategies.

“We must invent the means, nurture the skills, build the approaches that youth and civil society need to erect a bulwark against political, religious and ideological violence.”

Elisabeth Guigou
President of the Foreign Affairs
Commission of the French
National Assembly, President of
the Anna Lindh Foundation and
Friends of Europe trustee

“More often than not, top-down, state-driven counter-narrative efforts fail because they are viewed with suspicion. The most effective counter-narrative strategies are organic, bottom-up approaches.”

Mary Fitzgerald
Libya analyst and
“40 under 40”
European Young Leader

State and private sector support should be mobilised to help grassroots initiatives build up information networks to share their best practices, exchange expertise and synchronise their efforts. Regional or local digital counter-messaging communications centres could be integrated into such networks.

Building ties between Western civil society organisations and their counterparts in the Middle East could be particularly fruitful in forming intercultural dialogue. Other ideas raised during the Jam included regular “summits” of young leaders and training programmes that enable exchanges between young professionals of different backgrounds.

Specific focus should be placed on countering radicalisation in prison and, where feasible, integrating former extremists into counter-messaging efforts.

“More often than not, top-down, state-driven counter-narrative efforts fail because they are viewed with suspicion, precisely because they are coming from the authorities. The most effective counter-narrative strategies are organic, bottom-up approaches,” wrote [Mary Fitzgerald](#), a journalist and expert specialising in the Euro-Mediterranean region, particularly Libya. “I think there is an important role here for former extremists. We have seen how stories of the – admittedly rare – ISIS defectors who have gone public about the reality of life under ISIS have been effective counters to ISIS recruitment propaganda.”

Efforts are also needed to prevent over-reaction in the West to the extremist threat that can lead to attacks on minority cultures and then provide material for radical propaganda. Inclusion, opportunity and education must be promoted as forces for counter-radicalisation.

“In diverse societies, social cohesion can only be maintained if discrimination is outlawed and everyone has access to opportunities,” wrote [Thorbjørn Jagland](#), Secretary General of the Council of Europe. “Across our societies we must support democratic education, helping teachers to equip young people to become tolerant, active and engaged citizens.”

Effective counter-narratives should be built, stressing democratic values that include tolerance, respect for diversity and human rights.

“The extensive use of online propaganda contributes largely to Daesh’s recruitment of foreign fighters. Countering this online propaganda plunges us into tricky territory. Technical solutions – taking content off the web – may be complicated and legally challenging. And countering their messages in form and content may mean we are always one step behind, letting them set the agenda. So why don’t we promote our own values instead – the values of free, tolerant and inclusive societies?” asked [Michael Roth](#), German Minister of State for Europe. “To counter the influence of ISIL and other radical organisations, we must employ alternative narratives and social media champions, and learn to motivate and harness our own youth population.”

Far from being alien Western-imposed concepts, the values of tolerance and freedom are deeply rooted in Islamic tradition, said French-Iranian religious scholar [Dr Seyed Mostafa Azmayesh](#). That fact should be emphasised when building counter-narratives.

“The values represented by democracy and our societies’ freedoms are not just Western values, but are in effect inherent in the Quran and something the Quran recommends to all civilised societies,” he told Jammers.

THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT IS AT THE HEART OF VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM



■ Yes 23%

■ No 77%

“Far from being alien Western-imposed concepts, the values of tolerance and freedom are deeply rooted in Islamic tradition.”


Seyed Mostafa Azmayesh
French-Iranian religious scholar

“If Muslims are made aware of this they will see that Western values are nothing new, but consistent with Quranic teachings. For the purpose of cultural cohesion, all members of society should be made aware of this point.”

While prevention efforts have focused on Western Europe and the Middle East, Jam participants cautioned against neglecting other areas – such as Africa, Asia and the Western Balkans, where violent extremists are working to win over recruits.

“The Balkans face a challenge for which they need the help and support of the EU and other Western partners: not only in how to spot, arrest and prosecute extremists and terrorists – but also in how to develop an inclusive national strategy to tackle this problem through collective efforts which engage all sectors of society,” wrote [Branislava Perin](#) from Serbia.

EVEN RADICALS - UNLESS PROMOTING VIOLENCE - SHOULD BE ALLOWED PLATFORMS OF FREE DEBATE





10 REACH OUT TO CIVIL SOCIETY TO BUILD TRUST BETWEEN CITIZENS AND SECURITY FORCES

Jammers from various regions of the world from Central Asia to Latin America highlighted the lack of trust between citizens and security forces. Working with grassroots organisations can improve relations between security forces and communities, reducing the risk of conflict and boosting awareness of local conditions. Those lessons can be applied both domestically by police forces – particularly in the context of prevention programmes against radicalisation – and by security forces on international missions.

“In some areas, the community policing approach is working. These areas are relatively safe and there is cooperation between the police and community, like gatherings with elders and civil society to discuss problems.”

Pia Stjernvall

Head of the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan

Afghanistan provides an example. [Pia Stjernvall](#), Head of the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan, told the Jam that trust in the Afghan National Police (ANP) is low among the population – at just 50% for male respondents, according to a 2014 poll. The figures, she said, are related to the ongoing insurgency in which the ANP is called upon to fight, rather than perform traditional law-enforcement tasks. “The police work mainly amongst the public and unsupervised,” [Stjernvall](#) said. “People do not always feel that the police are there to protect them.” Corruption is a problem and citizens complain of insufficient access to justice.

Despite the adverse conditions, however, there are signs of progress. EUPOL Afghanistan is working with the government to promote the concept of civilian policing and implementing a community policing approach. [Stjernvall](#) spoke of a “growing involvement of civil society organisations in the community policing concept”, which is showing results in parts of the country.

“We at EUPOL would really like the police in Afghanistan to be part of society. In some areas this is working,” she explained. “In some areas of Kabul, in Herat and in Mazar the community policing approach is working. These areas are relatively safe and there is cooperation between police and community, like gatherings with elders and civil society to discuss the problems.”

From half a world away, [Rodrigo Rivera Salazar](#), Head of the Colombian Mission to the EU and former Colombian Minister of National Defence, explained how authorities in his country reached out to civil society to help their fight against the scourge of human trafficking.

“The Colombian government maintains a strong dialogue with civil organisations; civil society plays a very


important role in the fight against human trafficking,” he wrote. “In Colombia the organisation ‘Esperanza’ and the Civil Society Alliance for Human Trafficking offer significant assistance to victims and alert about possible problems in prevention, investigation and criminalisation, or in assisting victims.”

The two examples illustrate how the development of community partnership strategies can facilitate security forces’ work by building trust within societies, helping police understand citizens’ concerns and facilitating law enforcement officers’ responses. Civil society can also improve police awareness of emerging problems and act as a catalyst for positive change.

“Civil society fills important gaps usually not covered or very poorly covered by governments, such as promoting good governance, fighting corruption and lack of transparency and supporting poor communities,” wrote [Wided Bouchamaoui](#), 2015 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and President of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA). “In view of the importance of the social and public value which they create, civil society should be considered by governments, as well as regional and multilateral agencies, as valuable partners and contributors to help address national and global development issues.”

In post-conflict areas in particular, community outreach can help rebuild trust between security forces and citizens. Additional steps are often needed, however, to increase civilian oversight of the police or to crack-down on corruption or human rights abuses. Information gathering through surveys, focus groups and interviews with members of the public can be vital in building up understanding of citizens’ perceptions of the police, and here too civil society can play a vital role.

WHICH MEDIA DO YOU BELIEVE THE MOST?




“More subject matter experts need to be integrated in the predeployment training – on geographic areas and local cultures, on psychology and languages.”

Thierry Balzacq
Scientific Director at the Institute
for Strategic Research (IRSEM)

The Jam produced a number of ideas on how to improve the relationship between civil society and security services, including embedding good security sector governance principles in cooperation initiatives; ensuring international police missions’ focus on broad issues like education and consensus building rather than technical capacity building; and incorporating civil society expertise into pre-deployment training ahead of military or police missions.

“More subject matter experts need to be integrated in the pre-deployment training – on geographic areas and local cultures, on psychology and languages” wrote Jam moderator [Professor Thierry Balzacq](#), Scientific Director at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM), the think tank of the French Ministry of Defence. “This integration needs to be synchronised and properly institutionalised. Both the existing civilian and military leadership need to adopt a mutually beneficial level of relationships.”

SHOULD THE EU DEVELOP A COMMON ARMY?



OVERARCHING THEMES

THE MIDDLE EAST: A GLOBAL CONCERN - **65**

SCANNING THE FAR HORIZONS - **69**

BETTER TOGETHER - **72**

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THE MIDDLE EAST: A GLOBAL CONCERN

The fourth Security Jam was global in scope, but one region dominated. Concern over the Middle East reached into almost every debate in 2016, as Russia's intervention in Ukraine took centre stage two years ago and the rise of China provided a backdrop to the 2010 and 2012 editions of the Security Jam.

The wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya overshadowed the 77 hours of online debate. Across the six Jam topics, participants looked at ways to counter the violent extremism spreading bloodshed across the region and exporting terrorism way beyond its borders.

In a word cloud based on the whole of the Jam, the terms "Middle East", "security" and "extremism" leap from the page.


"This is a tragedy on a vast scale and it urgently cries out for a coherent and determined Western strategy to bring peace to the region and to create some kind of new order," wrote [Jamie Shea](#), NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges.

"When the wars end, clearly things will not go back to what they used to be," he added. "The problem in thinking about the Middle East is that we still do not know how much further the process of disintegration will go before we hit rock bottom and the reconstruction can begin."

"The problem in thinking about the Middle East is that we still do not know how much further the process of disintegration will go before we hit rock bottom and the reconstruction can begin."

Jamie Shea
NATO Deputy Assistant
Secretary General for
Emerging Security Challenges

THE RECENT DEAL ON IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME IS GOOD
FOR SECURITY IN THE REGION



■ Yes 71%

■ No 29%

Jammers debated solutions for the millions of refugees and internally displaced people desperate to escape the violence; ways to ease the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and longer-term strategies for reconciliation and cooperation so the region can cope with the challenges of economic inequality, democratic deficits, resource security and climate change.

Potential opportunities for cooperation in areas of mutual interest or common threat can be leveraged, from energy, food and water security to limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There was a broad consensus that solutions must come from within the region, but that outside players can play an important facilitation role. Jammers regretted weak Western responses both to the multiple interconnected crises in the region and the related refugee wave.

“Our slow and uneven response to the Arab Spring, and now our alarming lack of solidarity within the EU on migration, make it difficult to conceive of an EU-led security architecture,” wrote [Giles Merritt](#), Founder and Chairman of Friends of Europe. “Surely the urgent first step is to unveil a far more ambitious development strategy to stabilise Europe’s southern neighbours, and then make involvement in a security framework a condition of receiving EU assistance.”

On the refugee crisis, Jammers emphasised the positive contribution refugees can make to the economies of receiving countries and their potential for forging ties between host countries and their homelands – which could prove beneficial post-conflict. The importance of granting refugees access to education and integration opportunities was stressed with Jordan’s example winning praise.

Long-term planning is needed to address the root causes of unrest by reducing tensions between not-yet-in-conflict states and by helping ease economic and societal pressures. In a region of young populations – with the median age in Iraq and Syria at 21, almost half that of most EU countries – it is crucial to promote education and opportunity.

“Extreme violence does not occur in a vacuum, which is why it is necessary, as a first step, to find a lasting solution, to identify and address its root causes and catalysts - such as poverty, protracted conflict without hope of resolution, lack of good governance, political grievances, the alienation of communities and lack of opportunities for youth,” wrote [Leila Zerrougui](#), United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflicts. “Action is required from the international community, regional organisations and individual member states to mobilise resources to build resilience.”

Another recurrent theme was the quest for a comprehensive strategy – both in the region and in Western countries – to defeat Daesh and other violent extremist groups.

“Countering radicalisation requires an organised response at home as well as abroad,” wrote [Didier Reynders](#), Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs. “We have to tackle the root causes of the scourge, not only its symptoms. And we have to defeat it on the ground, in order to destroy the so-called ‘Caliphate’ it claims to have established. More importantly, we have a responsibility to help the local populations to escape the grip of the iron fist of Daesh.” Besides beating Daesh militarily, the group’s propaganda has to be countered to defeat the ideology behind it, [Minister Reynders](#) added.

“Extreme violence does not occur in a vacuum, which is why it is necessary to find a lasting solution – to identify and address its root causes and catalysts.”

Leila Zerrougui
United Nations Special
Representative for Children and
Armed Conflicts



SCANNING THE FAR HORIZONS

Too often, global powers have been wrong-footed by emerging security events.

They failed to spot how pro-European protests in Kyiv would trigger Russian President Vladimir Putin's annexation of Crimea, war in Eastern Ukraine and the dangerous new standoff between Moscow and the West. They were unprepared for the chain reaction that culminated in Syria's civil war and refugee tide. They missed the signs that Daesh's emergence on the Iraq-Syria borderlands would mutate into a multi-pronged global threat.

The need for early-warning, long-term thinking and strategic foresight to anticipate and, hopefully, prevent looming crises was a common theme that permeated not only the topic specifically dedicated to it, but much of the Jam debate.

"It is important for states to take a long-term view of security trends in the international system. It is too easy to be reactive and focused on the crises dominating the media cycle, but the operational choices both within and across crises should be guided by broader strategic goals," wrote [Mara E. Karlin](#), U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development.

"It is too easy to be reactive and focused on the crises dominating the media cycle, but the operational choices both within and across crises should be guided by broader strategic goals."

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of Defense for Strategy
and Force Development

“You can’t prevent violence or terrorism if you don’t have a solid understanding of underlying motivations.”

Bert Koenders

Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs

Governments were urged to analyse how crises are symptoms of broader trends, changing demographics, economic globalisation, gender dynamics, climate change and urbanisation. That should make it easier to identify risks in advance and enable the West to move off the back foot and prepare timely and appropriate responses.

“While foresight and forecasting can never be exact sciences, it is fundamental for leaders to put strategic vision at the heart of their action. And what we’re seeing at the moment, at the very least in Europe, is that leaders are consistently in reactive rather than proactive mode,” said [Pauline Massart](#), Deputy Director for Security at Friends of Europe.

Better use of data is key to boosting strategic foresight and developing a pro-active approach. Security services must become better at analysing data and social media to help them join up the dots and predict how trending events could develop into crises and threats. Current shortcomings need both technical and policy fixes, but with the right political will and the abundance of available data, relatively simple methods can bring big early-warning advantages.

“You don’t need complex analytical tools – sometimes you need just good research and common sense,” wrote [Lorenzo Nannetti](#), Senior Analyst for the Italian think tank Il Caffè Geopolitico. “We must combine a longer-term strategy to solve the overall issues with short-term tactics to address the current threats. But one doesn’t work without the other.”

Governments need to work more closely with civil society, the private sector and each other to draw in more data and analysis that will enable them to develop

a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and early-warning. NGOs can provide crucial information to help governments understand and mitigate threats, but there are complaints that governments ignore warnings pointing to inconvenient truths.

“Analysing data requires objectivity, and my experience is that often we see data as tools to support what we believe is relevant,” said [Emmanuel R. Goffi](#), Research Fellow with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, Canada. “You can have data showing signs that something is about to happen, but if you are not ready to admit that this something can happen, then you will not heed the signs. Data collection and analysis is too often biased by perceptions and political aims.”

Setting up a global early-warning mechanism, perhaps through the United Nations, could help overcome government inertia or slanted national views of incoming data.

Developing mechanisms to spot warning signs of radicalisation was a theme given particular emphasis. Understanding the mentality of those led into extremism can be key, said [Bert Koenders](#), Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs.

“You can’t prevent violence or terrorism if you don’t have a solid understanding of underlying motivations,” he said. “It remains a mystery to me, and I think to many of us, how a regular man or woman can turn into a terrorist, how a stable region can suddenly collapse into chaos and violence. What are the root causes, structures, dynamics and actors that trigger and feed into violent conflicts, extremism and mass atrocities?”

“Analysing data requires objectivity, and my experience is that often we see data as tools to support what we believe is relevant. Data collection and analysis is too often biased by perceptions and political aims.”

Emmanuel R. Goffi
Research Fellow with the Centre
for Defence and Security Studies
at the University of Manitoba,
Canada

BETTER TOGETHER



One clear message from the Jam was the need for greater cooperation and partnerships at almost every level: between countries to tackle transnational challenges; between agencies within countries to overcome silo mentalities; between civilians and the military; among international organisations, like the EU and NATO; and especially between state and civil society actors, business and non-government organisations.

Jammers argued for a new security approach that rethinks global partnerships and provides a more inclusive and coherent response to the interconnected and interdependent world. Coalitions and global partnerships can be based not only on shared values but also on overlapping interests, leading to a more joined-up approach in areas like cybersecurity, climate change, counter-terrorism and anti-piracy.

Despite scepticism over tardy decision-making and internal divisions, regional organisations and multilateral fora were considered the best way to strengthen multilateral defences, raise early-warning awareness, boost prevention efforts and forge collective responses.

“The changing security situation calls not for isolation, but for deepening cooperation and developed partnerships. Only together, with a unified European response and through a strong transatlantic link, can we stand up for common values and principles and ensure international peace and stability,” wrote [Peter Hultqvist](#), Swedish Minister of Defence.

Faced with Russian aggression in Ukraine, [Minister Hultqvist](#) insisted that Europe and the United States must stand together and underscored Sweden’s heightened cooperation with Nordic and Baltic neighbours, European partners and NATO.

Improving cooperation between the EU and NATO is a perennial Security Jam theme, and was picked up with renewed vigour this year ahead of the Alliance’s Warsaw summit and the impending release of the European Union’s Global Strategy.

“NATO is not the answer, and certainly not the whole answer, to every European security problem. So working

“The changing security situation calls not for isolation, but for deepening cooperation and developed partnerships. Only together can we stand up for common values and principles and ensure international peace and stability.”

[Peter Hultqvist](#)
Swedish Minister of Defence

“Both NATO and the EU can bring unique capabilities to enhance their members’ resilience in areas such as cybersecurity, strategic communications and critical infrastructure protection.”

Lee Litzenberger
U.S. Deputy Permanent
Representative to NATO
and Deputy Chief of Mission

closely with the EU on projecting stability is of the upmost importance,” said [Sir Adam Thomson](#), UK Permanent Representative to NATO. “NATO-EU cooperation has increased markedly in recent years – spurred by the hybrid threats faced by the member countries of both organisations. This partnership too needs to go much further, be more systematic and more strategic, if we’re going to deliver security for all.”

His words carried particular resonance, as several Jam contributors raised their concerns about the security impact of a possible British exit (“Brexit”) from the EU. The EU’s security role was also highlighted from the U.S. side.

“NATO-EU cooperation is important in a number of areas, including ways to counter the threat of hybrid warfare, and is under discussion now in both organisations,” wrote [Lee Litzenberger](#), U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO and Deputy Chief of Mission. “Both NATO and the EU can bring unique capabilities to enhance their members’ resilience in areas such as cybersecurity, strategic communications and critical infrastructure protection.”

Within countries, the fuzzy nature of security threats shows how all security-concerned agencies, both civilian and military, need to coordinate in the defence of citizens’ safety and national security. “Security is not one-dimensional, and the lines between who protects what are increasingly blurry, with cross-border and intra-state threats,” wrote [Lyuba Guerassimova](#) from Bulgaria. “The police has an increasingly outward set of tasks, while the military has an increased inward and multi-faceted crisis response task.”

[Pietro Costanzo](#), Secretary General of Il Caffè Geopolitico, pointed to Italy’s Carabinieri as an example

of a force that takes on both traditional military and police tasks, insisting that they can share their experience by training foreign forces. “Joint activities and training can be useful to improve mutual understanding, because armed forces – above all those involved in military policing abroad – can add value, for example by sharing know-how on urban policing during crises.”

The value of improved cooperation between state security actors and civil society was stressed again and again. Civil society organisations and the private sector are often less bureaucratic, more agile and closer to developments on the ground, with fewer mandate limitations and fewer restrictions in movements and communications.


Multi-actor, multi-level approaches can be especially fruitful in frozen conflict zones and fragile states, where dialogue across dividing lines by civil society can be fostered as a way to enhance early-warning systems and conflict prevention mechanisms. Listening to civil society can help government development agencies better understand requirements, prioritise resource use and anticipate trouble.

“Civil society must be an integral part of a global partnership for conflict prevention,” wrote [Lamberto Zannier](#), Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “We need all the comparative advantages we can get to fully understand the drivers of conflict and develop the tools to address them. Exchanging information and partnering with civil society, NGOs, think tanks and academia helps us improve our understanding of current or potential crisis situations and identify the most effective approaches.”

“Civil society must be an integral part of a global partnership for conflict prevention.”

Lamberto Zannier
Secretary General of the
Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

THE MOST POWERFUL ACTOR IN 2050 WILL BE



■ China	43%
■ USA	39%
■ Other	15%
■ The EU	3%
■ Russia	0%

INTO ACTION



Early-warning is one thing, but early response is just as important. The Jam revealed a clear need to improve the speed of decision-making, to build more flexibility into security processes and to boost investment in much-needed capabilities.

Participants pointed to inefficiencies in the decision-making processes of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union.

On the UN, there were calls for a reform of the Security Council, including by increasing the number of seats and reducing veto rights. More member states and non-state stakeholders ought to be given a greater voice.


“Only rarely do members of the UN Security Council listen directly to the parties to disputes, and when they do it is usually to give an audience to whom they are already sympathetic. This is simply not good enough in a world where most conflict is intra-state and not between states,” wrote [Carne Ross](#), Founder and Executive Director of Independent Diplomat. “It is implausible that the Security Council can make good quality decisions on the basis of second- or third-hand information.”

A reform of Security Council decision-making could improve the activation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provisions – empowering the international community to take over from states which fail to protect their populations either by replacing veto rights with a qualified majority system, or by allowing a transfer to the General Assembly when the UNSC is deadlocked.

“Double standards at the international level for many reasons (incapacity or unwillingness of the international community to act) have weakened the R2P at political and moral levels. An update [...] is much needed,” wrote [Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah](#), former U.N. Special Envoy for Somalia.

As for NATO, [Jaap de Hoop Scheffer](#), former NATO Secretary General and Friends of Europe trustee, said

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IS OUTDATED



■ Yes 75%
■ No 25%

“If NATO decision-making isn’t up to engaging military forces at short notice, we should forget about the Alliance.”

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
Former NATO Secretary General
and Friends of Europe trustee

the upcoming summit in Warsaw should implement previous decisions to commit member nations to defence-spending targets and back increased prepositioning of equipment and rotation of forces in Poland and the Baltic States. Quick reaction capacities are key, he insisted.

“If NATO decision-making isn’t up to engaging military forces at short notice, we should forget about the Alliance; it is its core responsibility,” [de Hoop Scheffer](#) wrote.

Several spoke of the importance of civilian oversight of security arrangements, not only for accountability purposes but also to make sure political entities understand the needs of the military and therefore are more willing to act when forces need to deploy on short notice.

“Too little attention has been given, though, to the role of national parliaments in this process. As the integration of forces and pooling of resources come off the ground, national parliaments should work much more closely together to see to it that they can give their support to engage,” added [de Hoop Scheffer](#).

The EU was urged to build a common defence culture, leveraging existing cooperation and collaboration structures among those countries that are also members of NATO; or to cooperate with it under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The EU should build on current steps to develop a comprehensive programme of Pooling & Sharing in procurement, capabilities and training to avoid duplication and make the best use of scarce defence resources.

Although many Jammers dismissed the idea of a fully integrated EU army as unrealistic, they said the Union

needs to strengthen its capacity to act in security matters. There were complaints that Europe's capabilities are weak due to insufficient political commitment from the member states, decreasing defence budgets and low spending on research and development. Participants agreed there is an apparent need for making better use of instruments like the EU battlegroups to improve European military effectiveness.

General Mikhail Kostarakos, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, highlighted the EU's contribution to security through foreign missions and the training of local forces.

"We create a new, far-away front, which we 'defend' not with walls and fences and bunkers, but by building security and prosperity, by restoring hope," **General Kostarakos** wrote. "We train the local armed forces to provide security by themselves. We try to create a safe and secure environment not by using our own troops but by building these countries' capacities to take care of their own security."

To be successful, military operations need clear political aims and leadership, which must be able to adapt to changing circumstances.

"Sending military force somewhere is a serious business, and it can only accomplish the political objective if this objective is clearly defined and realistically achievable with the combination of political, economic and military instruments we, over a period of time, are ready to deploy," wrote **Carl Bildt**, former Swedish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Friends of Europe trustee. "It's far more than just civilian advisors. What is needed is clear political leadership that can bring together all the aspects that are of relevance to achieving the objectives."

"We create a new, far-away front, which we 'defend' not with walls and fences and bunkers, but by building security and prosperity, by restoring hope."

General Mikhail Kostarakos
Chairman of the
EU Military Committee

MODERATORS' CONCLUSIONS

TOPIC 1: STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AND EARLIER-WARNING - **81**

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TOPIC 6: ANSWERS TO RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM - **97**

Senior experts from leading think tanks moderated discussions on each of the six topics. This section presents their evaluation of the Jam's conclusions.

Topic 1: Strategic foresight and earlier-warning

INCREASING THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC FORESIGHT

The need for strategic foresight is clear, but in a fast-moving world where competing crises emerge with disarming regularity to demand immediate response, policymakers don't have the luxury of choosing "big picture" options. The 2016 Security Jam provided an opportunity to discuss how to better anticipate risks and develop appropriate responses, so that governments can look beyond short-term difficulties and elaborate the strategies required to deal with emerging threats at an early stage.

Discussions on topic one achieved its goal of producing actionable recommendations for governments and international institutions, notably through the construction of a global early-warning system to facilitate crisis prevention, and forewarn governments and international organisations of impending conflict, tension and disaster before they evolve into full-blown crises. We welcome the recommendation to improve analysis of big data in ways that can enable authorities to turn early-warning into fast response.

What is important now is to build on that work, passing on the recommendations to policymakers so they can correct past failings in threat anticipation and develop concrete solutions to improve preparedness. If developed correctly, such solutions could improve strategic awareness within the European Neighbourhood

Moderated by
Eurasia Group
and Friends of Europe

Jam moderator
Charles Lichfield
Associate Europe,
Eurasia Group

Strategic foresight is all very well, but often ends up in reports which have little impact on policymaking.

Policy, empowering decision-makers to better anticipate and respond when Europe is next faced with signs of Moscow preparing to deploy “green men” in hybrid warfare or with early indicators of unrest threatening to destabilise areas in the Middle East. Strategic foresight must also look farther afield, to analyse the rise of China and implications for the balance of power in East Asia; the potential impact of natural disasters; and longer-term challenges from demographics to climate change.

Even with enhanced strategic foresight and early-warning, global leadership is required to ensure effective conflict prevention. At the moment, as my colleague [Ian Bremmer](#) pointed out in the Jam, such leadership is lacking. This is due to both the “creative destruction of the geopolitical space”, which prevents collective action from the big powers, and to the absence of great leadership from the United States.

“The rise of emerging markets (particularly China) and the implosion of the Middle East are together creating a higher bar for the sort of leadership necessary to bring about stability and security,” [Bremmer](#) explained to participants. “The former makes it harder for the Americans to rally the international community to ‘get to yes’. And the latter makes the notion of taking a leadership role less appealing.” In response, he suggested embracing incrementalism – policy responses where governments “don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good”.

All too frequently, important forward planning gets shelved by politicians focused on the crises of the day and lacking the time and resources to invest in long-term approaches. This needs to change.

Strategic foresight is all very well, but often ends up in reports which have little impact on policymaking.

How do we get decision-makers to think strategically? Perhaps, they should be invited to participate in the policy-planning exercises themselves.

HEEDING THE WARNING SIGNS

Do we really live in a volatile and “unpredictable” world marked by sudden tensions, wars, conflicts and famines?

Not really. In most cases, there are early and visible signs of nascent crisis. But these are ignored. There are written reports – including in the media and social networks – of emerging conflicts but they are unread. And there are voices warning of war, hunger and social tensions but they are unheard.

The correct use of information and intelligence on emerging crises which is available both in the public domain and in more confidential documents becomes even more important in a complex, interconnected and interdependent world, where crises in one country, area or sector can have quick and dramatic fall-out in others. The refugee crisis triggered by the war in Syria is one potent example of just how connected we are to each other.

Given this interdependency, a very important recommendation from the Security Jam is to create a United Nations early-warning office to coordinate strategic foresight and serve as a hub for information exchange and to promote conflict prevention policies.

Its key task would be to provide timely warning of impending problems, whether natural (disease, population, climate-related) or political (war, unrest, instability); improve intelligence on potential threats;

Jam moderator
Shada Islam
 Director of Policy,
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The use of information technology must become an integrated part of the worldwide conversation on security

improve international information-sharing to facilitate early-warning and early response and integrate input from regional players, civil society and the private sector to provide a fuller picture.

Regional bodies such as the OSCE, the African Union, ASEAN and others would feed information on risks and dangers emerging in their region. A stronger focus is required on earlier-warning signals and pre-crisis developments in fragile states which are already made more vulnerable by man-made and natural disasters, and where events can lead very quickly to violence and catastrophe.

More effective information-sharing must be given priority. In fact, there is no lack of data; the real problem is a lack of efficient and timely sharing of available knowledge. International and supranational organisations have not found workable models for intelligence and foresight cooperation.

There must also be better communication channels between civil society groups and security regulation authorities. This has been a major failing in the EU's response to the terrorist threat, where national intelligence agencies have failed to share data.

The importance of civil society actors was highlighted throughout the Jam. Amnesty International's [Anna Neistat](#) noted that "compared to government actors and even UN agencies, local and international civil society organisations have fewer mandate limitations and extensive networks of contacts; they are less restricted in movement and communication; and they have less bureaucracy to deal with – all of which make them efficient in collecting and sharing information. Yet, ironically, while such organisations are charged

with gathering 'intelligence', their findings and analysis are not always given sufficient attention in early-warning systems (EWS)." Business representatives also have a role to play in delivering earlier-warnings.

Finally, ICT and big data analytics must be made part of every conversation, project or initiative related to strategic foresight, conflict prevention and tracking evolving security threats. The use of information technology must become an integrated part of the worldwide conversation on security.

Topic 2: Global partnerships for conflict prevention

THE IMPORTANCE OF INCLUSIVENESS IN MULTI-ACTOR PARTNERSHIPS

In conflict prevention everyone plays a part, and global partnerships that involve multiple actors and levels can be particularly effective. Local actors at the grassroots level (including women and minorities) can identify problems that might not be seen from the government level or by the international community. They can, therefore, provide rapid responses and generate innovative solutions that fit the specific needs and socio-cultural context.

Bottom-up initiatives must be encouraged and supported by governments and international organisations, and if possible cooperation between the different actors must be fostered to enable fruitful national and global partnerships. In this sense, it is important to understand that these initiatives will not be a one-size-fits-all solution, nor replicable, as each local context is different, but we can learn from the communication and alliances between diverse actors.

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“Conflict prevention efforts should always pay enough attention to bringing women to the negotiation table, and not just for the picture!”

Irene Khan

Director-General of the
International Development
Organization (IDLO)

To encourage multi-level and multi-actor partnerships, it is important that governments and international organisations pay attention to what is happening at the local level. They should invest time and resources to establish a productive dialogue with local actors and leaders to enhance trust; promote a sense of inclusion; and ultimately engage local people in the promotion and implementation of the reforms that are necessary to improve conflict prevention measures.

In particular, the involvement of women is fundamental. Women should not only be consulted and have a forum where their voices can be heard, but they should be encouraged to play a key role in conflict prevention, mediation and resolution. As [Irene Khan](#), Director-General of the International Development Law Organization (IDLO), said: “As a rule, conflict prevention efforts should always pay enough attention to bringing women to the negotiation table, and not just for the picture!” [Khan](#) highlighted the work that IDLO has done to enhance the number of women working in the justice sector, both through research and analysis as well as capacity development programmes. She emphasised that IDLO research has shown that women’s access to justice improves when there are more women lawyers, investigators, judges and court officials. She added that the women’s shelter network in Afghanistan is an example of a successful, entirely Afghan-led and Afghan-run initiative. In addition, Jammers insisted on the positive impact that women can have by being part of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building forces, training missions and education programmes, peace process negotiations, conflict mediation and post-conflict implementation.

Topic 3: A regional security architecture for the Middle East

Moderated by
**American Security
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THE ELDERS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Jam moderator
Matt Freear
Adjunct Fellow,
American Security Project

The strength of “The Elders”, which describes itself as a group of “independent global leaders working together for peace and human rights”, lies in its perceived integrity and its demonstrated adherence to a set of values. During the Security Jam, the idea of replicating such a group to enhance Middle East security and cooperation was discussed. Core values of The Elders, particularly social justice and peace-making, could transfer to a similarly constructed organisation specifically for the Middle East.

Unlike The Elders, a regional network of elders and its specific values would have to be steeped in the traditions and cultures of the region to make it relevant and resonate amongst the states and peoples of the Middle East. To make it credible within the region, it would need to find its own path, and might have a different basis to the Western, secular, liberal values espoused by The Elders. By definition it would need to espouse a broad-minded, tolerant and forward-thinking agenda, but base itself in conservative values.

Institutionalising the experience and status of benevolent elder statesmen and former leaders, who could sit together in a council of values and forge consensus on challenging issues, seems to grow out of the common historical and cultural trends of the region. Membership of a group for the region could be loose, and could include both those from the region itself and “friends” from other parts of the world who could be associated with the group. It may be that other prominent leaders

An elders network for the Middle East could grow out of a handful of bold personalities who are capable of connecting across traditions and communities.

– not solely former statesmen and women – could be included from the worlds of business, science, the arts and religion, to name but a few. It would be critical for them not to be seen as representatives of their states, constituencies or communities, but rather as personalities of global stature who are committed to and publicly champion a set of agreed values.

One of its strengths would be drawing members who are no longer office holders. The current Elders organisation grew out of the pivotal leadership of Nelson Mandela, and its website provides a good definition of what membership requires: “Elders no longer hold public office; they are independent of any national government or other vested interest. They should have earned international trust, demonstrated integrity and built a reputation for inclusive, progressive leadership.”

Similarly, an elders network for the Middle East could grow out of a handful of bold personalities who are capable of connecting across traditions and communities, and who attract the respect of ordinary people as well as global leaders. It would need to be careful to position itself as not solely Arab in its structure, or exclusively Muslim in its values. The opportunity, however, is to reinforce and demonstrate the strength of a distinct identity and to re-interpret international norms. Which causes or issues it chooses to pursue first would be critical to its future work. Initial success is likely to depend more on being able to speak with one voice on a contested issue, rather than necessarily demonstrating results.

The Elders is involved in both critical geo-political conflicts and deeply-rooted social issues, from Myanmar to child marriage. A comparable Middle Eastern organisation might want to broaden its remit

and talk about a broader set of issues in addition to those involving the family, the ummah, refugees and international conflict. Some items on its agenda may place it at loggerheads with the UN and the international community.

An elders network for the Middle East would complement supra-national and transnational organisations, and bolster cultural confidence and regional identity. Undoubtedly, identity politics would prove a challenge. Nevertheless, it presents an additional avenue for cooperation, peace-making and regional resilience.



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Topic 4: Foreign military engagement 2025

FOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON FOREIGN MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Military engagement can serve noble or dubious political ends, deter political violence, topple an unfriendly government, or help rebuild an ailing country. Hybrid tactics and revolutionary technologies take military engagement to a whole new level. Decisions on and deployment of military force, however, raise a wealth of issues, ranging from technical to financial to legal and ethical.

This topic's primary focus was the evolving role of actors that "govern" military interventions (e.g. the UN Security Council), those who carry it out (states), and those that are its primary beneficiaries or victims (individuals). All these aspects were debated in an attempt to examine their political backgrounds, technical and operational components, and legal and ethical bases, and to identify the circumstances under which they function or fail. Ultimately, the discussion aimed to propose an innovative understanding of military engagement and design innovative solutions to the problems faced by these actors.

Jammers asked whether the UN Security Council is still the appropriate body to decide on foreign military engagement, whether the responsibility to protect justifies military intervention, and whether robots could hold the key to future "zero-casualty warfare".

Financial constraints and the resistance of public opinion were pitched against the need for effective

and successful coalitions and the need to ensure that soldiers are prepared to face future challenges in complex environments.

While many Jammers pointed to the changing roles of the private sector and industry, the majority referred to traditional international actors, such as the UN, or regional actors such as the EU, NATO or the African Union. Appropriate training (preferably multinational), effective command and control and coherent funding were listed as key elements for military engagement abroad. Most importantly, a legitimate political framework was clearly identified as the pre-condition for any intervention. Linking a realistic political and military goal to the engagement was seen as paramount to achieving the desired effect.

There was a general consensus that tomorrow's battlefield is far from clear: Europe's capabilities were described as weak, with poor political commitment from the Member States, decreasing defence budgets and low spending on research and development. Participants agreed that there is a strong need to reinforce European defence culture and to make better use of existing instruments (Berlin Plus Agreement, rapid reaction force) to improve European effectiveness.

Jammers developed four recommendations for more effective military engagement:

1. Improve the activation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, by developing criteria to enable the international community to take over from states that fail to protect their populations. Consequently, the decision on R2P should lie with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). To overcome vetoes, a system of qualified majority voting could be explored.

Some suggested transferring the authorisation of R2P interventions to the General Assembly in cases of UNSC deadlock, increasing credibility by involving all member states in decision-making, and in effect making R2P a principle of all governments.

2. Develop a strong EU defence culture, while avoiding duplication with NATO. Jammers insisted on more flexible and effective cooperation between the two organisations, while some examined a possible institutionalisation of this cooperation. One idea was to revive “the agonising negotiation of the Berlin Plus arrangements”. These agreements, signed 13 years ago, are still hampered by a number of unresolved issues.

3. Strengthen the EU’s capacity to act, for example by consolidating the European Defence Agency’s mandate, and by ensuring that the European Council discusses EDA recommendations at one or more of its meetings. A comprehensive programme of pooling & sharing, beyond air-to-air refuelling and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), in the areas of procurement, capabilities and training was suggested, with VIP Jammer Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger and others urging improvement and streamlining of pooling & sharing.

4. Better integrate Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the pre-deployment training phase, in fields such as geographic and cultural background, psychology, languages and negotiation skills. A whole-of-government and even whole-of-society approach is required to take into account the complexity of future security environments. This integration needs to be synchronised and properly institutionalised. Public-private partnerships should also be considered.

Topic 5: Policing 2025: New strategies against organised crime

NEW STRATEGIES TO PROTECT THE EU AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME

In the face of increasing concern about various forms of transnational crime, such as human and other forms of trafficking, money laundering and tax evasion, fragmented approaches within the EU must be overcome and common solutions found.

Through international cooperation, including under the auspices of Europol and Eurojust, national law enforcement officials are much better able to find the right landing place for enquiries that can help in a specific investigation. While international cooperation has been strengthened, a lot remains to be done to raise the efficiency of anti-crime measures.

Law enforcement communities across the EU need to understand the latest developments related to their specific tasks. There is a need for a shared understanding of the possibilities created by new and emerging technologies, the latest methodologies and techniques for building strategic and tactical intelligence; and for the skills needed for effective international cooperation.

In the field of military security, it has long been recognised that specialised language skills are needed for effective communication. Dedicated language training to facilitate international operations is standard practice. In law enforcement the perspective still seems more local, and lack of confidence in the ability to communicate effectively may deter some officers from participating in international initiatives.

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In light of the above, the main recommendations from this topic were:

- Work to reduce the residual mistrust between national law enforcement communities by promoting more, and more frequent, joint action.
- Promote extensive knowledge sharing in areas such as the application of the latest developments in forensic science; the use of data and digital information in policing; and new policing strategies, methodologies and techniques. In a first phase, topics that could be part of such efforts are collecting electronic and digital evidence, digital forensics to address cybercrime and knowledge-sharing around radicalisation leading to violent extremism among prison populations.
- Develop and implement dedicated language training to facilitate international cooperation. Make regular language refresher courses part of the overall programme of career development.
- Promote common curricula and joint training for the EU law enforcement community, though the “translation” of the skills would then have to be tailored to the local context.
- Build on existing investment in institutional structures to promote cooperation in building a comprehensive and detailed strategic intelligence picture of serious, organised, transnational crime in Europe: Europol, perhaps in collaboration with a new European inter-agency task force, could be the focal point for investment.

BROADENING OUR APPROACH TO ORGANISED CRIME

Organised crime does present a real security risk, and it should be incorporated into broader security policy. However, it needs to be viewed through a more holistic lens in order to develop effective strategies.

Framing organised crime as a security threat, while raising its profile, risks limiting the response to security actors. The fallback approach to organised crime is enhanced policing strategies. In Europe, most police bodies have some form of serious and organised crime unit. In third countries, the European Union, member states and other donors have been supporting capacity-building for law enforcement agencies to pursue organised crime. Although there is an increasing focus on upstream investigations rather than just arresting the lower rungs of criminal networks, the focus on policing strategies is reactive. They engage with instances of organised crime.

A much wider range of strategies can be deployed to “prevent” organised crime from taking root. This perspective has been incorporated into the UK’s Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. Alongside “pursue” strategies, actors involved in the fight against organised crime are expected to also focus on “protect”, “prepare” and “prevent” strategies. In 2015, the UK Home Office released their “Prevent Guide”, which outlines a variety of entry points to interrupt pathways into organised crime. But there is greater scope for preventing organised crime.

In relation to upstream strategies, there were specific factors that made Guinea Bissau conducive to becoming a transit hub in the cocaine trade from South America to Europe and to become labelled “Africa’s first narco-state”. Weak governance and the scope for state capture created an opening for Colombian cartels to capitalise on. On a smaller scale, high youth unemployment also helped create cadres of willing traffickers. Identifying and engaging with these factors is an important element in a holistic approach to organised crime.

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Conflict is no longer primarily state-based, as non-state actors play a key role, criminal activity often funds the activities of conflict actors, or the conflict serves as a cover for illicit activity.

Broadening strategies also heightens the priority of organised crime. The UK's National Security Strategy places organised crime as a Tier 2 threat. Understandably, the threat posed by organised crime will rarely be considered to match terrorism, a Tier 1 threat, although cybercrime and cyber-attacks are. However, international military crises are also a Tier 1 threat. Conflict is no longer primarily state-based, as non-state actors play a key role, criminal activity often funds the activities of conflict actors, or the conflict serves as a cover for illicit activity. From Mali to Syria, organised criminality is rife, and groups profiting from conflict have an interest in maintaining it.

The Security Jam discussions highlighted a range of shortfalls of policing strategies. In many countries, the police are not trusted by the community, which makes it difficult for them to establish effective intelligence networks. Although there are increasing mechanisms for transnational cooperation, such as the Joint Investigation Teams facilitated by Europol, law enforcement strategies are primarily national, making it difficult to effectively grapple with the borderless and fluid nature of criminal networks. Connected to this, rather than stamp out organised crime, successful law enforcement operations have merely pushed criminal networks into different regions or countries, in what has been well documented as a "balloon effect".

Although policing strategies using coercive strategies to deter criminals are essential in responding to organised crime, a broader range of tools is required in order to have a deeper and more sustainable impact on organised crime, rather than just pushing it in a different direction.

Topic 6: Answers to radicalisation and violent extremism

REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CENTRES TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) ONLINE

Among the best suggestions and lessons-learned put forth in the topic of “Answers to radicalisation and violent extremism”, one issue stood out: the potential of regional digital counter-messaging communications centres. The centres were described by one of the Jam’s partners, Gateway House’s Sameer Patil, as programmes that “use cyberspace to engage with Muslim youth to counter terrorist propaganda used to recruit foreign fighters and raise funds.”

The first such centre was initiated in the United Arab Emirates, and another one has now been established in Kuala Lumpur with the support of the United States, with the aim of reaching out to target audiences across Southeast Asia. Developing different approaches adapted to the particularities of each region and avoiding “one-size-fits-all” models was a key message emphasised by Jammers. In the case of Kuala Lumpur, U.S. support follows the “training, equipment and operational approach”. Programme infrastructure is costly, so financial support is important to take into account. The idea is to provide positive and inclusive messages as an alternative to violent extremist messages based on animosity. Additionally, the programme employs interactive communication methods such as “online Friday Imams” to answer questions posed by users, along with live chat features.

For violent extremist groups, especially for those recently established like ISIS, the Internet has served as a powerful tool for propaganda and recruitment. Indeed, ISIS has demonstrated a very sophisticated

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use of multimedia and new technologies. This requires a strong response or, better yet, a proactive approach to countering violent extremism online.

Regional digital counter-messaging communications centres are an important initiative that could be more successful if certain issues are addressed. The first is that of capturing the attention of and reaching out to the target group. Just providing a steady stream of messages does not automatically ensure effective outreach. The way the messages are delivered and the formulation of messages are just as important. Thus, they should be designed and employed accordingly.

The second issue is that of sustainability. Violent extremists are continuously broadcasting their messages and are innovative in how they get these out. Thus, the response to these violent messages must be equally innovative and continuous, delivered by civil society groups or individuals that truly care about the matter and want to bring about a real change. In order to gain momentum and sustain the initiative in the long term, the platforms could be opened to individuals willing to provide content. This could encompass the past experiences of deradicalised individuals for instance. Generally, content provided by participants makes a website more vibrant, sustainable and open to new ideas.

The third and final issue is that online channels should be backed by offline channels. Literature on CVE shows that online paths to radicalisation are backed by both offline and face-to-face communications. This approach is also applicable to deradicalisation processes and preventive measures. Online communications should be complemented by physical places and people who are there to give the same message or expand upon messages delivered online.

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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CONFLICT AND CRISIS

Crises and conflicts at the EU's borders and further afield often result from fragile states breaking down in violent conflict – Syria, Iraq and Libya are just some recent examples. These crises, and the unspeakable violence and human suffering they give rise to, threaten the EU's vital interests. The EU must engage in a practical and principled way with the aim of fostering human security. The EEAS live chat with policymakers, academics, think tank and civil society representatives aimed at practical recommendations on how the EU could take its integrated approach to conflicts and crises forward. It formed part of the outreach discussions for the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy.

Participants raised the importance of increasing conflict prevention efforts. They recommended that the EU improve its contacts with civil society organisations on the ground to improve early-warning. Big data analysis – including the use of social and local media – could also contribute to enhance the EU's knowledge of potential sources of conflict. A different mindset was deemed necessary to understand and deal with the increased unpredictability in today's international environment: thinking in terms of alternatives and chances should replace the classical linear extrapolation of trends. None of the current crises played out at a single level, so local, state, regional and global dimensions must be tackled at the same time.

Improving early-warning, however, was only seen as a first step: to operationalise it into “early action”, a shared level of willingness by political leaders would be crucial – as would reserving enough time in their agendas to think and act on tomorrow’s crises rather than being fully absorbed by ongoing ones. Decision-making must be sped up, and the actors to be involved at each decision stage must be thoroughly mapped out. To improve conflict prevention, participants also suggested improved coordination between the EU and Member States. EU Delegations could play a role here, as well as EU Special Representatives. A key objective of EU conflict prevention activities should be to improve the resilience of states and societies. “Resilience” should in this context be understood in a dynamic way, namely as the ability to change, react and adapt, which authoritarian regimes lack.

On the Common Security and Defence Policy, the EU’s key strength was identified as its combination of civilian and military capabilities, taking into account multiple aspects of conflicts. To ensure the EU’s credibility, however, it was recommended that the EU step up its capabilities, notably in Research and Development, collectively and through cooperative efforts. Finally, it was suggested that CSDP should also aim to contribute to rebuilding the trust of populations in legitimate local government actors as security providers.

Nathalie Tocci

Special Adviser to EU High Representative/Vice President of
the Commission Federica Mogherini and
Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

**A key objective of EU
conflict prevention
activities should
be to improve the
resilience of states
and societies.**



THE NEED FOR ECOSYSTEMS OF TRUSTED PARTNERS

The fourth edition of the Security Jam again brought together policy and security experts from around the world. It was a rich dialogue about a diverse set of topics – which is much needed as we are confronted with ever greater security challenges. The best way to deal with these is to have an inclusive dialogue, which is precisely the aim of the Security Jam.

Participants this year placed increased emphasis on building resilience of (critical) infrastructures, organisations and communities. The topic of resilience is rapidly rising on policymakers' agendas and urgently requires more strategic collaboration between governments and industry as the majority of the critical and cyber infrastructure is privately-owned and operated. Large military complexes also require active support from civilian contractors. Resilience is a topic that cuts across government and industry, thus requiring close collaboration.

In light of this, it was not encouraging to see a lower number of participants from industry. This may be for trivial reasons, but it could have more critical underlying reasons. Public-private dialogue on how to jointly tackle security issues seems to progress too slowly. Now more than ever – given the growing complexity and number of issues, there is a need for extensive

collaboration between government and industry, both large and small. Governments and industrial partners should aim to develop ecosystems of trusted partners in order to incorporate new technologies in solutions that can address current and future security concerns and produce tangible outcomes. The current governmental acquisition processes are antiquated and actually stand in the way of rapidly introducing new technologies in the primary security processes. While some defence forces are reaching out to industry to develop a more strategic relationship – beyond the normal transactions and thus requiring behavioural changes from the industrial side – the overall pace remains too slow.

The use of big data and open source information in decision-making processes is one such technological trend that builds on collaboration with industry. Large (curated) data sets combined with information from social media provide a rich source of insights, especially as new machine learning and deep-learning technologies become available. Such “cognitive technologies” understand context and learn from the interaction with experts to assist strategists and operators in complex decision-making based on a corpus of deep expertise. They are quickly making their way into military and security organisations, as this is a prime example of a sector where the cost of not knowing can be very high.

The current governmental acquisition processes are antiquated and actually stand in the way of rapidly introducing new technologies in the primary security processes.

Leendert van Bochoven

Global Lead for National Security and NATO, IBM

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STAYING AHEAD OF OUR ADVERSARIES

People are trying to take advantage of us. Some people – bad people – are operating among us in ways that are illegal, unjust and even dangerous. To put it bluntly, we are under attack. Our values are under assault. Our good will is being manipulated to our disadvantage. Despite the best efforts of many, we seem to be losing. Things seem to be getting worse. Why?

Immoral people – let's just call them “bad guys” – move in the shadows of our societies, our legal systems and our understanding. To stop them, we must shine a light in the darkness; we must be frank about our weaknesses; and we must learn about one another so that we can work together to thwart their criminal and terrorist designs.

We have three principle challenges: 1) the gaps in our capabilities to know and to act; 2) the seams between our security and military organisations – the “good guys”; and 3) the vulnerabilities inherent in how we operate. The 2016 Security Jam shed great light on all three of these work strands; on our gaps and on where we need to increase our strength; on our seams and on how we need to work across the divides that offer sanctuary to the bad guys; and on our vulnerabilities and on why we need to spend money on problems we didn't even know we had.

First, gaps in our security capability – to include areas in which our capacity is too limited – must be closed. Gaps can be closed through better training, more inclusive operational concepts or simply by increasing our collective understanding of how and where the bad guys are operating. Only after we've focused on training, operating and better understanding should we consider spending more, so that we spend wisely.

Second, seams between organisations offer conduits and channels to bad actors that enable them to slip past our defences and penetrate our security perimeter. As Jammers pointed out, sharing information widely, and expanding our understanding of security and spending holistically on defence AND security as a whole will enable a collective effort to seal the seams dividing the good guys.

Third, bad guys are very good at finding and exploiting our vulnerabilities. We need to work together to help one another spot these vulnerabilities. As Albert Einstein famously observed, "we can't solve a problem with the same mind that created it". Helping each other, therefore, is the surest way of finding those critical vulnerabilities exploited by the bad guys to do us harm. Once we've spotted each other's weak points, we can devise patterns of cooperation to cover for each other's shortcomings with the strengths available within a comprehensive approach. Integrating the EU's instruments is a good starting point, but to be

**This Jam report is a
fertile field of dreams
that could easily
and rapidly become
a concrete city of
security.**

successful and to sustain that success requires a more global – geographically and conceptually – approach.

The 2016 Security Jam is such a global approach. The top 10 recommendations, as well as the supporting ideas, are an excellent basis for taking our collective efforts forward. This Jam report is a fertile field of dreams that could easily and rapidly become a concrete city of security if we collectively take up the challenge which is already upon us. The United States European Command stands ready to partner with you to close our gaps, strengthen our seams and eliminate our vulnerabilities. Working together, sharing information and focusing on a truly comprehensive approach, we can all contribute to the fulfilment of the transatlantic vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace – and a Europe that carries its weight in a secure 21st century and beyond.

Want to work together? Contact me and let's get started.

I look forward to working with you!

Michael C. Ryan

Director, Interagency Partnering Headquarters,
United States European Command

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Hosted and moderated by
Kate Clark
 Country Director Afghanistan,
 Afghanistan Analysts Network

Despite genuine outreach from Kabul over peace-talks and American backing, it is extremely unlikely that there will be anything but continuing war this year in Afghanistan.

Eleven live chats – 45-minute “break-out” sessions with 45 participants – were hosted by partners from around the world. These in-depth discussions allowed Jammers to deep-dive into specific sub-topics, developing recommendations. The following summaries were written by the hosting partners and reflect their analyses of the discussions.

Prospects for war and peace in Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN ANALYSTS NETWORK (AAN)

Academics, NGOs, policymakers and others discussed prospects for war and peace in Afghanistan in 2016 in this live chat. The fast and furious conversation ranged from how the Taliban and other armed opposition groups and national forces are faring and the prospects for a negotiated end to the conflict. The discussion also touched upon the strength of Daesh in Afghanistan and the role of regional actors and of international forces and that of women.

Several contentious issues were debated, including the mobilisation of pro-government militias, Pakistan’s backing of the Taliban, and the stability of the National Unity Government and its preparedness and capability to defend the population from insurgents. Participants also looked at how crucial the support of international forces and funding was to the Afghan government.

Much of the chat focussed on whether a negotiated end to the war was possible. Could tribal leaders and elders help the peace process? Locally, yes, they could be important, if there was a national framework. Could peace talks be made more attractive to the Taliban? AAN argued that goodwill from Kabul had been met with no willingness to talk by the armed opposition.

AAN's assessment was that despite genuine outreach from Kabul over peace-talks and American backing, it is extremely unlikely that there will be anything but continuing war this year in Afghanistan. The Afghan government will have to work hard if it is to protect the population and bring the country together politically.

Geopolitics of cybersecurity cooperation

GATEWAY HOUSE: INDIAN COUNCIL ON GLOBAL RELATIONS

Hosted and moderated by
Sameer Patil
Fellow, National Security,
Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism at
Gateway House

Cybersecurity is an important issue defining the dynamics of current geopolitics. Since the 2014 Security Jam's discussions on the various dimensions of cybersecurity, cyberspace has witnessed landmark developments. These include the U.S.-China agreement on cyber-espionage, the effective use of social media by Daesh, an alleged cyberattack by Russia on Ukraine's power utilities, a phenomenal rise of digital black markets and a push for multi-stakeholder Internet governance at ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). These developments are an interesting combination of rivalry and cooperation, guided in essence by the geopolitical ambitions of major powers.

The live chat saw the participation of government officials, policy analysts, civil society and Jammers from around the world, and sparked some interesting remarks about the prospects of global cybersecurity cooperation and what kind of confidence-building measures (CBMs) could be adopted. One Jammer was pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation, seeing states as cooperating only when in their interest; geopolitical rivalries would hence always trump cooperation on cyber issues. Many others pointed out that we need to learn from other fields in which such cooperation has materialised. For instance, one

An agreement on critical infrastructure protection would go a long way in creating norms in cyberspace.

Jammer noted that even at the height of the Cold War, OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) countries agreed to share information on their military capabilities through the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. This sort of CBM could be the starting point for cooperation in cyberspace. Another Jammer observed that international cooperation for outlawing chemical weapons could be a useful guide for forging cyber-cooperation. Others emphasised that without an international monitoring organisation, no amount of cybersecurity cooperation would be effective.

Another important dimension Jammers discussed was the cyber capabilities of non-state actors such as the terrorist group Daesh. State actors will need to keep up with the advanced skills of these cyber saboteurs and non-state actors. Some Jammers stated that, although we have not yet experienced a real instance of cyber-terrorism, it is likely that very soon terrorists will look at cyberspace for more than recruitment and propaganda, and focus on kinetic attacks, aimed at critical infrastructure, by exploiting gaps in SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems.

The third important theme that dominated the discussion was bridging the concerns of different domestic stakeholders – government, military, business and civil society. Here, some noted the need for better coordination amongst these stakeholders and also a need to educate citizens about cyber threats as part of broader civic education.

Overall, Jammers pointed to the need for an initiative on global cybersecurity cooperation. In this context, Europe could possibly take the lead just as it has done through the European Convention on Cybercrime. For instance, an agreement on critical infrastructure protection would go a long way in creating norms in cyberspace.

The Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) phenomenon

HEDAYAH

Hosted and moderated by
Maqsoud Kruse
Executive Director
Hedayah

The Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) phenomenon is one of the most complex issues of recent years. The phenomenon per se is not a recent one in history: Individuals volunteering to fight in foreign battlefields are not a new trend, but the sheer number of those attracted to go to Syria and Iraq is astounding. The live chat attracted a number of relevant experts and focused on how to best design preventive programmes, aiming to share cross-sectorial views and find innovative solutions.

Preventive programmes should first identify the right interlocutors for radical or at-risk individuals. Several participants stressed the importance of religious leaders and family members as those able to better prevent radicalisation – and consequent departure – and to disseminate counter-narratives. Community-based programmes should, however, work in accordance with governmental strategies to ensure coordination and avoid duplication of efforts. The role of the media and their presentation of the problem also ought to be taken into account, as media narratives could be enhanced.

Much of the discussion revolved around the drivers of radicalisation; some stressed the “identity” element of the phenomenon, highlighting that recruiters are keen to use the lack of identity of certain individuals and purposely build a strong sense of group belonging. Any preventive programme should, therefore, work towards promoting a similar type of group pride.

To best design preventive programmes, success stories should be promoted as examples. In this

Recruiters are keen to use the lack of identity of certain individuals and purposely build a strong sense of group belonging.

context, Denmark's Aarhus model was mentioned as a good practice that could serve as a model for other countries. The need for a holistic approach towards the problem – noting that local contexts and differences must always be taken into account – was indeed highlighted as one of the top priorities.

Participants also assessed the difference between violent and non-violent extremism, wondering whether providing an open and controlled platform to peacefully express challenging ideas could actually work to decrease the number of those attracted to violent extremism. It was noted that there is often too much emphasis on the online element of radicalisation and not enough on the offline dimensions. Recruiters, in fact, tend to exploit personal networks and collective spaces to establish initial contact with individuals. Preventive efforts should, therefore, pay equal attention to online and offline recruitment.

Consequently, the discussion focused on UNSC Resolution 2178 and on whether there should be further inclusions in the concept of foreign terrorist fighters. It was particularly stressed that the resolution should talk more explicitly about those women who are increasingly recruited as integral members of terrorist groups. The problem particularly speaks to the lack of appropriate reintegration or de-radicalisation programmes for returning female fighters, as the current focus seems to be on child protection only. At the same time, women – especially mothers – should be integral parts of preventive programmes, given their unique position within families.

Finally, the integration of vulnerable individuals into mainstream society was recognised as a good practice to enhance community resilience.

Violence prevention and reduction: the nexus between drug policy, gun regulation and gendered approaches

IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE

Hosted and moderated by
Renata Avelar Giannini
Senior Researcher at the
Igarapé Institute

Despite the steady decline in homicide rates in most parts of the world in past years, homicidal violence remains one of the greatest threats to public security. In fact, the worldwide risk of murder is higher than that of violent death due to terrorism or war. About 9 in every 10 violent deaths around the world over the past decade were homicides. The aim of this live chat was, therefore, to discuss innovative approaches to lethal violence prevention and reduction through drug policy, gun regulation and gendered approaches. The challenges that tend to produce and escalate violence are cross cutting in nature, and participants underlined three agendas that could reduce the number of victims of lethal and other forms of violence around the world, especially in those countries with the highest rates of homicide.

First, participants highlighted that the dynamics and patterns affecting violence against women are very distinct from those affecting men. For instance, a significant proportion of homicides involving women are perpetrated in private spaces and by intimate partners. Men, in contrast, are more likely to be killed in public spaces as a consequence of altercations, in organised interactions between armed gangs and by security forces. Given such peculiarities, it was emphasised that, in order to be effective, policies aimed at reducing lethal violence must take into account the specific dynamics of violence against women.

Adopting strict gun laws would reduce firearm and ammunition stockpiles and the risk of deviation.

The second recommendation derived from the fact that, according to the Small Arms Survey, 60 percent of all violent deaths (homicides, suicides, extrajudicial killings) are committed with firearms, which represents 245,000 deaths annually. Participants underlined the importance of adopting responsible gun legislation to reduce lethal violence. Adopting strict gun laws would reduce firearm and ammunition stockpiles and the risk of deviation; decrease the possibility of guns and ammunition flowing to criminals; and mitigate situations where an escalation of violence aggravated by the presence of a firearm could lead a domestic conflict into a tragic outcome of death or serious injury.

The third aspect of the discussions related to the harmful consequences of the traditional repressive approach of drug control regimes. Jammers highlighted the necessity of moving from a prohibitionist and repressive paradigm to a health and human rights approach. The promotion of drug decriminalisation and responsible regulation was also evoked as an effective way of decreasing the economic and human costs of current drug policies.

Participants concluded by emphasising the transversal nature of these three agendas (drug policy, gun regulation and gender). It was pointed out that a sharp reduction in homicides and other forms of victimisation cannot be achieved without the promotion of efficient policies that take into account the impact of both the current drug policy approach and easy access to firearms in provoking and exacerbating different forms of violence, including violence against women.

European Security: with or without Russia?

THE INSTITUTE OF EUROPE OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES – IERAS

Hosted and moderated by
Professor Alexey Gromyko
Director, The Institute of Europe
of the Russian Academy
of Sciences

The discussion showed that the “without” option attracted no visible interest among experts. Participants, on the contrary, focused on key issues of reconciling and reorganising European security embracing the whole continent. Most attention focused on figuring out what should be done to restore confidence in Europe, and what mechanisms and instruments could relaunch dialogue between Russia and Western countries. The resumption of NATO-Russia Council meetings was seen positively although with cautious optimism in light of the forthcoming NATO Summit in Warsaw. In general, views varied including those who favour the tactic of “small steps” and those who stand for “big ideas” and break-through projects to repair the fabric of European security.

Notably, the question “who is threatening whom in Europe?” turned out to be purely rhetorical during the debate, and participants instead looked for ways to restore dialogue and confidence. The idea that the EU and NATO cannot build a Europe of stability and peace ignoring Russia was prominent in the discussion.

Another important thesis is that political cooperation is durable when coupled with strong economic ties. Russia and the West are separated by sanctions. A solution lies in dealing together with outstanding political issues, while liberating economic cooperation from the straightjacket of current political

**‘Second track’
diplomacy is of
utmost importance to
assist politicians and
diplomats.**

confrontation. Besides the moral, humanitarian and human rights shortcomings of sanctions, they are unacceptable because ineffective, while hurting all sides involved.

Any EU or NATO policy decisions, such as the new Global Strategy or Warsaw Summit, will not succeed in the long run if they do not take into account: a) the national interests of Russia and its concerns about regional and global security on the basis of common approaches towards international law; b) the necessity of pan-European reconciliation between different integration projects; and c) the risk of a further fragmentation of Europe, if its different parts continue to drift apart, while internal and external challenges pile up.

The small-steps approach, including the example of cooperation between the Russian and U.S. militaries in Syria, is useful tactically, in particular to forestall a further escalation of political and military tensions in Europe. It is, however, even more important to promote European strategic thinking and to restart deliberations on a pan-European hard- and soft-security system through the OSCE, the EU-Eurasian Economic Union dialogue, the NATO-Russia Council and EU–Russia political mechanisms. To this end, “second track” diplomacy is of utmost importance to assist politicians and diplomats.

The International Criminal Court and Africa

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (ISS) AFRICA

Hosted and moderated by
Ottilia Anna Maunganidze
Senior Researcher
Office of the Executive Director
Institute for Security Studies

African countries were integral to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and have historically supported accountability for international crimes. In recent years, however, this appears to have changed. For varying reasons, some traditional supporters of justice like Kenya and South Africa are now pushing back against the ICC. These and other trends have an impact on global justice and the quest for sustainable peace.

The live chat, with a range of stakeholders from government, the non-governmental sector and academia, unpacked the key issues of concern in the relationship between the ICC and Africa. The aim of the chat was to enhance understanding of the issues and offer constructive insights on how best to ensure continued support for international criminal justice. Issues raised during the chat included:

- The continued allegations by some African states and the African Union (AU) that the ICC is a neo-imperialist tool that “targets” Africa
- Ways in which the ICC can regain legitimacy and/or more constructively engage African governments
- Perceptions of the ICC by African citizens and reporting on the ICC by the media
- The role that the AU can play in re-establishing positive relations between African nations and the ICC
- The role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and other external actors such as the European Union (EU) in respect of international criminal justice, and the relationship between the ICC and Africa
- African efforts to ensure justice for international crimes through domestic and regional mechanisms

The ICC ought to have more direct contact with the AU, especially through the Office of the Legal Counsel.

It is generally accepted that the relationship between the ICC and the AU, as well as with individual African countries, needs to be reconstructed in a way that is not antagonistic and is more constructive. To do this, all entities ought to work towards seeking mutually agreeable solutions that do not undermine international justice. The main issues raised against the ICC related to its indictment of senior government officials (particularly heads of state) and its intervention in non-state disputes. The UNSC should ensure cooperation and compliance by states in cases that they have referred to the ICC. To avoid further allegations of neo-imperialism, the EU should allow the AU and the ICC to (re)build their relationship without interfering. The support that EU countries already show for the ICC is key and should remain strong.

For its part, the ICC should maintain its independence and ensure that its operations are above board, even in the face of great criticism. The ICC, through its registry and presidency, must also engage with states to foster its legitimacy. In addition, the ICC ought to have more direct contact with the AU, especially through the Office of the Legal Counsel.

Ultimately, critical and constructive engagement by all parties, including external actors such as the European Union, requires the recognition that when a system is not perfect, reframing it requires positive input. The role that the ICC, African states, the AU, the EU and other stakeholders can and should play is thus one of shaping a fair and just system of international justice in which they all play key roles.

Terrorism and radicalisation in West Africa

WATHI – THE WEST AFRICAN CITIZEN THINK TANK

Hosted and moderated by
Gilles Yabi
Founder of WATHI

Bennett Kelley-Bell
Intern at WATHI

West Africa has carried a heavy burden since the wars of the 1990s. Conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire were all very political and involved competition between numerous groups for control of power and resources in a changing regional and international context. The post-Cold War environment and increasing globalisation have made it easier for non-state groups to acquire significant means to perpetrate violence.

In more recent years, the bulk of conflicts and associated violence are related to Boko Haram, which has taken advantage of porous borders and weak governance to extend its reach to the neighbouring countries of the Lake Chad Basin; and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has used Mali as a base to launch waves of attacks throughout West Africa. In both cases, violence is associated with radical groups claiming a religious agenda. This has led to an increased interest in issues of violent extremism and radicalisation in West Africa.

It is important to look at particular situations and identify the key factors which together have created violence, namely the actors, their resources, and the context in which they operate. We must disaggregate our thinking and not treat all of these groups as a single actor. The history and conditions which have brought about Boko Haram in Nigeria are very different from those that brought about AQIM and its offshoots in the Sahel. There is no "one-size-fits-all approach". Each group must be viewed as an individual actor with its own grievances, leaders, ideological influences and even global context.

Isolated policies to prevent and counter radicalisation are less important than credible change in governance at all levels.

It is essential to distinguish between trends and analysis of terrorism and of religious radicalisation and tensions within and between religious communities. Many countries in the region experience confessional tensions, yet in only a few have these erupted into violence. Radicalisation – which has to be defined in a context-specific way – is only one of the factors which combine to facilitate terrorism. Radicalisation is the final push for marginalised youth to join terrorist organisations. West Africa cannot import Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) policies from abroad. Governments and Civil Society Organisations (CSO) must develop specific CVE programmes that fit within their individual political, cultural and historical contexts. And while tailored CVE policies can be helpful, what West African countries need most are institutional, political and economic reforms which transform the perception of the legitimacy and capacity of the state. Isolated policies to prevent and counter radicalisation are less important than credible change in governance at all levels.

There will always be some kind of “soft target” for terrorists to strike. Specific counter-terrorism actions are effective at handling short-term consequences, such as an ongoing or imminent attack. Regional military and security forces should continue training to deter and counter immediate and near-term threats. Governments must also effectively do their job, namely to administer resources for the mutual benefit of all citizens. Only when that happens will West Africa be rid of the scourges of terrorism and deadly violence, which are both equally harmful.

Inclusive security

WIIS – WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY BRUSSELS

Hosted and moderated by
Rosa Balfour
Senior Fellow Europe Programme
at the German Marshall Fund

Building stable and peaceful societies requires inclusive processes of negotiation and peace-making. Inclusive security means putting an end to practices that have allowed women to be ignored, silenced or abused. During the chat, participants discussed where we stand today on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and explored concrete ways to achieve inclusive security globally.

According to Ambassador Marriët Schuurman, Special Representative of NATO's Secretary General for Women, Peace and Security, "enduring leadership is the critical success factor needed to translate UNSCR 1325 into reality on the ground. If we aim to foster enduring, inclusive leadership, we need to demonstrate the relevance of inclusiveness for the security challenges we face today". Even today, more than 15 years after UNSCR 1325 was adopted, the number of women participating in peace talks (as mediators, negotiators, signatories or witnesses) is far from representative, and much remains to be done to "demonstrate the relevance of inclusiveness". It is not only about having "more women at the table", but about "giving them the chance to speak and to participate".

Delegating specific roles and functions on the basis of gender should not be part of the discussion of inclusiveness and equality. Rather, the goal should be a better understanding of how these roles and functions are used, for instance by the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, in their narratives to attract, radicalise and recruit women and girls. Applying a gender lens and ensuring equal participation will improve understanding and appropriate responses to the root causes and triggers of radicalisation and violent extremism.

Women are not to be perceived only as vulnerable and victims of armed conflict; they have a meaningful role to play in preventing conflict.

Similarly, stereotyping gender roles should be avoided. Women are not to be perceived only as vulnerable and victims of armed conflict; they have a meaningful role to play in preventing conflict, and need to actively participate in decision-making and negotiation. It was also suggested that more could be done to address male sexual violence in conflict.

Recommendations included:

1. Introduce diversity targets rather than quotas;
2. Ensure meaningful participation of women so they have a voice and are heard;
3. Bring men into debates about gender and women's participation;
4. Work with young women and men to build greater inclusiveness;
5. Make inclusive security a higher political priority;
6. Change narratives on femininity and masculinity, recognising women as part of the problem and the solution;
7. Transfer the experiences in stabilisation and reconstruction acquired in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq to other conflict areas, so as to include experience gained from women's participation.

Hosted and moderated by
Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini
 Co-Founder and Executive
 Director, International Civil
 Society Action Network (ICAN)
 on behalf of Women in
 International Security (WIIS)

Women's role in countering extremism

WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (WIIS) GLOBAL

Gender matters when addressing violent extremism, because the actors, the driving ideology and the actions of such groups are deeply gendered, as are the forces that challenge them and provide alternatives. The targeting of and impact on women is neither accidental nor "collateral damage". It is deliberate, tactical and



strategic. While the dominant voices and leaders of rising conservatism and extremism are male, women are both active and passive supporters of these ideologies. Interestingly, organisations that embrace discriminatory attitudes towards women are putting great effort into reaching out and co-opting women, while the secular states which claim to uphold women's rights tend to minimise and marginalise their fight for equality.

It is no surprise that women's rights movements across the world have been among the first to warn against and respond to the rise of extremism. Despite profound risks, many women are taking a stand to counter extremism, provide alternative visions and defend human rights. Just as extremist movements are locally rooted and globally connected, so too are women's movements.

Yet despite the range of policy commitments – including the UN’s Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism – that recognise and claim to support women’s organisations, three problems stand out. First, too many governments are using the countering violent extremism (CVE) agenda to shut down moderate dissent and target women’s NGOs. Second, the funding for such civil society groups remains limited. Third, women’s voices and perspectives are marginalised and excluded from the policymaking debate.

Major institutions claim to be doing research to prove the relevance of gender, when in fact the data already exists, and women’s organisations – nationally and internationally – have much expertise to share. If there is no viable independent space for constructive critique and dissent, radicalisation will flourish. Among the critical lessons that emerged from a gendered approach to addressing violent extremism were the following:

- a) It is not enough to focus on “violent” extremism. Extremist ideology that spreads into the mainstream provides space for violence to take root and become normalised. The gender lens is a very effective “early-warning” indicator of rising extremism, because the violence it condones is often either invisible or deemed to be “cultural”. It is the same phenomenon that spreads into society and becomes “terrorism” or “violent extremism”.
- b) The framing of this agenda as countering or preventing violent extremism (P/CVE) is too limited and ineffective. Extremist movements recruit on the basis of promising positive alternatives to people’s grievances. They also tap into the aspirations of youth and women. Simply being against them is not enough. The international community must articulate and stand by a set of values and principles that promote dignity,

rights, peace and pluralism as positive, non-violent and practical alternatives. Local actors are leading the way in this regard. The social and identity-based aspects of the extremism phenomenon must be reframed to include economic, security and governance issues.

Three key recommendations from this live-chat were:

1. All P/CVE related projects should commit to 50% women's participation, including practitioners and analysts.
2. Funding must be made available for women-led organisations active in communities affected by or at risk from extremism.
3. Governments should commit to protecting and enabling independent civil society organisations.

Youth, social media and radicalisation

YOUNG PROFESSIONALS IN FOREIGN POLICY (YPPF)

Current and future leaders in the field of foreign policy, defence and security participated in Young Professionals in Foreign Policy's live chat looking at the connection between youth, social media and radicalisation. YPPF volunteers and other Jammers from across the world had the opportunity to tackle one of the most politically volatile subjects the world is currently facing.

Discussions ranged from the role that young professionals, junior citizens and social media play in early-warning mechanisms; their involvement in decision-making on military engagement or conflict prevention; and the correlation between social media and the radicalisation of youth.

Hosted and moderated by
Katrina Murray
Executive Director of
YPPF Brussels

The anonymity of the Internet offers greater opportunity for women to become active within extremist and jihadist circles, in a way that may not be the case offline in their often traditional societies.

The correlation between social media and the radicalisation of youth turned out to be a particularly lively debate, with participants sharing their views on the phenomenon of the “lone wolf” who self-radicalises from behind his or her computer. This fed into the broader discussion on how extremist groups use social media as a strategic instrument and what governments can do to combat this. However, participants also insisted that youth radicalisation was not a new phenomenon, but that social media was simply a new way of delivering messages of extremism.


The role of women in radicalisation also came to the forefront, as there is growing evidence to suggest that the anonymity of the Internet offers greater opportunity for women to become active within extremist and jihadist circles, in a way that may not be the case offline in their often traditional societies. This was another example of social media being used not only as a propaganda tool, but as a mechanism to recruit of disenfranchised groups and individuals.

Inevitably, discussion also turned to the roots of radicalisation and Western involvement in the Muslim world, which has led to an “us versus them” mentality in some cases. Participants discussed whether governments could and should do more, and especially how, in order to counterbalance the rise of extremism through the Internet.


YPFP’s live chat concluded that, as digital natives, the current generation of young professionals had useful lessons to share on preventing youth radicalisation. YPFP’s recommendation to policymakers would be to create more forums for young people to share their views and perspectives on how to develop counter-narratives and better use technology to fight radicalisation.

STATISTICS

JAMMERS BY AGE




JAMMERS BY GENDER



JAMMERS BY AFFILIATION

Comparing the four Security Jams:


- Higher participation from international organisations, national governments and NGOs in 2016
- Lower participation from the European Union, the private sector and the military in 2016
- More Jammers conscious of confidentiality and registering without affiliation («Other») in 2016



EXPERTISE OF JAMMERS

Comparing the four Security Jams:

- Cyber did not feature among the top 10 expertise selected
- Cyber, interior security and security sector reform closely followed the top 10 expertise selected by Jammers.
- Jammers had significantly more experience in human rights and development than in 2014



Topic 1: Strategic foresight and earlier-warning
Topic 2: Global partnerships for conflict prevention
Topic 3: A regional security architecture for the Middle East

Topic 4: Foreign military engagement 2025
Topic 5: Policing 2025: Strategies against organised crime
Topic 6: Answers to radicalisation and violent extremism


TOP 3 MOST POPULAR TOPICS BY AFFILIATION




Noteworthy:

- Strategic foresight featured in the top 3 of all groups except for the media and EU representatives
- The military was almost solely interested in foreign engagement and strategic foresight
- Media and academia were most interested in Middle East security architecture
- EU representatives were the only ones with organised crime as part of their top 3
- NGO and EU representatives were most interested in countering violent extremism


TOP 3 MOST POPULAR TOPICS BY REGION



GENDER PARTICIPATION BY TOPIC



TOP 3 MOST POPULAR TOPICS BY GENDER




Noteworthy:

- Conflict prevention - while the most popular topic among men - was much less popular among women
- Strategic foresight, Middle East security and organised crime were equally popular
- Foreign military engagement was more popular among men, while countering violent extremism was more popular among women

Noteworthy:

- Organised crime only featured in the top three ranking of Africa and Latin America
- Europeans were most interested in Middle East security, while this topic did not feature in the top 3 of Asian, African or North American Jammers
- Jammers from the Middle East were most interested in radicalisation and in Middle East security architecture



VIP JAMMERS

VIP Jammers, like speakers at a conference, offered their insights and stimulated debate.



DAWOOD AZAMI

BBC World Service journalist, “40 under 40” European Young Leader



STÉPHANE DION

Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs



SEYED AZMAYESH

Iranian religious scholar and author of “New Researches on the Quran”



JORGE DOMEQC

Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA)



CARL BILDT

Former Swedish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trustee of Friends of Europe



MARY FITZGERALD

Libya Analyst and “40 under 40” European Young Leader



WIDED BOUCHAMAOU

2015 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and President of the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA)



ANA GOMES

Member of the European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and on the Subcommittee on Security and Defence



IAN BREMMER

President and Founder of Eurasia Group



ÉLISABETH GUIGOU

President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly, President of the Anna Lindh Foundation and Trustee of Friends of Europe



LOCK PIN CHEW

Director of the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Programme Office of Singapore’s National Security Coordinating Secretariat



PETER HULTQVIST

Swedish Minister of Defence



LUÍS DE ALMEIDA SAMPAIO

Portuguese Permanent Representative of Portugal to NATO



WOLFGANG ISCHINGER

Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and former German Ambassador to the U.S.



JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER

Former NATO Secretary General and Trustee of Friends of Europe



THORBjørn JAGLAND

Secretary General of the Council of Europe


ELIZABETH JOHNSTON

Executive Director of the European Forum for Urban Security


LEE LITZENBERGER

U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO


MARINA KALJURAND

Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs


JOANNE LIU

International President of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)


MARA E. KARLIN

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development


HERALDO MUÑOZ VALENZUELA

Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs


IRENE KHAN

Director General of the International Development Law Organization


ANNA NEISTAT

Senior Director for Research at Amnesty International


BERT KOENDERS

Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs


TRITA PARSI

President of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC)


GENERAL MIKHAIL KOSTARAKOS

Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (CEUMC)


MICHAEL PRINTZOS

Programme Director of The Hellenic Initiative


REAR ADMIRAL GIORGIO LAZIO

Chief of Staff Allied Maritime Command, NATO


DIDIER REYNDERS

Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs


JAMES A. LEWIS

Director and Senior Fellow of the Strategic Technologies Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)


RODRIGO RIVERA SALAZAR

Head of the Colombian Mission to the EU and former Colombian Minister of National Defence

**CARNE ROSS**

Executive Director of Independent Diplomat

**KATRIN SUDER**

German Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence

**MICHAEL ROTH**

German Minister of State for Europe

**ADAM THOMSON**

UK Permanent Representative to NATO

**MARIETJE SCHAAKE**

Member of the European Parliament, Vice-Chair of the Delegation for relations with the United States, Member of the Committee on International Trade

**HELI TIIRMAA-KLAAR**

Head of Cyber Policy Coordination at the European External Action Service (EEAS)

**MARRIËT SCHUURMAN**

NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security

**WALDEMAR VREY**

Deputy Special Representative for the Rule of Law at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

**JAMIE SHEA**

NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges

**CATHERINE WOOLLARD**

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The coalition partners gave the Jam its truly global nature, reaching out to their network of experts around the world.

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