FIT FOR PURPOSE

Effective Peace Operation Partnerships in an Era of Non-Traditional Security Challenges

JAÏR VAN DER LIJN

FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF PEACE OPERATIONS III INITIATIVE
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD

Stefan Löfven, Chair (Sweden)
Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Ghana)
Ambassador Chan Heng Chee (Singapore)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)
Dr Radha Kumar (India)
Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom)
Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States)

DIRECTOR

Dan Smith (United Kingdom)
FIT FOR PURPOSE

Effective Peace Operation Partnerships
in an Era of Non-Traditional Security Challenges

JAÏR VAN DER LIJN

FINAL REPORT OF THE
NEW GEOPOLITICS OF PEACE
OPERATIONS III INITIATIVE

February 2024

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Contents

Acknowledgements v
Abbreviations vi
Executive summary vii

1. Introduction 1
Defining non-traditional security challenges 2
The third phase of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations initiative 4
Report outline 5

2. Non-traditional security challenges in peace operations 6
Terrorism and violent extremism 6
Organized crime 8
Irregular migration and human trafficking 9
Environmental degradation and resource scarcity 11
Epidemics and pandemics 14

Table 2.1. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to counter terrorism and prevent or counter violent extremism 7
Table 2.2. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to combat organized crime 8
Table 2.3. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to address irregular migration and human trafficking 10
Table 2.4. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to address environmental degradation and resource scarcity 12
Table 2.5. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to address epidemics and pandemics 14

3. The opportunities and challenges for peace operations when addressing non-traditional security challenges 16
Opportunities 16
Challenges 22

4. Cooperation and coordination 32
Internal coordination 32
Coordination with national actors 34
International coordination 37
UN whole of system 38
EU whole of system 42
Inter-mission coordination 43

5. Conclusions 45
Peace operations and non-traditional security challenges 45
Coordination and cooperation with other actors 47
The challenges of a changing global environment 48

6. Policy implications and recommendations 49
Recommendations 49

About the author 55
Acknowledgments

The SIPRI New Geopolitics of Peace Operations III Initiative is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and is conducted in partnership with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Responsibility for the information and views set out in this report lies entirely with the author. The author is indebted to the participants of the dialogue meetings for their rich and valuable input. He would also like to acknowledge the authors of the background papers that provided the basis for the dialogue meetings. Lastly, the author is grateful to the reviewers for their very constructive feedback.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISON</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPPA</td>
<td>Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td>EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Geopolitics of Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>Preventing violent extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>UN Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEER</td>
<td>UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>UN Support Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

Multilateral peace operations are not necessarily thought of as important players in the field of non-traditional security challenges—terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, irregular migration and human trafficking, environmental degradation and resource scarcity, and epidemics and pandemics. In the past three decades, however, both United Nations and non-UN operations have been mandated to take on various tasks linked to the drivers and consequences of these challenges. Over time, various aspects of these non-traditional security challenges have received varying levels of attention according to mission and organization.

These challenges can destabilize countries, destroy the social fabric and risk derailing peace processes or progress on peace and security in already fragile countries. Therefore, there are clear advantages in multilateral peace operations taking on tasks linked to non-traditional security challenges. For example, their logistics and resources often go far beyond the capacity of any other actor when they are dedicated to dealing with non-traditional security challenges. However, there are also strong disadvantages. For example, most multilateral peace operations are already overstretched, and addressing non-traditional security challenges adds additional decoration to their ‘Christmas tree’ mandates. In addition, other organizations are often better positioned to take on non-traditional security challenges, which generally require long-term investment and commitment, as multilateral peace operations are generally only deployed for shorter periods. How these advantages and disadvantages are weighed will differ according to each challenge and geographical location, and perceptions can change over time.

Regardless of which organization takes the lead in dealing with them, non-traditional security challenges are important to mandate implementation by multilateral peace operations. Operations must collaborate, cooperate and coordinate with all the various actors involved: internally within the mission, with national partners such as host governments and civil society, and with other international actors ranging from regional organizations to the UN Country Team or European Union Delegation. A rough division of labour has emerged in which complex constellations of actors are deployed in multilateral peace operations. However, tasks are distributed based on activities but without any underlying joint analysis or strategy. Better coordination of efforts is therefore possible.

The challenges of a changing global environment

In line with the New Agenda for Peace, the current trend is to continue the move away from the deployment of UN and multidimensional operations, and towards small political or larger militarized operations deployed in partnership with regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions. This will have implications for how multilateral peace operations deal with non-traditional security challenges and how they collaborate with others. Non-UN multilateral peace operations with uniformed personnel focused on, for example, counterterrorism in the Sahel, combatting gang crime in Haiti or disrupting irregular migration seem likely to continue. The diminution of multidimensional operations, however, means that other non-traditional security challenges, such as environmental degradation and resource scarcity, as well as pandemics and epidemics, are more likely to be dealt with in the context of smaller political missions.

Most regional organizations do not have the agencies and specialized organizations that the UN has for dealing with non-traditional security challenges. Therefore, as peace operation partnerships become more frequent, coordination and cooperation are likely to become more difficult. UN peace operations will continue to face fragmented
approaches while being expected to act in an integrated way but also continue to outsource tasks to regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions. Joint analysis, planning, training, implementation and evaluation are likely to become even more difficult with this variety of partners. Ad hoc alliances in particular will have to reinvent the wheel over and over in the absence of a capacity for retaining institutional memory. Budgets and resources may not be readily available in every organization. Policies will need to be put in place, including on human rights due diligence, to guide practice on the ground. Coordination mechanisms will often have to be established. Transitioning within one organization is already a challenge but transitioning from one organization to another will face even more obstacles. While standing capacities may smooth processes, these do not exist in every organization. As a consequence, coordinating efforts on non-traditional security challenges in the context of multilateral peace operations may become even more difficult in future.

**Policy implications and recommendations**

The policy implications of this study can be clustered into the need to: (a) better operationalize either integration or outsourcing efforts in a well-coordinated division of labour; (b) invest more in joint analysis, planning, training, implementation and evaluation; (c) further streamline budget procedures; (d) further develop policies on non-traditional security challenges; (e) strengthen coordination mechanisms; (f) consider standing capacity options; (g) increase political awareness in peace operations and set conditionalities; (h) strengthen the application of long-term perspectives; (i) support transition processes; and (j) set up forums for cross-country and cross-organizational cooperation.
1. Introduction

Multilateral organizations have adapted their multilateral peace operations and crisis management instruments to better address non-traditional security challenges, such as terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, irregular migration and human trafficking, environmental degradation and resource scarcity, and epidemics and pandemics.

The African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) have each had to deal with terrorism and violent extremism on a regular basis, the latter despite the fact that the UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations was very clear in its recommendation that United Nations troops ‘should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations’.1

The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) struggled with gang-related violence, and the UN Security Council is currently considering the deployment of a non-UN Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti.2 Organized crime is often interwoven with national politics in countries that are host to multilateral peace operations.

Since the 1990s, UN peace operations have played a role in refugee repatriation and protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs). Since 1999, this has been in the context of the protection of civilians. Increasing awareness of and providing technical support to the Malian judicial authorities addressing the trafficking of persons and the smuggling of migrants were added to MINUSMA’s mandate in 2018 and 2019, respectively.3 The European Union (EU) has conducted a military operation under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Mediterranean to disrupt human smuggling networks and prevent the loss of life at sea (EUNAVFOR Mediterranean/ Operation Sophia), while some of its border assistance missions either directly or indirectly address irregular immigration, and in 2016 the mandate of the EU CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) was redirected to assist ‘the Nigerien central and local authorities and security forces in developing policies, techniques and procedures to better control and fight irregular migration’.4

Similarly, the Security Council has provided many UN peace operations with mandates to deal with conflict resources (see below) since the 1990s, and more recently environmental awareness has grown beyond ideas about ‘greening the blue’ helmets. Attention has moved from increasing the environmental sustainability of operations themselves—‘inside the fence’—to also seeking to contribute to the environmental sustainability of the host country beyond the mission ‘outside the fence’.5 According to former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), for example, was conducted in response to a conflict that began as an ecological crisis.6 Since 2017, when the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) were formally tasked with

---

5 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNEP: Nairobi, 2012).
considering the impact of climate change in their risk assessments, various UN peace operations have been mandated to undertake climate change-related activities.\(^7\)

Finally, even before the Covid-19 pandemic, in Haiti, West Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), UN missions faced epidemics such as cholera and Ebola, while various UN peace operations have played a role in prevention and the response to the impacts of HIV/AIDS. The UN General Assembly established the UN’s first ever emergency health mission, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), in 2014.\(^8\)

This growing trend for addressing non-traditional security challenges through multilateral peace operations and the emerging debate about the utility of such operations were raised in the first two phases of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations (NGP) initiative. One of the key findings of those phases is that the success of future multilateral peace operations is likely to be closely linked to their ability to respond effectively to non-traditional challenges to security. Interlocutors in previous NGP phases have highlighted how non-traditional security challenges are likely to become increasingly prominent in environments where peace operations are deployed. While some participants in the initiative argued that multilateral peace operations must adapt to remain relevant, others warned that such operations are rarely the right tool for addressing non-traditional security challenges and that mission mandates should not be overloaded with additional objectives—a phenomenon the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the ‘HIPPO report’) calls ‘Christmas tree mandates’.\(^9\) Some also expressed concerns that incorporating non-traditional security challenges into future peace operation mandates might securitize these challenges unnecessarily.\(^10\)

**Defining non-traditional security challenges**

Non-traditional security challenges are defined by scholars and organizations in different ways. A commonly referred to definition of the overall concept is that of Mely Caballero-Anthony, who describes them as: ‘challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime’.\(^11\)

There are no universally accepted definitions of terrorism or violent extremism and both terms are often used interchangeably.\(^12\) For political and pragmatic reasons, the UN has left their definition to the discretion of individual member states.\(^13\) The closest the Security Council has thus far come to a definition of terrorism is: ‘criminal acts,
including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Violent extremism is usually seen as support for or justification of ideologically motivated violence, without necessarily direct participation in it.

There are also various definitions of organized crime, depending on the context, sector and organization. However, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines an ‘organized criminal group’ as ‘a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences . . . in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’.

The meaning of irregular migration is somewhat clearer. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as the ‘Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination’. Trafficking in persons (human trafficking) is legally defined as ‘[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation’.

In this project, ‘resource scarcity’ is understood as ‘tensions that arise over contested natural resources, whether renewable resources (such as water and timber) or non-renewable resources (such as land and minerals)’. ‘Environmental degradation’ refers to ‘issues stemming from the impacts of human activity that degrade the capacity of those resources to sustain healthy human lives, whether through pollution, poor management or the impacts of climate change’.

The difference between pandemics and epidemics relates to the rate and extent of the spread of a disease. An epidemic is a sudden rapid increase in the number of disease cases affecting a large number of people in a given population or specific geographical area. The World Health Organization (WHO) declares a pandemic when a disease undergoes exponential growth affecting a wide geographical area.

While each of the above is a non-traditional security challenge, they are all often linked to conflict. They might directly or indirectly feed into a conflict and its causes, but also feed off conflict and the impact it has on effective governance. For example, jihadist groups in the Sahel are thriving on a vicious circle of community conflict, weak governance and increased poverty linked to climate change and the economic crisis.
following Covid-19. They collaborate or merge with criminal organizations and human traffickers, engaging in such activities to fund their own aims. This in turn further increases the potential for conflict, further weakens governance, exacerbates poverty and inequality, and curtails the ability to deal with disease.23

The third phase of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations initiative

Research questions and objectives

The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations initiative was designed as a set of projects to promote innovative research and international dialogue on the future of peace operations around the globe and in key regional contexts. Its third phase focused on the above five non-traditional security challenges, and particularly on the question of how multilateral peace operations should respond to security environments that increasingly involve such challenges. It devised three research questions:

1. To what extent should multilateral peace operations (UN and non-UN) play an active role in preventing, managing and resolving non-traditional security challenges?

2. If they should, how and with which instruments could they best achieve this, and which organization(s) or actor(s) would be best positioned to conduct such operations?

3. Regardless of the answer to 1, how can multilateral peace operations best cooperate and coordinate with those instruments or organizations outside the context of peace operations already dealing with non-traditional security challenges?

The project’s objectives were fourfold:

1. Further understanding: to gather data on existing knowledge and the various perceptions, positions and interests of relevant stakeholders, and on the basis of this evidence to map the policy space for the potential role of multilateral peace operations—what they can and cannot do—in respect of non-traditional security challenges.

2. Strengthen dialogue and cooperation: to create new dedicated forums in which the role of multilateral peace operations in addressing non-traditional security challenges could be freely discussed. It sought to enhance communication and understanding of various perspectives and of needs in different parts of the globe. In doing so, it sought to build bridges that could facilitate sustainable cooperation on peace operations and conflict management by soliciting inputs from key stakeholders across the world.

3. Advance the debate and provide practical policy recommendations: to advance the emerging debate on how the international community can best address non-traditional security challenges, and the broader discussion on the future direction and scope of multilateral peace operations.

4. **Enhance global partnerships**: to strengthen global partnerships on multilateral peace operations by including partners from around the world in the dialogue meetings.

**Project methodology**

As in the previous phases of the NGP initiative, dialogue meetings, in which selected participants discussed the questions listed above, were at the core of the data collection. The NGP III meetings were jointly organized by SIPRI and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Among the participants were: military, police and civilian mission personnel; representatives of key contributing and host states; representatives of international organizations, either deploying or deployed in operations; representatives of relevant agencies and programmes that missions either coordinate or cooperate with; experts on security or development; and representatives of civil society. Each dialogue meeting started from the current debate as identified in a background paper, and aimed to enhance knowledge and further the policy debate. In addition to serving as a dialogue platform, the meetings functioned as focus groups for providing core data inputs into this report. The dialogue process began in 2017 but the findings remain highly relevant today. This final report describes how the dialogue meetings built on the policy briefs, and advanced knowledge and policy discussion on key questions.

**Report outline**

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the various activities that multilateral organizations conducting peace operations in complex environments undertake to address the drivers and consequences of non-traditional security challenges. It sets out to identify whether a division of labour is emerging between different actors.

Chapter 3 takes stock of the possible implications of UN and non-UN multilateral peace operations seeking to address non-traditional security challenges. It investigates the opportunities and challenges presented by doing so or not doing so.

Multilateral peace operations operate alongside a variety of other actors, both international and local. These range from host governments and civil society organizations to international donors, NGOs and UN agencies. Chapter 4 examines cooperation and coordination between peace operations and these other actors in the field, in relation to non-traditional security challenges.

Chapter 5 draws overall conclusions on the role of peace operations vis-à-vis non-traditional security challenges and the implications for coordination and cooperation with other actors working on these issues. Chapter 6 concludes the report by considering the policy implications of the findings.

---


2. Non-traditional security challenges in peace operations

Terrorism and violent extremism

While the UN has been very active in the fields of preventing violent extremism (PVE), countering violent extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism (CT), most of these activities have been developed outside of multilateral peace operation contexts, and little attention has been paid to synergies and intersections.\(^\text{26}\) The discussion in the UN Security Council and among a number of troop-contributing countries is highly sensitive to UN peacekeeping operations getting involved in PVE/CVE, let alone the use of force in the context of CT. African governments generally support including CT activities in UN peace operation mandates, while other troop-contributing countries are moving more slowly or oppose their inclusion. In the Security Council, China and Russia view this as a western agenda, but China is generally supportive where African states demand it.\(^\text{27}\)

That is not to say, however, that UN peacekeeping operations have not taken on direct or indirect activities targeting the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism (see table 2.1). Stabilization-, development-, human rights- and rule of law-related activities in particular target drivers both indirectly and directly. The consequences of terrorism and violent extremism have led UN peace operations at times to engage indirectly in activities aimed at counterterrorism and countering or preventing violent extremism. MINUSMA’s mandate was to support the Bamako/Algiers peace agreement, which contains aspects that deal with CT. At the request of the host government, the justice and corrections section supported prosecutors and special investigators with addressing terrorist acts.\(^\text{28}\) Similarly, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) has been mandated to support the Somali National Strategy and Action Plan on Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism.\(^\text{29}\) The role UN peacekeeping operations might play falls within the context of the third pillar of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, building the capacity of host states to prevent and combat terrorism.\(^\text{30}\) For this purpose, the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism notes that preventing violent extremism is intended to be integrated into UN peacekeeping operations and special political mission mandates.\(^\text{31}\)

The AU is much more willing to integrate activities that directly target the consequences of terrorism and violent extremism, such as military CT, into its peace support operations. It has also included CVE in the activities of the civilian components of AMISOM and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia.\(^\text{32}\) Thus, a division of labour has emerged in which African regional organizations and ad hoc operations, such as the AU, its African Peace and Security Architecture or the G5 Sahel, take on

\(^{26}\) UN official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\(^{27}\) Member state representative no. 1 and member state representative no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\(^{28}\) UN official no. 1, UN official no. 2, and UN official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; and MINUSMA, Justice and Corrections, [n. d.].


\(^{31}\) United Nations (note 1); and UN official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\(^{32}\) AU official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
Table 2.1. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to counter terrorism and prevent or counter violent extremism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting drivers</th>
<th>Targeting consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic communications</td>
<td>• Kinetic military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Victim assistance</td>
<td>• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peer-to-peer engagement</td>
<td>• Law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Early warning of radicalization</td>
<td>• Demobilizing and disengaging violent extremists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Empowerment of youth and women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human rights and rule of law monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community engagement and resilience building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assisting host governments (and other local actors) in areas such as sustainable development, institution building and governance, livelihood and employment, and education and development</td>
<td>• Capacity building and training of national security and law enforcement entities, including in areas such as border management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assisting with the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of former members of violent extremist groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The example activities included have been identified from peace operation mandates or are selected from examples in the literature. Activities are not unique to one category and the categories can overlap.


more robust and direct tasks, even though these organizations are not necessarily the best trained or resourced for this purpose. However, African organizations and their member states have a greater interest in African security and are more willing to intervene. Under the AU Constitutive Act, particularly in the case of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, the AU does not have to wait for UN Security Council approval or funding. At the same time, however, AU officials in the dialogue meetings perceived that the UN often looks down on them as less competent.33

Similarly, in its direct and indirect activities, NATO has mainly focused on the consequences of terrorism and violent extremism. It led ISAF in Afghanistan, where it conducted military CT operations, and has undertaken more indirect activities in the context of its training and advisory missions elsewhere.34 EU CSDP missions generally do not have executive mandates to conduct direct activities, but EU military training missions and some of its civilian CSDP missions, in line with the Civilian CSDP Compact, support host governments with addressing terrorism by building capacity, providing training and advising security and defence sectors on security sector reform (SSR), strengthening the rule of law and addressing asymmetric threats.35

---

33 Member state representative no. 2, Breakout group no. 2, and AU officials no. 1 and no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; see also the Constitutive Act of African Union, Lomé, 11 July 2000.

34 NATO official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

Combating organized crime as part of UN peacekeeping operation mandates is much less controversial than addressing terrorism and violent extremism, as it is generally seen as supporting the national sovereignty of the host country. Multidimensional UN operations in particular address the drivers and consequences of organized crime in various direct and indirect ways (see table 2.2). Training and capacity building of national police forces are the bread and butter of UN Police (UNPOL) components of missions. In 1999, the UN Mission in Kosovo and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor received the first executive policing mandates and anti-gang operations were made part of the activities of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

AU operations only deal with organized crime on an ad hoc basis and do not include executive tasks. AMISOM, for example, was not mandated to deal with organized crime.

Table 2.2. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to combat organized crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting drivers</th>
<th>Targeting consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Executive policing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alternative livelihoods and alternative legitimacies</td>
<td>• Anti-gang operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sensitization to human rights, corruption and inclusiveness</td>
<td>• Tracking, fighting and combating organized crime and banditry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quick-impact projects to support community resilience</td>
<td>• Supporting, monitoring and verifying bans and moratoriums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community engagement and resilience building</td>
<td>• Investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating on and enforcement in cases of organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Specialized disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) projects</td>
<td>• Border security and counter-trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Counter-narcotics, e.g. crop eradication and trade interdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vetting and certifying police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporting, training and building the capacity of agencies such as</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the police, border security and coastguard, as well as the justice sector more broadly, to tackle and combat organized crime in areas such as: illicit economic activities and illicit trade in natural resources; drugs control and counter-narcotics; illicit trafficking of arms, drugs and persons; border management; gang violence; financial crime and anti-corruption; and protection of cultural heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assisting host governments (and other local actors) in areas such as sustainable social and economic development, education and socio-economic opportunities; reducing corruption and supporting social justice</td>
<td>• Coordination or clearing house role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting rule of law and human rights compliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institution building and strengthening governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The example activities included have been identified from peace operation mandates or are selected from examples in the literature. Activities are not unique to one category and the categories can overlap.

**Organized crime**

Combating organized crime as part of UN peacekeeping operation mandates is much less controversial than addressing terrorism and violent extremism, as it is generally seen as supporting the national sovereignty of the host country. Multidimensional UN operations in particular address the drivers and consequences of organized crime in various direct and indirect ways (see table 2.2). Training and capacity building of national police forces are the bread and butter of UN Police (UNPOL) components of missions. In 1999, the UN Mission in Kosovo and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor received the first executive policing mandates and anti-gang operations were made part of the activities of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). AU operations only deal with organized crime on an ad hoc basis and do not include executive tasks. AMISOM, for example, was not mandated to deal with organized crime.

---

but its mandated tasks, such as police training and mentoring, as well as addressing arms trafficking and piracy, were concerned with related aspects.37

The EU focuses on Africa and to a lesser extent on the Western Balkans and the Middle East, while its eastern Neighbourhood has been added more recently. The indirect activities of its civilian operations focus on supporting governments in their executive tasks, including addressing organized crime. Activities in the field of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), SSR, the rule of law and anti-corruption focus on the drivers of organized crime, while activities in the field of border monitoring, policing and law enforcement focus more on consequences.38 EU member states agreed in the Civilian CSDP Compact that civilian CSDP missions should continue to focus on these tasks.39 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) field operations conduct similar indirect activities to EU civilian CSDP missions in collaboration with the host nation on training officials and drafting laws and policies.40

While organized crime was mentioned in NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, it did not feature in the 2010 and 2022 versions. Its representatives in the dialogue meetings did not believe that the organization had a mandate to combat organized crime, but argued that it aims to assist where possible.41 In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, however, its military operations were drawn into actively engaging with organized crime, even taking on executive policing tasks to fill governance vacuums on deployment. In Afghanistan, ISAF was also involved in counter-narcotics operations in the context of the fight against the Taliban.42

Irregular migration and human trafficking

Although often not at the top of their agendas, UN peace operations have vast experience of working with issues related to refugees, IDPs and migration (see table 2.3). Generally speaking, it could be argued that by contributing to stabilization, all peace operations both indirectly and directly address the drivers of irregular migration and human trafficking. In the 1990s and early 2000s, UN peacekeeping operations conducted direct activities to repatriate and reintegrate refugees, but this has not been a major focus of mandates in recent years. At the same time, while IDPs were initially only supported in an ad hoc manner, particularly in the context of the protection of civilians, this has become a core task of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations.43 Direct activities by UN peacekeeping operations to counter migrant smuggling and trafficking remain controversial in the UN Security Council. Such smuggling and trafficking would have to become a threat to international peace and security, which currently they are not. Thus, only minor indirect support has been included, particularly in the mandates of MINUSMA and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).44 Protection of civilians and human rights mandates apply to irregular migrants, however, so while not explicitly

---

38 Researcher no. 12, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018; and European Union, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, [n.d.].
39 Council of the European Union (note 35).
42 (note 23); and UN official no. 5, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
mandated, UN peacekeeping operations are implicitly mandated to deal with aspects of irregular migration. The revised protection of civilians policy of 2019 explicitly mentions displacement and trafficking in persons. These are therefore included in peace operations’ operational planning and tools.45

Table 2.3. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to address irregular migration and human trafficking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting drivers</th>
<th>Targeting consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Safe areas or zones</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protection of Civilians (PoC)</td>
<td>• Protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the context of PoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sensitization to human rights, corruption and inclusiveness</td>
<td>• Enhancing security in IDP and refugee camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quick-impact projects to support community resilience</td>
<td>• Facilitation or coordination of the provision of humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community violence reduction projects, community engagement and resilience building</td>
<td>• Establishing the necessary security conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance and return of refugees and IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provision of security and supporting stability</td>
<td>• Facilitating, assisting or coordinating repatriation of refugees, return of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rule of law and reconciliation</td>
<td>• Reintegration of refugees and IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration projects</td>
<td>• Border monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training courses and information provision for irregular migrants, providing them with shelter and facilitating voluntary return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Support local authorities to protect civilians</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assisting host governments (and other local actors) in areas such as sustainable social and economic development, education and socio-economic opportunities, reducing corruption and supporting social justice</td>
<td><strong>Support local security enhancement in IDP and refugee camps</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting rule of law and human rights compliance</td>
<td><strong>Support local authorities in the return of IDPs and refugees</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institution building and strengthening governance</td>
<td><strong>Support government reintegration efforts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Security sector reform</td>
<td><strong>Monitor the return of IDPs and refugees</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Good offices and support for dialogue on IDP and refugee issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Strengthening border security and management institutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Strengthening the capacity of authorities and civil society to prosecute perpetrators and assist victims of human trafficking; training of officials and stakeholders; and support public information campaigns</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Supporting the government with controlling, managing and fighting irregular migration</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**: The example activities included have been identified from peace operation mandates or are selected from examples in the literature. Activities are not unique to one category and the categories can overlap.

The OSCE context is different from that of the UN. Since the early 2000s, OSCE field operations have been combating human trafficking as part of their rule of law and criminal justice assistance with building democratic institutions. This is possible because OSCE field operations are deployed in relatively stable countries in which governments are more interested in receiving support with migration issues and local staff have greater expertise to provide it.\textsuperscript{46}

Following the 2016 adjustment of the mandate of the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), civilian CSDP missions have become involved in targeting the consequences of irregular migration using indirect activities to assist ‘the Nigerien central and local authorities and security forces in developing policies, techniques and procedures to better control and fight irregular migration’. Following the 2015 migration crisis, EU CSDP missions became the only type of multilateral peace operation to actively seek to prevent irregular migration.\textsuperscript{47} In the Compact, EU member states decided that civilian CSDP missions should broaden their focus on irregular migration.\textsuperscript{48} After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) was adapted to include facilitating the flow of refugees.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Environmental degradation and resource scarcity}

Like irregular migration, activities in the fields of environmental degradation and resource scarcity are often more prominent in UN peacekeeping operations than is often perceived (see table 2.4). The illegal trade in resources that drives or prolongs conflicts has preoccupied the UN Security Council since the early 1990s. In this context, the Council has mandated UN peacekeeping operations to conduct direct and indirect activities to limit the access by conflict parties to financial resources that enable them to continue armed struggle.\textsuperscript{50} Alongside sanctions implementation, missions such as UNMIL have established an environment and natural resources unit to assist with restoration of the national natural resources administration.\textsuperscript{51}

Since 2007, climate security has also been on the UN Security Council’s agenda, but there is resistance from some member states that argue that it should be dealt with in other forums. Nonetheless, in 2011 the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to include the possible security implications of climate change in his conflict analysis and reporting.\textsuperscript{52} In addition, the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and member states have focused on ‘inside the fence’ issues regarding how peace operations conduct


\textsuperscript{48} Council of the European Union (note 35).


Table 2.4. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to address environmental degradation and resource scarcity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting drivers</th>
<th>Targeting consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reducing the environmental footprint of peace operations ‘inside the fence’</td>
<td>• Providing mediation support in resource conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collecting and analysing information on the criminal networks that support armed groups, including on illegal exploitation of natural resources</td>
<td>• Supporting post-resource conflict restitution, and truth and reconciliation processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tracking and interdicting trade in conflict resources through enforcement of sanctions</td>
<td>• Cleaning up and rehabilitating conflict damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improving natural resource management to address conflict resource challenges, including monitoring, inspection, conducting military operations to re-establish control over, and securing areas of natural resource extraction (e.g. mining and logging sites)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Preventively mediating emerging natural resource-related tensions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exchanging information with relevant actors regarding the illegal trafficking of natural resources</td>
<td>• Supporting improved environmental management ‘outside the fence’ to address environmental consequences of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advising and building capacity of authorities to strengthen environmental and natural resource management capacities to address conflict resource challenges related to conflict, including efforts to prevent armed groups from exploiting natural resources, and supporting authorities to re-establish control over, and monitor and inspect, mining sites</td>
<td>• Integrating environmental issues into disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting panels of experts with monitoring sanctions, and national governments to interdict and prevent resource trafficking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Helping to ensure the effectiveness of justice and corrections officials regarding the detention, investigation and prosecution of individuals involved in environmental crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitoring environmental security risks to provide early warning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assisting host governments (and other local actors) to develop climate sensitivity in areas such as sustainable development, institution building and governance, education and development, as well as peacebuilding and post-conflict projects related to the environment (e.g. climate change adaptation, reconstruction of water infrastructure)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting regional dialogues on transboundary and environmental issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting civil society organizations and government policies that address environmental, climate and natural resource challenges in peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting environmental quick-impact projects for local communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The example activities included have been identified from peace operation mandates or are selected from examples in the literature. Activities are not unique to one category and the categories can overlap.
their own environmental management in the context of ‘greening the Blue Helmets’. This task was explicitly mentioned in MINUSMA’s mandate for the first time in 2013. The environmental footprint of UN peace operations is also on the agenda of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) and the Fifth Committee, and is part of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P). Thus far, the Security Council has only been willing to include ‘outside the fence’ environmental and climate-related issues beyond the environmental sustainability of the missions themselves in the mandates of special political missions. As a consequence, most environmental and climate-related activities and developments in UN peace operations find their origins in the UN Secretariat, with the support of a number of member states. Regular activities to directly and indirectly address both drivers and consequences, such as mediation or support to government institutions, have included or mainstreamed climate security aspects where relevant. In addition, the Secretariat has decided that all missions should have a climate security focal point—a person who does not work exclusively on the topic, but addresses it in addition to other regular tasks. Following the example of UNSOM, some member states are actively supporting the appointment of full-time Climate Security Advisors, seconded by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) with extra-budgetary funding. In 2022 the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) became the first UN peacekeeping operation to appoint a Climate Security Advisor. Similarly, MONUSCO has considered using extra-budgetary funds to expand the role of Natural Resource Advisor into a Natural Resources Unit.

EU CSDP missions and operations have thus far not been given mandates to deal with environmental degradation or resource scarcity. However, the European Green Deal is an overarching umbrella for EU policies including these missions and operations. The EU has developed a concept for an integrated approach to climate change and security, which is a framework for integrating the topic into all instruments of and policies on peace and security, including missions and operations. In addition, EU member states agreed in the 2023 Compact that civilian CSDP missions should broaden their focus on these tasks. The European External Action Service has developed mini-concepts, including one on how missions can deal with environmental issues. The focus is particularly on indirect activities to combat drivers and consequences, particularly environmental crime, and on including climate mitigation strategies in the reform processes supported by missions. The EU does not have a political problem with mainstreaming climate change into its mandates but there is a gap between polit-

53 United Nations Environment Programme (note 5).
55 UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs et al., ‘Climate Security Mechanism: Climate Security Mechanism progress report’, May 2023, p. 4.
Table 2.5. Examples of activities that peace operations could undertake to address epidemics and pandemics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting drivers</th>
<th>Targeting consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementing preventive health and safety measures for personnel</td>
<td>• Providing security and a safe environment for local communities, local responders, and health and humanitarian workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementing proper disposal of waste products from mission bases and installations</td>
<td>• Providing healthcare services and supplies for affected personnel and communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Administering vaccinations to non-mission personnel and communities</td>
<td>• Providing information and outreach on epidemic/pandemic response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Providing vaccinations and health services to non-mission personnel</td>
<td>• Human rights monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Providing information and outreach on prevention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting the prevention efforts of local and national authorities, and of health sector and humanitarian actors</td>
<td>• Providing support to health sector and humanitarian actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integrating prevention into training and information for security and rule of law institutions personnel</td>
<td>• Providing an enabling environment through political engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordination of international efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capacity-building, training and institutional reform of the security sector and the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support for the rule of law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The example activities included have been identified from peace operation mandates or are selected from examples in the literature. Activities are not unique to one category and the categories can overlap.

Since the early 2000s, the OSCE has been paying increased attention to the environmental aspects of its economic and environmental ‘dimension’, including water security. It has been addressing the security risks that stem from climate change since the mid-2010s. Its environmental projects are often constructed as confidence-building measures, as water access, wildfires and so on are often some of the few issues on which conflicting parties can still cooperate across boundaries. Thus, the focus is on activities that deal indirectly with environmental degradation and resource scarcity. The OSCE Environmental and Security initiative (ENVSEC) has initiated projects in environmental hotspots that then found their way into the work of field operations. The OSCE introduced an environmental advisor in its Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, primarily focused on inside the fence issues.

Epidemics and pandemics

Since 2000, UN peacekeeping operations have undertaken direct and indirect activities to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, initially inside the fence, focused on mission

---


personnel, but after 2011 also outside the fence, focused on the wider population (see table 2.5).\textsuperscript{62} Large-footprint UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations have a great diversity of resources and capacities, in terms of logistics, the coordination and provision of humanitarian support and the management of misinformation, to engage in direct and indirect activities to address both the drivers and the consequences of epidemics and pandemics. These have been applied in support of host governments during the Cholera epidemic in Haiti in 2010, the Ebola epidemics in West Africa of 2014–16 and the DRC in 2018–19 and in the Covid-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{63}

In the Civilian CSDP Compact, epidemics and pandemics were not initially considered potential non-traditional security challenges that civilian CSDP missions might face. However, in the prevention of HIV/AIDS and during the Covid-19 pandemic, like UN peace operations and the multilateral peace operations fielded by the AU, the EU has undertaken prevention measures. They have contributed personal protective equipment to host state authorities or provided other forms of assistance, such as funding, mentoring or even the provision of medical personnel for local hospitals. However, the capabilities of both EU and AU missions are generally more limited than those of the UN.\textsuperscript{64}

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the niche contribution of CSDP missions and operations appeared to be to address the security implications of health crises. Civilian CSDP missions can for example provide assistance with addressing related criminality, supporting the rule of law and law enforcement, and strengthening crisis management structures and human rights monitoring.\textsuperscript{65} In the EU context, however, healthcare is unlikely to become a major part of CSDP missions. This would require resources and capabilities that are unavailable as there is, for example, no readily available healthcare personnel pool. Moreover, developing local capacities is considered to fall within the realm of development cooperation.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{63} Caparini (note 23).
\textsuperscript{64} EU official no. 2 and NATO official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{65} Council of the European Union (note 35); and EU official no. 2 and researcher no. 3, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{66} Online interview, EU official no. 7, 28 Apr. 2021.
3. The opportunities and challenges for peace operations when addressing non-traditional security challenges

Various arguments have been used in favour of or against the involvement of multilateral peace operations in addressing non-traditional security challenges. The precise content and frequency of these arguments differ according to the challenge being discussed, and the weight attached to each argument also varies.

Opportunities

Non-traditional security challenges are important to peace operations

All the non-traditional security challenges looked at in this study are major drivers of insecurity. The argument is often made that multilateral peace operations simply cannot ignore them and addressing them is essential to successful mandate implementation.

On terrorism and violent extremism, the argument was made in the dialogue meetings that in areas of conflict where designated terrorist groups are active, failure to deal with them would mean that any effort could by definition never be comprehensive. Support for PVE/CVE and CT activities in multilateral peace operations was therefore strong among most meeting participants. The discussion focused mostly on military CT, which was the most contested area, and the most important arguments made for engaging in this activity were: First, regardless of whether peace operations intend to, when deployed in asymmetric environments, they are likely to be forced to engage in CT to ensure their own security. Second, civilians are often killed in terrorist attacks, so military CT is important in the context of the protection of civilians. Third, also in the context of the protection of civilians, military CT activities are what host governments and often populations expect or even demand from peace operations. Ignoring this could affect mission legitimacy, as has arguably been the case in Mali and the DRC. Thus, supporting government forces, with training and equipment would help to build alliances. Lastly, in some cases such as Somalia, according to some member state representatives, military CT would be needed to extend government authority and clear the road for political dialogue.

The discussion in the dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism concentrated on UN peacekeeping operations. In 2015, the HIPPO report concluded that UN peacekeeping operations should not get involved in military CT. Many participants, including some representing traditionally more reluctant governments, called for an adjustment to this HIPPO conclusion, as it was argued that terrorism is now the main contemporary security challenge and that, given its impartiality, the UN would be the most legitimate actor to take on CT.

68 Member state representative no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
69 AU official no. 4 and EU official no. 5, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; and UNODC official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
70 Breakout group no. 1 and EU official no. 5, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
71 Member state representative no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
72 Member state representative no. 2, member state representative no. 3 and AU official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; and United Nations, General Assembly, Report of
Similar arguments on comprehensiveness were made regarding organized crime. There is a link between organized crime and conflict, although much is still unknown about local contexts and how these affect mandate implementation. While organized crime often thrives at the margins of host countries, it strikes at the heart of their governance. It is often transnational and connected to other non-traditional security challenges, such as terrorism, piracy and human trafficking. In the long run it reinforces economic inequality, squeezes out legitimate business, weakens the rule of law and increases corruption. ‘Nipping organized crime in the bud’ at the start of a peace operation would help missions to address the root causes of a conflict. If left unattended, organized crime might actually be empowered during peace processes, and a culture could develop in which it is tolerated, as arguably happened in Kosovo and Mali. In addition, peace operations have their most influence and host governments are most willing to combat organized crime at the start of a peace process. Later in the process, especially where organized crime may have captured the state and a peace operation’s capacity is reduced, governments are more likely to resist. As with terrorism, it was also argued that if peace operations failed to take on organized crime, they would lose credibility with and relevance to local populations. Moreover, focusing only on the protection of civilians would be missing the point as, like terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime is a major driver of insecurity for populations. In fact, it was argued that in places like Mali, where armed groups are funded through their criminal activities, it would be impossible to achieve peace in the absence of a mandate to combat organized crime.

The importance of including irregular migration in overall mandate implementation was mainly discussed in the context of UN peace operations. While the lens of migration is not used in these operations, it would be helpful to include it at times to better communicate their relevance. Assisting IDPs and refugees in various ways is often already part of UN peace operation mandates. In practice, these groups cannot easily be separated from other forms of migration, as in societies in conflict IDPs and refugees are generally part of a complex mix of migration. In order to increase the impact of work with IDPs and refugees, there is a need to better frame and to embrace irregular migrants in an integrated approach. Moreover, the links between human trafficking and migrant smuggling, organized crime, and terrorism and violent extremism were made in the context of the need for a comprehensive approach, as both non-state actors and government officials are involved in human trafficking, and extorting and exploiting migrants in a number of host countries in the Sahel.

While assisting with the consequences of or responses to epidemics or pandemics is rarely a direct part of peace operation mandates, there was also general support among dialogue participants for increased attention to be paid to these within existing mandates in case of emergencies. This is important for the success of mandate implementation.

73 UN official no. 4 and UNODC official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
76 Researcher no. 4 and researcher no. 5, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
Epidemics and pandemics, and the response to them, have huge potential to contribute to instability, as witnessed in the Ebola outbreaks in Liberia and the DRC. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed how epidemics and pandemics can lead to disgruntled, disunited and distrustful populations, while also allowing opportunistic politicians to pursue their own agendas. Particularly in ‘low-trust’ societies, where populations have little faith in the government, peace operations taking on roles that address disease-related issues can contribute to stability. In this context, it was argued that missions could monitor human rights violations, corruption, exclusion and inequality with a focus on epidemic or pandemic response, to ensure that the already vulnerable positions of minority and excluded groups are not disproportionately negatively affected and the potential for conflict is not further increased. Given that they are often a trusted source of information, peace operations can also support sensitization strategies. It was argued that getting peace operations involved would enhance the legitimacy of the state, and contribute to the extension of state authority and to conflict resolution. In addition, such support could create opportunities for the implementation of other mandated tasks and to gain the trust of local populations. A failure to get involved, on the other hand, might affect the legitimacy not only of the state, but also of the peace operation. Reduced trust in peace operations, such as in Haiti where MINUSTAH was the vector of transmission for the cholera epidemic or where peace operations personnel were involved in sexual exploitation and abuse, however, complicates such efforts.

The inclusion of environmental degradation and resource scarcity was also seen as essential for successful mandate implementation as these are at the root of many of the conflicts that multilateral peace operations aim to address. Conflict resources and resource scarcity received particular attention in the dialogue meetings. In states such as the DRC, armed groups often akin to organized crime networks exploit natural resources motivated by rent seeking, but also as a resource stream to be tapped in order to continue their activities. Similarly, the charcoal trade has financed extremist groups in Somalia, such as al-Shabab. This is facilitated by the absence or weak presence of the state. In Libya, UNSMIL had to engage with the political economy of the country’s natural resources to move the peace process forward and support mediation. The UN Security Council is aware of the role of natural resource exploitation and has mandated peace operations to deal with conflict resource issues. Without such a mandate, it is more difficult for peace operations to keep the peace in resource conflicts.

Similarly, community conflicts in Somalia and across the Sahel region have been fuelled by environmental degradation and resource scarcity, including due to transhumance, drought and locusts. Where communities compete over scarce resources, peace operations are often asked to mediate. In Mali, for example, changing weather

---

83 UN official no. 8, UN official no. 9, UNAIDS representative no. 1, civil society representative no. 1 and OSCE official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
89 UN official no. 7, researcher no. 3 and researcher no. 6, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
patterns mean that herders migrate earlier than before and take different routes. Consequently, they come into contact with farming groups that they have no existing arrangements with, which increases the potential for conflict. Moreover, traditional resource management arrangements are breaking down as armed youths question the authority of traditional leaders who used to mediate in such disputes. The violence that these conflicts generate requires missions such as MINUSMA to protect civilians in line with their mandates, among other means through mediation and community violence reduction projects.\textsuperscript{92} At the same time, projects on environmental degradation are generally uncontroversial and not conflictual, as all conflict parties often benefit from them. This makes them ideal for initiating cooperation and building confidence, and creating opportunities for successful change.\textsuperscript{93} Communities otherwise in conflict in Somalia, for example, have collaborated on the provision of water points.\textsuperscript{94}

Issues inside and outside the fence are often interrelated and cannot be seen as separate. Mission personnel and their actions affect the environment in which they are deployed and the other way round. While this argument was predominantly used in the dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, it is just as relevant to human trafficking and epidemics and pandemics. A mission cannot deal with issues outside the fence if it is not handling these issues properly inside the fence, as it would not be able to lead by example. At the same time, a mission cannot deal with issues inside the fence if the challenge is not being addressed outside the fence too.\textsuperscript{95}

\textit{Using the existing capacities of missions}

Peace operations generally bring with them capabilities, capacities and expertise that are scarce in host countries. Multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations in particular have tremendous capabilities and capacities in terms of personnel, equipment, resources and expertise for addressing non-traditional security challenges and multifaceted crises. Where these are readily available, they could provide significant added value if properly harnessed.\textsuperscript{96} Operations provide logistical and engineering support, secure the provision of assistance and protect civilians, raise awareness and sensitize, monitor human rights and government behaviour, and prevent and mediate conflicts. Reorientating these existing capacities to deal with non-traditional security challenges can strengthen existing partnerships, and sometimes opens up new pathways and partnerships for continuing engagement on different mandated tasks.\textsuperscript{97} At the level of the Security Council, there is an increasing awareness that threats to international peace and security are not limited to traditional security challenges, and that peace operations may have to step in, albeit within the scope of their mandate. At the request of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotesize
\bibitem{93} UN official no. 11, OSCE official no. 4 and member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\bibitem{96} UN official no. 10, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\end{thebibliography}
example, the Council examined the use of peacekeeping logistical capacities to support the distribution of vaccines in host countries.98

**Interest and funding**

When peace operations take on non-traditional security challenges it makes their relevance more visible to donors and attracts additional funding not only for the missions, but also for the countries they are deployed to and addressing the challenges they need to address.99 For example, including environmental issues in mission mandates has attracted additional extra-budgetary funding and capacity to deal with these challenges.100 The protection of elephants in Mali was only possible because MINUSMA had funds available that would otherwise not have been.101 PVE/CVE work has also proved highly attractive to donors. This can at times be at the cost of regular peace-building funds, however, and has led to the relabelling of regular peacebuilding projects.102 At the same time, by initiating projects, peace operations can serve as arrow heads that attract partners and stakeholders with more funding, and have the potential to be more sustainable.103

**The people-centred approach and winning hearts and minds**

Taking on non-traditional security challenges may also make peace operations more relevant to local populations, if these challenges are regarded as important by local communities. Tackling terrorism and violent extremism is often perceived as important by local communities, while the protection of civilians is often essential to IDPs and irregular migrants.104 At the same time, epidemic or pandemic response, or health provision more generally, is commonly used in peace operations as a Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) activity to win the hearts and minds of local communities. Such activities can increase the legitimacy of peace operations as they are seen to deliver, while avoiding the potential fallout where failing or corrupt host governments reflect badly on missions.105 In fact, engaging in activities to combat Covid-19 and adjusting working practices, including to online environments, allowed missions to be open to new opportunities and avenues for collaboration with local actors, including wider civil society and women.106

**Neutrality**

In contexts such as eastern DRC, where local or governmental actors are perceived as partisan, UN peace operations might be in a good position to tackle non-traditional security challenges. For example, peace operations providing security for humanitarian

---

102 UN official no. 1 and Civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
or medical assistance providers is often perceived as more neutral than if local security forces were providing the security.\textsuperscript{107} Missions’ perceived neutrality also at times allows them to coordinate the work of the technical and financial partners of host governments, which are perceived to be more partisan, by organizing meetings and workshops.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Do no harm}

Through their presence, multilateral peace operations have impacts on the environments in which they are deployed, which presents several non-traditional security challenges. Regardless of their outside the fence mandates, peace operations must deal with a number of non-traditional security challenges inside the fence to ensure that they do no harm in already difficult conflict situations.

Within the realm of irregular migration and human trafficking, missions have a responsibility to prevent misconduct. UN and non-UN multilateral peace operations have attracted prostitution, personnel have engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse, and in that context have attracted human trafficking. Missions therefore have to deal with human trafficking from an inside the fence perspective.\textsuperscript{109} Similarly, although nipping organized crime in the bud might be overly ambitious, at a minimum, within existing resources, peace operations could be better crime proofed to avoid contributing to increasing the size of the challenge.\textsuperscript{110}

For example, capacity building of governments, the funding of development projects and setting up initiatives to establish alternative livelihoods could have negative consequences where states have been captured by predatory organized crime. Assistance provided to state institutions might then also be used to strengthen the criminal organization. Moreover, assistance with the organization of elections might increase the legitimacy of corrupt or criminal governments. The limited attention paid to these negative side-effects of crime is an important partial explanation for the weak results in Kosovo and the deterioration in state legitimacy that allowed the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{111}

Similarly, peace operations should do no harm in terms of environmental degradation and resource scarcity. In this context, natural resource management and environmental awareness inside the fence are already widely supported (see above).\textsuperscript{112}

Finally, multilateral peace operations must also respond to pandemics or epidemics. UN peace operations in particular have been connected to the transmission of HIV/AIDS. MINUSTAH was also a vector of transmission of the cholera epidemic in Haiti. In order to prevent this from happening again, and in order to avoid the public from perceiving a mission as a vector, multilateral peace operations now place prevention high up the agenda. At the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, all the multilateral peace operations were particularly cautious. Missions locked down, interrupted rotations and continued only essential operations, while other activities were either paused, adjusted to become socially distanced or go online, or redirected, for instance by shifting the attention of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to Covid-19. This

\textsuperscript{107} UN official no. 9 and UN official no. 10, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{110} Researcher no. 4, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
\textsuperscript{111} Researcher no. 5, researcher no. 8 and breakout group no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
all required outreach and strategic communication with local populations and host
governments to build confidence in the missions’ efforts.\footnote{Note 23; and member
state representative no. 1, UN official no. 9, UN official no. 10, UN official no. 13 and
researcher no. 3, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23
Nov. 2021.}

\textit{Safety and security of personnel}

Particularly from a duty of care perspective, multilateral peace operations have also
been addressing epidemics and pandemics, as well as terrorism and violent extremism,
as a primary responsibility to protect the health, safety and security of their own
personnel. In terms of health, this has been the case with regard to HIV/AIDS, Ebola
and Covid-19.\footnote{UN official no. 9, UN official no. 10, EU official no. 2 and
researcher no. 3, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23
Nov. 2021.} Similarly, terrorism and violent extremism have been placed high on
the agenda in asymmetric threat environments in order to protect mission personnel.\footnote{United
Nations, ‘Action for Peacekeeping: Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping
Operations’, [n.d.].} Personnel and the countries that contribute to peace operations need to have confidence
that missions are doing due diligence to protect staff members, to avoid them being
withdrawn.\footnote{UN official no. 10, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23
Nov. 2021.}

\textbf{Challenges}

\textit{‘Christmas tree mandates’, overburdened missions and limited resources}

Multilateral peace operations are often overburdened with expansive mandates while
given inadequate resources to implement them. They consequently often struggle
to achieve their tasks. In the context of UN peacekeeping operations, the HIPPO
report calls the phenomenon of overloaded mandates ‘Christmas tree mandates’.\footnote{Breakout
group no. 1 and Civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent
extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; Researcher no. 4 and UNDP official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on organized
crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018; breakout group no. 3 and researcher no. 2, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration
and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019; Researcher no. 7, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation
and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021; and member state representative 1 and UN official no. 10, Dialogue
meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.} UN peacekeeping operations often lack the capacity to live up to the core of their
mandates: the protection of civilians and conflict management. Thus, although non-
traditional security challenges may be relevant to mandate implementation, making
addressing them an extra task that requires additional attention and resources
further hinders implementation of core tasks by diverting attention and funding.
This is especially the case if the required additional funding and resources do not
follow.\footnote{UN official no. 9, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23
Nov. 2021.} This was particularly notable during the Covid-19 pandemic. Refocusing the
attention of peace operations to respond to Covid-19 was in some cases at the cost of
addressing other important issues. For example, strategic communication was drawn
away from peacebuilding support to awareness raising, sensitization and addressing
misinformation, and the provision of logistics to deal with the pandemic reduced the
ability of missions to conduct military operations.\footnote{UN official no. 10, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23
Nov. 2021.} Similarly, increasing the role of missions in CVE can distract from other larger SSR-related, crime-related and policing
issues. In addition, adding tasks to mandates can increase internal competition over
these issues, as sections may disagree over who should lead, start turf wars or duplicate

\footnote{Note 1; and member state representative no. 1, UN official no. 9, UN official no. 10, UN
official no. 13 and researcher no. 3, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23
Nov. 2021.}
efforts.\textsuperscript{120} Finally, addressing some of these non-traditional security challenges is simply beyond the capacity of many peace operations.\textsuperscript{121}

*Increased costs for troop-contributing countries*

While multilateral peace operations can balance the costs of additional tasks by reducing attention paid to other tasks, troop-contributing countries are not always able to do this. This is particularly the case for the financial costs of environmental awareness and related projects. The UN has developed environmental management policies and standards for the footprint and waste management of its missions that are also followed by the AU in AMISOM. Consequently, troop-contributing countries have had to invest in environmental standards within existing budgets. The EU and the OSCE have not yet adopted such standards.\textsuperscript{122}

*Overstepping mandates and mission creep*

Most member states and mission personnel emphasize the importance of missions sticking to their mandates. Several UN member states, for example in Latin America, are particularly critical of the extension of peacekeeping operations’ activities beyond mission mandates when this involves military personnel. These member states fear mission creep but have also had relatively recent experience of the military taking on political and other tasks, up to and including military dictatorship. They are therefore particularly anxious about the military taking on new tasks without a proper mandate. At the same time, there is a general understanding among member states that uncharted territory, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, may require assistance from the military, and that if the military capability is there to provide medical assistance or vaccinate on a limited scale, and this would contribute to peace and stability, this may have to be pragmatically balanced against the mission’s mandate.\textsuperscript{123}

Similarly, many EU member states see considerable room for dealing flexibly with issues such as environmental degradation in the context of existing mandates.\textsuperscript{124} In the context of CSDP missions and operations, mission personnel in EUCAP Sahel Niger were particularly critical of mandate expansion to include addressing migration after the mission had already been deployed. The aims and activities of the mission had to be changed mid-course and in the middle of the budget year. This was considered mission creep.\textsuperscript{125}

Multilateral peace operations and the organizations that deploy them are very much aware of these sensitivities. For this reason, organizations have set up clear processes for mandate adjustment, which require both enforcement measures under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and the consent of the host government and other parties to the conflict. Missions have pushed the limits of their mandates in order to deal with non-traditional security challenges, but only in collaboration with the host government—and they have not overstepped these limits. This means that implementation of, for example, human rights monitoring mandates sometimes includes vulnerable groups such as people

\textsuperscript{120} Breakout group no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{121} Breakout group no. 3, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019; and Researcher no. 12, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.

\textsuperscript{122} Breakout group no. 2 and researcher no. 3, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{123} Member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{124} Member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{125} Breakout group no. 2 and EU official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
affected by HIV/AIDS or Covid-19. As a result, slight differences in mandates resulted in Covid-19 assistance being delivered in different ways.126 Nonetheless, in practice what falls inside or outside the scope of peace operation mandates is subject to interpretation. For example, a protection of civilians or an extension of state authority mandate allows room to support national governments with addressing environmental degradation-related challenges in order to protect local communities. In this way, MINUSMA took up the protection of elephants, as poaching and the illicit trade in ivory were menacing the security of local communities.127 Broader thematic UN Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and Youth Peace and Security often provide space to deal with issues such as environmental degradation, as in this context missions are requested to report on their sustainability- and environment-related efforts.128 However, dangers arise from too loose interpretations of mandates because once member states perceive a mission to be overstepping its mandate, they might become more strict in other cases.129

**Outside the realm of the Security Council, infringing on sovereignty**

While terrorism and violent extremism are topics that are frequently discussed in the UN Security Council, whether topics such as organized crime—and particularly irregular migration and human trafficking, environmental degradation and resource scarcity, and epidemics and pandemics—should be on the Council’s agenda is much more contested. Many member states advocate a far narrower definition of security, while others apply a broader ‘human security’ definition. The former group stresses that non-traditional security challenges do not belong in the realm of the Security Council, and generally stresses the importance of sovereignty. The latter group is less orthodox about the concept of sovereignty. A link with conflict is often made to ensure enough support for placing the more controversial items on the Council’s agenda.130

For the OSCE to obtain agreement from its participating states to deal with non-traditional security issues, it must increasingly emphasize security implications. There is, for example, limited political consensus on climate security, but the same group of northern European participating states that has pushed the climate security agenda in the UN is seeking to move this issue forward in the OSCE.131 This resulted in 2019 in a decision by the Ministerial Council to task OSCE field operations with integrating addressing climate-related challenges, and supporting dialogue and cooperation on the issue.132

---

126 UN official no. 1, member state representative no. 1 and member state representative no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; and member state representative no. 4 and EU official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
Securitization

In the dialogue meetings, a broad group of critical scholars and civil society organizations, as well as several UN member state representatives, saw the trend for peace operations to pay increasing attention to non-traditional security challenges as highly problematic, as this was said to securitize governance and development challenges, which can divert attention and resources from important issues unrelated to insecurity. They argued that this contributes to a militarization of solutions and reduces the role of civilian component activities in strengthening social development.133

They also argued that this is rebalancing peace operations away from their role as a conflict resolution tool to support host nations with addressing their security challenges.134 More specifically, a disproportionate security focus on terrorism and violent extremism would ignore their causes and populations often turn to violent extremists as a result of corruption and government abuse. Thus, over-securitized solutions and placing CT in the context of a global war on terror would not improve the situation, but potentially aggravate it, as governments would feel emboldened to clamp down on the political space and human rights, and to postpone required reforms.135

Similarly, although organized crime has security implications, it would in essence be an issue of governance or the absence of justice and development, particularly when crime becomes a livelihood. Moreover, it was argued that securitization of organized crime is often complemented by a narrow focus on the links with terrorism. While such links would ensure regional ownership of activities to address organized crime, this risks further securitization of the issue.136 In addition, at times the influx of funds from the securitized approach would be supporting unaccountable and non-transparent institutions captured by corrupt governments and security actors, without the necessary oversight or monitoring and evaluation. This, in turn, would stimulate corruption and strengthen organized crime.137

Participants also argued that providing peace operations with a role in curbing irregular migration would risk diverting already scarce funds and resources away from addressing the deeper forces driving migration: instability, human rights violations and challenging livelihoods. It would also help to drive irregular migration underground, as smuggling then becomes one of the most common ways to flee conflict areas. It might also incentivize states and armed groups to instrumentalize the risk of migration to obtain assistance with managing it, thereby perpetuating a war economy.138

The securitization of epidemics and pandemics was primarily seen as posing a risk that humanitarian and healthcare assistance during conflict could be instrumentalized. Under the assumption that extraordinary times require extraordinary measures, there is a risk that the military components of multilateral peace operations alongside the military in the host country might slip out of civilian control in extreme crisis situations. Although the military usually has considerable capabilities available for addressing crisis situations, participants in the dialogue meeting on the topic generally agreed on the importance of the strict application of the Oslo Guidelines, and that the

133 Breakout group no. 2, breakout group no. 3 and UNDP official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
134 Breakout group no. 2, breakout group no. 3 and UNDP official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
136 UN official no. 4, UNDP official no. 2 and member state representative no. 2, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
137 UNDP official no. 2 and UNODC official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
involvement of military components in peace operations should only be a last resort to deliver humanitarian and health assistance.\textsuperscript{139}

Finally, the securitization of environmental degradation and resource scarcity was seen as problematic as climate security was said to have become a buzzword that was crowding out other environmental issues, such as the impacts of climate change.\textsuperscript{140} It would also be ahistorical to link the causation of conflict to climate change, as this would ignore the historical existence of many conflicts and take political responsibility away from the parties and governments involved.\textsuperscript{141} Various participants argued that environmental degradation is a development issue and not a security challenge, and therefore should stay largely outside the scope of multilateral peace operations and with the UN Country Team, which includes all the UN entities working on sustainable development, emergency recovery and transition in programme countries.\textsuperscript{142} The securitization of environmental degradation was also questioned as civilian authorities would be better positioned than security forces to handle environmental issues.\textsuperscript{143} Similarly, the criminalization of environmental degradation was a topic of debate as, for example, criminalizing cutting down trees would not address the root causes of why communities have to do it and may therefore have to continue regardless.\textsuperscript{144}

The underlying question for all these topics is: whose security should peace operations be protecting when addressing non-traditional security challenges? Currently, this decision is often made top-down from the centre, while ignoring the reasons why local communities use certain coping mechanisms. Removing a coping mechanism without involving local communities in the required change, it was argued, would not lead to systemic change and only perpetuate violence.\textsuperscript{145} In addition, when criminalizing activities, the entire judicial chain from law enforcement to adjudication in court would need to be ready to deal with violations. This, according to many participants, is often not the case, which was said to result in a lack of effectiveness and a loss of credibility.\textsuperscript{146}

**Legitimacy, politicization and impartiality**

Involving multilateral peace operations in addressing non-traditional security challenges could also politicize their presence and affect perceptions of their legitimacy and impartiality. This was mainly raised in the dialogue meetings in the context of the potential challenge of addressing terrorism and violent extremism, irregular migration and human trafficking, and epidemics and pandemics. It was pointed out that peace operations operate in complex contexts where no activity is considered neutral. This means that peace operations providing support to other organizations or peace oper-

\textsuperscript{139} United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief, [ST/ OCHA/ ESB/2008/16/Rev.1, Nov. 2007; and Breakout group no. 2, civil society representative no. 1, EU official no. 2, NATO official no. 3, UN official no. 10 and member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.}

\textsuperscript{140} Researcher no. 9, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.


\textsuperscript{142} Breakout group no. 1 and member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{143} Researcher no. 6, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{144} Breakout group no. 1 and member state representative no. 5, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.


ations addressing certain non-traditional security challenges could have negative implications. For example, MINUSMA has been portrayed by some as partisan for providing support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which is mandated to deal with challenges such as terrorism, organized crime and human trafficking.\textsuperscript{147}

CT more generally risks compromising the impartiality of missions, which can complicate achieving political solutions and even escalate violence. It pulls missions into conflicts and makes them a party to those conflicts. This discussion is often focused on introducing military or ‘kinetic’ CT efforts to peace operations. In the dialogue meetings, it was pointed out that even the provision of counternarratives and countermessaging risks the perceived impartiality of missions.\textsuperscript{148} Adding CVE to UNPOL mandates might politicize civilian policing and reduce trust in the police in general.\textsuperscript{149} The civilian aspects of missions were said to suffer particularly, and the UN would risk losing its ‘go-to role’ as mediator in conflicts where a multilateral structure and space are required for dialogue and negotiation.\textsuperscript{150}

Similarly, where multilateral peace operations take on executive roles in addressing irregular migration, this could create local opposition and affect the legitimacy of those missions.\textsuperscript{151} Provision of assistance to border management agencies is by definition political, and security institutions such as the coastguard are inherently part of the conflict.\textsuperscript{152} The engagement of missions in questions related to migration, human trafficking and IDPs risks endangering the humanitarian space and politicizing humanitarian actors.\textsuperscript{153} An additional challenge for EUCAP Sahel Niger when it did become involved was that when its mandate shifted to addressing irregular migration, it became more difficult to ensure oversight and maintain a good relationship with the government, as interests began to diverge.\textsuperscript{154} The discussion on adding curbing migration to peace operation mandates has a generally Eurocentric focus, as in the Sahel states migration is a source of income through remittances. Therefore, the involvement of peace operations was seen by many dialogue meeting participants as ‘African solutions to European problems’.\textsuperscript{155}

Even in the field of epidemics and pandemics, where host governments have militarized approaches, the provision of healthcare assistance by peace operations could be considered assistance to a contested government, and therefore not neutral. This would particularly be the case if the military personnel in peace operations became involved. This is further aggravated, according to dialogue meeting participants, in environments where external and government-linked officials are no longer trusted due to a long history of conflict, or when populations are told they can no longer care for their sick or bury their dead, or have to go into lockdown over a disease that they consider to be of lesser concern. This could even lead to violent responses, including towards health and peace operation personnel.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{147} Member state representative no. 4 and Researcher no. 11, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{148} Breakout group no. 1, breakout group no. 2, breakout group no. 3, member state representative no. 2 and civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
\textsuperscript{149} Breakout group no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
\textsuperscript{150} Breakout group no. 1, breakout group no. 2, breakout group no. 3, member state representative no. 2 and civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
\textsuperscript{151} Breakout group no. 1, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{152} Breakout group no. 2 and civil society representative no. 3, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{154} Breakout group no. 2 and EU official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{156} Researcher no. 11, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
Other organizations in a better position

Other organizations or actors might be better positioned than multilateral peace operations to work on non-traditional security challenges. Insufficient interest, funding and resources, as well as the need for long-term commitment or sustainability are the main arguments for preferring other solutions over peace operations. Most non-traditional security challenges would already be being addressed by other organizations as part of their main mandate, and these organizations would have more funding and greater capacity to take on the full scope of these challenges. It was often argued in the dialogue meetings that while peace operations may be well positioned to take on urgent tasks directly, their presence is time-limited, which restricts their ability to sustain programmatic health and environmental work. The UN Country Team, EU Delegations and similar bodies would be better placed to take on tasks in a more sustainable manner. For this reason, while missions might perceive their work to be mainly laying the foundations on issues such as HIV/AIDS or CIMIC activities, this would be problematic in the absence of strong coordination with those who eventually take over. Such coordination would not only ensure sustainability and connect activities with ongoing and remaining programmes, but also avoid path dependency and setting work off in the wrong direction when missions start programmes.

Safety and security of personnel

While the safety and security of personnel can be used as an argument in favour of multilateral peace operations’ involvement in non-traditional security challenges, it can also be used as an argument against.

Several troop-contributing countries in particular, but also humanitarian, human rights and peacebuilding personnel and organizations, are reluctant to involve peace operations in counterterrorism or combating organized crime, especially where this involves the use of force. Troop-contributing countries fear the safety and security of their own uniformed personnel, who may become a target in the conflict. As armed groups do not differentiate between parallel missions, peacekeepers may also be targeted in contexts where they are not actively involved in CT but parallel operations are. Similarly, traffickers and criminals may respond violently if peace operations seek to counter organized crime. If peace operations take on executive tasks in the field of irregular migration and the protection of civilians, this might also have security consequences for their personnel.

Humanitarian, human rights and peacebuilding international, civil society and non-governmental organizations are especially concerned about the humanitarian space. They feel uncomfortable depending on peace operations with CT mandates and sometimes find it impractical. They argue that particularly in CT contexts, the role of missions in humanitarian assistance should be limited. At the same time,
others argued that regardless of whether operations are involved in CT or PVE/CVE activities, they are increasingly being targeted by UN-designated terrorist groups and the asymmetric threats they pose.\textsuperscript{167}

\textit{Do no harm}

While ‘do no harm’ is often used as a pro when considering taking on non-traditional security challenges inside the fence, the dialogue meeting participants used the same argument against peace operations taking on non-traditional security challenges, as this might have negative consequences outside the fence. The explanations for why harm might be done varied according to each non-traditional security challenge.

Mainstreaming the PVE/CVE agenda into multilateral peace operations risks framing complex conflicts through a single lens, thereby ignoring the real drivers of violence. Countering narratives would not be sufficient, as violent extremist or terrorist movements often have a significant social base with grievances that would have to be addressed by improving livelihoods.\textsuperscript{168} In fact, the involvement of peace operations could eventually contribute to the marginalization of already aggrieved population groups, risking them being held hostage by armed groups, and as such harm effective protection of civilians and potentially escalate violence.\textsuperscript{169} In addition, more military CT could result in more destruction and civilian casualties, strengthen non-inclusive and unaccountable governments and eventually result in more sympathy for terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{170} Support to host governments by training and arming their security forces also risks the proliferation of weapons and might be less effective due to high defection rates, and even be counterproductive if defectors switch sides.\textsuperscript{171} Finally, taking on terrorism and violent extremism would increase expectations of peace operations, and risks host governments becoming over-reliant on international support, while also leading to inflated expectations among the population.\textsuperscript{172}

Particularly when the state has been captured by organized crime, there is a dilemma between addressing organized crime by prosecuting the main players or keeping the major partners in the peace process on board and ensuring the consent of the state for the presence of a multilateral peace operation. Operations such as ISAF or EULEX in Kosovo often lack the political will to conditionalize assistance and combat organized crime.\textsuperscript{173} If they do, however, particularly when missions become involved in executive law enforcement, this can have highly negative impacts on the economy of host nations and the livelihoods of populations if done in the wrong way. It can therefore have a destabilizing effect on countries, might create spoilers and could affect the perceptions of local partners and their willingness to collaborate with missions.\textsuperscript{174}

When peace operations take on roles in the field of irregular migration and human trafficking, they can do harm in other areas. The provision of assistance to border

\textsuperscript{167} Breakout group no. 2 and UN official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{168} Civil society representative no. 5 and civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{169} Breakout group no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{170} Member state representative no. 2 and Civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{171} Civil society representative no. 6, AU official no. 2, member state representative no. 2, member state representative no. 3 and EU official no. 5, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{172} Member state representative no. 1 and member state representative no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{173} Researcher no. 5, researcher no. 8 and UNDP official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.

\textsuperscript{174} Researcher no. 8, member state representative no. 6, UN official no. 4 and breakout group no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
management agencies automatically affects conflict dynamics.\textsuperscript{175} Financial and technical security assistance with migration regulation could also be used to harm civilian populations, for example, as biometrics training to curb irregular migration can also be used to violate human rights.\textsuperscript{176} Such assistance could also legitimize human rights violators.\textsuperscript{177} There are also tensions between migrant human rights reporting and political mediation of the mandates of peace operations. In Libya, for example, UNSMIL has been obstructed in its human rights reporting following its reporting on violations of the human rights of migrants in government migrant detention centres.\textsuperscript{178} Moreover, strengthened border management capacity and making the historically acceptable practice of migration illegal could push irregular migrants to take more risks and increase the price they have to pay to take more dangerous routes across the Sahara and the Mediterranean, and might also attract more involvement of traffickers and organized crime.\textsuperscript{179} Curbing migration also takes away the livelihoods of those engaged in trafficking and of the recipients of remittances. In the absence of alternative livelihood and development projects, these groups can be hit very hard.\textsuperscript{180} Even returning and reintegrating IDPs and refugees, if not done well, can have unintended consequences, increasing inter-group division and tensions.\textsuperscript{181}

Even minimal engagement with epidemics and pandemics, ensuring that multilateral peace operations do not become a vector of transmission, needs to be weighed against the consequences for the broader aims of the mandate. For example, in South Sudan UNMISS pulled its personnel out of protection of civilians sites, which in the absence of alternative security providers resulted in a security gap in some of the camps.\textsuperscript{182} Another harmful impact of operations to address epidemics or pandemics is that health facilities might become targets for armed groups. In addition, a singular focus by peace operations on fighting an epidemic or pandemic over improving the health system as a whole would be harmful if it skewed attention away from the treatment of patients suffering from other diseases. Particularly when the effort is sustained over a long period, this would have impacts on addressing other longer term health challenges, such as malnutrition in Haiti. In turn, this often creates resentment among local populations that feel that their concerns are not being listened to, or might feed into existing patterns of inequality and conflict.\textsuperscript{183} In eastern DRC, the local population called the Ebola response ‘Ebola business’. Once the epidemic was taken care of and all the funding had dried up, there was no follow-up response and the country’s broken health system remained.\textsuperscript{184}

In the field of environmental degradation and resource scarcity, while multilateral peace operations may be relevant in terms of mediating and addressing community conflicts, the presence of large-scale peace operations is often said to block development.

\textsuperscript{175} Breakout group no. 2 and civil society representative no. 3, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{176} Civil society representative no. 3, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{177} Breakout group no. 1, OHCHR official no. 1 and civil society representative no. 3, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{178} Breakout group no. 1 and OHCHR official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{179} Breakout group no. 1 and breakout group no. 2, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{180} EU official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{182} UN official no. 9 and UN official no. 10, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{183} UN official no. 9 and UNDP official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{184} UN official no. 9, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
They might deal with the symptoms of armed conflict but crowd out the capacity to deal with its root causes, such as the destruction of climate-related coping mechanisms.\textsuperscript{185} Even projects such as providing solar energy panels for local populations, which might help to stop environmental degradation, can do harm if they become a target for armed groups.\textsuperscript{186}


4. Cooperation and coordination

Regardless of whether multilateral peace operations address non-traditional security challenges, they must collaborate, cooperate and coordinate with a variety of other actors that address the same or related issues. This cooperation takes place at various levels, internally within the mission, nationally with the host government and civil society, and internationally in various bilateral and multilateral efforts. Often, successful coordination is explained not in terms of technicalities or mechanisms, but of personal chemistry and trust. This starts at the top because it is easier for field personnel to coordinate their efforts when the leadership is in agreement.\textsuperscript{187}

Internal coordination

Depending on the organization deploying them, multilateral peace operations are able to bring to bear various widely differing instruments and components. The UN has the broadest range of options from various civilian substantive sections, to UNPOL and military components. There was general agreement among participants in the dialogue meetings that non-traditional security challenges cannot be dealt with successfully by military means alone. Therefore, if peace operations engage on cross-cutting issues, which non-traditional security challenges generally are, these different parts of missions should ideally collaborate and be coordinated in an integrated or comprehensive approach, as required. There is, however, much less agreement on who should be in the lead, where the emphasis should lie or how different approaches can or should be sequenced. In a limited number of cases, participants argued that comprehensive approaches are unhelpful. For example, in counterterrorism environments, a comprehensive approach would often link organized crime to violent extremism and terrorism, which would be too limiting a lens.\textsuperscript{188}

According to most participants, the centre of gravity of coordination lies at the operational and tactical level in the field. In practice, however, this collaboration is subject to a range of preconditions, challenges and presuppositions. First, that integrated and detailed analysis leads to common priority setting and a shared strategy. This is generally a challenge but, for example, in MONUSCO a focus on natural resources is included in integrated strategies and the mission’s operational and work plans. Second, that resources are available, although in practice they are limited. Operations are therefore often reactive in their approach, and focused on current problems rather than jointly and proactively anticipating emerging issues. Third, that technical expertise is available, although in practice the different components involved lack such expertise, and where it is available any collaboration also needs the necessary political support from the mission leadership.\textsuperscript{189}

In reality, participants in the dialogue meetings highlighted that internal projects in multilateral peace operations are often ad hoc and not well coordinated with other parts of the mission. In the field of environmental degradation and resource scarcity, for example, in MINUSMA, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) introduced a focus on natural resources into its analysis. Military components, UNPOL and various

\textsuperscript{187} AU official no. 2, EU official no. 1 and EU official no. 5, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\textsuperscript{188} Researcher no. 4, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018; EU official no. 5, NATO official no. 1, member state representative no. 2, member state representative no. 3 and civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

Cooperation and Coordination

Substantive sections have QIPs, Trust Fund and programmatic funding for environment-related projects, such as providing access to water in the context of community violence reduction. However, few projects are well coordinated internally. Moreover, environmental impact assessments of such projects are often absent, meaning that digging a well in one village can increase the potential for conflict with another village, and that solutions may be applied that are not environmentally friendly in the long term.\footnote{UN official no. 6 and UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.} Similarly, in MINUSMA the Transnational Organized Crime Taskforce was driven from the top to ensure that different parts of the mission would meet regularly and collaborate on the topic. Among the main challenges were sharing information and linking databases as, for a variety of reasons, different sections of the mission were unable or unwilling to share their data.\footnote{UN official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.}

Much of the discussion focused on internal coordination mechanisms and the way these are funded and provided with capacity. Focal points have been appointed in several UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as in EU CSDP missions on several topics. This is, however, not a dedicated but a regular position with an additional coordination assignment, and consequently capacity is limited. For example, the task of a climate security focal point is to stimulate the inclusion of environmental risk issues in analysis, planning and reporting, and to bring these together. Dedicated Climate Security and Natural Resource Advisors have also been deployed in a few missions. Focal points and advisors often receive pushback from substantive sections, as well as from the field support and uniformed components, as these do not feel ownership of the topics and argue they are none of their concern. Such reluctance is partly explained by the limited political commitment. Climate Security and Natural Resource Advisors are funded through extra-budgetary funding and not from assessed contributions. The latter would signify political commitment by the organization, while the former is just the political commitment of a donor country.\footnote{UNDP official no. 2 and UNODC official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018; and UN official no. 6 and UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.}

In the OSCE, most environmental security issues are financed through extra-budgetary contributions, as reaching consensus on funding from the unified budget would be difficult.\footnote{OSCE official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.} Only in EU CSDP missions and operations is there political commitment to mainstream activities that address the security challenges resulting from climate change and environmental degradation and exploitation. This is illustrated by the inclusion of a commitment in the New Civilian CSDP Compact.\footnote{Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, 9588/23, Brussels, 22 May 2023.}

With regard to other non-traditional security challenges in UN peacekeeping operations, transnational organized crime has a natural home with UNPOL, and IDPs and their protection are a substantive part of the work of protection of civilians sections. Participants in the dialogue meeting on pandemics and epidemics did not see any added value in health focal points, as the issue would not be essential for contextual awareness and other organizations should be addressing it.\footnote{Breakout group no. 2, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.}

Sequencing is often seen as a way to resolve coordination problems. In Afghanistan, for example, ‘clear, hold, build’ suggested different emphases during different phases, moving from the military to clear areas, to policing to hold them and on to development to
build stability. Although many participants in the dialogue meetings still saw relevance in sequencing, others questioned how productive it was, as many of the activities need to take place in parallel and different regions could find themselves at different stages. As a consequence, although there may be different emphases, the different ‘stages’ are not that clear-cut.\textsuperscript{196}

**Coordination with national actors**

There was general consensus that multilateral peace operations need sufficient political support at the national level in host countries to deal effectively with non-traditional security challenges. There must be momentum for change among the national authorities and the local population, which subsequently needs to be sufficiently grasped by the mission and its leadership.\textsuperscript{197}

According to participants in the dialogue meetings, host governments and civil society are best placed to coordinate efforts on terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime, irregular migration, and epidemics and pandemics. They generally know best what is required and how it can best be delivered, while their ownership is required to ensure the sustainability of peace operations’ activities and results. Moreover, they can help to establish which standards should be applied and often have the best overview of who is doing what on their territory.\textsuperscript{198} To allow for coordination to start from the establishment of an operation, the host government and population need to be included in the analysis and planning before a mission is deployed. However, in these early stages, deploying organizations tend to avoid taking responsibility and are reluctant to coordinate their efforts. Moreover, host government and civil society capacity is often limited at the start of an operation, and they are often parties to the conflict.\textsuperscript{199} As a consequence, external actors at times make their own assessment of the situation and of needs on the ground based on misunderstandings and wrong assumptions. In the past decade, for example, while international actors focused on Ebola and Covid-19, host state populations at various times considered malaria, which is responsible for many more deaths in Africa, a bigger concern. In addition, external actors such as peace operations are not always sufficiently aware of local customs. For example, washing and taking care of the dead is extremely important in certain cultures. Telling local populations that they can no longer do so to prevent the spread of disease can generate serious resistance to a peace operation.\textsuperscript{200}

Another discussion in the dialogue meetings was on the challenges that arise because multilateral peace operations are responsible to external bodies—in the case of UN peacekeeping operations, to the Security Council—not to host governments and local communities, whereas development actors, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), are directly responsible to the host government. Some participants felt that peace operations getting involved in development-related issues, such as non-traditional security challenges, could provide an opportunity to make them accountable

---

\textsuperscript{196} NATO official no. 1, EU official no. 5 and member state representative no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.


\textsuperscript{198} UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.

\textsuperscript{199} UN official no. 3 and member state representative no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; UN official no. 3, UN official no. 5 and UNDP official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018; EU official no. 6 and UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019; and civil society representative no. 1, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{200} Civil society representative no. 1 and researcher no. 11, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
to the host government, and as such strengthen the involvement and leadership of
the host state in the context of the extension of state authority and people-centred
approaches. Other participants, however, warned that this would be problematic where
governments are non-inclusive, oppressive or a party to the conflict.201

Host government
The starting point for engagement by any multilateral peace operation is the host
government, which has responsibilities under international law for addressing terror-
ism and violent extremism, organized crime, irregular migration and human traffick-
ing, environmental degradation and resource scarcity, and epidemics/pandemics.
However, host governments may be unable or unwilling to carry out their obligations.
They do not always have the required capacity to deal with these challenges, as they are
complex and solutions are rarely straightforward. Moreover, host countries frequently
suffer from a brain drain as educated nationals are regularly contracted by international
actors, including peace operations.202

Nor is the state always an innocent or even neutral actor. Some host states were
described as ‘mafia bazars’, the aim of which is not governance but maintaining the
illicit economy.203 This creates a dilemma as only if host country representatives are
treated as partners and listened to can a peace operation contribute to sustainable
solutions, as their achievements on departure need to be owned by those who have to
maintain them.204 However, successful assistance, including SSR and institution build-
ing, needs to be more than a technical exercise. It is profoundly political in character
in order to address important causes of conflicts: state capture, predatory criminal
power structures and lack of accountability. A mission needs to contribute to a change
in culture if newly trained personnel are to be able to operate differently in corrupt
structures, as those who hold government power may not be open to change.205

Thus, coordination with the host government is fundamental but weak or unwilling
governments may not initially be in a position to coordinate.206 In the absence of a
national strategy, international actors tend to focus on their own interests and mandates.
According to many participants, in PVE/CVE and CT, as well as fighting organized
crime, a national strategic plan would ideally be developed as soon as possible. Once
developed, if international actors support the plan as required, coordinating activities
will become easier.207 Where multilateral peace operations do not have an executive
mandate, for example in addressing human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants,
they depend entirely on the capacity and political will of host governments. However,
host government priorities often differ from those of peace operations. The former
are frequently focused on combating armed groups, and less interested in combating
human trafficking and migrant smuggling, as they may lack the capacity or they and
their populations gain from such activities.208 As a consequence, cooperation is at

---

201 UNDP official no. 4 and member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation
204 UN official no. 5, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
205 Researcher no. 5, researcher no. 8 and breakout group no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar,
2019; and Member state representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat,
207 UN official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017; and UN
208 UN official no. 15 and EU official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat,
times affected by UN personnel’s mistrust of government representatives. This affects, for example, the sharing of sensitive information or intelligence in the field of CT. Operations hold back on sharing information as they are uncertain about what will happen to that information, but they also question whether the information received is reliable.\(^{209}\) Moreover, mission personnel often feel that in order to get the best deal, host governments try to play international partners off against each other. Participants stressed that international coordination of assistance is required to ensure that the international community can remain firm on key principles.\(^{210}\)

**Civil society**

In some mission environments, it is not the state or international actors, but civil society actors that are best organized and most influential. For example, sometimes faith-based organizations can be the most relevant partner for peace operations.\(^{211}\) Therefore, multilateral peace operations need to actively engage and collaborate with civil society organizations, as well as traditional and community-based organizations. This has historically been a weakness of multilateral peace operations. In UN peacekeeping operations, Civil Affairs Divisions and Community Liaison Officers are often very helpful in establishing connections with local communities and civil society. However, military components of peacekeeping operations in particular tend to ‘bunkerize’, and to draw up protective walls that also limit access to the mission by civil society. This leads to frustration among these organizations and local communities, as they feel they are not listened to and their priorities are not taken into account.\(^{212}\)

While coordination is often focused at the international level, participants in all the dialogue meetings pointed out that the level of success is primarily determined by liaison with the local population and by how it perceives the drivers of the conflict.\(^{213}\) It was suggested that to ensure the sustainability of activities, it is important to ask populations how they want their security and justice to be built and how they can get involved.\(^{214}\) In order to deal with non-traditional security challenges, society at large, beyond the usual suspects such as non-governmental organizations, would need to be empowered and engaged with to change some of the existing dynamics. Multilateral peace operations try to contribute, and often succeed in contributing, to the creation of space for local groups to obtain a voice at the negotiation table on peace and development.\(^{215}\) Nonetheless, various challenges still need to be overcome.

First, while sequencing is sometimes seen as a way to resolve coordination challenges between missions and civil society, this is often a false assumption. For example, some participants assumed that military CT would create space for civil society organizations to actively deal with the underlying drivers of violent extremism, but many civil society representatives did not agree with a militarized approach and argued that they do not need the military to provide security for their activities.\(^{216}\)

\(^{209}\) Host nation representative no. 2 and member state representative no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\(^{210}\) EU official no. 5, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.


\(^{213}\) UNDP official no. 3, UN official no. 1, UN official no. 3, EU official no. 5, member state representative no. 1, civil society representative no. 6 and civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.


\(^{215}\) UNDP official no. 3, UN official no. 1, UN official no. 3, EU official no. 5, member state representative no. 1, civil society representative no. 6 and civil society representative no. 7, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

\(^{216}\) Civil society representative no. 7, AU official no. 2 and member state representative no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
Second, while multilateral peace operations often face information sharing challenges with civil society organizations, just as with host governments, civil society actors are frequently also reluctant to share information to avoid compromising their own security or perceived neutrality.\footnote{Member state representative no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.}

Third, while civil society is often seen as a service or intelligence provider, this risks delegitimizing governments if the state is not perceived to be in charge. For example, the provision of assistance through civil society is an alternative if the state has been captured by criminal elites, but this can also further erode the legitimacy of the state.\footnote{Researcher no. 12, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.} In the dialogue meetings, the role of civil society was primarily seen as that of a partner conducting the community-based work of a peace process.\footnote{Civil society representative no. 5 and UN official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.}

Finally, while civil society can complement multilateral peace operations in their efforts to deal with non-traditional security challenges, for instance, on organized crime, some organizations play the role of watchdog and advocate, which can fuel unrest and conflict. Moreover, the capacity of civil society organizations is often weak and they may be at special risk in insecure environments.\footnote{Researcher no. 13, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.}

**International coordination**

Missions are set up in environments where there is no blank slate. UN and non-UN humanitarian and development organizations, from UN Country Teams to EU Delegations, already have a lot of pre-existing knowledge and experience.\footnote{UNDP official no. 1 and EU official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.} In all the dialogue meetings, a strong emphasis was placed on the need for multilateral peace operations to coordinate with other international actors, be they specialized agencies, regional organizations or bilateral partners. Three reasons were given.

First, non-traditional security challenges cannot be resolved by means of the political and security instruments of peace operations alone. Solutions also lie in addressing the root causes and drivers of conflict, such as development or climate adaptation and mitigation. Therefore, peace operations can only be part of a broader approach that involves the humanitarian, development and peace nexus, as well as other partners in shared analysis, planning and possibly implementation. The questions that then need to be answered are who brings which assets to the table and how can these be coordinated?\footnote{Researcher no. 3, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.}

Second, while multilateral peace operations are generally focused on one host country, non-traditional challenges are generally transnational and transboundary in nature. Participants stressed the importance of including and better coordinating with regional organizations as one way to regionalize the efforts of peace operations.\footnote{UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.} The OSCE, for example, regularly works on cross boundary water cooperation and for this reason collaborates with the UN system, such as the UNDP and UNEP.\footnote{OSCE official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.} On the other hand, while NATO has a lot of experience of CIMIC activities, these have always been operation-based. Consequently, its cooperation structures with other organizations, as
well as the lessons learned, tend to disappear when operations end. Therefore, much of
the collaboration structure built in Afghanistan between NATO and other organizations
no longer exists. As new actors become active in the field of peace and security, the
demand to broaden existing coordination structures increases. While AU, EU and UN
coordination has taken root, such coordination would benefit, where relevant, from
including new organizations, such as the G5 Sahel, and new bilateral actors, such as
China and the Gulf States.

Third, peace operations are not necessarily the largest international players in a host
country. In Somalia, for example, bilateral donors had more funds and training cap-
cacity than AMISOM. Insufficient coordination of these international efforts has led to
the Somali security forces operating under different doctrines, as well as incompatible
training, increased tensions between different levels of governance and the security
forces being overburdened by training efforts, as their absorption capacity is limited
compared to what is on offer. While international organizations inform each other
about their ongoing activities relatively well, coordination with bilateral actors is much
more difficult, as they often fail to share information. In Mali, before the establish-
ment of MINUSMA, the Partenaires Techniques et Financiers du Mali (PTF) was set up
with a remit that included the environment and the climate. It brings together bilateral
and multilateral donors and forces them to talk and share information. Unfortunately,
only MINUSMA’s Stabilization and Recovery Unit participates, which conducts only
limited information sharing with the rest of the mission. An additional challenge
for such international coordination is that donor funding is typically inflexible and not
adjustable to needs. Thus, funds may be available for returning migrants but not for the
provision of medical assistance.

In practice, lighter organizations in terms of field presence such as the OSCE are
by their nature more interested in cross-organizational cooperation. Heavier organ-
izations, with substantial organizational presence, such as the EU and the UN, gener-
ally focus more on their own internal coordination within their own whole-of-system
approach.

**UN whole of system**

UN peace operations and the UN Country Teams are very different in character. Peace
operations report to the UN Security Council while the Country Team is responsible
to the host country. UN peace operations are financed by assessed contributions while
the UN Country Team depends on voluntary contributions from donors. Many of the
partners in the UN Country Team are project-driven and do not have core funding,
which makes collaboration and coordination with peace operations outside project
structures more difficult.

Integrating the efforts of UN peace operations into broader UN efforts to ‘deliver as
one’ (one UN) has received a lot of attention at the UN Secretariat with the intention

---

225 NATO official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva,


227 AU official no. 2, AU official no. 4, UN official no. 1 and UN official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and

228 EU official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.

229 UN official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov.
2021.


232 UN official no. 7 and UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource
of contributing to a more sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{233} At headquarters level, there are several coordination mechanisms in which the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) collaborates and coordinates with other parts of the UN system. These mechanisms draw up policies, advise on mandates and support training, among other things. They bring together different perspectives based on an appreciation of the importance of having different kinds of expertise at the table to contribute to a joint effort. Collaboration in such mechanisms is not always perfect but there is a genuine effort. The DPO is, for example, a member of the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT).\textsuperscript{234} On CT, the DPO and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) collaborate with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in the context of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.\textsuperscript{235} Similarly, the Climate Security Mechanism is a vertically integrated small unit that is deliberately trying to work across different parts of the UN, to which people are seconded from the DPPA, the UNDP, UNEP and the DPO, and collaborates closely with the climate focal points.\textsuperscript{236}

In the field, the starting point for the UN’s integrated approach is that different contexts require different forms of coordination. Particularly complex issues such as non-traditional security challenges require sophisticated coordination mechanisms, as these often fall within the purview of various agencies. Different development, humanitarian and peace operation structures need to be integrated, which creates a multiplicity of coordination structures that need to work together on various issues. The resulting network of existing and ad hoc coordination structures is frequently perceived as obstructing effective coordination. Leadership is important in order to smooth coordination but peace operations may be unable to provide such leadership. Even in integrated UN peace operations, not all parts of the mission are integrated into the UN Country Team structure and vice versa. Moreover, particularly if a topic is hot and attracts funding, different agencies may have an interest in engaging with it, but different agencies have different perspectives on and definitions of the same challenge, as well as different capacities for addressing them. As a consequence, it is not always obvious where in the UN system a certain topic, such as mixed migration, is situated.\textsuperscript{237}

In practice, therefore, the structures of integration differ. MONUSCO and UNSOM, for example, have an Integrated Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC), which contributes to an integrated approach between the mission and the UN Country Team, and which coordinates relevant common UN system activities in order to advance the UN’s Delivering as One agenda. A similar coordination mechanism is lacking in Mali, which has reduced the level of coordination on mission, development and humanitarian affairs inside MINUSMA and with the UN Country Team.\textsuperscript{238} In places where operations have become semi-permanent, such as Lebanon, collaboration with the UN Country Team is better. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, even though UNIFIL was not designed to deal with irregular migration, for example,
it was able to plug into the humanitarian response of the UN Country Team to support the influx of Syrian refugees, and to strengthen the resilience of host populations. The operation had knowledge of local infrastructure, political actors and contractors, and was able to set up QIPs.\textsuperscript{239}

**Benefits**

There are various benefits to UN peace operations and the UN Country Team delivering as one in a whole-of-system approach. First, UN peace operations and UN Country Teams complement and strengthen each other. UN peace operations have excellent political access, and logistical and other capacities that can support UN Country Team efforts with regard to non-traditional security challenges. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and several UN peace operations collaborated highly effectively in support of the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs. Peace operations have since contributed to the protection of camps, among others means through the protection of civilians. They have been instrumental in the protection of persons of concern, such as asylum seekers and returnees; the provision of infrastructural support, for example by sharing common offices, and building bridges and roads; the provision of logistical support (trucks and aircraft); and the provision of medical support and other supplies.\textsuperscript{240} During the Covid-19 pandemic, UN peace operations and UN Country Teams jointly supported governments and populations with preparing for and responding to the health, humanitarian and socio-economic impacts. They jointly provided personal protective and other equipment, and assisted with quarantine measures. Together, they bolstered communication measures for sensitization, public awareness raising and countering mis- and disinformation. As a consequence, however, following such support, once operations close, they can leave behind a vacuum or resource gaps in terms of infrastructure, logistics and medical support.\textsuperscript{241} Sustainability is a particularly important contribution of the UN Country team, as it has a long-term presence and addressing non-traditional security challenges requires its development tools. Moreover, the UN Country Team is better positioned to coordinate with all the relevant national and international stakeholders.\textsuperscript{242}

Second, whole-of-system coordination is important as the organizations and agencies in the UN Country Team are often able to operate regionally, while missions cannot. Non-traditional security challenges are not national challenges that can be dealt with by a mission that is organized nationally as a standalone entity. Missions can, however, build on collaboration with other actors with transnational mandates, such as Interpol and UNODC on organized crime.\textsuperscript{243}

Third, missions and the UN Country Team can support each other in terms of funding. Military components, UNPOL and various substantive sections have access to QIPs, assessed contributions, Trust Funds and programmatic funding, albeit focused on the short term. The UN Country Team has better access to long-term, programmatic funding. Unfortunately, coordination is still underutilized and, for example, missions’ environment-related projects, such as providing access to water in the context of com-

\textsuperscript{239} UNHCR official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.

\textsuperscript{240} UN official no. 12, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.

\textsuperscript{241} UN official no. 10 and member state representative no. 1, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{242} UN official no. 6 and member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.

\textsuperscript{243} UN official no. 4, UNODC official no. 1 and Interpol official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
munity violence reduction, are often not well coordinated with the Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH) cluster.\textsuperscript{244}

\textit{Challenges}

Although in principle the UN aims to deliver as one, at times challenges limit the space for collaboration. First, it might be pragmatic or realistic to maintain a distance between UN peace operations and humanitarian or development actors in the UN Country Team. However, even though current mission environments might be less welcoming than in the 1990s, when the UNHCR provided entire components of UN peacekeeping operations in a number of cases, the integration of UNHCR efforts into peace operations remains the norm. The UNHCR aims to maximize the advantages of peace operations, as these aim to address the drivers of displacement and to contribute to sustainable solutions. Only if collaboration threatens access or security would separate activities be preferred.\textsuperscript{245}

Second, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the strategic pooling of resources as one UN and the coordination of systemwide partnerships revealed how the diverging administrative and human resources, and financial regulations and rules throughout the UN system obstruct an integrated approach.\textsuperscript{246}

Third, in addition to the challenges of coordination between UN peace operations and UN Country Teams, there are also challenges of coordination within the Country Teams. In Mali, for example, the integrated strategic framework guiding the UN response faces challenges as agencies have different priorities and compete for access to financial resources.\textsuperscript{247}

Fourth, while there is a general sense that the UN Country Team should lead all efforts to ensure contextualization and sustainability, headquarters does not always support the field and often second guesses its judgement. For example, the establishment of new structures, such as UNMEER, which was advised against in the field, was seen as counterproductive by the dialogue participants.\textsuperscript{248} In eastern DRC, the Ebola Coordinator was not set up as a separate structure, and received insufficient financial and other support from headquarters.\textsuperscript{249} In the case of MINUSTAH in Haiti, headquarters was unwilling to be accountable for the cholera epidemic and refused to discuss it, which meant that a counterpart for the mission was absent.\textsuperscript{250} Successful senior leadership in missions often argues the need ‘to create one’s own destiny’, at times against the flow of the desires of headquarters. To do so, those on the ground would have to dictate the terms.\textsuperscript{251}

Fifth, collaboration between UN peace operations and the UN Country Teams is often hampered by the fact that consultation and information sharing are generally unsystematic. Neither the peace operations nor the UN Country Teams are to blame. By their very nature, there are distinctions between them. In addition, the UN Country Team is often not active in the areas where peace operations are deployed, which

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{244}UN official no. 6 and UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{245}UNHCR official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\item \textsuperscript{246}UN official no. 10, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{247}Researcher no. 7 and UN official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{248}UN official no. 8, UN official no. 9, UNDP official no. 1 and civil society representative no. 1 dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{249}UN official no. 9, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{250}UNDP official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{251}UN official no. 8, UN official no. 9 and UNDP official no. 1, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\end{itemize}
poses challenges for the mission as populations often want development projects that missions cannot deliver.\textsuperscript{252}

\textit{The way forward}

In order to avoid duplication or even competition between UN peace operations and UN Country Teams, participants generally argued that peace operations would be best integrated into or embedded in the work of the Country Teams. UN Country Teams are already present in host countries and therefore bring important knowledge and contacts to the table, and on departure they still have to continue the efforts of peace operations.\textsuperscript{253} There was a general consensus in the various dialogue meetings that there is no need to expand peace operation mandates. The UN system and regional organizations already have many instruments to hand for non-traditional security challenges, albeit not yet fully exploited and coordinated. This is, however, no justification for moving responsibility for non-traditional security challenges from the UN Country Teams to peace operations.\textsuperscript{254}

Nonetheless, the term ‘green helmets’ was coined in 1996.\textsuperscript{255} In 2019, an Indonesian delegate to the UN Security Council suggested that ‘One concrete step that we can take is to better equip our peacekeepers with the capacity to undertake military operations other than war—to carry out not only peacekeeping operations but also climate peace missions’.\textsuperscript{256} Previously, many experts deemed UN peace operations focused on non-traditional security challenges unrealistic, but this can no longer be excluded following the establishment of UNMEER.\textsuperscript{257}

\textbf{EU whole of system}

The EU, like the UN, is well placed to deal with non-traditional security challenges in an integrated approach, as its civilian and military CSDP missions and operations are just part of a broader spectrum of EU conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding structures, tools and instruments.\textsuperscript{258} Missions and operations add to the efforts of, among others, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO)—EuropeAid—and the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), which operate through the EU Delegations in various host countries. Therefore, to avoid impinging on what already exists in the EU family, in their design and mandating, EU CSDP missions and operations do not take on tasks that are already with either DG DEVCO or DG ECHO.\textsuperscript{259}

Various non-traditional security challenges are dealt with under other institutional frameworks. In the EU context, organized crime is part of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), for example, which has a different institutional setting to the CSDP. The JHA

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{252} UN official no. 6 and member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{253} UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019; and member state representative no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{254} OSCE official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Researcher no.14, member state representative no. 5 and researcher no.10, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{258} EU official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{259} EU official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
setting involves, among other agencies, Frontex and Europol. This complex landscape, however, leads to problems of interoperability, as well as duplication and gaps in EU policies.\textsuperscript{260} In the case of EUCAP Sahel Niger, for example, curbing migration has a great impact on the livelihoods of traffickers and recipients of remittances. Alternative livelihood and development projects are therefore needed to follow on from the mission’s efforts. However, the EU Delegation was ill-prepared for taking on such tasks, by means of for example quick impact projects, making the EU’s integrated approach weak.\textsuperscript{261} In the EU, some are looking at the UN’s coordination mechanisms as a useful bridge between the various parts of their own organization, and view the UN as an organization they can learn from.\textsuperscript{262}

**Inter-mission coordination**

For several decades, a number of host countries have welcomed complex constellations of various multilateral peace operations, either in parallel or in sequenced deployments. The different character of the various organizations deploying these missions has led to the emergence of a rough division of labour. The UN has broad mandates, which often contain executive aspects that address various forms of non-traditional security challenge, while the EU works on a limited number of niche issues often focused on the security sector, with non-executive mandates.\textsuperscript{263} NATO and the AU have deployed in particular military operations, but the AU has also deployed political missions. Both organizations have a particular focus on counterterrorism, and in practice also on organized crime, but they have not been in a position to ignore other non-traditional security challenges.\textsuperscript{264}

On the ground in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, a local level division of labour has emerged between the EU and the UN in terms of geographical space, as well as a focus on different centres of gravity. The EU focuses particularly on a limited number of niche or specialist issues within a broader shared policy area. Even when training courses overlap, one would focus on the rank and file while the other would focus on the leadership. Between EU and UN operations, attention is mostly focused on coordination of this limited number of activities to avoid overlap and conflict. Coordination has proved highly context-specific and context awareness is important. Thus, local coordination in theatre is more relevant than at headquarters level.\textsuperscript{265}

Coordination between AU and UN operations has at times been more challenging. In the case of AMISOM, the AU has mirrored the structures of the UN, as the original idea was that the mission would be transitioned to the UN. However, as UNSOM has deployed in parallel, this set-up has created a degree of competition and various coordination challenges. The headquarters level is particularly important for coordination between AU and UN operations. As memoranda of understanding may not always be perceived as entirely consensus-based, disagreement and mistrust can enter the relationship. AU representatives frequently do not feel sufficiently listened to. This tension is often framed as being between ‘those who pay’ and ‘those who fight’, and is over issues such as who should decide and who should receive most of the spotlight. However, these issues can also have concrete implications in terms of whether it is acceptable for AU

---

\textsuperscript{260} Researcher no. 12, Dialogue meeting on organized crime, Dakar, 19–20 Feb. 2018.
\textsuperscript{261} EU official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{262} EU official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{264} AU official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
\textsuperscript{265} Civil society representative no. 1 and EU official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
and UN staff to live under different conditions, even when co-located. From an AU perspective, this is often seen as a lack of respect that cannot be resolved by improving codes of conduct or interagency coordination mechanisms.\textsuperscript{266}

While parallel military operations, such as by the EU, France, the G5 Sahel and the UN in CAR or Mali, often collaborate or coordinate their operations, they rarely do so on their CIMIC activities, which adds confusion.\textsuperscript{267} In the context of CT, intelligence sharing is also problematic between different parallel missions, between missions and other bilateral and multilateral actors—or even between missions and host governments, and between the different personnel contributing countries in missions.\textsuperscript{268}

Inter-mission coordination between missions deployed by the same organization in the same region is also often difficult. As non-traditional security challenges are by definition cross-border in character, it is important for different missions in different host countries to collaborate and to coordinate their efforts. Despite the fact that the UN Security Council urges missions in its mandates to coordinate and collaborate, such collaboration is limited in practice. Generally, missions operate as separate entities, frequently without a shared vision on common challenges. There is no structural collaboration between the various components of different UN peace operations. Coordination and collaboration work when there is an immediate threat but are much harder to establish for the purpose of prevention, even in terms of information sharing on upcoming cross-border risks. Such cooperation is also very much personality-driven. Even in Sudan and South Sudan, where the UN has deployed three missions—UNAMID, UNISFA and UNMISS, coordination has only taken place on an ad hoc basis in times of crisis, or if personnel are invited to seminars.\textsuperscript{269} In the case of the UN, the Integrated Operational Teams in the New York Secretariat might be the best level of coordination possible, given the way UN peace operations are mandated and structured.\textsuperscript{270} The EU has responded to the same problem by regionalizing its missions in the Sahel region. Despite these efforts, however, different missions have different mandates and reporting lines, and must also manage the consent of different host governments.\textsuperscript{271}

Nonetheless, better coordination of some efforts on non-traditional security challenges is possible. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the Covid-19 efforts of the various parallel multilateral peace operations were coordinated by one external actor, the WHO.\textsuperscript{272} This was required because the existing division of labour, which divided tasks on the basis of activities without an underlying joint analysis or strategy, had the unintended consequence of diluting multilateral responsibilities, meaning that challenges were addressed in isolation and not in an integrated way.\textsuperscript{273}

\textsuperscript{266} AU official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
\textsuperscript{267} UN official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on environmental degradation and resource scarcity, Geneva, 24–25 Nov. 2021.
\textsuperscript{268} AU official no. 1, AU official no. 2, AU official no. 4 and UN official no. 3, Dialogue meeting on terrorism and violent extremism, Addis Ababa, 7–8 Nov. 2017.
\textsuperscript{269} UNDP official no. 4, researcher no. 2, OHCHR official no. 1, UN official no. 15 and EU official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{270} UNDP official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{271} UNDP official no. 4, researcher no. 2, OHCHR official no. 1, UN official no. 15 and EU official no. 6, Dialogue meeting on irregular migration and human trafficking, Rabat, 21–22 Mar. 2019.
\textsuperscript{272} OSCE official no. 4, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
5. Conclusions

Peace operations and non-traditional security challenges

While multilateral peace operations are not necessarily thought of as important players in the field of non-traditional security challenges, in the past three decades both UN and non-UN operations have been mandated to take on various tasks to deal with both the drivers and the consequences of these challenges. They have done so indirectly, by supporting others, and directly by addressing the challenges themselves. Over time, various aspects of these non-traditional security challenges have received different levels of attention, and attention has differed according to organization.

Terrorism and violent extremism have received a lot of attention since 2001, but have remained sensitive topics in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly with regard to military operations. These have become bread and butter issues for the AU and NATO, however, and in African ad hoc operations. While addressing organized crime has become a regular issue for UN peacekeeping operations, NATO and other organizations have often dealt with it in a much more ad hoc manner. Although refugee repatriation was an important task for several UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, and the protection of civilians and particularly IDPs has become a core task, addressing migration issues remains a sensitive topic for the UN, while in the past decade it has been centre stage of EU CSDP missions.

Resource scarcity, particularly when it involves conflict resources, has received a lot of attention from the UN Security Council and UN peacekeeping operations since the 1990s. Broadening the scope of attention to other potential environmental drivers of conflict has long been highly controversial at the UN and in the OSCE. However, as climate change and environmental awareness have become more prominent, attention on these challenges has also expanded beyond limiting the environmental impact of the presence of a peace operation. Finally, UN peace operations have been deployed in host countries severely affected by AIDS, Ebola and Cholera—and at times been implicated in the spread of these epidemics or pandemics—and they command important resources that can assist in addressing the challenges. They were therefore already prepared when Covid-19 spread around the globe. Other organizations deploying multilateral peace operations were also quickly pulled in to address the consequences of the pandemic.

There are clear advantages to multilateral peace operations taking on tasks vis-à-vis non-traditional security challenges. First and foremost, non-traditional security challenges might destabilize countries, break down the social fabric and risk derailing peace processes or progress on peace and security in already fragile countries. Therefore, addressing these challenges is important to the conflict management and peacebuilding aims of peace operations. In addition, in some of the countries in which they are deployed, peace operations have the logistics, a presence and resources that go far beyond the capacity of any other actor. These operations therefore logically step up and step in where relevant to deal with issues such as migration, terrorism and violent extremism or organized crime. Taking on these challenges can maintain the interest of and funding from finance- and troop-contributing countries. It might also make peace operations more relevant to local populations, as these challenges may actually matter more to them than other mission activities. Moreover, as peace operations are often seen as neutral in contested regions, they may be able to take on challenges, such as the provision of health assistance, that governments are not well positioned to face. In order to do no harm, peace operations may also have to take on challenges, such as human trafficking, epidemics and pandemics, as in the past they have been at least partly responsible for introducing these. Finally, ignoring challenges such as terrorism
and violent extremism, or pandemics and epidemics, could be a threat to the safety and security of peace operations personnel. These therefore demand the attention of operations.

Nonetheless, there are also strong disadvantages. Multilateral peace operations are already overstretched and addressing non-traditional security challenges adds additional decorations to the ‘Christmas tree’. It is also an extra burden for troop-contributing countries, which are generally low- or lower middle-income countries, and therefore not in a position to cover the increased costs of, for example, greening the blue helmets. Many Non-aligned Movement states, in particular, are sensitive to the risks of peace operations overstepping their mandates and see addressing non-traditional security challenges as a topic where missions typically tend to do more than they are mandated to. They also feel that the UN Security Council should not become involved in the internal affairs of host countries, something to which non-traditional security challenges are often linked. From a critical perspective, multilateral peace operations taking on non-traditional security challenges is also part of a trend for development and governance issues, such as irregular migration, organized crime and environmental degradation, to be securitized. As peace operations are generally deployed in areas where by definition no activity is perceived as neutral, the involvement of peace operations in tackling non-traditional security challenges could also politicize their presence and affect their legitimacy and impartiality.

In addition, other organizations are often better positioned to take on non-traditional security challenges, which generally require long-term investment and commitment, while multilateral peace operations are generally only deployed for shorter periods. Taking on non-traditional security challenges could also risk the safety and security of peace operation personnel, particularly when combating terrorism or where this affects the business models of organized crime. Lastly, taking on non-traditional security challenges could also do harm. It may, among many other things, lead to simplified approaches being taken to complex problems, destabilize economies and create spoilers or distract attention from the main tasks of missions. The attention paid to the symptoms of challenges could crowd out funding for tackling their root causes. The assistance provided to governments to deal with terrorism and violent extremism or irregular migration, for example, might also be used against civilian populations to violate human rights or to limit political and civic space.

How these advantages and disadvantages are weighed will differ according to each challenge, and perceptions also change over time and geographical location. On pandemics and epidemics, and environmental degradation and resource scarcity, the traditional pushback on broadening the scope of UN peace operations appears to be changing somewhat. Under the Compact for the Civilian CSDP, these are now seen as topics to be dealt with by CSDP missions alongside other non-traditional security challenges. Organized crime is also increasingly part of multilateral peace operation mandates. The lessons from CSDP missions addressing migration are not very positive, and this issue is unlikely to be picked up by the UN. While refugees, including their repatriation, have been largely off the agenda, IDPs, by virtue of the protection of civilians, are still very much at the centre of many UN peace operation mandates. Finally, while the UN may continue to refrain in particular from involvement in military CT, regional organizations and their operations, particularly in Africa, have been eager to take on this role. In the dialogue meetings, the consensus was clear that while the involvement of peace operations is often supported when regular civilian structures are unable to deal with non-traditional security challenges, in line with the Oslo Guidelines, use of the military should only be a last resort.
Coordination and cooperation with other actors

As non-traditional security challenges are important to mandate implementation by multilateral peace operations, regardless of whether they deal with them directly or indirectly, or not at all, operations must collaborate, cooperate and coordinate with the various other actors involved. Internally, that ideally means that different parts of missions collaborate in an integrated or comprehensive way as required. All this presupposes integrated and detailed analysis, and the availability of resources and technical expertise. Several UN and non-UN peace operations have extra-budgetary focal points on non-traditional security challenges. In practice, however, internal cooperation and coordination are often ad hoc and either makeshift or improvised.

The starting point for peace operations to effectively deal with non-traditional security challenges, however, is that they coordinate and collaborate with national partners—host government and civil society—as they know what is needed and how to achieve it, while their ownership is required to ensure sustainability. To allow national coordination right from the establishment of an operation, there is agreement that the host government and civil society need to be included as soon as possible in the analysis and planning, and ideally before the deployment of a mission. The challenge is, however, that host government and civil society capacity is often limited early on, and that either might be culpable. Moreover, multilateral peace operations are by nature responsible to multilateral organs such as the Security Council and not to the host government. Nonetheless, particularly where multilateral peace operations do not have an executive mandate, they depend entirely on the capacity and political will of host governments. Given the history of conflict and consequent diverging interests, however, UN personnel will at times mistrust government representatives, and vice versa. Active engagement and collaboration by peace operations with civil society organizations, traditional leaders and community-based organizations have also been a weakness historically.

It is important for multilateral peace operations to coordinate with other international actors, not least to deal with the root causes of non-traditional security challenges, to ensure regionalized transboundary approaches and to relate to others, as multilateral peace operations are often not the largest external actor active on the ground. By their nature, smaller organizations such as the OSCE are often better set up for cross-organizational cooperation, as larger organizations such as the EU and the UN generally focus more on their own internal coordination. In the UN, peace operations and the UN Country Team are very different in character in terms of reporting lines, funding and being project- rather than programme-driven. This makes collaboration and coordination on non-traditional security challenges more difficult.

Nonetheless, the general consensus in the various dialogue meetings was that the UN Country Team and regional organizations already have many instruments vis-à-vis non-traditional security challenges at hand, and that as these have not yet been fully exploited or coordinated with UN peace operations, there is no need to expand peace operation mandates. In addition, the establishment of new structures, such as UNMEER, was seen as counterproductive. Similarly, the EU has a broad spectrum of conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding structures, tools and instruments for addressing non-traditional security challenges. However, in the case of EU CSDP missions and operations, the EU’s integrated approach was seen as weak as the EU Delegation was regarded as ill-prepared to take on supporting tasks, such as QIPs.

A rough division of labour has emerged where complex constellations of various multilateral peace operations are deployed. Tasks have been carved up based on activities but without any underlying joint analysis and strategy. Better coordination of
efforts on non-traditional security challenges is therefore possible. As non-traditional security challenges are by definition of a cross-border nature, it will be important to improve inter-mission cooperation and coordination not only across borders, but also across organizations.

**The challenges of a changing global environment**

If, in line with the New Agenda for Peace, current trends continue to move away from the deployment of UN and multidimensional operations, and towards small political or larger militarized operations deployed in partnership with regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions, this will have implications for how multilateral peace operations deal with non-traditional security challenges and how they collaborate with others. Multilateral peace operations with uniformed personnel focused on, for example, CT in the Sahel, anti-gang crime in Haiti or countering migration or refugee streams are likely to continue. With the diminution of multidimensional operations, however, other non-traditional security challenges, such as environmental degradation and resource scarcity, and pandemics and epidemics, are more likely to be dealt with in the context of smaller political missions.

Most regional organizations do not have the agencies and specialized organizations to deal with non-traditional security challenges that the UN has. Therefore, as peace operation partnerships become more frequent, coordination and cooperation are likely to become more difficult. Missions will continue to face fragmented approaches in which they are meant to act in an integrated way, but also to outsource tasks to regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions. Joint analysis, planning, training, implementation and evaluation are likely to become even more difficult with this variety of partners. Ad hoc alliances in particular will have to reinvent the wheel over and over in the absence of a lessons learned capacity. Budgets and resources may not be readily available in every organization. Policies, including on human rights due diligence, will need to be put in place to guide practice on the ground. Coordination mechanisms are frequently absent and will often have to be established. Transitioning within one organization is already a challenge but transitioning from one organization to another will face even more obstacles. While standing capacities may smooth processes, these cannot exist in every organization. As a consequence, it may become even more difficult in future to coordinate efforts on non-traditional security challenges in the context of multilateral peace operations.

---

6. Policy implications and recommendations

The policy implications of this study can be clustered into the need: (a) to better operationalize either integration or outsourcing efforts in a well-coordinated division of labour; (b) to invest more in joint analysis, planning, training, implementation and evaluation; (c) to further streamline budget procedures; (d) to further develop policies on non-traditional security challenges; (e) to strengthen coordination mechanisms; (f) to consider standing capacity options; (g) to increase political awareness in peace operations and set conditionalities; (h) to strengthen the application of long-term perspectives; (i) to support transition processes; and (j) to set up forums for cross-country and cross-organizational cooperation.

Recommendations

1. Better operationalize integration or outsourcing

A more holistic vision for peace and security is needed that can provide a framework for the efforts of multilateral peace operations and their humanitarian and development partners. Such a comprehensive approach will need to frame and embrace non-traditional security challenges in order to increase impact. The various existing compacts could be integrated further into the triple nexus of humanitarian, development and peace sectors. UN Security Council Resolution 2282 on the review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture provides a more holistic vision that could be made more central to current practice.275

There is generally no need to separate non-traditional security challenges in multilateral peace operation mandates. These should instead be mainstreamed, including in the analysis. Rather than missions take on additional tasks, it would be better for the UN Country Team to take the lead in ensuring contextualization and sustainability. Only if these challenges are not picked up by the Country Team should operations get involved—and then only as a last resort in the spirit of the Oslo Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief.276 The establishment of multilateral peace operations focused on the eradication of a single non-traditional security challenge, as was the case with UNMEER, should be avoided.

Non-UN multilateral peace operations will require sufficient logistical, intelligence and other forms of capabilities and capacities if, as suggested by the New Agenda for Peace and by the HIPPO report on CT tasks, the division of labour is outsourcing addressing non-traditional security challenges to regional organizations.277 In the absence of UN peacekeeping operations, partner operations or activities will require support packages from the UN accompanied by human rights due diligence policies. Moreover, as local populations, and criminal and armed groups do not differentiate between different parallel operations, UN special political missions or support offices not engaged in CT or other forms of addressing non-traditional security challenges might still be targeted, and will therefore also require the necessary force protection.

276 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 139); and NATO official no. 3 and EU official no. 2, Dialogue meeting on epidemics and pandemics, Geneva, 22–23 Nov. 2021.
277 United Nations (note 274).
2. **Invest more in joint analysis, planning, training, implementation and evaluation**

**Invest in joint analysis.** Both UN and non-UN multilateral peace operations need a much better understanding of the context in which they are deployed. This means a context, political economy and political analysis of the host country, including its non-traditional security challenges. Such an analysis will help to provide an understanding of the interests of local and national actors, the role international actors and the specific role the mission can play, and set priorities and identify and assess the risks for peace operations. These assessments require some form of independence to avoid the outcome becoming an organizational struggle over resources. They would also do well to include the local research community to ensure that long-term data and analyses are available and included in the planning. Such a joint analysis will require more human intelligence, for example gathered through the provision of mobile telephones and rewards to local informants. It will be important to report the findings of the assessment to the UN Security Council or other mandating bodies, and this should be repeated regularly to keep these bodies updated. In addition, various parts of multilateral peace operations, the UN Country Team, other international and bilateral partners, as well as various civil society organizations often collect data but do not share it. Bringing these resources together in an information sharing platform would benefit analysis, priority setting and policy planning. Finally, during deployments, there will be a need to further increase the information and intelligence analysis capability of multilateral peace operations, among other things by having JMAC organized crime cells in UN peacekeeping operations.

**Ensure joint planning.** Alongside multilateral peace operations, different organizations and bilateral partners also have their own strategies with regard to non-traditional security challenges. Only once a joint strategy has been drawn up can action plans be made that allow for better coordination of the different activities and avoid duplication. Ideally, the starting point would be what those partners already provide through their presence on the ground and is likely to remain after the departure of a peace operation. Multilateral peace operations should only take on those tasks which the organizations already present cannot handle. Pre-deployment planning is, however, not a silver bullet for integration. Adaptive planning is essential to be prepared for unforeseen events such as pandemics.

**Invest in joint training.** In order to better navigate non-traditional security challenges, senior management needs to be trained on how to lead and coordinate on complex issues, in terms of both vision and subject matter expertise.

**Strengthen joint implementation.** While multilateral peace operations and the UN Country Team develop the obligatory multi-year Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), which identifies a common vision, joint priorities and areas for better coordination, these should move beyond box ticking exercises. If existing UN structures are too weak to deal with non-traditional security challenges, it is best to strengthen the UN Country Team, particularly UNDP, UNOCHA and the WHO, as it is not helpful to set up parallel structures in peace operations. The same is also applicable to the relationship between CSDP missions and operations and EU delegations.

**Develop joint monitoring and evaluation capabilities.** Such a capability might be costly and few donors are willing to finance it, but it is essential if multilateral peace operations are to adjust and improve.
3. **Further streamline budget procedures**

**Incentivize integrated operations.** In both the UN and the EU systems, the funding streams for development and humanitarian actors, and peace operations are very different in character. While numerous attempts have been made to bridge these systems, integration efforts have so far not been sufficiently supported. Currently, the two main options in the UN are: (a) an allotment for the agencies, a special arrangement from the assessed peacekeeping budget to fund joint projects by the mission and the UN Country Team; and (b) different funding streams pooled in a common fund, ideally managed by the DSRSG/RC with joint reporting. The first is not very practical and the latter is generally preferred by mission and UN Country Team staff. Donors could further incentivize the joint planning and implementation of activities that address non-traditional security challenges by making these and other funding procedures more flexible.

**Outsource to partner organizations.** In a partnership in which regional organizations are expected to take on non-traditional security challenges, such as terrorism and violent extremism, predictable, adequate and sustainable funding is essential. If these regional organizations are not in a position to generate this themselves, support from UN assessed contributions is essential. Outsourcing tasks without accompanying funds and resources is likely lead to reduced effectiveness.

4. **Further develop policies on non-traditional security challenges**

Although coordination on non-traditional security challenges is moving forward in the UN at the operational level, at the policy level in the Security Council there is no agreement on the extent to which peace operations should deal with these issues and, if so, how. This leads to a discrepancy between the operational and policy levels, as there is no policy framework for activities in the field controlled by the Security Council at the macro level. As Council agreement is unlikely in the foreseeable future, non-permanent members of the Security Council might need to form coalitions to keep non-traditional security challenges on the agenda of the Council and of other security forums. The UN Secretariat also has policy space, as the most important doctrine on peacekeeping, the Capstone Doctrine, is a Secretariat document. In addition, a partnership in which regional organizations increasingly take on non-traditional security challenges demands that also they strengthen and expand their policy frameworks.

5. **Strengthen coordination mechanisms**

There is no one-size-fits-all coordination mechanism in the field. The coordination architecture for addressing non-traditional security challenges needs to be tailor made to the context and driven by priorities and relevant capabilities and capacities. Nonetheless, existing coordination mechanisms could be further strengthened and expanded.

**Focal points, advisors and specialists on various non-traditional security challenges already exist in various multilateral peace operations.** With the exception of pandemics and epidemics, and human trafficking, multilateral peace operations require specialists on non-traditional security challenges to better inform all of their activities. Given the size of their tasks, these need to be dedicated to this single task and should not therefore be focal points. In the UN, these advisors need to be funded from assessed contributions, and to be double hatted in the mission and the Country Team, as the latter should remain in the lead. The topics of pandemics and epidemics, and human trafficking do not need their own workstream in missions, as pandemics and epidemics
should stay with the UN Country Team and human trafficking can already be effectively dealt with under the protection of civilians, human rights and organized crime.

**Flexible coordination mechanisms are helpful.** Top-down, prescriptive planning structures and instruments do not work in the long run, as they lose their energy once those who have set them up for a particular purpose leave. More bottom-up, looser structures might be more effective. A cluster approach to non-traditional security challenges, such as an inter-agency standing committee as a predictable coordinating mechanism, could be flexible and adaptable to different contexts. As a vertically integrated small unit that is deliberately trying to work across different parts of the UN, the Climate Security Mechanism, to which people are seconded from different organizations and that works closely with the specialists in missions, could be seen as a good example of a coordination mechanism, including for the EU.

**Pull bilateral partners into coordination mechanisms.** As conflict management is becoming increasingly fragmented and bilateral partners are upscaling their own approaches to dealing with non-traditional security challenges, it is important that these activities are included in international coordination mechanisms to avoid international efforts becoming counterproductive.

**Place host countries—host governments and populations—in the lead, and actively engage and partner with civil society and community-based organizations and traditional leaders.** They generally know best what is required for non-traditional security challenges and how this can best be delivered, while their ownership is required to ensure the sustainability of peace operations’ activities and results. Despite the challenges, governments in particular can help to establish which standards should be applied. They often have the best overview of who is doing what on their territory.

**Lead by example.** In addressing non-traditional security challenges, multilateral peace operations need to strengthen the partnership by ensuring that inside-the-fence challenges are dealt with, in that peace operations personnel are not engaged in criminal activities, peace operations do not attract human trafficking or become a vector for the transmission of diseases and missions are environmentally sustainable.

6. **Consider standing capacity options**

The UN’s UNPOL Standing Police Capacity is a rapid deployment operational asset of the Police Division, which provides police and law enforcement start-up and surge capabilities for UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions. Similar capacities could be envisaged for delivering expertise on non-traditional security challenges, such as environmental degradation and resource scarcity, as engineers dedicated to supporting the environmental sustainability of operations are already operating from the logistics base in Brindisi.

7. **Increase peace operation’s political awareness and set conditionalities**

Multilateral peace operations are not merely technical activities but inherently political. This means that their involvement in non-traditional security challenges, or the lack of such involvement, also has political implications. Obviously, this requires a balanced approach, but the political risks of long-term challenges such as corruption, state capture and an environment of impunity will eventually lead to mission failure and should weigh more heavily than short-term resistance from corrupt governments. One implication is that UN and non-UN multilateral peace operations need to be firmer about imposing conditionalities on their activities, including cutting off funding, supply routes and access to networks, as well as the imposition of personal sanctions.
Human rights reporting and institution building in the field of the rule of law, in cooperation with civil society as part of a long term, inclusive strategy, are important when addressing organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, as well as irregular migration and human trafficking. Similarly, it is essential that multilateral peace operations and partner organizations have a human rights due diligence policy in place when providing support to host governments or partner operations and organizations.

8. Strengthen the application of long-term perspectives

Multilateral peace operations need to step out of their traditional mindset of managing conflict and addressing its consequences, and focus more on addressing the root causes of such conflict, including non-traditional security challenges. This may not be very glamorous and requires long-term engagement. They may not have the mandates or resources to do this by themselves, but they can help to build coalitions that are able to do so, and are often in a good position to coordinate or at least initiate efforts.

9. Support transition processes

Multilateral peace operations are not deployed in a vacuum. Various long-term instruments and initiatives will be present before they arrive and will remain in place after their departure. Missions cannot deal with all the causes of the conflict and all the non-traditional security challenges within the timespan of their presence. Therefore, even before their deployment, their planning needs to be directed at the transition to other actors. The UN Country Team—or EU Delegations in the case of EU CSDP missions and operations—need to be involved in pre-deployment planning to allow a smoother transition to the end of operations. This will allow the efforts of peace operations to be more sustainable, as legacy institutions can take advantage of the mission’s logistical capacity and budgets. As resources for peacebuilding reduce substantially at the time of transition, it is important to give thought to path dependency from the start. In addition, it is important to involve the host government in peace operation efforts as soon as possible. Once the activities of missions have transitioned to the UN Country Team, the consent of the host nation is essential. It is therefore important to cherish the privileged relationship between the UN Country Team and the government, and to ensure that addressing non-traditional security challenges is not drawn too much into the realm of the Security Council, as this would close off a lot of long-term options.

10. Set up forums for cross-country and cross-organization cooperation

Non-traditional security challenges are generally transboundary in nature and cannot be resolved by one organization in one country alone. Multilateral peace operation practitioners should avoid seeking to reinvent the wheel. They need to interact more with and learn more from the experiences of other relevant bodies and organizations. Opportunities exist to share analysis with partner organizations. The UN could consider setting up forums for such cross-country cooperation, comparable to those of the OSCE, including bilateral partners in them and using these for cross-organizational learning and information exchange.
About the author

Dr Jaïr van der Lijn (Netherlands) is a Senior Researcher and Director of the SIPRI Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme. Jair joined SIPRI in 2013. He is also affiliated with the Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. His research focuses primarily on: current trends and future developments in multilateral peace operations (eg. the African Union, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations); their handling of complex environments; their evaluation; and, their relationship with local actors in host nations.