European Union (EU) member states established a political compact in 2018 to strengthen the civilian dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU wants to become a credible security provider and maintains that it has a unique strength in preventing and managing external conflicts and crises because it can deploy both military and civilian instruments within an integrated approach. Following the launch in 2016 of the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy and the EU’s new level of ambition in security and defence, the focus was mainly on strengthening the military dimension of CSDP. The activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with binding commitments in areas such as defence capability development, exemplified the growing imbalance between the EU’s ambitions in military and civilian CSDP. The 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact—initially referred to by some as ‘civilian PESCO’—meant to narrow this gap by ensuring that civilian CSDP would also take a ‘qualitative and quantitative leap forward’.

The compact consists of 10 strategic guidelines and 22 political commitments to make civilian CSDP more capable; more effective, flexible and responsive; and more joined up with other EU actors and instruments, most notably in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) domain. The recognition that it is the responsibility of EU member states to ensure that civilian CSDP missions have the capabilities they need to operate lies at the core of the compact. This is inherent in the intergovernmental nature of CSDP and pursuant to the 2007 Treaty on European Union (TEU), which stipulates...
that EU member states shall decide the mandates of missions and jointly provide their capabilities.  

The apparent inability to do the latter and insufficient burden sharing between EU member states were important reasons behind the compact.  
Therefore, EU member states committed first and foremost to increasing their contributions to civilian CSDP. More specifically, they committed to increasing the number of seconded personnel in missions and raising the share of seconded personnel to at least 70 per cent of international personnel. EU member states also committed to ‘actively promoting’ a better representation of women at all levels.

Civilian CSDP is at a critical juncture. The deadline for implementing the compact expires in mid 2023. At the end of 2021 the Council of the EU commended the progress achieved to that point and welcomed the commitment by all stakeholders to implement the compact fully and on time.

This narrative is challenged, however, by the apparent failure so far of EU member states to deliver on the core commitment to increase the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. This took on even greater relevance when, in March 2022, EU member states approved the Strategic Compass, which provides a common vision for EU security and defence policy through 2030. The Strategic Compass emphasizes the need to strengthen further the EU’s ability to act whenever crises erupt, including through civilian CSDP. Russia’s war against Ukraine and its knock-on effects on European and global security have revived the political interest in civilian CSDP as a crisis management tool. With regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact, these events have also underlined the importance of continuing to focus on and invest in capabilities, responsiveness, flexible mandates and decision making, and cooperation with JHA and other actors.

EU member states therefore intend to adopt a new Civilian CSDP Compact by mid 2023. Initial discussions have focused on whether the new compact should define the level of ambition for civilian CSDP in terms of the type, number and size of missions the EU should be able to deploy.

This would then inform a new civilian capability development process beginning in 2024. The new compact is also an opportunity to renew commitments on increasing secondments and women’s representation, based on lessons learned from the current compact. This will remain critical for

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7 Council of the European Union, 14305/18 (note 1).


delivering the compact  3

EU member states are expected to provide CSDP missions with capabilities so that the missions can execute their mandates.

The effectiveness and credibility of civilian CSDP as a political instrument, owned by EU member states.

This SIPRI Research Policy Paper takes stock of the outcomes of the 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact in terms of the commitments by EU member states to: (a) increase national contributions to civilian CSDP (commitment 1) and raise the share of seconded personnel in missions to at least 70 per cent (commitment 3); and (b) promote a better representation of women in missions (commitment 16). It builds on previous research by SIPRI and on data from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database. Unless otherwise stated, all analysis of mission personnel is based on data from the database. The objective of this paper is to contribute to the transparency and accountability of the compact and to a better understanding of the factors affecting EU member states’ ability to increase secondments and women’s representation in civilian CSDP missions. The policy recommendations of this paper focus particularly on ways to strengthen the commitments on national contributions and women’s representation in the new compact.

II. The EU’s civilian CSDP

The TEU states that the EU may deploy civilian and military CSDP missions outside the EU to conduct tasks in the areas of peacekeeping and conflict prevention, and to strengthen international security. CSDP missions are essentially an intergovernmental instrument. EU member states define their mandates in the Council of the EU and exercise political control and strategic direction over the missions through the Political and Security Committee. They decide unanimously on all matters related to CSDP. EU member states are expected to provide CSDP missions with capabilities so that the missions can execute their mandates. Military and civilian CSDP missions are distinct in terms of their (military vs civilian) chain of command and how they are financed. The common costs of the military missions are covered by the European Peace Facility (EPF), a financial instrument outside the regular EU budget. The common costs of the civilian missions are covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget. The CFSP budget is part of the regular EU budget and managed by the European Commission.

The EU has conducted 23 civilian CSDP missions since 2003. Eleven of these missions are active as of 2022 (see table 1). All the ongoing missions have been active since before the compact was established in 2018, except for the EU Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA),

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13 Council of the European Union, 14305/18 (note 1).
15 Treaty on European Union (note 5).
17 This has been the case since 2021, before that they were covered by the Athena Mechanism. Council of the European Union, 'European Peace Facility', accessed Oct. 2022.
Table 1. Active EU civilian CSDP missions as of October 2022, by region

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<th>Europe</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
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CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union.

Notes: EUCAP Somalia was named EUCAP Nestor until 2017. The EU monitoring capacity to Armenia is not included as a mission because its tasks are performed by EUMM Georgia.


which was established in 2019 and launched in 2020. The Council of the EU decided in October 2022 to deploy civilian monitors to Armenia to monitor the border with Azerbaijan but it did not create a new civilian CSDP mission for this purpose; instead, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia was given the task to do this, within existing means and resources.\(^\text{19}\) No mission has been discontinued since the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan ended in 2016.

Civilian CSDP missions have traditionally focused on strengthening the police, rule of law and civilian administration in fragile and post-conflict states, as well as on security sector reform and monitoring tasks. The compact broadened their focus by adding that the missions may contribute to the EU’s wider efforts to address non-traditional security challenges along the so-called internal–external security nexus, such as organized crime, irregular migration, violent extremism, hybrid warfare and cyber threats.\(^\text{20}\)

This was in line with the EU Global Strategy and the EU’s new strategic priorities in security and defence to: (a) respond to external conflicts and crises; (b) build the capacity of partners; and (c) protect the EU and its citizens, placing greater emphasis on its internal security needs.\(^\text{21}\)

The role of most contemporary missions has thus been linked more directly to the interests of the EU and its member states.\(^\text{22}\) To illustrate this, the latest Council conclusions on civilian CSDP (from December 2021) stated, among other things, that ‘benefit to the host country should be an important element


21 Council of the European Union, 14392/16 (note 2), p. 3.

of missions’ activities’ (emphasis added). One consequence of this is that civilian CSDP missions appear to be increasingly overlapping with the work of JHA actors, both in terms of their mandates and the expertise they need. On the one hand, this has blurred the lines between the intergovernmental civilian CSDP and European Commission-led instruments in the JHA domain. On the other hand, it has been viewed as a necessary adaptation to an evolving and increasingly complex security environment, and as a way of regaining the interest and political ownership of EU member states. This also explains the focus in the compact on cooperation and synergies with JHA actors, and on conceptualizing the added value of civilian CSDP in the new strategic priority areas. Making civilian CSDP more attractive to JHA ministries and agencies in EU member states has been an important objective, as missions depend heavily on voluntary personnel contributions from these actors.

**Staffing civilian CSDP missions**

The ability of civilian CSDP missions to implement their mandates depends greatly on the quality and quantity of their human resources. The international personnel in these missions can be divided into operational and non-operational personnel. Operational personnel carry out the substantive tasks of a mission. These positions usually require specific professional skills and expertise, depending on the focus of the mandate and whether a mission is an advisory, capacity-building, monitoring or executive rule of law mission. Non-operational personnel perform generic and support functions that are needed by all missions regardless of mandate and type. This is a broad category covering personnel in areas such as management, planning and reporting, administration and support services, and security and duty of care.

In theory, EU member states should provide all mission personnel, but this is not the case in practice. International mission personnel are either seconded by EU member states or participating third states or contracted directly by the missions. EU member states are invited to nominate candidates for vacant posts, which are announced regularly by the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in calls for contributions. Most posts (almost two thirds since the start of the compact) are advertised as seconded positions and can be filled only by seconded personnel. The other posts are advertised as seconded/contracted positions and can be filled by contracted personnel if there are no qualified candidates for secondment. As a rule, a seconded post can be converted to a seconded/contracted post only after it has been advertised in two successive calls for contribution without being filled. However, it happens that posts are advertised as seconded/contracted from the outset, when experience has shown that it is difficult to fill these with seconded personnel.

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23 Council of the European Union, 14740/21 (note 8), p. 3.
24 Bellocchi and Tabit (note 16).
25 Local staff are outside the scope of this paper.
26 Smit, ‘Increasing member state contributions to EU civilian CSDP missions’ (note 14).
High turnover rates and short-term deployments of personnel can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of missions.

Most personnel are selected individually in a competitive recruitment process. This means that missions spend much time and resources on staffing issues, especially because personnel turnover is relatively high. This challenge is inherent in the temporary nature of secondments, but it is aggravated by the prevalence of one-year secondments, which are quite common for personnel coming from the law enforcement sector. In 2021 alone, the CPCC announced 40 calls for contributions, with vacancies for almost 700 unique positions across 11 missions. To put this in context, there were around 1450 positions in total at the time, of which approximately 100 were reserved for the formed police unit (FPU) of the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, which is deployed as a unit outside the regular recruitment process.

High turnover rates and short-term deployments of personnel can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of missions. They can affect continuity and productivity because it takes time to onboard new personnel and institutional memory is often lost when people leave. Tasks involving the transfer of skills and knowledge, such as advising or mentoring, require time to build personal relationships and trust with counterparts in host state institutions. High turnover also increases the risks of capacity gaps and understaffing, as personnel who leave cannot always be immediately replaced. Between 2019 and mid 2022, the CPCC launched almost 2000 recruitment projects for vacancies in civilian CSDP missions, of which one quarter had to be re-advertised once or multiple times in consecutive calls for contributions. Consequently, key positions in missions can sometimes remain unfilled for several months.

III. Introducing the Civilian CSDP Compact

In the Civilian CSDP Compact, EU member states committed to increasing their national contributions to civilian CSDP and to raising the share of seconded personnel in the missions to at least 70 per cent of all international personnel. The compact further specifies that EU member states will continue to prioritize seconded personnel in operational positions. However, EU member states also committed to developing the full range of capabilities for civilian CSDP and making these capabilities available to missions. Besides capabilities for operational tasks—in the traditional and new priority areas, as well as in cross-cutting areas such as gender and human rights—this explicitly covers generic and mission support capabilities for the

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28 This is based on an analysis by the author of all calls for contributions in 2018–22 (as of 30 June 2022). Vacancies for temporary positions (visiting experts, civilian response teams and specialized teams) and vacancies in the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC & SPO) are excluded from this analysis.
29 Author’s analysis (note 28).
30 Council of the European Union, 14305/18 (note 1).
missions’ non-operational tasks. When the compact was established there was no data that could break down mission personnel by job category and employment type. This meant that there was no overview at the time of the ratio of operational to non-operational personnel in the missions, or of the ratio of seconded to contracted personnel within these job categories.

The reasons why EU member states made a strong commitment to increase secondments are threefold. First and foremost, the TEU stipulates that EU member states must provide the capabilities for the implementation of the intergovernmental CSDP. This principle is primarily about demonstrating and reinforcing EU member states’ political ownership. Second, civilian CSDP missions have operational tasks that require capabilities that are available only in national public services, such as law enforcement or the judicial system. Besides their unique skill sets and professional experience, active public servants enable missions to engage peer-to-peer or uniform-to-uniform with counterparts in host state institutions. This reason applies to operational personnel in particular. Third, increasing secondments reduces pressure on the CFSP budget, which is used to finance contracted personnel. This has implications for the political ownership of the missions too. Whereas the CFSP budget is administered by the European Commission, most costs related to seconded personnel are borne by the seconding member states.

EU member states also committed to ‘actively promoting’ a better representation of women at all levels of the missions—although they did not set a concrete target. Women have been chronically under-represented in civilian CSDP missions. The reasons why the EU and its member states (some more than others) want to rectify this are both normative and related to effectiveness. The normative reasons emphasize that gender equality is a founding value of the EU and promoting the equal right of men and women to participate in all its activities is an important EU objective. This also applies to EU external action and CSDP, in accordance with the TEU and various existing EU policies, and in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security (WPS). Following this reasoning, reducing gender imbalances in civilian CSDP also contributes to the credibility of the EU in its ambition to promote gender equality and WPS objectives globally. The reasons related to effectiveness are based on the idea that missions are more effective when they are more gender balanced. This argument is often used to justify targets and other gender-balancing measures. While there is support in research for this argument, it has also been criticized for being reductionist and potentially counterproductive, as it may reinforce gendered stereotypes and place an added burden on women in missions.

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The 70 per cent target

The question of whether the compact should include concrete targets initially divided EU member states and was subject to tough negotiations. The 70 per cent target for seconded personnel is one of the few numerical goals that made it into the final text. The compact does not clarify on what basis the target was chosen. There is no objective threshold or ratio of seconded to contracted personnel above which missions become more effective or cost-efficient. It is more likely that 70 per cent was chosen because it seemed to be a reasonable target at the time and one that could be achieved within the given time frame. When the compact was established, the share of seconded personnel in all missions stood at 66 per cent.

The common interpretation of this commitment has been that the 70 per cent target applies to all international mission personnel at the aggregate level, as well as horizontally to each individual mission. When the compact started, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine, the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and EUMM Georgia were the only missions that exceeded the target. Most other missions were far removed from it and had already accumulated a critical mass of contracted personnel relative to their size.

It is difficult for missions to increase the percentage of seconded personnel when they employ many contracted personnel, and it is difficult for missions to reduce the number of contracted personnel unless they are downsizing. This is because positions that are filled by contracted personnel tend to remain filled by contracted personnel. Moreover, the turnover rate for seconded personnel tends to be higher than for contracted personnel, which means that there is more pressure on EU member states to replace seconded personnel that are ending their deployments.37

No gender parity target

The compact does not set a target for women’s representation in civilian CSDP missions and makes no reference to gender parity. The EU has been trailing behind the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in this regard, which launched comprehensive gender parity strategies for their field operations in 2017 and 2019, respectively. The Council of the EU adopted its first-ever conclusions on WPS in December 2018, in which it asked for a ‘concise, specific, measurable and achievable’ action plan for the implementation of the new EU Strategic Approach to WPS.38 The action plan, which was issued in July 2019, encouraged EU member states to decide a target for the gender balance in CSDP missions.39 However, EU member states disagree on whether such targets are necessary or even desirable.

37 Smit, ‘Increasing member state contributions to EU civilian CSDP missions’ (note 14).
Meanwhile, the CPCC has proactively developed a strategy and action plan to enhance women’s participation in civilian CSDP missions. The strategy and action plan were published in December 2021 and cover the period 2021–24.\(^{40}\) The strategy sets an ambitious target of 40 per cent women across missions and personnel categories by 2024, while acknowledging that achieving gender parity remains the long-term objective.\(^{41}\) This target and long-term commitment to gender parity are in line with existing EU policies and action plans such as the Strategic Approach to WPS and the Gender Action Plan III.\(^{42}\) The CPCC’s strategy and action plan aim to remove structural barriers to equal participation by fostering institutional change through four areas of strategic engagement: (a) equal opportunities in candidacy, recruitment, retention and career development; (b) inclusive and harassment-free work environment; (c) leadership engagement; and (d) strategic communication and networking.\(^{43}\)

IV. Personnel contributions before the compact

EU civilian CSDP underwent a partial transformation in the years leading up to the Civilian CSDP Compact. Between 2011 and 2017, several large missions closed or drew down and gave way to a new generation of missions (see table 1). EULEX Kosovo, the largest civilian CSDP mission ever deployed, was downsized by 75 per cent in three successive reconfigurations, and EUMM Georgia by one third. Long-running EU police missions in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina were discontinued. The newly established missions in the Middle East and North Africa (Iraq and Libya), sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Niger and Somalia) and Ukraine were smaller in size and their mandates narrower in scope than earlier missions.

While the number of missions remained stable—during most of this period, the EU was running 10 civilian CSDP missions simultaneously—the type and size of these missions evolved considerably. These developments had a significant effect on the division between seconded and contracted personnel and the balance between men and women deployed in the missions.

The total authorized strength of all civilian CSDP missions also decreased sharply because of these developments, from more than 3000 in 2011 to 1300 in 2017. Authorized strength is measured here in terms of the number of approved positions in a mission according to its budget. The number of filled positions is usually between 10 per cent and 30 per cent lower. The total authorized strength reflects the missions’ quantitative demand for human resources, in other words, it is based on capability requirements, as decided by EU member states.


\(^{43}\) Council of the European Union, 14885/21 (note 40).
The gradual shift from conducting at least a few large-scale missions to only medium-sized and small ones has been attributed to EU member states’ inability to meet the demand for human resources, through secondments, that they themselves created.\textsuperscript{44} Lowering the overall (quantitative) demand for personnel contributions did not resolve this. The number of seconded personnel deployed in civilian CSDP missions decreased from more than 1500 in 2011 to 700 in 2017 and their share among the total personnel went from 81 per cent to 67 per cent, with the rest being contracted personnel.

**Unconducive trends**

The fact that personnel secondments continued to trend downward between 2011 and 2017, despite the lower quantitative demand, was widely interpreted as further evidence of a growing lack of interest in civilian CSDP among EU member states. Although insufficient commitment from EU member states may have been one cause, there were other factors that contributed to the decreasing share of seconded personnel in the years leading up to the compact. The changes to the type and size of missions gradually affected the composition of the missions and therefore the demand for civilian capabilities. These trends were unconducive to maintaining a high share of seconded personnel and preventing an increase in contracted personnel. Several of these trends continued during the implementation phase of the compact, but some may have started to reverse more recently.

First, the demand for personnel contributions shifted increasingly from Europe and Afghanistan to Africa and the Middle East. Missions in Europe and Afghanistan received personnel from almost all EU member states, including those with relatively limited capacity and resources. The reasons for this included geographical proximity, alignment with foreign policy priorities and participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military operation in Afghanistan. Missions in Africa and the Middle East did not benefit from such broad participation and received personnel from a smaller group of countries. Many EU member states did not prioritize these missions. Language requirements in French-speaking missions were also an obstacle to recruiting personnel.\textsuperscript{45}

Second, the demand shifted increasingly from operational to non-operational personnel. As missions became smaller and operated in more remote and high-risk environments, the ratio of operational to non-operational personnel also decreased. Because operational positions tend to require professional experience or skills that exist primarily in public services, and because EU member states prioritize operational personnel in their contributions, the percentage of seconded personnel in operational positions is usually high. Few EU member states seconded non-operational personnel to missions. Indeed, several lack the necessary legal framework to do this and exclusively second public servants. For this reason, and because most non-operational positions do not require personnel with a

\textsuperscript{44} Karjalainen and Savoranta (note 22).
\textsuperscript{45} Böttcher (note 33).
public service background, the percentage of seconded personnel in non-operational positions tends to be low.

Third, the demand for operational personnel shifted increasingly towards more specialized expertise. The new missions were mandated more narrowly to support host governments through capacity building and strategic advice in specialized areas such as integrated border management, maritime security, counterterrorism, combating organized crime and tackling irregular migration. This meant that personnel that had been deployed in the large missions in Europe and Afghanistan that closed or downsized could not simply be transferred to these new missions. In addition, it is often more difficult to second personnel with important and highly specialized capabilities than those with general skill sets because national authorities may be more reluctant to provide scarce and valuable personnel who may be needed at home.

Civilian CSDP missions also competed for capabilities and resources with other international players. While the demand for personnel contributions coming from civilian CSDP missions decreased in the years leading up to the compact, the demand coming from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the OSCE increased substantially. Frontex expanded quickly in the wake of the European migrant crisis in 2015 and the OSCE deployed the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine in 2014, following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The OSCE SMM became the world’s largest civilian crisis management mission of its time, totalling almost 800 international personnel at its height, of which more than half were seconded by EU member states.

Finally, on the supply side, third states substantially reduced their personnel contributions to civilian CSDP missions, which also affected the share of seconded personnel in these missions. The number of personnel seconded by non-EU member states fell from more than 200 in 2011 (11 per cent of all seconded personnel) to below 20 in 2017 (2 per cent of all seconded personnel). The third states that reduced their contributions the most during the period were the United States and Turkey (in EULEX Kosovo) and, to a lesser extent, Canada (in EUPOL Afghanistan).

V. Personnel contributions since the compact

Having reached its lowest point in 10 years by December 2018, the total authorized strength of civilian CSDP missions then increased following the establishment of the Civilian CSDP Compact (see figure 1).

The data analysis in this paper and all personnel-related figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC & SPO), non-permanent international personnel, such as visiting experts or specialized teams, and national staff.

46 Bellocchi and Tabit (note 16), p. 32.
48 The data analysis in this paper and all personnel-related figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC & SPO), non-permanent international personnel, such as visiting experts or specialized teams, and national staff.
tinuation of older trends. EULEX Kosovo continued to downsize, while most other missions continued to expand. As a result, the demand for personnel continued to shift further from missions in Europe to missions in Africa and the Middle East. As of August 2022, the missions in Africa and the Middle East accounted for 53 per cent of all approved posts in civilian CSDP missions, up from 45 per cent when the compact began.

Raising secondments: No quantitative leap forward

EU member states have not been able to raise substantially the number of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions since the start of the compact (see figure 1). Total secondments were also at a 10-year low when the compact was adopted, and EU member states have not been able to meet the growing demand for personnel contributions through their secondments. In December 2018, EU member states seconded approximately 700 personnel to civilian CSDP missions, of which 100 were part of the Polish FPU in EULEX Kosovo. The number of seconded personnel in these missions has gone up and down in the years thereafter. It increased until early 2020, when the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic caused a temporary drop in secondments, and then again until mid 2021, when it peaked at almost 800. The number of seconded personnel has been declining since mid 2021, reaching 735 in August 2022.

The most recent decline in 2021 and 2022 resulted almost entirely from reductions in the number of seconded personnel in EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Ukraine (see figure 2). The numbers of seconded personnel remained stable in most other missions over the period. While EULEX Kosovo has been downsizing for a long time, the decrease in secondments to EUAM Ukraine was likely a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. By then, the mission had already withdrawn non-essential personnel and evacuated its field offices in eastern Ukraine. Following the invasion, the mission evacuated all international personnel remaining in Ukraine and relocated to temporary headquarters in Moldova, from where it continued its operations.49 The Council of the EU revised the mandate of EUAM Ukraine twice to enable the mission to shift its activities to areas in which Ukrainian authorities need support, such as the facilitation of refugee flows and humanitarian aid delivery, as well as the investigation and prosecution

49 European External Action Service, ‘EUAM Ukraine will stand and work together with Ukraine towards the common goal of moving the country ever closer to the EU’, 10 June 2022.
The mission returned to its headquarters in Kyiv in May 2022 and started to recruit additional experts to implement its new tasks. If EU member states can provide these experts, secondments to EUAM Ukraine may quickly return to pre-invasion levels.

The data used here to measure personnel contributions by EU member states does not include temporary personnel that can be deployed to reinforce missions for specific tasks and for a limited duration. Such contributions used to be quite small (and were mostly limited to so-called visiting experts or civilian response teams) but have increased in size in recent years following the introduction of so-called specialized teams. EU member states agreed in the compact to provide such capabilities when missions need specific operational support, limited in time and scope, that can be delivered better by organized teams than by individual experts. Specialized teams consisting of 4–8 members were deployed to EUAM Ukraine in 2021 and to EUCAP Somalia in 2021 and 2022. The largest temporary reinforcement of international crimes.


51 European External Action Service (note 49).

a civilian CSDP mission was the deployment of a reserve FPU consisting of 70 gendarmes from France and Portugal to EULEX Kosovo between March and July 2022. The reserve FPU was deployed in response to rising tensions in northern Kosovo and operated alongside the mission’s permanent FPU from Poland (which, unless otherwise stated, is included in the data used in this paper).53

Increasing reliance on contracted personnel

The number of contracted personnel in civilian CSDP missions has grown substantially since the compact was established (see figure 1). It increased by almost 50 per cent, from 370 in 2018 to more than 500 in 2022. Reducing the reliance of missions on contracted personnel was a key objective of the compact. Yet all the missions that were not downsizing have become more dependent on this type of personnel (see figure 2). This is especially the case for the high-risk missions in Africa and the Middle East, which already had relatively high levels of contracted personnel before the compact. Whereas one quarter of all vacancies in civilian CSDP missions between 2019 and mid-2022 were advertised as seconded/contracted positions, between one third and half of all vacancies in high-risk missions in Africa and the Middle East were recruited this way. By contrast, contracted personnel were eligible for merely 11 per cent and 7 per cent of all vacancies in EUAM Ukraine and EUMM Georgia, respectively, in this period.

The recruitment of additional contracted personnel in missions increased continuously throughout the implementation phase of the compact. Whereas the initial increase in secondments was disrupted in 2020 by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the increase in contracted personnel accelerated during this period. It is likely that seconding authorities in EU member states hesitated more than usual to authorize tour-of-duty extensions and nominate new candidates during this phase, while many missions had suspended their operations and non-essential personnel were working remotely anyway. By contrast, contracted personnel are employed directly by missions and do not usually have other jobs to which they can or must return.

53 EULEX Kosovo, ‘EULEX’s reserve formed police unit leaves Kosovo’, 18 July 2022.
Declining secondment rates

The share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP has decreased overall and in almost every mission since the establishment of the compact (see figures 2 and 3). At the aggregate level, the share of seconded personnel decreased from 66 per cent in 2018 to 60 per cent in 2022. EUMM Georgia remained the mission with the highest share of seconded personnel (86 per cent on average in 2022) and EULEX Kosovo also exceeded the 70 per cent target in 2022 (71 per cent on average). EULEX Kosovo achieved this percentage because it retained the 100-strong FPU from Poland, without which its secondment rate would drop below 50 per cent. EUAM Ukraine and EUPOL COPPS fell below the 70 per cent threshold in 2022, but may recover if secondments to these missions return to previous levels. In the high-risk missions in Africa and the Middle East, the share of seconded personnel fell to levels around or below 50 per cent. These missions have accumulated too many additional contracted personnel to have a realistic chance of approximating to the 70 per cent target any time soon.

Operational vs non-operational personnel

Another trend that continued during the implementation phase of the compact was the decrease in the ratio of operational to non-operational posts (see figure 4). Operational personnel accounted for 49 per cent of all international
personnel in the missions in 2022, down from 55 per cent when the compact started. The overall posture of civilian CSDP continued to move from large and medium-sized missions in Europe to medium- and small-sized missions in Africa and the Middle East. The latter tend to have greater needs when it comes to mission support and fewer operational personnel. The decrease in secondments since 2021 also contributed to this development, as this affected primarily the operational personnel in missions, especially in EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Ukraine.

The share of seconded personnel has remained high among operational personnel and low among non-operational personnel since the establishment of the compact (see figure 4). This share also remained remarkably stable in both personnel categories, at around 87 per cent for operational personnel and 35 per cent for non-operational personnel. Variation of the ratio of operational to non-operational positions over time and between missions helps to explain why the share of seconded personnel continued to decrease at the aggregate level and in many missions, and why some missions depend more on contracted personnel than others.

The number of operational personnel across all missions increased initially but was similar in August 2022 to what it had been in December 2018. The number of non-operational personnel increased by more than 25 per cent in this period. In other words, the net growth of personnel deployments in civilian CSDP missions following the compact comprised mostly non-operational personnel.
This means that the share of seconded personnel across all missions continued to decrease mainly because EU member states did not contribute more non-operational personnel to missions. Several EU member states do not second personnel in non-operational post categories such as administration, mission support, and security and duty of care. Rather than availability, the main obstacles to providing these types of capability tend to be legal or bureaucratic constraints, such as the inability to second freelancers or ‘experts outside public service’ to civilian CSDP missions. Raising the share of seconded personnel among non-operational personnel remains challenging for this reason and because most missions already employ relatively large numbers of contracted non-operational personnel.

The share of seconded personnel in operational positions has remained relatively high in all missions since the compact began (see figure 4). Although it decreased in some missions during the period, especially EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger, it continued to exceed 70 per cent even in those missions. Most missions employ a small number of contracted operational personnel. This means that it should be fairly easy for EU member states to raise the share of seconded personnel even further in this category. However, high shares of seconded personnel do not necessarily mean high occupancy rates in these positions. Most operational posts are advertised for seconded personnel only, which means that missions cannot employ contracted personnel even if these posts remain unfilled. In addition, high levels of secondment do not reveal much about rates of retention and turnover. These are factors that can hamper the effectiveness of missions even when the share of seconded personnel is high.

National personnel contributions

EU member states agreed in the compact to increase the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions ‘jointly’. Burden sharing between EU member states had become increasingly uneven and several of them were already making substantial contributions to missions when they established the compact (see figure 5). There was a clear divide between a group of eight EU member states—comprising Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden—providing most of the seconded personnel on the one hand, and the rest of the EU member states on the other hand. By 2018 these eight ‘top contributors’ accounted for 69 per cent of all seconded personnel in missions. One implicit goal of the compact was to redistribute part of the burden sharing in terms of personnel contributions and narrow the gap between the top contributors and the other EU member states.

Instead of narrowing, however, the gap continued to widen: the same eight EU member states remained the largest personnel contributors by far during the implementation phase of the compact. By 2022 they accounted for 73 per cent of all seconded personnel. The number of personnel seconded by this group increased somewhat in this period. The number seconded jointly

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by the other 19 EU member states was similar in 2022 to what it had been in 2018.

Poland has been the largest personnel contributor to civilian CSDP missions since 2016. This is mainly because it has provided EULEX Kosovo’s last remaining permanent FPU, which is deployed as a unit and consists of around 100 police officers. Even in terms of its individual secondments, Poland has been the eighth largest contributor nearly every year since the compact began (see figure 5, which shows only individual secondments). Germany and Finland raised their personnel contributions most in absolute terms following the establishment of the compact, while Latvia nearly doubled its secondments. The personnel contributions by Bulgaria and Sweden decreased most in absolute terms, although the latter was still the third largest contributor in 2022.

Some EU member states increased their contributions to missions in the form of temporary personnel reinforcements, which are not accounted for in the data used in this paper. Portugal and France contributed 42 and 28 gendarmes, respectively, to a reserve FPU of EULEX Kosovo between March and July 2022. Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden all contributed personnel to specialized teams or civilian response teams (consisting of between four and eight members) that were sent to reinforce EUAM Ukraine and EUCAp Somalia for shorter periods (usually one to three months) during 2021 and 2022.

Increasing women’s representation

All the civilian CSDP missions that were not downsizing have recruited more women personnel since the establishment of the compact. As a result, the total number of women personnel in all missions increased by 24 per cent, from 238 in December 2018 to 294 in August 2022. The number of seconded women increased by 14 per cent (from 168 to 192) and that of contracted women by 46 per cent (from 70 to 102). The share of women among all

Figure 6. Number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, Dec. 2018–Aug. 2022

Notes: For a list of abbreviations see p. 25. Does not include KSC & SPO personnel.

international personnel increased from 22 per cent to 24 per cent. Women’s representation continued to be higher among seconded than contracted personnel. The share of women among seconded personnel increased from 24 per cent to 26 per cent and among contracted personnel from 19 per cent to 21 per cent (see figures 6 and 7).

The improvement in women’s representation in the overall deployments in civilian CSDP missions is a relatively new development. The percentage of women in missions was stagnant during 2019 and 2020, but clearly increased during 2021 and 2022, among both seconded and contracted personnel. It was in this latter period that the increase in the total demand for personnel contributions plateaued, the number of seconded personnel started falling again (following initial increases) and the increase in the number of contracted personnel started slowing down. That the representation of women did not increase during 2019 and 2020 and did increase during 2021 and 2022 is in line with earlier findings that gender balancing is particularly challenging during periods in which the demand for personnel is growing.56

Women’s representation remained higher among non-operational personnel than among operational personnel, but it increased in both categories. There is much variation in terms of gender balance in job roles within the broad category of non-operational personnel. By 2022, women accounted for more than 40 per cent of personnel in management support roles and

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56 Smit and TiDBlad-Lundholm (note 35).
in evaluation, planning, and reporting functions. By contrast, women accounted for less than 15 per cent of personnel in mission support (which includes functions such as logistics), security and duty of care positions. Since the establishment of the compact, EU member states have appointed 10 men and 3 women as head of a civilian CSDP mission. There has been considerable variation between missions in terms of the level of women’s representation and how much it has changed since the compact (see figure 8). The share of women personnel has increased the most (and achieved the highest levels) in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) and EUPOL COPPS. Between 2018 and 2022, the average share of women personnel increased from 23 per cent to 37 per cent for EUBAM Libya and from 28 per cent to 41 per cent for EUPOL COPPS. The share of women personnel was the lowest in EULEX Kosovo. However, this can be fully attributed to its 100-strong FPU, which has only one female member. Without the FPU, the average share of women among its international personnel would have been 32 per cent instead of 17 per cent in 2022, which is higher than in most other missions.

Figure 8. Average share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–22

Notes: For a list of abbreviations see p. 25. Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2022 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2022. EUBAM Rafah is not included because it had fewer than 10 international personnel.


Women’s representation in national personnel contributions

Most women among the seconded personnel deployed across all civilian CSDP missions come from a small group of EU member states (see figure 9). Finland, Germany and Sweden remained the largest contributors of women personnel since the start of the compact. Together they accounted for 47 per cent of all seconded women personnel in August 2022, up from 39 per cent in February 2019. They are followed by Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark, which accounted for an additional 21 per cent of all seconded women personnel in August 2022. These six countries seconded more than twice as many women to civilian CSDP missions in 2022 than all other EU member states together.

Several EU member states increased the number and/or share of women in their national contributions to civilian CSDP missions. The contributions of Finland and Germany increased the most in absolute terms. Estonia, Finland and Luxembourg achieved gender parity in their national contributions during the implementation phase of the compact. Belgium, Czechia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden all reached around 40 per cent.

Figure 9. Average number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by contributing country and year, 2019–22

Notes: For a list of abbreviations see p. 25. Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2022 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2022. The contributions by Poland do not include its formed police unit in EULEX Kosovo. The contributions by the United Kingdom (which left the EU in 2020) are included in the non-EU contributions for all years. Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>, accessed Oct. 2022.
VI. Conclusion and policy recommendations

The Civilian CSDP Compact has been generally regarded positively. Most stakeholders agree that it has pushed investments and reforms at the national and EU levels, aiming to strengthen civilian CSDP immediately and over time. Much of this would probably not have happened without the common road map and timetable offered by the compact, or without the peer pressure deriving from the collective ownership of the initiative and an EEAS-led annual review process. The positive impact of the compact has been recognized by the Council of the EU and in the Strategic Compass.

Nevertheless, four years into implementation, the results are mixed. Personnel secondments have not substantially increased, even though this was one of the core commitments of the compact. The share of seconded personnel has continued to decrease, both overall—from 66 per cent in 2018 to 60 per cent in 2022—and in almost every mission. Burden sharing between EU member states remains uneven. In other words, the quantitative leap forward called for in the compact has yet to be made. Meanwhile, the EU has again taken major steps in other areas such as defence and border control. The establishment of the €5 billion EPF and Frontex’s 10 000-strong standing corps are key examples of this.58

There have been mitigating circumstances that disrupted EU member states’ efforts to increase secondments, such as the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine. In addition, the data and indicators used to measure personnel secondments do not include temporary contributions such as visiting experts, specialized teams, or the reserve FPUs that were deployed to EULEX Kosovo in 2022. These contributions can be sizeable and fill urgent capability needs. The share of seconded personnel in operational positions has remained high overall and (well) above 70 per cent in every mission. Women’s representation has increased among seconded and contracted personnel. Although the increase was modest overall, women’s representation reached around 40 per cent in some missions and several national contributions.

Several trends in the demand for personnel contributions, which were unconducive to raising the share of seconded personnel, continued after the compact was established. However, some of these trends may be reversing. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it seems likely that the demand for civilian CSDP missions will increase again in Europe, not just in Ukraine but also in places such as Moldova and in the Southern Caucasus.59 The discontinuation of the OSCE SMM to Ukraine and the recent establishment of the EU’s civilian monitoring capacity in Armenia indicate that the EU may need to deploy more monitoring missions like EUMM Georgia in the coming years. The ending of the OSCE SMM could also be an opportunity to increase third state contributions to civilian CSDP again. EU partners such as Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom and the USA seconded almost 170 personnel to the OSCE SMM before it ended.

58 Council of the European Union (note 17); and Frontex, ‘We support’, [n.d.].
Civilian CSDP is at a critical juncture. Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated to the EU and its member states the need to strengthen further their ability to act whenever crises erupt, including through civilian CSDP, as emphasized in the Strategic Compass. To this end, EU member states will adopt a new civilian CSDP Compact by mid 2023, when the current compact expires. This is a chance for them to define more clearly the level of ambition for civilian CSDP in the years to come. The new compact is also an opportunity for EU member states to renew and refine their commitments on increasing secondments and women’s representation in civilian CSDP missions, based on lessons learned from the current compact. The policy recommendations of this SIPRI Research Policy Paper focus specifically on ways in which the EU and its member states can do this.

**Policy recommendations regarding the new Civilian CSDP Compact**

1. EU member states should agree an ambitious new Civilian CSDP Compact by mid 2023, as stipulated in the Strategic Compass, in which they renew their shared political ownership of civilian CSDP and their commitment to strengthen civilian CSDP missions.

2. EU member states should renew their commitment to increase national contributions to civilian CSDP missions, especially in terms of human resources.

3. EU member states should maintain a commitment in the new compact to raise jointly the number and share of seconded personnel to at least 70 per cent of international personnel across all missions and at all levels, while aiming for 100 per cent seconded personnel in operational positions.

4. EU member states should maintain a commitment in the new compact to develop the full range of capabilities needed to undertake and sustain civilian crisis management missions, including mission support and generic capabilities, and commit to specific measures to enhance their availability for civilian CSDP missions.

5. EU member states should endorse the CPCC’s Strategy and Action Plan to enhance women’s participation in civilian CSDP missions for 2021–24 in the new compact, and include a commitment to raise the share of women to at least 40 per cent across missions and at all levels by 2025, while acknowledging that achieving gender parity remains the long-term objective.

6. EU member states should commit to gender parity in the appointments of heads of mission and other senior leadership positions.

7. EU member states should request an evaluation of the CPCC’s Strategy and Action Plan to enhance women’s participation in civilian CSDP missions in the first half of 2025 and aim to adopt a comprehensive gender parity strategy for CSDP missions and operations in the second half of 2025.
8. EU member states should complement the commitment to raise the number and share of seconded personnel in missions with commitments to increase retention and post occupancy and reduce personnel turnover across missions and at all levels. Special measures should be considered to reduce gender gaps in these areas wherever these exist.

9. The EEAS should develop indicators for measuring retention, turnover and post occupancy rates. It should conduct a baseline study of these indicators based on the available data in its human resources databases and then suggest targets accordingly.

10. The EEAS should invest in additional analytical and technical capacity in the CPCC to ensure that it can make full use of the potential of its human resources databases, which will be necessary for reporting on and measuring progress against any new indicators and targets.
**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EPF</td>
<td>European Peace Facility</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUAM Iraq</td>
<td>EU Advisory Mission in Iraq</td>
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<td>EUAM RCA</td>
<td>EU Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point</td>
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<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td>EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td>EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP Somalia</td>
<td>EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
<td>EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed police unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frontex</td>
<td>European Border and Coast Guard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSC &amp; SPO</td>
<td>Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>SMM</td>
<td>Special Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women and peace and security</td>
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</tbody>
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SIPRI RESEARCH POLICY PAPER

DELIVERING THE COMPACT: TOWARDS A MORE CAPABLE AND GENDER-BALANCED EU CIVILIAN CSDP

Timo Smit

CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1
II. The EU’s civilian CSDP 3
III. Introducing the Civilian CSDP Compact 6
IV. Personnel contributions before the compact 9
V. Personnel contributions since the compact 11
VI. Conclusion and policy recommendations 22

Abbreviations 25

Figure 1. Number of personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, Dec. 2018–Aug. 2022 12
Figure 2. Average number and share of personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–22 13
Figure 3. Share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by personnel type, Dec. 2018–Aug. 2022 14
Figure 4. Average share of personnel in operational positions, average share of seconded personnel in operational positions, and average number of contracted personnel in operational positions, by mission and year, 2019–22 15
Figure 5. Average number of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by contributing country and year, 2018–22 16
Figure 6. Number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, Dec. 2018–Aug. 2022 18
Figure 7. Average number of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–22 19
Figure 8. Average share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–22 20
Figure 9. Average number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by contributing country and year, 2019–22 21

Table 1. Active EU civilian CSDP missions as of October 2022, by region 4

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