


COMPARING RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS AMONG THE EU, NATO AND THE OSCE

ANNIEK BARNHOORN



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Summary

This SIPRI Policy Report compares responses to climate-related security risks by the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—the three main intergovernmental regional organizations involved in addressing security in Europe and beyond. All three have formulated ambitious policies in the area of climate security in recent years. With a view to maximizing the potential of these organizations to respond to climate-related security risks, as well as identifying complementary approaches and synergies, this policy report seeks to systematically explore the similarities and differences between the three. The analysis is structured around five building blocks: (a) context; (b) discursive framing; (c) institutional design; (d) policy action; and (e) ambition.

First, context identifies how an organization's approach to addressing climate-related security risks aligns with its organizational logic on international security. The EU, NATO and the OSCE have each formulated approaches to addressing climate-related security risks that are closely aligned with their respective organizational logic on international security.

Second, discursive framing explores how climate security is understood in an organization's official discourse and the extent to which it has been mainstreamed. Climate change is increasingly being framed in terms of security by all three organizations, but while the EU has adopted an integrated approach to climate security, this more holistic understanding has yet to be fully mainstreamed in all the relevant policy domains by NATO and the OSCE.

Third, institutional design reveals where climate-related security risks are being addressed in an organization and how this is being coordinated. Each of the three organizations has multiple institutional as well as dedicated bodies addressing climate-related security risks, but there is potential for enhanced coordination across the board.

Fourth, policy action unpacks how an organization is translating the climate security discourse into practice and the implementation so far. Each organization has its own thematic approach and priorities in addressing climate-related security risks but there is insufficient implementation and challenges remain. Setting out concrete goals and responsibilities represents an important step in enhancing policy action.

Fifth, ambition captures an organization's concrete goals and assesses how realistic these are. Despite the high ambitions set by the three organizations to address climate-related security risks, not all are realistic and require further concretization. Achieving their various ambitions will depend on how the different building blocks interact. These building blocks do not operate in isolation but interact and strengthen each other's development, enabling change in addressing climate-related security risks.

The discussion in this report shows that while the EU, NATO and the OSCE have come a long way in raising the interlinkages between climate, peace and security on their agendas, it is not enough just to strengthen the discourse. Despite efforts to move beyond discursive framing through institutional design towards policy action, more is required to achieve the organizations' ambitions in this domain. In addition, although all three include cooperation as part of their thematic approach to responding to climate security, thus far the focus has remained on discourse rather than action. Enhanced cooperation is needed to maximize the organizations' complementarities and synergies in responding to climate-related security risks.

The policy report concludes by suggesting three ways forward for policymakers: (a) enhance cooperation between relevant European regional organizations;

(b) increase leadership from member states, including through dedicated bodies; and (c) strengthen financial instruments aimed at supporting responses to climate-related security risks. Although these entry points are broad and may seem obvious to some, they are essential to ensuring progress on the climate security agenda. Moreover, they are feasible in the short to medium term and have the potential to not only reduce security risks stemming from climate change but also proactively contribute to peace.

1. Climate change in a new security landscape

Climate change is transforming the security landscape.¹ Amid a new era of risks, it is transcending borders and exacerbating existing social, economic and political vulnerabilities, with adverse effects on peace and security.² Europe has seen extreme floods, heat waves and rising sea levels, while forest fires have increased in both frequency and intensity.³ At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has deeply altered geopolitics, further compounding existing security risks, including those related to food and energy.⁴ Thus, addressing climate change amid Europe's rapidly evolving security landscape requires a range of stakeholders, including inter-governmental organizations, to respond to climate-related security risks.⁵

This SIPRI Policy Report compares responses to climate-related security risks by the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—the three main intergovernmental regional organizations involved in addressing security in Europe and beyond (see figure 1). A SIPRI study published in 2018 found that while these organizations all engage in the climate security debate, none see it as part of their core mandate.⁶ In the five years since, the EU, NATO and the OSCE have each published policy documents outlining their ambitions to better respond to climate-related security risks.⁷ With a view to maximizing the climate security potential of these organizations in responding to climate-related security risks, as well as identifying complementary approaches and synergies, this policy report seeks to systematically explore the similarities and differences between the three. Comparing their approaches is important for advancing knowledge on how communities of practice overlap, as well as identifying possible gaps or synergies, thereby helping inform the climate security agenda.⁸

This policy report shows that while the EU, NATO and the OSCE have come a long way in raising the interlinkages between climate, peace and security on their agendas, it is not enough just to strengthen discourse. Despite efforts to move beyond discursive framing through institutional design towards policy action, more is required

¹ For a comprehensive definition of climate-related security risks see Remling, E. and Barnhoorn, A., 'A reassessment of the European Union's response to climate-related security risks', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2021/2, Mar. 2021.

² Adger, W. N., Eakin, H. and Winkels, A., 'Nested and teleconnected vulnerabilities to environmental change', *Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Apr. 2009); and Hedlund, J. et al., 'Quantifying transnational climate impact exposure: New perspectives on the global distribution of climate risk', *Global Environmental Change*, vol. 52 (Sep. 2018).

³ Bednar-Friedl, B. et al., 'Europe', eds H.-O. Pörtner et al., *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Working Group II Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2022).

⁴ Smith, D., 'Introduction: International stability and human security in 2021', *SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2022); and Zhou, J. and Anthony, I., 'Environmental accountability, justice and reconstruction in the Russian war on Ukraine', SIPRI Topical Backgrounder, 25 Jan. 2023.

⁵ Black, R. et al., *Environment of Peace: Security in a New Era of Risk* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2022); and Melvis, N. et al., *Enabling an Environment of Peace: Environment of Peace (Part 4)* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2022).

⁶ Bremberg, N., 'European regional organizations and climate-related security risks: EU, OSCE and NATO', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2018/1, Feb. 2018.

⁷ See for example European External Action Service (EEAS), *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence* (EU: Brussels, Mar. 2022); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* (NATO: Brussels, June 2022); and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ministerial Council, 'Decision no. 3/21: Strengthening co-operation to address the challenges caused by climate change', MC.DEC/3/21, 3 Dec. 2021.

⁸ Bremberg, N., Danielson, A. and Michalski, A., '10. Conclusion: Learning and contestation in EU foreign and security policy', eds N. Bremberg, *The Everyday Making of EU Foreign and Security Policy: Practices, Socialization and the Management of Dissent* (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd: Feb. 2022).




Figure 1. Mapping membership of the EU, NATO and the OSCE

EU = European Union; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

to achieve the various ambitions set by the three organizations in this domain. In addition, although all three include cooperation as part of their thematic approach to responding to climate security, thus far the focus has again mainly been on discourse rather than action. Maximizing the complementarities and synergies between the organizational approaches with a view to strengthening responses to climate-related security risks requires enhanced cooperation among the three organizations. Thus, the policy report concludes by suggesting three ways forward for policymakers in this field: (a) enhance cooperation between relevant European regional organizations; (b) increase leadership from member states, including through dedicated bodies; and (c) strengthen financial instruments to support responses to climate-related security risks.

The following five sections compare the three organizations across multiple building blocks.⁹ First, *context* identifies how an organization's approach to addressing climate-related security risks aligns with its organizational logic on international security. Second, *discursive framing* explores how climate security is understood in an organ-

⁹ The analytical framework consists of a heuristic device to compare and contrast how intergovernmental organizations are responding to climate-related security risks. It adds to existing research by Remling and Barnhoorn (note 1); and Bremberg, N., Mobjörk, M. and Krampe, F., 'Global responses to climate security: Discourses, institutions and actions', *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, vol. 17, no. 3 (2022).

ization's official discourse and the extent to which it has been mainstreamed. Third, *institutional design* reveals where in an organization climate-related security risks are being addressed and how this is being coordinated. Fourth, *policy action* unpacks how an organization is translating climate security discourse into practice and how this has been implemented so far. Fifth, *ambition* captures an organization's concrete goals and assesses how realistic these are. In doing so the analysis relies on relevant academic literature and policy documents from the organizations, as well as exchanges with policy officers and experts. Additional insights were drawn from a SIPRI Roundtable held in December 2022 about climate security, NATO and Sweden.¹⁰ The above five sections are followed by a discussion of the complementarities and synergies between the various organizational approaches to climate-related security risks, before the final ways forward section sets out a number of possible means of advancing multilateral cooperation in responses to such risks.

¹⁰ New video series on climate security, Sweden and NATO, SIPRI, 17 Feb. 2023.

2. Context

The first building block—*context*—identifies how an organization’s approach to addressing climate-related security risks aligns with its organizational logic on international security. The context encompasses an organization’s mandate in the field of international security, why it is relevant for them to address climate-related security risks and how it intends doing so (see table 1 for a summary comparing the EU, NATO and the OSCE).

Organizational logic on international security

While the EU, NATO and the OSCE all strive to sustain peace and security both in their region and internationally, their respective organizational logics on international security differ.

Whereas the EU promotes international security through regional integration and effective multilateralism, NATO does so through military cooperation and deterrence, and the OSCE through democratization and regional cooperation.¹¹ The EU is unique among the three in having a wider remit—which includes trade and development cooperation—with security constituting a part of this.

All three organizations are currently preoccupied with a range of geopolitical challenges, not least the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the transition away from fossil fuels towards renewable energies. For NATO, Sweden’s accession, which has been hindered by Türkiye and Hungary, is a key topic on its agenda. The OSCE, meanwhile, was recently sidelined by Russia over Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as over Ukraine. Given the OSCE is a consensus-based organization, going beyond providing a forum of cooperation over issues its 57 participating states can agree on presents considerable challenges.

The organizational logic on international security, combined with current geopolitical challenges, are an important driver of how the respective organizations address security-related challenges.

General approach to addressing climate-related security risks

All three organizations are working towards addressing climate-related security risks. The EU is increasingly integrating climate security across foreign, security and defence policies. This includes efforts made through the EU’s operational domain, integrated approach, capability development and partnerships.¹² NATO has been working towards integrating climate change in collective security and defence, as well as military planning and operations. This includes a variety of awareness, adaptation, mitigation and outreach efforts.¹³ One key example is the establishment of the Centre of Excellence on Climate Change and Security (CCASCOE), which will be hosted by Canada.¹⁴ In the case of the OSCE climate change can be applied to all three security dimensions of the organization: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human security. Climate-related challenges were given a renewed mandate in the latest Ministerial Council Decision, which aims to strengthen cooperation in addressing cli-

¹¹ Bremberg (note 6).

¹² European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘Climate Change and Defence Roadmap’, Council of the EU, 9 Nov. 2020; and EEAS, ‘Concept for an integrated approach on climate change and security’, Council of the EU, 5 Oct. 2021.

¹³ NATO, ‘NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan’, 14 June 2021.

¹⁴ Government of Canada, ‘NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence’.

Table 1. Context of climate-related security risks among the EU, NATO and the OSCE

	EU	NATO	OSCE
<i>Organizational logic on international security</i>	International security promoted by regional integration and effective multilateralism	International security promoted by military cooperation and deterrence	International security promoted by democratization and regional cooperation
<i>Approach to addressing climate-related security risks</i>	Integrating climate change across foreign, security and defence policies	Including climate change in collective security and defence, as well as military planning and operations	Strengthening cooperation to address challenges caused by climate change
<i>Alignment of approach with logic</i>	***	***	***

EU = European Union; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Note: Asterisks (*) based on a ranking out of three.

Source: Author's own compilation. The row on organizational logic on international security is borrowed from Bremberg, N., 'European Regional Organizations and Climate-Related Security Risks: EU, OSCE and NATO', *Insights on Peace and Security* (SIPRI: Feb. 2018).

mate change-related challenges, and identifies opportunities for executive structures, participating states and multilateral organizations.¹⁵ Given the political and financial challenges currently besetting the OSCE, however, it remains to be seen how progress can be made on climate security or any other agenda.

While each organization has a unique mandate when it comes to addressing climate-related security risks, there are complementarities and synergies between their approaches.

Alignment of approach with logic

Recently, despite facing a range of geopolitical challenges, all three organizations have formulated their own approach to addressing climate-related security risks. These approaches closely reflect their organizational logic on international security. The EU has the broadest scope to address climate-related security risks while NATO and the OSCE have to some extent narrowed down their approaches to focus on, respectively, armed forces and cooperation.

The contexts of the three organizations also feature when looking at their corresponding discursive framings, institutional designs, policy actions and ambitions, which will be analysed in the subsequent sections.

¹⁵ OSCE, Ministerial Council (note 7).

3. Discursive framing

The second building block—*discursive framing*—explores how climate security is understood in an organization’s official discourse and the extent to which it has been mainstreamed. Here it is relevant to explore how the framing of climate change in relation to security has developed over time, including how it is currently labelled and described. This encompasses whether climate security is subject to positive framing and whether climate change is perceived as an internal or external risk to security. The degree of mainstreaming illustrates how far each organization has come in incorporating climate security into its discourse across policy areas (see table 2 for a summary comparing the EU, NATO and the OSCE).

Discourse over time

Environmental concerns (and in the case of the EU also climate change) have been part of the organizational mandates of the EU, NATO and the OSCE ever since their respective inceptions. While the degree to which climate security discourse has been included in policies has only grown, the ways in which it has been used has changed over time.

Within the EU climate-related security risks have not always been framed consistently across its various bodies.¹⁶ Climate change was first framed in relation to security in the 2003 European Security Strategy, followed by a 2008 paper on Climate Change and International Security that labelled climate change a ‘threat multiplier’.¹⁷ In 2016 the European Global Strategy identified climate change and environmental degradation as potentially being exacerbating factors in conflicts.¹⁸ Moreover, the European Green Deal—the EU’s flagship policy announced in 2019, which aims to achieve climate-neutrality by 2050—acknowledges the negative effects of climate change on security.¹⁹

Before climate change was placed on NATO’s agenda the discourse revolved mainly around issues of environmental change, such as the impacts armed forces have on the environment. In 1969 the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was created to provide a scientific base for various issues, including air and noise pollution.²⁰ In 2003 the NATO Military Committee formulated principles and policies for environmental protection (later updated in 2011).²¹ NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security was the first to acknowledge climate change as a risk to security, through ‘further[er] shap[ing] the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and hav[ing] the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations’.²²

¹⁶ Remling and Barnhoorn (note 1).

¹⁷ Secretary General/High Representative, ‘European Security Strategy’, Council of the European Union, 8 Dec. 2003; and Secretary General/High Representative, *Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council* (European Commission: 2008).

¹⁸ European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy* (EU: Brussels, June 2016).

¹⁹ European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Green Deal’, 12 Nov. 2019).

²⁰ NATO, ‘Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)’, NATO Archives Online [n.d.].

²¹ NATO, ‘Environment, climate change and security’, 26 July 2022.

²² NATO, ‘Active engagement, modern defence: Strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon’, 19 Nov. 2010.

Table 2. Discursive framing on climate-related security risks among the EU, NATO and the OSCE

	EU	NATO	OSCE
<i>First framing</i>	Climate change and security (2003)	Environmental protection (1969)	Environmental challenges (1975)
<i>Key recent policy documents</i>	Climate Change and Defense Roadmap (2020); Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security (2021); Strategic Compass for Security and Defense (2022)	Climate Change and Security Action Plan (2021); Strategic Concept (2022)	Ministerial Council Decision on Strengthening Co-operation to Address the Challenges Caused by Climate Change (2021)
<i>Labelling</i>	Climate change and security; climate change and defence	Climate change and security	Climate-related challenges
<i>Description</i>	Climate change and environmental degradation are challenges and risks to international peace and security	Climate change is a threat multiplier	Climate change can exacerbate economic challenges and environmental degradation, which may negatively affect prosperity, stability and security
<i>Positive framing</i>	Environmental peacebuilding	Strategic autonomy of armed forces	Climate change can contribute to stability, resilience and peace
<i>External vs internal risk</i>	Mainly external but also internal	Internal and external	Mainly internal
<i>Mainstreaming climate security in discourse</i>	***	**	**

EU = European Union; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Note: Asterisks (*) based on a ranking out of three.

Source: Author's own compilation.

This acknowledgement was reaffirmed in the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, which placed emphasis on improving the energy efficiency of armed forces.²³

Addressing environmental degradation has been part of the OSCE's remit since its founding documents.²⁴ The 1975 Helsinki Final Act recognized the transnational implications of environmental degradation and inspired work in areas such as natural resource management and managing hazardous waste and substances.²⁵ The 2007 Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security explicitly recognized climate-related challenges, stating that the OSCE has 'a complementary role to play within

²³ NATO, 'Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales', 5 Sep. 2014.

²⁴ Bremberg, N. and Barnhoorn, A., 'Advancing the role of the OSCE in the field of climate security', SIPRI Policy Brief, Sep. 2021;

²⁵ Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 'Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act', Helsinki, 1975.

its mandate in addressing this challenge in its specific region'.²⁶ Since then a series of ministerial council decisions have acknowledged the adverse effects of climate change, complemented by so-called Security Days on a variety of climate-related themes.²⁷ Although the main focus has been on the environment, climate change has been mentioned in discussions of security risks related to, among other issues, energy, migration and disaster risk reduction.²⁸

All three organizations have, over time, given climate security a more prominent role in their policy documents. While—at least in the case of NATO and the OSCE—framing initially revolved around the environment alone, climate change has more recently been acknowledged as a prominent risk in its own right.

Current discourse

Over the past few years climate security has had a more pronounced presence on the agendas of the EU, NATO and the OSCE. This is illustrated not only in a range of recent policy documents, but in speeches and a variety of events and conferences.

In the EU, climate security has been framed through an integrated approach that acknowledges the complexity of the relationship between climate change and foreign, security and defence policy. More concretely, climate change and environmental degradation are seen as risks to peace and security. The 2020 Climate Change and Defense Roadmap addresses the links between climate change and defence through proposing some 30 short-, medium- and long-term actions.²⁹ Complementing the roadmap is the 2021 Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security, which aims to integrate climate change and security concerns across all relevant policy domains.³⁰ Lastly, the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defense mentions climate change in two of its pillars—namely those on security and partnering (but not those on acting or investing).³¹ The documents frequently refer to fragile states, highlighting how efforts to address climate-related security risks can also contribute to peacebuilding.

When it comes to NATO, recent policy documents have framed climate change as a threat to security and therefore an important area for the alliance to contribute to. More concretely, climate change is seen as affecting the collective security of NATO's members and allies, impacting among other things why, where, when and how armed forces operate. Conversations at the NATO leaders meeting in London in 2019 were a turning point in climate change gaining importance on the alliance's agenda.³² In March 2021 NATO foreign ministers endorsed the Climate Change and Security Agenda, providing a 360-degree approach to addressing the impacts of climate change

²⁶ OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security', MC.DOC/4/07, 30 Nov. 2007.

²⁷ Relevant Ministerial Council Decisions include: Athens (2009); Kyiv (2013); Basel (2014); and Hamburg (2016). See OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Decision no. 5/09: Migration management', MC.DEC/5/09, 2009; OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Decision no. 6/09: Strengthening dialogue and co-operation on energy security in the OSCE area', MC.DEC/6/09, 2009; OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Decision no. 5/13: Improving the environmental footprint of energy-related activities in the OSCE region', MC.DEC/5/13, 2013; OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Decision no. 6/14: Enhancing disaster risk reduction', MC.DEC/6/14, 2014; and OSCE, Ministerial Council, 'Decision no. 4/16: Strengthening good governance and promoting connectivity', MC.DEC/4/16, 2016.

²⁸ Relevant OSCE Security Days include: water diplomacy (2014); climate change and security (2015); migration (2016); sustainable cities (2017); and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2019). See Buttanni, E., 'Climate change, global security and the OSCE', OSCE, *OSCE Yearbook 2019* (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik: Baden-Baden, 2020), pp. 215–29.

²⁹ EEAS, 'Climate Change and Defence Roadmap' (note 12).

³⁰ EEAS, 'Concept for an integrated approach on climate change and security' (note 12).

³¹ EEAS (note 7).

³² Söder, R., 'NATO in a climate of change', WritePeace blog, SIPRI, 14 Feb. 2020.

on security. Shortly thereafter, at the 2021 Brussels Summit, the Climate Change and Security Action Plan was presented as a framework for addressing these risks. The action plan frames climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’.³³ This framing has been carried forward in multiple ways, including at the 2022 NATO Public Forum—an official side event of the Madrid Summit—which opened with its first ever high-level dialogue on climate change and security.³⁴ Although the summit made important steps, including on progressing the climate security agenda, opinions are divided as to the extent of its success.³⁵ Lastly, climate change plays a role in the 2022 Strategic Concept that followed the Madrid Summit. The concept includes climate change in all its pillars, as well as two paragraphs dedicated to the relationship between climate change and security.³⁶ The positive framing around the strategic autonomy of armed forces in these various documents points to the potential benefits of addressing climate-related security risks for NATO’s own military planning and operations.

In the case of the OSCE climate security was given a renewed mandate through the 2021 Stockholm Decision, which acknowledged that climate-related challenges ‘may negatively affect prosperity, stability and security in the OSCE area’ by exacerbating economic challenges and environmental degradation. Conversely, effective cooperation to address these challenges could ‘contribute to stability, resilience, and prosperity’.³⁷ Thus, the decision illustrates that although climate change is regarded as a risk to security within the region, it also represents an opportunity for cooperation between participating states. Despite this, the organization’s efforts to further integrate climate security have been critiqued for not being sufficient.³⁸

All three organizations have given increased attention to climate-related security risks in their discourse, with their policy documents framing climate security holistically in relation to multiple policy areas. The EU frames climate change as more of an external than internal risk, while NATO is focused on both internal and external risks, and the OSCE primarily on internal risks. This not only reflects their respective organizational priorities but the areas where each wishes to focus their attention regarding climate-related security risks. Moreover, the three organizations are increasingly presenting a more positive framing around addressing climate-related security risks, suggesting it holds the potential for peacebuilding (EU), strategic autonomy (NATO) or cooperation (OSCE). Such framing is important given that it may translate into the other building blocks, including in fragile and conflict-affected areas.

Mainstreaming climate security in discourse

Despite the increased prominence of climate change and security in the current discourse, it is notable that none of the organizations have provided a working definition of climate security. Although this could be interpreted as implying an inconsistent understanding of climate security across the organization, it may also be reflective of a more holistic approach to climate security, with climate change understood to pose a

³³ NATO (note 13).

³⁴ NATO, ‘2022 NATO Public Forum | Day 1 | High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Security’, YouTube video, 28 June 2022.

³⁵ See for example Keating, D., ‘Nato disappoints with tepid climate action’, *Energy Monitor*, 18 July 2022; and Kertysova, K., ‘Perseverance amidst crisis: NATO’s ambitious climate change and security agenda after Madrid’, *European Leadership Network*, 18 Oct. 2022; and Sikorsky, E., ‘Summer heatwave underscores importance of NATO’s climate security focus’, *Center for Climate & Security*, 21 July 2022.

³⁶ NATO (note 7).

³⁷ OSCE, *Ministerial Council* (note 7).

³⁸ See for example Barnhoorn, A., ‘Taking climate security forward in the OSCE’, *WritePeace blog*, SIPRI, 15 June 2022.

range of security risks depending on its interactions with existing social, economic and political vulnerabilities.

Given that many of the key policy documents framing climate change in relation to security have only been published since 2020, it is difficult to assess whether climate-related security risks have been fully mainstreamed in discourse. Following the integrated approach of the EU the discourse surrounding climate security has been mainstreamed across policy areas. Recent steps in NATO and the OSCE, meanwhile, show that climate security discourse is playing an increasing role in both organizations. To be fully mainstreamed, however, additional steps need to be taken to further include climate change and climate-related security risks in all relevant policy domains.

4. Institutional design

The third building block—*institutional design*—reveals where in an organization climate-related security risks are being addressed and how this is being coordinated. Institutional design relates to the organization’s main institutional bodies, as well as dedicated bodies and the roles played by leadership and member states. Coordination on climate security is telling of how each organization works internally in this field (see table 3 for a summary comparing the EU, NATO and the OSCE).

Institutional bodies

The EU, NATO and the OSCE have been responding to climate-related security risks through multiple institutional bodies. Each organization has a body responsible for long-term policy planning related to the climate security agenda within its existing decision-making structures, which to varying degrees differs from the body responsible for its practical implementation.

For the EU, climate security has most often been linked to external action through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the Council of the EU the Political and Security Committee—which is responsible for CFSP and CSDP—has regularly placed topics related to stemming climate-related security risks on its agenda. The committee also feeds into the Foreign Affairs Council where, despite climate-related security risks rarely being discussed as a standalone item, climate security concerns are frequently raised in council conclusions.³⁹ Given that the EU sees climate change as primarily an external risk, the European External Action Service (EEAS)—the union’s diplomatic service—has been the main actor fostering coherence between policies in this area. The European Commission and its various Directorate Generals (DGs) have also actively sought to address climate-related security risks, including those affecting international partnerships (DG INTPA), climate action (DG CLIMA), European civil protection and humanitarian aid operations (DG ECHO), and the defence industry and space (DG DEFIS).⁴⁰

Turning to NATO, the Office of the Secretary General and its Policy Planning Unit are responsible for the organization’s long-term vision for the climate security agenda. Operationalization of the climate security agenda is dealt with by the Emerging Security Division through its Climate Change and Energy Security Section, which addresses actor-less threats such as pandemics, biodiversity loss and climate change. The addition of ‘climate change’ to the energy security section’s name came about in response to NATO’s organizational approach to climate change. As such, the section oversees the creation of relevant climate security strategies and is responsible for following up on the agenda.

The OSCE created the Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) in 1997 to ‘address economic, social and environmental aspects of security’. This mandate includes drawing on expertise from relevant organizations in the environmental field.⁴¹ The OSCE Secretariat and more specifically the OCEEA are responsible for addressing climate-related issues, for example through supporting projects on climate security and facilitating trainings and events. Climate security has also been discussed in the OSCE’s Ministerial Council, Permanent Council, and

³⁹ Bunse, S. et al., *Advancing European Union Action to Address Climate-Related Security Risks*, SIPRI Research Policy Paper (SIPRI: Sep. 2022).

⁴⁰ Remling and Barnhoorn (note 1).

⁴¹ OSCE, Permanent Council, ‘Decision no. 194: Mandate for a Co-Ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities’, PC.DEC/194, 5 Nov. 1997.

Table 3. Institutional design on climate-related security risks among the EU, NATO and the OSCE

	EU	NATO	OSCE
<i>Long-term planning</i>	Council of the EU; European Commission	Office of the Secretary General	OSCE Secretariat
<i>Practical implementation</i>	European External Action Service	Climate Change and Energy Security Section	Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities
<i>Examples of other bodies involved</i>	European Parliament	Environmental Protection Working Group and the Specialist Team on Energy Efficiency and Environmental Protection	Parliamentary Assembly
<i>Dedicated bodies</i>	Group of Friends on Ambitious Climate Diplomacy	Centre of Excellence on Climate Change and Security	Group of Friends of Environment
<i>Leadership</i>	High Representative/ Vice President Mogherini	Secretary General Stoltenberg	Secretary Generals Gremminger and Schmidt
<i>Member states</i>	Council of the EU	n/a	Chairpersonship
<i>Coordination of climate security in institutions</i>	**	**	*

EU = European Union; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Note: Asterisks (*) based on a ranking out of three.

Source: Author's own compilation.

Economic and Environmental Committee, while the Parliamentary Assembly went as far as issuing a plea for resolute climate action.⁴²

Dedicated bodies

Beyond the traditional institutional structures outlined above there are various dedicated bodies within the three organizations that are involved in dealing with climate-related security risks. Although they lack official decision-making powers, they can nevertheless assist their respective organizations in various ways, including through offering trainings, hosting events, workshops and conferences, or even coordinating projects/programming.

Within the EU, Germany and Denmark launched the Group of Friends on Ambitious Climate Diplomacy in October 2022. Joined by Finland, France, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherland, Spain and Sweden, one of the group's three overarching priorities is to 'enhance the nexus between climate and security within EU Foreign Policy, including through systematic climate assessments on the effects climate change has on stability, peace and security in specific contexts'.⁴³

For NATO a recent institutional development aimed at addressing climate security is the CCASCOE, which will become operational over the course of 2023. The purpose of

⁴² OSCE, Ministerial Council (note 7); Bremberg and Barnhoorn (note 24); and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 'A Parliamentary Plea for Resolute Climate Action', 5 Nov. 2021.

⁴³ German Federal Foreign Office, 'Launch of the Group of Friends for an Ambitious EU Climate Diplomacy', 17 Oct. 2022.

the centre is to ‘serve as another platform where Allies can exchange expertise and best practice and work together to build the required capabilities to contribute to NATO’s goal of reducing its environmental footprint’.⁴⁴ While there is plenty of potential in this the exact focus and contribution of CCASCOE remains to be seen.

Similarly, in September 2019 France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom created an informal OSCE Group of Friends of Environment, which recognizes ‘the close connection between the environment and security [and] aims to strengthen cooperation on environmental issues as part of a broader effort to prevent conflicts, build mutual confidence and promote good neighbourly relations’.⁴⁵ Recent research indicates that engaging in agenda-setting with like-minded countries has the potential to move the agenda forward in the OSCE.⁴⁶

So far the potential of these dedicated bodies has been understudied, with further analysis needed of their decision-making power and ability to push issues like climate security to the forefront of the agenda.

Role of leadership and member states

The role of leadership and political buy-in from member states is crucial when it comes to addressing the political landscape. Here, the level at which climate security is being dealt with, as well as the capacity and resources dedicated to the issue, is often revealing of how risks in this area are being approached.

Leadership has played a key role in moving the climate security agenda forward in all three organizations. For the EU, the 2018 high-level Climate, Peace and Security: Time for Action event hosted by High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini was important in placing climate security higher on the EU’s agenda.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, in NATO, Jens Stoltenberg—following a career as Norwegian prime minister and deputy environment minister, as well as UN special envoy on climate change—joined as secretary general in 2014. Stoltenberg made climate security a key priority and was the first NATO secretary general to participate at the Conference of Parties organized by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.⁴⁸ In the case of the OSCE both the current and previous secretary general—Thomas Greminger and Helga Maria Schmid respectively—have highlighted the relationship between climate change and security.⁴⁹ Following the Stockholm Decision Secretary General Schmid dedicated her January 2022 thematic report for the OSCE Permanent Council to climate change and announced a high-level conference to be held on the topic in March.⁵⁰ Unfortunately,

⁴⁴ Government of Canada (note 14).

⁴⁵ Fages, C., ‘Statement on behalf of the informal Group of Friends of Environment made by Permanent Representative of France, Ambassador Christine Fages’, Statement at the 27th Economic and Environmental Forum, Prague, 11 Sep. 2019, Eel.DEL/15/19, 16 Sep. 2019.

⁴⁶ Bremberg and Barnhoorn (note 24).

⁴⁷ Mogherini, F., ‘Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the high-level event “Climate, peace and security: The time for action”’, 22 June 2018.

⁴⁸ NATO, ‘Video message by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on his attendance of the United Nations “COP26” Climate Change Conference’, 2 Nov. 2021; and NATO, ‘NATO Secretary General at COP27 virtual event’, 8 Nov. 2022.

⁴⁹ See e.g. Greminger, T., ‘The role of multilateralism and multi-level governance: An interview with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger’, Wilson Center, 30 Sep. 2020; and Schmid, H. M. (@HelgaSchmid_SG), ‘#ClimateChange has alarming effects on our societies. Let us effectively co-operate in addressing these challenges to contribute to stability, resilience & prosperity. This is what the @OSCE is pursuing by promoting regional cooperation and implementing concrete projects.’, Twitter, 17 Feb. 2022.

⁵⁰ Ostrauskaite, R. (@RasaOstrauskai2), ‘■ thanks @HelgaSchmid_SG for the timely thematic report on #climatechange. ■ is convinced that climate change is one of the most significant global challenges of 21st century & @OSCE has an important complementary role to play. We look forward to the High-Level Conf on 3/25!’, Twitter, 17 Feb. 2022.

the latter did not materialize due to uncertainty following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Member states have not only been trying to address climate-related security risks at a national level but have been instrumental in raising climate-related security risks on organizational agendas. For example, EU member states have promoted the appointment of climate security advisors and incorporated climate-related security risks in programme design and auditing.⁵¹ Sweden, meanwhile, dedicated its year-long OSCE chairpersonship in 2021 to going 'back to basics', which included emphasizing a comprehensive approach to security and spotlighting climate change.⁵² In the case of NATO, members have not been driving the climate security agenda to the same degree.

How leadership and member states have influenced the climate security agenda thus far and their potential to continue doing so in the future presents an interesting avenue for further research.

Institutional coordination on climate security

There is potential for all three organizations to enhance coordination between their internal institutional bodies when it comes to addressing climate-related security risks.

Although the EU's climate security approach is not always efficiently coordinated between the various bodies involved, the union's integrated approach and mainstreaming of discourse across policy domains demonstrate that this is increasingly becoming the case. Recent research has, however, found that overcoming the EU's internal coordination challenges requires improved coordination between thematic officers and geographical desks.⁵³ NATO and the OSCE will also need to enhance their internal coordination across institutional bodies, including those already dealing with climate-related security issues, in order to follow through on their respective discursive framings and take the necessary steps towards policy action.

Given that climate security is not limited to any one policy area, it is understandable that none of the organizations has a dedicated institutional home for climate security. Research has shown, however, that there are advantages in having a body coordinating the climate security approach across different institutions and supporting implementation of the agenda, as is the case with the UN Climate Security Mechanism.⁵⁴ All three organizations would benefit from exploring whether this option might prove advantageous.

In addressing climate-related security risks it is important to coordinate the diverse efforts being undertaken by an organization's internal institutions and bodies, including linking up long-term planning with practical implementation.

⁵¹ Bunse, S. et al., *Mapping European Union Member States' Responses to Climate-Related Security Risks*, SIPRI Research Policy Paper (SIPRI: Sep. 2022).

⁵² Government of Sweden, 'Programme of the Swedish OSCE Chairpersonship 2021', [n.d.].

⁵³ Bunse et al. (note 39); and Bremberg, N. and Bunse, S., 'Climate, peace and security in a changing geopolitical context: Next steps for the European Union', SIPRI Policy Brief, Feb. 2023.

⁵⁴ The Climate Security Mechanism is a joint initiative of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA), UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO).

5. Policy action

The fourth building block—*policy action*—unpacks how an organization is translating climate security discourse into practice and how this has been implemented so far. Thus, this section explores the thematic approaches taken by the EU, NATO and the OSCE in responding to climate-related security risks—in particular how each organization prioritizes development, defence and diplomacy through their policy initiatives—as well as the challenges for further policy action. In each case, the degree of implementation reveals how far the organization has come in shifting from discourse and institutions to implementation of policies (see table 4 for a summary comparing the EU, NATO and the OSCE).

Thematic approach

Of the three organizations the EU has the most concrete thematic approach to addressing climate-related security risks, differentiating between operational domain, integrated approach, capability development and partnerships. NATO is pursuing a broader, more holistic approach that has awareness, adaptation, mitigation and outreach at its centre. The OSCE, meanwhile, has not yet identified a clear thematic approach. Even so, the Stockholm Decision does identify ways forward. Thus, for the purposes of this policy report the OSCE's thematic approach is interpreted, based on the recent decision, in terms of executive structures, participating states and multi-lateral organizations (see table 5 for a summary of thematic approaches and examples of relevant policy initiatives).

The thematic approaches alone already offer a good indication of how far along the respective organizations are with their thinking: the EU has concrete areas it is contributing to; NATO is pursuing a range of areas, with some enjoying greater focus than others; while the OSCE is exploring which actor is best suited to the task of addressing climate-related security risks.

Development, defence and diplomacy

The EU, NATO and the OSCE each have a range of policy initiatives aimed at addressing climate-related security risks. To a large extent these initiatives can be categorized under either development, defence or diplomacy.

In the case of the EU most policy initiatives in this field relate to development and defence, as well as diplomacy to a lesser extent. For NATO, defence is the main priority, followed by diplomacy and lastly (to little or almost no extent) development. The OSCE, meanwhile, places most emphasis on diplomacy, with development and defence granted much lower (it could be argued almost no) importance in this field.

This reaffirms that each organization has its own approach to addressing climate-related security risks. While there are overlaps—such as all three striving for more diplomatic efforts in this field or the EU and NATO contributing to the area of defence—no organization shares the same prioritization when it comes to addressing climate-related security risks.

Below we explore examples of policy initiatives (and in some cases, policy action) across the three areas, as well as miscellaneous examples that do not strictly fit in these categories.

Table 4. Policy action on climate-related security risks among the EU, NATO and the OSCE

	EU	NATO	OSCE
<i>Thematic approach</i>	Operational dimension; integrated approach; capability development; strengthening partnerships	Awareness; adaptation; mitigation; outreach	Executive structures; participating states; multilateral organizations
<i>Prioritization of development, defence and diplomacy</i>	Development; defence; diplomacy	Defence; diplomacy; development	Diplomacy; development; defence
<i>Examples of policy initiatives relating to development</i>	Climate finance; integrating climate change in conflict analysis	n/a	Programming
<i>Examples of policy initiatives relating to defence</i>	Mainstreaming climate change in CSDP missions; standardization of trainings	Methodology to map emissions; creation of innovation fund; energy transition by design initiative	Providing trainings
<i>Examples of policy initiatives relating to diplomacy</i>	Bilateral with US and Canada; with NATO	With EU; relevant partners	Partners for Cooperation in Mediterranean and Asia
<i>Example of miscellaneous policy initiatives</i>	Early warning; humanitarian action	Crisis response	n/a
<i>Challenges for further action</i>	Alignment between institutions	Knowledge and capacity	Political and budgetary constraints
<i>Shift from discourse and institutions to implementation of policy action</i>	**	*	*

EU = European Union; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Notes: Asterisks (*) based on a ranking out of three. The examples of policy initiatives are drawn from policy documents from the respective organizations. This does not necessarily mean they have been implemented, merely that these examples are illustrative of the organization's approach to addressing climate-related security risks.

Source: Author's own compilation.

Development

In terms of addressing climate-related security risks through development the EU has a number of policy initiatives relating to climate finance and integrating climate change in conflict analysis, while the OSCE can be seen to be pursuing this path in its programming more broadly. The EU stands out as the most active of the three organizations in the development domain, with no obvious examples available of NATO's involvement in this area.

The EU has already identified several actions to address climate, peace and security in programming under NDICI–Global Europe, the EU's external development financing tool, which includes a 30 per cent climate spending target (with political ambitions to

increase this to 35 per cent). One example is the climate change and security partnership with the UN Environment Programme, which included pilot activities in Nepal and Sudan. Another is the EU's attempts to ensure the conflict sensitivity of programming through integrating climate change aspects into conflict analysis screenings. The EU has overseen pilots on climate-enhanced conflict analysis in South Sudan and is currently pursuing climate and natural resource-related analysis in Somalia with the aim of conducting approximately 66 screenings over the course of 2020–23.⁵⁵

Since 2020 the OSCE has, in partnership with adelphi, been implementing its flagship project, Strengthening Responses to Security Risks from Climate Change in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.⁵⁶ The project aims to reduce climate change-related security risks through raising awareness, developing capacities and sharing knowledge regarding the implementation of climate change adaptation measures. So far this has included regional assessments for South-Eastern Europe and regional consultations for the South Caucasus and Central Asia.⁵⁷ There were also a range of workshops on climate change and security in 2022, including in Kyrgyzstan and North Macedonia.⁵⁸ The OSCE has continued working in the Shar/Šara Mountains and Korab Massif Area during 2023, with a close eye on forest governance.⁵⁹ It should be noted that these projects are funded through extra-budgetary means by a selection of countries rather than by all OSCE participating states.

Defence

In terms of addressing climate-related security risks through defence both the EU and NATO have policy initiatives specifically related to capacity development and greening military operations. The two organizations share multiple policy priorities in the area of defence and while it is possible the OSCE could increase its contribution it has yet to do so beyond trainings.

The EU has been working towards mainstreaming climate change and environmental aspects into the planning and implementation of CSDP missions/operations. This includes measuring and improving the environmental footprint of CSDP missions/operations and deploying environmental advisors to civilian CSDP missions. At present there are EU environmental advisors in Mali and Somalia and there was previously one in the Central African Republic. Niger, meanwhile, has a dedicated environmental crime expert. The EU's goal is to have environmental advisors in all CSDP missions. The EU also acknowledges that to achieve its goals in this area train-

⁵⁵ EEAS, 'Joint Progress Report on Climate Change, Defence and Security (2020–2022)', Council of the EU, 16 Nov. 2022.

⁵⁶ The project has been funded through extra-budgetary means by Andorra, Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United States. See OSCE, 'Strengthening Responses to Security Risks from Climate Change in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia', [n.d.].

⁵⁷ Rüttinger, L. et al., *Regional Assessment for South-Eastern Europe. Security Implications of Climate Change* (OSCE and adelphi: Berlin and Vienna, 2021); Rüttinger, L., van Ackern, P. and Foong, A., *Regional Consultation for the South Caucasus. Armenia and Georgia: Co-Operation Opportunities for Addressing the Security Implications of Climate Change* (OSCE and adelphi: Berlin and Vienna, 2021); and Rüttinger, L., van Ackern, P. and Foong, A., *Regional Consultation for the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Co-Operation Opportunities for Addressing the Security Implications of Climate Change* (OSCE and adelphi: Berlin and Vienna, 2021).

⁵⁸ OSCE, 'Climate change and security focus of training organized by OSCE and adelphi in Bishkek', 12 July 2022; OSCE, 'Climate resilience, nature conservation and security in the Shar/Šara Mountains and Korab Massif area focus of workshop organized by OSCE and adelphi', 3 Nov. 2022; and OSCE, 'Tackling wildfires in a changing climate—OSCE facilitates co-operation among emergency management and climate experts', 7 Dec. 2022.

⁵⁹ OSCE, 'Turning climate-related risks into opportunities for co-operation: A new OSCE-adelphi report on Shar/Šara Mountains and Korab Massif area', 21 Mar. 2023.

Table 5. Summary of thematic approaches and examples of policy initiatives responding to climate-related security risks by the EU, NATO and the OSCE

European Union			
<i>Operational domain:</i> <i>Deepen understanding and mainstream climate change and environmental aspects into planning and implementation of CSDP missions and operations</i>	<i>Integrated approach:</i> <i>Integrate climate change aspects into EU instruments and policies</i>	<i>Capability development:</i> <i>Reduce dependency on fossil fuels and enhance energy efficiency and sustainability of military capabilities</i>	<i>Partnerships:</i> <i>Closer, more systematic cooperation and coordination on climate-related security risks with actors</i>
Improve climate-related situational awareness, early warning and strategic foresight, e.g. climate trend analyses	Enhance incorporation of climate change into conflict analyses, e.g. pilots in South Sudan and Somalia	Integrate climate change mitigation, adaptation and environmental protection in EU trainings and exercises, e.g. assessments to improve training and awareness-raising activities	Cooperation with the UN, e.g. UNEP
Mainstream climate change and environmental aspects into planning and implementation of CSDP mandates e.g. develop operational concept, guidelines and procedures	Update existing tools and instruments e.g. Early Warning System indicators	Explore possibilities of green public procurement, e.g. study on sustainable energy in the defence and security sector	Cooperation with NATO, e.g. Joint Communications
Deploy environmental advisors in all CSDP missions, e.g. as done in three missions	Improve synergies between data instruments e.g. mapping by EEAS, Euroean Commission services and EDA	Improve climate change in illustrative scenarios, e.g. through the EDA and PESCO projects	Cooperation with regional organizations, e.g. AU, OSCE and LAS
Reporting mechanism on environmental footprint of all CSDP missions and operations, e.g. reports concluded for four pilots	Integrate climate security in the fields of DDR civil protection and SSR e.g. through conceptual developments		Cooperation with partner countries, e.g. USA and Canada
	Enhance programming, e.g. partnership with UNEP for pilot activities in Nepal and Sudan		
	Greening the humanitarian field, e.g. develop and release minimum environmental requirements for EU-funded humanitarian projects		

North Atlantic Treaty Organization			
<i>Awareness:</i> Increase allied awareness regarding impacts of climate change on security	<i>Adaptation:</i> Adapt to climate change	<i>Mitigation:</i> Contribute to mitigation of climate change	<i>Outreach:</i> Enhance outreach
Conduct annual impact assessments on the strategic environment; NATO's assets, installations, missions and operations; and resilience and civil preparedness	Incorporate climate change and security into work on resilience; civil preparedness; defence planning; capability delivery; assets and installations; standards; innovation; training; exercises and disaster response	Reduce NATO reliance on fossil fuels and increase energy efficiency in exercises and operations	Strengthen exchanges with partner countries, e.g. NATO–Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
Integrate climate change, as well as civil advice on regions of key interest to NATO, into security risk and resilience assessments	Adapt procurement practices and partnerships with the defence industry, as well as deterrence and defence by armed forces, in relation to climate change	Develop a methodology to map emissions from military and civilian missions	Strengthen exchanges with regional and international organizations, e.g. EU
Include climate and security in curricula of allied military education, e.g. climate change, global security and future operations	Respond through disaster relief operations, e.g. in cases of natural, technological or humanitarian disaster	Creation of \$1 billion innovation fund to support adaptation of emerging security and defence technologies	Increase dialogue with civil society, academia and industry on climate-related security issues, e.g. Science for Peace and Security Programme
	Support demilitarization and defence transformation projects in partner countries, e.g. cleaning up and destructing stockpiles of weapons, ammunitions and unexploded remnants of war	New energy transition by design initiative is scheduled to be presented in 2023	
	Adapt procurement practices and partnerships with the defence industry, as well as the deterrence and defence by armed forces, in relation to climate change.		

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe		
<i>Executive structures: Assist participating states to implement decisions</i>	<i>Participating states: Contribute towards the OSCE's approach in this area</i>	<i>Multilateral organizations: Cooperate with relevant/regional organizations to implement decisions</i>
Create a platform for facilitating exchanges of information and best practices, e.g. adaptation and mitigation of climate change	Fund extra-budgetary projects, e.g. with the support of adelphi	Engage with cooperation partners in the Mediterranean and Asia, e.g. through annual meetings
Train field operations about climate change and security, e.g. Türkiye	Contribute informal groups, e.g. OSCE Group of Friends on Environment	Pursue a multi-stakeholder approach, e.g. women and youth

AU = African Union; CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy (EU); DDR = disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; EDA = European Defence Agency; EDF = European Defence Fund; EEAS = European External Action Service; EU = European Union; LAS = League of Arab States; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OCEEA = Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OSCE); OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; PESCO = Permanent Structured Cooperation (EU); SSR = security sector reform; UN = United Nations; UNEP = UN Environment Programme

Note: The table includes EU, NATO and OSCE thematic approaches as well as key examples of policy action aimed at addressing climate-related security risks. The content is based on what the organizations have reported in policy documents and is not intended to represent all policy action addressing climate-related security risks.

Source: Author's own compilation based on relevant EU, NATO and OSCE documents. See European External Action Service and Political and Security Committee, 'Joint Progress Report on Climate Change, Defence and Security (2020–2022)', (Council of the European Union: 16 Nov. 2022); European Council, Council of the European Union, 'Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, 10 January 2023', 10 Jan. 2023; NATO, 'NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan', 14 Jun. 2021; NATO, 'NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan: Compendium of best practices', Factsheet, July 2022; NATO, 'NATO Releases its Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment', 28 June 2022; and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ministerial Council, 'Decision no. 3/21: Strengthening co-operation to address the challenges caused by climate change', MC.DEC/3/21, 3 Dec. 2021.

ings need to be standardized at all levels of armed forces. Some trainings have already taken place while others need to be developed at both national and EU levels.⁶⁰

NATO has developed a methodology to map emissions from military and civilian missions that can help reduce the environmental footprint of armed forces, as well as potentially inspire voluntary commitments by member countries. Although the methodology has been shared with member countries, its classification level prevents it from being made publicly available.⁶¹ Moreover, NATO has announced a \$1 billion innovation fund that will complement its Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) in supporting the adaptation of emerging security and defence technologies.⁶²

The EU and NATO have a number of policy initiatives that overlap in this area, including in relation to green procurement practices and partnerships with the defence industry.⁶³ The OSCE conducted a training on climate change and security to field operations and executive structures in Türkiye in November 2020 and there

⁶⁰ EEAS (note 55).

⁶¹ Kertysova (note 35).

⁶² NATO, 'NATO launches Innovation Fund', 30 Jun. 2022.

⁶³ NATO (note 13); and EEAS (note 55).

is potential for the organization to address climate-related security risks in its various field operations.⁶⁴

Diplomacy

All three organizations have policy initiatives aimed at addressing climate-related security risks through diplomacy, including at the bilateral, regional and international level. In terms of how this is framed within their thematic approaches the EU labels such efforts ‘partnerships’, NATO ‘outreach’ and the OSCE ‘multilateral cooperation’.

The only organization to (based on their own reporting) engage with countries on climate-related security risks bilaterally is the EU, specifically with the United States and Canada. Most efforts by the three have been directed at other organizations in their region or elsewhere in the world. Reporting documents have mentioned regular exchanges around climate-related security risks between the EU (including the European Defence Agency) and NATO, as well as between the EU and OSCE. The EU and NATO have held staff-to-staff meetings, conferences and high-level events.⁶⁵ In January 2023 the two organizations signed a joint declaration on EU–NATO cooperation that explicitly references the security implications of climate change.⁶⁶ In March 2023 the Council of the EU agreed on Council Conclusions regarding how best to pursue EU priorities at the OSCE, including supporting the OSCE and its participating states in implementing the Stockholm Decision.⁶⁷

Looking further afield, the EU has cooperated with the African Union and the League of Arab States and is considering cooperation with other regional actors, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.⁶⁸ NATO recently met with its allies and partners at the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre in Kuwait to discuss emerging climate challenges and joint cooperation.⁶⁹ The OSCE has also engaged around these topics with its cooperation partners in the Mediterranean and Asia. For instance, the organization’s 2022 meeting with its partners in the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) specifically highlighted climate change and related security issues.⁷⁰

The thematic approaches of all three organizations highlight international cooperation. Although there has been engagement with the UN and its respective bodies, including the UN Climate Security Mechanism, the nature of this cooperation has not been reported on to any great extent.

Miscellaneous

In addition to addressing climate-related security risks through the above three areas, the EU, NATO and the OSCE have policy initiatives that do not, strictly speaking, fit within these categories—for example, in relation to early warning systems, humanitarian action, crisis response and knowledge development.

The EU has been strengthening synergies between its existing tools and instruments. For example, it is updating its EU Early Warning System with climate-relevant indicators that include the risk of violent conflict breaking out and is making climate

⁶⁴ OSCE, ‘OSCE Field Operations and other OSCE Executive Structures trained on climate change and security’, 28 Nov. 2022; and OSCE Ministerial Council (note 7).

⁶⁵ EEAS (note 55).

⁶⁶ European Council, Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration on EU–NATO Cooperation, 10 January 2023’, 10 Jan. 2023.

⁶⁷ Council of the EU, ‘EU priorities at the OSCE – Council conclusions’, 7587/23, 20 Mar. 2023.

⁶⁸ EEAS (note 55).

⁶⁹ NATO, ‘NATO and Kuwait hold talks with partners on climate change and security’, 6 Feb. 2023.

⁷⁰ OSCE, ‘Improving co-operation on climate change critical to advance common security—OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation Group meeting’, 30 May 2022.

change and environment part of its crisis response toolbox. The EU has also made efforts to green the humanitarian field, including setting out a minimum set of environmental requirements for EU-funded humanitarian projects and incorporating climate security into the fields of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), civil protection and security sector reform (SSR).⁷¹

When it comes to crisis response NATO has been involved in disaster relief operations and missions launched in the wake of natural, technological or humanitarian disasters.⁷² Since 1998 the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre has been responsible for NATO's disaster response operations. Although initially created to assist with earthquakes (a recent example being the earthquakes in Türkiye), it has developed to address climate-related incidents as well, such as floods and heatwaves.⁷³ The demands placed on armed forces for humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations, which are only likely to increase due to climate change, could reduce the ability of armed forces to fulfil their more traditional roles.

All three organizations share an emphasis on developing knowledge on climate-related security risks, including through research initiatives. This illustrates an awareness that more can be learned and that room remains for improving responses to climate-related security risks. While this does not necessarily translate directly into policy action, it helps promote research in this field.

Challenges for further action

Despite the fact that all three organizations are pushing ahead in addressing climate-related security risks, challenges to pursuing further policy action remain.

Research on the EU has identified that 'a lack of alignment between the climate and conflict-sensitizing work of the EEAS and the climate adaptation and mitigation work of the European Commission remains'.⁷⁴ Disputes over the energy transition have hampered recent efforts to agree on the EU Council Conclusions for Climate Diplomacy.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, NATO's efforts to respond to climate-related security risks are in their relative infancy, meaning it is important to increase relevant knowledge and capacity within the organization. The OSCE boasts fewer concrete examples of policy action compared to the other two organizations, likely due to the organization's political and financial constraints, including its heavy reliance on participating states to contribute through extra-budgetary projects. Some have also critiqued the OSCE's current financial situation as leaving it open to being used as a political tool.⁷⁶

There are a number of important challenges that must be addressed in order to enhance responses to climate-related security risks, some of which will be easier to overcome than others. How this can best be pursued is a relevant area for further research.

Shift from discourse and institutions to implementation of policy action

All three organizations have made an important shift from discursive framing and institutional design towards policy action. Given the multitude of policy initiatives identified, however, the issue is one of ensuring they are actually implemented through action.

⁷¹ EAAS (note 55).

⁷² NATO (note 21).

⁷³ NATO, 'Operations and missions: Past and present', 14 Jun. 2022.

⁷⁴ Bremberg and Bunse (note 53).

⁷⁵ 'EU climate diplomacy deal on hold as nuclear dispute deepens', Euractiv, 21 Feb. 2023.

⁷⁶ Liechtenstein, S., 'Will Russia kill the OSCE?', *Foreign Policy*, 29 Nov. 2022.

The EU, having already implemented several initiatives, is the furthest ahead in terms of responding to climate-related security risks through policy action. Even so, there remains room for improvement across its thematic approach. While NATO has been engaged in some policy action, many policy initiatives from its thematic approach still need to be implemented. Here, it would be useful to have concrete goals setting out when the organization intends to achieve its ambitions, as is the case in, for example, the EU's Climate Change and Defence Roadmap. The OSCE has launched several important projects but taking the next step requires strengthening efforts to implement the policy initiatives in its thematic approach. This, however, may not be financially feasible at present.

Overall, policy action thus far has not been sufficient to address climate-related security risks. Research has shown that achieving this goal requires a range of approaches, including climate mitigation/adaptation/development and conflict prevention/resolution/development.⁷⁷ Although there are examples of such initiatives, they need to focus on the short to medium term rather than just the long term, addressing the security risks that climate change is posing today and in the immediate future.⁷⁸

When comparing initiatives in the areas of development, defence and diplomacy, it is important to determine which go beyond discourse to incorporate the actual implementation of policy. Most diplomacy-related initiatives, for instance, have centred around discursive framing. The progress made in the areas of development and defence is the most significant—this is due not only to the policy initiatives undertaken but because of their relative importance in addressing climate-related security risks on the ground. Although implementing some of these initiatives will take a long time, they will make important changes.

In summary, while the EU, NATO and the OSCE have a range of policy initiatives, most of these have not yet been sufficiently implemented to address climate-related security risks effectively. For example, all three organizations encourage their member states to contribute to such efforts but fail to identify how they will support them or monitor the relevant processes. Thus, setting out concrete goals and responsibilities represents an important step in enhancing policy action.

⁷⁷ Black et al. (note 5).

⁷⁸ Remling and Barnhoorn (note 1); and Bunse et al. (note 39).

6. Ambition

The fifth and final building block—*ambition*—captures an organization’s concrete goals and assesses how realistic these are. In unpacking this the section below explores general ambitions, concrete goals, timelines and reporting, the organization’s added value, and possible entry points that may be acted on in the immediate future. Exploring how realistic these goals are is not only relevant to managing expectations but can help in determining what corrections or improvements are needed to ensure their achievement (see table 6 for a summary comparing the EU, NATO and the OSCE).

General ambitions

The EU, NATO and the OSCE all share the ambition of addressing climate-related security risks within both their designated region and beyond. What precisely these ambitions consist of, how they are to be achieved and whether they are realistic, however, differs across the organizations.

The EU has the broadest ambitions when it comes to integrating climate security into all relevant policy domains, including across foreign, security and defence policies. NATO is also ambitious, having expressed its intention to integrate climate change into collective security and defence as well as military planning and operations. In doing so it wishes to become the leading international organization in the field of addressing climate change and security. The main headline for the OSCE in this area is its ambition to address the challenges caused by climate change by strengthening cooperation.

These ambitions have consistently been reflected in each of the organization’s discourse, institutions and policy initiatives. The main question now is how to give these ambitions more concrete form.

Concrete goals

When it comes to responding to climate-related security risks all three organizations have made efforts to formulate more concrete goals. Here, NATO and the OSCE have both highlighted the need to implement—rather than just formulate—policy initiatives. The EU, meanwhile, has set out goals to be achieved in the short, medium and long term. These include deploying environmental advisors in all CSDP missions by 2025 and member states developing national strategies to prepare their armed forces for climate change by the end of 2023.⁷⁹ NATO aims to reduce its carbon emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 and to net zero by 2050.⁸⁰ While the OSCE has not yet formulated a concrete set of goals there is potential for the organization to press forward in this area, including through incorporating climate-related security concerns into its field missions.

Given that the three organizations have only recently declared their climate security ambitions, it is understandable that some have progressed further than others in operationalizing policy initiatives and formulating more concrete goals.

⁷⁹ EEAS (note 55).

⁸⁰ NATO, ‘NATO releases its Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment’, 28 Jun. 2022; and NATO (note 7).

Table 6. Ambitions on climate-related security risks among the EU, NATO and the OSCE

	EU	NATO	OSCE
<i>General ambitions</i>	Integrating climate change across foreign, security and defence policies	Becoming the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impacts of climate change on security	Strengthening co-operation to address the challenges arising from climate change
<i>Examples of concrete goals</i>	Deploying environmental advisors in all CSDP missions by 2025; member states developing national strategies to prepare their armed forces for climate change by 2023	Reducing carbon emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 and to net zero by 2050	Including climate-related security concerns in field missions
<i>Timeline to achieve ambition</i>	Short, medium or long term	Specified to some extent	Unspecified
<i>Reporting on ambition</i>	Yearly progress report (first one published)	Yearly, including compendium of best practices (first one published)	Not specified (beyond annual OSCE-wide reports)
<i>Added value of the organization</i>	Resources and programming	Standardization and benchmarking	Convening power
<i>Short-term opportunities</i>	Council Conclusions on Security and Defence	Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence	Climate Affairs Advisors seconded from member states
<i>Realism of achieving goals</i>	**	**	*

EU = European Union; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Notes: Asterisks (*) based on a ranking out of three.

Source: Author’s own compilation.

Timelines and reporting

In order to hold the organizations accountable it is important to have specific timelines setting out when the general ambitions and concrete goals for climate-related security are to be achieved by, as well as mechanisms that can take regular stock of progress.

The EU has specified when it intends to achieve each of its goals by, NATO has done this for some policies, and the OSCE for none (at least publicly). Both the EU and NATO have committed to yearly progress reports on climate security while the OSCE has not yet specified how it will pursue this beyond its annual whole organization reporting documents.

The commitments on timeframe and reporting are a good indication of how high each organization’s ambitions are when it comes to not only formulating policy initiatives but implementing them in practice.

Added value of the organization

In terms of addressing climate-related security risks it is relevant for the three organizations to gear their general ambitions and concrete goals towards their specific added value in this field.

The key added value of the EU is the resources it has available (e.g. finance, but also through delegations) and its programming (e.g. in fragile and conflict-affected countries). For NATO one of its key added values is standardization and benchmarking, for example through its methodology for mapping emissions. In the past the OSCE's biggest strength has been its convening power, for example through providing its participating states with a platform for dialogue and cooperation.⁸¹

Each organization's ambitions, including its goals, appear to relate directly or indirectly with their added value. Efforts could be made to further align objectives with added value in order to maximize the strengths of the respective organizations.

Short-term opportunities

Looking ahead to the coming year and beyond there are multiple opportunities for further integrating climate-related security risks into existing policy areas.

The EU is currently working on its Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, as well as an updated civilian CSDP compact set to expire at the end of 2023. These documents will illustrate whether climate-related security risks continue to be mainstreamed across policy areas and indicate any changes to current thinking. Assuming Türkiye and Hungary's reservations can be overcome, Sweden's accession to NATO could be promising for the climate security agenda, as the country has generally been ambitious in addressing such risks (including in the UN and OSCE). Moreover, once CCASCOE is fully established it will be an important tool in moving NATO's climate security agenda forward. For the OSCE, there is short-term potential in the organization seconding national experts to become Climate Affairs Advisors in the OCEEA.

While these upcoming opportunities offer a number of possibilities for strengthening responses to climate-related security, it is important to not merely wait and react but to proactively contribute to their development, integrating climate-related security risks into all relevant efforts.

Realism of achieving goals

The more realistic ambitions are, the greater potential there is for success in responding to climate-related security risks.

Both the EU and NATO have largely (though not completely) aligned their ambitions with their strengths. While these ambitions appear realistic, it remains to be seen how successful efforts to incorporate climate-related security risks into projects on the ground will be. In the area of defence, operational efficiency remains a strict necessity for most member states as well for the EU and NATO. Looking ahead, the geopolitical situation, political buy-in for the agenda, and the financial situations of the organizations will be telling factors in how successful the EU, NATO and the OSCE can be in their respective agendas. In particular, the political and financial challenges currently facing the OSCE are already influencing its convening power. Nevertheless, the OSCE's ambitions are certainly not unachievable, especially as the climate agenda seems to be on a forward trajectory regardless of the current political landscape. Even if a range of participating OSCE states express a willingness to respond to climate-related

⁸¹ Bremberg and Barnhoorn (note 24).

security risks, however, the consensus-based nature of the organization requires that all 57 participating states agree to move an agenda item forward, including the annual budget.

Achieving the ambitions set by the organizations depends on how the various building blocks—the context, discursive framing, institutional design, policy action and ambitions—interact. These building blocks do not operate in isolation but interact and strengthen each other’s development (though not necessarily linearly), enabling change in addressing climate-related security risks.

7. Complementarities and synergies

As shown in this policy report, the EU, NATO and the OSCE all have cooperation as part of their thematic approach to responding to climate-related security risks. To date, however, such cooperation has mainly focused on increasing discourse rather than implementing action. In order to maximize the complementarities and synergies between the three organizational approaches in this area, increased cooperation among the organizations is required.

Increasing discourse around climate, peace and security alone is not sufficient to address these interrelated risks

In recent years the EU, NATO and the OSCE have increasingly framed climate change in relation to security. Climate-related security risks have been included in a range of policy documents, including in foreign and security policies. They have also featured in defence policies, as demonstrated by the EU and NATO. While the EU has mainstreamed climate security across all its policy areas, NATO and the OSCE still have additional steps to take in this regard.

Increasing discourse alone is therefore not sufficient. How climate-related security risks are framed is important as it paves the way for how institutions will go on to address climate security through policy action. Framing such risks more holistically—for example, as primarily an external risk to security with the potential for peacebuilding (as is the case for the EU)—can translate into proactively responding to climate-related security risks in fragile countries. Such framing can be absorbed by the other building blocks, including in terms of financial resources dedicated to these efforts.

One could argue that highlighting the importance of climate, peace and security at the highest levels of an organization is most important when it comes to addressing climate-related security risks. While discourse at the highest levels is indeed pivotal in moving the climate security agenda forward, such discourse does not develop in isolation. Addressing climate-related security risks is not a linear process—rather, it relies on the development of all five building blocks analysed in this study, including how they interact with each other. Thus, not only does discourse shape policy action, policy action shapes discourse.

While important steps have been taken to increase discourse on climate, peace and security, this alone is not sufficient to address climate-related security risks. Thus, as well as mainstreaming climate-related security risks across policy domains and levels, the three organizations should exercise caution in how they frame these risks.

More policy action is required to achieve organizational ambitions and adequately respond to climate-related security risks

Each of the three organizations has a thematic approach to addressing climate-related security risks. Although they have started implementing their respective approaches, a lot remains to be done in order to achieve their organizational ambitions in this domain. The EU and NATO have set a range of goals in each of their thematic areas, which they have already started addressing. While the OSCE faces a more complicated political landscape, it has been involved in ongoing extra-budgetary projects funded by participating states and there is potential for the organization to contribute to further policy action. For all three it is important that existing challenges hindering further

action are overcome and movement is made (e.g. coordination between institutions, knowledge and capacity) towards concrete action.

As previously mentioned, research has shown that multiple entry points are required when it comes to responding to climate-related security risks, and that policy action in this area should focus on the short to medium term rather than just the longer term. In order to achieve this, financial resources need to be not only climate and conflict sensitive but also adaptive.⁸²

Some may argue that the three organizations have good plans in place and have already started to act on them through their respective policies. Although this assumption is not incorrect—the EU, NATO and the OSCE have indeed started to shift beyond discourse and institutions towards policy action—the examples of policy action seen thus far do not go far enough. While the steps already taken have contributed to reducing some risks, more policy action is required if the three are to achieve their many organizational ambitions in this area.

Cooperation on climate security between organizations is focused on discourse, not action

All three organizations have cooperation as part of their thematic approaches to addressing climate-related security risks. Thus far, however, cooperation has primarily focused on discourse—for example, through high-level dialogues and events like the recent EU–NATO joint communication, or the EU’s Council Conclusions on its priorities at the OSCE—rather than action. Although this is important, there does not appear to be any clear climate security cooperation strategy aimed at going beyond discursive framing to policy action. The organizations should therefore not merely cooperate at the highest level but at all relevant operational levels, including through discussing concrete thematic or geographic concerns.

To make this happen, leadership—including from member states—is essential, with one example being the funding of projects addressing climate-related security risks. Dedicated bodies could also be employed to convene member states, allowing them to use their advocacy power to address risks in this area. The EU, NATO and the OSCE all depend highly on contributions from their members and therefore their leadership is essential in responding domestically, regionally and internationally to climate-related security risks.

One could argue that cooperation is not a priority given that the three organizations have different approaches to addressing climate-related security risks and are at varying stages of implementation. While the EU, NATO and the OSCE have different mandates, there are complementarities and synergies between their approaches. Learning from each other could therefore reduce duplication and enhance mutual knowledge when it comes to achieving the same end goal: addressing the security risks associated with climate change.

Maximizing the complementarities and synergies between organizations in responding to climate-related security risks requires increased cooperation

While the three organizations have expressed a willingness to enhance cooperation on climate-related security risks, no concrete steps have been put in place on how this might be pursued. All three have similar mandates and approaches in this field, and hence also shared challenges. Efforts to document their policies and progress in this area therefore constitute an important starting point.

⁸²Black et al. (note 5).

Research has shown the importance of building communities of practice that can, among other things, advocate to move certain agendas forward.⁸³ In attempting to build such communities there is a lot to be learned from partners dealing with similar issues, such as the UN Climate Security Mechanism—not least because the UN Charter promotes the contributions of regional arrangements.⁸⁴

Given the differences in outlook between member states and organizational inertia, collaboration over climate security in the current political landscape poses stiff challenges. On the other hand, the additional risks presented by the state of geopolitics mean that cooperation has become even more important when it comes to addressing shared challenges and identifying shared solutions.

⁸³ Bremberg, N. and Danielson, A., '4. Communities of practice and the everyday making of EU foreign and security policy', eds N. Bremberg, *The Everyday Making of EU Foreign and Security Policy: Practices, Socialization and the Management of Dissent* (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd: Feb. 2022).

⁸⁴ Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed 14 Aug. 1941, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945, Chapter VIII.

8. Advancing multilateral cooperation

In order to overcome the various challenges outlined in this report and move the climate security agenda forward, organizations need to advance multilateral cooperation in their responses to climate-related security risks.

With this in mind we offer three ways forward for policymakers working for the three organizations and their member states: (a) enhance cooperation between relevant European regional organizations; (b) increase leadership from member states, including through dedicated bodies; and (c) strengthen financial instruments aimed at supporting responses to climate-related security risks.

Although these entry points are broad and may seem obvious to some, they are essential to ensuring progress on the climate security agenda. Pursued in tandem they will enhance the organizations' complementarities and synergies in responding to climate-related security risks. Moreover, they are feasible in the short to medium term and have the potential to not only reduce security risks stemming from climate change but proactively contribute to peace.

Enhance cooperation between relevant European regional organizations

While the EU, NATO and the OSCE have all made important progress in addressing climate-related security risks, they still have a long way to go. Sharing their experiences (both positive and negative), as well as their ambitions for the future, will potentially enhance learning and reduce duplication. Specific collaboration over thematic and geographic concerns (both political and technical) would be a good starting point—for example, in relation to field missions. Such exchanges should happen on a regular basis in an environment that maximizes the value of each organization. Given the diverse memberships of the three organizations, the UN Climate Security Mechanism would be well suited to coordinating these discussions. Further down the line this could be scaled up to include cross-regional collaboration in which examples of best practice are shared. This would be especially useful for organizations like the OSCE that have not progressed as far as the EU and NATO in addressing climate-related security risks.

Increase leadership from member states, including through dedicated bodies

EU, NATO and OSCE member states have been instrumental in driving the discourse on climate security, including at the highest political level. Such leadership is valuable not only for advocacy but for streamlining and clarifying discourse, as well as pushing the climate security agenda towards policy action, particularly in cases where states are members of more than one of the organizations. There is also potential in dedicated bodies established by member states to address climate-related security risks. Although not officially part of the respective organizations' decision-making bodies, they can nevertheless play an important role in shaping internal approaches to climate security. These groups should not be seen as merely coordinating units but should be empowered to ask critical questions. In this regard it will, for example, be interesting to see how CCASCOE contributes to NATO's efforts.

Strengthen financial instruments aimed at supporting responses to climate-related security risks

Any successful pursuit of the recommendations set out above requires that the financial resources available for addressing climate-related security risks are strengthened.

While for the OSCE this is primarily a matter of accessing additional resources, for the EU and NATO it is also about how best to use existing resources, as well as ensuring these resources are climate and conflict sensitive and adaptive. Without financial instruments the other building blocks cannot have any impact. The literature on climate finance and the literature on organizational responses to climate security have often been separated—combining these fields and identifying ways forward for policy action is an important area for future research, both for organizations and their respective member states.

Abbreviations

CCASCOE	Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (NATO)
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy (EU)
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy (EU)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DG	Directorate General (EU)
DG CLIMA	DG for Climate Action (EU)
DG DEFIS	DG for Defense Industry and Space (EU)
DG ECHO	DG for the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (EU)
DG INTPA	DG for International Partnerships (EU)
DIANA	Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (NATO)
EEAS	European External Action Service (EU)
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCEEA	Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OSCE)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SSR	Security sector reform
UN	United Nations

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