7. Peace operations and conflict management

Overview

The year 2015 was a year of reviews for the United Nations: 70 years after the UN was founded; 67 years after the first UN peacekeeping operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was established; and 15 years after the Brahimi Report, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and the Millennium Development Goals. Three major reviews took place more or less simultaneously in 2015, with great potential for strengthening peace operations and tying the fragmented UN system more closely together: the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO), the Ten-year Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, and the Global Study on UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

At the same time, 2015 was a year of consolidation with regard to trends and developments in peace operations. Although there was no shortage of conflicts and crises, international efforts to resolve them rarely involved any new or significantly enhanced peace operations. The four relatively small, new missions were: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM); the European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali); the EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) (EUMAM RCA); and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM). There were also few terminations of missions (see section II). The three relatively small operations that terminated in 2015 were: the Security Council-mandated French Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire; the EU Military Operation in the CAR (EUFOR RCA); and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan.

The number of peace operations active during 2015 in comparison to 2014 declined slightly (by 2) to 61. With 162 703 personnel in the field, the total number of personnel deployed in peace operations in 2015 was slightly more (about 1000) than the previous year. This means that the fall in the total number of personnel deployed in peace operations that started in 2012 (due to the drawdown of ISAF) has come to an end, and that the increase in personnel in all peace operations (excluding ISAF and the RSM) is slowing down. The UN deployed 3336 more personnel in 2015 than in 2014. As such, it remained the primary actor in peace operations, deploying roughly one-third of all peace operations (20 out of 61) and 70 per cent of all personnel (113 660 out of 162 703) (see section I).
Several factors underlie this overall consolidation in peace operation trends. First, in a number of conflicts (geo)political obstacles, failing peace processes and/or the security environment continued to prohibit the establishment of new peace operations. Second, in those countries where the interests of great powers converged and the situation allowed for a peace operation to be deployed, one or more peace operations were often already being hosted. Third, in their conflict management efforts and in dealing with jihadist groups such as Islamic State and Boko Haram, international and regional actors relied on means other than peace operations—such as military interventions and direct or indirect support of local proxies.

It is hard to predict the direction of next year’s trends. A number of operations are on the list for drawdown, potentially decreasing the number of missions as well as the number of personnel deployed. However, this could be the calm before the storm, with difficult operations in Burundi, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen potentially on the horizon. In light of this, HIPPO’s review of UN peace operations, along with its recommendations and a call for change and essential strategic shifts, is increasingly relevant.

Following HIPPO’s review, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, presented his own report on how he intends to implement the recommendations. At the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping many of the recommendations were endorsed by UN member states and many countries came with unprecedented pledges. Yet what the future brings for the implementation of HIPPO’s recommendations remains to be seen. It certainly appears to have been a missed opportunity that, in the end, the three major review processes were not better tied together to allow for a more cross-cutting impact on the UN system.

Moreover, as the potential new mission areas are not the most stable and peaceful, clearer HIPPO recommendations on how UN peace operations should deal with situations where there is ‘no peace to keep’ or no political process to support would have been useful. In such circumstances it is often unclear who the parties to the conflict are, and peacekeepers face asymmetric and unconventional threats. As UN stabilization missions are becoming increasingly common, there is a need not only for caution but also for anticipating how to undertake them. And this need to further develop strategies to deal with the ‘exceptions to the rule’ has become increasingly urgent (see section III).

In spite of all the pledges and revived support for peace operations at the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, 2015 was also a year in which the UN’s reputation was seriously damaged and its efforts to strive for peace undermined by cover-up attempts regarding sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by French soldiers in Operation Sangaris in the CAR. The UN system for dealing with SEA, which has been established over the past few years, is clearly insufficient and HIPPO’s call for change is greatly needed in this area (see section IV).
I. Global trends in peace operations

TIMO SMIT

Multilateral peace operations in 2015

Various multilateral actors—the United Nations, regional organizations and alliances, and ad hoc coalitions of states—conducted 61 multilateral peace operations in 2015.¹ The number of peace operations decreased by two compared to 2014, as the four new missions in 2015 did not compensate for the six that terminated in 2014. The decrease, albeit slight, was the first since 2010 and reversed the upward trend in mission deployments of the previous three years. Nonetheless, the number of peace operations was still above average compared to other years in the 2006–15 period (see figure 7.1).

New peace operations and mission closures

Four peace operations began in 2015. The Resolute Support Mission (RSM), led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), replaced the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan at the start of the year. The European Union (EU) carried out two new peace operations in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) was formally launched on 15 January, and the EU Military Advisory Mission in the CAR (EUMAM RCA) replaced the EU Military Operation in the CAR (EUFOR RCA) on 15 March. Finally, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) succeeded the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) in South Sudan in December. Notably, 2015 was the first year since 2009 that the UN did not establish a new peace operation.

Three operations terminated during the year (but are still included in the total for 2015). France officially ended its Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire on 21 January. As noted above, the mandate of EUFOR RCA ended on 15 March. It handed over its tasks of securing the international airport and certain districts in Bangui to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA). Finally, the MVM in South Sudan, led

¹ The quantitative analysis draws on data collected by SIPRI to examine trends in peace operations. By definition, a peace operation must have the stated intention of: (a) serving as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place; (b) supporting a peace process; or (c) assisting conflict prevention or peacebuilding efforts. Good offices, fact-finding or electoral assistance missions, and missions comprising non-resident individuals or teams of negotiators are not included. Unilateral operations are included only when they are authorized by a UN Security Council resolution to provide support to another peace operation (see section V). All data is reviewed on a continual basis and adjusted when more accurate information becomes available. Therefore, the statistics in this chapter may not always fully correspond with previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook or the data in SIPRI’s Multilateral Peace Operations Database.
by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), transitioned into the CTSAMM in December 2015. Although the CTSAMM is in many ways a continuation of the MVM and maintains a similar structure, it no longer reports to IGAD but to a new body that was created to oversee the implementation of the August 2015 peace agreement on South Sudan (of which IGAD is a member among many other actors).

With four new peace operations and three mission closures, 2015 was a relatively calm year. In comparison, there were eight new missions in 2014, while six were brought to an end. The four missions launched in 2015 are described in more detail in section II.

Mission areas

The 61 multilateral peace operations that were active in 2015 were spread over 33 countries, 1 less country than in 2014. There were no deployments to new mission areas. All the new missions were deployed to countries that were already hosting one or more ongoing peace operations. The only change in 2015 compared to the previous year was in Sierra Leone. The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) concluded its mandate in 2014. More than half of all missions (33 of the 61) were located alongside two or more other peace operations in the same country. The countries that hosted three or more concurrent peace operations in 2015

Figure 7.1. Number of multilateral peace operations, by type of conducting organization, 2006–15

Israel/Palestine (including the Golan Heights), India/Pakistan (Kashmir) and South Sudan/Abyei are each treated as a single country/mission area.
were: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the CAR, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo, Mali, South Sudan/Abyei and Ukraine (see section V).

The deployment of several peace operations alongside each other in complex constellations seems almost to have become standard practice in recent years, as different actors have deployed separate operations to the same places, either at the same time or in sequence. This trend has been particularly obvious in Mali and the CAR. Indeed, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUMAM RCA were the sixth and eighth peace operations to have been established in Mali and the CAR respectively since 2013. These 14 missions were conducted by six separate actors.³

**Largest peace operations in 2015**

Although Africa is not host to the most armed conflicts or to the most violent ones, the five largest peace operations in 2015 were located in Africa.⁴ The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was the largest, with 22,126 personnel. This was the first time that AMISOM—or any mission led by the African Union (AU)—was the largest peace operation. The UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) dropped one place to become the second largest mission, with 19,543 personnel. The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) maintained its position as the third largest peace operation, with 18,518 personnel. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) completed the top five, with 13,822 and 12,879 personnel respectively. The RSM, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) also deployed more than 10,000 personnel in 2015 (see section V).

**The number of personnel deployed in peace operations**

The 61 missions active in 2015 together deployed 162,703 personnel.⁵ The total number of personnel deployed in peace operations in 2015 was only

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³ The six actors were: the African Union (AU), the Economic Communities of Central and West African States (ECCAS and ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the United Nations and France (in support of African-led and UN operations).
⁴ See also chapter 6, sections II and V, in this volume.
⁵ Figures on aggregate personnel are based on data as of 31 Dec. or, for missions that ended during the year, the date on which the mission terminated. The data on peace operation personnel provides a snapshot of the number of personnel in peace operations that were active in 2015 and is meant to serve as a reference point to enable comparative analysis between 2015 and previous years. The figures do not represent maximum or average numbers deployed, or the total number of personnel deployed during the year. Personnel figures exclude locally recruited staff, UN volunteers and subcontractors.
slightly higher than in previous year, when 63 peace operations deployed 162,052 people.

Changes in personnel deployments in 2015

The differences in the total number of personnel deployed in peace operations from year to year are the result of mission launches, mission closures and changes in ongoing missions. Peace operations terminating during the year do not necessarily have an immediate effect on the aggregate figures, as their personnel are still included in the total count for that year. They will, however, affect the total in the subsequent year. Nonetheless, as missions usually commence withdrawal well before their mandates end, personnel decreases within these missions during their final year can still be significant.

The launch of four new missions in 2015 had little effect on the aggregate number of personnel. The two new EU missions together deployed no more than 140 personnel. Meanwhile, the transition from ISAF to the RSM had little impact because the RSM maintained a strength similar to that of ISAF at the end of 2014, when the majority of NATO forces had already withdrawn from Afghanistan. Although the CTSAMM is supposed to become an expanded version of the MVM, by the end of 2015 it had only just started and had therefore not yet been enhanced. Of the missions that terminated
in 2014, only France’s Operation Serval in Mali and the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine, MISCA) fielded a substantial number of personnel (1600 and 6080 respectively). However, the end of MISCA had no significant impact on the number of personnel in 2015 as most of its personnel were incorporated into MINUSCA.\footnote{Operation Serval was incorporated into the new French regional counterterrorism operation, Barkhane. Unlike Serval, Operation Barkhane does not qualify as a peace operation.}

Several missions either increased or reduced significantly in strength during 2015. France not only ended Operation Licorne, but also withdrew 900 troops from Operation Sangaris to reinforce its 3500-strong counterterrorism operation, Operation Barkhane in the Sahel.\footnote{France has announced that Operation Sangaris will end after the elections in the CAR in early 2016.} Although these French forces based in Mali and forward-deployed in Côte d’Ivoire remain authorized by the UN Security Council to support the UN peacekeeping operations in those countries when necessary and on request, they are no longer counted as peace operation personnel due to the change in character of the operation.

EUFOR RCA withdrew 432 troops from the CAR before pulling out its remaining 313 forces after the end of its mandate. Meanwhile, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) expanded the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine by an additional 315 personnel. However, the largest personnel changes occurred within UN peacekeeping operations. The net effect of these changes was that the UN deployed 3336 more personnel in 2015 than in the previous year. Due to this increase (see below) the total number of personnel deployed in all multilateral peace operations was still slightly higher in 2015 than in 2014.

\textit{Trends in personnel deployments}

The slight increase in total personnel deployments in 2015 is a clear break with the trend of the past few years, halting the fall that began in 2012 due to the drawdown of ISAF. The number of personnel in all missions combined is back at approximately the same level as in 2006. In the intermediate period overall personnel deployments increased to more than 260 000 in 2010 and 2011. These dramatic changes resulted almost entirely from developments within ISAF, which was by far the largest operation in the world between mid 2006 and late 2014 (see figure 7.2).

Given ISAF’s major impact on the figures for the years 2006–13, and because it is debated whether it qualifies as a peace operation, it is useful to examine trends in the number of personnel deployed in all missions excluding ISAF. ISAF’s follow-up mission, the RSM, is also excluded from
the analysis to prevent what would seem to be a sudden major increase in personnel from 2014 to 2015, while in fact the number of NATO forces in Afghanistan hardly changed following the transition from ISAF to the RSM. Indeed, excluding the NATO forces in Afghanistan in the period 2006–15 reveals a notably different trend. The number of personnel in peace operations (excluding ISAF and the RSM) increased for the fourth consecutive year in 2015. In 2014 all peace operations excluding ISAF deployed 148,716 personnel, which was unprecedented at the time. In 2015 the number of personnel in all missions, excluding the RSM, deployed 149,798 personnel. This is not only a new record, but also nearly 20,000 more than in 2006. In other words, this trend of ever-increasing numbers of personnel in all other operations continued in 2015, albeit at a slower rate. This development was driven first and foremost by the continual growth in the number of personnel deployed in UN peace operations (see figure 7.2).

Whether this trend will continue remains to be seen. Several major peace operations are expected to downscale and possibly terminate in the near future. UN peacekeeping operations in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia are already in the process of withdrawing, while exit strategies are currently being discussed for the large UN missions in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Although the future of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan remains uncertain and initial plans for downscaling during 2015 were postponed, current plans still foresee a major reduction in RSM personnel by the end of 2016. Meanwhile, the large ongoing missions in the CAR, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan have either achieved or are approximating their authorized strength. This means that they may not build up much further in strength as they have done in previous years. Whether personnel deployments will fall or continue to grow in the coming years is therefore likely to depend on whether major new peace operations are established for the ongoing conflicts in Burundi, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen.

Organizations conducting peace operations

The UN remained the principal actor in 2015. It was responsible for roughly one-third of all peace operations (20 of the 61) and more than two-thirds of all personnel (113,660 out of 162,703). The number of personnel deployed in UN peace operations increased for the third year in a row—the UN deployed 3,336 more personnel in 2015 than in 2014 (see figure 7.2). As the UN did not establish any new missions during the year, this increase reflects the net outcome of changes within ongoing UN operations. Four UN missions were bolstered by significant additional deployments: MINUSCA by 3,938,

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8 These operations included UNAMID and special political missions.
MINUSMA by 2235, UNAMID by 1682 and UNMISS by 1571. Four other UN missions were significantly reduced: MONUSCO by 2382, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) by 2376, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) by 1144 and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) by 1042.

The AU retained its position as the second largest contributor of personnel to multilateral peace operations. It deployed 22,141 personnel in three missions, compared to 27,368 in four missions in 2014. Almost all the AU personnel were part of AMISOM. The other two missions were small political missions in Mali and the CAR. The AU authorized two new missions to Burundi during 2015—a group of human rights observers and military experts, and a protection and preventive force—but neither of them came into effect before the end of the year. The few AU observers that did deploy to Burundi could not initiate their mandate because the AU and the Burundian Government failed to agree on the terms of their mission (see section II).

NATO conducted two peace operations in 2015—the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the RSM—deploying 17,514 personnel. The RSM, which succeeded ISAF, was initially supposed to reduce its force and geographical footprint in Afghanistan towards the end of the year. However, the mission was kept at its original strength and in regional bases throughout the year, mainly because the United States Government postponed its scheduled withdrawal in the light of the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. As was the case with ISAF, the USA is the lead nation and principal contributor to the RSM.

The EU conducted 14 peace operations, 1 more than in 2014.10 The total number of personnel in these missions was 3231, compared to 3579 in the year before. The two largest EU-led peace operations were its two long-running missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo: the EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) and the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). Together they account for nearly half of all personnel in EU peace operations (47 per cent). Although the EU deployed most of its personnel in its European neighbourhood, it conducted most of its peace operations outside Europe. The EU conducted seven peace operations in Africa, two in the Middle East (Israel/Palestine) and one in Afghanistan. The deployment of a third CSDP mission in the Sahel region reflects the increasing importance the EU attaches to stability and resilience in its extended southern neighbourhood. The EU deployed 655 personnel in

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9 Whereas the increases in UN personnel in the CAR, Mali and South Sudan were part of a longer build-up process, UNAMID recovered from a sharp decrease in personnel during 2014, albeit not fully.

10 Not all EU CSDP missions qualify as peace operations. E.g. this chapter does not cover the naval operation established by the EU in 2015 to counter human trafficking across the Mediterranean Sea (the EU Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean, or EUNAVFOR MED). This operation is discussed in detail in chapter 11, section III, of this volume.
its missions in Mali and Niger—a fifth of all EU personnel in peace operations in 2015.

The OSCE conducted nine peace operations, the same number as in the previous year. Together, these missions comprised 1005 personnel. The expansion of the OSCE SMM in Ukraine, from 423 to 738 personnel, was the only notable change in 2015. The SMM is the largest mission that the OSCE has conducted since the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of 1998–99, and has nearly three times as many personnel as all the other ongoing OSCE missions combined.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the IGAD each conducted one peace operation in 2015. The remaining 10 peace operations were conducted by ad hoc non-standing coalitions of states. These 13 missions together accounted for 5152 personnel.

**Troop and police contributions**

Ethiopia was the largest troop contributor to multilateral peace operations for the second year in a row. By the end of 2015 Ethiopia deployed 12,659 military personnel in AMISOM and various UN peacekeeping operations (see figure 7.3). Ethiopia further strengthened its position as the main troop contributor in 2015 by deploying additional units to AMISOM and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). It is notable that Ethiopia deployed all but a few of its troops in peace operations in its neighbouring countries of Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.
The USA was the second largest contributor of troops to peace operations in 2015 with 8231 military personnel. It had been the largest troop contributor between 2006 and 2013, but dropped to fifth place in 2014 as a result of the drawdown of ISAF over the course of that year. The high position of the USA in 2015 is due to its increased number of troops in Afghanistan (ISAF/RSM) compared to the end of 2014, but it also makes sizable contributions to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula and KFOR. (It contributed only 41 military personnel to UN peace operations in 2015.) The other countries in the top 10 of troop contributors to multilateral peace operations are all African or South Asian states (see Figure 7.3).

Jordan consolidated its position as the largest police contributor to multilateral peace operations in 2015. It contributed 1531 police to various UN peace operations. Senegal was the second largest, contributing 1380 police personnel. Bangladesh dropped one position compared to 2014, contributing 1172 police personnel. Bangladesh had been the largest police contributor in 2013 (see figure 7.4).
II. Regional trends and developments

TIMO SMIT

Africa has generally been the continent where most peace operations have taken place in recent years (see figure 7.5). This was certainly the case in 2015. Of the 61 multilateral peace operations that were active during the year, 26 were located in African countries, including 6 missions with more than 10,000 personnel (see section V). Three of the four missions launched in 2015 were deployed to African countries. More than 80 per cent of all United Nations peace operation personnel (94,616 of the 113,660) were deployed in Africa. Together, peace operations in Africa comprised 119,945 personnel, which was approximately 75 per cent of the total number of peace operation personnel in 2015. The remaining 25 per cent (42,758 personnel) were deployed in 35 missions in the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Middle East (see table 7.1).

The spectacular increase in the number of personnel deployed in peace operations in Africa may well be the most important trend in 21st century peace operations so far. In 2000, the 10 peace operations in Africa deployed about 15,000 personnel. Since then personnel deployment in Africa has on average doubled every five years. All the other regions have experienced a general decline in personnel deployment in recent years, further widening the gap between Africa and the rest of the world (see figure 7.6).

Africa

There were 26 peace operations in Africa in 2015, 2 less than in 2014. Nonetheless, the number of personnel deployed in peace operations in Africa rose by 3 per cent, from 116,723 to 120,500. This is a relatively modest increase compared to the three preceding years, particularly given that a significant share of it resulted from an increase in the African Union (AU)/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID experienced a temporary dip in strength in the second half of 2014, from which it recovered during 2015 due to the deployment of 1,682 additional personnel. Thus, even in Africa there were signs of consolidation in 2015.

Given the large number of peace operations that were active in Africa this section discusses a selection of them under four cross-cutting themes: new peace operations, peace agreements, jihadist groups and asymmetric attacks against peace operations, and exit strategies; and provides a case study on Burundi.
Three of the four peace operations launched in 2015 were based in Africa. The European Union (EU) launched two new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions: the EU CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and the EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) (EUMAM RCA). In addition, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) was created in South Sudan to monitor the security provisions of a new peace agreement.

EUCAP Sahel Mali officially began implementing its mandate on 15 January 2015, although it had already partly deployed to Mali by then following its authorization in April 2014.¹ By the end of 2015 the mission consisted of 71 international staff. EUCAP Sahel Mali is a civilian mission mandated to support the Government of Mali with reforming its internal security forces (the police and gendarmerie). As such it fulfils a similar role to the EU CSDP mission in neighbouring Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), which deployed in 2012, and complements the efforts of the EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali), which has been training and advising the Malian Army since 2013.²

EUMAM RCA was established by the EU on 19 January and launched on 15 March. Although its launch coincided with the end of EUFOR RCA, it is a very different mission in terms of size and mandate. EUFOR RCA was a 750-strong military operation with a narrow mandate to secure and stabilize the airport and certain districts of Bangui, which the EU deployed to help facilitate the transition of the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) into the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), and to subsequently relieve the latter while it was building up its strength before handing over its tasks. By contrast, EUMAM RCA consists of approximately 70 military personnel and has an advisory role. It is mandated to advise the CAR armed forces on security sector reform, improving their professionalism and inclusiveness, and increasing democratic control over the military. At the same time, MINUSCA continued deployment to reach its authorized strength, which the UN Security Council increased by 750 military personnel, 280 police and 3


20 correction officers.\textsuperscript{5} The political and security situation remained volatile in the CAR in 2015, and deteriorated in September. In November 2015, a 250-strong detachment of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) quick reaction force deployed to Bangui to provide additional temporary support to the transitional authorities of the CAR during a visit by Pope Francis and the upcoming general elections.\textsuperscript{6}

The CTSAMM became effective in South Sudan in December 2015. It succeeded the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM), led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which had been monitoring the ceasefires between the Government of South Sudan and the armed opposition. The transition of the MVM into the CTSAMM was an outcome of the peace agreement concluded in August 2015. The CTSAMM reports to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). CTSAMM is therefore a new mission, even though IGAD retains a leading role as a member and the chair of the JMEC.

\textit{Peace agreements in Mali, South Sudan and Libya}

In Mali, the government signed a peace agreement with two coalitions of armed groups based in the north of the country in May and June 2015.\textsuperscript{7} Briefly thereafter the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mis-

\textsuperscript{7} The 2015 peace agreement in Mali is discussed at greater length in chapter 5 of this volume.
sion in Mali (MINUSMA) assumed additional responsibilities for supporting the implementation of the peace accord and monitoring the ceasefires on which it is based. The UN Security Council assigned 40 military observers to the mission for this purpose. Although MINUSMA did not report significant ceasefire violations during the remainder of the year, it continued to face regular asymmetric attacks by jihadist armed groups that are not part of the agreement.

In South Sudan, the government and opposition groups signed a peace agreement in August 2015, agreeing to share power in a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU) for a 30-month transition period. National elections will then determine the future governance of South Sudan. The peace agreement also established a permanent countrywide ceasefire and a set of transitional security arrangements for the demilitarization of the capital, Juba. While the August accord was welcomed as an important step forward in resolving a conflict that had raged since late 2013, there were many setbacks in its implementation. The TGONU was not established during the remainder of the year, while continued fighting and mutual ceasefire violations led to more displacements and continued insecurity. As a consequence, the number of internally displaced persons in UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) protection sites increased to approximately 200,000.

The peace deal had direct implications for the MVM and UNMISS. The MVM had been established a year earlier to observe the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of January 2014, which formed the basis for the permanent ceasefire in 2015. The peace agreement authorized a new mission, the CTSAMM, to succeed the MVM and monitor compliance with the new ceasefire and security arrangements. The transition of the MVM into the CTSAMM took place in December. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council expanded the UNMISS mandate to support the implementation of the peace agreement by, among other things, monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disarmament of non-state actors. UNMISS also continued to support the MVM, and later the CTSAMM, by providing protection for their monitoring teams and sites. In December, the Security Council increased the authorized strength of UNMISS by 1178 troops and police personnel, and

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9 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 17 Aug. 2015.
agreed to consider expanding its mandate in order to deter a further escalation of violence.\textsuperscript{13}

The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated the peace process in Libya, which eventually culminated in the conclusion of a Political Agreement on 17 December 2015. Among the signatories were representatives from Libya’s two rival governments: the internationally recognized General National Congress (GNC) and the House of Representatives (HoR). The GNC and the HoR agreed to form a Presidential Council, which will form a Government of National Accord (GNA). In October 2015 reports emerged of EU contingency plans for the possible deployment of a CSDP mission to Libya following the establishment of the GNA. Options reportedly include a civilian ceasefire-monitoring mission, support to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate militants, and—in case the ceasefire does not last—a more robust military operation.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Jihadist groups and asymmetric attacks against peace operations}

The continued presence and spread of jihadist organizations in Africa remained a cause of great concern to both local and international security actors. Several peace operations, most notably MINUSMA and AMISOM, continued to operate under the persistent threat of such groups.\textsuperscript{15}

In Mali, extremist groups targeted MINUSMA with rockets, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines, as well as occasional suicide attacks. A number of civilian UN personnel were also among the victims of attacks that took place in southern Mali, most notably in the central town of Sevaré and in the capital, Bamako. However, although MINUSMA suffered 12 fatalities during 2015 due to hostile acts—more than any other UN mission—this was considerably fewer than the 28 it suffered in 2014. This might suggest that the additional security measures implemented by MINUSMA to better protect its forces against asymmetric threats had some positive effect.\textsuperscript{16}

In Somalia, al-Shabab continued to stage successful attacks against AMISOM. It clearly demonstrated its continued ability to inflict mass casualties on the AU forces in two major attacks against AMISOM bases in June and September. Both attacks involved vehicle-born IEDs and more than 100 heavily armed militants. Although it has not been confirmed how many AU soldiers died in the assaults, claims by al-Shabab and witness accounts

\textsuperscript{15} The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, which is composed of forces from the countries of the Lake Chad Basin Community (LCBC) and Chad, does not qualify as a peace operation. It became operational in 2015 but did not secure explicit authorization from the UN Security Council.
suggest that dozens were killed. Nonetheless, AMISOM recovered significant territory from al-Shabab in a new ground offensive supported by combat aircraft and US drone strikes.

**Exit strategies**

Throughout 2015, several large and long-running peace operations in Africa were either in the process of withdrawing or developing exit strategies to enable drawdown in the near future. This section discusses the ongoing, pending or potential departure of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO) and UNAMID. Both France’s Operation Sangaris in the CAR and the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the DRC were also significantly reduced during the year, and are set to terminate in 2016. However, since these missions were relatively small they are not discussed.

In West Africa, UNMIL and UNOCI continued to downsize in 2015 in the light of the improving security situation in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. UNMIL resumed its phased withdrawal, which had previously been put on hold due to the Ebola crisis in 2014. The UN Security Council authorized a further reduction from 5465 to 1846 uniformed personnel by 30 June 2016, when UNMIL is scheduled to hand over its security tasks to the Liberian Government. After the peaceful October elections in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council decrease UNOCI’s military component from 5437 to 4000 troops by 31 March 2016. The Security Council is scheduled to review the continuing need for UN peacekeepers in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire later in the year.

In the DRC, MONUSCO began reducing its military component pursuant to the outcome of a strategic review in 2014 on the future role of the peacekeeping operation. The UN Security Council endorsed the recommendation to withdraw 2000 troops, made possible by the improved security situation in parts of the country and measures to make the force leaner but more efficient through the creation of rapidly deployable units. The DRC Government had requested a much larger reduction of 7000 by mid 2015, but the strategic review concluded that a reduction of more than 2000 troops would

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compromise MONUSCO’s ability to implement its mandate.\textsuperscript{22} However, in December 2015 the UN Secretary-General recommended that an additional reduction of 1700 would be feasible, and the resumption of consultations with the DRC on a gradual drawdown of MONUSCO.\textsuperscript{23}

In Darfur, UNAMID continued to struggle to implement its mandate, while negotiations on an exit strategy for the mission officially began in February 2015.\textsuperscript{24} The Government of Sudan has always resisted UNAMID’s presence and requested in November 2014 that it take concrete steps to implement an exit strategy. This followed accusations by the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, that the mission had become a liability and was supporting rebels rather than protecting civilians.\textsuperscript{25} However, by the end of 2015 a political solution to the conflict in Darfur still seemed out of reach, and an escalation of hostilities during the year resulted in the displacement of an additional 100,000 people. In the light of the deterioration in the security situation, the UN Security Council maintained the authorized strength of UNAMID at its current level when it renewed its mandate for another year. Meanwhile, the UN, the AU and the Government of Sudan could not agree on the terms and conditions for an exit strategy for the mission, which meant that the future of the mission remained uncertain throughout the year.\textsuperscript{26}

\textit{Case study: the crisis in Burundi}

In Burundi, the escalation of political violence in 2015 led to fears that the country might relapse into civil war. As security deteriorated and Burundi descended into chaos, several observers warned of the potential for mass atrocities reminiscent of the ethnic conflict that killed 300,000 Burundians between 1993 and 2005. Some went so far as to draw parallels with the run-up to the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda and the costs of inaction there.\textsuperscript{27} Although there were many calls for UN or AU peacekeepers, two attempts by the AU to deploy a mission to Burundi were unsuccessful before the turn of the year.

Popular unrest began in Burundi in April 2015 when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would run for a third term in the upcoming

\textsuperscript{25} ‘Sudan’s Bashir slams UN peacekeepers, demands they leave’, Reuters, 30 Nov. 2014.
\textsuperscript{27} ‘Burundi violence: Africa “will not allow genocide”’, Al Jazeera, 17 Dec. 2015.
elections. Violent demonstrations erupted in the capital, Bujumbura, in protest at Nkurunziza’s candidacy, which was criticized as being in breach of the 2005 Burundian Constitution. A failed coup in May led to heavy fighting in Bujumbura and set the tone for an increasingly repressive campaign by government forces and pro-government militias against all elements in society associated with the opposition. Violent confrontations between supporters of the ruling party and the opposition continued after Nkurunziza’s re-election on 21 July. By the end of the year, the unrest had killed at least 400 people, while an estimated 220,000 had sought refuge in other countries.

In December 2015, rebel attacks against different military sites in the capital resulted in the heaviest fighting seen in months, and at least 87 deaths. They also produced new allegations of gross violations of human rights by the Burundian security forces. Reports of indiscriminate and extrajudicial killings, overwhelmingly of Tutsi men, in the aftermath of the attacks aggravated fears of ethnic profiling by the government, especially as the violence thus far had not seemed to have a strong ethnic dimension.

The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided on 13 June to send observers and military experts to Burundi to monitor human rights and verify the disarmament of non-state armed groups. Deployment was supposed to commence on 8 July, but was postponed at the request of the Burundian Government until after the presidential elections. The mission was subsequently delayed further because the AU and Burundi could not agree on a memorandum of understanding on its modalities. By the end of 2015 there were only 10 AU observers in Burundi, of the 100 that had been authorized. In the continued absence of a memorandum of understanding, the mission remained on standby.

On 17 December, following the violent outbreak in Bujumbura, the AU PSC instead authorized the deployment of a 5000-strong force—the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU)—to prevent

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28 The disagreement is over whether Nkurunziza’s initial post-transitional term as president, for which he was not elected by universal direct suffrage but appointed by parliament, counts as one of the maximum two terms a Burundian president is constitutionally allowed to have. If it does not, that would allow him to run for a third term.


33 ‘Dispatches from the field: Meetings with the African Union and UN Special Representatives in Addis Ababa’, What’s in Blue, 23 Jan. 2015.
further escalation and protect civilians.\textsuperscript{34} It urged the Burundian Government to accept the deployment within 96 hours, or else it would recommend that the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government invoke Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. This provision allows the AU to intervene in member states without their prior consent in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The PSC also urged the UN Security Council to authorize the operation. The Council had already adopted a resolution on Burundi in November, but that had made no reference to the possible deployment of AU or UN peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{35} The Burundian Government rejected the deployment of MAPROBU and responded that any intervention without its permission would be regarded as a violation of its territorial integrity and would be met with armed resistance.\textsuperscript{36} In the end, the AU Assembly did not invoke Article 4(h) due to the opposition of several of its members.\textsuperscript{37} However, given the volatile situation in Burundi and the increasing pressure on its government to accept some form of international presence, it is not unlikely that MAPROBU, AU observers or possibly UN peacekeepers will deploy to Burundi in 2016.

The Americas

The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) were the only two peace operations in the Americas in 2015. Both missions have been running since 2004. MAPP/OEA, led by the Organization of American States (OAS), is a small mission of just 21 international staff, and the number of personnel has remained stable over many years. The overall trend in the region is therefore entirely determined by MINUSTAH.

MINUSTAH continued its gradual drawdown in 2015. In the past year its personnel decreased by 41 per cent to 5156. In October 2015 the UN Security Council extended the mandate of MINUSTAH for another year, while maintaining its personnel ceiling as authorized a year earlier. The Security Council will assess in 2016 whether security in Haiti, and the capacity of the national authorities to uphold it, continues to require the presence of UN peacekeepers, or whether it can consider their withdrawal.\textsuperscript{38}

Meanwhile, the peace process in Colombia between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Arma-
The Revolucionarias Colombianas, FARC) continued to make progress in 2015. On 23 September both sides agreed to set a deadline of six months to reach a final truce, by 23 March 2016.\(^{39}\)

## Asia and Oceania

There were seven peace operations in Asia and Oceania in 2015, the same number as in the previous year. By the end of the year these missions comprised 13 658 personnel, which is a decrease of 3 per cent from the end of the previous year. After significant fluctuations in previous years due to developments in ISAF, 2015 was the first year in many that deployments in the region remained relatively stable.

Three missions were located in Afghanistan: the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan); and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The other four missions were the long-running UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao, the Philippines; the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in South Korea; and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The RSM was by far the largest peace operation in the region, with 12,905 personnel. The only mission in Asia and Oceania that experienced a significant change in staff numbers was EUPOL Afghanistan, which had its personnel reduced from 235 to 154. EUPOL Afghanistan is scheduled to terminate in 2016.

### The Resolute Support Mission

The most notable development in the region in 2015 was the start of the NATO-led RSM in Afghanistan on 1 January. This was also the date on which the Afghan Government officially assumed full responsibility for security in the whole of Afghanistan, which remained extremely fragile after 13 years of international military intervention. The RSM’s role is to ‘train, advise and assist’ the Afghan security institutions and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) at the ministerial and corps levels. However, it was clear from the outset that the ANDSF still lacked a number of key capabilities, and that it would continue to rely on NATO and the United States for so-called critical enablers, including close air support in combat situations.\(^{40}\)

During the year it became increasingly apparent that the ANDSF cannot prevail against a resurgent Taliban without continued international support.


\(^{40}\) Smith, J., ‘NATO promises Afghans air support after 2014 as it shuts key base’, *Stars and Stripes*, 26 Oct. 2014.
By the end of the year the Taliban controlled more territory than at any other point since it was removed from power in 2001, and the death toll among the civilian population had exceeded that of all previous years since UNAMA began recording it in 2009. The emergence of armed groups claiming allegiance to Islamic State (IS) further exacerbated fears that a premature withdrawal of coalition forces would lead to a situation similar to that in Iraq following the withdrawal of US troops. In March, the US Government announced the postponement of its initial plans to withdraw approximately half of all US forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2015. US President Barack Obama subsequently announced in October that 5500 troops would remain in Afghanistan into 2017, reversing his earlier decision to end the mission by the end of 2016. This meant that the RSM could maintain its 13,000 troops and four regional command centres throughout 2015, instead of scaling down to a 5500-strong force based in Kabul, as originally planned.

Europe

There were 18 active peace operations on the European continent in 2015, the same number as in the previous year. The number of personnel in these missions was 9,644, which is an increase of 3 per cent. Except for the three missions that were established in 2014 in response to the conflict in Ukraine, the peace operations located in Europe have generally been active for many years. All but one mission—the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)—are deployed in countries that were once part of the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia.

There was no significant progress on resolving the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Despite repeated calls by the Ukrainian Government for UN or EU peacekeepers to be deployed to Ukraine, it was clear that neither option was feasible in the light of the political situation and the likely objection of Russia. The decision by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in March 2015 expanded the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine by doubling its authorized strength from 500 to 1000 international personnel was the most noteworthy development. By

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the end of the year the SMM had deployed 738 personnel, 315 more than in 2014. As a result, the OSCE SMM surpassed the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) as the largest civilian peace operation in Europe. The NATO-led military operation in Kosovo, Kosovo Force (KFOR), remained the largest peace operation in Europe by a large margin. All other missions maintained personnel levels that were approximately similar to the previous year.

**The Middle East**

There were eight peace operations in the Middle East during 2015, the same number as in the previous year. The number of peace operation personnel in the region also remained stable at 14,279, a minimal increase compared to 2014. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its personnel by 444 during the year. Except for the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), all the missions in the Middle East operate in the Levant.

Several missions in the Middle East were affected by the volatile security situation in many parts of the region and by increasing regional tensions. In January, a UNIFIL peacekeeper was killed by Israeli artillery amid a series of hostile exchanges and mutual retaliatory strikes between Israel and Hezbollah around the southern Lebanese border. Continued fighting and generally non-permissive security conditions in the area of separation between Israel and Syria prevented the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) from returning to its ordinary positions. In June, in the Sinai Peninsula, militants affiliated to IS fired rockets at an airbase operated by the MFOs.

The international efforts to address the conflicts in Syria and Iraq did not involve any peace operations. The Syrian war and the international efforts to degrade IS became increasingly internationalized during 2015, most notably through Russia’s involvement in Syria. Meanwhile, several European countries expanded their operations in the context of the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve, which aims to ‘degrade and destroy’ IS. In Yemen, an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched a military intervention, including air-strikes and ground forces, to counter the Houthi rebellion which escalated in 2015.

A positive development in 2015, which might pave the way for a future peace operation in Syria, was the progress made in the mediation of the Syrian conflict towards the end of the year. Following a breakthrough in

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46 ‘Israel admits its fire killed Spanish UN peacekeeper’, BBC News, 7 Apr. 2015.
48 ‘Sinai Province fires rockets towards airport used by multinational peacekeepers’, Reuters, 9 June 2015.
negotiations in October, the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution on Syria since the Syrian conflict began in 2011. In UN Security Council Resolution 2254 of 18 December, the Security Council agreed to initiate formal UN-facilitated peace talks between the Syrian Government and representatives of the opposition (not including IS and the al-Nusra Front) on a political transition process aimed at ending the war. The Security Council emphasized that a future ceasefire would require international monitoring and verification, thereby opening the door to the possibility of a future observer mission in Syria.49

III. A year of reviews

JAİR VAN DER LIJN

In 2015 United Nations peace operations were put under the microscope by several high-level reviews. In June, 15 years after the Brahimi Report, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which was established in October 2014 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, produced its report: *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People.*¹ Over the summer the UN Secretariat worked on the Secretary-General’s response and in September published the report entitled ‘The future of United Nations Peace Operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’.² These efforts to make UN peace operations fit for purpose culminated in the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping held during the General Assembly high-level week at the end of September, at which unprecedented pledges were made to support UN peace operations.

The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

In over 100 pages and more than 100 recommendations, the HIPPO report called for change. Although it recognized the many improvements in the field of peace operations made over the past decade, HIPPO flagged a wide range of ‘significant chronic challenges’, most notably increasing demands on operations in the absence of sufficient resources, insufficient unity of effort among the different parts of the UN system, too much use of template answers and too little attention on tailoring solutions to support political processes and strategies, and too much focus on technical and military approaches over prevention and mediation.³

A call for change

To achieve the required change, HIPPO called for four ‘essential shifts’ to prepare peace operations for the challenges ahead. First, ‘politics must drive

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the design and implementation of peace operations’. Current operations, such as the African Union (AU)/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) or the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), often seem to have been deployed without being embedded in a political strategy. HIPPO argued that politics should be at the centre of any peace operation. Second, ‘the full spectrum of United Nations peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground’. This is why HIPPO uses a broad definition of what constitutes a peace operation, beyond peacekeeping operations and special political missions:

a broad suite of tools managed by the United Nations Secretariat. Those instruments range from special envoys and mediators; political missions, including peacebuilding missions; regional preventive diplomacy offices; observation missions, including both ceasefire and electoral missions; to small, technical-specialist missions such as electoral support missions; multidisciplinary operations both large and small drawing on civilian, military and police personnel to support peace process implementation, and that have included even transitional authorities with governance functions; as well as advance missions for planning.4

Third, it called for a ‘stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership’. As the UN is not able and may not be the best positioned organization to take care of all peace operations, HIPPO emphasized the importance of partnerships with regional organizations. Finally, because peace operations have for too long been directed by the UN Secretariat and determined by international politics in the Security Council—which takes too little account of the needs of the local population, the ‘recipients’ of the peace—HIPPO stressed that UN peace operations must become ‘more field-focused’ and ‘more people-centred’.5

In addition to these four essential shifts, HIPPO emphasized ‘decisive and far-reaching change’ in four core fields of UN peace operations. First, conflict prevention and mediation should return to centre stage. Second, because there are high expectations on the UN to protect civilians, the capabilities to do so should be brought in line with these expectations. However, the tensions that can arise between the protection of civilians and supporting political solutions, and potential short-term and long-term trade-offs, were not dealt with.6 Third, many of the more recently established operations are active in hostile environments, and more clarity should be provided

4 United Nations, 17 June 2015 (note 1), p. 20. The HIPPO definition of UN peace operations is broader than the SIPRI definition of multilateral peace operations, which includes peacekeeping operations and most special political missions but excludes e.g. envoys and election monitoring missions. This makes the HIPPO definition less clear about what does not constitute a peace operation, and many of these tools are also implemented by e.g. individual countries.
on when, how and under what conditions they can use force. Finally, more attention should be given to sustaining peace through, among other things, strengthening inclusive economic growth, wider community involvement and women’s participation. HIPPO also made more detailed recommendations on partnerships, the use of force and a number of technical or institutional improvements.

**Partnerships**

HIPPO put major emphasis on the need for the UN to strengthen its cooperation and coordination with regional organizations. The UN is unable to act as a global police force in every conflict—a role that would anyway be seen by some as external interference. Therefore, HIPPO calls for a ‘global-regional partnership for peace and security’ in which the UN Security Council can ‘call upon a more resilient and capable network of actors in response to future threats’. 

The idea of peace operation partnerships is not new. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter has a similar vision for the relationship between the UN and regional organizations. The Prodi Report echoed the Charter with its call to strengthen global and regional partnerships. Governments in general like to work through regional organizations as they feel they have more influence and control over operations in a regional context. This feeling is particularly strong in Africa, where African ownership has been embraced not only by African leaders who hope to be in the driving seat, but also by non-African governments which hope, among other things, in the absence of interests, that they do not have to deal with problems on the continent. Consequently, cooperation between the UN, the European Union (EU) and the AU has greatly improved in recent years. It should also come as no surprise that the AU in particular embraced HIPPO’s call to strengthen the UN–AU strategic partnership and ‘on a case-by-case basis provide enabling support, including through more predictable financing, to African Union peace support operations when authorized by the Security Council, even as the African Union builds its own capacity and resources for that purpose’.

Although partnerships in Africa are likely to be the way forward, obstacles remain. Two further UN reports were published in 2015: on ‘transitions from the AU to the UN’ and on ‘partnership peacekeeping’.
has led to frequent operational problems and financial challenges due to the different organizational cultures and bureaucratic constraints. According to one analyst, cooperation in the hybrid AU/UN UNAMID set-up is ‘producing more “lessons learned” than “best practices”’. The transition from the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) also showed that the bridging operation approach will face many challenges.

The use of force

One of the reasons why HIPPO was established was to find solutions to the challenges many UN peace operations face when: (a) there is ‘no peace to keep’ or political process to support; (b) it is unclear who the parties to the conflict are; and (c) peacekeepers face asymmetric and unconventional threats. This was a challenging assignment and it is therefore not surprising that HIPPO was unable to provide complete solutions.

HIPPO was very clear in its recommendation that ‘United Nations troops should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations’. However, this did not take into account that UN peace operations can be the victims of terrorist acts, for example, the bombing of UN headquarters in Bagdad; may well face more asymmetric attacks in potential future deployments to Libya, Syria and Yemen; and are sometimes pulled into supporting military counterterrorism operations, for example, when MINUSMA provided security backup and medical support at the site of the Radisson Blue Hotel siege in Mali in November 2015.

HIPPO was less clear about the use of force in other cases. It was reluctant to support operations such as the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which is mandated to ‘degrade, neutral-
ize or defeat a designated enemy’. It cautioned that such mandates should be given only in exceptional cases, for a limited period and ‘with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the United Nations mission as a whole’. UN peacekeeping operations deployed in parallel with a force engaged in offensive combat operations were also advised to maintain a clear division of labour and distinct roles.\(^{18}\)

These recommendations are meant to placate those troop contributing countries that fear for the safety of their peacekeepers and those which hold on to the principles of peacekeeping—consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force. However, the operations established over the past decade have generally been deployed to ongoing conflicts—particularly the Force Intervention Brigade, MINUSMA and MINUSCA—and indicate that for the UN Security Council, stabilization is more the rule than an exception. Hence, there is a need not only to caution against, but also anticipate how to undertake stabilization missions.\(^{19}\)

Unfortunately, the formulations in HIPPO are similar to the formula used by the Security Council to overcome its internal disagreements over the mandates of the Force Intervention Brigade and MINUSCA: ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations’.\(^{20}\) The principles remain the rule, but there are exceptions in a growing number of cases, and increasingly the exceptions become the rule. Consequently, the need to further develop strategies for dealing with the ‘exceptions to the rule’ has only become more urgent.

**Technical solutions**

Perhaps the largest contribution of the HIPPO report is that the panel members, who are all insiders in the UN system, were able to highlight a set of technical and institutional recommendations that need to and can be implemented within the UN system.

Among the recommendations, HIPPO suggested ways to improve planning, establish a strategic analysis and planning capacity, and apply a two-stage mandating process in which the UN Secretary-General must prioritize tasks and stimulate better access to expert analysis and research. It endorsed the new strategic force generation approach, which it hoped would be better resourced and supported by stronger political efforts. It also focused attention on the fact that many policies already exist and simply need to be put into practice, such as improving the selection, preparation


and accountability of senior mission leaders, and appointing more women to senior leadership positions. Similarly, it underlined that because so many operations are deployed in insecure environments, ensuring that safety, security and crisis management systems as well as medical standards are at agreed levels is vital.²¹

HIPPO favoured more results-oriented budget preparation and oversight, and innovations in delivering mandates, through programmatic funding. As special political missions struggle due to insufficient funding and backstopping arrangements, HIPPO proposed a single ‘peace operations account’ to finance all peace operations and their related activities in future—as suggested by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in 2011.²²

It also highlighted a number of frustrations commonly heard from staff in the field, such as the need to enhance communication with both international audiences and host nations; to provide all the available technologies in the field to support missions; and to modernize and make UN administrative procedures more field-focused, particularly within human resources.²³

Reviewing the review

The HIPPO’s call for ‘essential shifts’ and ‘decisive and far-reaching changes’ sounds more revolutionary than it is in practice. Some analysts criticized it for being ‘technocratic’, others for missing ‘a compelling narrative that would persuade Member States to re-commit to peace operations with a passion’.²⁴ The Brahimi Report was frequently referred to as a landmark document that was much more revolutionary.²⁵ However, some analysts have called the HIPPO report ‘incisive and pragmatic’, believing that:

The report combines sound analysis of the current problems of peacekeeping with a comprehensive package of specific recommendations . . . In contrast to most prior UN reports, however, the panelists acknowledge that the main problems of peace operations lie with the political and budgetary jockeying of member states . . . The panelists don’t shy from recognizing the ‘root causes’ of the issues at hand, and governments from Washington to Khartoum to New Delhi are bound to find something to dislike . . . But it remains a good starting point—if UN member states adopt even half of its recommendations.²⁶

²¹ United Nations, 17 June 2015 (note 1).
²³ United Nations, 17 June 2015 (note 1).
In fact, just as a number of the more ambitious recommendations in the Brahimi Report are still awaiting implementation, some of the HIPPO recommendations are also likely to prove too utopian. For example, the call to move beyond reactive peacekeeping missions and marshal all of the UN’s tools in the struggle for peace is not new, and has been made since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Nonetheless, politics, interests and sovereignty have persistently blocked any progress on the issue of prevention. In addition, the need to have a standing peace operation capacity can be traced back to Article 43 of the UN Charter, but it has never been implemented as the cost and issues of control have deterred member states. Even HIPPO’s suggested rapid reaction ‘vanguard’ capability and rapidly deployable integrated headquarters for new missions—an ‘intriguing concept’, according to the UN Secretary-General—will probably be regarded as too ambitious.

The HIPPO’s call to shift from consulting with local people to actively including and engaging them in the work of operations is crucial for many reasons. Awareness of the need for a more field-focused and people-centred approach also goes back to earlier reports, but has so far been impossible to implement in practice. Multilateral actors seem to need recognizable counterparts and generally find these in government officials and the military. They lack the organizational ability to work with civil society, women’s groups and other non-state actors, which is a more complex constellation. Indeed, although the report advocates a people-centred approach, its focus is yet again on bureaucratic institutional fixes.

Would a more revolutionary report lead to more effective change? The lessons from the failure to implement many of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report suggest not. It might have satisfied more critical commentators on peace operations, but it would probably also have led to more resistance among member states and within the UN bureaucracy. For this reason, HIPPO appears to have adopted a more incrementalist approach—a strategy that seemed to have worked when the AU Peace and Security Council expressed its appreciation of the report. In the General Assembly too, many of the countries that participated in the debate on the report endorsed it either in part or in its entirety. Whether this turns out to be lip-service or leads to genuine progress remains to be seen. Perhaps the best that can be

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27 Einsiedel and Chandran (note 24).
30 Call (note 26).
hoped for is that the HIPPO report leads to a change in mindset at the UN and among the international community.34

The UN Secretary-General’s report

In his report on the implementation of the HIPPO recommendations, the UN Secretary-General focused on measures aimed at strengthening the capacities for prevention and mediation; reinforcing global-regional partnerships; tailoring peace operations; increasing the agility of field support; increasing the speed, capabilities and performance of the uniformed components of missions; addressing the safety and security of deployed personnel; and strengthening leadership and accountability.34

In so doing the Secretary-General adopted the broad HIPPO definition of peace operations: the ‘full spectrum’ of all ‘field-based peace and security operations mandated or endorsed by the Security Council and/or the General Assembly’, ranging from special envoys, to special political missions to peacekeeping operations. Like HIPPO, he embraced the need for a holistic approach combined with an understanding that the different instruments used in operations need to be tailored and appropriate to specific contexts. The Secretary-General also placed the political process at the centre of peace operations, and hopes to refocus on prevention and mediation, and to further strengthen regional partnerships. In addition, he accepted most of the recommendations related to planning and analysis.35

The Secretary-General touched on all the proposed shifts and changes, but the call to pay more attention to sustaining peace and changing the mindset that a peace process does not end with a ceasefire or elections was largely ignored. This important HIPPO insight has been subsumed into strengthening the capacities for prevention, and in particular strengthening the capacities of the UN country teams. Thus, the increased role for civil society and women advocated by HIPPO largely disappears from the Secretary-General’s report, and he only flags a ‘people-focused’ approach in his conclusions.36 Furthermore, he pays little attention to the use of force. Beyond protecting civilians, like HIPPO, the Secretary-General makes little progress on how operations that are active in more hostile environments might receive more clarity on when, how and under what conditions they should use force. He only states that:

34 United Nations (note 2).
35 United Nations (note 2).
a United Nations peace operation is not designed or equipped to impose political solutions through sustained use of force. It does not pursue military victory. As the Panel rightly recognizes, United Nations peace operations are not the appropriate tool for military counter-terrorism operations. They do deploy in violent and asymmetric threat environments, however, and must be capable of operating effectively and as safely as possible therein.\textsuperscript{37}

Finally, the Secretary-General ignored a number of the more technical HIPPO recommendations, such as the creation of a Deputy Secretary-General position responsible for peace and security, or the creation of a single ‘peace operations account’ to finance all peace operations and their related back-stopping activities in the future.

The Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping

Following the HIPPO report and the Secretary-General’s report, the Leader’s Summit on Peacekeeping was held on 28 September at the UN Headquarters in New York. In 2014 a similar event was convened by US Vice-President Joe Biden, leading to pledges to support UN peace operations from 31 member states. However, 2015’s summit, convened by US President Barack Obama, saw much higher-level participants and pledges from 49 member states and 3 regional organizations. These pledges were more than expected, totalling more than 40 000 troops and police, almost 40 utility and attack helicopters and 12 field hospitals.\textsuperscript{38}

Nonetheless, pledges are not contributions—and countries need to follow through on them and not hide behind caveats.\textsuperscript{39} The UN also needs to be able to absorb all the pledges, with some capability gaps being easier to fill than others. Thus, only time will tell how successful the summit really was in terms of force generation.

However, the summit was also important for a second reason: to potentially strengthen and further endorse the findings of the HIPPO report. The summit’s declaration made reference to a range of the more technical HIPPO recommendations, including improving human resource management and procurement practices, and enabling missions to deploy ‘more quickly, effectively and flexibly’. The importance of intelligence capabilities was stressed as a way to ensure the safety of UN personnel. It also endorsed more merit-based selection of capable and accountable leadership and further increasing the effectiveness of the UN bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} United Nations (note 2), pp. 4–5.
\textsuperscript{38} For an overview of the pledges see United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Leaders’ summit, 2015’, [n.d.].
\textsuperscript{39} Kromah, L. M., ‘Hopes high for new capacities after Obama’s peacekeeping summit’, Global Observatory, 5 Oct. 2015.
\textsuperscript{40} The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Declaration of Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping’, Press release, 28 Sep. 2015.
While the Secretary-General had given less attention to incorporating a gender perspective into UN operations, the summit’s declaration reinforced the need for this. It stressed proper conduct by UN peace operation personnel and the UN’s ‘zero tolerance’ of sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as the protection of civilians, including through the use of force consistent with an operation’s mandate and rules of engagement. The safety and security of UN peace operation personnel remained high on the agenda.\textsuperscript{41} The fact that the protection of civilians and the safety of UN personnel were combined almost in a single breath is particularly notable, because when the former fails it is often due to the prioritization of the latter.

With regard to the HIPPO report, the summit’s declaration particularly stressed the critical role of partnerships and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations; the notion that peace operations are essentially a means for supporting sustainable political solutions to armed conflicts; and the importance of conflict prevention and mediation, including through the use of good offices and special political missions.\textsuperscript{42}

**Conclusions**

That neither the UN member states nor the Secretary-General took the opportunity to combine the processes of the HIPPO, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the Global Study on Resolution 1325 to create a joint process for the implementation of the recommendations of these processes was a missed opportunity. In the absence of a formal process, it remains to be seen how much will really happen. The Secretary-General is approaching the end of his term, so a lot will depend on the willingness of his successor to implement many of the reforms, and on the interested member states to keep the implementation process and the spirit of HIPPO alive.

There is likely to be resistance from within the UN bureaucracy and, on some issues, from a number of member states. Moreover, the reforms will need to be financed or will require the restructuring of current financing and resources. If the relationship between the troop contributing countries and the police contributing countries, on the one hand, and the finance contributing countries, on the other, does not improve, and the former are not given more influence while at the same time being held more accountable, reform is unlikely to succeed.\textsuperscript{43} While there are many reasons not to be overly optimistic, some analysts are hopeful that the review might increase

\textsuperscript{41} The White House (note 40).
\textsuperscript{42} The White House (note 40).
} If it does, it will be as part of a larger process in which it delivers the next step forward in a long process.

IV. Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations

THERESA HÖGHAMMAR

Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in peace operations once again made headline news in 2015. Allegations of SEA of civilians by United Nations peacekeepers have repeatedly surfaced in the international media since the 1990s.\(^1\) The first cases emerged in the UN mission in Cambodia, and there have been allegations from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Timor-Leste.\(^2\) These allegations include rape, forced prostitution, ‘rape disguised as prostitution’, sexual abuse of children and paedophilia, trafficking and other forms of sexual violence.\(^3\) Allegations of SEA have been made against all types of UN peace operation personnel, both civilian and military.\(^4\) In spite of the bad publicity and international pressure to resolve the problem, there have been continued, frequent allegations. SEA is not limited to the UN, and personnel in multilateral peace operations deployed by other organizations, alliances and ad hoc coalitions have been similarly accused.\(^5\) In an attempt to better understand the problem, there have been a small number of theoretical studies on the power and gender implications of peace operations, as well as some larger statistical studies.\(^6\)

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1. The UN defines an allegation as ‘an unproven report of alleged misconduct, which may not necessarily lead to an investigation if there is insufficient information to warrant an investigation. Allegations are counted per individual, unless the number and/or identities of individuals have not been confirmed. In that case, allegations would be counted per incident’. United Nations, Conduct and Discipline Unit, ‘Statistics: Overview of statistics’.


3. In a case where rape has been disguised as prostitution, the perpetrator(s) rape the victim then leave money or food as a means of legitimizing the abuse as a consensual transaction.


Allegations against French forces in the Central African Republic

In 2015, reports emerged that French military personnel deployed in the UN Security Council mandated Operation Sangaris had been involved in transactional sex and the rape of children in the CAR. The manner in which the UN handled the affair put it under further pressure to implement strict measures to mitigate the situation and hold the perpetrators accountable.

French special forces were allegedly involved in the sexual exploitation of young boys at a camp for internally displaced persons. Boys aged 9–15 years were raped and suffered other forms of sexual abuse in exchange for food in the period December 2013 to June 2014. Although Operation Sangaris was not a UN peace operation, the UN was criticized for not dealing adequately or seriously with the case until the story was leaked to the media by a non-governmental organization (NGO) called AIDS-Free World. The NGO shared documents with the media, describing UN inaction on SEA in the CAR, together with the story of the UN official and ‘whistle-blower’, Anders Kompass, who was suspended after leaking internal reports about the allegations to the French authorities. Kompass was later asked to resign by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, but refused. The report describes the sexual abuse of 13 children by 16 peace operation personnel: 11 from France, part of Operation Sangaris; 3 from Chad; and 2 from Equatorial Guinea, part of the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA).

The French Government initiated an investigation, the results of which are still pending. Kompass was later exonerated of any breach of UN protocol.

After the story had been leaked, the UN Secretary-General commissioned an external independent review in June 2015 to assess the UN’s management of the allegations. The review detailed in its report that ‘information about the allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the

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7 Transactional sex is defined as a relationship that involves the exchange of money or material goods for sex. It is often differentiated from formal sex work because the individuals engaging in transactional sex do not always view themselves as sex workers.

8 In Dec. 2013 the UN Security Council authorized the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) backed by a French peacekeeping force (Operation Sangaris) to halt the spiralling violence that was threatening the country. See Van der Lijn, J., ‘New peace operations’, SIPRI Yearbook 2015.


11 Laville (note 10).
serious human rights violations’. The review also concluded that the UN’s overall response to the alleged cases of SEA in the CAR had been fragmented and bureaucratic. The UN agencies on the ground, such as the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), staff from the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), did not act in the victims’ interests. According to the report, ‘Staff became overly concerned with whether the allegations had been improperly “leaked” to French authorities, and focused on protocols rather than action’. Just after the report was released, seven new allegations of SEA were reported from the CAR, this time by MINUSCA personnel, creating even more pressure on the UN to address the violations and its inadequate response to them.

The relevance of sexual exploitation and abuse today

The allegations in the CAR were widely publicized, but SEA is more frequent than this case alone. According to the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), allegations of SEA were made against 480 personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions in 2008–13 (7 regarding special political missions and 473 about UN peacekeeping operations); 173 allegations (36 per cent) involved children, obviously a serious breach of the UN’s zero tolerance policy and the rights of children. The largest source of allegations of SEA in 2008–13 was the UN’s operations in the DRC (214 allegations, 45 per cent): the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and its predecessor the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). Half the allegations of SEA in 2008–13 involved military personnel. Civilians accounted for 17 per cent of all peacekeeping personnel, but a disproportionate 33 per cent of all SEA allegations in 2008–13. The police accounted for 11 per cent of peacekeeping personnel and 12 per cent of SEA allegations. The remaining 5 per cent involved unknown or unidentified alleged offenders.

According to the UN Secretary-General’s annual report on ‘special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse’, the number

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of allegations of SEA against all categories of personnel increased from 52 in 2014 to 69 in 2015. Of the allegations reported in 2015, 38 (55 per cent) originated from MINUSCA and MONUSCO. The remaining allegations came from eight different peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{17}

Apart from the fact that SEA is illegal and immoral, and that such incidents have a severely negative effect on the victims, the issue also has wider implications for peace operations and the UN as a whole. It affects the trust between the peace operation and the civilian population. Contemporary international peace operations are multidimensional, have mandates that go beyond purely military goals, encompass civilian and military personnel, and bring personnel closer to the local population, including women and children.\textsuperscript{18} In many current conflicts, sexual violence, rape, sexual slavery of women, girls and boys and the forced recruitment of child soldiers are part of the tactics of modern war.\textsuperscript{19} Recent studies indicate that there is a higher risk of allegations of SEA by peace operation personnel if the mission is placed in a hostile environment where sexual violence has been widespread during the conflict.\textsuperscript{20} The protection of civilians is a core obligation of the UN and such misconduct discredits the peace operation and the troop contributors, and ultimately undermines the UN’s credibility as a guarantor of international peace and security. It also violates international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), as well as undermining the promotion of gender equality and human rights at the international and local levels—values that the UN endorses.\textsuperscript{21}

UN action on sexual exploitation and abuse

As the UN has been the focus of much of the criticism in recent years, it has undertaken a number of reform processes and actions to prevent and mitigate SEA.\textsuperscript{22} In 2000, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 focused serious attention on the issue in policy circles for the first time.\textsuperscript{23} The resolution paved the way for a gender perspective to be incorporated into all UN peace

\textsuperscript{17} United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, A/70/729, 16 Feb. 2016.


\textsuperscript{20} Nordås and Rustad (note 6), p. 139.


\textsuperscript{22} For examples of the reforms see United Nations, Conduct and Discipline Unit, Evolution of initiatives to address sexual exploitation and abuse, [n.d.].

operations and for evaluation mechanisms to be put in place, bringing gender into the mainstream debate not only in peace operations but also in the broader peace, security and peacebuilding discourse. Continued allegations of SEA, however, gravely undermined the implementation of the resolution and the UN’s work in this field.  

The UN first addressed SEA as a separate issue in 2003, when the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, announced a policy of ‘zero tolerance’ of sexual exploitation in a bulletin outlining special measures for protecting against sexual exploitation and abuse. This zero-tolerance policy prohibits all forms of sexual activity and transactional sex with children, identified as persons under the age of 18. Furthermore, it strongly discourages, but does not prohibit, sexual relationships between UN staff and the host population, ‘since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics, [that] undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the United Nations’. In 2004 Annan appointed the Permanent Representative of Jordan, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussain, a former civilian peacekeeper who would later become High Commissioner for Human Rights (see above), to work on a report on how the UN should address and prevent SEA in UN peacekeeping operations. The so-called Zeid Report, published in 2005, was a significant step for the UN in acknowledging accusations against peacekeepers of sexual violence against civilians. It recommended the establishment and implementation of a comprehensive strategy to mitigate SEA by UN peacekeeping personnel, divided into three areas: prevention, enforcement and remedial action. It also highlighted the under-representation of women in peacekeeping.

In a major development, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) established a Conduct and Discipline Team to train peacekeepers on the new strategy and implementing it in the field, and on how to investigate allegations of SEA. The team later became the Conduct and Discipline Unit, which in 2006 started to collect data on SEA allegations and investigations—an important signal that the UN was taking the problem seriously. The Secretary-General started to report the data annually, and share information on the measures being taken to strengthen the organization’s response.

26 United Nations (note 25), section 3.2 (d).
29 Karim and Beardsley (note 2), p. 101. For the Secretary-General’s reports see United Nations, Conduct and Discipline Unit, Resources, ‘Documents’, [n.d.].
In 2007 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to ‘ensure that victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations staff and related personnel receive appropriate assistance and support in a timely manner’.  
In 2008 a revised Model Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated between the UN and troop contributing countries, which included specific provisions on SEA for the first time.  

**Sexual exploitation and abuse and the UN’s 2015 reviews**

Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations was an important topic in two of the major UN reviews published in 2015: the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report and the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Both reports contain recommendations on how to tackle the problem of SEA in peacekeeping operations.

**The HIPPO report and sexual exploitation and abuse**

In spite of the efforts described above, the HIPPO report concluded that there is a ‘culture of enforcement avoidance’ within peacekeeping operations with regard to ‘addressing abuse and enhancing accountability’. In addition, HIPPO emphasized that local communities are unaware of how to report incidents of misconduct by UN personnel or how any preventive work on sexual exploitation and abuse is being handled by missions. The report argued that the current system, where the UN Secretariat follows up allegations with member states regarding disciplinary and jurisdiction issues as well as prosecution of the alleged perpetrators, is weak. Questions to member states in cases of alleged SEA generally go unanswered. Responsibility for both prevention and enforcement is at the mission level and with UN Headquarters. All matters regarding allegations against military and police personnel are handled by national capitals, which makes a comprehensive overview of criminal cases difficult to achieve. Furthermore, there is no adequately resourced programme to provide assistance to individual victims or for a child that is born as a result of SEA.

To address some of the problems, HIPPO made a number of recommendations, including (a) establishing immediate response teams to ‘gather and preserve evidence of sexual exploitation and abuse for use in investigations’;

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(b) a six-month deadline for completing SEA investigations; (c) new enforcement sanctions, such as dismissal and repatriation of personnel without the possibility of further service within the UN system; (d) new reporting obligations on member states about the status of investigations of allegations of SEA; and (e) standard approaches for dealing with troop and police personnel contributions from countries with poor human rights records—and where forces are listed in the Secretary-General’s reports on violations against children and on conflict-related sexual violence, these governments should be barred from contributing troops to UN missions until they are delisted.\textsuperscript{34}

The HIPPO recommendations focused primarily on enforcement and remedial action. There were no preventive measures to mitigate SEA, even though this is part of the UN strategy to eliminate SEA.

\textit{The Global Study and sexual exploitation and abuse}

Just after the HIPPO report was launched, a review of the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda was published, written by an independent UN panel of experts.\textsuperscript{35} In the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, a section on ‘Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel’ reiterated and built on the HIPPO recommendations.

On ending the culture of impunity, the study stated that immunity from prosecution does not, and was never intended to, apply to UN personnel alleged to have committed SEA. In addition, countries that repeatedly fail to investigate and prosecute their soldiers should not be allowed to contribute troops to peace missions; there should be ‘naming and shaming’ for those states that fail to report, meaning that the UN Secretariat would name in a transparent manner the countries that fail to do so. Furthermore, ‘if the UN has prima facie evidence of misconduct, the home country of the alleged perpetrator should be under an obligation to prosecute. If they do not, they should be obligated to provide a detailed explanation of the reasons why’.

The study also suggested that an independent commission could conduct a broadly based investigation across the system on SEA and the handling of allegations by both member states and the UN. Other options included an international tribunal with jurisdiction to try all UN staff and all categories of peacekeeping personnel; or a hybrid court with jurisdiction shared between the UN, the host country and the troop contributing country.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} United Nations (note 33), p. 291.
\textsuperscript{36} United Nations (note 35).
In contrast to the HIPPO report, the study highlighted the importance of pre-deployment training on sexual violence and abuse in preventing SEA. It also noted that ‘not a single female peacekeeper has ever been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse’. A call for the deployment of female peacekeepers has been made in several policy documents as a way of empowering women and implementing gender perspectives in UN peace operations and in the military more generally. It is often argued this would have many positive side effects.

The UN Secretary-General's response

The most prominent feature of the UN Secretary-General’s 2015 report on ‘special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse’ is the new naming and shaming policy, which means that the report provides the nationalities of military and police personnel where allegations have been referred for investigation. This increases pressure on member states to hold perpetrators accountable and to conduct proper investigations into allegations of SEA. Furthermore, the Secretary-General derived a series of measures from his analysis of the High Level External Independent Review Panel on SEA by International Peacekeeping Forces in the CAR, which was submitted in December 2015.

One of the measures was the appointment of Jane Holl Lute as a special coordinator for improving the UN response to SEA. Additional measures include (a) the enhancement of pre-deployment education and human rights training; (b) expanding the vetting of all UN peacekeeping personnel to ensure that they do not have a history of sexual misconduct; (c) rapid and effective investigations; (d) boosting assistance to victims; and (e) financial accountability and the withholding of payments to alleged perpetrators. Furthermore, the Secretary-General called on the General Assembly and troop contributing countries to set up courts martial in host countries and to create a DNA register for all peace operation personnel.

37 United Nations (note 35).
Major obstacles to averting and dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse

In spite of the various reform processes, the UN continues to face a number of obstacles to developing a fully fledged and effective policy for tackling SEA.

The privileges and immunities of peace operation personnel

The first major obstacle is the privileges and immunities given to peace operation personnel. The UN takes disciplinary action against its civilian staff, and substantiated cases of criminal conduct can also be referred for prosecution, or directly prosecuted, by the national authorities of the host country. Troops are under the authority of their home state, however, and are thus subject to its exclusive criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction during the time they are deployed in the peacekeeping operation. The UN Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) stipulates that military personnel are legally immune from prosecution in the host country and, as such, the troop contributing country is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of alleged misconduct. It is therefore difficult for the UN to hold perpetrators accountable. Impunity for SEA crimes is often the outcome, which creates the perception that SEA is tolerated.

Organizational inertia

Another obstacle is the seeming organizational inertia of the UN in the face of allegations of SEA. An OIOS evaluation of the UN’s enforcement of its SEA policy criticizes the Investigations Division of the OIOS for excessively long delays in completing investigations into allegations of SEA, arguing that they undermine enforcement. It also emphasizes that assistance to victims has been affected by the slow investigation and enforcement process, as well as the lack of dedicated funding. In the past, efforts have been made by senior officers in UN peace operations, among others, to cover up incidents of SEA, and whistle-blowers have suffered reprisals for reporting cases. Recent policy developments, in particular a commitment by the Secretary-General to reduce the time taken to investigate allegations, are intended to address these issues.

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42 Burke (note 21), pp. 70–71; and Stern (note 28), p. 10.
45 Burke (note 21), p. 8.
The underreporting of sexual exploitation and abuse

The sensitive nature of SEA leads to underreporting. Many victims are uncomfortable about reporting sexual abuse, through fear of being stigmatized by their families and communities, or of retribution by the perpetrator. In addition, the post-conflict contexts in which peace operations take place are generally fragile, with weak or corrupt law-enforcement and justice systems. This provides little incentive for victims to come forward. Moreover, victims are often not in a position to report because of poverty, desperation and/or separation from their families. Vulnerable women and children may have to engage in ‘survival sex’ in order to obtain services, food, money or goods. In some cases this is their only source of income.

The masculinity of peace operations

A final obstacle is that, like military organizations, peace operations possess an underlying dynamic that appears to stimulate SEA. It has been suggested that attitudes to sex, culture, gender, masculinity and militarism are a contributory factor to SEA. A recent study established a link between the risk of SEA and the level of gender equality in the troop contributing country’s forces. It argues that higher levels of gender equality in a society reduce levels of abuse against women and thus a link between gender equality norms and the physical security of women.

Conclusions

All the independent panel reviews published in 2015 agree that the failure of the UN to hold perpetrators of SEA sufficiently accountable sends a signal that it is acceptable to commit such abuse. The legal system surrounding UN peace operations is designed to ensure that individuals deployed on peace operations are immune from prosecution by the host nation’s police and courts. These norms and rules on legal immunity for peace operation personnel have exacerbated the problem of lack of accountability for SEA, and the legal framework requires further reform. Suggestions for radical reform of the system, such as an international tribunal for peacekeeping personnel, have been blocked by states that do not want to delegate control of their troops.

The Secretary-General’s naming and shaming policy, developed after the scandals in the CAR, is not a direct UN solution but could indirectly act as a catalyst for member states to improve their prosecution and reporting rates. It was also a recommendation in both the HIPPO report and the Global

47 Burke (note 21), pp. 4–5.
Study. In addition, courts martial during missions and the creation of a DNA registry for personnel could act as effective deterrents and help to end the culture of impunity. However, they are unlikely to be welcomed by member states, which would lose control over their troops.

Increasing the number of female peacekeepers might have a positive effect, but adding women to insufficiently gender-balanced, gender-equal and gender-sensitive structures would not guarantee that these challenges would be effectively addressed. Therefore, training for peace operation personnel on gender equality, and what a gender perspective in a peace operation really means, needs to be further developed by the UN and troop contributing countries.

Nevertheless, significant policy developments to address sexual violence by peacekeepers were made in 2015, mainly as a result of the scandals in the CAR. These policies now require regular assessment and monitoring to ensure that they are actually achieving their aims—and there is further work to be done.
Table 7.2 provides data on the 61 multilateral peace operations that were conducted during 2015, including operations that were launched or terminated during the year. By definition, a peace operation must have the stated intention of (a) serving as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) supporting a peace process or (c) assisting conflict-prevention or peacebuilding efforts.

SIPRI follows the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-affected countries to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeeping tasks may include monitoring and observing ceasefire agreements; serving as confidence-building measures; protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assisting with the demobilization and reintegration processes; strengthening institutional capacities in the areas of the judiciary and the rule of law (including penal institutions), policing, and human rights; electoral support; and economic and social development. Table 7.2 does not include good offices, fact-finding or electoral assistance missions, nor does it include peace operations comprising non-resident individuals or teams of negotiators.

The table lists operations that were conducted under the authority of the UN, operations conducted by regional organizations and alliances, operations conducted by ad hoc (non-standing) coalitions of states, as well as unilateral operations that were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution. UN operations are divided into three subgroups: (a) observer and multidimensional peace operations run by the DPKO, (b) special political and peacebuilding missions, and (c) the joint African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

The table draws on the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>, which provides information on all UN and non-UN peace operations conducted since 2000, including location, dates of deployment and operation, mandate, participating countries, number of personnel, budgets and fatalities.
**Table 7.2. Multilateral peace operations, 2015**

Unless otherwise stated all figures are as of 31 Dec. 2015 or, in the case of operations that were terminated in 2015, the date of closure. Operations that were launched in 2015 are shown in bold type. Operations that closed in 2015 are shown in italic type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
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<th>Pol.</th>
<th>Civ</th>
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- = not applicable; . . = information not available; ( ) = SIPRI estimate; Mil. = military personnel (troops and military observers); Pol. = police; Civ. = international civilian personnel; AMISOM = AU Mission in Somalia; CAR = Central African Republic; CTSAMM = Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; ECOMIB = ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau; EUAM Ukraine = EU

(a) Figures for international civilian personnel are as of 31 July 2015.
(b) Figures for international civilian personnel may include police.
(c) Mission area is the Gukovo and Donetsk checkpoints.


Sources

Data on multilateral peace operations is obtained from the following categories of open source: (a) official information provided by the secretariat of the organization concerned; (b) information provided by operations themselves, either in official publications or in written responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires; and (c) information from national governments contributing to the operation under consideration. In some instances, SIPRI researchers may gather additional information on an operation from the conducting organizations or governments of participating states by means of telephone interviews and email correspondence. These primary sources are supplemented with a wide selection of publicly available secondary sources consisting of specialist journals, research reports, news agencies, and international, regional and local newspapers.