THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE IAEA AND WMD
NON-PROLIFERATION: UNITY OF APPROACH
AND CONTINUITY OF ACTION

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I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) Non-Proliferation Consortium has recently published papers on the EU and its role in promoting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This paper focuses on how the EU can best support the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and boost its effectiveness in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, building on substantial contributions that the EU has already made.

Non-proliferation is one of the functions of the IAEA—which is often described as the nuclear watchdog of the international community—but it is not the only one. A core task of the IAEA is to apply nuclear safeguards, defined in bilateral legal agreements between the IAEA and states, to ensure that nuclear material and activities are not used for military purposes. This provides key information that helps states to ensure countries’ compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the IAEA also helps countries to upgrade nuclear safety and security and to mobilize peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. In fact, the medium-term strategy for the IAEA during the period 2012–17 outlines a number of objectives to be pursued in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner: (a) to facilitate access to nuclear power, (b) to strengthen the promotion of nuclear science, technology and applications, (c) to improve nuclear safety and security, (d) to provide effective technical cooperation, (e) to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA’s safeguards and other verification activities, and (f) to

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SUMMARY

European Union (EU) institutions and member states need to develop a single paradigm to better work together in support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This should be possible even if the Lisbon and Euratom treaties are not merged. In light of this, it is time to review the European Security Strategy and the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both elaborated in 2003.

Important efforts have been made to improve cooperation between Euratom and the IAEA in recent years, including at the highest level. These efforts need to continue and need to fully engage the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU and its member states are also coming together more effectively within IAEA decision-making bodies in support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty process.

The review of the EEAS in 2013 should lead to a further strengthening of staff and other resources, both at the level of the EU delegation and at headquarters, to underpin this work. Similarly, before the next EU financial framework is set for 2014–20, it is time to review and optimize the financial instruments supporting non-proliferation work, both in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Euratom. The scope of this work is wider than commonly perceived, ranging from dedicated projects in support of nuclear security to development projects, including nuclear applications to be used in hospitals. Only with this broader approach can it be argued that the added value of the EU as a vehicle working for ‘multilateral effectiveness’, in the words of the European Security Strategy, has been properly realized.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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provide efficient and innovative management and strategic planning.\(^1\)

This has several implications and means that the EU and its member states relate to the IAEA in more than one way and in more than one context. They do so in the context of non-proliferation on the basis of the 2003 EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD Strategy) but also as an outflow of the much older European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) framework, with its links to the non-proliferation objective. \(^2\) Lina Grip’s paper ‘Mapping the European Union’s institutional actors related to WMD non-proliferation’ illustrates how a number of different services in EU institutions deal with nuclear and other WMD-related issues. \(^3\) Cooperation between the EU and the IAEA has developed into a highly complex relationship involving many different actors. It is important to look at the full picture when analysing how the EU can assist the IAEA to evolve in the area of non-proliferation. This paper puts forward the proposition that the EU could further enhance its effectiveness if it took a more comprehensive approach to its relationship with the IAEA.

One might have expected this to happen during the negotiation and adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, as an obvious remedy would have been to integrate the Euratom Treaty into the Lisbon Treaty framework. \(^4\) However, given the sensitivity of the Lisbon Treaty project, even without taking the nuclear energy issue into account, this did not happen. At present there seems to be no major political push among EU member states to integrate the two treaties at any time soon. What was originally conceived as a constituent part of the European Peace Project has been somewhat contaminated by domestic debates on the future of nuclear energy. Even if EU member states do not consolidate the two treaties, from a medium-term perspective a lot could be done to further enhance EU effectiveness in support of nuclear non-proliferation. The problem of different approaches to the future of nuclear energy within the EU should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle. It should be possible to agree among member states to continue the approach taken by both EU institutions and the IAEA that it is the sovereign choice of each country to decide its future in terms of nuclear energy and that it is the role of the IAEA supported by the EU to enable it to do so with the appropriate safeguards, safety and nuclear security provisions.

Enabling countries to use nuclear applications to fight cancer, treat water and so on is not only an aim in itself but also plays a role in the fight against proliferation. The EU cannot expect developing countries to show empathy for what some may perceive as objectives foreign to their interest, if the EU shows no empathy for their concerns in development-cooperation areas. The current emphasis being put on development issues by the new Director General of the IAEA is therefore not only worthwhile in itself, it is a political necessity in the non-proliferation context. \(^5\) Similarly, ongoing efforts to build support in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy are vital to the whole non-proliferation regime. The information circular of 30 November 2011 by the EU in the IAEA contains an overview of EU efforts in this broader context and is to be welcomed. \(^6\)

Despite its problems in dealing with the issue of nuclear energy internally, the EU has been able to engage in substantial programmes outside of its borders over the past decades, from assistance to Chernobyl in the 1980s to Fukushima recently. It is also important to keep the safety imperative in mind in non-crisis situations. For instance, the EU was engaged in political dialogue with some Asian countries on the need to strengthen the Asian nuclear safety network several years before the Fukushima nuclear accident. \(^7\) Fukushima—as often is the case in a crisis—tested the cooperation mechanisms in place and restored

\(^4\) The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, and entered into force on 1 January 1958. The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was signed at the same time and the two are therefore jointly known as the Treaties of Rome.
\(^6\) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ‘Communication dated 16 November 2011 received from the Delegation of the European Union to the International Organizations in Vienna on international cooperation by the European Union in support of peaceful uses of nuclear energy’, INFCIRC/830, 30 Nov. 2011.
\(^7\) See the Asian Nuclear Safety Network website, <http://www.ansn.org/>. 
nuclear safety as a key political priority. Chernobyl and Fukushima, however, also showed the difficulties in maintaining a sense of urgency after the immediate crisis period is over in order to prevent the next crisis.

II. UNITARY ACTOR

Developing a single paradigm for the EU’s relationship with the IAEA brings a number of challenges for the EU to project itself as a unitary actor towards the IAEA. Peter Van Ham has put forward one perspective on the wider context:

Surely, the EU’s greatest strength lies in the multilateral arena, where it can have a momentum-increasing and capacity-building role. This, however, can only be achieved if all the Member States are moving in the same direction, preferably with the same commitment. Still, the EU’s role in the WMD non-proliferation area has proven to be rather limited, and certainly less ambitious than the 2003 WMD Strategy envisaged. Although it has had plenty of time for reflection, the EU still has no idea what type of actor it is and what role it should play on the international stage. The notion of mainstreaming all aspects of EU affairs – from trade and aid, to diplomacy and defense – has proven difficult, and has failed until now. It is not even arranged well in the EU’s own External Action Service, where relationships between geographical and thematic issues (and hence “desks”) remain unclear and undecided.8

It can be debated whether van Ham overstates or correctly describes the situation. However, it is clear that the EU can do better. One part of this work relates to the formal implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in international organizations. This is indeed important but there is also the informal work of the EU in IAEA negotiations and political dialogues and the role of the EU as a donor and partner organization. The present author is convinced that the actual or potential influence of the EU interacting with the IAEA is underestimated.

If all the relevant EU actors contributed to a coherent EU approach to the IAEA, as best they could within the current treaty set-up, the EU would be able to play the role incumbent on it as both a partner to and an actor in the IAEA. A key factor in the evaluation of the role of the EU in the IAEA should be how the EU influences its decisions and how it can enable the IAEA to work in support of the goals set by the international community and indeed by the EU itself. Several positive observations can be made in this regard.

First, the relationship between Euratom and the IAEA has improved considerably over the years. The visit by IAEA Director General ElBaradei to Brussels and to European Commission President Barroso in May 2008 was a key event. It witnessed the broad scope of cooperation between the IAEA and the Commission in the form of a joint statement covering a number of important Directorate Generals (DGs), including energy, research, development and external relations.9 There is now a need to follow up this work with a more comprehensive visit by the current Director General, Amano, to Brussels, which would include the European External Action Service (EEAS) and cover the full scope of non-proliferation work in the EU. The IAEA has come a long way in its inter-institutional cooperation with the EU since the New Partnership Approach was signed between the Commission and the IAEA in 1992, focusing mainly on safeguards and related research areas.10

Second, the EU’s informal outreach has improved considerably over the past years, both at headquarters level and in Vienna with other regional groupings and strategic partners. In Vienna, the EU delegation is now able to work more systematically to promote political dialogue with third countries than was the case in the past with the rotating presidency’s six-monthly planning perspective. This can further improve if and when the EU delegation is staffed at the appropriate level (including, if possible, several negotiators at ambassadorial level) in order to fully take over the responsibility for this political dialogue for which there is an explicit Lisbon Treaty basis. At the latest, this

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should happen in the context of the EEAS review in 2013.

Third, several positive developments have also improved coordination between EU institutions and among EU member states. The coordination among member states and like-minded countries when voting in the IAEA decision-making bodies has become much better. This has manifested itself not least in the context of votes on highly political issues in the IAEA General Conference—the Middle East being a case in point. The EU delegation plays an essential role in this regard. In Vienna, member states have taken on the role of chef de file on important topics in support of the EU team. The EU delegation has also been somewhat reinforced in terms of staff with important expertise from member states. At headquarters level, the relevant working groups now have permanent chairs, a situation which has already considerably improved the synergy between the work of the ambassadors in Vienna and the working groups in Brussels.¹¹

However, this should not hide the fact that several necessary steps remain in order to promote unity of action. The level of ambition also needs to be defined realistically. It is a common mistake to believe that the Lisbon Treaty will mean the end of national diplomacy for EU member states in an organization such as the IAEA. The members of the IAEA Board of Governors are national representatives and so are the member states’ representatives in the General Conference, the highest decision-making body of the organization. Further, a number of competencies are not conferred to the EU but nevertheless remain as national competencies.

Helpfully, one EU delegation represents both the EU and Euratom in Vienna. Although more efforts need to be deployed at the headquarters level in order to develop an inter-service cooperation covering the entire scope of the nuclear agenda. The EU Council Secretariat, through its creation of a WMD Centre, has made important efforts to this end with representation from the Commission in the past. Within the Commission there have also been inter-service groups involving many DGs. Further work along these lines will be important in order to maintain and strengthen the strategic overview. For this to work, it is essential to properly staff the current two DGs in the EEAS that are dealing with nuclear security issues under the new

Managing Director for Global and Multilateral Issues.

Key to updating the WMD-related strategies in the EU in a holistic way is having a strategic approach in Brussels at the level of the relevant working groups and in the Political and Security Committee, as well as keeping the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) aware of developments.

In this regard, an important goal should be to further increase the sense of ownership of various strands of EU action among EU ambassadors, including in Vienna. Member states’ ambassadors should not only be enabled by their capitals and through information from Brussels to show an interest in Council decisions which have been important, for instance, in underpinning IAEA work in the area of nuclear security or, for that matter, regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). It would be equally useful and important to see early member state input on the priorities related to the Instrument for Stability (IFS), with its long-term part dealing with non-proliferation issues, where programming documents are scrutinized in a dedicated management committee in Brussels. This could be done without changing the current comitology. An opportunity to do this will arise in the context of the debate on the next EU financial perspective.

This does not mean that the further implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of representation in the decision-making bodies in the IAEA, the Board of Governors and the General Conference is less important. However, it does mean that difficulties in moving forward in this domain should not be an excuse for inaction in the areas mentioned above.

The issue of the formal implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the Vienna context is clearly a difficult one, which will require attention at the highest level in capitals. If the ‘non-decision’ is taken—not to go forward in harmonizing the Euratom Treaty with the Lisbon Treaty—the EU will have to decide whether it will also promote unity of representation at the political level. This is not just a legal issue, but it is also a clearly political one. The EU High Representative mainly works with foreign ministers but could also be authorized to speak on behalf on Euratom as First Vice President of the Commission. The Energy Commissioner, who works mainly with energy ministers in the EU, has another line of command. Could member states accept that he (or in the future she) also speaks on behalf of the EU, noting that his US counterpart, the Secretary of Energy, is typically

¹¹ This assessment is based on the present author’s personal experience.
the US Head of Delegation during the IAEA General Conference? Further, would any EU institutional representative at ministerial level be ready to prioritize presence in Vienna during the General Conference, which takes place at the same time as the UN General Assembly high-level segment in New York every year? This would be a prerequisite for the EU being able to speak early on in the General Conference, among the speakers for other regional groups.

Assuming that no solution allowing unitary representation of the EU could be found, would it then be possible for the EU and Euratom to continue to speak separately as is now the case? At the moment this is done through the country holding the rotating presidency of the EU and, for Euratom, normally through a deputy director general in DG Energy. Could this be done from one single seat, changing nameplates with the speaker? Or would two observer seats be necessary, a request which no doubt would be highly complicated to get approval for from the whole IAEA membership? The current legal situation is that Euratom, represented by the Commission and locally by the EU delegation, has a standing invitation to the General Conference and is invited to speak as an observer very late on in the proceedings. In the Board of Governors there is no permanent observer seat, rather it has to be arranged for each meeting. The EU as such has no formal relationship with the IAEA beyond being a regional group that regularly consults with the Chairman of the Board of Governors, the President of the General Conference and, of course, with the Director General of the IAEA.

The formal status of the EU highly undervalues its importance. In fact, it even underestimates the status of Euratom that, for instance, is a full signatory to the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Changing the formal status of the EU is, however, easier said than done. Several regional entities, including the Arab Group, are looking to enhance their status in the UN system and are following EU actions very closely. Although it may be argued that the case of the EU is special, there is a limit to what can be accepted internationally. This was clearly seen in the process of lobbying for the resolution in the General Assembly after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.\footnote{On 3 May 2011 the UN member states voted to grant the EU the right to speak with one voice in the General Assembly. United Nations, General Assembly, ‘General Assembly, in recorded vote, adopts resolution granting European Union right of reply, ability to present oral such a resolution turned into a very resource- and time-consuming process, requiring the personal involvement of the High Representative in New York.}

In addition, extensive deliberations were necessary within the EU, in particular among member states, in order to define the EU position. This also turned out to be a very complicated process. Once a successful agreement was reached in the General Assembly, it turned out that the validity of the agreement was essentially limited to that particular forum.

The situation in the IAEA is in many respects more complicated than in the UN General Assembly. What is being discussed in the IAEA Board of Governors may, to a certain extent, be technical but it touches on key aspects of the sovereignty and security of EU member states, two of which are permanent members of the UN Security Council and nuclear weapon states.

III. CONTINUITY

The EU faces a further set of challenges in terms of continuity. As the NPT regime is a process requiring constant attention and nurturing, with new initiatives and efforts at all levels, how can the EU do better to promote this process?

Again, this is a timely question in view of the upcoming debate on the EU’s financial perspective for 2014–20 and the instruments related to nuclear issues to be included in it. Here it can be noted that a shift in focus took place in the allocation of resources during the last financial perspective.\footnote{Whereas the Group of Eight Global Partnership initiative (Kananaskis 2002) required large investments from the Commission related to the former Soviet Union, a more global view was attempted when programming for the long-term component of the IFS for the period 2007–2013.} This discussion will be even more important for the period 2014–20 and working with the IAEA could provide important input for a global perspective on issues that have previously been mainly dealt with in a regional context.

\footnote{Report on the G8 Global Partnership 2010, Muskoka, 26 June 2010.}
Another relevant process is the review of the EEAS mentioned above, which is foreseen for 2013. At headquarters level there will be a need to look at the emphasis, in terms of staffing and structures, placed on multilateral work and thematic work related to nuclear issues. So far it seems that the pre-eminent organizing principle in the EEAS remains geographic, with thematic and multilateral services in more of a supporting role. At the same time, the notion of multilateral effectiveness in the European Security Strategy, and as recently put forward by the High Representative in the UN Security Council, indicates a higher level of ambition and a capability to act both in bilateral and multilateral contexts simultaneously.

Closely related to this is the ongoing process of implementing the Lisbon Treaty in international organizations, as mentioned in the IAEA context. As noted above, experience of working with the resolution in the UN General Assembly shows that it is a medium- to long-term effort. A recent compromise on how to deal with EU statements in international organizations will hopefully help—the question being whether statements should be delivered in the name of the EU only or on behalf of the EU and its member states, depending on whether national competencies are involved. It is very important to note in that compromise language that the objective of the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU in its work in international organizations is put at the forefront.

In the IAEA context, it is also clear that the EU needs to further enhance continuity in its strategy to influence the outcome of important decisions in IAEA decision-making bodies—and this does not just mean demarches at the capital level. More intensive political dialogue at the Vienna delegation level has been underway with like-minded countries for several years, requiring considerable staff resources in the EU delegation. EU member states often do not realize that political dialogue at the Vienna delegation level has been underway with like-minded countries for several years, requiring considerable staff resources in the EU delegation.

Group, are very well organized and that the delegations from countries such as the USA and Russia are staffed at a far higher level than the EU delegation. The level of ambition for the EU delegation must be set higher, in order to enable it to contribute to policy development at headquarters level and to fully match the work of the US and Russian delegations. There are some reasons for cautious optimism in terms of the willingness of EU member states to contribute to such a situation in the medium term. For example, the size of national delegations is being reduced and ambassadors from member states are being increasingly accredited not only to all the international organizations in Vienna but also bilaterally to Austria and neighbouring states. This means that it will be increasingly important for member states to have, or to have had, nationals within the EU delegation in order to be aware of how the EEAS works from the inside.

A current focus of the work in Vienna is towards a 2012 conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Such a conference would be a positive follow-on step from the successful NPT Review Conference that took place in 2010, but also a difficult and labour-intensive process in Vienna. For example, the EU team at ambassadorial level (the Ambassador of Belgium during the Belgian presidency and the Head of the EU Delegation) met with over 60 ambassadors and heads of delegation ahead of the UN General Conference in 2010. The upcoming NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, due to take place in Vienna on 30 April–11 May 2012, is another example of a positive follow-on step.

Another direction being taken is the inter-institutional cooperative framework between the EU and the IAEA itself, so far mainly defined in the Euratom context under the New Partnership Approach agreed in 1992. Regular meetings are being held in Luxembourg, Brussels and Vienna, both high-level meetings between the Head of Euratom and the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and lower-level, more frequent meetings between directors and heads of unit. Cooperation is also intensive in the area of research, not least on the basis of the Euratom framework programme for nuclear research and training.

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18 The present author acted as EU head of delegation in this context.

19 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INFCIRC/193 (note 10).

Importantly, the new Director General of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has a Euratom background. This is valuable given the role of the JRC, for instance, in dealing with the stress tests of nuclear reactors in the EU after Fukushima and for the overall EU ambition to stay on top of technological developments in the nuclear sector in terms of safeguards, safety and security.

The challenges for continuity in the IAEA’s work also need to take into account the trend of more countries acquiring nuclear energy—a trend which is likely to continue, even if the opposite might also be the case in some, primarily European, countries. In recent years 58 IAEA states have indicated that they are considering the introduction of nuclear power. The importance of the IAEA will, therefore, increase over the coming years, even excluding the current high level of attention given to the IAEA’s work related to, for instance, Iran. A continuous stream of political messages from the EU, from the highest political level, and appropriate level attendance at the General Conference will be necessary.

The IAEA will be expected to assist countries in introducing the necessary nuclear safety infrastructure and the IAEA Secretariat will be tasked with safeguarding new facilities and assuring their security against the theft of nuclear materials for possible terrorist purposes. This has been one of the main justifications for the Secretariat’s request to increase the operational budget to the IAEA over the past few years. As a former EU Ambassador to Vienna, the present author can testify that there is a lot of goodwill among EU staff there. They are in favour of promoting a stronger and more efficient EU contribution to the work of the IAEA and, in particular, to capacity building.

IV. THE IAEA AND BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH THE EU

Established in 1957, the IAEA has an annual budget of approximately €315 million (2010 budget). The IAEA’s core areas of activity are safeguards and verification, safety and security, and science and technology.

currently supports specific research activities framed within Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with emerging Third Countries, and within the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). So far countries such as: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, South Korea and Ukraine have benefitted. The Council of the European Union agreed on a general approach for extending the EU’s 7th EURATOM Framework Programme for nuclear research and training (2012-2013).”

The IAEA has safeguards agreements in force with 178 states and with Taiwan as of 21 June 2011. In addition, 111 states have an Additional Protocol in force. More than 1100 facilities around the world are under IAEA safeguards.21

Based on the cooperation agreements of 1976, Euratom, represented by the Commission, has observer status at the annual General Conference. Following on from these agreements, the Commission and the IAEA have built up cooperation in a large number of areas, including: (a) the application of safeguards in the EU (cf. the New Partnership Approach), (b) JRC support for IAEA safeguards research and development, (c) Commission support for the IAEA’s enhancement of nuclear safety in a number of EU countries, (d) EU financial support for the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and (e) IAEA support for cooperating on fusion energy research.

Cooperation between the Commission and the IAEA has long been focused on the area of safeguards, on the basis of the safeguards agreements signed by Euratom and the IAEA. However, IAEA cooperation with the Commission, and more broadly the EU, has widened over the years. This is documented by projects supported under European Community instruments such as Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), the Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Phare) and, more recently, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). This has been complemented by Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Council decisions to substantially support IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Fund and actual nuclear non-proliferation activities. For example, support from the CFSP joint action for the IAEA monitoring of the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor in North Korea.

EU funds are, as a rule, provided along thematic lines and through financial instruments, rather than attributed to a particular international initiative. The total amount of EU annual funds allocated to these activities is at least €150 million each year. This amount includes projects implemented by the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Together with contributions from its member states, the EU is the second biggest financial

contributor to the fund. In addition, Euratom has negotiated a series of nuclear-related cooperation agreements with a number of third countries.

A pragmatic way to move forward would be to repeat the very significant visit of the IAEA Director General to Brussels in 2008, but this time with the full involvement of the newly established EEAS. In the Commission–IAEA joint statement signed on 7 May 2008, on the occasion of the meeting between President Barroso and Director General ElBaradei in Brussels, both parties confirmed the importance of continuing to promote high standards in nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the statement confirmed the determination of both institutions to further reinforce their cooperation. The joint statement should be seen, first and foremost, as a possible vehicle for enhanced cooperation. The present author believes that a follow-on document should be given more publicity and ownership should be more widely promoted.

Over the years, the IAEA’s budget has not increased in line with its responsibilities, notably as regards new activities in the area of nuclear security against the threat of acts of nuclear terrorism. Even infrastructure for core activities, such as the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, requires upgrading. The EU has recently contributed to the Seibersdorf installation, requiring the IAEA to seek extra-budgetary support from member states and donors. By the end of 2007 the EU had become the second largest donor to the IAEA (after the USA) in the area of nuclear security, through contributions from the CFSP budget and member states’ donations. Technical cooperation with new and developing countries is another area where the IAEA is actively seeking the support of the EU, as is the area of research and development.

Following the joint statement, the IAEA’s lobbying of Commission services has intensified. Notably, the IAEA Secretariat has indicated an interest in expanding the existing cooperation in the context of the INSC, the IPA and the EU’s thematic, regional and geographic instruments for development. Within the IAEA there are tensions between the ‘nuclear technology holders’ and those who do not possess the technology, as is demonstrated by the debate on technical cooperation. The IAEA is generally seen as a highly professional body. Its technical expertise as well as its broad membership, global reach, legitimacy and good contacts make the IAEA and its Secretariat an indispensable partner for the EU and, more specifically, for Euratom and the EEAS. From the EU’s point of view, the IAEA is not only a competent partner for technical cooperation on safeguards, safety and research, but also a preferred partner for ‘entering’ countries, with whom it has no previous experience of working on nuclear files. This includes China, member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the states of the Middle East.

Cooperation with the IAEA can, but need not necessarily, involve EU funding. In contacts with the Commission following the joint statement of 7 May 2008, the IAEA Secretariat confirmed its interest in a continued dialogue and exchange of information, for example, in the area of nuclear safety. Moreover, financial cooperation in this area need not be limited to the IAEA. When working with member states’ authorities or other partners, including regional ones, the IAEA can also be an important partner for the Commission and the EU as a whole—and play a coordinating role.

V. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF SAFEGUARDS AND NON-PROLIFERATION

Through a set of activities defined as ‘safeguards’, the IAEA seeks to verify that a state is living up to its international undertakings under the NPT not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear weapons purposes. The safeguards system is based on an assessment of the correctness and completeness of a state’s declarations to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. IAEA verification helps to provide assurance that such items are not diverted or misused in order to assemble nuclear weapons and that no items required to be declared under safeguards go undeclared. This, in turn, helps to allay security

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22 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INFCIRC/830 (note 6).
23 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INFCIRC/830 (note 6). Euratom has negotiated nuclear-related cooperation agreements with the following third countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and the USA. These agreements may address various issues, including nuclear trade and research activities (nuclear safety, nuclear research and fusion energy research), as well as other activities supporting peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
concerns among states with respect to the development of nuclear weapons.

Under the 1968 NPT (in force since 1970), the IAEA became the instrument with which to verify that the ‘peaceful use’ commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are being kept. The NPT has made it obligatory for its non-nuclear weapon states parties to submit all nuclear material and nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. With all but a handful of the countries around the world as states parties, the NPT is the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The strengthened safeguards system, based on comprehensive safeguards agreements, has established a new and higher standard for the effective and cooperative verification of states’ nuclear undertakings. Extended IAEA mechanisms for verification, as provided for in the Additional Protocol to the NPT, are the most effective way to address the problem of detecting clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol can safeguard against the development of clandestine nuclear weapons programmes that are not detectable under the comprehensive safeguards agreements, which rely on states’ declarations of nuclear assets. Examples of such clandestine programs are those started by North Korea, Iran and Libya.

The need to universalize the Additional Protocol and further enhance nuclear safeguards (the ‘next generation safeguards’ discussion) puts the IAEA in a central position. No other state or organization outside the EU has the same credibility, or is likely to enjoy the same confidence, among IAEA member countries to allow broad and even undeclared access to their nuclear installations. It is in the interest of the EU to work with the IAEA to strengthen the latter’s role as the world’s nuclear watchdog. The EU needs to push from within the IAEA, as well as in other appropriate contexts, for the universal application of the Additional Protocol by all countries—at the very least in its political dialogue with third countries. In fact, all technical support to countries in the nuclear area could be linked to conditions to implement the Additional Protocol.

The Commission cooperates closely with the IAEA in the area of safeguards in what is a unique regional arrangement. This cooperation includes the implementation of safeguards in the Euratom territory under the New Partnership Approach coupled with a continuous dialogue in the context of liaison committees. Cooperation extends beyond safeguards implementation in the EU to the Euratom support programme provided by the JRC, including the research and development of safeguards, analytical laboratory support (analyses of samples) and the development of technical applications (for example, surveillance and detection equipment).

The JRC supports efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the international safeguards regime. Euratom and the member states have demonstrated their commitment to the strengthened safeguards system by ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol. Moreover, adherence to the Additional Protocol has become a condition for accession to the EU. The EU consistently speaks out in the context of the IAEA in favour of a universalization of the Additional Protocol, considering it to be today’s verification standard.

A possible area of cooperation between the EU and the IAEA within nuclear non-proliferation could be support for the EU initiative to set up chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence in various regions of the world. These centres are currently being funded by the IFS and being implemented by the JRC and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The IAEA’s previous experiences of working with regional centres could be very valuable for the EU in this initiative.25

Another possible area of cooperation is the creation of Multilateral Nuclear Assurances (MNAs), which are schemes that are designed to offer reassurance to countries about continued access to nuclear fuels without having to build their own uranium enrichment facilities by organizing enrichment or stockpiling under international control. There are a number of proposals for MNA schemes, but it has become evident that the credibility and acceptance of any such multilateral project will depend critically on IAEA involvement. The IAEA’s own project for the creation of a small low-enriched uranium (LEU) bank will be the first MNA project that is realized.26 The project will be supported by €20 million from the IFS 2009–11 indicative programming and €5 million from the CFSP budget. The Commission can also provide valuable

26 Approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 3 Dec. 2010.
technical expertise in this area, among other things from its involvement in the Euratom Supply Agency.

VI. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

Following the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, it is now necessary to review nuclear safety work within the IAEA. This is an ongoing process in which the EU and the IAEA have long experience of cooperation. However, it is also an area where the Director General of the IAEA has consistently, and over many years, asked the EU to do more. The competencies in the framework of Euratom have been limited in the past and it is only in recent years that Euratom and the EU have been able to set the good example of adopting a nuclear safety directive in the EU on the basis of IAEA standards.27

The role of the IAEA in this area is to assist countries to upgrade nuclear safety and to prepare for and respond to emergencies through work in the areas of safety standards, installations safety, regulatory issues, safe management of spent fuel, radioactive waste, transport of radioactive material and safe decommissioning. The IAEA Secretariat makes an important contribution to the implementation of the conventions created under the auspices of the IAEA: the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The main aim of this work is to protect both humans and the environment from harmful radiation exposure, through targeting the safety of nuclear installations, radioactive sources, radioactive materials in transport and radioactive waste. A core element of the IAEA’s work is setting and promoting the application of international safety standards for the management and regulation of activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials.

Euratom is a contracting party to the conventions in the area of nuclear safety and, represented by the Commission, participates actively in the work under the conventions. The review process, including peer reviews, can be considered an important system for improving countries’ nuclear safety. The EU established a High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management, now called the European Nuclear Safety Regulatory Group, in order to steer the process within the EU and this has attracted the interest of other countries and regions.24 With their broad potential reach and membership, the conventions are an important tool for ensuring the safety of nuclear installations and the EU has an interest in promoting their adherence and implementation as a step in implementing its WMD Strategy.

The Commission has long experience of cooperating with the IAEA in assuring the safety of nuclear installations in third countries. From 1991 to 2006 the Commission allocated €1.3 billion to the promotion of safety culture and nuclear safety improvements in the former Soviet Union through the TACIS programme.29 A recent example of cooperation between the Commission and the IAEA in the field of nuclear safety is the joint European Commission–IAEA–Ukraine project ‘Safety Evaluation of Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants’.30

In the next financial perspective the INSC will cover the period 2014–20. In the current budgetary cycle the INSC supports traditional fields of activity such as regulatory and operational support, design safety, waste and decommissioning of installations, off-site emergency preparedness and safeguards. It also supports international projects and initiatives such as the Chernobyl Shelter Fund and the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. It is in the EU’s interest that new countries in its neighbourhood invest in proper safety environments for the introduction of nuclear energy. It is in the Commission’s interest to work with the IAEA in countries where it has no previous experience of working in the area of nuclear cooperation. The IAEA, with its good contacts and credibility, can help to facilitate the Commission’s work in synergy with the host authorities.

Other important areas of European Commission–IAEA cooperation include Basic Safety Standards and harmonization, emergency preparedness and


29 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INFCIRC/830 (note 6).

30 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INFCIRC/830 (note 6).
the automatic international exchange of radiation monitoring data (the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform, EURDEP). Events in Japan following the Fukushima nuclear accident are likely to further upgrade the importance of this work both within the IAEA and in the EU–IAEA cooperation.

VII. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR SECURITY

The rise of nuclear terrorism as a potential threat has seen increased efforts to improve security at nuclear installations worldwide. The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is responsible for coordinating the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan (NSP). Its tasks are to plan, implement and evaluate the IAEA’s nuclear security activities, supported by the Nuclear Security Fund, which is external to the IAEA’s budget. Key IAEA member states have resisted an integration of the fund into the regular budget. The NSP builds on existing international legal instruments and agreements to help states strengthen their nuclear security in order to combat the risk of nuclear terrorism. The plan focuses on three key areas: (a) protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, facilities and transport from malicious acts, (b) detection of and response to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material, and (c) information coordination and analysis to underpin the NSP and support its implementation, including evaluation, cooperation with bilateral and multilateral support programmes, and information collection.³¹

Through individual contributions by EU member states and five Council decisions, the EU remains the second major donor to the Nuclear Security Fund. Nevertheless, the work of the Office of Nuclear Security remains underfunded and it is worth questioning how far the office is able to reach its goals. In its budget proposal for 2010, the Secretariat proposed a large budget increase for security-related activities to be gradually taken over by the regular budget, if IAEA member states agree.

Due to its nature as a CFSP budget instrument, the ownership of Council decisions tends to lie more on the side of member states than of the Commission. The Commission needs to decide whether it wants to be more involved in the substance of the work in the area of nuclear security, as a follow-up to the joint statement. This would necessitate a stronger involvement of the counter-terrorism services in both the EEAS and the Commission’s DG Home Affairs. Using the IFS could also be considered.

With its broad reach and credibility, the IAEA appears to be well placed to assist third countries in addressing their nuclear security gaps. It is, therefore, an important partner in achieving this objective. The Secretariat has indicated its interest in cooperating with the EU with regard to sharing country information available to the EU in the context of its geographic programmes. This opens up the possibility of a dialogue, which is necessary to address these complex issues, not only as regards nuclear issues, but CBRN issues in general. For example, as regards trafficking in nuclear and radiological sources, the challenge is to find the right balance between improving detection capability and capacity building for preventive actions. International coordination is, therefore, required not only from the IAEA, but also from the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, among others.

The IFS is an important financial tool for the EU to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. The IAEA could be a key partner to work with in this regard, due to its extensive reach and the expertise it has built up. The IAEA would, however, not be the sole partner for cooperation. Considering the aspects of trafficking and terrorism, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and other UN counterparts in New York should be considered as well.

VIII. TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND PEACEFUL USES

The role of the IAEA’s Department of Technical Cooperation is to transfer nuclear and related technologies for peaceful uses to countries throughout the world. The Technical Cooperation Programme distributes equipment, services and training to more than 100 countries and territories, including to countries within the EU. The target budget for 2010 was €85 million, all of which falls outside the

³¹ The IAEA’s nuclear security activities are being carried out under the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010–2013, which is the third plan of its kind since the nuclear security programme was established in 2002. This plan, approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2009, builds on existing international legal instruments and agreements to help states strengthen their nuclear security to combat the risk of nuclear terrorism.
IAEA's core budget and is dependent on voluntary contributions by member states. The IAEA is constantly seeking additional donor support to fund project proposals that exceed the available resources. The Department of Technical Cooperation has been successful in securing funding from the IPA for the Vinca Institute Nuclear Decommissioning project in Serbia. There is also a regional programme in the Western Balkans to improve the regulatory environment for safety. A further example is funding from the INSC to prepare an international donor conference on uranium mine remediation in Central Asia.32

Given this large development programme with important thematic, national and regional funds, the IAEA is very interested in a possible cooperation with the EU in the areas of new applications for health, agriculture and the environment. This was raised with the EU Commissioner for Development in 2008 during Director General ElBaradei's visit. It has since been raised again by the new Director General, Amano, in his contacts with a number of high-level interlocutors in the EU institutions. Amano has made it a point to put cancer treatment and water at the top of his agenda.

The development community often finds such types of funding requests difficult to deal with, for several reasons. First, there is a global effort to limit the number of objectives in development assistance to just a few, such as poverty reduction, health and education. Second, the IAEA is not widely perceived as a development assistance organization. Thirdly, the recipient countries do not always prioritize niche requests. It has, therefore, been difficult to get the appropriate political support for development-related projects in the IAEA. However, the USA has prioritized this area more over the past two years and the EU also plays an important role through its various instruments mentioned above. The EU is investing heavily in third countries, as it is convinced that only by creating the necessary legal and regulatory framework through assistance and capacity building can the safe and secure use of peaceful nuclear activities and applications be justified and sustained in the long term.

32 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INFCIRC/830 (note 6).

IX. COOPERATION WITHIN THE IAEA AS A FORUM

A few years ago Vienna did not count as an important site for multilateral work from the perspective of Brussels. The EU (through the Commission) was a major donor in most of the Vienna organizations, but beyond that it mainly served as an observer and provided technical expertise rather than actively contributing to the development of policies. The main purpose of the Vienna organizations at the time was security, which remained a contentious issue in terms of European Community competencies.

In that regard the Lisbon Treaty promised to solve a major problem for Vienna by creating a more unified approach. The IAEA is primarily a technical organization, but it also carries out important political work through its Board of Governors and its annual General Conference. The General Conference usually takes place at the same time as the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in New York and is, as a result, overshadowed by it. This would not be a problem if proper attention were paid to the IAEA's work. However, there is a tendency to focus attention on the wrong issues during the General Conference. Instead of supporting the IAEA's work on the basis of the very extensive reports that are put before the conference, political issues that would be better dealt with in New York tend to hijack the agenda—that was certainly the case in the years preceding Fukushima.

The EU's role as a moderating and constructive force in this context should not be underestimated and the current situation should be viewed positively—as a glass half full rather than half empty. Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of EU representation has not yet been fully achieved in Vienna, but the EU's informal capability to pursue a political dialogue with its partners is there. This is important to note because there is a tendency to underestimate what has already been achieved in this regard in Vienna. Back in 2008 EU ambassadors in Vienna came together to analyse the situation and came to the informal conclusion that more could be done in the outreach of the EU to other regional groups, building not least on the important overall cooperation of the Commission with the countries and regions represented in the IAEA. This conclusion was reached at a time when it was still unclear whether or not the Lisbon Treaty would be fully ratified and enter into force, as it did on 1 December 2009.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INFCIRC/830 (note 6).
X. CONCLUSIONS

The EU Security Strategy and the WMD Strategy, which were developed in parallel in 2003 and reviewed in 2008, did not fully take into account the full spectrum of problems and opportunities within WMD non-proliferation. In fact, the 2003 WMD Strategy only mentions the IAEA in passing. Non-proliferation is a particularly difficult topic to keep at the top of the agenda, with the exception of the most visible trouble spots such as Iran and North Korea. The recent seminar on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is an example of how the EU has been able to contribute to the work of the IAEA as a forum in support of a process.

The IAEA report on the Iranian nuclear programme published in November 2011, which drew attention to the possible military dimensions of Iranian activities, was another reminder to the international community that the work of the IAEA is vital. Maintaining continuous attention to the non-proliferation dossier is a challenge well known both at the political level and, for instance, in the Political and Security Committee where many other issues compete for attention.

It is even more difficult to mobilize the appropriate institutional and budgetary resources, including staff, to deal with the full spectrum of the often very technical tasks facing the IAEA. This applies to all the EU institutions that work with the IAEA, whether they are part of the EEAS or the Commission.

EU institutions and member states need to develop a single paradigm to allow them to work better together, even if legal and other parameters make this difficult. Only then can it be argued that the added value of the EU as a vehicle working for ‘multilateral effectiveness’, in the words of the European Security Strategy, has been properly realized.

The agenda for further work is extensive. It includes continuing cooperation with the IAEA on the application of effective safeguards within the EU in order to reach the necessary assurances; striving for continued improvements and simplification and intensifying work with the IAEA for the creation of MNAs, including support through the IFS for the IAEA’s nuclear fuel bank project and through technical expertise; using the IAEA system and bilateral contacts to actively encourage third countries to adhere to and implement Additional Protocols to their comprehensive safeguards agreements; considering the experience of clandestine weapon programmes and reflecting on what other steps have to be taken to strengthen the international non-proliferation system and whether the instruments available to the IAEA are the right ones; and finally, but not conclusively, where appropriate working with the IAEA to support the creation of regional Centres of Excellence against the threat of trafficking of CBRN substances. It is, therefore, all the more important that discussions have started in the EU to better coordinate and streamline the various strands of engagement with the IAEA and this paper aims to contribute to these discussions.

The IAEA continues to be an invaluable asset in scrutinizing the nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon states. In order to achieve and maintain effective multilateralism in this process, it is crucial to guide, support and protect the IAEA. This can be achieved if the EU is perceived as a fair and credible partner and if it actively engages in all the areas mentioned above. Finally, the EU must also have a stronger voice in the IAEA.


35 The recent information circular produced by the EU in the IAEA illustrates the scope of the EU contribution as a donor in a series of contexts (note 6): the EU Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (€631 million proposed allocation by the European Commission for 2014–2020); the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance; the EU Instrument for Stability (€2.8 million proposed allocation by the European Commission for 2014–2020); EU Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions to support nuclear security; EU technical support to the IAEA; the seventh Euratom framework programme for nuclear research and training; and EU nuclear cooperation agreements with third countries.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IFS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>INSC</td>
<td>Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Research Centre</td>
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<td>MNA</td>
<td>Multilateral Nuclear Assurance</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>Nuclear Security Plan</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon(s) of mass destruction</td>
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A EUROPEAN NETWORK

In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to create a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centres from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.

STRUCTURE

The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly by four institutes entrusted with the project, in close cooperation with the representative of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The four institutes are the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Consortium began its work in January 2011 and forms the core of a wider network of European non-proliferation think tanks and research centres which will be closely associated with the activities of the Consortium.

MISSION

The main aim of the network of independent non-proliferation think tanks is to encourage discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, particularly among experts, researchers and academics. The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to conventional weapons. The fruits of the network discussions can be submitted in the form of reports and recommendations to the responsible officials within the European Union.

It is expected that this network will support EU action to counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also establish cooperation with specialized institutions and research centres in third countries, in particular in those with which the EU is conducting specific non-proliferation dialogues.

http://www.nonproliferation.eu