Draft United Nations Security Council Resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1887 (2009) and continuing its resolve to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Reaffirming that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty), adopted by the General Assembly by its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, and that States Signatories, by their resolution on 19 November 1996, established the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization,

Recognizing that a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable in-force test ban treaty is the most effective way to ban nuclear-weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, and that an end to all such explosions will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that entry into force of the Treaty will constitute an effective nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation measure that would contribute to the attainment of a safer world and the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons,

Welcoming progress made towards universalization of the Treaty, noting that 183 States have signed the Treaty and 164 States have deposited their instruments of ratification, and *further noting* that of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, 41 have signed and 36 have both signed and ratified the Treaty,

Welcoming the efforts of Member States of the PrepCom and its Provisional Technical Secretariat to build all elements of the Treaty's verification regime, which will be unprecedented in its global reach, recognizing the maturity of and progress achieved in the establishment of the International Monitoring System, as well as the satisfactory functioning of the International Data Centre that has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable means to ensure compliance with the Treaty once it enters into force, and emphasizing the continuing progress in

developing, exercising, and demonstrating the advanced technologies and logistical capabilities necessary to execute on-site inspections,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

- 1. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and to maintain their moratoria in this regard, emphasizes that such moratoria are a de facto norm of responsible international behavior and should continue, pending entry into force of the Treaty, while stressing that such moratoria do not have the same permanent legally binding effect as entry into force of the Treaty, and notes the Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America of [date], in which those States noted that, inter alia, "a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT";
- 2. *Urges* all States that have either not signed or not ratified the Treaty, particularly the eight remaining Annex 2 States, to do so without delay;
- 3. *Expresses* the view that it is the responsibility of all States Signatories to promote the universality of the Treaty;
- 4. *Underlines* the need to maintain momentum towards completion of all elements of the Treaty verification regime, and in this regard, *calls upon* all States to provide the support required to enable the PrepCom to complete all its tasks in the most efficient and cost effective way, and *urges* all States hosting International Monitoring System facilities to transmit data to the International Data Centre;
- 5. Decides that each State listed in Annex 1 to the Treaty Protocol as responsible for one or more facilities of the International Monitoring System shall provide the Secretary-General, either directly or through the PrepCom and within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution and annually thereafter, with a report detailing their activities to complete the installation of those facilities for which they are responsible and a report detailing the status of transmission of data from their facilities to the International Data Centre; further decides that all States Signatories shall provide the Secretary-General, either directly or through the PrepCom and within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution and annually thereafter, with a report describing the support they have provided, including financial support, to the PrepCom; and requests that the PrepCom provide the Secretary-General all such reports pertaining to possible nuclear testing;
- 6. Requests the Secretary-General to assimilate the information received pursuant to paragraph 5 of this resolution and coordinate with the PrepCom to provide a report to the Security Council within 180 days of the adoption of this resolution and annually thereafter on support for the expedited completion of the Treaty's verification regime, and for the maintenance and operational needs for the International Data Center and International Monitoring System;

- 7. Requests the PrepCom to assist in the preparation of the report requested in paragraph 6 of this resolution, including by facilitating collection and transmission of relevant information to the Secretary-General;
- 8. Recognizes that even absent entry into force of the Treaty the monitoring and analytical elements of the verification regime, operating on a testing and provisional basis, are at the disposal of the international community to support national security needs, and that such elements contribute to regional stability as a significant confidence-building measure, reinforce non-discriminatory and participatory multilateral arms control, and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime;
- 9. Affirms that entry into force of the Treaty will enhance international peace and security and recognizes that the Provisional Technical Secretariat has demonstrated its utility in bringing tangible scientific and civil benefits to States, and in this regard encourages the PrepCom to consider ways to ensure that these benefits can be broadly shared by the international community through capacity building and the sharing of relevant expertise on the verification regime;
- 10. *Resolves* to review information concerning future nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;
- 11. Decides to remain seized of the matter.