Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet

Haiti

Located on the Atlantic hurricane belt, Haiti is susceptible to earthquakes and is particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change due to its geographical location as well as political instability, extreme poverty and gang violence. Rising sea levels, changing precipitation patterns and frequent natural disasters and extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, landslides and earthquakes, exacerbate the country's humanitarian crisis. Flooding during El Niño years worsens existing food insecurity and drives displacement, increasing population pressure on host communities and fuelling social tensions.

- Deteriorating economic conditions in Haiti have eroded people's coping capacities and increased vulnerability to climate change.
- Internal displacement has increased dramatically due to extreme gang violence. Furthermore, natural hazards such as flooding have led to secondary displacement in several locations.
- Instability, among other factors, hinders efforts to reduce climate change vulnerabilities and build preparedness and resilience in Haiti.
- There is an urgent need for the Haitian political leadership to strengthen the country's resilience to climate shocks.


Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 and a devastating earthquake a month later, the level of gang violence in Haiti has increased dramatically. In response to an appeal from then-acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry, the United Nations Security Council approved a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti in October 2023. Led by Kenya, the MSS aims to support the Haitian National Police in re-establishing security against the wave of gang violence. However, it remains understaffed, underfunded and structurally limited in fulfilling its mandate.

Haiti has urged the Security Council to transform the MSS into a UN peacekeeping operation. In March 2024, Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), consisting of political groups, the private sector and civil society observers, was established under the aegis of the Caribbean Community to facilitate elections and the political transition in Haiti.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

- There is a pressing need for data, research and learning on the socio-economic consequences of the convergence of climate change, environmental degradation and insecurity in Haiti. Specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations from across the UN system should collaborate by sharing data and analyses that inform climate-sensitive policies and programming in the short term, and disaster risk reduction in the long term.
- Humanitarian agencies like the World Food Programme and the International Organization for Migration should strengthen long-term livelihood and food security by investing in affordable and regenerative nature-based solutions in rural areas impacted by Haiti's current displacement crisis. Measures should seek to improve agricultural yields and market access for increased food security.
- The UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the MSS mission and the UN Climate Security Mechanism should advocate for and mobilize resources to turn existing analyses on the adverse effects of climate change on peace and security in Haiti into action. Future efforts should support the reintegration of former gang members, particularly forcibly recruited members and children, for instance through climate-resilient livelihood options. The UN Security Council's Informal Expert Group on Climate, Peace and Security should continue monitoring the situation in Haiti to better inform the council's actions.
- BINUH and the UN Country Team should support existing intra-Haitian dialogue on climate change, peace and security coordinated by the Haiti Climate Security Group. They should also support efforts to develop a national policy on climate security in Haiti that defines national strategies and mainstreams climate, peace and security in government priorities.

Figure 1. Key statistics



Note: Climate change projections are based on the Sixth Phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6) and a set of Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs). Sources: World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 'Haiti: Current climate—Climatology', accessed 12 May 2025; World Bank Group, 'Population, total—Haiti', accessed 12 May 2025; International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 'Haïti – Rapport sur la situation de déplacement interne en Haïti – Round 9 (Décembre 2024)], I4 Jan. 2025; Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), 'Haiti: Acute food insecurity situation for August 2024–February 2025 and projection for March–June 2025', 30 Sep. 2024.

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Climate exposure: Trends and projections

Haiti has a hot and humid tropical climate with a long rainy season lasting from May to November.¹It is among the world's most climatevulnerable countries—susceptible to extreme weather events such as hurricanes, sea level rise, tropical storms, flooding, landslides and droughts. It is also vulnerable to earthquakes.²

Haiti's observed mean temperature ranges from 19°C to 28°C in the winter and 23°C to 33°C during the summer months (1991–2020). Since 1960, the observed mean temperature has risen by 0.45° C.³ Annual precipitation averages 1200 mm in the mountain regions and 550 mm in the lowlands (1991–2020).⁴ Haiti's climate is impacted by the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). During El Niño events, Haiti experiences drier and warmer weather conditions, which heighten the risk of droughts and impair agricultural production. During La Niña years, Haiti experiences wetter conditions than usual, increasing the risk of flooding and landslides.⁵

Conservative projections indicate that Haiti will experience sustained increases in seasonal mean surface air temperatures, ranging from 30.3°C in the winter to 32.7°C in the summer (2020–39).⁶ Precipitation projections indicate a decline in seasonal rainfall, particularly between June and September, reducing the predictability of rains and putting pressure on rain-fed agriculture; which would impact the majority of Haiti's agricultural sector.⁷ When interacting with ENSO, the effects of climate change can lead to more intense and irregular rainfall and more intense droughts.

Socioecological vulnerabilities

The World Bank estimates that about 96 per cent of Haiti's population is exposed to climate shocks.⁸ Over the past 30 years, Haiti has experienced 34 flooding events, 35 significant storms and 31 hurricanes.⁹ One of the most devastating examples is Hurricane Matthew, which struck Haiti in 2016 and is estimated to have caused losses and damages equivalent to 32 per cent of total gross domestic product (GDP).¹⁰ Earthquakes have also caused extreme damage. In 2010, a devastating earthquake led to the deaths of over 220 000 people and caused damage equivalent to 120 per cent of GDP; in 2021, another earthquake caused 2246 deaths, destroyed 54 000 houses and damaged 84 770 buildings, including schools, health facilities and public buildings.¹¹

By 2026, as much as 37 per cent of Haiti's population will live under the extreme poverty line (living on less than \$2.15 per day).¹² This limits people's preparedness and coping mechanisms for the adverse effects of climate change. People's vulnerability to extreme weather is worsened by weak governance, and the magnitude of flooding and droughts is exacerbated by deforestation, as steep, barren hills surrounding populous cities in valleys along the coast flush rainwater towards urban areas.¹³

The adverse effects of climate change in Haiti put additional pressure on the dire humanitarian situation in the country. Food insecurity persists at alarming levels. The number of people experiencing food insecurity in Haiti has tripled since 2016, and 2 million people currently face emergency levels of food insecurity; an increase of 42 per cent since August 2023.¹⁴ At least 1 million children are facing critical food insecurity in Haiti, while an estimated 2.85 million children face consistently high food insecurity across the country.¹⁵ Moreover, increased precipitation and flooding contribute to the spread of water-borne (typhoid, cholera, diarrhoea) and vector-borne (malaria, dengue, chikungunya) diseases due to inadequate waste management systems.¹⁶

Climate-related peace and security risks

Climate change is rarely the main driver of conflict, but it can undermine development gains, exacerbate the dynamics of ongoing violence, amplify existing tensions and disrupt fragile peace processes. Violent conflict and political instability can also weaken community resilience to the effects of climate change. This fact sheet uses four interrelated pathways to navigate the relationship between climate change, peace and security: (*a*) livelihood impacts, (*b*) migration and mobility, (*c*) armed actors and security, and (*d*) political and economic grievances.¹⁷

Livelihood impacts

Haiti's economy is largely based on agricultural exports such as coffee, cocoa, maize and rice. At the same time, 92 per cent of the agricultural sector is rain-fed, which makes the economy susceptible to the adverse effects of climate change.¹⁸ Compounding the problem, Haiti's economy has been damaged by the political and security crisis, with knock-on effects on livelihoods, health, gender equality and development.

Deteriorating livelihood conditions erode people's coping capacities, increase their vulnerability to shocks, including climate shocks, and give rise to economic, social and political grievances.

Haiti is acutely exposed to livelihood shocks. Approximately 66 per cent of the rural population works in the agricultural sector, and local production covers 50 per cent of the country's total food needs.¹⁹ Other food needs are covered by imports and humanitarian assistance. However, these have been constrained in recent months by gangs operating in airports and ports, as well as by the sudden reduction in humanitarian funding from the United States of America.²⁰ Haiti's crisis has also had significant effects on household finances. Some 43 per cent of female heads of household have borrowed money to manage current shocks, which increases their indebtedness and threatens the long-term financial security of their dependents.²¹ Moreover, lawlessness and gang control have led to a dramatic increase in sexual violence against girls and women, with figures from February 2025 showing that sexual violence against children in Haiti had increased tenfold in the preceding year.²²

Climate change has worsened food insecurity in Haiti by exacerbating environmental degradation and reducing soil fertility and water supply during prolonged dry seasons. Climate change also leads to seasonal shifts, impacting planting and growing seasons and changing the prevalence of pests and pathogens. This in turn pushes up food prices by reducing market supply.

Long-term droughts in 2015–16 reduced crop production by up to 70 per cent in parts of the country, and a drought between 2018 and the first half of 2019 shrank agricultural production by at least 12 per

- ¹⁴ World Food Programme, 'Emergencies—Haiti', accessed 15 Apr. 2025.
- ¹⁵ UNICEF, 'At least one million children facing emergency levels of food insecurity in Haiti', accessed 8 May 2025.
- ¹⁶ Diouf, I., Sy, I. and Diakhaté, M. 'Assessing climate change impacts on public health in Haiti: A comprehensive study of disease distribution, modeling, and adaptation strategies', *Frontiers in Tropical Diseases*, vol. 4 (Feb. 2024).
- ¹⁷ Mobjörk, M., Krampe, F. and Tarif, K., 'Pathways of climate insecurity: Guidance for policymakers', SIPRI Policy Brief, Nov. 2020.
- ¹⁸ World Bank (note 2).
- ¹⁹ USAID, 'Haiti: Climate risks to resilience food security in bureau for humanitarian assistance geographies', 30 Sep. 2020.
- ²⁰ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), 'Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) persist as gang violence intensifies', Haiti—Key Message Update, Nov. 2024; and ACAPS, 'Haiti: Anticipated implications of US funding freeze', Anticipatory Note, 21 Feb. 2025.
- ²¹ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), 'Haïti: Analyse IPC de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë—août 2024–juin 2025' [Haiti: IPC analysis of acute food insecurity—Aug. 2024–June 2025], 30 Sep. 2024.

¹ World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 'Haiti: Current climate—Climatology', accessed 15 Apr. 2025.

² World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 'Haiti: Country summary', accessed 15 Apr. 2025.

³ Frake, A. et al. 'Climate and health vulnerability assessment: Haiti', World Bank, Mar. 2024.

⁴ World Bank (note 1).

⁵ World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 'Haiti: Current climate—Trends and significant change against natural variability', accessed 15 Apr. 2025.

⁶ These projections are based on the Sixth Phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6) and Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) 1–2.6; see World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 'Haiti: Climate projections–Mean projections', accessed 15 Apr. 2025.

⁷ World Bank (note 2).

⁸ World Bank (note 2).

⁹ Frake, A. et al. (note 3).

¹⁰ UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), Regional Office for the Americas and the Caribbean, 'DRR critical to \$2.7 bn Haiti recovery effort', 3 Mar. 2017.

¹¹ World Bank, 'The World Bank in Haiti', accessed 15 Apr. 2025.

¹² World Bank (note 11).

¹³ Frake, A. et al. (note 3).

²² Elder, J., 'Haiti's children under siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and

cent compared to previous years.²³ A drought in 2024 also affected crop producers during the winter harvest in January and February.²⁴ The effects of climate change are expected to decrease livestock growth rates and milk production, reduce grazing pastures and fodder, and limit water availability for livestock due to the salinization of coastal water resources driven by rising sea levels. Climate change also increases the risk of more frequent or widespread outbreaks of livestock pests and diseases, leading to livestock losses.²⁵

There is a pressing need for data, research and learning on the socio-economic consequences of the convergence of climate change, environmental degradation and insecurity in Haiti. Specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations from across the UN system should collaborate by sharing data and analyses that inform climate-sensitive policies and programming in the short term, and disaster risk reduction in the long term.

Migration and mobility

Climate change interacts with migration and mobility in different ways: for example, extreme weather can lead to displacement and changing seasonal weather conditions can alter mobility patterns. In some cases, this contributes to

tensions between migrants and host communities, for instance due to competing demands for natural resources or limited coping capacities. $^{\rm 26}$

As of February 2025, gang violence in Haiti has led to the internal displacement of more than 1 million people, equalling roughly one tenth of the population.²⁷ Women and children have been particularly affected, with reports showing that minors make up more than half of the displaced population and that 55 per cent of displaced people are women and girls.²⁸

Climate change-related extreme weather events also cause displacement in Haiti, for example by increasing the risk of landslides and flooding during periods of intense rainfall. Flooding can also force people who are already displaced to move again, leading to secondary displacement, especially during La Niña years. In November 2024, torrential rains, and the severe flooding that followed, led to secondary displacement in the Sud Department, which at the time hosted 116 602 internally displaced persons (IDPs); including 36 813 in the regional capital, Les Cayes, which was one the worst-hit municipalities in the region.²⁹ An estimated 26 per cent of displaced households in Haiti have been displaced more than once, but in the Port-au-Prince area, as many as 52 per cent of IDPs have been displaced more than once.³⁰

Some 75 per cent of displaced people are living with host families in departments outside of Port-au-Prince, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that 68 per cent of host communities are negatively affected by the displacement crisis.³¹ Reduced access to food and water, and higher market prices fuel tensions between IDPs and host communities.³² In some cases, these tensions cause IDPs to leave host communities for more precarious


recruitment by armed groups', UNICEF Press Briefing, 7 Feb. 2025.

- ²³ Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), 'Belgium and FAO support the Government of Haiti to improve the livelihoods of drought-affected households in the North-East', 18 Feb. 2020.
- ²⁴ FAO, 'Livelihoods at risk due to the effects of El Niño compounded by an upsurge in violence—Executive brief of the DIEM-Monitoring assessment round 5', Jan. 2024.
 ²⁵ USAID (note 19).

²⁶ Mobjörk, Krampe and Tarif (note 17).

- ²⁷ UN Humanitarian Coordinator, 'Haiti: Over one million displaced by gang violence', 27 Feb. 2025.
- ²⁸ IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 'Rapport sur la situation de déplacement interne en Haïti–Round 9 (Décembre 2024)' [Report on the internal displacement situation in Haiti–Round 9 (December 2024)], Dec. 2024.
- ²⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Haiti: Floods in the South Department–Flash update no. 01 (as of 15 November 2024)', Nov. 2024.
- ³⁰ IOM, DTM, 'Displacement dynamics in Haiti–Understanding the relationships between IDPs and their host communities, impact of IDPs' arrival on these





Jare: The different phases of acute food insecurity are used to reflect the severity of food insecurity in a given area. Tolent incidents refers to battles and attacks against civilians. Journes: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), 'Hait: Acute food insecurity situation for August 2024–February 2025 and projection for Marc

grated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), 'Haiti: Acute food insecurity situation for August 2024–February 2025 and projection for March–June 2025', accessed 12 rmed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 'Political violence events–Haiti, August 2024–February 2025', accessed 17 Apr. 2025.

and improvised displacement sites where they are exposed to security risks such as communal violence, sexual violence, discrimination or abuse.³³ Large-scale deportations of Haitians from the neighbouring Dominican Republic place additional pressure on host communities.³⁴

International agencies like the World Food Program and the IOM should work with the Haitian government to strengthen long-term livelihood and food security by investing in low-cost and regenerative nature-based solutions to address environmental degradation in rural areas impacted by Haiti's current displacement crisis.

Armed actors and security

When mandating the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the UN Security Council noted that climate change adversely affects food security, water scarcity and the humanitarian situation in Haiti, and that insecurity is one of the main factors hindering efforts to reduce risk and build preparedness and resilience.³⁵

Since 2021, armed and criminal groups have gradually gained territorial control over parts of Haiti.³⁶ An estimated 85 per cent of the capital, Port-au-Prince, is now under the control of armed groups; the Viv Ansanm gang alliance has also expanded its control to parts of Ouest Department.³⁷ As part of this territorial expansion, gang violence has surged. According to the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), in 2024 more than 5600 people were killed, 2212 people were injured and 1494 kidnapped as a direct result of gang violence. OHCHR also recorded 315 lynchings of gang members and people allegedly associated with gangs, indicating a rising trend of vigilante violence in the absence of effective policing.³⁸ Gang violence has restricted movement in Port-au-Prince and on major transport routes, restricting goods as well as people, and reducing market supply to the capital and other regions.³⁹ Recent reports indicate that at least 30 per cent of

communities, the displacement history of IDPs and their return intentions (September 2024)', Sep. 2024.

- ³¹ UN Security Council, 'United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General', 13 Jan. 2025.
- ³² IOM, DTM (note 30).
- ³³ IOM, DTM, 'Displaced Haitians face greater risks in improvised sites', 16 Aug. 2023.
- ³⁴ IOM, DTM, 'Haiti situation report, April 2025', Apr. 2025.
- ³⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 2743, 12 July 2024, para. 15.
- ³⁶ Human Rights Watch (HRW), 'Haiti: Criminal violence, hunger trapping children', 9 Oct. 2024.

³⁷ Elder (note 22).

³⁸ OHCHR and BINUH, 'At least 262 people were killed and 66 others injured, resulting in a heavy humanitarian toll during gang attacks aimed at expanding territorial control over Kenscoff and Carrefour', Flash Report, Apr. 2025; and OHCHR, 'Haiti: Over 5,600 killed in gang violence in 2024, UN figures show', Press Release, 7 Jan. 2025.

³⁹ FEWS NET (note 20).

gang members are children, and gangs' recruitment of children, along with sexual violence against children, has increased exponentially since 2023.⁴⁰

In 2023 the UN Security Council authorized the MSS mission to provide support to the Haitian national police, facilitate humanitarian aid and, in exceptional circumstances, carry out arrests and detentions in coordination with the national police.⁴¹ Efforts to restore security through policing should be complemented by creating the economic conditions to socially reintegrate former gang members, particularly forcibly-recruited members, female and child recruits, for instance through climate-change resilient livelihood options.

BINUH, the MSS mission and the UN Climate Security Mechanism should advocate for, showcase good practices from and mobilize resources for existing efforts to develop integrated approaches tackling the adverse effects of climate change on peace and security in Haiti. This could feed into existing governmental coordination mechanisms, for example the interministerial task force on disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration and community violence reduction, to develop awareness among security actors of the longterm challenges posed by climate change. The UN Security Council's Informal Expert Group on Climate,

Peace and Security should continue monitoring the situation in Haiti to better inform the council's actions.

Political and economic grievances


Research has identified numerous examples where powerful elites exploited the effects of climate change at the expense of vulnerable groups; as well as examples where a lack of government legitimacy hampered efforts to adapt to the worst effects of global warming.⁴² Haiti's history of colonial exploitation, corruption, repeated coup d'états, as well as several scandals involving foreign aid schemes, has left many Haitians as sceptical of political elites as of foreign interventions.⁴³

Insecurity has plunged Haiti into a deep political and economic crisis and made the country increasingly vulnerable to real and urgent climate risks. Haiti's exposure to climate change is high; it is a small nation exposed to extreme weather and earthquakes. Decades of weak governance, poverty and marginalization have compounded this vulnerability, amplifying the impacts of natural disasters on the population. As a result of gang violence, political infighting and limited, primarily securitized international responses to the conflict, food insecurity has escalated sharply, with knock-on effects for livelihoods, health, gender equality and development. There is an urgent need for Haitian authorities to build community resilience to climate shocks.

- ⁴⁰ HRW (note 36); HRW, 'Haiti: Escalating violence; humanitarian crisis', 16 Jan. 2025; and Amnesty International, "I'm a child, why did this happen to me?": Gangs' assault on childhood in Haiti', 12 Feb. 2025.
- ⁴¹ The MMS mission has been severely challenged by understaffing and inadequate access to reliable funding; nonetheless, its mandate has been renewed until September 2025. The government of Haiti has proposed that it be transformed into a peacekeeping mission to provide it with more funding and a broader mandate. See: UN Security Council, 'Letter dated 22 October 2024 from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council', 25 Oct. 2024.
- ⁴² van Baalen, S. and Mobjörk, M., 'Climate change and violent conflict in East Africa: Integrating qualitative and quantitative research to probe the mechanisms', *International Studies Review*, vol. 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2018).
 ⁴³ Oxfam, 'Haiti investigation report', 2011.
- ⁴⁴ Flécher, J. 'Haiti's costly presidential council on brink of collapse amid deepening

Figure 3. Land productivity, cyclone hazards and displacement in Haiti

Land productivity trends



Note: This data covers the period of a dramatic rise in the number of people displaced by violence in Haiti, to the most recent data at the time of publication. There is a pressing need for data on the socio-economic consequences of the convergence of climate change, environmental degradation and insecurity in Haiti. Recent data shows land degradation trends in some runal reas affected by the current displacement crisic. Displaced people are very exposed to natural hazarafici, including cyclones. Sources: International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 'Haiti Emergency Tracking Tool Dataset, January 2023-April 2025', accessed 12 May 2025; EarthMap, Tand Productivity Dynamics (JPD Trend – MODIS), Haiti, 2024; 14 Jan. 2025; World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 'Haiti: Estimate Risk Index for Trajoial Cyclene Hazard'; In Climate Change Country Pohle for Haiti, p. 3, TApr. 2011.

> Haiti's TPC was mandated to facilitate national presidential elections by February 2026 and has committed to holding a constitutional referendum by May 2025, though no date has yet been set. However, in 2024, three key members of the TPC were accused of serious corruption and the TPC was criticized for excessive spending of public funds.⁴⁴ Tensions within the TPC have been acknowledged publicly; this has undermined public confidence and cast doubt on the TPC's ability to meet its stated aims and bring peace to Haiti.

> BINUH has been mandated to use its good offices role to support the TPC in facilitating free, fair and transparent elections and to help the Haitian government pursue stability, food security and the protection of human rights, in addition to other sustainable development goals.⁴⁵ BINUH, the UN Country Team and other actors within the UN system should support intra-Haitian dialogue on climate change, peace and security, and facilitate efforts by Haitian women, men and youth to define national response strategies.⁴⁶ A viable approach would be to support existing intra-Haitian dialogue coordinated by the Haiti Climate Security Group, as well as efforts to develop a national policy on climate security in Haiti that defines national strategies and mainstreams climate, peace and security in government priorities.⁴⁷

- ⁴⁵ UN Security Council (note 35).
- ⁴⁶ UN Security Council (note 31). Dialogue initiatives could build on existing expert groups, including the Haiti Climate Security Working Group: see Mosello, B., Destrijcker, L. and McMurray, S.A., 'Roots for Peace: Uncovering climate security challenges in Haiti and what to do about them', Weathering Risk, Oct. 2023.
- ⁴⁷ The Haiti Climate Security Group (HCSG) was created in 2022 by the UN Environment Programme and the Haitian Ministry of Environment, with the support of the UN Climate Security Mechanism, following Norway's request at the UN Security Council that BINUH consider the broader factors contributing to instability in Haiti, including climate change. The HCSG is a multidimensional dialogue space comprising more than 60 organisations, including 5 Haitian government institutions, 15 UN agencies, 5 international partners, 10 international NGOs and 30 civil society organisations, including federations with more than 80 member organisations.

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The Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheets aim to generate reliable, relevant, timely and actionable information and analysis on climate-related peace and security risks in selected countries and regions on the United Nations Security Council agenda.

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corruption scandal', 15 Oct. 2024.