



Photo: German Air Force

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE EU AND OTHER EXTERNAL ACTORS TO THE EU'S EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD, 2010-25

PIETER D. WEZEMAN



STIFTUNG
MERCATOR

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Introduction

Strengthening the military capabilities of European Union (EU) partner states, including by providing weapons, has become an important element of the EU's approach to peace and security over the past five years. This shift from an approach centred mainly around crisis management means the EU is entering a space occupied by several other actors, including some EU member states, allied states—notably the United States—and what the EU refers to as its 'strategic competitors'.¹

The shift is a rapid evolution that is occurring against a backdrop of volatility in US foreign policy and intensifying strategic competition in the EU's broader neighbourhood. Together, these trends raise important questions about how the EU compares to other external actors as a provider of military assistance. To address these questions, SIPRI has produced three fact sheets mapping military assistance provided by the EU and other external actors to states in the broader European neighbourhood. The fact sheets will feed into a larger study into the effectiveness of the EU's military assistance to partner states and its coherence with that of EU member states.

'Military assistance' is here defined to include basing and deployment at the request or with the acceptance of host countries; supply of arms and military equipment; advisory support for military organizations; provision of training and education; and bilateral or multilateral exercises. The fact sheets also look into arms sales, as these reflect relations among states and the influence of external actors in a country or region.

This fact sheet provides an overview of the EU's and other external actors' military assistance to states in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood in 2010–25. It covers the period after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. The treaty considerably expanded the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (previously the European Security and Defence Policy).²

In the same year the EU also started to use the concept of the 'Eastern Neighbourhood' to describe Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as a framework for relations with these countries, with a focus on strengthening political, economic and security stability along the EU's eastern borders.³

KEY FACTS

- There have been three distinct phases in the role of the European Union (EU) and EU member states as providers of military assistance to the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood. Before 2014, several EU member states were developing military relations with Russia, but neither EU member states nor the EU were involved in major military assistance to any of the Eastern Neighbourhood states.
- From 2014, the EU became more engaged in security sector reform in the Eastern Neighbourhood. A few EU member states began supplying military assistance to Ukraine and some sold arms to Azerbaijan and Georgia.
- In reaction to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most EU member states massively increased their military assistance to Ukraine. The EU became a key institution for financing and channelling large-scale military assistance to Ukraine and—though to a far lesser extent—to Armenia and Moldova.
- Military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood through NATO increased massively from 2022.
- The United States was a dominant provider of military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood from 2010 to 2025, significantly ahead of individual European states and the EU. However, its role as a provider of military assistance has become uncertain since early 2025, as US security policy towards Europe has entered a period of flux.
- Russia's role as a supplier of military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood has changed drastically. Throughout 2010–25 it was by far the main supplier to Belarus. However, its role as a supplier of military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan has dwindled since 2020.
- The role of other external actors providing military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood has been relatively limited.

The European Union

The EU's military assistance to states in the Eastern Neighbourhood were limited in scope up until 2022. For example, in 2005 the EU established a Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, which provided advice on border control issues.⁴ In 2014 it established the Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine to assist Ukrainian law enforcement agencies in reform efforts. However, even from the Russian aggression in 2014, the provision of military assistance by the EU was blocked by several of its member states.⁵ It took until late 2021 for EU military assistance to Ukraine to take off, when the EU established the European Peace Facility (EPF), a funding mechanism to finance the provision of equipment and other assistance by EU member states to the armed forces of EU partners. The EPF's financial ceiling was originally set at nearly €5.7 billion for 2021 to 2027.⁶

EU military assistance to Ukraine, 2021–25

In December 2021 the EU decided for the first time to use €31 million from the EPF to supply non-lethal equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces.⁷

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU decided by the end of that month to massively increase its military support to Ukraine and to include financing of lethal equipment. By October 2022 the EPF had been used to supply €2.82 billion in lethal equipment and military platforms and €0.19 billion in non-lethal support.⁸ In 2024 the EPF's financial ceiling for 2021–27 was increased to €10.7 billion. The extra €5 billion was ring-fenced for Ukraine through the creation of the Ukraine Assistance Fund.⁹ By the end of 2025, the EPF had financed €6.4 billion in military assistance to Ukraine and channelled a further €3.4 billion in revenues from immobilized Russian assets to military support for Ukraine.¹⁰ The funding has been used for the supply, maintenance, repair and refit of a wide range of major and small arms, ammunition and other military equipment. By late 2025 €610 million from the EPF had been used for the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine through which EU member states had trained 86 800 Ukrainian military personnel by early 2026.¹¹

The use of the EPF must be unanimously approved by EU member states. Although a total of €11 billion in EPF funding had been earmarked for Ukraine over the period 2022–25, €6.6 billion remained blocked at the end of 2025 because Hungary vetoed releasing the funds.¹²

In addition to support through the EPF, in 2025 the EU gave Ukraine access to the Security Action for

Europe (SAFE) instrument, which coordinates and provides loans to EU members for cooperative military procurement projects. The EU also included Ukraine in the European Defence Fund, which supports collaborative military research and development activities within the EU. In December 2025 the EU started the European Defence Industry Programme, which includes €300 million to support Ukraine's arms industry through a dedicated Ukraine support instrument.¹³

EU military assistance to Moldova

From late 2021 EPF funding has been used for the supply of air defence systems, drones and non-lethal military equipment to Moldova. By the end of 2025, EPF funding to Moldova stood at €197 million.¹⁴ In 2024 Moldova signed a Security and Defence Partnership agreement with the EU which includes EU support for the Moldovan Armed Forces' efforts to enhance their operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with EU standards and interoperability, as well as support for countering hybrid and cyber threats.¹⁵

EU military assistance to Georgia and Armenia

Georgia received €63 million in non-lethal equipment through the EPF between 2021 and 2024. However, in 2024 Georgia–EU relations reached a low point when the EU suspended financial assistance to the Georgian government for what it deemed significant 'backsliding' in democratic reforms.¹⁶

In 2024 the EPF was for the first time used to fund €10 million in non-lethal military equipment to Armenia.¹⁷

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a key conduit through which military assistance from European states and the United States to states in the EU Eastern Neighbourhood has been organized.

NATO military assistance to Ukraine

Ukraine became in 1994 the first post-Soviet state to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, a framework in which non-NATO states can organize their relations and cooperation with NATO. In 2014, as a reaction to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, NATO member states agreed to increase support for the Ukrainian armed forces in several sectors, including logistics and command, control and communications, and strengthen-

ing civilian control over the armed forces. However, the support was limited to non-lethal equipment, advice and services. From 2016 NATO military support was primarily provided through a Comprehensive Assistance Package focused on non-lethal assistance in areas such as command, control, communications, logistics and cyber defence.¹⁸

Also in 2016, the Commission for Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine was established, under which the NATO–Ukraine joint working group on military reform implemented projects to combat corruption, train civilian security and military personnel, and reform military education in Ukraine. Another focus of the Commission is assisting Ukraine in adapting to NATO technical standards. In 2020 Ukraine gained Enhanced Opportunity Partner status, which provided Ukraine with preferential access to NATO exercises, training and exchange of information and situational awareness.¹⁹

From 2022 NATO played a key role in coordinating the provision of military training and equipment to Ukraine. The International Donor Coordination Centre, established in 2022 to coordinate immediate military assistance of allied states to Ukraine, was superseded by the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) command, with around 700 staff. In the longer term NSATU also aims to support the transformation of Ukraine's defence forces to enable interoperability with NATO. Since late April 2022 NATO military assistance has been supported by the establishment of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) through which 50 countries coordinate their military support to Ukraine. It was first led by the USA and from 2025 by the United Kingdom. The structure for NATO assistance to Ukraine has been further divided among 'capability coalitions' for specific areas of equipment, such as air defence and artillery.²⁰

In 2022 several NATO members, led by the UK, established the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) to coordinate the purchase and transport of military equipment to Ukraine from third-party countries and industry. The IFU was later expanded to finance the rapid purchase of military equipment for Ukraine, to support Ukraine in the procurement process and to facilitate training. By late 2025 12 states had contributed a combined 2.6 billion British pounds to the IFU: 10 NATO members (Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK) and 2 non-NATO states (Australia and New Zealand).²¹

NATO military assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova

NATO military assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova started in the 1990s when all three joined the NATO Partnership for Peace programme. Since then, support has focused on advice and training in organizational reform, interoperability with NATO forces, and strengthening security-sector governance.²²

In 2008 NATO members agreed on eventual NATO membership for Georgia, though the path to membership was not set, in part due to concerns over the possible effects on relations between NATO and Russia. Georgia was a significant contributor to the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, which ended in 2021. In 2014 NATO established the Substantial NATO–Georgia Package (SNGP) to improve Georgia's military capabilities, and Georgia became a NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner. In 2015 Georgia joined the NATO Response Force, a multinational rapid reaction force. Also in 2015, NATO opened a Joint Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia to enhance interoperability and operational readiness. The Center has hosted three joint NATO–Georgia exercises. Several NATO member states have also participated in military exercises led by the USA and Georgia.²³ Political changes in Georgia in 2024 led NATO to suspend or modify several elements of the SNGP, including projects on strategic communications, cybersecurity and training facilities, although some projects proceeded unchanged while others had already concluded.²⁴

EU member states

In addition to participation in EU or NATO military assistance activities, EU member states engaged in bilateral military activities and arms trade with Eastern Neighbourhood states in 2010–25.²⁵ Such military assistance primarily went to Ukraine, with some also going to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. However, this did not include Belarus, as the EU had imposed sanctions on Belarus, including an arms embargo and restrictions on relations with the Belarussian leadership and military.²⁶

EU member states' military assistance to Ukraine

Up until 2014 individual EU member states did not provide notable military assistance to Ukraine and commercial arms trade was very limited.²⁷ At the same time several EU member states were selling arms to Russia, including projects for large naval ships from France and military training equipment from Germany. As the Crimea crisis unfolded in 2014, European countries had different and

sometimes conflicting positions on how far the arms trade with Russia should or could be limited.²⁸ The EU imposed an arms embargo on Russia in August 2014. However, this allowed EU states to continue the licensing of transfers to Russia of arms and military equipment as part of agreements signed before August 2014. For example, France continued to allow the supply of military components for Russian weapons up until around 2018 and Italy until around 2020.²⁹

From 2014 until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there were significant differences of opinion among European states about providing military assistance or selling arms to Ukraine. Some states—including Germany, France, the UK and Finland—argued, each in their own way and on different points during these years, that sending weapons to Ukraine could contribute to conflict escalation, draw the suppliers into a war with Russia or hinder a dialogue with Russia on a peaceful solution. Other European states, such as Lithuania and Estonia, were already in 2015 in favour of sending arms to Ukraine, and by 2016 Poland and Lithuania had reportedly supplied lethal equipment as aid.³⁰ In 2017 Denmark signed a contract for delivery of patrol craft to Ukraine, and in 2018 Czechia supplied artillery and armoured vehicles.³¹ In 2021 the UK agreed to start a process for supplying technology for frigates and other naval weapons to Ukraine.³² Other states, notably Germany, remained explicitly against sending arms to Ukraine until just before or just after the 2022 Russian invasion.³³

Some states were prepared to give substantial military training support to the Ukraine. From 2015 the UK ran Operation Orbital in which UK military personnel trained a total of 20 000 members of the Ukrainian armed forces in key infantry skills.³⁴ From 2020 the UK also led a multinational Maritime Training Initiative for the Ukrainian Navy, with personnel from NATO states Canada, Denmark and Sweden the first to deliver the training.³⁵

From early 2022, most of the 27 EU member states decided to assist the armed forces of Ukraine with weapons, military equipment, logistical support, training inside and outside the country, and financing for weapons production in Ukraine.

Whereas the willingness to supply arms varies, most EU member states have contributed to the supply of arms or non-lethal military equipment to Ukraine, both directly and through contributions to the EPF.³⁶ Only Hungary decided not to supply military aid to Ukraine and to block EPF aid to Ukraine.³⁷

Based on the reported financial value of military assistance provided during 2022–25 to Ukraine, the

eight largest European donors were Germany (€20 billion), Denmark (€9.9 billion), the Netherlands (€8.6 billion), Sweden (€7.9 billion), France (€6 billion), Poland (€4.2 billion), Finland (€3 billion) and Belgium (€2.7 billion). In cooperation or close coordination with these EU member states, Norway and the UK also provided Ukraine with military aid of €5.6 billion and €14.3 billion, respectively.³⁸ Slovakia provided substantial aid in 2022 and 2023, but following a change in government in late 2023, it halted military aid to Ukraine.³⁹

Since 2022, European countries have differed over which types of weapons should be supplied to Ukraine, according to their varying assessments of the risk that providing systems which would strengthen Ukraine's offensive capabilities might prompt further Russian escalation, and of Ukraine's ability to operate complex weapons new to its arsenal. In 2022, for example, Poland opted to deliver tanks, while France and Germany declined to do so until 2023. Similarly, although France and the UK decided to supply cruise missiles in 2023, Germany continued to oppose such transfers through the end of 2025.⁴⁰

European member states' military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan

EU member states have shown varying levels of willingness to engage in military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan during 2010–25, as the two countries were engaged in an arms race and regular armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, while the international community tried to mediate a diplomatic resolution.⁴¹ In 1992 the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe called on its participating states to impose a voluntary multilateral arms embargo on 'deliveries of weapons and munitions to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area'.⁴² Up until 2025 some European states imposed full national arms embargoes on both countries, whereas others supplied arms, mainly to Azerbaijan. Following the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2024–25, several states, including Germany in 2024 and the UK in 2025, removed their national arms embargoes on Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁴³

Armenia moved away from Russia as its main military assistance provider by around 2022. A 2023 defence partnership with France was Armenia's first notable military relation with an EU member state. The initial agreement was for delivery of a small batch of armoured vehicles and some military radars from France, and for French assistance in training Armenian military personnel. It was followed by a larger contract for artillery in 2024.⁴⁴

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE EU AND OTHER EXTERNAL ACTORS TO THE EU'S EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

KEY FACTS

- ▶ There have been three distinct phases in the role of the European Union (EU) and EU member states as providers of military assistance to the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood. Before 2014, several EU member states were developing military relations with Russia, but neither EU member states nor the EU were involved in major military assistance to any of the Eastern Neighbourhood states.
- ▶ From 2014, the EU became more engaged in security sector reform in the Eastern Neighbourhood. A few EU member states began supplying military assistance to Ukraine and some sold arms to Azerbaijan and Georgia.
- ▶ In reaction to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most EU member states massively increased their military assistance to Ukraine. The EU became a key institution for financing and channelling large-scale military assistance to Ukraine and—though to a far lesser extent—to Armenia and Moldova.
- ▶ Military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood through NATO increased massively from 2022.
- ▶ The United States was a dominant provider of military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood from 2010 to 2025, significantly ahead of individual European states and the EU. However, its role as a provider of military assistance has become uncertain since early 2025, as US security policy towards Europe has entered a period of flux.
- ▶ Russia's role as a supplier of military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood has changed drastically. Throughout 2010–25 it was by far the main supplier to Belarus. However, its role as a supplier of military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan has dwindled since 2020.
- ▶ The role of other external actors providing military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood has been relatively limited.


MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY EU ACTORS

EU and EU member state military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood was limited before 2014. In reaction to Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, a small number of EU member states started providing arms and military training to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Other EU member states refrained from doing so.

From 2022, the EU's and EU member states' military assistance to Ukraine expanded dramatically. The EU established the European Peace Facility (EPF) and earmarked €11 billion for military assistance to Ukraine between 2022 and 2025, including for large numbers of weapons. From 2022 nearly all EU member states, together with the United Kingdom and Norway, supplied lethal and non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine, often coordinated through NATO frameworks.

Though on a much smaller scale, the EU and a small number of EU member states also expanded military assistance to Georgia from 2019, to Moldova from 2022 and to Armenia from 2024.

RECIPIENTS AND SUPPLIERS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE



MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY OTHER EXTERNAL ACTORS

NATO

NATO has played a central role in coordinating military assistance by the USA and EU members states to the Eastern Neighbourhood throughout 2010–25. After 2014 this included projects to combat corruption in the military, train civilian security and military personnel, and reform military education in Ukraine. From 2022 NATO played a key role in coordinating the provision of military training and equipment to Ukraine. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova also received military assistance through NATO during 2010–25. NATO's close cooperation with Georgia during that period was suspended in 2024.

RUSSIA

During 2010–25 Russian military cooperation with Belarus intensified. Russia was by far the largest supplier of arms to Belarus and the two states conducted regular large-scale joint military exercises. Russia has based nuclear weapons in Belarus. In 2011–20 Russia accounted for an estimated 94 per cent of Armenia's imports of major arms and 59 per cent of Azerbaijan's. But Azerbaijan has not imported major arms from Russia since 2019. In 2024 Armenia suspended its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is dominated by Russia.

OTHER EXTERNAL ACTORS

The role of other external actors providing military assistance to the Eastern Neighbourhood has been relatively limited. Türkiye stood out as an important provider of military assistance to Azerbaijan, including through joint exercises, military education and arms sales. It also provided Georgia logistics reform funding, exercises and transfers. Before 2022 Türkiye engaged in arms sales to Ukraine, and it became a relatively modest provider of military aid from 2022. Israel was an important arms supplier to Azerbaijan between 2011 and 2025. China supplied small quantities of arms to Belarus and later Azerbaijan, and provided small-scale military advice and training to Moldova.

THE UNITED STATES

The USA was the largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine between 2014 and 2025. This assistance was initially limited but expanded gradually after 2014, and from 2017 it included lethal equipment, starting with small arms and light weapons. US arms sales and military aid to Ukraine were worth \$1.7 billion between 2014 and 2020. From February 2022, the USA rapidly increased its military assistance to Ukraine. In 2022–25 the USA committed over \$40 billion for providing newly produced equipment, training and services as security assistance to Ukraine, of which \$20.6 billion had been delivered by the end of 2025. In the same period the USA also delivered weapons and military equipment valued at \$31.7 billion

directly from its stockpiles to Ukraine. The US administration in 2025 drastically changed its policy on military assistance to Ukraine, providing limited additional military aid and instead selling arms and military equipment to NATO allies and partners for supply to Ukraine. During 2010–25 Georgia has been one of the USA's largest recipients (after Ukraine, by a significant margin) of US military assistance in Europe, including arms supplies and training. The USA also provided military assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova at low levels compared to overall US external military assistance, but at generally higher levels than provided by the EU or EU members states.

KEY EVENTS

- 2010
EU adopts "Eastern Neighbourhood" framework.
- 2014
Russia annexes Crimea. EU arms embargo on Russia. NATO expands military training support to Ukraine. EU cannot agree on military assistance to Ukraine. EU launches Ukraine civilian security reform mission.
- 2015
UK starts large-scale training of Ukrainian military.
- 2016
A few EU member states start arms supplies to Ukraine.
- 2017
USA approves lethal weapons for Ukraine. Denmark contracts patrol boats for Ukraine. Slovakia supplies artillery to Azerbaijan.
- 2020
Ukraine gains NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner status. Türkiye contracts frigates for Ukraine. Armenia stops importing major Russian arms.
- 2021
EU agrees on first EPF military aid for Ukraine and Moldova.
- 2022
Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. EU funds large-scale funding of arms to Ukraine. Most EU states start arming Ukraine NATO takes on key role in coordination of military aid to Ukraine.
- 2023
France and Armenia sign defence partnership.
- 2024
EU agrees on €5 billion more EPF funding for Ukraine. EPF non-lethal military aid to Armenia starts. Moldova signs EU Security and Defence Partnership. EU aid for Georgia partly suspended. Armenia suspends CSTO membership.
- 2025
EU includes Ukraine in EU defence-industry support programmes. USA decreases military aid to Ukraine and instead sells arms to NATO partners for supply to Ukraine.

During 2010–25 several European states sold arms to Azerbaijan, though no notable bilateral military assistance was provided. Slovakia supplied artillery to Azerbaijan in 2017–18, Spain delivered military radars in 2019, Italy agreed to the sale of transport aircraft in 2023, and Czechia agreed to the sale of artillery in 2023.⁴⁵ France reported deliveries of unspecified military equipment worth €148 million to Azerbaijan in 2015–16.⁴⁶ In 2025 the UK lifted its arms embargo on Azerbaijan and announced two bilateral arrangements with Azerbaijan: a strategic partnership and a defence cooperation programme. Under the partnership, military instructors from the UK and Czechia delivered training in Azerbaijan. In late 2025 Azerbaijan and the UK initiated discussions about possible arms sales.⁴⁷

EU member states' military assistance to Georgia

Bilateral military aid provided by European states to Georgia has been modest. Germany and Georgia signed a military cooperation agreement in 2018, which included Germany taking on the role as lead nation of the NATO 'Counter Mobility' initiative, aimed mainly at strengthening Georgian military engineering capabilities.⁴⁸ In 2019 Germany supplied Georgia with non-lethal military support equipment under its Enable and Enhance Initiative.⁴⁹ In 2023 Germany, Denmark and Georgia launched a four-year military cooperation programme with a total budget of approximately €9.6 million involving several military training and advice activities.⁵⁰ However, Germany and Denmark suspended their military assistance to Georgia in 2024.⁵¹ France sold an air defence system to Georgia for €78 million in 2015, which was delivered in 2018. At that time the two countries discussed further defence cooperation, but no further substantial outcomes have been announced.⁵²

European member states' military assistance to Moldova

France, Germany and Romania already had formal military cooperation agreements with Moldova in place since the early 2000s, though related activities appear to have been limited.⁵³ From around 2022 these and other European states increased their military assistance to Moldova, still at modest levels. Germany decided in 2022 to support the Moldovan armed forces, in light of a perceived threat from Russia, by funding 19 armoured vehicles, followed by 14 more in 2024.⁵⁴ In 2023 France delivered an air surveillance radar and Romania donated body armour and light vehicles.⁵⁵ Sweden and Moldova signed a letter of intent on defence cooperation in 2024,

and in 2025 Sweden announced it would supply the first batch of €1.1 million worth of light weapons.⁵⁶ Although not part of the EU by now, in 2025 the UK sent military experts to train Moldovan armed forces in drone combat tactics.⁵⁷

The United States

US military assistance to Ukraine

US military assistance to Ukraine between 2003 and 2013 was valued at around \$200 million, excluding US aid for dismantling equipment related to the former nuclear weapons stockpiles in Ukraine.⁵⁸ At the start of the conflict in 2014, the USA denied a request from Ukraine for lethal military equipment.⁵⁹ After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the USA increased its military assistance to Ukraine, still only for non-lethal equipment, such as personal gear, communication equipment and radars. Through the Joint Multinational Training Group—Ukraine (JMTG-U), established in 2015, the USA (and allied states) 'provided training, mentoring, and doctrinal assistance' to Ukrainian Armed Forces (the mission was suspended in 2022 at the outset of Russia's invasion).⁶⁰ Only from 2017 did the USA become willing to provide lethal weapons, such as anti-tank weapons and rifles, to Ukraine.⁶¹

By 2015 US military assistance to Ukraine had already increased to \$91 million (from \$49 million in 2014). Total military assistance between 2014 and 2020 included at least \$677 million under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme, which provides grants to countries to purchase arms and related services in the USA, and at least \$1.02 billion through the purpose-built Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).⁶²

Shortly before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the USA rapidly increased its military assistance to Ukraine. In 2022–25 Congress committed over \$40 billion for providing newly produced equipment, training and services as security assistance to Ukraine, of which \$20.6 billion had been delivered by the end of 2025. In the same period the USA also delivered weapons and military equipment valued at \$31.7 billion directly from its stockpiles to Ukraine. Under the FMF and USAI programmes the USA delivered large numbers of weapons, mainly equipment for ground forces, air defence systems and ammunition for aircraft, as well as large-scale military training to the Ukrainian military under the JMTG-U.⁶³

The USA's willingness to provide military assistance to Ukraine changed drastically in 2025 under the second administration of President Donald Trump, which contin-

ued the supply of weapons and other military aid agreed before 2025 but only committed to limited additional military aid. Instead, the USA established in 2025 the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, through which NATO allies and partners can purchase US-made weapons and military equipment for Ukraine.⁶⁴

US military assistance to Georgia

During 2010–25 Georgia has been one of the USA's closest partners in Eastern Europe and one of the largest recipients (after Ukraine, by a significant margin) of US military assistance in Europe. The USA deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia after its invasion by Russia in 2008 and again following the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Between 2014 and 2023, Georgia received about \$334 million in financial assistance to purchase arms and military equipment, training, and services. From 2018 the USA supported the Georgian armed forces through its Georgia Defense Readiness Program, followed in 2022 by the Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative, a \$110 million five-year programme to support Georgia with defence reform advice, training and equipment intended to strengthen the Georgian military 'to resist and repel Russian aggression'.⁶⁵

The USA and Georgia have held regular joint military exercises, in Georgia, since 2011. These began as bilateral training in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations and shifted focus in 2015 to conventional warfare capabilities and interoperability exercises in which other NATO member states joined. In 2024 the USA shared the EU's concerns about democratic 'backsliding' in Georgia, which resulted in a pause in some US assistance to Georgia, although assistance to its armed forces continued. In 2024 the USA 'indefinitely suspended' that year's planned iteration of the annual Noble Partner exercise with Georgia.⁶⁶

US military assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova

During 2010–25, when the USA worked to facilitate a resolution to the Azerbaijan–Armenia conflict, the USA provided limited military assistance to both countries—for example, \$1 million each in funding for military procurement in 2017—generally applying a principle of parity. However, in 2018–19 the USA provided at least \$26.9 million only to Azerbaijan to assist in building capacity for its southern border with Iran and for Caspian Sea maritime security operations.⁶⁷

Total USA military financing for military assistance to Moldova over the period 2010–21 was \$55 million. Between 2022 and 2024 Moldova received nearly \$75 million in military assistance from the USA, of which \$45 million was provided in 2024 alone.⁶⁸ Both countries engage regularly in exercises.⁶⁹

Russia

Russian military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan

Despite Russia's role as a leading mediator in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in 2011–20 it accounted for an estimated 94 per cent of Armenia's imports of major arms and 59 per cent of Azerbaijan's.⁷⁰

Russia's arms supplies to Armenia have been part of Russia's broader military cooperation with Armenia mainly under the umbrella of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. While the military relation between Armenia and Russia was strong in 2010, by 2024 Armenia suspended its CSTO membership and it started taking formal steps to withdraw. Armenia has not imported major arms from Russia since 2019.⁷¹ However, a lease of two military bases in Armenia by Russia is planned to continue until 2044.⁷²

Azerbaijan procured significant volumes of weapons from Russia until 2018, after which no transfers of major arms from Russia to Azerbaijan have been identified.⁷³

Russian military assistance to Belarus and Ukraine

During 2010–25 Russian military assistance to and cooperation with Belarus intensified. Russia has been by far the main supplier of arms to Belarus, and the two states conducted regular large-scale joint military exercises. The relationship culminated in recent years, when Russia used such an exercise in Belarus as a partial staging ground for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and based nuclear weapons in Belarus from 2023.⁷⁴

Before being cut abruptly in 2014, Russia's military relations with Ukraine included the lease of naval facilities in Crimea, procurement of key weapons components from Ukraine, and Ukraine's participation in a major military exercise with Russia and Belarus in 2011.⁷⁵

Other external actors

China

China supplied small volumes of arms to Belarus in 2011–25 and began to supply weapons to Azerbaijan around 2025.⁷⁶ It also provided what seems to have been small-scale support to the military of Moldova, including military advice and training of staff in China.⁷⁷ Before 2022 China was an important customer for the Ukrainian arms industry, especially for aircraft and ship engine technology.⁷⁸ However, there have been no indications of notable military relations between the two countries since 2022.

Türkiye

In 2010 Türkiye signed an agreement with Azerbaijan on strategic partnership and mutual assistance. During 2010–25 the two countries held regular joint military exercises, rising from 7 exercises in 2018 to 20 in 2023, and thousands of Azerbaijani military personnel were trained in Turkish military educational institutions.⁷⁹ Türkiye accounted for 2.9 per cent of Azerbaijan's imports of major arms over the decade 2011–25.⁸⁰ In 2021 the

two countries signed the Shusha declaration, which included cooperation in the field of arms production, military cooperation, military exercises and mutual military assistance.⁸¹

The defence ministries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye have organized trilateral annual meetings since 2012 and an annual military exercise since 2009. In 2023 they signed a trilateral protocol aimed at expanding cooperation in military-technical fields and military education.⁸² Türkiye has financed the Georgian Ministry of Defense with \$17 million for reforms in military logistics as part of an agreement signed in 2019, and supplied armoured vehicles to Georgia in 2022–24.⁸³

Türkiye signed contracts with Ukraine for armed drones in 2018 and for two frigates in 2020. From 2022 it has provided military aid to Ukraine, including armed drones and armoured vehicles.⁸⁴

Israel

During 2011–25 Israel accounted for an estimated 25 per cent of arms imports by Azerbaijan. Israel also supplied air defence systems to Georgia in 2008 and 2025, and artillery to Moldova in 2025.⁸⁵

Notes

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Pieter D. Wezeman is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. Within his overall objectives of contributing to the understanding of the effect armament dynamics have on peace and conflict and supporting arms control and disarmament efforts, his main areas of expertise include the global production and proliferation of arms and other military technology and trends and patterns in military expenditures.

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**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org

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